Luxembourg

   

Executive Capacity

#14
Key Findings
With its comparatively small administration, Luxembourg falls into the upper-middle ranks internationally (rank 14) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to 2014.

The country’s small executive has limited resources for strategic planning. The Prime Minister’s Office lacks broad policy-assessment and coordination capacities, and is not legally allowed to work with line ministries in policy preparation. The prime minister is responsible for policy communication, with consensus between ministers an important norm.

Informal coordination is very important. Implementation is generally effective if somewhat slow. Municipalities complain of insufficient central funding. The PMO does not have the resources to monitor ministry activities.

RIAs are required, but are not publicly available or independently evaluated. After stumbling during the crisis, traditional neocorporatist channels of policy development have regained their significance.

Strategic Capacity

#23

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
4
Luxembourg’s small size, and thus the small size of its administration, does not allow for sufficient strategic planning capacity. Some public bodies, such as the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies Luxembourg (STATEC) and the General Inspectorate of Social Security (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale, IGSS) offer simulations. The State Economic and Social Council (Conseil économique et social) and the merged public-research institute LISER offer more qualitative analyses. The research department of the central bank (Banque Centrale du Luxembourg) and the financial sector’s general inspectorate (Commission de surveillance du secteur financier, CSSF) focus on economics and finance planning. While these institutions are state-financed, they are still not sufficiently equipped to offer long-term planning activities. State Economic and Social Council reports are partly written by civil servants in the relevant ministry departments. Strategic planning is mostly done, if not commissioned, by institutions abroad, which offers the advantage of independence and guidance via international standards. Once a report is submitted, negotiations begin between the minister and promoters; the final compromise is a draft of the project designed abroad.

Citations:
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/autres/index.html
http://www.bcl.lu/fr/index.php
http://www.ces.public.lu/fr/index.html
http://www.liser.lu/

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decisionmaking?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Scholarly Advice
7
Luxembourg’s main research institutions have been founded only recently: the national university was founded in 2003 and the three national research centers (CRP-Gabriel Lippmann, CRP-Henri Tudor, CRP-Santé) in 1999. The House of Innovation already provides space for about 500 scientists and researchers from CRP-Henri Tudor, Luxinnovation and the Dr. Widong Center in Esch-Beval.

For major policy reform projects, the government mostly consults highly reputed institutions abroad. Commissioning scholarly advice from institutions abroad favors independent analysis. Given the country’s small size and the personal links between government and national research facilities, there are strong links between the institutes and governmental bodies which do not favor independence.

Citations:
Grubb, D. (2007), Audit du service public de l’emploi au Luxembourg, http://www.oecd.org/fr/els/39424034.pdf
Rössler, W. (2009), Psychiatrie Luxembourg. Stand der Umsetzung der Empfehlungen der Planungsstudie 2005, http://www.sante.public.lu/publications/systeme-sante/politique-nationale-sante/rapport-rossler-psychiatrie-luxembourg-2009/rapport-rossler-psychiatrie-luxembourg-2009.pdf
Rössler, W. et al. (1993), Gemeindepsychiatrie, Grundlagen und Leitlinien. Planungsstudie Luxembourg, Innsbruck
Zanardelli, M./ Brosius, J. (2009), Pratiques des entreprises du secteur privé en matière de prospection de candidats à l’embauche, in: CEPS/INSTEAD, Population & Emploi, no. 44, Luxembourg
http://www.uel.lu/410-annuaire-de-la-competitivite-2015

Interministerial Coordination

#9

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

10
 9

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) employs around 40 civil servants, primarily trained in law, economics and political sciences. The PMO does not have sufficient resources to assess all the activities of government ministries. Due to the limited capacities of all ministries including the PMO, there is no specific capacity and no special committee designated to manage interministerial coordination. After the inauguration of the new government in December 2013, interministerial coordination presented some difficulties.
Senior civil servants in the ministries prepare a “pré-conseil” or pre-briefing for the weekly meeting of ministers (conseil de gouvernement). All draft bills have to be adopted at both stages before being introduced to parliament, and all draft bills are revised within these two interministerial meetings. The Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF) evaluates draft bills and participates in numerous committees.

Citations:
http://www.igf.etat.lu/
OECD (2013), OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2012/Supplement 1, Paris
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/oecd-journal-on-budgeting-volume-2012-supplement-1_budget-v12-sup1-en#page1
http://www.gouvernement.lu/1719191/conseil-gouv
http://www.mss.public.lu/acteurs/igss/index.html
http://www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

10
 9

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
 5
 4
 3


The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
 2
 1

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.
GO Gatekeeping
8
The long period of leadership of former Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker (in office 1995 – 2013) gave him the authority to reject policy proposals or inspire new policy projects. The prime minister is in general able to withdraw a project or a draft bill without formal procedures. However, he or she acts as first among equals (primus inter pares), and therefore should be reluctant to interfere particularly in dossiers handled by ministries held by the government coalition partner. Consultative bodies, interministerial meetings and the Inspection General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is affiliated with the budget ministry, function as arbiters in policymaking.

Citations:
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2009/0173/a173.pdf#page=2
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/compilation/code_administratif/VOL_1/GOUVERNEMENT.pdf

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
8
The Prime Minister’s Office is not legally allowed to be involved in the preparation of bills or proposals by line ministries. Sensitive political proposals are often contained in the coalition program. There are no institutionalized mechanisms of coordination between line ministries, and there is no unit dealing with policy assessment and evaluation. Informally however, no sensitive proposal is presented to the Council of Ministers without being approved beforehand by the prime minister. An informal body of ministerial civil servants meets ahead of the Council of Ministers to prepare the agenda and make adjustments if needed. Even though the prime minister has not held the influential finance portfolio since 2009, his central role in the governance process has not been weakened.

Citations:
http://eli.legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/agd/2015/01/28/n1/jo
http://www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement
http://www.gouvernement.lu/3723809/SIP_Gouvernement_2013_EN.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
8
There are no cabinet committees in a strict sense. The Council of Ministers (Luxembourg’s cabinet) has to rely entirely on the work of line ministries or inter-ministerial groups, if more than one department is concerned. Generally, the Council of Ministers is well prepared, as only bills that have been accepted informally are presented. Moreover, bills have to be scrutinized by experts at the Ministry of Finance and the inspector general of finance (Inspection générale des finances), made up of senior civil servants and chaired by the secretary general of the Council of Ministers. This informal body insures that coherence prevails. The Prime Minister’s Office has assumed some horizontal competences on issues that concern more than one ministry, notably in the field of administrative simplification, ethical and deontological questions.

Citations:
http://www.gouvernement.lu/1719075/gouvernement
http://www.gouvernement.lu/482644/systeme-politique
http://www.igf.etat.lu/

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
9
Senior ministry officials and interministerial meetings are important in the preparation of draft bills and for cabinet meetings. There is both formal and informal coordination in the conception of new policy, in policy modification or in the conception of a pre-draft bill. As part of the process, inter-ministerial ad hoc groups are formed. Normally, a pre-draft bill is already the result of consultation with social partners and civil society groups. Once the pre-draft bill is published, official consultation rounds start again.

Citations:
http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/fr/politique/institutions-politiques/gouvernement/index.html
http://www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7693_332_ThomasSchmit.pdf
http://www.wort.lu/de/politik/oeffentlicher-dienst-nichts-ist-perfekt-5510515f0c88b46a8ce55ffd

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
9
There are many opportunities for informal coordination, given Luxembourg’s small size and its close-knit society and government administration. Those in public administration responsible for early policy research and formulation are well familiar with representatives of social organizations and members of civil-society research institutions. There are many occasions for informal contact between public servants and experts from research institutions, businesses and civil society. Senior civil servants responsible for various projects simultaneously have a huge workload and represent the government within different bodies, boards and committees.

Citations:
http://www.lessentiel.lu/de/news/Luxembourg/story/27428798

Evidence-based Instruments

#34

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
4
At the end of the 1990s, Luxembourg launched its first draft for regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) to simplify administrative procedures at both the national and European levels. Since 2004, the government has systematized the potential impact of legislative proposals by aligning legislative and administrative processes under the responsibility of the competent authority, the Plateforme interministérielle de réforme et de simplification administrative.

Since 2009, all draft bills have been required to undergo a regulatory impact assessment. Within eight weeks before adoption of a draft bill, the government has to carry out consultations with stakeholders, considering their expertise and responding to requests. Based on adequate analysis, a draft bill is adapted, completed and submitted to parliament. The impact assessment is necessarily attached to legislation or regulation submitted to the Council of Ministers. Prior to submission, the secretariat of the Council forwards a copy to the interministerial platform, which prepares a formal statement to the Council.

The standard impact-evaluation form (a checklist form, or “fiche d’évaluation d’impact”) was revised in 2010 to include gender mainstreaming principles. It enabled a close cooperation with the Ministry for Equal Opportunities. Although regulatory impact-assessment programs have been instituted for some years, there is still room for improvement, especially in making such evidence-based instruments more widespread. Further improvements should be implemented through an ex ante verification process on a national and European level.

Citations:
http://www.ceps.be/files/book/1291.pdf
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/publications/brochures/caf/brochure-CAF.pdf
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/qualite-publique/gestion-qualite-base-caf/index.html
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/qualite-publique/index.html
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/actualites/articles-actualites/2015/05/20150512_seanceinformationreformes/Reforme-FP—presentation-12-05-20151.pdf
http://www.eipa.eu/files/File/CAF/CAF_2013.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/40984990.pdf
http://www.simplification.public.lu/archives/Documents/procedure_analyse_flux/Fil_conducteur_de_la_fiche_d___valuation_d_impact.pdfhttp://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015/luxembourg_9789264238770-31-en#page1
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/simplification-administrative/mieux-legiferer/fiche-evaluation-impact-note-explicative.pdf
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015_9789264238770-en#page183
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/structure-organisationnelle/plateforme-interministerielle/Plateforme_rsa.pdf
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/modernisation-etat/index.html

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
There is no open consultation on regulatory impact assessment (RIA) specifications. The procedure requires an interministerial exchange between governmental departments and coordination groups with the consultation of experts. Impact-assessment data comes from internal ministry documents, which may be consulted by the state Council of Ministers and parliamentary members.

Unlike parliamentary procedures, there is no general public access to RIA documents and evaluations are not intended for publication. As in most OECD countries, there is no risk management in the formal process of developing harmonized standards. RIAs are not evaluated by an independent body.

Since the general introduction of RIAs in 2009, there has not been enough transparency or civil-society participation in the process. Significant efforts should be made to increase the involvement of stakeholders.

Citations:
http://www.fonction-publique.public.lu/fr/structure-organisationnelle/plateforme-interministerielle/Plateforme_rsa.pdf
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/40984990.pdf
http://www.simplification.public.lu
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/RPC%282015%294&docLanguage=En
http://www.simplification.public.lu/Rapport_Mieux_l__gif__rer_en_Europe_-_Luxembourg_2010.pdf
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015_9789264238770-en

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
There is no systematic sustainability-assessment process in Luxembourg. The government plans to introduce effective sustainability checks and the systematic monitoring of relevant administrative and legislative acts. In general, the impact of policies and policy side effects at all levels (economic, social and environmental) need to be evaluated with reference to principles of sustainable development and sustainable decision-making. It is essential to agree on Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) procedures to “benefit from improved coherence and coordination between ministries, civil society and stakeholders.” Luxembourg has to mainstream sustainability checks at all levels by establishing harmonized legislation with binding RIA standards.

Citations:
http://www.gouvernement.lu/5330895/2014-rapport-activite-travaux
http://www.environnement.public.lu/developpement_durable/
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2004/0102/a102.pdf#page=2#page=2

Societal Consultation

#6

To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

10
 9

The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.
 8
 7
 6


The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.
 5
 4
 3


The government consults with societal actors.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Negotiating Public Support
8
Luxembourg is a consensus-oriented society with a well-known model of neo-corporatism (the Luxembourg Model), which became institutionalized in the aftermath of the steel crisis in the 1970s. When introducing a draft bill to parliament, the government normally launches a broad consultation process. Unions and employers’ organizations are consulted in any case; every draft bill is submitted to the respective organization of employees (Chambre des Salariés) and to employers’ organizations (Chambre de Commerce and Chambre des Métiers). Depending on the purpose of the draft bill or the new policy, civil society is included in the process. The tripartite system is considered to have failed in 2010, when the three partners were unable to reach agreement on critical issues. However, the new government relaunched the social dialogue with employers and employees, and the process has since functioned reasonably well.

Citations:
http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/fr/politique/concertation/modele-social/index.html
Clément, F. (2012), Consociativisme et dialogue social. Les relations professionnelles au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Saarbrücken
Hirsch, M. (2012), Sind Konkordanz-, Konsens- und Drei-Partnermodelle “Schönwetter-Veranstaltungen”? Das Beispiel Luxembourg, in: Köpple, S./ Kranenpohl, U. (Ed.), Konkordanzdemokratie. Ein Demokratietyp der Vergangenheit? Baden-Baden, pp. 117-132
http://www.land.lu/2013/01/18/ruf-nach-leadership/
http://www.legilux.public.lu/ldp/2013/20130024_I.pdf
http://www.gouvernement.lu/3370722/16-bettel-tageblatt

Policy Communication

#6

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 8
 7
 6


The government coordinates the communication of ministries. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
Coherent Communication
8
After Council of Ministers meetings on Fridays, the prime minister holds a public press conference to communicate the body’s work effectively and coherently. This weekly press briefing had been the government’s main method of communicating. Whereas public press briefings under former Prime Minister Juncker were rare toward the end of his administration, public relations have been given more importance under the new coalition.

Aside from the prime minister, no government member has a press officer. Reporting directly to the prime minister, the state Press and Information Service (SIP) works to coordinate a coherent and wide-ranging government communication policy. Government members are encouraged not to voice disagreement in public so as to give the impression of unanimous decision-making. The search for consensus is one of the main traditions in Luxembourg government. In 2010, however, ministers spoke out publically over austerity, a policy that the coalition began modifying shortly after the beginning of this parliamentary term.

During the years of the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP) and the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) coalition, the press reported that there were some disagreement between government members, but this was never expressed explicitly by government members.

Citations:
https://www.gouvernement.lu/4021433/attributions
For further information: http://www.gouvernement.lu/sip
http://www.wort.lu/de/politik/nach-dem-ausrutscher-von-schneider-die-acht-groessten-kommunikationspannen-der-regierung-553d34f80c88b46a8ce581f0

Implementation

#12

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Efficiency
7
In general, the government can implement its policy objectives, usually outlined in electoral promises or coalition government programs. This might take longer than planned, given that a policy based on maximum consensus is often cumbersome. But projects are sometimes not only slowed down but delayed indefinitely, especially when powerful lobbies are involved. This is particularly the case for major infrastructural or zoning projects, such as the tramway system for the city of Luxembourg, which was under discussion for 25 years before agreement was reached in 2013. A law proposal that was already very far advanced was postponed before the 1999 election. Since then, different variants have been discussed, studies have been carried out and construction on the first elements of the tram project has started.

Citations:
http://www.wort.lu/fr/view/un-tram-a-luxembourg-en-2017-4feadec6e4b026f9aa61740e
http://www.wort.lu/en/politics/central-train-station-to-luxexpo-parliament-votes-for-the-tram-5390279cb9b398870803124a

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
7
The Luxembourg electoral system combines proportional representation of candidate lists and a type of majority system that allows a voter to pick individual candidates by giving them preferential votes on more than one list.
Consequently the voters, and not the party, decide on the composition of parliament and even of the government, since those candidates with the best results usually become ministers. This system encourages politicians to pursue personal initiatives, but as they generally address small lobbies, such projects do not typically conflict with the government’s agenda.
“Go-it-alone” actions are not uncommon, because ministers and candidates want to raise their profile to benefit precisely from these personal votes that ultimately make the difference. Especially in pre-electoral periods, this kind of deviant behavior is quite frequent. Ministers are usually allowed to pursue their pet topics, provided they manage to convince their colleagues in government and the prime minister.

Citations:
http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/de/le-grand-duche-se-presente/systeme-politique/systeme-electoral/http://cbiver.eu/2013/10/das-wahlsystem-in-Luxembourg/
http://www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7726_334_Fehlen.pdf
https://www.forum.lu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/7695_332_Fehlen.pdf

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
6
There is no formal monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office, as no institutional resources exist to carry this out. The small size of the government administration and ongoing discussions between ministers foster a high level of transparency without the necessity of explicit monitoring tools. In case of conflicts, the prime minister moderates and acts as conciliator.

Citations:
http://www.merissehovic.eu/letzebuerg/demokratische-kontrolle-des-geheimdienstes-in-Luxembourg-wieso-wir-eine-gesetzesreform-brauchen/
Schroen, M. (2009), Das politische System Luxembourgs, in: Ismayr, W. (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas, Wiesbaden, pp. 483-514.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies
8
Executive agencies and the administration usually lack the autonomy to pursue a course of action independent of guidelines issued by the responsible ministers. Sometimes the strong personality of an agency head leads to conflict. If this happens, the views of the minister or his key collaborators usually prevail. In the domain of social security and public finance, monitoring is more centralized and effective, since the financial implications for the state are much more consequential. The two agencies that wield considerable control if not outright veto powers are the Social Security Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale, IGSS), which is attached to the Ministry of Social Security, and the General Inspectorate of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is attached to the Ministry of Finance.

Citations:
http://www.mss.public.lu/acteurs/igss/
http://www.igf.etat.lu/
http://www.mf.public.lu/finances_publiques/

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
7
Since 2015, the Ministry of the Interior has overseen 105 municipalities in Luxembourg. This supervision is matched by substantial financial transfers from the central government to local entities, which, apart from a substantial share in corporate income tax (CIT) revenues, lack autonomous sources of revenue. Two-thirds of local entities have fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, a size which is believed to be far too small to handle modern political, administrative and technical requirements. By 2017, the number of local entities is planned to be reduced to 71. However, the new government has weakened this goal, as it does not subscribe to a top-down strategy for municipal mergers. The aim is to have no municipality under 3,000 inhabitants, thus reducing operational costs and improving administrative and technical efficiency. Municipalities frequently complain that funding from the central government is insufficient. The government has used financial transfers to overcome local resistance to municipality mergers. So-called municipal associations (syndicats intercommunaux) exist in fields such as culture and sports to help improve the quality of local government.

Citations:
Halsdorf, J.-M. (2013), Die Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform im Großherzogtum Luxembourg - Grundzüge und Perspektiven, in: Junkernheinrich, M./ Lorig, W. H. (Ed.): Kommunalreformen in Deutschland, Baden-Baden, pp. 445-462
http://www.gouvernement.lu/3673077/25-conseil
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/textescoordonnes/compilation/code_administratif/VOL_8/ORGANISATION/TXT_ORGANIQ.pdf
http://www.syvicol.lu

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
7
Local government depends increasingly on transfers from the central government. Land-use regulation was centralized during the review period. Nevertheless, a serious conflict between local interests and the aims of the government’s transport and land-use planning body (Integrierte Verkehrs- und Landesplanung, IVL) occurred when the construction of a large business center in a rural region near the capital was not authorized. With the passage of education reforms, municipalities lost one of their major prerogatives, which was the autonomous management of primary-school (students four to 12 years old) teaching staff. In return, the government has promised to provide more autonomy through territorial reform, especially in the form of expanded financial autonomy and the provision of support for municipal finances through regional funds.

Citations:
http://www.land.lu/2013/02/08/der-tanz-beginnt%E2%80%A9/
http://www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/7660_330_Eicher.pdf
http://www.dat.public.lu/publications/documents/bericht_ivl_2004/bericht_ivl_de.pdf
http://steinschultz.de/steinschultz2014/wp-content/uploads/2013/pdf/stein_raumvision_2007.pdf
Eser, Th. W./Scholtes, M. (2008), Raumentwicklung, Regionalpolitik und Landesplanung, in: Lorig, W./Hirsch, M. (ed.), Das politische System Luxembourgs, Wiesbaden, pp. 286-309.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
9
The Ministry of Interior supports local administration. As part of territorial reforms, the administration responsible for monitoring municipal finances will be integrated within the existing national Auditing Court (Cour des Comptes). The government is not entirely free to streamline and improve local government. More than 70% of members of parliament also have a local mandate, and as of 2013, 17 worked as city mayors. This is one reason why conflicts of interests between national and local mandates sometimes arise in parliamentary processes, depending on the issues being discussed.

Citations:
http://www.cour-des-comptes.lu/
http://www.tageblatt.lu/nachrichten/Luxembourg/story/31314170
http://www.wort.lu/fr/luxembourg/depute-maire-deux-mandats-qui-ne-seront-plus-cumulables-au-luxembourg-52a59f5de4b010cbc9a3834b

Adaptability

#11

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
7
Luxembourg has made progress in implementing European legislation. In terms of the transposition of EU directives, Luxembourg’s performance is moderate, yet it has improved in recent years. Given the size of the country, there is limited scope for improving the government administration’s human resources. A single civil servant is typically responsible for a number of tasks that would be assigned to an entire team in other member states. For example, European Social Fund (ESF) activities fall under the responsibility of only four civil servants who have other responsibilities in addition to European programs. Despite a lack of personnel, work expected by European and supranational institutions is completed. The government presented its national plan (Luxembourg 2020. Plan national pour une croissance intelligente, durable et inclusive) in April 2013, in which budgetary mechanisms are adapted.

Luxembourg often responds to international requests by launching an ad hoc group. The country has also done well in conforming national law to EU directives, sometimes transposing laws verbatim. However, this does not guarantee that the law will be followed verbatim; differences between de jure and de facto interpretations have emerged.

Citations:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/eu2020/docs/luxembourg_gov_fr.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/annex32014_luxembourg_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/csr2014_council_luxembourg_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/eccom2014_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/luxembourg/national-reform-programme/index_en.htm
http://www.mf.public.lu/publications/programme/16th_update_stability_growth_programme.pdf
http://www.mf.public.lu/publications/divers/previsions_fin_180412.pdf
http://www.odc.public.lu/publications/pnr/2013_PNR_Luxembourg_2020_avril_2013.pdf
http://www.gouvernement.lu/4789506/30-gramegna-stabilite
http://www.gouvernement.lu/5363183/22-closener-competitivite

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
8
Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in cooperation with the European Union. The legal framework for the launch of the European Citizens’ Initiative was passed by parliament in 2012.

Luxembourg is ranked highly within the European Union for the inclusiveness of its welfare benefits, as its programs are both generous and wide-ranging. However, with a Gini index coefficient of 28.7 in 2014, Luxembourg is a middling performer within the EU-28 (which has an average Gini index coefficient of 31). The generous social transfers and the high share of social transfers relative to total income not only reduce poverty risks, but also sustainably strengthen social cohesion.

The country’s Gini index score highlights the positive effects of government transfer policies. However, Luxembourg also retains a number of labor-market protection measures and unsustainable pension policies; both provide incentives to leave the labor market and opt instead for replacement revenues. Attitudes on the part of the insured – mainly those of residents and nationals – are partly still those of consumers of welfare provisions. The system’s main weakness is the “early exit” attitude which is expressed by many residents.

Citations:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tessi190
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&id=6325
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/nrp2014_luxembourg_en.pdf
http://www.gini-research.org/system/uploads/456/original/Luxembourg.pdf?1372249144
http://www.odc.public.lu/publications/pnr/2013_PNR_Luxembourg_2020_avril_2013.pdf
For further informations: http://www.missoc.org/

Organizational Reform

#21

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
5
In the absence of systematic monitoring of institutional arrangements, the government relies mainly on international expertise. EU und OECD data has significant impact with regard to changes in the political agenda and the implementation of social and economic policy. For example, the 2007 OECD country report on research and innovation led to the creation of a higher research and innovation committee, and subsequently to the updated ERAWATCH assessment of research systems and policies in 2013.

An example for best practices is the 2006 Council of Europe report, “Profile of the Luxembourgish educational linguistic policy,” a two-year investigation involving national stakeholders. The report led to the reform of language teaching in 2009. The OECD audit of the country’s public-employment service (L’Agence pour le développement de l’emploi, ADEM), against the background of a rising jobless rate, resulted in a draft bill adopted in 2012. Self-monitoring seems to be beyond the capacity of government authorities. It has also become clear that sustainable changes would require the creation of in-house analysis and forward-looking planning capacities. No ministry and other administration is currently able to fulfil these requirements.

Citations:
http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/erawatch/opencms/information/country_pages/lu/
http://www.oecd.org/luxembourg/sti-outlook-2012-luxembourg.pdf
Shewbridge, C./Ehren, M./Santiago, P./Tamassia, C. (2012), OECD Reviews of Evaluation
and Assessment in Education LUXEMBOURG, Paris (internet document: http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/OECD%20Reviews%20of%20Evaluation%20and%20Assessment%20in%20Education%20-%20Luxembourg.pdf)

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
7
The previous government’s 2009 program outlined a series of administrative reforms. One of the most ambitious, the general opening of the civil service to citizens of the European Union, with the exception of some positions relating to national sovereignty, came into effect on 1 January 2010. The change is expected to gradually improve the quality of government administration, but the number of EU citizens hired remains low at approximately 5%, especially in the higher ranks. This is due to a compulsory language test in the three national languages, which limits the number of applications from non-nationals who aren’t fluent in all of these languages. Other reforms are directed to the area of e-government, such as a planned implementation of electronic internal and external document exchange. To date, Luxembourg has neither an overall e-government law nor specific freedom-of-information legislation.

Citations:
Loi du 18 décembre 2009
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=5561
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=6459
http://www.epractice.eu/files/eGov%20in%20LU%20-%20May%202014%20-%20v.16.0_0.pdf
http://www.odc.public.lu/publications/pnr/2015_PNR_Luxembourg_2020_avril_2015.pdf
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/egov_in_luxembourg_-_january_2015_-_v_17_0_final.pdf
http://www.transparency.lu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Luxembourg-ATS-Providing-an-alternative-to-silence-Country-Report-ENG-v4.11.2013-Clean.pdf
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