Israel

   

Executive Accountability

#23
Key Findings
With some legislative weaknesses evident, Israel falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 23) with regard to executive accountability. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.

Parliamentarians have adequate resources. The State Comptroller serves as auditor, but allegations of intimidation and suppression at the office have raised concerns over the quality of audits. The primary data-protection authority lacks the resources and authority to ensure that public institutions comply with data-privacy laws.

Citizens are highly interested in politics, and participate actively. Trust in public institutions aside from the army has plummeted. While the media often focuses on prominent and popular topics, it also produces substantial reporting on policy and long-term strategies.

The large number of political parties vary strongly in their internal decision-making processes. Business organizations are sophisticated and work closely with the government. Social and environmental interest groups formulate relevant policies, and many have legal and research terms that support their policy engagement.

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

#10

To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?

10
 9

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
 2
 1

Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Political Knowledge
8
Compared to other countries, Israeli citizens show high levels of interest in politics and political participation. In the Israeli Democracy Index published by the Israel Democracy Institute, the Political Participation Index published by the Economist, and other international comparative indices, Israeli citizens were found to participate widely and be highly interested in politics. Israel also has one of the region’s highest internet-penetration rates (according to one source, reaching 82% as of January 2019); a lively, pluralistic and independent news media market; and a politically heterogeneous and active civil society.

That being said, the Israeli public appears to be, to put mildly, “unimpressed” by the government’s capabilities and its levels of transparency. The Israeli Democracy Index 2020 recorded the lowest point in a decade in the public’s trust in public institutions and government officials (particularly in the Knesset and the Supreme Court), as well as substantial erosion in the public’s sense of social solidarity (Israel Democracy Index 2020). Indeed, in 2021, the Israeli public reported the highest level of trust in the army, and the lowest level of trust in government, parliament and political parties (Israel Democracy Index 2021).

Citizens usually rely on the media rather than official (government) information channels for information about public policies. Indeed, according to several surveys published in January 2019 prior to the first round of elections in April 2019, over 50% of all respondents use traditional news media outlets to access political information, while about 20% of all respondents use social media.

Citations:
Arlozorov, Meirav. “For the First Time: The Grade the Government Gave Itself in Achieving Goals.” The Marker website. https://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.4002747. April 6th, 2017 (Hebrew)

Arlozorov, Meirav. “The Professionalist Revolution of the Government of Israel.” The Marker website. https://www.themarker.com/allnews/1.5846420. February 25th, 2018 (Hebrew)

Data Israel Survey Database of the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research. Source for data of the surveys for the Eli Hurvitz Conventions. https://dataisrael.idi.org.il/

Digital 2019: Israel. A slideshow about Israel’s state of telecommunications, by We Are Social and Hootsuite, thinktanks. Retrieved from https://www.slideshare.net/DataReportal/digital-2019-israel-january-2019-v01

“Freedom of the Press: Israel 2017,” Freedom House, 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/israel

Hermann, Tamar et.al., The Israeli Democracy Index 2016, The Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem 2016. https://en.idi.org.il/media/7811/democracy-index-2016-eng.pdf

Israel. The State Comptroller. “The Government’s Transparency – Actions to Promote the Open Government,” Annual Report, 68(3), 2018, Jerusalem, vol. 1, pp. 5-71. (also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_627/6dd1ae66-0117-438b-bef5-241d493c6f01/101-shkifut.pdf) (Hebrew)

“Joining the Open Government Partnership and the nomination of the ‘Open Government Israeli Forum,’” Prime Minister Office website 2012 (Hebrew)

“The Government approved today the publication of all governmental databases” http://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.3053541 (Hebrew)

“The Knesset Presents: Advanced Committee Web Portals Now Available,” http://www.ch10.co.il/news/110674/#.V8R-rvl9670 (Hebrew)

“The Special Committee for the Transparency and Accessibility of Government Information,” The Knesset Website (Hebrew): http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Committees/GovInfo/Pages/default.aspx

The State Comptroller’s official website in English. Numerous reports are in English and Arabic. http://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/Pages/default.aspx

The World Bank internet Users Data http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2

“Yearly Report on the Implementation of the Law of Freedom of Information 2014” Ministry of Justice website – The Governmental Unit for Freedom of Information (Hebrew): http://index.justice.gov.il/Units/YechidatChofeshHameyda/Report2014/index.html

Herman, Tamar and Ella Heller, Tzipy Laza-Shoef, Fadi Omar, “The Israeli Democracy Index 2017. Summary,” 2017, https://en.idi.org.il/media/9837/israeli-democracy-index-2017-en-summary.pdf

Herman, Tamar and Ella Heller, Tzipy Laza-Shoef, Fadi Omar. The Israeli Democracy Index 2018. Israel: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2018. Retrieved from https://en.idi.org.il/publications/25031 (for the Hebrew version: https://www.idi.org.il/books/25008)

Tamar Hermann, “Democracy in Crisis? Israeli Survey Respondents Agree to Disagree,” 13.12.2018, Podcast: https://en.idi.org.il/podcasts/25310

“Work Book for the Year of 2018.” Containing links to all work books since 2011 and goals achievement reports since 2017 (reviewing 2016). http://plans.gov.il/Plan2012/Pages/newWorkPlan2012.aspx

Transparency International: “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018,”: http://www.ti-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-2018-Executive-summary-PRINT.pdf

Tamar Hermann, 2021. “The Israeli Democracy Index”; https://en.idi.org.il/media/17276/final-madd-d2021-eng_web.pdf


The Israel Democracy Institute, 2021, ” IDI’s 2020 Democracy Index: Public Trust, Social Solidarity and Democracy in Danger”; https://en.idi.org.il/articles/33415

Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?

10
 9

The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 8
 7
 6


The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 5
 4
 3


The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
 2
 1

The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Open Government
7
In recent years, the government has expanded its efforts with regard to policy transparency. In 2011, Israel joined the Open Government Partnership and, in 2016, the government announced the launch of a program designed to open all governmental databases to public access. This step is part of an ongoing policy of increasing transparency by expanding the authority of and funding for the Governmental Unit for Freedom of Information.

Most (if not all) governmental authorities have an official website and social media presence, some of which are available in languages other than Hebrew (e.g., English and Arabic). The websites offer a wide range of services, including information services (like press releases, law drafts for public commentary and policy explanations). One important example of this is the official website of the Ministry of Finance, which publishes the state budget (or more accurately its highlights) in a readable and keyword-searchable PDF format. The website also offers tools to observe changes in the budget and to compare it with the budgets from previous years.

The Knesset has a comprehensive website, offering the option to download all of the Knesset’s press releases, general assembly and various committee protocols (although excluding protocols from confidential committees, such as the Committee for Foreign Affairs and National Security Matters), draft and enacted laws, and even research papers that were handed to the various committees. The Knesset’s committee and general assembly meetings are usually recorded and made available to watch online. The Knesset also operates the National Legislation Database, which aims to make all legislation and legislative processes digitally accessible to the public.

Citations:
Bender, Eric. “The Transparency Committee Headed by MK Shaffir Shall Be Cancelled in the Next Knesset.” In Ma’ariv website.. April 18th, 2019. (Hebrew)

Government ICT Authority, “Open Government Action Plan for 2018-2019”: http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3english/

Liel, Dafna. “MK Shaffir’s Transparency Committee Will Be Cancelled?.” In Mako website.. April 18th, 2019. (Hebrew)

Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018”: http://www.ti-israel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CPI-2018-Executive-summary-PRINT.pdf

Tamar Hermann, “Democracy in Crisis? Israeli Survey Respondents Agree to Disagree”: 13.12.2018, Podcast, https://en.idi.org.il/podcasts/25310

“Transparency International – Israel”: http://www.ti-israel.org/ (Hebrew)

Anna Ahronheim, “IDF comptroller to investigate army’s readiness,” JPost, 26.09.2018: https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/IDF-comptroller-to-investigate-armys-readiness-567994

Legislative Actors’ Resources

#34

Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?

10
 9

The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
 5
 4
 3


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
 2
 1

The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Parliamentary Resources
8
Two major Knesset departments, the Knesset research center, and the Knesset’s legal advisory department serve as structural resources for acquiring information. The role of the research center is to equip Knesset members, committees and departments with information and research to meet the requirements of their parliamentary work, including reports on government activities. The research center is a massive document producer: it receives on average 500 research requests and produces 300 documents annually.

The Knesset’s Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit (KATEF) has published several papers, which are available on its website and mostly comprise pamphlets. While the papers lack uniformity, a general direction is slowly and steadily emerging. One example of this is the series of pamphlets called Gate to the government, which provide advice on how to access government information. However, the unit is still very new and recent instability in the political system has not contributed to its path-finding processes.

Citations:
A Pamphlet Explaining About the Katef Unit’s Vision, Fields of Operation, and Its Short History of Establishment, Undated. Available Online Through the Katef Unit’s “About” Webpage (see link below). (Hebrew)

Alon, Gideon. “The fa is on the Shoulder [also Katef].” In: Israel Today website. July 23rd, 2017. (Hebrew): https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/492397

Arlozorov, Meirav. “How the Knesset Broke the World Record in Proposing Private Bills.” In Themarker. May 16th, 2017 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.4091536

Azulay, Moran. “Exposure: On the Way to a Revolution in Legislation and Oversight of the Knesset over the Government.” In Ynet. February 2nd, 2017. (Hebrew): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4917549,00.html.

Ben-David, Lior, “A comparative survey on the status, function and employment conditions of parliamentary assistants,” Knesset research institute 4.11.2004 (Hebrew)

Blander, Dana. “Opinion as to the corrections to Base Law: the Knesset, Base Law: the Government and the Knesset Act Regarding the Authorities of Parlamentary Committees of Public Inquiry.” The Israeli Democracy Institute. July 4th, 2017. (Hebrew)

“Correction: Debate on ‘Hok Ha-Hesderim 2013,” Open Knesset website (Hebrew)

“Is Bagatz mocking the petition against the treasury?,” Globes website 18.6.2014: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000947260 (Hebrew).

Israel. The Knesset. Katef – the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit. Oversight Process of the Implementation of the Committee for the War on Poverty’s Report. Second Report. June 2018. Retrieved from https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightSupervisoryProducts.aspx (Hebrew)

Friedberg, Chen. How to Improve the Knesset as a Legislative and Oversight Body: Key Recommendations. Updated Edition. Israel: the Israel Democracy Institute, 2018. (Hebrew)

Galnoor, Itzhak, and Dana Blander. The Political System of Israel: Formative Years; Institutional Structure; Political Behaviour; Unsolved Problems; Democracy in Israel. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 2013, two volumes. (Hebrew) “Information and research in the Knesset,” Knesset website (Hebrew)

“In the Knesset corridors,” IDI website (September 2010) (Hebrew)

“Katef Unit – About.” In the Katef unit’s website. https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightAbout.aspx

Knesset Research Center Summary of 2016 https://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03933.pdf (Hebrew)

Public Inquiry Commissions Act, 1968 (Hebrew)
Shapira, Asaf, “A decade to the Knesset’s research and information center,” IDI website (September 2010) (Hebrew)

Lis, Johnathan. “Rivlin in the Knesset’s Inauguration: There are Times in Which the President is Compelled to Intervene,” Ha’aretz, October 4th, 2019, p. 6. (Hebrew)

The Knesset’s Rules of Procedure, up to date as of June 14th, 2018. (specifically article 135, “the Authorities of a Parliamentary Committee of Public Inquiry and the Presentation of a Report to the Knesset,” clause A; also article 127, “Failure of Arrival [to a committee] and Failure of Presenting of Information”). (Hebrew)

Zerahia, Zvi, “The treasury is deliberately holding out information from MPs so we can’t supervise it,” The Marker 7.1.2014: http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2210843 (Hebrew)

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Obtaining Documents
7
According to Israel’s basic laws and the Knesset’s Rules of Procedure, the executive or appointed officials must attend and provide information to Knesset committees upon request, unless information is considered confidential. However, the law contains no specific provisions or sanctions for enforcement in cases of disobedience and lack of compliance or the provision of insufficient or inaccurate information. Thus, the parliament has only general or disproportionate means of response, such as passing a motion of no confidence or reporting to the Civil Service Commission. These options do not provide a solution to mundane problems, such as receiving unreliable information from the government.

Citations:
Fridberg, Chen, “The Knesset committees from an oversight perspective: Chronicle of a failure foretold?,” Studies in Israel’s revival 20 (2010) 49-79: http://in.bgu.ac.il/bgi/iyunim/20/a3.pdf (Hebrew)

Knesset Rules of Procedure, Section H, Chapter 7

Liel, Dafna. “The New Minister of Justice: MK Amir Ohana.” In Mako website.. June 5th, 2019. (Hebrew)

Plesner, Yohanan, “There is Still Hope for Knesset Reform,” IDI Website, 10/8/17, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/18582

Zerahia, Zvi, “The treasury is deliberately holding out information from PMs so we can’t supervise it,” TheMarker 7.1.2014: http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2210843 (Hebrew)

Roznai, Yaniv, Liana Volach, Law reform in Israel, in “The Theory and Practice of Legislation,” 6(2018)2, pp. 291-320: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20508840.2018.1478330

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Summoning Ministers
7
Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers. According to the basic law’s provisions on the Knesset, every committee may require a minister to appear before it, and the minister is obliged either to attend the meeting or send a representative to provide the required information. Officials invited by committees generally attend meetings as requested. However, ministers and other public figures do occasionally refuse requests or provide insufficient information, causing conflicts between the Knesset and the government. Committees have no real power to enforce sanctions in these cases. Moreover, they are not authorized to force a minister to provide information at a set date in order to better prepare for a meeting.

One exception to the rule detailed above is the Knesset’s State Audit Committee. Since 1990, the audit committee is able to warrant the attendance of officials, and fine officials who failed to show up to the committee or sufficiently justify their lack of compliance (though the size of the fine is not specified).

Citations:
Ataeli, Amichai, “The Evasion and its Punishment,” Yedioth Aharonot, 07.07.2016, http://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4825644,00.html (Hebrew)

Lis, Jonathan, “Instead of an investigation committee, a decoration committee: In the Knesset they are jealous of American congress,” Haaretz 7.9.2014: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/.premium-1.2426295 (Hebrew)

Plesner, Yohanan, “There is Still Hope for Knesset Reform,” IDI Website, 10.8.2017, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/18582

“The Legislature’s Authority to Inquire Information, and the Obligation to Provide True Information,” Knesset Research and Information Center (December 2002). (Hebrew)

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Summoning Experts
9
Parliamentary committees are entitled to invite experts or any interested civilian to meetings. However, these figures are not obligated to attend, unlike civil servants or representatives of the executive. In addition, independent experts are not compelled to answer committee members’ questions. Their testimony cannot serve as evidence and has no official status. Despite these issues, citizens who appear before Knesset committees are generally interested in voicing their opinions in order to reinforce their viewpoints in the eyes of decision-makers and the public.

Citations:
Blander, Dana. “Opinion regarding Corrections to Base Law: the Knesset, Base Law: the Government and the Knesset Act concerning the Authorities of Parliamentary Inquiry Committee.” The Israeli Democracy Institute. July 4th, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.idi.org.il/ministerial-committee/16190 (Hebrew).

Freidberg, Chen and Atmor, Nir, “How to improve the Knesset’s position as a legislator and a supervisory body?” The Israel Democracy Institute 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/media/2438022/00321913.pdf (Hebrew).

Shapira, Asaf, “Citizens in the Parliamentary Committees,” The Israel Democracy Institute, (September 2010). (Hebrew).

“The authority of the legislature to inquire information, and the obligation to provide true information,” Knesset Research and Information Center (December 2002). (Hebrew).

Kam, Zeev,“Refused to show up in a Knesset committee after summoning? Punishment will follow” NRG 19.4.2016 http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/770/601.html (Hebrew)

Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

10
 9

The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
 2
 1

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Task Area Congruence
3
Knesset committees are currently not well structured for efficient government monitoring. The structure of the ministries and the parliament’s committees diverges significantly: The Knesset has 12 permanent committees, while the number of ministries shifts according to political agreements, totaling 29 at of the time of writing (headed by 22 ministers, excluding the prime minister). Since parliamentary committees are divided by themes and not by ministerial responsibilities, they often struggle to gather and coordinate information. High turnover rates among representatives also makes it difficult to control professional and bureaucratic information. Although the number of committees is average by global standards, the combination of a small number of parliamentarians (120) and the usually broad coalitions results in only two-thirds of all members being available to sit on committees regularly. Some members of the Knesset sit on as many as five or six committees, inevitably impairing their committees’ supervisory capabilities. This problem may be somewhat mitigated by the recent adoption of the Norwegian Law, which allows ministers who are members of the Knesset to quit the Knesset and be replaced by other members on their party list.

Citations:
Freidberg, Chen, “Monitoring of the executive by the parliament in Israel – potential and function,” Doctoral Dissertation (2008) (Hebrew).

Freidberg, Chen and Atmor, Ronen, “How to improve the Knesset’s position as a legislator and a supervisory body?” The Israel Democracy Institute 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/media/2438022/00321913.pdf
(Hebrew).

Kenig, Ofer, “The new Israeli cabinet: An overview of the 33rd government of Israel,” Israel Democracy Institute. (March 2013).

Kenig, Ofer, “Coalition building in Israel: A guide for the perplexed,” Israel Democracy Institute. (February 2013).

“Knesset Committees,” The Knesset Website: https://www.knesset.gov.il/deSCRIPTion/eng/eng_work_vaada.htm

“Ministries,” Prime Minister’s Office Website (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/IsraelGov/Pages/GovMinistries.aspx

Twentieth Knesset: Government 34 – Current Members, https://knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByNumber_eng.asp?current=1

Media

#14

To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?

10
 9

A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
 5
 4
 3


A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
 2
 1

All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Media Reporting
6
Israel’s media industry is adapting to the global trend of decreased consumption of print and radio news media and the increased dominance of television, the internet, and social media websites. While the Israeli media sector has been bolstered in recent years by the creation of strong independent investigatory websites and blogs that have gained considerable attention in professional and public circles, other new popular outlets such as the free daily Israel Ha’yom often fail to deliver in-depth news coverage.

Despite a frequent tendency to focus on prominent and popular topics of the hour, the Israeli press, public television channels, and radio shows do offer interpretative and investigatory journalism that informs the public regarding policy decisions and long-term strategies. Nonetheless, the growing rate of news consumption through social media websites, the decline in citizens’ exposure to print media and TV, and the shallow nature of coverage in new media all significantly reduce the percentage of civilians exposed to in-depth journalistic information.

Citations:
Goldenberg, Roi, “‘The seventh eye’ website won the Israeli prize for critical media,” Globes 28.1.2013: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000817765 (Hebrew)

Mann, Rafi and Lev-on, Azi, “Annual report: Media in Israel 2016 – agendas, uses and trends,” Ariel University School of Communication: https://store.ariel.ac.il/downloadable/download/sample/sample_id/6/ (Hebrew)

Persisco, Oren, “Restraint and prudence,” The seventh eye website: http://www.the7eye.org.il/9774 (Hebrew).

“Freedom of the Press: Israel 2017,” Freedom House, 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/israel

Parties and Interest Associations

#12

How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?

10
 9

The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
 8
 7
 6


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
 5
 4
 3


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
 2
 1

A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Intra-party Decision-Making
5
According to the last parliamentary election that took place on 23 March 2021, only two parties – Likud and Yesh Atid – can be considered major parties, having gained at least 10% of the popular vote.

Likud is characterized by intra-party democratic institutions. It chooses its candidates through primary elections and has elected representative institutions that take part in decision-making, such as decisions on whether the party will join or leave a governing coalition, and debates over policy stances. Nevertheless, despite its formal democratic procedures, the power of former Prime Minister Netanyahu on Likud’s institutions is overwhelming, after effectively removing all his significant rivals from power.

Within the Yesh Atid party, some consultation with party members is conducted, but important decisions are made by senior members and specifically by the party leader. Moreover, the regulations authorize the party’s leader to decide on the most important personnel issues, such as the list of electoral candidates.

Other parties are characterized by intra-party institutions which range from highly democratic to completely undemocratic.

Citations:
The Knesset and the Central Elections Commitee website: “Parliamentary groups of the 24th Knesset,” (in Hebrew) https://votes24.bechirot.gov.il/

To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Employers & Unions)
8
Israel has a vibrant business community that often interacts with government departments and Knesset representatives in order to advance its agenda in Israel and abroad. At least three major business groups – the Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce, the Manufacturers’ Association of Israel and a group for coordination between financial organizations – actively pursue policy goals through legal, regulatory or project-based perspectives. In general, Israeli businesses are well represented in the political sphere, and most economic-interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policy proposals. However, there is a significant degree of social inequality in this practice, as the Arab business sector seldom enjoys such close and productive ties with the government.

In addition, the Labor Federation is involved in policymaking. Given its weakening position over the last decades, its influence (e.g., in the adoption of the new pension legislation) was conditioned on cooperating with business associations (most prominently, the Manufacturers’ Association).

Citations:
Israel. The Knesset. Protocol Number 827 from the Economic Affairs Committee. October 15th, 2018. (Hebrew). Retrieved from https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Economics/Pages/CommitteeProtocols.aspx?ItemID=2074129

“Law Bill.” In the Knesset’s official website (regarding “Bill of Limitation of the Advertisement and Marketing of Tobacco Products Act (Ammendment Number 7), 2018,” by several MKs). Last Seen: October 28th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Legislation/Laws/Pages/LawBill.aspx?t=lawsuggestionssearch&lawitemid=2020202.

Linder-Gantz, Roni. “The Advertisement Blitz: The Smoking Companies Are Out for a Final Battle.” In TheMarker website. October 15th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/news/health/.premium-1.6554561.

Linder-Gantz, Roni. “The Day the Smoke around the Tobacco Advertisement Cleared – and the MKs Chose the Side of the Public.” In TheMarker website. June 26th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/consumer/health/.premium-1.6213257.

Miller, Elhanan, “Finance minister says government has failed Arabs,” Times of Israel, 24.02. 2014, http://www.timesofisrael.com/finance-minister-says-government-has-failed-arabs/.

“The chamber for coordination between financial organizations,” Maot website (Hebrew)

Solomon, Shoshanna, “Netanyahu to head panel to tackle high-tech workers pinch,” The Times of Israel, 28.12.2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-to-head-panel-to-tackle-high-tech-workers-pinch/

The Industry Association Press Releases, https://bit.ly/2ANM3kP

“Israel Business Conference 2016,” Globes, http://www.globes.co.il/news/home.aspx?fid=8750

“Netanyahu to open Globes Business Conference on Wed,” Globes, 18.12.2018: https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-netanyahu-to-open-globes-business-on-wed-1001265135

To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Others)
7
Noneconomic associations and NGOs have become increasingly influential in recent years, with over 47,000 non-profit organizations registered with the Ministry of Justice. Along with professional consultancy firms, they fill the gap left by state’s privatization policies. Both social and environmental interest groups often formulate relevant policies and cooperate with government and academic bodies, and many of these groups have legal and research teams that support their policy engagement.

Citations:
ACRI. Anti-NGO Legislation in the Israeli Knesset. February 2016, http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Anti-NGO-Bills-Overview-Updated-Febuary-2016.pdf

“Collaborative discourse in the Civil Society” March 2016, Civic Leadership in Israel, (Hebrew)
http://migzar3.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/report-2016_web-1.pdf

Guidestar, the NGOs’ website of Israel. By the Ministry of Justice. (Hebrew). Last seen: October 31st, 2018. https://www.guidestar.org.il/home

HCJ 3646/18 Yedid Centers of Rights in the Community V the Minister of Justice (Hebrew)

Kalian, Gil “The non-profit sector in Israel is smaller than thought,” Calcalist 16/3/2016, http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3683649,00.html (Hebrew)

Madhala, Shavit, et al. Israeli Welfare Organizations: A Snapshot. Policy Paper 03.2018. Internet Edition. Jerusalem: the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, 2018.

Memorandum of Ordinances of Courts (Fees) (Representative Action), 2017. (Hebrew). Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law11/43143.htm

Nisan, Limor, “Civil society and the third sector in Israel,” IDI paper for the 10th Caesarea conference, June 2010: https://bit.ly/2YcMs8y (Hebrew)

Regulations of Courts (Fees), 2007 (Hebrew)

Shamai, Barkat. “Starting Today: Significant Fees on Submission of Representative Actions.” In Globes website. May 8th, 2018. (Hebrew).

The Associations Act, 1980 (Hebrew)

“The Clinic for Representation Populations from the Periphery Presented a Lawsuit Against the Ordinances Dictating for the First Time a High Fee at the Time of Submitting a Request for the Approval of Representative Action.” In the Center for Clinical Legal Education’s website. Last seen: November 4th, 2018. (Hebrew). [Here the statement of claim can be found]

The Obligation to Reveal as to Who is Supported by Foreign Statal Entity Act, 2011 (Hebrew)

“The transparency law has passed finally” Knesset website 12.7.2016, http://main.knesset.gov.il/News/PressReleases/pages/press120716.aspx (Hebrew)

Independent Supervisory Bodies

#24

Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent audit office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Audit Office
7
State audit functions in Israel are chiefly overseen by the State Comptroller. The State Comptroller is an independent agency that conducts audits of government ministries, local and municipal governments, and other independent, governmental organizations, including public universities, all military branches and government-funded corporations. The scope of audit powers is one of the broadest in the world, giving the comptroller jurisdiction over 1,400 organizations. The office receives its powers and authority from the Basic Law: The State Comptroller, which authorizes the comptroller to receive immediate information from the bodies undergoing audits. Additionally, the State Comptroller is tasked with auditing campaign and party finances, and reviewing the accounts and finances of party primary candidates and government ministers. The State Comptroller’s Office is under the oversight of the Knesset State Audit Committee (Comptroller 2021).

However, allegations of intimidation and suppression at the State Comptroller’s Office have swirled since the beginning of the current state comptroller’s tenure. In January 2020, reports about the whitewashing of official audits surfaced, including a coverup of the Finance Ministry fudging a Finance Ministry audit of Israel’s 2018 deficit figures in order that the official number met deficit reduction targets, concealing implications of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s corrupt interventions in audits and reports, and forbidding staff from airing concerns and speaking to the media (Magid 2020). While the State Comptroller’s Office reacted swiftly to the pandemic and issued several reports (as noted above), these allegations raise serious concerns and questions over the integrity, accuracy and quality of the State Comptroller’s audits.

Citations:
Ministry of Justice (2021), “Amendments to Privacy Protection Act” Acceses 11 January 2021, Retrived from: https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/amendments_privacy_protection_act


Israel Government. 2017. Government Decision 3019 on the Renaming the Technology and Information Law Authority in the Ministry of Justice (in Hebrew). Access 20 January 2020. https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/dec3019.

Israel Government. 2006. Government Decision 4660 on the Establishment of a Legal Authority for Information Technologies and Protection of Privacy in the Ministry of Justice (in Hebrew). Access 20 January 2020. https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2006_des4660.

Israel Government. 2020. Government Decision 4897 on the Authorization of the General Security Service to assist in the national effort to reduce the spread of the new coronavirus (in Hebrew). Access 20 January 2020.

Israel Government. 2020. Government Decision 2916 on the Authorization of the General Security Service to assist in the national effort to reduce the spread of the new coronavirus (in Hebrew). Access 20 January, 2020.

European Commission. 2011. Commission Decision of 31 January 2011 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by the State of Israel with regard to automated processing of personal data. Access 20 January, 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011D0061.

The Privacy Protection Agency. Organizational structure. Access 20 January 2020. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/organizational_structure/he/OrganizationStracture.pdf.

The Privacy Protection Agency. 2020. First report in accordance to Act to Authorize the ISA to Assist in the National Effort to Contain the Spread of the Novel Coronavirus and to Promote Use of Civilian Technology to Locate Individuals who were in Close Contact with Patients (Temporary Provisions) 2020-5780 (in Hebrew). Access 20 January 2020. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/privacy-shabak-coronavirus/he/privacy-shabak-coronavirus.pdf.

The Privacy Protection Agency. 2020. Interim Summary: The Privacy Protection Agency’s Actions During the Corona Crisis (in Hebrew). Access 20 January 2020. https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/_review_ppa_activity_corona/he/corona%20activity.pdf.

Ravia, Haim. 2020. The government has decided to freeze the law authorizing the GSS to help fight the Corona. Access 20 January 2020. https://www.law.co.il/news/2020/06/08/government-freeze-law-to-track-covid-19-patients/

Sela Steinman, Ronit. 2020. Sharp letter to the Minister of Justice: The Privacy Protection Authority is silenced and not heard. https://www.law.co.il/news/2020/04/22/experts-warn-justice-minister-against-silencing-ppa/

Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Ombuds Office
8
The state comptroller also serves as the state ombudsman. Under this role, the office is authorized to investigate complaints raised by the public regarding ministries, local authorities, state institutions and government corporations. Citizens may file a complaint free of charge if they believe that they were directly or indirectly harmed by an act or an activity of the government; if an act is against the law, without lawful authority, or violates principles of good governance; or if an act is unduly strict or clearly unjust.

The other body to be mentioned is the Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints. Though authorized to handle complaints regarding the IDF only (specifically, complaints about injustices done to soldiers or soon-to-be-soldiers by the IDF), the authorization to submit a complaint is very wide and covers a variety of issues.

Citations:
Comptroller and the Ombudsman official website: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/Ombudsman/Pages/default.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (Hebrew).

Israel. The Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints. Annual Report 46, 2017. Tel Aviv: The Security Ministry Press, 2018 (Hebrew): http://www.nakhal.idf.il/1073-he/Nakhal.aspx

Israel. The Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints. Annual Report 47, 2018. Tel Aviv: The Security Ministry Press, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.mod.gov.il/nakhal/Pages/Reports.aspx (Hebrew)

Israel. The State Ombudsman. Annual Report 45 for the Year of 2018. June 24th, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Publications/277.aspx (Hebrew)

Lev Ram, Tal. “The Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints to Liberman and Eizenkot: The IDF isn’t Ready for War.”
Ma’ariv Online. July 13th, 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.maariv.co.il/news/military/Article-661030.

Limor, Yoav. “‘The IDF is in Peak Preparedness, the Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints is Wrong.’” Israel Hayom. September 19th, 2018 Hebrew): https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/588377.

Office of the Ombudsman brochure: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Ombudsman/Guidecomplainant/Documents/ntz_english.pdf

“Security System Comptroller Eitan Dahan Appointed as Stand-In Commissioner for Soldiers’ Complaints.” In Maariv website. January 9th, 2019. (Hebrew)

“The Ombudsman yearly review number 43 for 2016,” The State comptroller Website (Hebrew), http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/591.aspx

The State comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel. Website: State http://www.mevaker.gov.il/(X(1)S(5rxc1pa0jpc1qkpdphpupj5p))/En/Pages/default.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

Ziton, Yoav, and Yaron Drukman. “The Complaints Commissioner Warns of Deficiencies in the Readiness for War: ‘You Will Fall Off Your Feet from the Reports.’” In Ynet. June 25th, 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5296079,00.html.

Ziton, Yoav. “The Outrage of the Harsh Report Over the IDF’s Readiness for War: ‘There were Negligence, Carelessness and Unacceptable Behaviour [lit. “Unworthy Culture”].” Ynet. September 26th, 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5358401,00.html.

Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?

10
 9

An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
 8
 7
 6


An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
 2
 1

There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data Protection Authority
7
There are several authorities that are accountable for handling technical issues of data protection and privacy. First, there is the State Comptroller, who can inspect and scrutinize all governmental bodies in the respect to data protection and privacy, and has powers to hold government bodies to account if necessary. Though these powers for scrutiny are only occasionally exercised. Second, civilian sector operations are initiated and regulated by the Management of Security in Public Corpora Act 1998, which introduced a strong cybersecurity apparatus.

An additional body is the Authority for the Protection of Privacy (APP), which is located within the Ministry of Justice, and reports to the Ministry of Justice and the Knesset. According to the Protection of Privacy Act, one of the APP’s roles is to monitor the compliance of public institutions with information security and privacy regulations. In addition, the APP manages the Information Databases Registrar, which registers and records databases, and ensures their compliance with the law and information security regulations.

Nevertheless, according to the State Comptroller, the APP lacks the resources to properly accompany governmental projects. Since 2011, the APP has not been able to ensure the full compliance of public institutions with some of the Protection of Privacy Act’s regulations concerning inter-institutional information transfers (i.e., public institutions must report to the APP if they transfer information between themselves). Consequently, the APP has limited authority to penalize non-compliance.

Citations:
“About the Authority for the Protection of Privacy | The Authority for the Protection of Privacy.” In the Authority for the Protection of Privacy’s official website.. Last updated: August 15th, 2019. (Hebrew)

Ministry of Justice, “The Privacy Protection Authority,” https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/the_privacy_protection_authority

Israel. The Prime Minister’s Office. Promotion of National Regulation and Governmental Guidance in Cyber Defense. Government Decision number 2443. February 15th, 2015. (Full text: https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2015_des2443) (Hebrew)

Israel. The State Comptroller. “Aspects in the Protection of the Privacy in Information Databases,” Annual Report, 69(2), 2019, Jerusalem, vol. 1, pp. 3-88. Retrieved from https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Reports/1427-1.aspx (Hebrew)

Israel. The State Comptroller. “Aspects in the State’s Preparations in Defense of the Cyber Space,” Annual Report, 67(1), 2018, Jerusalem, vol. 1, pp. 3-10. (Hebrew) (Also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_552/b9842c3e-e157-4f16-9529-df1aca2002cb/101-cyber.pdf).

Israel. The State Comptroller. “The Preparedness [lit. arrangement, deployment] of Essential Organizations [lit. bodies] for Cyber Defense,” Annual Report, 69(2), 2019, Jerusalem, vol. 4, pp. 2065-2073. Retrieved from https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Reports/1427-35.aspx (Hebrew)

Aridor-Hershkovitz, Rachel and Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, Privacy Protection Bill, 2019-5779. Summary, Israel Democracy Institute, Jerusalem November 2019, https://en.idi.org.il/media/13429/privacy-protection-bill-2019-5779-a-proposed-draft-en.pdf

Solomon, Shoshanna, “Data is up for grabs under outdated Israeli privacy law, think tank says,” ToI, 31.01.2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/data-is-up-for-grabs-under-outdated-israeli-privacy-law-think-tank-says/


Goichman, Rafaela. “A Hacker Attack or Just an Amateurish Website? What Brought Down the Website Made for the Elections Day,” TheMarker, November 1st, 2018, p. 2. (Hebrew).

Goichman, Rafaela. “‘There Was No Internet Reception’: the Crashed Elections Results’ Website Still Isn’t Back Running.” In TheMarker website. November 1st, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.6614011.

Memorandum for the Cyber Security and the National Cyber Directorate Act, 2018. (Hebrew). Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law11/44319.htm

Siboni, Gabi, and Ido Sivan-Sevilla. Cyber Regulation. Memorandum 180. Tel Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, 2018. (Hebrew).

“The Government ICT Authority | About the Government ICT Authority.” In the Government ICT Authority’s official website. Last updated: May 2nd, 2015. (Hebrew). https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/about/about_ict_authority.

“The Ministry of Justice – About.” In the Privacy Protection Council’s official website.. Last seen: October 24th, 2019. (Hebrew)

“The National Cyber Directorate | About the National Cyber Directorate.” In the Israel National Cyber Directorate’s official website. Last updated: July 14th, 2019. (Hebrew). https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/about/newabout.

“The National Cyber Directorate.” In the Israel National Cyber Directorate’s official website (main page). Last seen: November 1st, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/israel_national_cyber_directorate.

“The National Cyber Directorate | The Directorate is Happy to Announce the Opening of the First Course for the Training of Certified Inspectors in the Market [lit. economy].” In the Israel National Cyber Directorate’s official website. September 12th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/news/supplychaintraining.

The Protection of Privacy Act, 1981. (Hebrew; full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/087_001.htm)

Ziv, Amitai, ‘A Shin Bet Puppet.’ What Went Wrong With Israel’s Cybersecurity Agency, Haaretz, 29.8.2018: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-cybersecurity-agency-drops-role-of-protecting-business-1.6429506
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