Turkey

   

Executive Capacity

#32
Key Findings
Despite its increasingly powerful central government, Turkey scores relatively poorly (rank 32) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.9 points since 2014.

Following the April 2017 constitutional referendum, President Erdoğan immediately began exercising constitutional powers slated to take effect in 2019. The role of the prime minister and Council of Ministers has been rendered symbolic. The governance by emergency decree undermined strategic thinking and public administration improvements.

Government legislation is often drafted and adopted without the consultation of stakeholders. Despite the executive’s centralized structure, contradictory policy statements are frequent. It remained unclear how the presidency would fulfill monitoring responsibilities as the Prime Minister’s Office is gradually dissolved.

Government inefficiency is widespread, particularly with regard to economic objectives. The restructuring of governance has been driven by the aims of centralizing power and control. Turkey continues to host millions of Syrian refugees. The country expanded its joint anti-ISIL military operations in Syria to include full military confrontation with the U.S.-backed Kurdish YPG forces.

Strategic Capacity

#27

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
6
All public institutions, including municipalities, special provincial administrations (laws 5216, 5302 and 5393) and state-owned economic enterprises (KİTs), but excluding regulatory and supervisory bodies, must prepare strategic plans according to Law 5018 (2003) on Public Financial Management and Control and the By-law on Principles and Procedures for Strategic Planning in Public Administrations (2006).

Ministries have established strategic-planning units, creating the need for inner- and interministerial coordination and cooperation on present and future tasks and problems. In general, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministries of Finance, Development and Interior, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Turkish Court of Audit, and the Board of Internal Audit are the primary institutions involved in the process of strategic planning. The High Planning Board of the Ministry of Development is in charge of coordinating development plans and annual programs, and determining investment and export incentives.

Strategic management within the Turkish public administration faces several challenges. Public institutions in general have insufficient strategic-management capacity. Strategic plans, performance programs, budgets and activity reports are prepared with little if any coordination. Although a total of 730 internal auditors are employed across 207 public institutions, the Turkish public administration as a whole has failed to develop an effective internal-audit system. The Court of Audit cannot fulfill its functions and pursue performance audits. There is no relationship between political strategy documents and lower-level policy materials, and little coordination between associated institutions. Difficulties in gaining access to relevant information within public administrative bodies and insufficient human resource capacities are additional major contributors to this failure. There are also no cumulative statistics on the frequency of meetings between strategic-planning staff members and government heads. In general, these meetings are held once a year and during budget negotiations. However, there is no harmony between strategic plans and governmental decisions.

During the review period, the 2016 – 2019 National e-Government Strategy and Action Plan was prepared. The plan envisages an integrated, technological, participatory, innovative and high-quality Effective e-Government Ecosystem, and takes into account national and international considerations.

Citations:
T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim Çalışma Grubu Raporu, Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018), 2015. http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/zel%20htisas%20Komisyonu%20Raporlar/Attachments/264/Kamuda%20Stratejik%20Y%C3%B6netim%20%C3%87al%C4%B1%C5%9Fma%20Grubu%20Raporu.pdf (accessed 7 November 2016)
Kamu İdarelerince Hazırlanacak Stratejik Planlara Dair Tebliğ, Resmi Gazete, 30 April 2015, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2015/04/20150430-10.htm (accessed 7 November 2017
TC Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2016-2019 Ulusal e-Devlet Stratejisi ve Eylem Planı, 2016 http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPTemelBelge/files/Swkoy+2016-2019-Ulusal-e-Devlet-Stratejisi-ve-Eylem-Plani.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Stratejik Yönetimde Kapasite Geliştirme Projesi, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/html/97/Stratejik+Yonetimde+Kapasite+Gelistirme+Projesi (accessed 1 November 2017)
Yüksek Planlama Kurulu, http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Pages/Yuksek-Planlama-Kurulu.aspx (accessed 1 November 2017)

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decisionmaking?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Scholarly Advice
4
In former years, the frequency of participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and experts in political decision-making processes were increased. In addition to working with pro-government think tanks, the government consults with academic experts in the context of projects sponsored by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union.
However, the spectrum of communication with outside experts is narrowing, as the government has begun to recruit its own experts to provide alternative but not critical opinions on relevant issues of public policy. Policymaking is increasingly biased. As Turkish politics has become increasingly polarized, the government and the ruling party have seemed to shut themselves off from broader societal influences, basing decision-making increasingly on information provided by loyal personal or clientelist networks. Several academics who had previously worked with the government were recently dismissed from their university positions due to their associations to Gülenist organizations.

Public institutions’ annual activity reports provide no indication of how often expert opinions have been requested. Selected groups of scholars participate in the preparation of special expert reports related to the national development plans. The Turkish Academy of Sciences has been critical of the lack of scholarly cooperation with public institutions.

Citations:
Türkiye Bilimler Akademisi, 2014 Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.tuba.gov.tr/upload/tables/2014-tuba-faaliyet-raporu.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
Mevzuat Hazırlama Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik, 19.12.2005, http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.20059986.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)

Interministerial Coordination

#26

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

10
 9

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
5
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has established a General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and a General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication. The directorates scrutinize bylaws prepared by ministries and public agencies, examining their congruity with existing draft bills, decrees, statutes, regulations and Council of Minister resolutions. The General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication also examines the congruity between existing legislation, development plans and programs, and the government’s program. The Directorate of Administration Development, which employs 13 experts and researchers, deals with standardization. These units are the primary government entities charged with drafting and coordinating new regulations. However, not all draft bills are the product of expert advice. Recently, the number of adjustments to draft bills made during the parliamentary-approval process indicated that standards were only partially upheld.

During the review period, the PMO had a total of 2,253 employees, a quarter of whom were experts or advisers, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established to provide advice to the PMO in 2011. In May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public institutions were assigned to this unit. Critics argue that these senior civil servants lack sufficient resources, as well as incentives for effective action. Until the “cleansing” activities of the government following the 15 July coup attempt, the unit was also alleged to be a “detention camp” for bureaucrats supposedly close to illegal Gülenist organizations.

Citations:
TC Başbakanlık 2016 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Ra poru.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Cinnah’taki toplama kampı, Taraf daily newspaper, 25 September 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/cinnahtaki-toplama-kampi/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Kamuda Paralel tasfiyesi, Akşam daily newspaper, 12 September 2015, http://www.aksam.com.tr/ekonomi/kamuda-paralel-tasfiyesi/haber-442223 (accessed 27 October 2015)

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

10
 9

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
 5
 4
 3


The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
 2
 1

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.
GO Gatekeeping
9
According to Article 112 of the constitution, the prime minister, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, is tasked with ensuring cooperation among ministers and with supervising the implementation of government general policy. The members of the Council of Ministers are jointly responsible for the implementation of policy. Each minister is responsible to the prime minister and is responsible for the conduct of affairs under his or her jurisdiction and the acts and activities of his or her subordinates. The prime minister ensures that the ministers exercise their functions in accordance with the constitution and the law, and can take corrective measures. Article 109 of the constitution, which gives the prime minister the power to appoint ministers, also makes his or her oversight power over ministerial proposals clear. However, ministries have been able to exercise greater influence during periods of coalition government. In those times, to prevent this, a special coordinating body composed of ministers from coalition parties sets the agenda for cabinet meetings. In contrast to that, since the presidential election in 2014, and the re-election of the AKP into power in 2015, the presidency evolved into another strong power center in the policymaking process, indicated by the regularity with which President Erdogan has chaired cabinet meetings. During the review period, Erdoğan’s de facto status as chair of the cabinet became de jure following his election as chair of the AKP in May 2017. The Presidential Office has assumed primary authority for coordinating between ministries, with the PMO becoming a secondary authority.

There is also a hidden (discretionary) budget which is allocated by the prime minister and the minister of finance. Following the 2014 presidential elections, an additional presidential discretionary budget was also created. The total expenditure from these funds reached €471.3 million during the first eight months of 2017. These funds are not audited.

Citations:
Circular, 2012/15, 16 Haziran 2012, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskil er/2012/06/20120616-6.htm (accessed 27 October 2015)
Cumhurbaşkanlığı’na örtülü ödenek yetmedi, bütçe 546 milyona çıktı, T24, 16 September 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cumhurbaskanligina-ortulu-odenek-yetmedi-butce-546-milyona-cikti,309811 (accessed 27 October 2015)
“Erdoğan ve Yıldırım’ın kullandığı 1 yıllık örtülü ödenek 8 ayda bitti,” 16 September 2017, http://t24.com.tr/haber/erdogan-ve-yildirimin-kullandigi-1-yillik-ortulu-odenek-8-ayda-bitti,441810 (accessed 1 November 2017)

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
7
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has a twofold role in the preparation of draft bills. It checks the congruity of laws from a legal point of view, and collects ministries’ legal and political opinions along with opinions from civil society, interest and pressure groups, expert groups and institutions. Thus, the PMO is always directly involved in the preparation of policy proposals at a relatively early stage.

However, line ministries do not always provide all the information necessary for draft bills, particularly in the case of information that may cast their ministry in a bad light. From time to time, policymaking is tarnished by issues of bureaucratic competition, including among politicians. The PMO’s inability to foster interministerial cooperation has been a serious institutional shortcoming. A recent reorganization of the PMO and line ministries led to some performance declines. Conflicting announcements regarding policy proposals made by the PMO and line ministries have been a sign of weak coordination.

The Ministry of Development was assigned as the primary consultation body in preparing policies according to the decision on the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the government’s program. After the parliamentary election of 1 November 2015, government proposals to restructure the ministries and increase their number were made. Several new public units such as the National Mine Institute were additionally established. It remains to be seen whether this kind of institutional fragmentation of policymaking will hinder or enhance the effectiveness of policy coordination and accountability.

During the review period, it is assumed that the president worked closely with the line ministries, although there is little public evidence of this. It is unclear how the current system will be transformed into a presidential system.

Citations:
TC Başbakanlık Kanunlar ve Kararlar Genel Müdürlüğü Performans Raporu 2014, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/PerfRapor2014.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014)
2017 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 19 October 2017,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/10/20161019-13.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
6
The Ministry of Development was designated the primary consultation body for the preparation, implementation, coordination and monitoring of the government’s program.

The Better Regulation Group within the PMO ensures coordination among the related agencies and institutions and improve the process of creating regulations. In addition, the government has created committees – such as the anti-terror commission under the Ministry of Interior, which includes officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, as well as other security departments. These are composed of ministers, experts, bureaucrats and representatives of other bureaucratic bodies (such as those on legislation techniques, legislation management and administrative simplification, and regulatory impact analysis) in highly important policy areas or when important or frequently raised issues were under consideration.

Other such committees include the Economy Coordination Board, the Money Credit Coordination Council, the Investment Environment Coordination Board, the Coordination Board for Combating Financial Crimes and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board.

In addition, the Reform Monitoring Group was renamed to Reform Action Group to coordinate policy measures in line with EU legislation. It has been extending its predecessor’s tasks and mission. The new body is tasked with monitoring political reforms, preparing draft reform bills and playing an active role in securing proposals’ parliamentary passage and in the subsequent implementation process. However, this body had convened only three times until December 2015, raising doubts about its impact on policymaking.

Citations:
Ömer Öz, Regulatory Oversight Bodies in Turkey. Better Regulation Group, The Prime Minister’s Office of Turkey,
31 May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/48710734.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
Çözüm Süreci Kurulu Resmi Gazete’de, 1 October 2014, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/158881-cozum-sureci-kurulu-resmi-gazete-de (accessed 5 November 2014).
‘Reform Monitoring Group for EU reforms replayed with Action Group,’ Hürriyet Daily News (7 November 2014)
2015 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 17 October 2014,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141017-11-1.pdf (accessed 27 Octoer 2015)
Daily Sabah, PM asks other parties to support passing EU bills, 11 December 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2015/12/12/pm-asks-other-parties-to-support-passing-eu-bills

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
5
Ministerial undersecretaries, under the authority of a minister and his or her aide, executes services on behalf of the ministers. This is a political position that is achieved through merit and a successful political career. Deputy undersecretaries in the ministries also help to conduct ministerial affairs.

During the review period there was an increasing tendency to draft and adopt legislation without appropriate consultation. The creation of new ministries and agencies and the resulting fragmentation of responsibilities has complicated ministerial coordination, for example in the areas of budgeting and medium-term economic policymaking. The oversight bodies under the Prime Minister’s Office are responsible not only for coordinating and overseeing legal proposals, but are also tasked with monitoring legislative implementation.

The 2016 Annual Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) stressed that although the PMO has the authority to coordinate ministries, its powers are not used effectively. The authority of the PMO over public administration should be improved and diversified.
Similar observations have been made by the Ministry of Development, the primary policy-coordination body. Accordingly, a serious problem is inefficient coordination due to institutional ambiguity and conflicts.

Citations:
Ömer Öz, Regulatory Oversight Bodies in Turkey. Better Regulation Group, The Prime Minister’s Office of Turkey,
31 May 2011, http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/48710734.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
TC Başbakanlık 2016 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, https://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
2015 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 17 October 2014,
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141017-11-1.pdf (accessed 27 Octoer 2015)

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
6
Informal bodies, which are usually made up of senior party members and their personal networks, are typically used to sketch the framework of an issue in consultation with experts, while civil servants develop proposals, and finally the upper administrative echelons finalize policy. The higher levels of the ruling party in particular, in cooperation with ministers who have considerable experience in their fields, continue to form a tight network and contribute significantly to policy preparation.

However, the recent allegations of and fight against an illegal parallel structure within existing state structures linked to the network of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen placed significant strain on these informal mechanisms. As a consequence, a new generation of cabinet and administrative staffers with a high degree of loyalty and commitment to the party-state system is being groomed.

Informal coordination between the PMO and the Presidency has allegedly become more relevant since President Erdogan took over office, and especially after Binali Yildirim became prime minister. Erdoğan regularly meets with line ministers and with the “small cabinet” to coordinate government policies. This type of informal coordination, however, cannot be considered constructive, but rather it has the potential to replace formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.

Citations:
Bülent Duru and İlhan Uzgel, AKP Kitabı-Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, İstanbul: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2013.

Evidence-based Instruments

#34

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
4
In 2007, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a circular that provided guidance on how to prepare regulatory impact assessments (RIA). Since that time, the completion of a RIA has been required for all new legislation (laws, decrees and other regulatory procedures), excluding issues relating to national security, the draft budget or final accounts (under Article 24 of Regulation 4821 on the Procedure and Principles of Preparing Legislation, 12 December 2005). However, despite regulations adopted to encourage administrative simplification in April 2012, the introduction of RIAs has not improved the quality of government legislation, and RIA processes are only rarely followed.

During the review period, several chambers of industry conducted EU-funded RIA projects. The EU Regulation on the Export and Import of Harmful Chemicals Technical Support Project for Implementation was conducted by several Turkish chambers of industry, including Balıkesir, Kayseri and Kocaeli. The European Union also funded the Technical Assistance for Capacity-Building and Support to the Preparation of a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) for Decoupled Agricultural Support project.

Citations:
Dr. Sibel Güven, Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Etki Analizi (DEA) Uygulamaları Nedenİstenen Düzeyde Değil? TEPAV,
Ankara, Ocak 2011.
Technical Assistance Service for IPPC – Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control in Turkey, Draft Regulatory Impact Assessment, June 2013, http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ippceng/webmenu/webmenu9986.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
Zararlı Kimyasalların İhracatı ve İthalatına İlişkin AB Tüzüğü’nün Uygulanması için Teknik Destek Projesi, http://kosano.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ankt.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
3
During the period under review, the regulatory impact assessment (RIAs) requirement did not help improve the quality of proposed government legislation. Instead, the government more often than not drafted and adopted legislation without the appropriate consultation of NGOs or other stakeholders; not to mention the government’s de facto surpassing of the parliament under its state of emergency powers.

Citations:
Dr. Sibel Güven, Türkiye’de Düzenleyici Etki Analizi (DEA) Uygulamaları Neden İstenen Düzeyde Değil? TEPAV,
Ankara, Ocak 2011.
Technical Assistance Service for IPPC – Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control in Turkey, Draft Regulatory Impact Assessment, June 2013, http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ippceng/webmenu/webmenu9986.pdf (accessed 5 November 2014).
EKÖK “Entegre KirlilikÖnleme ve Kontrol” Teknik Yardım Hizmeti, Haziran 2013.
http://www.csb.gov.tr/db/ipp c/icerikbelge/icerikbelge1631.pdf

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
The government has conducted several sustainability checks within its regulatory impact assessment (RIA) framework, for instance for the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive, the Habitat Directive and the Discharge Directive.

However, these examples refer to internationally sponsored projects and are not an indication of a general administrative practice. Politicians and experts widely use the term “sustainability” in policy slogans, but there is no formally adopted sustainability strategy in Turkey.

During the review period, the Coordination Board of Internal Audit published Performance Audit Guidelines for Public Sector Internal Auditors, which includes sustainability checks as a component in performance auditing. However, there is no information about RIA sustainability checks.

Citations:
Başbakanlık, Bürokrasinin Azaltılması ve Kamu Hizmet Sunum Esaslarının Geliştirilmesi, DÜZENLEYİCİ ETKİ ANALİZİ RAPORU, Temmuz 2009, www.riaturkey.org/doc/Burokrasinin_ azaltilmasi.doc (accessed July 26, 2010)
Yavuz Gazibey, Ahmet Keser, Yunus Gökmen, Türkiye’de İllerin Sürdürülebilirlik Boyutları Açısından Değerlendirilmesi, Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi, 2014, 69(3): 511-544. (accessed 27 October 2015)
İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu, Kamu iç Denetçileri İçin Performans Denetimi Rehberi, 2016, http://www.idkk.gov.tr/SiteDokumanlari/Mevzuat/Ucuncul%20Duzey%20Mevzuat/PerformansDenetimiRehberi.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)

Societal Consultation

#34

To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

10
 9

The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.
 8
 7
 6


The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.
 5
 4
 3


The government consults with societal actors.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Negotiating Public Support
4
According to the Regulation Concerning the Procedures and Principles of Preparation of Legislation (Article 6), ministries may announce draft texts that are of public concern via the internet, press or printed publication before forwarding it to the Prime Minister’s Office. Consequently, government decisions are made after the draft text has been publicly debated. In developing policies on housing, energy and education, among other policy areas, ministries may convene consultative bodies of major stakeholders, although not all sectors or organizations are typically included. Turkey’s national development plans emphasize the importance of cooperation between NGOs and the public sector. The EU-funded public-civil society dialogue projects promote the participation of civil society in public decision-making. Government-society and parliament-society relations are not based on a systematic, ongoing and structured consultation mechanism. Political polarization during the review period increased the government’s restrictions and biases on public access to policymaking processes and strengthened its preference to consult only with pro-government actors.

In general, governmental authorities consider this requirement to have a “slowing” effect on policymaking (e.g., on progressive projects such as urban renewal or the planning of hydroelectric power plants). Although it is required by the legal framework, societal consultation has largely been neglected or rendered ineffective.

Citations:
TBMM Başkanlığı İdari Teşkilatı 2014 Faaliyet Raporu, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/faaliyet_raporu_2014.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).
Türkiye’de Hidroelektrik Sektöründe Paydaş Analizi, İstanbul: WWF-Türkiye, 2015, http://awsassets.wwftr.panda.org/downloads/wwf_paydas_analizi.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).
Civil Society Dialogue, Political Criteria Projects, http://civilsocietydialogue.org/masonry-grid/ (accessed 27 October 2015).
Selami Erdoğan and Eray Acar, “Türkiye’de Yeni Anayasa Yapım Süreci ve TBMM Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu (2011-2013),” Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, October 2016, 1801-191.
Hakan Yerlikaya, Kamu Politikalarının Oluşturulmasında Katılımcılık ve Bilgi ve İletişim Teknolojileri, Uzmanlık Tezi, TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2015.
Gökçeçiçek Ayata and Ulaş Karan, Sivil Topluma Aktif Katılım: Uluslararası Standartlar, Ulusal Mevzuattaki Engeller, Öneriler, İstanbul: TÜSEV, 2015.
“Kamu - Sivil Toplum İşbirliği,” https://www.avrupa.info.tr/tr/kamu-sivil-toplum-isbirligi-37 (accessed 1 November 2017)

Policy Communication

#24

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 8
 7
 6


The government coordinates the communication of ministries. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
Coherent Communication
5
In spite of its centralized and hierarchical structure, Turkey’s executive is poorly coordinated and rarely speaks with a single voice. Contradictory policy statements on the economy (role of the central bank), security (failure in security and safety provisions) or education (reform of the examination processes) are regular.

In addition, under state of emergency powers, the voice of the president is considered decisive. Yet, a coordinated “division of labor” has not been achieved. Following the April 2017 constitutional referendum, the government initiated a project to prevent confusion over overlapping ministerial authority, reduce the “bureaucratic oligarchy” and improve the effectiveness of administrative processes.

Citations:
“Yetki karmaşaları mercek altında,” Hürriyet, 3 September 2017, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yetki-karmasalari-mercek-altinda-40568608 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan TEOG ve LYS açıklaması,” Yeni Şafak, 27 September 2017, http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogandan-teog-ve-lys-aciklamasi-2796903 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Başbakan Yıldırım’dan TEOG açıklaması,” 3 October 2017, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/basbakan-yildirimdan-teog-aciklamasi,gexFodLrykKgWvTypnFNow (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Milli Eğitim Bakanı Yılmaz, TEOG yerine gelecek yeni istemi açıkladı,” 5 November 2017, http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/milli-egitim-bakani-yilmaz-teog-yerine-gelecek-yeni-istemi-acikladi-340141.html (accessed 5 November 2017)
Patates fiyatında bakanlar da anlaşamadı, 8 May 2015, http://www.ohaber.com/patates-fiyatinda-bakanlar-da-anlasamadi/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Erdoğan Merkez Bankası’nı eleştirdi, dolar rekor kırdı, 4 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/ekonomi/2015/02/150204_erdogan_dolar_faiz (accessed 27 October 2015)

Implementation

#31

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Efficiency
6
The government’s performance has been mixed during the review period. Finance Minister Naci Ağbal defined the 2017 budget as “growth friendly,” and foresaw a TYR 46.9 billion budget deficit and TYR 10.6 billion primary budget surplus. As of October 2017, the budget deficit had reached TYR 35 billion. Presidential and prime ministerial discretionary funds increased 73% compared to 2016.

The economy has weakened over recent years. Meanwhile, Turkey’s onetime proactive and strategic foreign and security policies have become increasingly less coherent, particularly with regard to regional conflicts. The AKP’s credibility was undermined by the party leadership’s unwillingness to accept the results of the June 2015 elections. Contradictions between the goals of political liberalization and the government’s conservative-religious ambitions have become increasingly visible. Seeking to consolidate its control over government, the AKP has instead sought to create a legal framework for its “monopolization” of power. Opposition forces inside and outside of parliament often play into the ruling party’s hands.

Governmental inefficiency is widespread, especially in relation to the economy. The first nine months following the implementation of the government’s annual economic objectives varied sharply from official budget and 2017 – 2019 medium-term fiscal plan forecasts. The recent devaluation of the Turkish lira has increased the fiscal burden on macroeconomic variables. In the current and the next (2018 – 2020) medium-term fiscal plan, greater fiscal discipline is expected. Unemployment, inflation and the budget deficit will continue to be major economic weaknesses, which will be exacerbated by population growth, refugee issues and security concerns. Results were similarly mixed in other sectors. For instance, the Ministry of Education realized most of its 43 performance objectives, while the Ministry of Health completed most of its 22 objectives for 2016. However, the Ministry of Health failed to realize two key objectives, namely human resource objectives in the health care sector and scientific publications.

No significant progress has been made concerning EU accession since 2015, when economic and financial chapters were opened. Chapters 23 and 24 are currently under blocked by Cyprus. These chapters regulate Turkey’s harmonization of fundamental rights and the judiciary with those of the European Union. Despite some signals to continue negotiations from both sides, the European Parliament in November 2016 and Germany since September 2017 have opted to suspense, and Austria has demanded a complete stop to talks.

Citations:
“İşte hükümetin bütçe performansı,” 17 October 2017, http://www.businessht.com.tr/ekonomi/haber/1311270-iste-hukumetin-butce-performansi (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Turkey challenges EU to ‘open new chapters,’” Hürriyet Daily News, 10 May 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-challenges-eu-to-open-new-chapters-112952 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Bütçe açığı ve örtülü harcamalar coştu,” 16 November 2017, Sözcü, http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/ekonomi/butce-acigi-ve-ortulu-harcamalar-costu-2092299/ (accessed 16 November 2017)
Ministry of Development, 2017-2019 Medium Term Programme in Macro-economic and Fiscal Targets, http://www.mod.gov.tr/Pages/content.aspx?List=16bb86d7%2Dad48%2D4f23%2Db1e3%2D56bbe5b28aaa&ID=13&Source=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Emod%2Egov%2Etr%2FPages%2FMediumTermPrograms%2Easpx&ContentTypeId=0x0100F7A44FBA3ED2844D8825963D0C0BE391 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Sağlık Bakanlığı 2014 Faaliyet Raporu, https://dosyasb.saglik.gov.tr/Eklenti/7585,raporpdf.pdf?0 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2016 Faaliyet Raporu, https://sgb.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2017_02/28172815_2016_FR_webde_yayYmlanacak_kitap.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
Pelin Ünker, Ekonomide tüm hedefler şaştı, Cumhuriyet daily newspaper, 10 September 2015. (accessed 27 October 2015)

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
6
The entrenched single-party government, with strong party leadership and high demand for ministerial positions among party members, provides strong incentives for the promotion of the government program. Therefore, it is difficult even for those ministers who are professionals in their fields to come independently to the forefront. The charisma and standing of the party leader and the tendency of political parties to leave personnel decisions to the party leader prevent ministers from pursuing their own interests during their time in office.

The AKP government under former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made it even more difficult for ministers to follow their own agendas, a situation which has continued under Erdogan’s successors since 2014. A number of key ministries during the review period were under the leadership of ministers with substantial professional expertise, but these figures had little support from the party apparatus, leaving them dependent on the prime minister. This ensures that the strong leadership of the prime minister and party leader, rather than other incentives, drives ministers to implement the governmental program. After Erdoğan was elected to the presidency, additional loyalist ministers were appointed to the cabinet. Erdoğan rejected claims that the new prime minister would merely do his bidding; however, he continues to maintain his grip on the government, stressing his intention to be an active president, and interfering in virtually every policy field and ministerial portfolio.
Erdoğan also intervenes in the nomination of deputies, appointment of higher civil servants and the organization of electoral campaigns by taking part actively in these events. In other words, it is argued that the office of the president, now entrusted with increasing powers, has replaced those otherwise established by the constitution. Thus, the current constellation raises the question whether the effectiveness of the executive in general and the government in particular will be diminished by the existence of several centers of power and suggests that the democratic separation of powers as a whole are eroding.

Following the constitutional referendum of April 2017, Erdoğan was immediately re-elected chair of the AKP, legalizing a previously de facto status. This contradicted the principle that Turkey’s head of state should be impartial and not a member of a political party. Second, Erdoğan immediately started to exercise constitutional powers that were intended to take effect after 2019 presidential elections. In this transition period, the role of the prime minister and Council of Ministers as the sole authority for governmental actions has been reduced to a symbolic power vis-a-vis Erdoğan’s full authority as the president and chair of the ruling party. Ministers can only use their constitutional powers with the approval of the president. Sometimes the president gives direct orders to ministers for the sake of his own popularity and legitimacy.

Citations:
Erdoğan says new PM will not be puppet, Al Jazeera, 27 August 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/08/Erdoğan-says-new-pm-will-not-be-puppet-2014827133851415267.html (accessed 5 November 2014)
“Constitutional amendments in Turkey: Predictions and implications,” 28 February 2017, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/positionpapers/2017/02/constitutional-amendments-turkey-predictions-implications-170228092500529.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Stadiums in Turkey to no longer be called ‘arena,’ Erdoğan instructs minister,” Hürriyet Daily News, 26 May 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/stadiums-in-turkey-to-no-longer-be-called-arena-erdogan-instructs-minister-113595 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Daniel Dombey, Turkish president tightens grip on state, The Financial Times, 15 April 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f89a7b74-c747-11e4-8e1f-00144feab7de.html#axzz3rIJjSiYj (accessed 27 October 2015)

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
7
The Prime Minister’s Office has, among other measures, established the General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and the General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication to examine the congruity with the constitution of draft bills, decrees, regulations and resolutions of the Council of Ministers, as well as to review in general laws, plans and the government’s program. These bodies are the primary government centers for the drafting and coordinating of regulations.

However, there is no systematic monitoring of the activities of line ministries. In some cases, the ministerial bureaucracy resists policy handed down by the government without serious consequences, particularly in issues of democratization. In general, however, ministries work in cooperation with the prime minister’s office because the single-party government has staffed leading ministerial posts with bureaucrats who operate in sync with the ruling party’s program and ideology.

The PMO has a total of 2,253 employees, a quarter of whom are experts or advisers, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established in 2011 to provide the PMO consultation. A total of 17 full-time officers are employed by the PMO. Beginning in May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public institutions were also assigned to this unit.

It remains to be seen how effectively the presidency, with the gradual dissolution of the PMO following the April 2017 referendum, will fulfill the PMO’s monitoring responsibilities.

Citations:
TC Başbakanlık 2016 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/docs/KurumsalHaberler/Basbakanlik_2016_Faaliyet_Raporu.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies
7
Turkey is a unitary state divided into 81 provinces (Article 126 of the constitution). Power is devolved in such a way as to ensure the efficiency and coordination of public services from the center. Ministerial agencies are monitored regularly. The central administration by law holds the power to guide the activities of local administration, to ensure that local services are delivered in conformance with the guidelines set down by the central government, as well as ensuring services are uniform, meeting local needs and in the interest of the local population (Article 127). The central government has provincial organizations that differ in size and capacity and are regularly scrutinized by the central government. Independent administrative authorities such as the Telecommunications Authority and Energy Market Regulatory Authority are not monitored, but are subject to judicial review.

Law 5018, adopted in 2004, introduced a strategic-management approach under which all public agencies must prepare a strategic plan, annual program and activity reports. The performance of subunits is assessed on the basis of these documents. However, neither strategic management principles nor internal oversight mechanisms have been effectively implemented.

The Internal Audit Coordination Board, affiliated with the Ministry of Finance, was established under Article 66 of the Public Financial Management and Control Law (Law 5018). The board ensures that administrative bodies cooperate with public auditing bodies, and recommends measures to eliminate fraud and other irregularities. According to the 2016 Annual Activity Report, qualified human resources management, capacity-building, coordination, and the separation of inspection and internal-audit functions are major issues in this field.

All public agencies maintain an internal audit body. However, such bodies do not function effectively or operate to their fullest.

The State Supervision Board, which is subject to the Presidency of the Republic, provides supervision and prepares in-depth reports upon the request of the Presidency. These reports were made public until recently; since 2009 only summaries of the reports are available.

Citations:
İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu 2016 Yılı Kamu İç Denetim Genel Raporu, November 2016, http://www.idkk.gov.tr/SiteDokumanlari/Faaliyet%20Raporlar%c4%b1/2017KamuicDenetimGenelRaporu.pdf

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
6
Municipal governments depend on financial contributions from the central government. Many municipalities do not have the sufficient resources to finance basic duties. Thus, many have declared bankruptcy. Municipal borrowing constitutes a large share of Turkey’s total medium- and long-term debt. Financial decentralization and reform of local administration have been major issues during the review period. The central administration (mainly through the Bank of Provinces) is still the major funding source for local governments. During the 2014 – 2015 fiscal year, the government allocated €118 million to a village infrastructure project (KÖYDES), €189.9 million to the Drinking Water and Sewer Infrastructure Program (SUKAP), €74 million to the Social Support Program (SODES).

The previous governments have been frequently accused of taking a partisan approach toward the distribution of funds. Since 2009, transfers from the central government to municipalities via the Bank of Provinces have taken into consideration the number of inhabitants and the locality’s relative position on development indices. However, the new model has not eased the difficult financial situation of Turkey’s municipalities, which are seriously indebted to central-government institutions. According to Audit Court reports, most metropolitan municipalities have substantial debts. Therefore, most local projects in major metropolitan municipalities are run by the central government.

The recent change in regulations governing metropolitan municipalities was designed to generate funds for them. However, this shift is expected in turn to cause smaller administrative units to be fiscally and administratively dependent on the metropolitan municipalities. In other words, the authority held by subunits such as villages and small towns are expected to be undermined in the long run.

Citations:
TC Kalkınma Bakanlığı KÖYDES Projesi 2015 Ödeneği, 20 January 2015, http://www.migm.gov.tr/Dokumanlar/2015_1_KOYDES_YPK_KARARI.pdf. (accessed 27 October 2015)
2015 Yılı Yatırım Programı yayımlandı, 15 January 2015, http://www.bloomberght.com/haberler/haber/1702267-2015-yili-yatirim-programi-yayimlandi (accessed 27 October 2015)
TC Sayıştay Başkanlığı Kalkınma Bakanlığı 2014 Yılı Sayıştay Denetim Raporu, http://www.sayistay.gov.tr/rapor/kid/2014/Genel_B%C3%BCt%C3%A7e_Kapsam%C4%B1ndaki_%20Kamu_%C4%B0dareleri/KALKINMA%20BAKANLI%C4%9EI.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
‘Hazine’ye 17 milyar lira borçlu olanların listesi,’ Karar daily newspaper, 23 April 2015, http://www.karar.com/ekonomi-haberleri/hazineye-17-milyar-lira-borclu-olanlarin-listesi (accessed 27 October 2015)
“Sayıştay’a göre; İstanbul ve Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyeleri borç ‘batağında,” 19 October 2017, http://t24.com.tr/haber/sayistaya-gore-istanbul-ve-ankara-buyuksehir-belediyeleri-borc-bataginda,468360 (accessed 1 November 2017)

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
2
According to Article 127, Paragraph 1 of the constitution, local administrative bodies are public entities established to meet the common needs of the local inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose decision-making bodies are determined by the electorate as described in law, and whose structure is also determined by law. However, according to Article 127, Paragraph 5 of the constitution, the central administration has the power of administrative trusteeship over local governments, under a framework of legal principles and procedures designed to ensure the functioning of local services in conformity with the principle of administrative unity and integrity, to secure uniform public services, to safeguard the public interest and to meet local needs in an appropriate manner.

Past reforms driven by the process of alignment with the European charter of local self-government have changed Turkey’s administrative structure and the relationship between the center and subnational bodies. In December 2012, the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities were revised to make public service provision more effective and productive. The law has been criticized, as it appears to set aside the principle of subsidiarity despite its “official” goal of strengthening democracy at the local level. First, the legal status of provincial administrations, villages and municipalities cannot be changed through a special law without consultation or referendum; such changes require a constitutional amendment. Second, the 2012 law essentially violates the principle of self-government. And finally, it is questionable whether the effective delivery of social services is indeed relevant to strengthening local democracy. In addition, the Mass Housing Administration (Toplu Konut İdaresi, TOKI), a central administrative body and a patronage tool for the AKP, is empowered to implement urban renewal projects almost anywhere.

In mid-2014, some mayors in southeast Anatolian provinces called for the transfer of half of the state’s share yielded from oil drilling to the municipality of the province in which oil is produced.

Soon after the 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections, two towns and 16 municipalities (14 towns and two neighborhoods in İstanbul) declared self-government. The government took a strong stand against these declarations, and judicial investigations were initiated against mayors and other people in charge. Moreover, in the wake of the 15 July coup attempt and the government’s declared state of emergency, numerous democratically elected mayors and municipality staff of larger and smaller local administrations in various provinces have been detained and replaced with trustees by the central government.

Citations:
Ayşe Güner and Serdar Yılmaz, Son Değişikliklerin Türkiye’de Yerel Yönetimlerin Takdir Hakkı ve Hesap Verilebilirlik Üzerindeki Etkisi, Marmara İktisat Dergisi, 1,2 Eylül 2017, 229-250.
Mehmet Zahid Sobacı, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Yerel Yönetimler Özerklik Şartı’na Uyumu: Özerklik Miti, 2015, http://setav.org/tr/turkiyenin-avrupa-yerel-yonetimler-ozerklik-sartina-uyumu-ozerklik-miti/analiz/18570
Öz yönetim ilan edilen merkez sayısı 16’ya yükseldi, 20 August 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/oz-yonetim-ilan-edilen-merkez-sayisi-16ya-yukseldi,306949
HDP submits bill for oil revenue sharing with local governments, 3 July 2014, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-submits-bill-for-oil-revenue-sharing-with-local-governments.aspx?pageID=517&nID=68621&NewsCatID=348

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
5
The Regulation Concerning Public Service Standards was issued by the Council of Ministers in July 2009. According to the regulation, all public entities including municipalities must prepare service standards tables for the council’s use.

The Ministry of Interior Affairs closely monitors the structure and quality of services provided by municipal governments, through its own local agencies and administrative trusteeship (through internal and external audits, and audits by civil service inspectors). The Union of Municipalities of Turkey also offers nationally or EU-funded training and technical support for municipalities in this respect.

While United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support for the implementation of local-administration reform in Turkey (LAR Phase 2) has been concluded, Turkey still aims to fulfill some requirements of the European Local Self-Government Charter. In this context, municipalities work to establish departments tasked with monitoring, investment and coordination. The main duties of these departments are to provide, monitor and coordinate public institutions and organizations’ investments and services; to provide and coordinate central-administration investments in the provinces; and to guide and inspect provincial public institutions and organizations. However, the most significant outstanding issues with regard to standardizing local public services are essentially financial, technical and personnel-driven. Within the OECD, Turkey remains the country with the largest regional disparities.

Citations:
Kamu Hizmetlerinin Sunumunda Uyulacak Usul ve Esaslara İlişkin Yönetmelik, Official Gazette, 31 July 2009, http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/main.aspx?home=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090731.htm&main=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2009/07/20090731.htm (accessed 1 November 2017)
Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Hizmet Standartları Tablosu, https://www.ankara.bel.tr/files/2913/4727/6681/tablolar_imar_8_1.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)

Adaptability

#40

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
3
In contrast to former tendencies of adopting international standards and practices, centralizing power and control have become the major drivers for restructuring governance during the review period. By a state of emergency decree, the general chief of staff and head of the National Intelligent Service (MİT) were affiliated with the presidency, all armed forces were reorganized under the Ministry of National Defense and the Gendarmerie, and the Turkish Police was aligned under the Ministry of Interior – in line with EU standards to place military and defense forces under civilian control. A reorganization of financial institutions including the Capital Market Board is underway. Despite heavy pressure, the central bank remains largely independent. The justice system has again been reorganized following the recent constitutional amendments. The chairman of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), namely the Minister of Justice, appoints four members of the council and seven members are in-effect elected by the AKP, given the party’s parliamentary majority.

Turkey is a signatory of several international conventions that include binding provisions, and the Turkish government has attempted to comply with these international responsibilities. However, the government has fallen short on many requirements, either legally or institutionally. On issues such as child labor, gender issues, general working conditions

Even taking into consideration Turkey’s “trauma” after the failed coup and the necessary declaration of a state of emergency, the wide-ranging and radical use of state of emergency powers has diminished Turkey’s ability to meet established standards of policymaking and the rule of law.

Citations:
Venice Commission, Turkey Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law N° 674 of 1 September 2016 Which Concern The Exercise of Local Democracy in Turkey, 6-7 October 2017, “http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)021-e (accessed 1 November 2017)
Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, “The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey” 8 MArch 2017, http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/3258251/20170308-TurkeyInstitutions-EN.pdf/bbd65de5-86d4-466f-9bc1-185d5218bce7 (accessed 1 November 2017)
Bakanlar Kurulu yeniden yapılandırılıyor, Hürriyet, 8 June 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17982957.asp (accessed 5 November 2014)
Seriye Sezen, International versus Domestic Explanations of Administrative Reforms, Andrew Massey (eds.) Public Sector Reform, Vol. II, Sage Publications, 2013.
Saray Kendine Hazine Kuruyor, Taraf, 29 January 2015, http://www.taraf.com.tr/saray-kendine-hazine-kuruyor/ (accessed 27 October 2015)
Yaşar Aydin, Erdoğan steht vor der Wegscheide, http://www.b-republik.de/aktuelle-ausgabe/erdogan-steht-vor-der-wegscheide (accessed 21 December 2016)

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, Turkey has hosted and assisted more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, with only a limited proportion of refugees living in state-run refugee camps. The EU-Turkey Statement has become an important element of the European Union’s comprehensive approach on migration. While Turkey accuses the European Union of falling behind on its promises, the European Union claims that €3 billion were allocated through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey in 2016 and 2017.

The U.S.-led coalition campaign to destroy the Islamic State group enters its fourth year, with authorities declaring concrete improvements. However, Turkey, a key player in the coalition, has also intensified its own separate efforts in Syria. The Turkish military established its own mission in Northern Syria in 2016 and 2017. This mission has since developed into a full military confrontation with the U.S.-backed People’s Protection Units (YPG). Turkey claimed the mission is part of Turkey’s efforts to fight all terrorist organizations, including ISIL. In December 2016, a total of 3,359 people were taken into custody for associating with ISIL militants and 1,313 were arrested. Since November 2017, police officers have conducted almost daily raids on ISIL cells across Turkey, with increasing intensity in the past few weeks.

In addition to the consultative, coordinative and cooperative structures within NATO and the European Union, Turkey also participated in the Vienna and Geneva talks as well as – after overcoming disputes with Russia – bilateral talks with Russia, Iran and other regional players in search of a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict.

Citations:
“Number of Syrian refugees in Turkey reaches 3.2 million,” 4 October 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2017/10/04/number-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-reaches-32-million (accessed 1 November 2017)
“EU-Turkey Statement one Year on,” https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Anti-ISIL operations enter fourth year “, Hürriyet Daily News, 8 August 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/anti-isil-operations-enter-fourth-year——116502 (accessed 1 November 2017)
“Turkey’s Interior Ministry releases report on its operations against ISIL,” 28 December 2016, https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/turkey-s-interior-ministry-releases-report-on-its-operations-against-isil-141132.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
Turkey to contribute more to UN peacekeeping, says PM, 29.09.2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-to-contribute-more-to-un-peacekeeping-says-pm/347611 (accessed 27 October 2015).
Murat Yetkin, BM’den Türkiye’ye mülteci uyarısı: Yıl sonuna dek 2,5 milyonu bulur, 27.4.2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/murat-yetkin/bmden-turkiyeye-multeci-uyarisi-yil-sonuna-dek-2-5-milyonu-bulur-1344086/ (accessed 27 October 2015).
Turkey rejects EU offer on refugee crisis, Aljazeera, 15 October 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/turkey-rejects-eu-offer-refugee-crisis-151016194610039.html (accessed 27 October 2015).
Turkey’s air force hits IS and PKK in Syria and Iraq, 26 July 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33663005 (accessed 27 October 2015).

Organizational Reform

#14

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
7
Several units in the hierarchic Turkish administration contribute to the monitoring process directly or indirectly. These include the State Supervisory Council, the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, the Directorate General of Legislation Development and Publication, the Directorate General of Laws and Decrees, and the Council of State. Each administrative institution has its own internal control unit for monitoring how financial rules are implemented. However, these units are not fully effective. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and individual ministries also occasionally communicate with the parliament’s general secretariat and other institutions and organizations with the aim of reforming existing legislation.

Turkey has undergone an organizational change involving the creation of new institutions, the merging or splitting of ministerial bodies, legal changes and rapid personnel shifts. These developments make monitoring exceedingly difficult. The OECD Sigma assessments provide some insight on actual operations. As stated in the annual report of the PMO and of the Ministry of Development, coordination and monitoring are major weaknesses in Turkish public administration.

During the review period, the use of state of emergency powers and the debate on Turkey’s transition to a presidential political system has intensified. In January 2017, the State of Emergency Procedures Investigation Commission was established to evaluate and resolve complaints related to the use of state of emergency decree laws with the intention of unblocking administrative objections. The government submitted a large harmonization reform package to parliament in September 2017. The package contains changes to 132 articles in 16 laws. For the time being, it is unclear how and to what extent self-monitoring would be considered relevant in the new constitutional framework that President Erdogan and the AKP have in mind.

Citations:
Belgin Uçar Kocaoğlu and M. Kemal Öktem, “Belediyelerde Yönetsel Kapasite Değerlendirmesi: İç Anadolu Bölgesi Örneği,” http://www.todaie.edu.tr/resimler/ekler/0578eb13c87fc28_ek.pdf?dergi=Cagdas%20Yerel%20Yonetimler%20Dergisi (accessed 1 November 2017)
“132 maddelik anayasa uyum paketi Başbakanlık’ta,” http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/132-maddelik-anayasa-uyum-paketi-basbakanlikta-318675.html (accessed 1 November 2017)
“State of Emergency Commission receives nearly 60,000 applications,” Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/08/25/state-of-emergency-commission-receives-nearly-60000-applications (accessed 1 November 2017)
TC Maliye Bakanlığı, İç Denetim Koordinasyon Kurulu, Kamu İç Denetim Rehberi, http://www.idkk.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Mevzuat/Ucuncul%20Duzey%20Mevzuat/KamuIcDenetimRehberi.aspx (accessed 27 October 2015)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
6
According to Law 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control, all public institutions, including municipalities and special provincial administrations, must prepare strategic plans. All public bodies have designated a separate department for developing strategy and coordination efforts; however, these departments are not yet completely functional. Maximizing strategic capacity requires resources, expert knowledge, an adequate budget and a participatory approach. The government lacks sufficient personnel to meet the requirements of strategic planning, performance-based programs and activity reports. In this respect, several training and internship programs have been established.

During the assessment period, Turkey developed sectoral strategies and action plans for 2015 – 2018 on biotechnology, entrepreneurship, small and medium scale enterprises, productivity and information society. Several strategy documents were also prepared such as a National Employment Strategy. Also, a National Strategy of Regional Development was prepared for the period 2014 – 2023. The central government’s institutions and agencies, local administrations, universities, and the state economic enterprises (KİTs) also prepared strategic plans.

Advocates of a presidential system, argue that it will bring greater efficiency and effectiveness. However, the state of emergency decrees and practices, and the urgent need to harmonize current legislation with recent constitutional amendments undermines strategic thinking and improvements in public administration.

Citations:
Kalkınma Bakanlığı, Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim Çalışma Grubu Raporu, Ankara, 2013.
Neşe Songör, “Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Stratejik Planlama ve Uygulamalara İlişkin Genel Bir Değerlendirme” Strategic Public Management Journal (SPMJ), Issue No: 1, October 2015, 56-78.
Stratejik Yönetimde Kapasite Geliştirme Teknik Destek Projesi Revize Edilmiş Taslak Boşluk Değerlendirme Raporu, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/html/54/Stratejik+Yonetimde+Kapasite+Gelistirme+Projesi, (accessed 27 October 2015)
Kamuda Stratejik Yönetim, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/kurum (accessed 27 October 2015)
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-15, ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-strategy-paper_en.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015)
“Kamu yönetimi sil baştan: Cumhurbaşkanlığına bağlı tarım, çevre ve ekonomi ofisleri kurulacak,” 31 October 2017, http://www.diken.com.tr/kamu-yonetimi-sil-bastan-cumhurbaskanligina-bagli-tarim-cevre-ve-ekonomi-ofisleri-kurulacak/ (accessed 1 November 2017)
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