Executive Summary

The year 2015, like years past, was marked by deep divides in Turkish politics and society. The war in Syria, however, has had a profound effect on politics and society in Turkey, as the terrorist attacks in Suruc and Ankara, the massive inflow of Syrian refugees and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) group have fueled tensions across the country and presented the government with major political challenges. Alleged end of the peace process between the Turkish state and the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was so promising in the years before. This will not only hamper economic opportunities in the southeast, but also the capacities to reinvigorate democratic governance in the years to come. Indeed, throughout the review period, the government continued to meet dissent with repressive tactics. When faced with dissent, the government has continued relying on repressive practices: open threats to the alleged opponents, be they activists or journalists, the latter of which have to operate under the conditions of financial threats, self-censorship and increased job insecurity.

Although the number of civil society organizations increased during the review period, their influence in decision-making processes remains limited. The massive polarization of the pro- and anti-government camps is present across all spheres of political, economic and social life. The negative effects of this divide were manifest in the aftermath of the parliamentary elections on 7 June 2015 that failed to deliver a coalition government in line with the constitution. This inability and/or unwillingness to engage in any kind of power-sharing agreement demonstrates a serious crisis of democratic politics and marks the first time in modern Turkish history that civilian politicians refused to accept parliamentary election results and reach across party lines. It was not until a second elections in November 2015 did the AKP acquire the absolute majority of parliamentary seats which allowed her to rule alone for the fourth time since 2002.

Electoral fairness, the AKP’s use of state resources and campaign finance transparency were major campaign issues in both parliamentary elections. Throughout both, the AKP failed to fully implement recommendations issued by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on campaign and party funding. However, the use of languages other than Turkish was permitted in both elections. Despite several improvements made to anti-discrimination
efforts, Alevi and Roma people still lack access to basic public services. Moreover, anti-Semitism in Turkish politics and society remains widespread. Authorities have begun to address gender issues, but violence against women persists and no improvements have been made to the gender gap in terms of educational attainment and economic participation. The inflow of Syrian refugees which, at the time of this writing, exceeds two million, is bound to have serious social, economic and political implications for both Turks and Syrians alike.

Economically, Turkey has enjoyed the benefits of robust growth. After dipping from the 2013 and 2014 GDP year-on-year growth rate of 2.9% to 2.5% in the first quarter of 2015, Turkey’s growth rate increased to 3.8% in the second quarter of 2015. In total, the Turkish economy is expected to grow by 3% in 2015. As of July 2015, the unemployment rate stood at 9.8%, whereas the annual inflation rate reached 7.6% in October 2015. The banking sector proved resilient against the effects of the global financial crisis thanks to robust capital buffers and a healthy loan portfolio. Turkey’s fiscal performance was also quite satisfactory throughout the review period. Looking ahead, Turkey will likely have to settle for modest growth as higher global interest rates will tighten external financing and lower economic momentum in Europe. Combined with growing geopolitical tensions, these developments will reduce demand for Turkish exports.

Sustainability in fields such as environmental protection, energy, urbanization and progress toward a high-tech, science-based society is not sufficiently assured. However, the government’s increased spending during the review period on a variety of areas (i.e., research and development, education, training, social policy and health care) marks a promising step forward.

In terms of international developments, the ongoing civil war in Syria and Iraq has had a tremendous impact on Turkey as large numbers of incoming refugees have crossed its border and the Islamic State (IS) group has carried out several attacks on its territory, which has also had a profound impact on tensions between the Turkish government and Kurds. With no foreseeable resolution to the country’s disputes with Cyprus, Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU have not advanced. However, during Turkey’s G-20 presidency in 2015, the government, state agencies and some non-governmental groups were able to take important steps forward on global issues such as the fight against terrorism, advancing socioeconomic prosperity and inclusiveness, and promoting energy and environmental sustainability.
Key Challenges

Turkey’s main problems are political and societal. Political stability versus political competition and participation, freedom of religion versus freedom from religion, majority-minority cleavages versus an integrated state and society – each issue presents a trade-off with its own political, social and international repercussions.

Nevertheless, the government should strengthen the people’s sovereignty at the expense of the tradition of the Kemalist state. Initially, the government was able to break the monopoly held by Kemalist state elites (the military and the judiciary) over state resources and policies. While some progress has been made in reforming institutions, shortcomings in civil rights persist. The government should further expand minority rights for Kurds, Alevis and Christians to increase their visibility and identification within the state and further encourage intra-societal peace, if not outright foster a pluralist, integrated society. The government should therefore enhance the powers of local and regional authorities as well as introduce mechanisms of democratic participation and subsidiarity. Additionally, the 10% electoral threshold should be reduced to increase smaller parties’ participation in national decision-making.

At the same time, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) should take more seriously domestic and international concerns of increasing authoritarianism of the Turkish state and of growing exclusivist conservatism at the expense of pluralism and liberalism within society. It should contribute to the peaceful inclusion of all societal groups. The successive monopoly of the AKP in government and the authoritarian stance of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against groups and media critical of the regime is not only a concern for foreign observers, but even more domestically, as continuing mass protests against the government and its policies have demonstrated since the Gezi protests. Generally, a more inclusive, reconciliatory rhetoric and better communication of the intentions behind policy initiatives are urgently needed. In this respect, international stakeholders, such as the EU and the Council of Europe, repeatedly exercise their influence on the Turkish government.

Despite the global financial crisis, Turkey’s economic performance has been above average. To sustain this positive development in the mid- and long-term, the government should refrain from short-term deficit spending. Although popular, such policies weaken Turkey’s international competitiveness.
Furthermore, the country should introduce structural reforms, possibly by extending the current EU-Turkey Customs Union Decision of 1995, which covers industrial commodities, to include as well agriculture, services and government procurement. Turkey’s relatively high current account deficit also remains a major problem which needs to be tackled through appropriate policies, including a real exchange rate policy.

During the review period, Turkey’s gradual demographic changes increasingly posed a problem. While a young and well-educated population is a boon and offers enormous potential, financial and social provisions for the elderly need to be addressed. In this context, the government should continue pension system reforms to avoid issues of social exclusion and poverty. Furthermore, the country’s record in environmental issues, public health care, education and technological innovation is poor when compared to other OECD countries. Since these are key elements to address in rapidly growing populations and economies, the government should increase expenditures in these fields.

While Turkey has become a major emerging economic power and a key regional player, as demonstrated by its performance in holding the G-20 presidency in 2015, it increasingly struggles with the repercussions of the internal conflicts in neighboring and regional Arab countries. Particularly with regard to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Turkey plays an important and crucial role, not only in humanitarian terms, but also as a stabilizing force, as it has shown in the past. In order to regain lost credibility and influence, Turkey should use all diplomatic means possible to re-establish trust, peace and security in the region, through close dialogue with reliable actors in the region and with its Western partners. Turkey’s international influence and credibility would further increase if the government became more involved and active in initiating and implementing international agreements, especially those of the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. An active continuation of reform processes in line with the acquis communautaire and in close cooperation with the European Commission is necessary both in terms of Turkey’s EU accession ambitions and sustainable democratization.
Policy Performance

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Over the past decade, Turkey has experienced important gains in income and living standards. Recently, it has also improved its competitiveness. The country is relatively well positioned in global competitiveness rankings, ranking 51st in the World Economic Forum’s 2015 – 2016 Global Competitiveness Index, and 55th in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking. The 1995 EU-Turkey customs union, and the EU accession process have played a considerable role in these achievements.

After rising 2.1% in 2012 and 4.2% in 2013, Turkey’s economy expanded by 2.9% in 2014. However, measured in U.S. dollars, GDP declined from $823 billion in 2013 to $798.3 billion in 2014 as a result of exchange-rate depreciation. The country’s slowdown since 2012 has been driven in part by the ongoing global financial crisis, and in part by Turkish policymakers’ desire to slow the economy in order to bring current account deficits under control. Other contributing factors include the fact that formerly booming regional Turkish export markets such as Syria and Iraq have been decimated by political instability and war.

Turkey’s inflation rate, based on the consumer price index, decreased from 8.9% in 2012 to 7.5% in 2013, but increased again to 8.9% in 2014. The country’s annual inflation rate in September 2015 was at 7.95%. Thus, headline inflation rate remains well above the central bank target of 5%. However, according to Turkey’s hourly-labor-cost index, the total hourly cost of employing labor increased by 11.5% in 2012, by 13% in 2013, and 11.5%
in 2014. According the most recent figures, the hourly labor costs increased by 12.8% on a year-over-year basis during the second quarter of 2015.

The banking sector has proved resilient in the face of global financial crisis thanks to robust capital buffers and a healthy loan portfolio. Turkey was the only OECD country in which no explicit or implicit public-sector support was provided to the banking sector in the wake of the 2008–2009 crisis. Turkey’s most significant economic problems are related to external imbalances. The current account deficit increased from $48.5 billion in 2012 (6.2% of GDP) to $64.7 billion in 2013 (7.9% of GDP). In 2014, the current-account deficit amounted to $46.5 billion, or 5.8% of GDP, and the latest publicly available (September 2014 – August 2015) annualized current account deficit amounted to $45.3 billion. Although moderate growth and a weaker lira narrowed the current-account deficit in 2014 from close to 10 percent in 2011, Turkey still faces a considerable current account deficit. In the meantime, net foreign direct investment has been on the decline, constituting 18.9% of the current-account deficit in 2012, 13.7% in 2013, and 12.3% in 2014.

According to the World Bank, the current account deficit is expected to fall to $34.6 billion (4.4% of GDP) in 2015 as a result of lower oil prices. But Turkey’s external financing requirement will still amount to about $200 billion since, in addition to a current account deficit of $34.6 billion, the country will need $166 billion to roll over existing external debt.

Turkey’s net international-investment position (NIIP), defined as the value of total external assets owned by Turkish residents in the rest of the world minus the value of total external liabilities of Turkish residents to the rest of the world, increased from –3.3 billion at the end of 2012 to -4.6 billion in 2013; this decreased to -0.5 billion at the end of 2014, but had again increased to -1.2 billion by the end of August 2015. The country’s net foreign debt at the end of August 2015 thus amounted to $371.2 billion. Considering the August 2015 figure for net foreign debt and the IMF’s estimate of GDP for 2015, the net-foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio for 2015 would be 51.4%.

It should be noted that the change in a country’s NIIP over time is determined largely by its current account balance as a share of GDP. Thus, if Turkey’s current-account deficit-to-GDP ratio were to remain at around 6%, and real GDP were to increase at its historical average annual growth rate of 5%, then the country’s net-foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio would increase over the long term to 126%, which is unsustainable. Turkey must therefore reduce its current account deficit to sustainable levels. Calculations show that a sustainable current account deficit-to-GDP ratio lies around 2%. Since one of the main determinants of the current-account-deficit-to-GDP ratio is the real exchange
rate, achieving sustainability with regard to the country’s current-account deficit will require a depreciating real exchange rate over time.

Turkey’s main assets include a young, dynamic population, a large domestic market, the country’s geographically strategic location, a strong infrastructure and much-improved public services. However, domestic and foreign investors remain deterred by unpredictability and a lack of transparency in the business climate, and a lack of trust in key institutions. Growth since 2012 has been moderate. In 2013–2014, election-related uncertainties, geopolitical developments, and concerns over the government’s handling of corruption allegations dampened confidence and weakened private demand. Moreover, Turkey has been vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment and, together with other emerging markets, has experienced significant currency and financial market volatility since mid-2013.

A major challenge facing Turkey is the reform of trade policy. Almost 20 years have passed since the EU-Turkey Customs Union Decision covering industrial commodities was signed. Negotiations over a free trade agreement between the EU and Turkey include the liberalization of agriculture, services and government procurement, which would help Turkey navigate the negative effects of a EU-U.S. free trade agreement in the form of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Intentions to begin reforming the Customs Union with an eye toward TTIP was made public by both Turkey and the EU in May 2015.


Labor Markets

Turkey’s population and work force are growing significantly. From 2012 to 2014, the country’s population increased by an estimated 2 million, to 77.7 million people. Likewise, the working-age population (those 15 years old and older) grew from 55 million in 2012 to 57 million in 2014, while the labor-force participation rate rose from 47.6% in 2012 to 50% in 2014, and again to 52.4% in July 2015. A total of 23.9 million people were officially registered as employed in 2012, rising to 25.9 million in 2014 and 27.3 million people in July 2015.

Employment figures in various sectors point to growing dynamism in Turkey’s economy and labor market. Since the global financial crisis, Turkey has created some 5.7 million jobs. The recent employment figures in the industrial and services sectors point to an increase of 198,250 jobs in industry from 2012
to 2013 and an increase of 563,250 jobs in the services sector for the same time period. These numbers grew once again by 214,000 and 851,500 respectively from 2013 to 2014. However, agricultural employment fell by 97,000 jobs from 2012 to 2013, increasing by 265,750 from 2013 to 2014.

The official number of unemployed increased from 2.4 million in 2013 to 2.9 million in 2014, and further to 3 million by July 2015. The increase in unemployment shows that the number of new entrants to the labor force outnumbered the number of jobs created, reflecting demographic factors as well as the slowdown of the Turkish economy. The overall unemployment rate increased from 9% in 2013 to 9.9% in 2014. By July 2015, the unemployment rate stood at 9.8%. Unemployment rose in the non-agricultural sectors from 10.9% in 2013 to 12% in 2014, and remained at 12% by July 2015. Informal employment represented 32.8% of total employment in July 2014 and increased to 35% by July 2015.

A major challenge facing the government in the medium term is to create more and better jobs for Turkey’s young and growing population, since many young people (15 to 24 years old) are neither in employment nor in education (NEET). The unemployment rate of young people increased from 15.8% in 2012 to 18.3% in July 2015.

Another major medium-term challenge for Turkey is to boost women’s participation rate in the labor force. Despite notable job-creation successes in recent years, almost half of Turkey’s working-age population fails to enter the labor market, a problem accounted for in large part by women’s low participation rates. As of July 2015, Turkey’s female population aged 15 years and older amounted to 29.3 million, of which only 8.3 million were employed, which represents an employment rate of 28.3%. According to the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Global Gender Gap Report, Turkey ranks 125th out of 142 countries in terms of women’s economic participation and opportunity.

The World Bank (2015) points to labor market rigidity and high labor costs as important constraints to job creation in Turkey. Minimum wages are high, and Turkey has a very generous severance payment system. The government’s recently approved National Employment Strategy includes measures to reform the severance payment scheme, unemployment benefits and temporary work contracts.

Citation:
Taxes

General government revenue increased from 37.8% of GDP in 2012 to 40% of GDP in 2013, falling to 39.1% of GDP in 2014. In 2012, taxes accounted for 53.2% of government revenue. This share increased slightly to 53.5% in 2013, and then decreased to 52.5% in 2014. As a result, tax revenue totaled 20.2% of GDP in 2012, 21.4% of GDP in 2013, and 20.5% of GDP in 2014.

The taxation system can be divided into three categories: direct taxes such as the individual-income tax and corporate-income tax; indirect taxes such as the value added tax (VAT), the banking and insurance-transaction tax, the special consumption tax, and the telecommunications tax; and other government revenues drawn from factor incomes, social funds and privatization revenues. In 2014, individual-income tax rates varied from 15% to 35%. The standard corporate tax rate is 20%, while capital gains are usually treated as regular income and taxed accordingly.

Biased toward indirect taxes, Turkey’s taxation system does not take into consideration horizontal or vertical equity. This gives the government more flexibility to react to changes in Turkey’s highly dynamic and volatile economy but, at the same time, decreases fiscal stability and political credibility, particularly concerning the special consumption tax. In 2012, 66.6% of total tax revenues were derived from indirect taxes. This share increased in 2013 to 69.1%, and decreased to 67.2% in 2014.


Budgets

Total general government expenditures as a share of GDP increased from 38.8% in 2012 to 40.7% in 2013, falling to 39.8% in 2014. Interest payments on public debt amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 2012, 3.2% in 2013, and 2.8% in 2014. During the period under review, there were some changes in the composition of government expenditure, such as the share of current expenditures, investment expenditures and transfer expenditures in GDP. Current expenditures increased from 17.5% of GDP in 2012 to 18% in 2013, and then decreased to 17.8% of GDP in 2014. Public-investment expenditures increased from 3.5% of GDP in 2012 to 4.2% in 2013, and then decreased to 4.1% in 2014. Current transfers increased from 17.8% of GDP in 2012 to 18.5% in 2013, and declined to 18% in 2014.

As of the end of 2012, gross public debt totaled 39.7% of GDP. After
increasing slightly in 2013 to 39.8%, the gross-debt-to-GDP ratio decreased in 2014 to 36.9%. On the other hand, the net-public-debt-to-GDP ratio decreased from 17% in 2012 to 12.6% in 2013, and further to 10.6% in 2014. In sum, Turkey’s fiscal policy has been sustainable.

**Research and Innovation**

The government continued to strengthen the country’s research and innovation capacity during the review period. The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) is the leading agency for management, funding and conduct of research in Turkey.

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the government’s provision for R&D increased from $2.5 billion in 2012 to $3.1 billion in 2013. Total R&D spending by the public and private sectors as a fraction of GDP in 2013 was 0.95%. Commercial enterprises account for the largest share of R&D expenditures, at 47.5%. While universities accounted for 42.1% of spending on R&D, public institutions’ share was 10.4%. In terms of financial contributions to R&D projects, commercial enterprises have the largest share with 49.3%, followed by public institutions with 26.8%, universities with 20.6%, and other sources 3.3% of R&D. In terms of full-time employment, 196,321 people worked in the R&D sector in 2013, an increase of 6.5% compared with the previous year. 35.2% of R&D personnel were employed by commercial enterprises, while 57.2% worked at universities, and public institutions employed 7.1% of R&D personnel.

In 2013, Turkey adopted the Tenth Development Plan, covering the period 2014-18, aiming to improve science, technology and innovation, as one of the building blocks for innovative production and steady growth. In Turkey, the Supreme Council for Science and Technology (SCST) is the highest ranking science and technology policymaking body in Turkey. In the last few SCST meetings, emphasis was placed on intensifying R&D efforts in the energy, health and biotechnology sectors, and providing subsidies to R&D laboratories of multinational enterprises that would be established in Turkey.


**Global Financial System**

Turkey actively contributes to the G-20’s work. On 1 December 2014, Turkey assumed the G-20 presidency and its priorities, including ensuring global economic and financial stability, reforming the global economic system by reflecting the increasing weight of emerging economies; achieving inclusive and robust economic growth; and addressing problems related to trade,
logistics, small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), employment, strengthening gender equality in employment, security, climate change and migration. Apart from many meetings on the ministerial level throughout 2015, Turkey held the Think-20 Summit (13-15 November, in Antalya), the Labor-20 Summit (13-14 November, in Antalya), the Business-20 Summit (14-15 November, in Antalya), and the G-20 leaders’ summit (15-16 November, in Antalya). In addition, Turkey hosted the G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers Meeting (8 October 2015, in Ankara), the G-20 Trade Ministers Meeting (5-6 October 2015 in Istanbul), and the OECD/G-20 Global Forum on International Investment (5 October 2015, in Istanbul). Acknowledging that the meetings and summits produced numerous working documents, communiqués, plans of action or intentions to increasing cooperation, the Turkish presidency seems to have been effective in its role as an agenda-setter and provider of the platform for negotiations and talks. One of the main outcomes of the working summits of the G-20 Ministers of Finance and Heads of the Central Banks was the agreement on rules to fight against tax evasion (or the G-20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan) committed by multinational enterprises which account for billions of U.S. dollars in losses to public budgets. Moreover, under Turkey’s G-20 presidency, a so called SME Finance Forum was launched. Established by the G-20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) and managed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, the SME Finance Forum brings together financial institutions, technology companies, and development finance institutions to share knowledge, spur innovation, and promote the growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

consisting of eight years of primary school (4+4) and four years of secondary school was introduced. A child can now expect to receive 14 years of overall schooling, including two years of pre-school.

Over the years Turkey has made significant progress in increasing access to schools. In the 2013 – 2014 school year, it achieved almost universal primary school enrollment. Secondary-school enrollment was 76.7% during the same year. The government is actively seeking to expand secondary school enrollment to comply with the new “4+4+4” law on education. The gender-based enrollment gap has nearly disappeared for primary education, and has narrowed significantly for secondary education. However, Turkey is ranked 105th out of 142 countries in terms of educational attainment in the Gender Gap 2014 Report. The report indicates that 92% of females and 98% of males are literate; the enrollment rate in primary education is 93% for females and 95% for males; the enrollment rate in secondary education is 80% for females and 84% for males; and the enrollment rate in tertiary education is 64% for females and 75% for males. On the other hand, pre-primary-education participation rates among three- to five-year olds are increasing rapidly, as are higher-education enrollment rates, but both remain well below the OECD average.

Regarding the quality of education, the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) scores Turkey’s performance still relatively low. Although Turkey’s scores have improved significantly over time, and inequality in student performance has declined. The performance of Turkey’s average 15-year-old in reading, mathematics, and science is 35 points behind the OECD average. Furthermore, Turkey has a higher-than-average proportion of underperforming students, and academic achievement is particularly low among disadvantaged students from low socioeconomic backgrounds. In addition, around 22% of Turkish 15-year-olds do not read well enough to be able to analyze and understand what they read.

As the government seeks to improve the quality of education, education spending has become the largest item in the national budget. Expenditure in this area now accounts for nearly a quarter of tax revenues. The proportion of GDP allocated to education from the government budget has increased significantly, from 2.5% in 2000 to 4.2% during 2011.

National examinations select and place students within secondary and tertiary institutions. Parents, particularly those who are educated and have relatively high incomes, often seek tutoring services to prepare their children for the national examinations, thus improving their chances of entering top schools and universities. However, Turkey adopted legislation to close private
Preparatory schools for university entrance exams by 1 September 2015 – a step that was widely seen as related to internal quarrels within the government.

The government seeks to align its tertiary-education standards with those in the EU. Currently, Turkey has 176 universities, but significant quality differences persist. There is no independent and fully functional quality-assurance and accreditation agency. Participation in the Youth in Action program has continued to grow. In May 2014, Turkey became a full participant in the Erasmus+ program. In May 2014, the Higher Education Council (YÖK), Turkey’s supreme decision making body for universities and higher education, published a road map for enhancing higher-education system quality. Despite announcements on the issue, the government has thus far refrained from strengthening universities’ autonomy.

According to the OECD (2014), Turkey has one of the highest earnings premiums among OECD countries. In 2012, adults with a tertiary education earned 91% more on average than an adult with an upper secondary education, compared with the OECD average of 59%. An adult with an upper secondary education also earned 37% more than an adult with a below upper secondary education, compared with the OECD average difference of 22%. Furthermore, the 2014 OECD study notes that tertiary attainment levels continue to increase particularly among young adults; a high proportion of females graduate from computing, sciences, engineering and mathematics academic (tertiary-type A) programs; investment in education is below average of OECD countries; and teachers in Turkey earn low salaries by international standards but are relatively well paid within Turkey.

Citation:

Social Inclusion

Despite an improved Gini coefficient – falling from 42.2 in 2003 to 39.1 in 2014 – income distribution in Turkey continues to be among the OECD’s most unequal. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the highest income group forming 20% of population receives 45.9% of income in the economy, the lowest 20% of population receives only 6.2%.
According to the World Bank (2015), extreme poverty fell from 13% in 2002 to 4.5% in 2012, while moderate poverty fell from 44% to 21% over the same period. It should be noted here that the World Bank defines extreme poverty and moderate poverty using the World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia regional poverty line of $2.5 and $5 per day in terms of purchasing power parity. In 2014, the share of the population living below the poverty line was 15%. Whereas 27.7% of the illiterate population live below the poverty line, 1.3% of university graduates live in poverty. Poverty in Turkey is particularly prevalent among the less educated, workers in the informal market, unpaid family workers, among the rural population and among elderly people.

According to United Nations Development Program’s 2014 Human Development Report, the Human Development Index increased from 0.671 in 2005 to 0.759 in 2013, placing Turkey in the high human development group. However, Turkey’s inequality-adjusted Human Development Index is 16% lower than its nominal Human Development Index. A large share of this inequality is explained by such factors such as birthplace and parental education levels.

The government has developed an integrated social-assistance system geared toward helping welfare recipients get out of poverty. Social-assistance spending has increased rapidly in recent years, amounting to 1.26% of GDP in 2013. But there is still room to increase the generosity of benefits, as only about 10% of beneficiary household consumption is covered by social-assistance transfers. Since 2011 responsibility for all central-government social-assistance benefits has been combined under the new Ministry of Family and Social Policies. This ministry has worked to strengthen social inclusion. The government has been implementing an Integrated Social Assistance Information System, using a single proxy means test to target benefits more effectively. Links between the social assistance system and active labor-market policies implemented by ISKUR are being strengthened.


Health

The 2003 Health Transformation Program has produced significant improvements in Turkey’s health care system in terms of access, insurance coverage, and services. As a result, the health status of Turkey’s population has improved significantly. In particular, maternal mortality rate fell from 28.5 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2005 to 15.94 deaths in 2013. There has also been a sharp decline in infant mortality from 20.3 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2005 to 12 in 2012. As a result, Turkey has met its Millennium
Development Goal target on both counts.

Recently, new legislation was introduced restructuring the Ministry of Health and its subordinate units, while enhancing its role in health-system policy development, planning, monitoring and evaluation. A new public health institution has been established to support the work of the Ministry of Health in the area of preventive health care services.

Turkey has increased access to and utilization of health services by expanding health-insurance coverage. The targeted Green Card Program for the poor and its integration into the social-security system has increased coverage considerably. The introduction of family-physician practices helped increase coverage further. The Family Medicine Program introduced in 2010 assigned each patient to a specific doctor. The program was established throughout the country. Currently, Community Health Centers provide free-of-charge logistical support to family physicians for priority services such as vaccination campaigns, maternal and child health and family planning services.

By 2014, Turkey had achieved near-universal health-insurance coverage, increasing financial security and improving equity in access to health care nationwide. The scope of the vaccination program has been broadened; the scope of newborn screening and support programs have been extended; community-based mental-health services have been created; and cancer screening centers offering free services have been established in many cities.

As emphasized by the World Bank (2015), the key challenge in health care is to keep costs under control as demand for health care increases, the population ages, and new technologies are introduced. Total health expenditure as a share of GDP has been increasing steadily since 2003, reaching 5.4% in 2012. In 2012, 77% of this spending was funded by public sources, as compared to a 62.9% public share in 2000. According to the OECD, the supply of health workers has increased considerably over the last decade. The number of doctors per capita has risen considerably since 2000, from 1.3 doctors per 1,000 people in 2000 to 1.7 in 2012; similarly, the number of nurses has increased from 1 nurse per 1,000 people in 2000 to 1.8 nurses in 2012. In 2000, there were two hospital beds per 1,000 people, a figure that had risen to 2.7 beds per 1,000 in 2012. As a result of these achievements, life expectancy at birth has increased from an average of 71.1 years in 2000 to 74.6 in 2012 (72 years for men, 77.2 years for women).

As access has widened, the government has focused attention on efficiency improvements and cost control, while maintaining high-quality services for the entire population. The authorities have launched an ambitious health public-
private partnership program, aiming to leverage private funding and efficiencies in the management of integrated new hospital campuses, while redeveloping existing hospital buildings as part of ongoing urban renewal efforts.


Families

In July 2015, female population has amounted to 29.3 million, and of this population 9.5 million women formed the labor force. Since 8.3 million women were employed, the unemployed amounted to 1.2 million. While the labor force-participation rate for women amounted to 32.4%, the employment rate for women was 28.3%, and the unemployment rate amounted to 12.5%. Women’s rate of participation in the labor market thus remains low, far below the EU average.

Among women in the labor force, 34% are employed in agriculture, 14.6% in industry and 51.4% in services. About 48% of working women are not registered with any social security institution. In this respect, there are both sectoral and regional disparities. Paid maternity leave is 16 weeks.

Several national and local-level initiatives in recent years have ostensibly been aimed at helping women become more employable, helping them find more and higher-quality jobs, and in general helping to remove obstacles to their participation in the workforce. However, there have been many shortcomings in the implementation and proper monitoring of these policies.

In general, the government’s conservative stance on women and family affairs (e.g. concerning the number of children, or women’s roles) has provoked ongoing public debate on gender equality in the labor market and public life more generally.

Citation:
Pensions

Turkey’s social security and general health insurance law, passed in 2006 and implemented in October 2008, radically reformed the country’s previous pension and health system. The reforms put an end to the unequal, corporatist character and fragmented structure of the previous system and made the Social Security Institution responsible for managing provisions. With the new changes, the state began to contribute to the system, in addition to employers and employees. The new law specifically set out to cover all social groups, including individuals not formally employed, and guarantees equal access to health care. In addition, those under 18 years of age are covered by health insurance without having to pay premiums. The 2008 reform adjusted pension rules by gradually increasing the retirement age and contribution period, and reducing the accrual rate.

The 2008 social-security reform improved the coverage provided by public pensions, and is expected to yield significant savings, but these are insufficient to ensure pension-system balance over the long term. The World Bank (2015) notes that pension spending in Turkey, at around 7% of GDP, is still modest in comparison to high-income OECD countries. This reflects the relatively young population, and the fact that due to the system’s high dependency ratio and generous eligibility rules (including early retirement and low minimum years of service), more than half the country’s pension spending is financed through budget transfers. The 2008 reform adjusted pension parameters, gradually increasing the retirement age and contribution period, and reducing the accrual rate. But these adjustments will be phased in over a period of several decades, too slowly to counter the effects of expanded coverage and a maturing population. For this reason, pension-system deficits are expected to remain around 3% of GDP until the middle of the century.

Under the new pension law, which came into force on January 1, 2013, the government matches 25% of individual contributions up to a gross monthly salary of around EUR 410. Participants will gain access to government contributions through a gradual vesting system – 15% after the first three years, 35% after six years, 60% after 10 years and 100% at retirement at the age of 56. The reform was aimed at widening system coverage and making the system more progressive, and could be an important step in making pensions far more attractive.

Citation:
Integration

Turkey’s new Law on Foreigners and International Protection took effect in April 2014. On the same date, the General Directorate for Migration Management officially took on responsibility for implementing the law with a view to bringing Turkey in line with EU and international standards.

Turkey is increasingly becoming a country of destination for regular migration. At the same time, it also remains a notable transit and destination country for irregular migration. Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Turkey has hosted a large number of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, Turkey witnessed an unprecedented increase in asylum applications from Afghans, Iraqis and Iranians. Turkey has been following an open-door policy for refugees. There are about two million Syrian refugees, 100,000 Iraqi refugees, and more than 50,000 Afghan refugees in Turkey. Turkey is hosting a large number of these refugees in refugee camps equipped with schooling, health care and social services, while nearly 60% of refugees are living in cities. According to Turkish sources, the humanitarian response has cost Turkey about $6.5 billion. Yet, apart from the necessary emergency support, the authorities are reluctant to officially accept a long-term presence of refugees in the country and therefore do not actively pursue sustainable integration policies.

Most refugees, in particular women and children, are susceptible to exploitation. Poverty, insufficient health and educational facilities are major issues. A governmental draft law on work permits for certain group of refugees was prepared but, due to the recent elections in Turkey, not adopted. Whether refugees should stay or move beyond Turkey’s borders is a subject of considerable debate among the Turkish public. Initially perceived in terms of humanitarian issues, many people are increasingly concerned about the long-term negative social and economic effects of refugees remaining in Turkey. Turkey’s open-door policy has conflicted with the efforts of some European governments stem the flow of migrants by restricting access. In an effort to manage the influx of refugees more sensibly, the EU sought to seal a deal with Ankara by November 2015, offering Turkey potentially up to three billion euros in aid and the prospect of easier travel visas and revitalized accession talks in return for its help with stemming the flow of refugees to Europe.

Citation:
The Guardian, ‘Istanbul has more Syrian refugees than all of Europe says David Miliband’ (October 27, 2015).
Safe Living

According to the OECD, in Turkey, 5.0% of respondents report having been victims of assault in 2014, which is higher than the OECD average of 3.9%. The survey indicates that 62% of respondents say they feel safe walking alone at night, which is lower than the OECD average of 69%. More recently, acts of terrorism carried out by domestic (PKK) and international (IS group) groups have become an important issue, raising considerable doubt about state authorities’ capacity to effectively combat terrorist cells and groups. Bombings before and after the June 7 elections increased security and safety concerns, and since then, some 400 people have been killed in terrorist-related or other incidents associated with the escalation of violence in the southeast. Since the beginning of 2015, homicides and the murder of women (honor crimes) have also increased. As of the end of October 2015, a total of 249 women were killed by men (i.e., a husband, lover or another man).

The General Directorate of Security was allocated an annual budget of €5.45 billion in 2014 and 71% of this budget was spent for personnel expenditures. About €5 billion was spent for public order and security as part of the functional budget. In 2015, the directorate’s total budget reached €5.67 billion. Some €5.38 billion of this sum has been allocated in 2015 to the public order and security category. About 270,000 personnel are employed by the directorate, which means 360 police per 100,000 inhabitants. The Turkish National Police (TNP) collaborates extensively with domestic partners as well as international organizations such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, SECI, AGIT, BM, CEPOL, and FRONTEX. Moreover, the TNP has introduced an e-government infrastructure in many divisions, and initiated several projects intended to bring operations into harmony with the EU acquis communautaire. EU-funded capacity development projects for judicial sciences were completed in Adana, Diyarbakır and İzmir. Several projects were also initiated by the Directorate such as the Security Department Law Enforcement Services, the Missing Person Alarm System, or the Media Monitoring System. Except for logistical matters and work conditions, all major departments of the directorate achieved their performance objectives in the year 2014.

In 2010, the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Safety was established to develop policies and strategies to combat terrorism and to coordinate among the relevant institutions and agencies. As of the end of 2014, a total of 96
personnel were employed by the undersecretariat. Several national and international activities including surveys, publications on resolving the Kurdish issue were conducted in particular. The number of special security service companies reached 1,330 in 2014, and 233,457 people were employed in this sector by the end of 2014.

In August 2014, the government submitted to parliament for ratification the CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, which was signed in 1981. Moreover, the government submitted a draft bill concerning the protection of personal data, and a separate bill for the establishment of an Anti-Discrimination and Equality Board that has to date not been passed.

As a reaction to mass demonstrations, a controversial “domestic security” bill (Law No. 6638) amending the Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Powers of Police was adopted by parliament in March 2015. As a result, police chiefs can now order that a person, their belongings and private vehicle be searched if they have obtained the written or oral permission of administrative chiefs.

Many observers argue that Turkey needs a holistic, integrated and well-coordinated and centralized domestic security policy.

Global Inequalities

During the period under review, Turkey used development assistance to advance social inclusion and development beyond its borders. The government expanded its annual official development assistance (ODA) disbursements from $967 million in 2010 to $4.5 billion in 2015. The increase in ODA was mostly related to its response to the refugee crisis in Syria. Aid to Syrian refugees, provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD),
amounted to $1.6 billion in 2013. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.32% in 2012 to 0.54% in 2015.

Turkey’s development cooperation is provided in line with the Statutory Decree on the Organization and Duties of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), adopted in 2011. Turkey engages in bilateral development cooperation mostly with South and Central Asia and the Middle East, but also with Africa. Social infrastructure and services, notably education and health, as well as governance and civil-society capacity-building efforts comprise the priority areas of Turkey’s bilateral development cooperation.

Under the auspices of the United Nations, Turkey will organize the first World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

Sustainable development policies gained in importance in Turkey as part of the EU accession process, which involved the country taking steps forward in environmental policy and legislation. The environmental chapter (Chapter 27) of the EU acquis was opened in 2009. In terms of environmental impact assessments, Turkey is generally in line with EU environmental legislation. In recent years, considerable progress has been made toward establishing emissions controls, the use of renewable energies and promoting energy efficiency. In the 2014 Environmental Performance Index, Turkey was ranked 66th out of 178 countries. In the 2014 Climate Change Performance Index, Turkey was described as showing “very poor performance,” and was ranked 54th out of 61 countries, climbing three positions compared to the previous year. Turkey’s greenhouse-gas emissions rose by 5.1% in the 2010 – 2011 period, and by 3.7% in 2011 – 2012. Whether the slowdown in this rate of growth is due to past legal and structural reforms and/or technical improvements is a matter of growing debate.

Progress has also been made in terms of regulating air quality and industrial pollution, though it will take time and considerable funding for this legislation to undergo full implementation. On 2 April 2015, the Turkish Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning adopted a new regulation on waste management based on the EU’s Waste Framework Directive (2008/98/EC). The regulation that will take effect immediately is intended to manage waste with minimal harm to the environment and human health, decrease waste
produced, increase the re-use and recycling of waste, and supervise the market in terms of environmental protection.

The European Commission confirms that the enforcement of new legislation in Turkey has remained rather weak. While the country’s legislative alignment has made significant progress, implementation will require time and significant funding. Achieving full alignment with the EU acquis with regard to environmental policy will be quite challenging for Turkey. Large investments will be required to achieve EU environmental-quality standards in a wide range of areas, including water and air quality; integrated pollution prevention and control; management of municipal and hazardous waste and chemical products; biotechnology; radiation protection; and nature conservation. Improving compliance, while maintaining cost competitiveness, will be a key challenge for Turkey in the years ahead. Investments targeting the implementation of the EU environmental acquis are expected to place an increasing burden on Turkey’s public sector finances over the next two decades.

Although public awareness of environmental issues and climate change has been rising in Turkey in recent years, even within inner-government circles, obstacles remain significant. Environmental problems are perceived primarily as potential risks to the country’s economic development and as challenges to be addressed through technology and by those in positions of power at the top. These views are reflected in the government’s eschewal of support for renewable-energy and energy-efficient projects and plan instead to increase significantly the number of dams and hydroelectric plants, despite the disruption of environmental and social balances associated with such projects.

European Commission, Turkey Progress Report, November 2015

Global Environmental Protection

As a member of the OECD and the G-20, and as an EU accession candidate, Turkey has set sustainable-development targets. These are also a main concern of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Turkey’s Climate Change Action Plan 2011 – 2023 stresses its adherence to international commitments, standards and measures, and foresees increasing cooperation with international actors,
especially in the fields of combating climate change and improving energy efficiency, along with an active role in international activities more generally. In 2012, Turkey hosted a joint project with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on protected marine areas. In this area, Turkey has made remarkable achievements with regard to fulfilling its commitments to protect the health, wealth and sustainability of marine ecosystems, as well as the biodiversity, goods and services they provide. The government planned to include the topic of climate change on its G-20 presidency agenda and thereby send a strong message from the G-20 Antalya summit to the Paris summit on climate change. Although this intention was overshadowed by the Paris terrorist attacks, Turkey was able to push several issues forward through its G-20 presidency. These include the G-20 Principles on Energy Collaboration (established in 2012), which recognize the need to support the poor through the consideration of energy access, energy efficiency, renewable energy, market transparency, and the rationalization and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption. As a result, the G-20 Ministers of Energy adopted a G-20 Toolkit of Voluntary Options on Renewable Energy Deployment and a G-20 Energy Access Action Plan, the Voluntary Collaboration on Energy Access. The first phase of this plan focuses on enhancing electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa where lack of access is most acute. Moreover, the G-20 leaders finally endorsed the G-20 Action Plan on Food Security and Sustainable Food Systems which underlines the countries’ commitment to improve global food security and nutrition and which aims to ensure environmentally, socially and economically sustainable means of food production, consumption and purchase.

Citation:
Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

The Turkish Constitution, Law 298 on the basic principles of elections and the electoral registry, Law 2839 on deputies’ elections, and Law 2972 on local-administration elections lay the legal groundwork for fair and orderly elections and prevent discrimination against any political party or candidate. However, the relative freedom given to each political party’s central executive committee in determining party candidates (by Law 2820 on political parties, Article 37) renders the candidate-nomination process rather centralized, antidemocratic and exclusionary. The parliament weakened the centralization of political parties’ leadership somewhat in 2014 with the passage of a law permitting co-leadership structures. Some restrictions on candidacy rights are incompatible with Paragraph 7.5 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document and similar international documents.

The nationwide 10% electoral threshold for parliamentary elections (Law 2839 on deputies’ elections, Article 33) is a major obstacle for all small political parties. In 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found the 10% electoral threshold to be excessive, but not in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (ECHR) Protocol 1 Article 3. As of November 2015, there were 100 registered political parties, although only 20 participated in the June 7 parliamentary elections, and 16 in the subsequent November 1 elections. The share of the representation of valid votes rose to 97% during the last two parliamentary elections. Parties’ executive boards typically determine their parties’ candidate lists, with the exception of the Republican People’s Party, which holds a primary-election vote. An independent candidate who secures a majority of votes in his or her electoral district is allowed to take a parliamentary seat without regard to the nationwide threshold.

Although there is no legal obstacle barring women from standing as candidates, issues of gender inequality and access to financing render their participation doubly difficult. The number of women candidates fluctuated in the June 7 and November 1 elections, with the number of women deputies ultimately dropping from 79 to 76. A bill permitting political parties and candidates to use any language or dialect in their campaigning, including
Written material, was passed by the parliament in April 2014.

Presidential candidates are not asked to pay a nomination fee; however, political parties require parliamentary candidates to pay a fee ranging from €185 to €2,800. Women candidates are generally asked to pay half or less of the fee required from male candidates. Most political parties do not ask for a nomination fee from disabled candidates. Independent candidates face greater obstacles, as they must submit a nomination petition along with a fee of about €3,279 (TRY 10,167). This fee is held by the revenue department of the provincial election board where the candidate is standing for election. If the independent candidate fails to be elected, this fee is registered as revenue by the Treasury.

In April 2014, the parliament agreed that political parties receiving more than 3% of the total number of valid votes cast in a general election would receive treasury funds, thus making small parties more competitive in campaigning. The People’s Democracy Party was slated to begin receiving these funds in 2016.

Citation:

According to Law 3984 on the establishment of radio and television enterprises and broadcasts, “equality of opportunity shall be established among political parties and democratic groups; broadcasts shall not be biased or partial; broadcasts shall not violate the principles of election bans which are determined at election times.”

Currently, most mainstream media companies, including the state-owned radio and television company (TRT), are either directly or indirectly controlled by the government. Privately owned media outlets face either judicial or financial investigations, and media freedom is thus being placed at risk in an unconstitutional manner. A member of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) revealed that in the period before the parliamentary elections
(1 – 25 October 2015), the TRT provided 30 hours of coverage to the prime minister, in comparison to five hours for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader, 70 minutes for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and only 18 minutes for the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) leaders. During the same period of time, the 12 nationwide television channels, including the TRT, allocated 138 hours of live broadcasting time to covering President Erdoğan’s various activities.

In general, the existing structure of media ownership, the degree of cartelization and the media’s business relations with the state violate the provisions of Law 3984, Article 29. The current legal framework easily enables the authorities to block Turkish residents’ access to Internet sites and other electronic media. The incidence of violence against journalists and media outlets has increased. During the elections, the environment was characterized by media politicization, limited criticism of the government, the closure of several television channels that had been critical of the government, and judicial investigations against these channels on charges of supporting terrorism.


All Turkish nationals over the age of 18 can exercise the right to vote (Constitution, Article 67). The Supreme Election Board is the sole authority in the administration of Turkish elections (Law 298, Article 10). The General Directorate of the Electoral Registry, a part of the Supreme Election Board, prepares, maintains and renews the nationwide electoral registry.

Armed-services privates and corporals in active duty, military-school students, and currently imprisoned convicts cannot vote. The Supreme Election Board determines measures to be taken to ensure the safety of the vote-counting process.

In 2008, the parliament passed a law facilitating voting for Turkish citizens who are not living or present in Turkey during elections (Law 5749). In the
2015 parliamentary elections, about 54 million voters were registered domestically, along with an additional 2.8 million voters living abroad. More than 1 million voters cast their votes abroad. The distance of polling stations from residents’ homes and the comparatively short voting period can be considered as potentially major obstacles to voting.

Turkey has a passive electoral registration system maintained by the Supreme Election Board. Despite the recent revision of the national electoral registry based on an address-registration system, critics have noted that the number of registered voters and the number of eligible citizens registered in the address system do not match. These critics argue that about 672,000 citizens are missing from the electoral rolls. However, OSCE reports have judged the registration process to be reliable and inclusive.

Parliamentary and local elections are conducted by local election boards under the supervision of the Supreme Election Board. These local boards verify election returns and conduct investigations of irregularities, complaints and objections, with the national board providing a final check. The Vote and Beyond, a non-governmental organization, reported no significant violations of the law at the polling stations in 2015.

Disabled voters sometimes face difficulties if the polling stations lack appropriate access facilities.

Citation:

Article 60 of Law 2820 requires political-party organs at every level to keep a membership register, a decision book, a register for incoming and outgoing documents, an income and expenditure book, and an inventory list. According to Article 73 of Law 2820, political parties must prepare yearly statements of revenues and expenditures, at both the party-headquarters and provincial levels. However, Turkish law does not regulate the financing of party or independent-candidate electoral campaigns. Presidential candidates’ campaign finances are regulated by Law No. 6271; these candidates can legally accept contributions and other aid only from natural persons having Turkish
nationality. However, the Supreme Election Board has allowed political parties to organize campaign activities and purchase advertisements for their candidates in a way unregulated by law. Thus, the state aid provided to the political parties can be used indirectly for presidential-campaign activities.

There is no legal ceiling for campaign expenditures. Law No. 2820 (Article 66) enables organizations such as unions or professional organizations to contribute to political parties. The finances of candidates in local and parliamentary elections are not regulated by law. There is no specific reporting obligation for campaign contributors, apart from a general requirement, based on the Tax Procedure Code, for individuals to declare expenses (which could include political contributions) to the tax authorities. Pursuant to Article 69 of the constitution, Article 74 of Law 2820 stipulates that political-party finances must be audited by the Constitutional Court to verify whether the parties’ property acquisitions, revenues and expenditures are in compliance with the law. Auditing decisions by the Constitutional Court are published in the Official Gazette. The review report of the Supreme Election Board on presidential candidates’ campaigns must be announced within a month of the audit’s completion. However, the law does not specify where the audit result shall be announced.

The Constitutional Court, with the assistance of the Court of Accounts, examines the accuracy of information contained in a party’s final accounts and the legality of recorded revenues and expenditures on the basis of information at hand and documents provided. Before the court’s examination, party accounts must be audited by certified experts. Law 2820 contains criminal, administrative and civil sanctions that can be imposed on political parties, party officials, party candidates or other persons (such as political-party donors). Political parties’ illegal income and expenditures are forfeited to the Treasury. The big parties, including the AKP and the CHP, have been subject to sanctions of this kind in recent years.

In a recent amendment to the campaign law, the minimum threshold qualifying a party for annual state aid was reduced from 7% to 3% of the valid votes in the most recent general elections. State aid accounts for about 50% to 65% of the major political parties’ official income for the period 2002-2011.

Ceilings for donations to political parties by private individuals are revaluated each year. This level was approximately €8,000 in 2015. However, donations are often not properly or systematically recorded – for example, cash and in-kind contributions or expenditures made in support of parties or candidates during elections are not recorded. The funds collected and expenditures incurred by individual elected representatives or candidates in the course of
party-political activities, including electoral campaigning, are not included in party accounts. Party accounts published in the Official Gazette provide only general figures and potential infringements. The accuracy of the financial reports posted by political parties online needs to be examined. Critics have argued that discretionary funds controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and the president were used for the incumbent party’s campaigns.

During the period under review, GRECO found that no tangible progress has been made in Turkey since the adoption of the Second Compliance Report on Transparency of Party Funding in March 2014. No legal framework for auditing election campaigns or individual candidates’ finances at the local or parliamentary level exists.


According to Article 67 of the constitution, all citizens over 18 years old have the right to take part in referendums. Referendums are held in accordance with the principles of free, equal, secret and direct universal suffrage, with votes counted publicly. In recent years, referendums were held to amend the 1982 constitution. Paragraph 3 of Article 175 of the constitution reads that, if the parliament adopts a draft constitutional amendment referred by the president by a two-thirds majority, the president may submit the law to a referendum. Laws related to constitutional amendments that are the subject of a referendum must be supported by more than half of the valid votes cast in order to be approved.

If a law on an amendment to the constitution is adopted by at least a three-fifths majority but less than a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Grand National Assembly, and is not sent back to the Assembly for reconsideration by the president, it is then published in the Official Gazette and submitted to a referendum.

A law on a constitutional amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly directly or upon the return of the law by the president may be submitted to a referendum by the president.
Popular decision-making is also possible at the local level. Law 5593 on municipalities (Article 76) enables city councils to implement policies for the benefit of the public. Yet these units are not wholly effective, as they depend upon the goodwill of the local mayor, and some councils exist on paper only and have yet to be established in fact.

Turkey has not signed the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).

**Citation:**
Emine Behiye Karakitapoğlu, Public participation in EIA process of small hydro power plants (HES) in Turkey, University of Uppsala, 2015.

**Access to Information**

Although Turkey has a somewhat diversified media structure, the government places direct and indirect pressure on media owners in order to obtain coverage favorable to the government party. In Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press report, Turkey has lost 11 points since 2010 (three points in 2014) in the area of media freedom, and was most recently ranked at 144th out of 199 countries, under the “not free” category. The World Freedom Index similarly ranked Turkey 149th out of 180 countries in 2015.

The constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and freedom of expression are only partially upheld in practice, and are generally undermined by provisions in the penal code and the strict Anti-Terror Law (TMK). The Telecommunication Authority’s (TIB) power to block websites without a court decision has been expanded, although the Constitutional Court annulled some legal changes in this area. New legislation has restricted journalists’ freedom to report on issues of national security, and has empowered intelligence agencies to access a wide range of personal information without oversight. The government appoints the general director of the country’s public broadcaster, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT). In doing so, it essentially exercises tutelage over the public-media organization’s administration. Several TRT channels regularly broadcast pro-government programs, and invite experts allied with the government party to appear on these programs.
Most concerning for many observers have been the unprecedented expansion in the range of reasons given for journalists’ arrests, the massive phone-tapping campaign, and the contempt shown for source confidentiality. These factors have in sum reintroduced a climate of intimidation with regard to the media. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the number of journalists behind bars had declined to seven as of December 2014, down from 40 reporters in 2013.

Another substantive problem involves media owners’ economic interests. Although Article 29 of Law 3984 restricts media owners’ shareholder rights, owners who have stakes in other business sectors have been seen to influence coverage so as to favor their outside business interests. A significant share of media owners are industrial conglomerates with interests that go beyond freedom of press and opinion, and in some cases have close relationships with the government. This further undermines media independence, increasing self-censorship and job insecurity among journalists. The number of outlets belonging to the so-called pool media (Havuz Medyası) — media properties owned by government-allied businesses — has expanded. Shortly before the November 1 elections, police raided the pro-opposition Koza-İpek media conglomerate, accusing the company of “terror propaganda” linked to Fethullah Gülen, a cleric currently in exile in the United States. Once an ally of Erdoğan and the AKP, Gülen is today one of the government’s most prominent critics. Media outlets including seven TV stations and two newspapers have been seized through a court decision, with their journalists fired. The publisher and editor of the weekly Nokta journal along with the editor-in-chief and a reporter of the daily Cumhuriyet were arrested in November on suspicion of “inciting criminal activity” in the wake of the parliamentary elections, “inciting armed revolt against the government,” and “forming or supporting a terrorist organization.”

Journalists have also been subject to individual threats and physical harassment by groups allegedly close to the governing party. A typical example of this was Ahmet Hakan, a journalist, columnist and TV host who was attacked by four perpetrators in front of his house after the airing of his Tarafsız Bölge (Neutral Zone) TV program on the CNN Türk network in early October.

Intimidating statements by politicians and lawsuits launched against journalists critical of the government, combined with the media sector’s ownership structure, have led to widespread self-censorship by media owners and journalists. In some cases journalists have simply been fired. The politicized Radio and TV Supreme Council (RTÜK) has issued disproportionate fines to pro-opposition media; however, after the 2015 parliamentary elections, the
Supreme Election Board asked the RTÜK to issue fines to media companies that violated the election law.

‘IFJ and EFJ slam Turkish government over latest media clampdown ahead the elections’, 19 October 2015, http://europeanjournalists.org/blog/category/turkey?print=pdf-search

In addition to the increasing restrictions on media freedom in Turkey (see “Media Freedom” section), the country’s dominant media structure features ownership by industrial conglomerates, strong links between political forces and media organizations, and a lack of unionization in the media (a so-called Mediterranean or polarized pluralist media model). This undermines pluralism in the media sector. Adopted in 2011, Law 6112 increased the maximum allowable foreign-ownership stake in media companies from 25% to 50%, with the condition that a single foreign investor cannot invest in more than two enterprises. Foreign companies still cannot be majority stakeholders in domestic media companies.

Pressure on media outlets and owners has grown over the last several years. Media companies were accused of conspiring to incite a coup d’état in late 2014, with this pressure intensifying further before the June 7 elections. On 31 May 2015, the board of the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA), meeting in Washington D.C., called for the Turkish government to end its attacks on the country’s independent media and to recognize the value of a critical press to the democratic process. The WAN-IFRA board noted with alarm that the Ankara public prosecutor had asked the Turkish Satellite Communications Company (TÜRKSAT), which is overseen by the Ministry of Transportation, Maritime Affairs and Communications, to deny use of the state-owned satellite infrastructure to certain critical and opposition media outlets. Indeed, this tactic has been regularly used against several media companies.

A number of digital-transmission platforms including Digiturk, Tivibu and Turkcell also halted the broadcast of some opposition-allied TV channels.
Digiturk was sold to the Qatar-based BeIN Media Group in July 2015 without a tender, although there were many companies interested in buying the firm. In the case of Tivibu, a satellite-broadcast system owned by TTNET, 55% of its shares were sold to a Saudi Oger-affiliated company for a period of 21 years. Turkcell is the country’s biggest GSM mobile-phone operator, and is jointly owned by Telia Sonera, the Çukurova Group and MV Holding.

The European Union explicitly condemned the media crackdown in late 2014. In 2015, EU representatives noted that hate speech and the seizure of media outlets violated European values of the rule of law and media freedom. In late October 2015, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović condemned the police raids against media outlets in Turkey, and called on authorities to restore and ensure media pluralism. Recently seized media outlets have been assigned trustees tasked with managing their daily broadcasts. Precedent for this tactic came nearly eight years ago, when a similar operation was initiated against ATV, an organization owned by the Uzan Group. This raised questions about the role of media ownership and media freedom in Turkey that are even more pressing today.

‘IFJ and EFJ slam Turkish government over latest media clampdown ahead the elections’, 19 October 2015, http://europeanjournalists.org/blog/category/turkey/?print=pdf-search
OSCE Representative condemns police raid against media outlets in Turkey, calls on authorities to restore and ensure media pluralism, 28 October 2015, http://www.osce.org/fom/195016 (accessed 28 October 2015)
Sabahattin Önkibar, İmamlar ve Haramiler Medyası, İstanbul: Kırımzi Kedi yaynevi, 2015.

According to Law 4982, citizens, noncitizens and foreign corporations have the right of access to government information. However, many public records are not included within the scope of the law, as there are exceptions for state secrets, intelligence information, individual privacy and communication privacy.

Almost all public offices have a section that deals with requests for information. These can be made in person or electronically.

A total of 3,298,465 applications for information based on Law 4982 were made to public institutions in 2014. According to official information, 95% of requests resulted in the full provision of the requested information, 2% resulted in partial information or a negative response, and 3% were rejected. A total of 8,471 applications were found to be related to state secrets or private
issues. The annual report on the issue does not provide information about the subject of the applications.

Several regulations adopted in April 2012 aimed at administrative simplification, particularly by providing basic public services online (e-government). The law governing the creation of an ombudsman office was adopted in June 2012 and took effect in 2013. Offices must respond to applications for access to government information within 15 days.

The Board of Review for Access to Information reviews administrative decisions rendered under articles 16 and 17 of the information-access law, and makes decisions regarding institutions’ implementation of the associated right. The board did not publish an annual report for 2014. As with other administrative decisions, appeals can be made to an administrative court if information requests are denied. A total of 746 applicants appealed for judicial review in 2014.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law, and Article 12 enshrines fundamental rights and freedoms, concerns over shortcomings in judicial proceedings remain, including limited access by defense attorneys to prosecution files, lengthy pretrial detentions, and excessively long and catch-all indictments. This relates especially to numerous cases involving Kurdish activists, journalists, union members, students, military officers, and policy and security personal being tried for alleged violations of the Anti-Terror Law. Many such cases are considered by domestic and foreign observers to be partly or even fully politically motivated.

In 2014, the parliament passed a bill requiring that investigation, detention and custody decisions be based on “concrete evidence,” and reducing the maximum period of pretrial detention from 10 to five years. Some detainees and prisoners were released after the passage of this measure.

Constitutional amendments passed in 2010 granted individuals the right to petition the Constitutional Court if they believe their right to fair trial has been violated. The court has accepted such petitions since September 2012, and 393
violations of the right to fair trial have been noted by the court since that time. Article 148 of the constitution states that anyone who believes his or her human or citizens’ rights as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have been infringed by a public authority also has a right to apply to the Constitutional Court, after exhausting other administrative and judicial remedies. Constitutional Court applications cost approximately €63.80. Individual applications must be filed within 30 days after the notification of the final proceeding that exhausts other legal remedies. In the first quarter of 2015, a total of 6,250 such applications were submitted.

After the individual right to petition the Constitutional Court was granted in 2012, the number of new applications from Turkish citizens to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) for ECHR violations dropped drastically. However, as of July 2015, Turkey ranked second after Russia in the list of countries with the largest number of human-rights violation cases open at the ECtHR, with a total of 9,292 applications in front of the European court. In March 2014, the country agreed to an Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations. A series of activities were carried out under this plan in 2015, including translations of a Council of Europe publication on judges’ independence, efficiency and responsibilities and the ECtHR’s Guide to the Right to a Fair Trial, as well as several training programs and a business visit to Strasbourg.

Following a petition by the Association of Equal Rights Monitoring, the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey advised the Supreme Election Board to prepare public advertisements in languages other than Turkish in June 2015.

Citation:

Whereas the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion are generally respected, official violations of the freedoms of expression and assembly occur, particularly when criticism of the ruling government and its policies is involved. Regressing somewhat in this regard, Turkey has in recent years frequently been deemed only “partly free” due to the degree of political
interference in media, judicial and anti-corruption mechanisms. In Freedom House’s 2015 Freedom in the World report, the country received middling ratings for political rights and civil liberties (respectively three and four points out of a possible seven). In the Web Index Report 2014 – 2015, Turkey was ranked 28th out of 85 countries overall, and 52nd in the freedom and openness sub-index.

The European Commission stated during the review period that the freedoms of expression and assembly have become major shortcomings in Turkey. Intimidation of journalists, up to and including physical attacks, has taken place. The Commission advised Turkey to improve monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations (adopted in March 2014). The Commission’s 2015 Progress Report identified several major weaknesses, including the intimidation of and denial of accreditation to journalists; the government’s blocking of websites with or without a court decision; the lack of editorial independence within the public broadcast system, especially during the elections; and media-ownership transparency more generally. The number of journalists in prison decreased during the review period. The Internet law was amended in March 2015, enabling the Presidency of Telecommunication and Communication to block websites under certain circumstances without a court decision. Insulting high-level politicians, including the country’s president, can result in prison sentences of one to four years. Government-ordered media blackouts have been imposed on events such as the bombings in Ankara and Suruç in July and October 2015, as well as court trials or the IS siege of Kobani in early 2015.

A highly controversial Internal Security Law adopted in March 2015 granted the police the power to detain a person caught in the act of committing a crime. A person can be kept in custody for 24 hours without seeing a judge, and this period can be extended to 48 hours if the police deem that a “collective crime” has been committed. The police forces have been allowed to use firearms against demonstrators, deepening fears of crackdowns on dissent ahead of parliamentary elections. This law was considered a threat to the Turkish state’s conflict-resolution negotiations with the PKK, and a means of attracting nationalist votes for the AKP.

In the Penal Courts of Peace established in July 2014, single judges have the authority to issue search warrants and approve detentions and the seizure of property. Judges have been criticized for undermining the public’s trust in the judiciary due to the arbitrary nature of their detainments, arrests and judgments.

Although bans on social media imposed by the government in early 2014 were
subsequently lifted by the Constitutional Court, legal provisions limiting the free use of the Internet, presented as necessary for “national security and protection of the public order,” have raised additional concerns.

Civil-society organizations have reported restrictions on their freedom of assembly, and have been fined for violating these restrictions. Concepts such as the “general morality,” the “Turkish family structure,” “national security,” and the “public order” have been widely used to justify restrictive practices, allowing broad discretion to authorities and hindering the freedom of association in practice. LGBTI associations have been closed on grounds of “general morality.” Court cases regarding the closure of five associations dealing with human rights in general and Kurdish issues in particular remain pending. Moreover, legislative and bureaucratic obstacles have hindered civil-society organizations’ financial sustainability. Associations applying for public-benefit status and for permission to raise funds have complained of discrimination.

The Turkish-Kurdish “solution process” – which was pushed forward in June 2014 when the Turkish parliament adopted a law to “bring a stronger legal foundation to the settlement process” – represents a positive and promising step toward the concession and protection of political rights. Political campaigning in languages other than Turkish by political parties and candidates during local and parliamentary elections was legalized in 2013 and implemented in the March 2014 local elections. The European Commission’s 2015 Progress Report underlined the halt of the peace process in 2015 due to the elections, as well as the violence that occurred in their aftermath, and advised Turkish government to give a high priority to making further progress toward democratization and reconciliation.

Citation:

While Article 10 of the constitution guarantees equality before the law, irrespective of language, race, sex, political opinion or religion, the political reality in Turkey differs significantly from this constitutional ideal.
The European Commission’s 2015 report stated that the principle of non-discrimination is not sufficiently respected either in law or practice, with gender-related violence, hate speech, and discrimination against LGBT communities being serious problems. On a positive note, property was returned to 1,014 non-Muslim communities’ foundations at the beginning of 2015. However, physical attacks on non-Muslim residents were reported during the period under review, and anti-Semitism in physical or oral form is increasingly expressed in public. According to the Anti-Defamation League’s 2015 Global Anti-Semitism Index, 71% of Turkey’s adult population is estimated to harbor anti-Semitic attitudes – a slightly higher figure than for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region overall.

A “democracy package” adopted by the parliament in March 2014 included measures ostensibly securing the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion. The Turkish government allowed a Greek community on the island of Imvros (Gökçeada) to re-open a Greek primary, middle and high school in September 2015. However, the Halki Greek Orthodox Seminary has not been able to reopen, despite international support. The establishment of an inclusive Anti-Discrimination and Equality Board is still pending.

A number of high court rulings remain unimplemented, including the European Court of Human Rights’ December 2014 decision on cemevi (gathering places for Alevi Muslims) as a place of worship and February 2015 rejection of Turkey’s appeal on the issue of compulsory religious-education classes, as well as the Turkish Court of Cassation’s August 2015 judgement on cemevi as religious locations within the scope of the ECHR ruling. Some leading politicians’ “uneven” treatment of the Alevis negatively affects the public atmosphere.

As a consequence of the ongoing “Kurdish opening” and “Solution Process”, the Turkish government introduced some legal and practical initiatives improving the social and living conditions of the Kurdish population in the south east. However, investigations and detentions of Kurdish activists have undermined efforts to find a workable solution to the Kurdish issue.

Three years ago, the Ministry for Family and Social Policies adopted a national action plan to combat violence against women. However, despite rising public awareness, the incidence of violence against women in Turkey has undergone a dramatic and rapid increase in the last decade. Even though a large number of cases go officially unreported, women’s-rights groups reported that 251 women had been killed in 2015 as of mid-November. In some cases, courts have ruled that “extenuating circumstances” existed for perpetrators of so-called honor crimes. A 2014 Penal Code amendment
expanding penalties for violence against women was considered unsatisfactory by women’s rights associations.

Citation:

Rule of Law

Several articles in the Turkish constitution ensure that the government and administration act in accordance with legal provisions, and that citizens are protected from the despotism of the state. Article 36 guarantees citizens the freedom to claim rights, and Article 37 concedes the guarantee of lawful judgment. According to Article 125, administrative procedures and actions are subject to administrative review. Despite the existence of legal protections, more than 9,000 applications from Turkey were pending before the European Court for Human Rights as of October 2015. During the period under review, the Constitutional Court received 6,250 individual applications. In 2014, the Council of State, the country’s highest administrative court, received more than 333,000 files, and completed its review of just 143,000 cases.

The main factors affecting legal certainty in the administration are a lack of regulations on particular issues, the misinterpretation of regulations by administrative authorities (mainly on political grounds), and unconstitutional regulations that are adopted by parliament or issued by the executive. In addition, the high frequency of amendments to some basic laws under certain circumstances lead to a lack of consistency. High-profile prosecutions can follow unpredictable courses. For example, after prisoners associated with the clandestine Ergenekon network were released, they were called back for a retrial. Mehmet Baransu, a journalist, was detained after a 12-hour-long search related to documents he submitted to prosecutors in 2010 about the so-called
Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plot. Moreover, prosecutors launched a new trial against members of the “parallel structure” network allegedly linked to U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen, who the government alleges supports terrorist activities. Some media outlets allegedly related to the network were seized by the police, and Savings Deposit Insurance Fund authorities and trustees were assigned to administer them. A prosecutor banned several TV channels from accessing Türksat (the Turkish satellite system) without a court decision. On the other hand, the corruption allegations of December 2013 and the Deniz Feneri case did not result in convictions. Legal as well as judicial instruments are sometimes used against government opponents, especially those in the media.

Although judicial reform was one of the major objectives of the government during the review period, the judiciary’s independence, professionalism, organization and ability to provide fair trials all remain serious concerns. The government issued a new Judicial Reform Strategy Document in April 2015. However, this does not specify detailed instruments for reaching objectives such as judicial independence and impartiality. The minister and undersecretary of justice are still members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.

In May 2015, former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said, “If the rules are not clear and transparent, if they are not enforced on those who break the law, if the judiciary is not properly functioning, democracy will likely fail.” He also pointed out that prolonged court trials that are often reversed by higher courts damage the cause of legal certainty. However, critical voices within the executive such as Babacan have been increasingly silenced.

The average length of a case that reaches the Council of State, the supreme administrative court, is 480 days. In 2014, a total of 74,516 out of 167,559 administrative cases were annulled by the administrative courts, giving one indicator of the lack of certainty within the administration.

Citation:
The new Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, Hürriyet Daily News, 17 October 2014,
Article 125 of the constitution states that all government administrative decisions and actions are subject to judicial review. Developments during the review period demonstrated that the Constitutional Court plays a vital role in safeguarding judicial review in Turkey.

However, the president of the Republic is not accountable for his actions except for “high reason”. The actions of some other institutions are also excluded from judicial review, including the Supreme Military Council, whose decisions affect the individual rights of military personnel and are administrative in nature; parliamentary resolutions such as declarations of martial law or war, or the decision to send Turkish troops to a foreign country; and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK), whose organization and working conditions are still in need of internal reform (as are the Court of Cassation and the Council of State), especially with regard to safeguarding the political independence of its members and bodies.

The Venice Commission, referring to some politically sensitive cases in Turkey, has expressed concern about violations of European and universal judicial-independence standards. A judicial-reform package adopted by the parliament in December 2014 allowed Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) investigatory judges be elected solely by the HSYK, bypassing the Supreme Court Presidency Council. During the review period, the HSYK also launched an investigation into the appointments of 5,000 judges and prosecutors on the basis of irregularities in the entrance exams conducted since 2010.

Civilian oversight during the review period was weak with regard to investigations of human-rights abuses or acts by the gendarmerie. Under Article 148 of the constitution, the Constitutional Court cannot review legal amendments passed during a period of martial law or state of emergency. A Human Rights Compensation Commission has been established within the Ministry of Justice, and has demonstrated some positive results. As of August 2014, the commission had decided on 4,710 applications out of 5,925 claims. In total 1,180 decisions (about 25%) were appealed by the original applicant. The average case-completion time has been 165 days.

Citation:
Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan ‘yargı paketi’ni onayladı, 12 December 2015,
The Constitutional Court has 17 members, as outlined by Article 146 of the 2010 constitutional referendum. These members are nominated or elected from other higher courts by the country’s president, the parliament and professional groups made up of senior administrative officers, lawyers, first-degree judges, prosecutors, or Constitutional Court rapporteurs who have served for at least five years.

To be appointed to the Constitutional Court, candidates must either be members of the teaching staff of institutions of higher education, senior administrative officers or lawyers; be over the age of 45; have completed higher education; and have worked for at least 20 years. Constitutional Court members serve 12-year terms and cannot be reelected. The appointment of Constitutional Court judges does not take place on the basis of general liberal-democratic standards such as cooperative appointment and special majority regulations. In addition, the armed forces still wield some civilian judicial influence, as two military judges are members of the Constitutional Court.

Recruitment patterns in the past have highlighted the politicization of the judiciary. In 2014, the regular elections for Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) members were indicative of this problem, occurring as they did in the wake of the corruption proceedings against the government, the allegations of infiltration of the judiciary by the Fethullah Gülen network, and the government’s subsequent hasty legislative changes. Instead of being elected, four new members of the HSYK were appointed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, thus undermining the principles of independence and impartiality. In support of the procedure, a newly elected member of the Supreme Council stated: “It is essential and correct that the administrative councils, such as the HSYK, operate in harmony with other public institutions, the legislative and executive powers.” In sum, the amendments to the HSYK law and the subsequent dismissal of staff and numerous reassignments of judges and prosecutors raised serious concerns regarding both the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the separation of powers.
Law 5018 regarding public financial management and oversight also touches on issues of legality, transparency and predictability. However, these concepts, as well as instruments such as the formation of strategic plans, performance budgets and regulatory impact assessments, are not effectively incorporated into government oversight processes. An amendment to the law on audit court has limited the degree to which state expenditures can be audited. Public-procurement safeguards have deteriorated thanks to legislation allowing municipalities to operate in a less than transparent fashion. There are no codes of conduct guiding members of the legislature or judiciary in their actions. Conflicts of interest are not broadly deemed a concern, and there is no effective asset-declaration system in place for elected and appointed public officials.

The Council of Ethics for Public Officials lacks the power to enforce its decisions through disciplinary measures. Codes of ethics do not exist for military personnel or academics. Legal loopholes (regarding disclosure of gifts, financial interests and holdings, foreign travel paid for by outside sources, etc.) in the code of ethics for parliamentarians remain in place. In 2014, a total of 3,664 public civil servants across 48 institutions were provided with ethics training, and 130 of them were themselves assigned to serve as ethics trainers. Moreover, two separate modules dealing with the issue were placed online for further training purposes.

In general, corruption remains widespread, and unfair and biased treatment by the bureaucracy is common. Especially at the local level, corruption remains a systemic problem. While municipalities controlled by opposition parties are closely monitored by law-enforcement authorities and government inspectors, municipalities controlled by the AKP are shielded from close scrutiny. The Court of Audit reported a number of municipalities to the Ministry of Finance in 2014 on the basis of illegitimate practices. Recent reports by the Audit Court have not been addressed by parliament. However, the reports have been published in the media and online, thus publicly exposing a number of irregularities including hidden budget expenditures, housing-procurement abuses and tax compromises.

A major source of international concern during the review period were the corruption investigations launched in December 2013 against four ministers, their relatives, one district mayor and various other public officials and businessmen, along with the lack of credible investigation afterwards. In 2014, an Istanbul prosecutor specializing in organized crime, dropped proceedings
against 53 suspects in a case that had targeted the inner circle of then-Prime Minister Erdoğan. The HSYK suspended four prosecutors who initiated the corruption investigation. About 50 of the AKP’s 312 parliamentarians declined to support at least one of the four deputies who sought to open a parliamentary graft investigation. Furthermore, journalists that wrote on the corruption cases were intimidated. The government of Erdoğan’s successor as prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, introduced a “transparency package” in January 2015. However, even Erdoğan, by this time president, considered this package to be ineffective.

In general, no progress has been made in limiting the impunity of politicians and public officials with regard to corruption-related cases, and major concerns persist regarding transparency and accountability in funding for political parties and election campaigns. Turkey is no longer subject to Financial Action Task Force (FATF) monitoring under that group’s global anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance process. However, as of the time of writing, the outcome of the 2010 – 2014 National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan remained uncertain, and it was unclear whether authorities would reinstate the campaign. GRECO’s third-round recommendations have not been fully implemented. In particular, the country’s official definition of active bribery is not in compliance with the GRECO standards. Political funding and campaign-finance rules and procedures need to be more transparent. The first review of compliance with the U.N. Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) was published in June 2015.

In February 2014, an omnibus law amended various aspects of Turkish public-procurement legislation, introducing restrictive measures that make the previously optional domestic price advantage of up to 15% compulsory for “medium and high-technology industrial products.” The law authorizes the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology to determine the list of items for which a domestic price advantage will be compulsory; this gives considerable discretion to the administration.

Despite some legal and institutional advances in the fight against corruption and organized crime, Turkey still needs to ensure that its investigatory units and law-enforcement agencies are independent of political interference, provide for effective enforcement of sanctions, and create a realistic action plan and independent anti-corruption unit to coordinate relevant agencies’ activities, as required by the UNCAC.

Citation:
Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, “Kamuda şeffaflık paketi ne getirecek?” 30 January 2015,
Daniel Donbay, Turkish parliament votes against graft trial for former ministers, Financial Times, 21 January 2015, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f805557-a14a-11e4-8d19-00144feab7de.html#ixzz3erWV7tpq (27 October 2015)
Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

All public institutions, including municipalities, special provincial administrations (laws 5216, 5302 and 5393) and state-owned economic enterprises (KİTs), but excluding regulatory and supervisory bodies, must prepare strategic plans according to Law 5018 (2003) on Public Financial Management and Control and the By-law on Principles and Procedures for Strategic Planning in Public Administrations (2006).

The parliament; the ministries of Finance, Development and Internal Affairs; the Turkish Court of Audit; and the Board of Internal Audit are the primary institutions involved in the process of strategic planning.

Strategic management within the Turkish public administration faces several challenges, according to the Working Group Report on Strategic Management in the Public Sector (2015). Public institutions in general have insufficient strategic-management capacity. Strategic plans, performance programs, budgets and activity reports are prepared with little if any coordination. Although a total of 730 internal auditors are employed across 207 public institutions, the Turkish public administration as a whole has failed to develop an effective internal-audit system. The Court of Audit cannot fulfill its functions and pursue performance audits. There is no relationship between political strategy documents and lower-level policy materials, and little coordination between associated institutions. Difficulties in gaining access to relevant information within public administrative bodies and insufficient human-resources capacities are additional major contributors to this failure. There are also no cumulative statistics on the frequency of meetings between strategic-planning staff members and government heads. In general, these meetings are held once a year and during budget negotiations.
The Ministry of Development issued a circular in April 2015 concerning strategic plans to be prepared by the public institutions. This document emphasizes the importance of coordination among institutions and harmony between strategic documents, and gives institutions (except municipalities) the capacity to renew their strategic plans in conjunction with changes in government. Also during the review period, the Supreme Board of Planning approved action plans relating to 25 priority transformation programs (ÖDÖP) that fall under four primary macroeconomic-, sectoral- and regional-policy objectives – ensuring sufficient labor-market skills, supporting innovative production, enhancing livable space and engaging in international development cooperation – all within the scope of the 10th Development Plan.

Citation:

The frequency of participation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and experts in political decision-making processes has increased in recent years. In line with EU standards, the government issued an emergency action plan in 2002 underlining that all regulatory reforms would be initiated in close consultation with NGOs. In addition, regulations concerning the rules and principles by which new laws are prepared state that academic experts can be consulted during the drafting process. The government occasionally asks outside experts to prepare opinions or help with surveys or reports on individual issues.

A major step was taken in 2013 with the establishment of the so-called Wise Men Group of intellectuals, writers, academics and celebrities in favor of the government’s conciliatory approach toward the Kurdish issue. This group was tasked with starting a dialogue with all segments of society on questions and concerns related to the issue. The group reported the results of the dialogue to the government, and was reactivated in 2014 following the presidential elections, but ceased activity soon afterward.

In addition to working with pro-government think tanks, the government consults with academic experts in the context of projects sponsored by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union. However, the spectrum of communication with outside experts is narrowing, as the government has begun to recruit its own experts to provide alternative but not critical opinions on relevant issues of public policy. As Turkish politics has become increasingly polarized, the government and the ruling party have
seemed to shut themselves off from broader societal influences, basing decision-making increasingly on information provided by loyal personal or clientelist networks.

Public institutions’ annual activity reports provide no indication of how often expert opinions have been requested. Selected groups of scholars participate in the preparation of special expert reports related to the national development plans. The Turkish Academy of Sciences has been critical of the lack of scholarly cooperation with public institutions.

Citation:

Interministerial Coordination

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has established a General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication to scrutinize bylaws prepared by ministries and public agencies, examining their congruity with the existing body of draft bills, decrees, statutes, regulations and Council of Minister resolutions. The directorates also review laws, general legal principles, development plans and programs, and the government’s program. These units are the primary government-office entities charged with drafting and coordinating new regulations. However, not all draft bills are the product of expert advice. Recently, the number of adjustments to draft bills made during the parliamentary-approval process indicated that standards were upheld only partially.

The PMO has a total of 2,243 employees, a quarter of whom are experts or advisors, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established to provide advice to the PMO in 2011. As of May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public institutions were assigned to this unit. Critics argue that these senior civil servants lack sufficient resources, as well as incentives for effective action. It is also alleged to be a “detention camp” for bureaucrats supposedly close to the illegal Gülenist “parallel state” structure.

Citation:
According to Article 112 of the constitution, the prime minister, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, is tasked with ensuring cooperation among ministers and with supervising the implementation of government general policy. The members of the Council of Ministers are jointly responsible for the implementation of policy. Each minister is responsible to the prime minister and is responsible for the conduct of affairs under his or her jurisdiction and the acts and activities of his or her subordinates. The prime minister ensures that the ministers exercise their functions in accordance with the constitution and the law, and can take corrective measures. Article 109 of the constitution, which gives the prime minister the power to appoint ministers, also makes his or her oversight power over ministerial proposals clear. However, ministries have been able to exercise greater influence during periods of coalition government. To prevent this, a special coordinating body composed of ministers from coalition parties sets the agenda for cabinet meetings.

An example of the exceptional power of the Prime Minister’s Office in terms of policymaking is the fact that all public institutions, entities and corporations in which more than 50% of assets are publicly held – excluding municipalities and special provincial administrations – must get permission from this office before selling, renting, transferring, allocating or bartering any real-estate holdings (Circular 2012/15).

The hidden (discretionary) budget is allocated through the approval of the prime minister and the minister of finance. This was increased to €429 million in the January – October 2015 period. Expenditures through the president’s discretionary budget, which was created after the 2014 presidential elections, totaled €89.6 million during the first nine months of 2015. These expenditures are not audited.


The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has a twofold role in the preparation of draft bills. It checks the congruity of laws from a legal point of view, and collects ministries’ legal and political opinions along with opinions from civil society, interest and pressure groups, expert groups and institutions. Thus, the PMO is always directly involved in the preparation of policy proposals at a relatively early stage.
However, line ministries do not always provide all the information necessary for draft bills, particularly in the case of information that may cast their ministry in a bad light. From time to time, policymaking is tarnished by issues of bureaucratic competition, including among politicians. The PMO’s inability to foster interministerial cooperation has been a serious institutional shortcoming. A recent reorganization of the PMO and line ministries led to some performance declines. Conflicting announcements regarding policy proposals made by the PMO and line ministries have been a sign of weak coordination.

According to the Decision on the Implementation, Coordination and Monitoring of the 2015 Program, the Ministry of Development is assigned to be the primary consultation body in preparing policies.

After the parliamentary election of 1 November 2015, government proposals to restructure the ministries and increase their number were made. Several new public units such as the National Mine Institute were additionally established. It remains to be seen whether this kind of institutional fragmentation of policymaking will hinder or enhance the effectiveness of policy coordination and accountability.

Citation:
2015 Programının Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine İlişkin Karar, Resmi Gazete, 17 October 2014,

In November 2004, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) established the Better Regulation Group to ensure coordination among the related agencies and institutions and improve the process of creating regulations. In addition, the government has created committees – such as the anti-terror commission under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which includes officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, as well as other security departments – composed of ministers, experts, bureaucrats and representatives of other bureaucratic bodies (such as those on legislation techniques, legislation management and administrative simplification, and regulatory impact analysis) when important or frequently raised issues were under consideration.

The Economy Coordination Board, headed by the deputy prime minister and composed of the finance minister and state ministers responsible for economic affairs and development; customs; labor and social security; and science, technology and industry, was especially established to evaluate economic and financial matters and develop policy proposals.
An interministerial committee tasked with finding solutions to the Kurdish issue was recently established. Other interministerial bodies include the Money Credit Coordination Council, the Investment Environment Coordination Board, the Coordination Board for Combating Financial Crimes, and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board.

In 2014, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s government created a Reform Action Group. This replaced a Reform Monitoring Group, consisting of the same ministers (economy, justice and European Union affairs), but extending its predecessor’s tasks and mission. The new body is tasked with monitoring political reforms, preparing draft reform bills, and playing an active role in securing proposals’ parliamentary passage and in the subsequent implementation process. However, as of the time of writing, this body had convened only twice since its establishment, raising doubts as to its efficacy.

Ministerial undersecretaries, under the authority of a minister and his or her aide, executes services on behalf of the ministers. This is a political position that is achieved through merit and a successful political career. Deputy undersecretaries in the ministries also help to conduct ministerial affairs.

During the review period there was an increasing tendency to draft and adopt legislation without appropriate consultation. The creation of new ministries and agencies and the resulting fragmentation of responsibilities has complicated ministerial coordination, for example in the areas of budgeting and medium-term economic policymaking. The oversight bodies under the Prime Minister’s Office are today responsible not only for coordinating and overseeing legal proposals, but are also tasked with monitoring legislative implementation. Accordingly, inefficiencies of coordination due to institutional ambiguity and conflicts is a serious problem.

The 2014 Annual Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office stressed that although coordination between various national and international policymaking activities had improved, performance goals in this area are not in
general satisfactorily achieved. Similar observations have been made by the Ministry of Development, the primary policy-coordination body.

Citation:

The government has always held informal meetings on various topics (such as on the issue of Kurdish rights or EU accession plans) with other politicians, senior officials and consultants. However, these informal bodies, which are typically used to sketch the framework of an issue in consultation with experts, while civil servants develop proposals, and finally the upper administrative echelons finalize policy. The higher levels of the ruling party in particular, in cooperation with ministers who have considerable experience in their fields, form a tight network and contribute significantly to policy preparation.

However, the recent allegations of an illegal “parallel structure” within existing state structures linked to the network of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen placed significant strain on these informal mechanisms. As a consequence, a new generation of cabinet and administrative staffers with a high degree of loyalty and commitment to the party-state system is being groomed.

Citation:

Evidence-based Instruments

In 2007, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a circular that provided guidance on how to prepare regulatory impact assessments (RIA). Since that time, the completion of a RIA has been required for all new legislation (laws, decrees and other regulatory procedures), excluding issues relating to national security, the draft budget or final accounts (under Article 24 of Regulation 4821 on the Procedure and Principles of Preparing Legislation, 12 December 2005). However, despite regulations adopted to encourage administrative simplification in April 2012, the introduction of RIAs has not improved the quality of government legislation, and RIA processes are only rarely followed.
The government has not, for example, conducted RIAs prior to the adoption of certain key legislative items such as education reform. A regulatory impact assessment of the EU-Turkey Civil Society Dialogue was performed. In 2012, an RIA was filed regarding the European Seveso II directive, which dealt with industrial-pollution control and risk management. In 2013, another draft RIA was prepared for the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control program. In general, however, the RIA process in Turkey has suffered due to insufficient awareness of the benefits of the mechanism, underdeveloped administrative capacities and the decreasing importance given to harmonization with EU norms.

According to the 2014 Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office, none of the government’s objectives relating to regulatory impact assessment were achieved that year.

Citation:


During the period under review, the regulatory impact assessment (RIAs) requirement did not help improve the quality of proposed government legislation. Instead, the government more often than not drafted and adopted legislation without appropriate consultation of NGOs or other stakeholders.

As part of the RIA conducted in 2012 in connection with the EU Seveso directive, industry participation was made possible through an Internet-based system. However, this process is still in the early stages of development. In 2013, the government prepared an RIA for the EU-funded Protection and Control of Integrated Pollution in Turkey project. However, this was a unique situation and the study was itself a pilot project, and did not as such represent a standard that other public institutions must follow.

According to the 2014 Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office none of the government’s objectives related to regulatory impact assessment were achieved that year.

Citation:

Technical Assistance Service for IPPC – Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control in Turkey, Draft
The government has conducted several sustainability checks within its regulatory impact assessment (RIA) framework, for instance for the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive, the Habitat Directive and the Discharge Directive.

However, these examples refer to internationally sponsored projects and are not an indication of a general administrative practice. Politicians and experts widely use the term “sustainability” in policy slogans, but there is no formally adopted sustainability strategy in Turkey.

Citation:
electronically or in writing during the process of drafting the new constitution in 2012. Stakeholder participation is required under the Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation. However, governmental authorities consider this requirement to have a “slowing” effect on “progressive” projects such as urban renewal or the planning of hydroelectric power plants. Although it is required by the legal framework, societal consultation has largely been neglected or rendered ineffective.

Citation:

**Policy Communication**

In spite of its centralized and hierarchical structure, Turkey’s executive is far from being monolithic or able to speak with a single voice. For example, a spokesman for the Council of Ministers issues public declarations on behalf of the council, while a prime minister or minister may make different declarations. After former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election to the presidency, and the fall 2014 accession of Prime Minister (former Minister of Foreign Affairs) Ahmet Davutoğlu’s government, public communications came from three different major sources: the president, the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. This has increased the need for a coordinated communications policy.

The minister of economy and the minister of finance have frequently expressed opposing views regarding macro- and microeconomic policies. When Ali Babacan, former deputy prime minister responsible for the economy, also participated in such public debates, the AKP was considered to have multiple “types of policies” regarding the economy. President Erdoğan also publicly criticized the Central Bank’s interest-rate policy in late 2014 and early 2015, causing some speculative financial crises. Similarly, bureaucrats from various ministries also make opposing statements on economic policies, again causing public confusion.

A high-profile example of such variance emerged after the Ankara bombing in
October 2015, when three different official views were expressed in public concerning the failure of security measures. While the minister of interior affairs claimed that “no failure” had been made in advance of the bombing, the deputy chairman of the AKP admitted negligence, and the prime minister wondered aloud if any failures had been made.

Citation:

Implementation

At least until the November 2015 elections, the ruling AKP’s program was focused on several guiding principles, including “market-oriented, reform- and service-based politics,” “philanthropic and regulated neoliberalism,” and a “proactive foreign policy”. This programmatic continuity underlined the government’s approach to its reformist agenda. Major objectives included improving the country’s economic welfare (extending foreign-trade relations, increasing foreign direct investment); strengthening social inclusion (reforming the social-insurance system, legalizing irregular housing in the suburbs); establishing intra-societal peace and stability (social and cultural inclusion, a conservative approach toward religiosity especially involving strengthening the Sunni Islam identity, seeking a solution to the Kurdish issue); limiting veto players’ powers (the military and the judiciary, and especially the Constitutional Court); and implementing foreign-policy goals (establishing Turkey as a key diplomatic player and conflict mediator). Officially, EU accession also remained an important target.

In each of these fields, however, the government’s performance has been mixed at best during the review period. The country’s economy has weakened compared with the situation some years ago, while its onetime proactive and strategic foreign and security policies have become less coherent, particularly with regard to the conflicts in its regional neighborhood. The AKP’s credibility was itself undermined after the government’s suppression of the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013, among other triggers. Moreover, the contradictions between the goals of political liberalization and the government’s conservative-religious ambitions have become increasingly
visible. Emerging authoritarian tendencies combined with the AKP’s four successive electoral victories have hindered further democratization. Seeking to consolidate its control over the government, the AKP has instead sought to create a legal framework for a “monopolization” of power.

Turkey has experienced four elections since March 2014, and thus saw a period of constant campaigning starting from the Gezi protests and lasting until the November 2015 elections. These campaigns affected the efficiency and effectiveness of government-policy implementation. Moreover, regional and international circumstances should be taken into account, especially the ongoing violent conflicts in the southern neighborhood, the deep refugee crisis, the continuing weak performance of the European economy, and the tight global interest-rate policy. However, some concrete aspects of governmental inefficiency in several sectors are worthy of special mention, especially in the area of the economy. The first nine months of implementation of the government’s annual economic objectives varied sharply from official forecasts in the budget and the Medium Term Plan of 2015 – 2017. Ultimately, the government had to correct its end-year expectations with regard to unemployment and inflation rates, growth and per capita income. The decrease in the current-account deficit has been attributed to the shrinking economy. Results were similarly mixed in other sectors; for instance, the Ministry of Education realized half of its 130 performance objectives, while the Ministry of Health completed 10 of 34 service-oriented performance objectives and 12 of 17 institutional-performance objectives in 2014.

During the review period, the government’s foreign policy faced a number of significant challenges associated with regional and international dynamics within the Middle East, especially the conflict in Syria and Iraq. On the one hand, Turkey’s own involvement in the conflict – particularly with regard to the Kurdish issue within Turkey and in Northern Syria – as well as President Erdoğan’s tactical approach to the issues led to tensions with Turkey’s main Western allies, as well as neighbors such as Russia and Iran. On the other hand, the government’s doctrine of “humanitarian diplomacy” with a special focus on the refugee crisis has been effectively implemented by the main actors in this field, including the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD). No significant progress was made concerning EU accession. No new negotiation chapters were opened or closed, although mutual commitments to further progress were regularly expressed. During 2015, the refugee issue led to the mutual awareness of a common problem requiring joint action; however, the deal between the EU and Turkey on handling the inflow of refugees was finalized only in late November. In Cyprus, the election of moderate politician
Mustafa Akıncı as president of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in May 2015, along with the resumption of negotiations between the north and the south, offered some hope in Greece, Turkey and elsewhere that a solution on the issue of the divided island might be found. This could also create a window of opportunity for opening more chapters in Turkey’s EU-accession talks.

In general, the government’s past proactive and unilateral approach to foreign policy has been replaced with a multilateral crisis-management approach, especially with regard to the refugee issue and the fight against terrorism. However, this approach has not proved fully effective. It seems that the government will have to rebuild trust on many fronts before being able to return to its stability-oriented foreign-policy approach of the past. Turkey’s successful performance holding the G-20 presidency in 2015 did help further this trust, however.

Citation:


Pelin Ünker, Ekonomide tüm hedefler şaştı, Cumhuriyet daily newspaper, 10 September 2015. (accessed 27 October 2015)


The entrenched single-party government, with strong party leadership and high demand for ministerial positions among party members, provides strong incentives for the promotion of the government program. Therefore, it is difficult even for those ministers who are professionals in their fields to come independently to the forefront. The charisma and standing of the party leader and the tendency of political parties to leave personnel decisions to the party leader prevent ministers from pursuing their own interests during their time in office. The AKP government under former Prime Minister and current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made it even more difficult for ministers to follow their own agendas, a situation which has continued under Prime Minister Davutoğlu so far. A number of key ministries during the review period were under the leadership of ministers with substantial professional expertise, but these figures had little support from the party apparatus, leaving
them dependent on the prime minister. This ensures that the strong leadership of the prime minister and party leader, rather than other incentives, drives ministers to implement the governmental program. After Erdoğan was elected to the presidency, additional loyalist ministers were appointed to the cabinet. Erdoğan rejected claims that the new prime minister would merely do his bidding; however, he continues to maintain his grip on the government, stressing his intention to be an active president, and interfering in virtually every policy field and ministerial portfolio.

Erdoğan also intervenes in the nomination of deputies, appointment of higher civil servants and the organization of electoral campaigns by taking part actively in these events. In other words, it is argued that the office of the president, now located in a lavish presidential palace and entrusted with increasing powers, has replaced those otherwise established by the constitution. Thus, the current constellation raises the question whether the effectiveness of the executive in general and the government in particular will be diminished by the existence of several centers of power and suggests that the democratic separation of powers as a whole are eroding.

Citation:


The Prime Minister’s Office has, among other measures, established the General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and the General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication to examine the congruity with the constitution of draft bills, decrees, regulations and resolutions of the Council of Ministers, as well as to review in general laws, plans and the government’s program. These bodies are the primary government centers for the drafting and coordinating of regulations. However, there is no systematic monitoring of the activities of line ministries. In some cases, the ministerial bureaucracy resists policy handed down by the government without serious consequences, particularly in issues of democratization. In general, however, ministries work in cooperation with the prime minister’s office because the single-party government has staffed leading ministerial posts with bureaucrats who operate in sync with the ruling party’s program and ideology.

The PMO has a total of 2,243 employees, a quarter of whom are experts or advisors, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established in 2011 to provide the PMO consultation. Beginning in May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public
institutions were assigned to this unit. However, observers argue that these senior civil servants lack sufficient infrastructure and effectiveness and some liken the unit to a “detention camp” for bureaucrats allegedly closer to the illegal Gülenist “parallel state” structure.


Turkey is a unitary state divided into 81 provinces (Article 126 of the constitution). Power is devolved in such a way as to ensure the efficiency and coordination of public services from the center. Ministerial agencies are monitored regularly. The central administration by law holds the power to guide the activities of local administration, to ensure that local services are delivered in conformance with the guidelines set down by the central government, as well as ensuring services are uniform, meeting local needs and in the interest of the local population (Article 127). The central government has provincial organizations that differ in size and capacity and are regularly scrutinized by the central government. Independent administrative authorities such as the Telecommunications Authority and Energy Market Regulatory Authority are not monitored, but are subject to judicial review.

The Internal Audit Coordination Board, affiliated with the Ministry of Finance, was established under Article 66 of the Public Financial Management and Control Law (Law 5018). It ensures that administrative bodies cooperate with public auditing bodies, and makes its own proposals to eliminate fraud or irregularities.

All public agencies maintain an internal audit body; however, such bodies do not function effectively or operate to their fullest capacity.

Law No. 5018, adopted in 2004, introduced a strategic-management approach under which all public agencies must prepare a strategic plan, annual program and activity reports. The subunits’ performance is assessed on the basis of these documents. However, neither strategic management principles nor internal oversight mechanisms have been effectively implemented by the administration.

The State Supervision Board, which is subject to the Presidency of the Republic, provides supervision and prepares in-depth reports upon the request of the Presidency. These reports were made public until recently; since 2009 only summaries of the reports are available.
Municipal governments depend on financial contributions from the central government. Many municipalities do not have the sufficient resources to finance basic duties. Thus, many have declared bankruptcy. Municipal borrowing constitutes a large share of Turkey’s total medium- and long-term debt. Financial decentralization and reform of local administration have been major issues during the review period. The central administration (mainly through the Bank of Provinces) is still the major funding source for local governments. During the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the government allocated €118 million to a village infrastructure project (KÖYDES), €189.9 million to the Drinking Water and Sewer Infrastructure Program (SUKAP), €74 million to the Social Support Program (SODES).

The previous governments have been frequently accused of taking a partisan approach toward the distribution of funds. Since 2009, transfers from the central government to municipalities via the Bank of Provinces have taken into consideration the number of inhabitants and the locality’s relative position on development indices. However, the new model has not eased the difficult financial situation of Turkey’s municipalities, which are seriously indebted to central-government institutions. As of March 2015, municipalities owed a collective total of €3.5 million to the Treasury.

The recent change in regulations governing metropolitan municipalities was designed to generate funds for them. However, this shift is expected in turn to cause smaller administrative units to be fiscally and administratively dependent on the metropolitan municipalities. In other words, the authority held by subunits such as villages and small towns are expected to be undermined in the long run.
According to Article 127, Paragraph 1 of the constitution, local administrative bodies are public entities established to meet the common needs of the local inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose decision-making bodies are determined by the electorate as described in law, and whose structure is also determined by law. However, according to Article 127, Paragraph 5 of the constitution, the central administration has the power of administrative trusteeship over local governments, under a framework of legal principles and procedures designed to ensure the functioning of local services in conformity with the principle of administrative unity and integrity, to secure uniform public services, to safeguard the public interest and to meet local needs in an appropriate manner.

Past reforms driven by the process of alignment with the European charter of local self-government have changed Turkey’s administrative structure and the relationship between the center and subnational bodies. A December 2012 law revised the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities with the goal of making the provision of public services more effective and productive. The law has been criticized, as it appears to set aside the principle of subsidiarity despite its “official” goal of strengthening democracy at the local level. First, the legal status of provincial administrations, villages and municipalities cannot be changed through a special law without consultation or referendum; such changes require a constitutional amendment. Second, the 2012 law essentially violates the principle of self-government. And finally, it is questionable whether the effective delivery of social services is indeed relevant to strengthening local democracy.

In mid-2014, some mayors in the southeast Anatolian region called for the transfer of half of the state’s share yielded from oil drilling to the municipality of the province in which oil is produced.

Soon after the June 7 parliamentary elections, a total of two towns and 16 municipalities (14 towns and two neighborhoods in Istanbul) declared self-government. The government took a strong stand against these declarations, and judicial investigations were initiated against mayors and other people in charge.

Citation:
The Ministry of Interior Affairs closely monitors the structure and quality of services provided by municipal governments, through its own local agencies and administrative trusteeship (through internal and external audits, and audits by civil service inspectors). The Union of Municipalities of Turkey also offers nationally or EU-funded training and technical support for municipalities in this respect.

While United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support for the implementation of local-administration reform in Turkey (LAR Phase 2) has been concluded, Turkey still aims to fulfill some requirements of the European Local Self-Government Charter. In this context, municipalities work to establish departments tasked with monitoring, investment and coordination. The main duties of these departments are to provide, monitor and coordinate public institutions and organizations’ investments and services; to provide and coordinate central-administration investments in the provinces; and to guide and inspect provincial public institutions and organizations. However, the most significant outstanding issues with regard to standardizing local public services are essentially financial, technical and personnel-driven. Within the OECD, Turkey remains the country with the largest regional disparities.

Currently, all municipalities (metropolitan, province and town) have developed service standards for health, transportation, environmental protection, real estate, construction etc. in proportion to their size and scope of activities. However, there is no effective mechanism to assess whether these standards are met or not.

Citation:

Adaptability

The EU accession process is the main driving force behind changes or adaptations in Turkey’s domestic government structures. Almost all public entities maintain a unit for EU affairs; strategic-planning units can be found in all ministries. The European Union and Turkey have developed several projects aimed at harmonizing legislation with the body of EU law and increasing Turkey’s human resources capacity. Particularly, the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and EU twinning programs are major mechanisms aimed at adapting central and local governmental structures to
supranational developments, addressing issues of primary and secondary legislation, public administrative reform, education, justice and home affairs, health care, the environment, public works and so on. In the context of EU accession, the government was able to reform the National Security Council and limit the political role of the military. With respect to judicial reforms, the government created the Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), modeling it on similar criteria found in other EU member states.

Turkey is a signatory of several international conventions that include binding provisions, and the Turkish government has attempted to comply with these international responsibilities. However, the government has fallen short on many requirements, either legally or institutionally. On issues such as child labor, general working conditions and environmental standards, Turkey still falls below international standards.

Following the reorganization of ministerial structures in June 2011, some ministries attempted to reorganize their provincial units as well. With an eye to improving efficiency and effectiveness, some former employees were replaced by new staffers with higher qualifications. These reforms were supported by training programs and other capacity-development tools. However, nepotism and partisanship still prevent full realization of the objectives of effectiveness and efficiency.

In January 2015, a new restructuring plan for the Turkish Public Administration was announced. According to this plan, the Armed Forces (TSK), the National Intelligent Service (MIT), the Gendarmarie and the General Directorate of Security (Turkish Police) shall are to be organized under the Ministry of Security. Moreover, the major economic and financial sector institutions, such as the central bank, the treasury, the Capital Market Board, the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund and the İstanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa İstanbul) shall also be included in a similar reorganization process. Many observers have argued that the central bank’s responsibilities should be redefined.

Citation:

Turkey is present in UN peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The government has continued its efforts to mediate in the Balkans, the Middle
East and the Black Sea/ Caucasus region. The government’s doctrine of “humanitarian diplomacy” has been widely acknowledged, and the global activities of its main actors in this field – the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) – have received widespread praise.

As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, Turkey had hosted and assisted more than 2.5 million Syrian refugees as of November 2015, with only a limited share of this group living in state-run refugee camps. The flow of refugees through Turkey on their way to Europe has become an urgent international issue. EU-Turkey dialogue on the refugee issue, beginning with a late-November 2015 summit, quickly became a bargaining dialogue over the EU’s financial contribution to Turkey’s attempts to stem the flow of migrants and Turkey’s membership negotiation process.

The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group has represented a new threat to Turkey as well as others. It challenges established state frontiers, exacerbates sectarianism and refugee pressures, and claims ideological hegemony with its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Moreover, IS’s sudden advance into the Kurdish regions in Syria and Iraq has imposed new challenges for the Kurds in the region and to the Turkish government’s “solution process.” Turkey’s initial, rather unilateral policy toward IS was criticized by opposition parties, media outlets, and the international community. Later, in July 2015 and after the Suruç bombing, the Turkish Armed Forces began to strike IS as well as PKK targets. The government subsequently realized that both the refugee and the international terrorist crises require an effective and coordinated action plan with the participation of all relevant parties. In addition to the consultative, coordinative and cooperative structures within NATO and the EU, Turkey has also participated in the Vienna talks in search of a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict.

Chairing the G-20 in 2015, Turkey effectively coordinated a wide range of policies and global issues including youth, refugees, climate change and transparency within the consultative framework of this multilateral body. In addition, Turkish politicians participate in World Economic Forum meetings and other regional and international organizations. The country is also one of the initiators and co-sponsors of the U.N.-affiliated Alliance of Civilizations initiative. Turkey hosted the 8th Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) Summit Meeting “Migration and Human Mobility for Sustainable Development” in October 2015, and is organizing the first “World Humanitarian Summit” to be held in 2016 under the auspices of the United Nations.
Organizational Reform

Several units in the hierarchic Turkish administration contribute to the monitoring process directly or indirectly. These include the State Supervisory Council, the Prime Ministry Inspection Board, the Directorate General of Legislation Development and Publication, the Directorate General of Laws and Decrees, and the Council of State. Each administrative institution has its own internal control unit for monitoring how financial rules are implemented. However, these units are not fully effective. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and individual ministries also occasionally communicate with the parliament’s general secretariat and other institutions and organizations with the aim of reforming existing legislation.

All ministries regularly assess current legislation and draft amendments. The Prime Minister’s Office also requires public institutions to produce regular monitoring reports, but these are not made publicly available. In a limited sense, national and international organizations such as the United Nations Development Project, the European Union and the Council of Europe provide a blueprint for institutional performance, as observations may produce a needs analysis and outline reasons to pursue institutional reforms. Public participation in this process is limited, however.

Turkey has undergone an organizational change involving the creation of new institutions, the merging or splitting of ministerial bodies, legal changes and rapid personnel shifts. These developments make monitoring exceedingly difficult. The OECD Sigma assessments provide some insight on actual operations. As stated in the Annual Report of the PMO and of the Ministry of Development, coordination and monitoring are major weaknesses in Turkish public administration.

The European Commission’s recent Enlargement Strategy document also emphasizes that a regular monitoring of governmental performance enables effective auditing and the realization of objectives.
Institutional Reform Score: 6

According to Law 5018 on Public Financial Management and Control, all public institutions, including municipalities and special provincial administrations, must prepare strategic plans. All public bodies have designated a separate department for developing strategy and coordination efforts; however, these departments are not yet completely functional. Maximizing strategic capacity requires resources, expert knowledge, an adequate budget and a participatory approach. The government lacks sufficient personnel to meet the requirements of strategic planning, performance-based programs and activity reports. In this respect, several training and internship programs have been established.

A two-year project seeking to improve strategic management capacity was introduced by the Ministry of Development in 2010. This aims to ensure efficient strategic-planning capacity within key central public organizations, including the General Directorate for Local Authorities, the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control, the Council of Higher Education, and the Court of Accounts. In the 2013 Gap Assessment Report, Turkey was deemed to be ten years behind OECD countries. Major weaknesses cited include the compatibility of existing legislation, a lack of strategic management in budgeting systems and cycles, and a weak performance management and organizational culture.

During the assessment period, Turkey developed sectoral strategies and action plans for 2015-2018 on biotechnology, entrepreneurship, small and medium scale enterprises, productivity and information society. Several strategy documents were also prepared such as a National Employment Strategy. Also, a National Strategy of Regional Development was prepared for the period of 2014-2023. The central government’s institutions and agencies, local administrations, universities, and the state economic enterprises (KİTs) also prepared strategic plans.

The European Commission’s recent Enlargement Strategy document underlines that public administration reform is essential in the process of integration and must be based on certain principles such as strategic management, monitoring and the integration of national, local and sectoral policies.
Making matters worse, debates continue to rage on over the transformation of Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential system, which has been driven by President Erdogan and the ruling AKP in an effort to, as they assert, reduce the frictions resulting from the “current military-drafted constitution” and thereby enhance “efficiency and democracy.” And although the AKP failed in November 2015 to secure enough seats in parliament to enable it to draw a new constitution, it has nonetheless declared its intent to consult with opposition parties in an effort to reform the constitutional system.

Citation:

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

The government generally does not adequately inform citizens about the content and development of government policy. In his monthly TV appearance, the prime minister only shares government success stories. Government officials highlight policies as a promising objective, but do not offer follow-up details. While there are no surveys that review how citizens get information on government policy, it is evident that policymaking in Turkey is not transparent or participatory.

Citizens often learn of policies only after their implementation process has begun. The public’s level of knowledge about government affairs is low, as is the public’s level of satisfaction with the government; however, this has not until recently manifested itself in public unrest. According to a 2011 survey, the media is the public’s first source of information, including information on government policies; however, many people also believe the media is not entirely reliable. Even the participatory mechanisms set up to assist government policymaking do not work effectively. Civil-society organizations are not able to inform their members or society at large about ongoing developments. Policy plans are mainly kept secret or are subject to last-minute
changes, and the parliament’s tendency to pass important measures as a part of omnibus legislative packages has been subject to increasing criticism, because it confuses the public.

Social media has become a widespread tool, even for the government in its public relations. Ministries and municipalities use social media frequently, though there are some fake accounts spreading disinformation. Academic studies concluded that people consider social media a mechanism able to influence views and developments in two directions: government can inform its citizens and the people can influence government policies. In other words, social media can facilitate input-output and implementation and feedback in governmental processes. Sometimes ministers, mayors and other decision-makers share their policies through social media. However, the recent restrictions and bans on social media on the one hand and its limited presence on the other make it ineffective. Furthermore, as is the case demonstrated in other countries, social media may inform people, but it also tends to re-affirm biased views and opinions among the public. As a result, social media may underline or even exacerbate polarization tendencies in Turkey.

Citation:
Volkan Göçoğlu and Mehmet Devrim Aydınl, Kamu Politikası ve Sosyal Medya İlişkisinin Toplumsal Hareketler Hammında İncelenmesi, Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, 2015, 8(37): 880-901.

Legislative Actors’ Resources

The administrative organization of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) consists of departments that support the Speaker’s Office. The conditions of appointment of the administrators and officers are regulated by law (Law 6253, 1 December 2011). The administrative organization (including the research services department and the library and archives services department) is responsible for providing information as well as bureaucratic and technical support to the plenary, the bureau, committees, party groups and deputies; informing committees about bills and other legislative documents and assisting in the preparation of committee reports; preparing draft bills in accordance with deputy requests; providing information and documents to committees and deputies; coordinating relations and legislative information between the Assembly and the general secretary of the president, the Prime
Minister’s Office and other public institutions; organizing relations with the
media and public; and providing documentation, archive, and publishing
services (Article 3, Law 6253). Although the budget of the Assembly is part of
the annual state budget, it is debated and voted on as a separate spending unit.
The Assembly prepares its own budget without negotiation or consultation
with the government; yet, it does follow the guidelines of the Ministry of
Finance.

The 550 deputies are provided with 496 primary and 452 secondary advisors
and 502 clerks. A total of 32 experts and 76 clerks are assigned to the various
party groups. The Turkish parliament has improved both its human-resources
services and technical infrastructure, thus providing greater support for
members’ work. However, capacity development remains a major problem.
The parliamentary library and research unit cannot effectively meet demands
for information.

The 2014 Annual Activity Report of the TBMM identifies the following
weaknesses in the country’s parliamentary services: transition problems in
human resources management, insufficient expertise in some areas, low
information technology literacy rates and a low adaptive capacity of personnel
for deputy services. So far, internal reforms to address these issues have not
been initiated.

According to Article 98 of the constitution, the Grand National Assembly of
Turkey exercises its supervisory power over the government by posing written
and oral questions, conducting inquiries, sponsoring general debates, offering
motions of censure or starting parliamentary investigations (Articles 96-113 of
the Rules of Procedure). Parliamentary committees or commissions may ask
the ministries to provide any information relevant to their sphere of duty
(Article 41 of the Rules of Procedure). However, in practice some
parliamentary inquiry committees that deal with security or military issues
have not been able to collect information from security forces. Some invited
public officials, mainly military officers, have not attended parliamentary
inquiry committee meetings.

The allegations of corruption made against former ministers of the 61st
government offer a more recent and quite typical example of how
parliamentary-inquiry committees malfunction in serious cases. In early 2014,
a parliamentary commission was created to probe the allegations of December 2013. The formation of the commission took longer than expected due to the government party’s delaying tactics before the presidential elections. A total of 62 files ostensibly detailing corruption were sent to parliament and then returned to the prosecutor’s office, after which only 32 files were resubmitted to the parliament. In 2015, the prosecutor assigned to the matter dropped the case, asserting a lack of evidence.

According to Article 30 of the parliamentary rules of procedure, the prime minister or ministers can attend committee meetings as a representative of the government without invitation, and may talk on the subject matter at hand. However, the prime minister or ministers may also delegate a senior civil servant to be his or her representative at a committee meeting. If relevant, the committee may ask a minister to explain a government position, but he or she is not required to comply with this invitation if there is no legal obligation. While parliamentary committees are not able to summon ministers for hearings, the responsible minister may voluntarily decide to participate in a meeting. Normally, the committees are briefed by high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats.

The annual activity reports of the TBMM do not provide any information on how many ministers were summoned and how many times by which parliamentary commission.

According to Article 30 of the parliamentary rules of procedure, committees are legally able to summon experts from non-governmental organizations, universities or the bureaucracy to provide testimony without limitation. During the review period, parliament made de facto use of this right, for example in committees to investigate past military coups, the mass killings in Tunceli (Dersim) in 1937 and 1938, and the Uludere incident of December 2011 when
a group of Kurds from the borderline city of Uludere, allegedly PKK fighters, were attacked at night by the Turkish airforce, resulting in at least 34 deaths.

Citation:

There are 18 standing committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), which are generally established in parallel with structure of the ministries. The most recent such committee, the Security and Intelligence Commission, was established in spring 2014. Except for committees established by special laws, the jurisdiction of each committee is not expressly defined by the rules of procedure. Some committees have overlapping tasks. Committees do not independently monitor ministry activity, but do examine draft bills. During discussions, committees may also supervise the ministry activity indirectly. The State Economic Enterprises Commission does not audit ministries but plays an important role in monitoring developments within their administration. The distribution of the workload of these committees is uneven. The Planning and Budget Commission is the most overloaded group, as every bill possesses some financial aspect. Professionalization among committee members is low. Neither the Strategic Plan nor the Activity Reports of the TBMM emphasize the need to implement effective ministerial monitoring. These committees recently stated their intent to recruit more qualified personnel in certain areas.

Citation:

According to Article 160 of the constitution, the Court of Accounts is charged on behalf of the Grand National Assembly with auditing all accounts related to revenues, expenditures and properties of government departments that are financed by the general or subsidiary budgets. The Court’s auditing capacity was limited by the Law No. 6085 in 2010, but the Constitutional Court annulled Article 79 regulating the audit of the Audit Court’s accounts in 2013. In December 2012, the Court also annulled the provision limiting performance auditing. In December 2013, a new article was added to the Regulation Concerning the Submission of the Public Institutions’ Accounts to the Audit Court, which meant that these accounts are to be excluded from the audit of the Court until the end of 2016. Although the Court completed the reviews of 480 public institutions and 77 public enterprises’ accounts and found several corrupt transactions in 2014, parliament does not have sufficient capacity to
monitor them effectively. In addition, about 15% of defense expenditures, including several governmental funds related to defense, are not supervised by parliament.

The parliamentary Final Accounts Committee reviews the TBMM’s accounts annually. The Court of Accounts reports to parliament but is not accountable to it. The parliament, from a list compiled by its Plan and Budget Commission, elects the Court’s president and members. The Council of Ministers, however, appoints court rapporteurs and prosecutors.

Citation:

A law establishing a Turkish ombudsman office, called the Public Monitoring Institution (KDK), was adopted in June 2012 and went into force in December 2012. The office is located within the Parliamentary Speaker’s Office, and is accountable to parliament. The ombudsman reviews lawsuits and administrative appeals (from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law) and ensures that the public administration is held accountable. In 2014, a total of 5,639 petitions arrived at the Ombudsman and by the end of 2014 it had addressed 6,348 complaints (including the pending cases from 2013). According to the KDK itself, several main obstacles hamper the efficacy of its work. First, the degree of compliance with its decisions has been low, with only 20% of its released decisions having been obeyed by public administrative bodies. Second, under the current law, the KDK cannot conduct inquiries on its own initiative. Moreover, the mandate of the office does not cover administrative actions performed by military personnel.

The Parliamentary Petition Committee reviews citizens’ petitions (a total of 4,149 from October 2014 to May 2015) and refers them to the relevant authority, when appropriate. The Human Rights Investigation Commission has the authority to receive, investigate and review complaints on human-rights issues. The Commission on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is entitled to review complaints regarding violations of gender equality.

Citation:
Media

Despite the pluralistic media scene in Turkey, the Turkish media (TV channels, newspapers, etc.) seems increasingly split between proponents and opponents of the AKP government. In consequence, it is difficult for citizens to find objective or substantive in-depth information on government policies and government decision-making. A media-ownership structure based on industrial conglomerates (the so-called Mediterranean or polarized pluralist media model), the government’s clear-cut differentiation between pro- and anti-government media, and the increasingly polarized public discourse make it difficult for journalists to provide substantial information to the public. This is true even of the main news agencies, such as Anadolu, ANKA, Doğan and Cihan. Superficial reporting and self-censorship are widespread within the major media outlets. Media ownership, and direct and indirect government intervention in private media outlets and journalism obscure the objective analyses of government policies. Thus, few newspapers, radio or TV stations offer in-depth analysis of government policies or their effects concerning human rights, the Kurdish issues, economic conditions and so on. Social media has recently become a major means of communication, but is limited in its reach to urban, primarily young segments of society. However, it is frequently restricted by the government. In 2015, a total of 106,188 web sites were blocked.

Sabahattin Önkibar, İmamlar ve Haramiler Medyası, İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınevi, 2015.

Parties and Interest Associations

The Political Parties Law (Law No. 2820) does not encourage intra-party democracy. Nor do the bylaws of the major parties provide any incentive to pursue intra-party democracy. Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) do not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or religious
orientation with regard to membership, contestation within the parties is limited, at best. Dissenting voices are generally unable to find an institutional path by which to engage in effective debate. Competition usually revolves around party members’ ability to create local power centers through which they compete for the attention and goodwill of the party leader.

Membership, party congresses and executive boards are not democratically managed in most political parties. Süheyl Batum, former deputy of the CHP, was dismissed from the party in 2014, but returned to the party through a court decision in early 2015. Sinan Ogan, a leading politician of the MHP, was dismissed from the party after he speculated that the party may fail to meet the 10% threshold in the election. Later, he returned to the party by a court order, but the party annulled that decision. Tuğrul Türkeş, the son of the founder of the MHP, was also dismissed when he agreed to take part in the government formed in August 2015. Several deputies of the AKP allegedly closer to the illegal Gülen “parallel state” structure either resigned or faced being dismissed in 2013 and 2014.

In 2014, the ruling AK Party retained its internal regulations – unique in comparison to other parties – limiting deputies and officeholders to three terms. Before the renewed parliamentary elections of 2015 on November 1, Prime Minister Davutoğlu announced that they lifted this rule. The AKP’s intra-party democracy arbitration committee does facilitate intra-party bureaucracy only.

The AKP determines its candidates through a somewhat complex process involving a so-called tendency survey, interviews by special commissions, and the supreme board’s final say. However, candidates are ultimately chosen by the party’s leadership, which consults “significant” public opinion leaders. The CHP chose 301 out of 550 candidates through primary elections before the June 7 elections, however, most of the delegates were determined by the trusteeship of the party’s central executive committee during the provincial and township congresses. Some 41 candidates were placed near the top by the party’s leader. The MHP and the HDP also follow somewhat centralized nomination procedures.


Bekir Ağırdr, Fuat Keyman, Tarhan Erdem, Türkiye’nin Demokratikleşme İçin Kapsamlı Bir Siyasi Parti
The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) is the most influential business association in Turkey, representing more than 1.2 million enterprises and members of various industry and business chambers. The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), affiliated with TOBB University in Ankara, provides extensive surveys in various fields. The pro-Western, Istanbul-centric Turkish Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’ Association (TÜSİAD) and the conservative, Anatolian-centric Independent Industrialists’ and Entrepreneurs’ Association (MÜSİAD), also have R&D units and sponsor reports on political reforms, education, health care, security and migration. The degree of direct impact of such proposals and amendments on legislation is unknown, but the government regularly claims to take such reports under consideration.

The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), an umbrella organization founded in 2005 and representing seven business federations, 211 business associations and over 55,000 entrepreneurs from across Turkey, is believed to be close to U.S.-based preacher Fethullah Gülen and his global network of enterprises and schools. In November 2015, the Ankara police department launched a raid against the TUSKON headquarters as part of an investigation into the illegal network, allegedly called “Parallel State Structure Terror Organization/Pro-Fethullah Terror Organization.”

Among labor unions, the ideological split between secular unions such as the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions (KESK) and the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (DİSK) and the more conservative-Islamic Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş) tends to prevent common action. Moreover, it has become increasingly obvious over the last decade that religiosity has become a strategic resource in creating solidarity among union members, and in bolstering loyalty to the government. Turkey’s oldest trade union, Türk-İş, has for many years prepared monthly surveys on hunger and poverty thresholds and is included in the collective bargaining process.

Ayse Bugra and Osman Savaskan, New Capitalism In Turkey The Relationship between Politics, Religion and Business, Edward Elgar, 2014.


The number of non-economic civil-society organizations has increased in the last decade, indicating a growing degree of public engagement within many
segments of Turkish society. There are several initiatives to promote the
capacity of civil society in Turkey, yet only a few leading, semi-professional
associations have the financial and human resources needed to work and
provide alternative proposals for social issues that are grounded in scholarly
research. The number of pro-government and pseudo-CSOs (otherwise known
as GONGOs) benefiting from public as well as EU funding has increased
recently. Several CSOs lack the staff, resources and visibility to carry out face-
to-face fundraising. Turkey ranked 123rd in the World Giving Index 2014
(WGI). The government has excluded opponents from participation in
decision-making process, creating instead its own loyal civil-society groups
such as TÜRGEV, a foundation led by President Erdoğan’s son that has gained
political influence in the executive and expanded its financial resources.
Religious orders and communities have extended their networks under the
different names of solidarity associations.

Environmental pressure groups have increasingly demonstrated against dam
and hydroelectric-energy projects throughout Turkey, but their protests are
regularly suppressed by the security forces and subjected to criminal
investigations.

The Association for Support of Women Candidates (KA.DER) has for years
promoted the equal representation of women and men in all walks of life.
KA.DER sees equal representation as a condition for democracy and calls for
equal representation in all elected and appointed decision-making positions. It
conducts several EU- and UNDP-sponsored projects and advocate its
objectives.

The initiative Oy ve Ötesi Girişimi (Vote and Beyond) in collaboration with the
Unions of Bars of Turkey, several bars and the Checks and Balances Network
monitored the local and presidential elections in 2014 and two parliamentary
elections in 2015 with tens of thousands of volunteers spanning the spectrum
of political affiliations and ideological backgrounds. Upon receiving training,
these volunteers acted as independent election observers and reported the
accuracy of the official election results.

CIVICUS, State of Civil Society Report 2015,
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