



Adaptability Report

Domestic Adaptability, International Cooperation

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2018

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Indicator Domestic Adaptability

Question To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
- 8-6 = In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
- 5-3 = In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
- 2-1 = The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.

Sweden

Score 10 Following Sweden's EU membership, which came into force in the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained effort to adapt government, policy and regulation to European Union standards. The bulk of this adaptation relates to changes in domestic regulatory frameworks and policies, a development that does not impact the structure of government.

Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU member states.

Most of the adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative level, for instance by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies.

Citation:

Jacobsson B. and G. Sundström (2006), *Från hemvävd till invävd: Europeiseringen av svensk förvaltning och politik* (Malmö: Liber).

Zannakis, M. (2010), *Climate Policy as a Window of Opportunity: Sweden and Global Climate Change* (Gothenburg: Department of Political Science).

Denmark

Score 9 Being a small and open economy, Denmark has a long tradition of participating in international cooperation. The most intrusive form of international/supranational cooperation is Denmark's membership of the European Union. Since joining in

1973, an elaborate system of coordination within government administration has developed. It involves all affected ministries and agencies, and often also interest organizations. In parallel, the European Affairs Committee in the parliament (Folketinget) has become an efficient democratic control of Danish-EU policy. Denmark speaks with one voice in Brussels.

Citation:

Finn Laursen, "Denmark: in pursuit of influence and legitimacy," in Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Maurer and Jürgen Mittag (eds.), *Fifteen into one? The European Union and its member states*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 92-114.

Rasmus Brun Pedersen et al., "Dansk europapolitik og det danske EU-koordinationssystem." in Jørgen Grønnegård and Jørgen Elklit (eds.), *Det demokratiske system*. 4. ed., Reitzels, 2016, pp. 248-284.

Estonia

Score 9

The most important supranational organization affecting domestic policies is the European Union. After consultations with the parliament and advocacy groups, the government has typically adopted a framing-policy document (e.g., Estonian EU Policy 2015 – 2019). Generally, the formation and implementation of national EU policy is the responsibility of the government. An interministerial Coordination Council for EU Affairs is tasked with facilitating coordination of these national efforts. The Coordination Council plans and monitors the initiation and implementation of all EU-related policy activities. Each ministry bears the responsibility for developing draft legislation and enforcing government priorities in its domain.

The Secretariat for EU affairs within the GO provides administrative and legal support in preparing EU-related activities. It advises the prime minister on EU matters (including preparations for European Council meetings), manages EU affairs across all government bodies, and offers guidelines for permanent representations. To prepare for the 2017 Estonian Presidency of the Council of the EU, a special task force (i.e., GO Presidency Team) was formed with 31 positions. For the presidency, 335 temporary positions were established with relevant staff training. These arrangements were successfully accomplished even though the EU Presidency started six months earlier than initially planned.

The parliament's European Union Affairs Committee issues political positions on draft EU legislation, provides political opinions and oversees the activities of the government as it implements EU policies.

Cooperation with international organizations (e.g., WTO, OECD and NATO) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finland

Score 9 Most important adaptations have resulted from Finland's EU membership. Finland was among the first EU member states to adopt the euro and government structures have in several instances been adapted to EU norms. The Parliamentary Grand Committee is tasked with preparing and adopting EU legislation. Furthermore, oversight of the EU secretariat, responsible for the coordination of EU affairs, has been transferred from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office. A coordination system exists to ensure that Finland maintains positions in line with its overall EU policy. This system involves relevant ministries, a cabinet committee on EU affairs and various EU subcommittees. These subcommittees are sector-specific governmental organs and constitute the foundation for the promotion of EU affairs within the state's structures. Finland is a member of the MOTAN donor network, which evaluates the work of international organizations and their organizational effectiveness. Also, the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2022 was adopted in 2014, introducing measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change. The implementation of the plan is coordinated by a national monitoring group.

Ireland

Score 9 The key influence in this area is Ireland's membership in the European Union and, in the financial area, of the euro zone. Over the 42 years since Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community, the country has adapted institutions at all levels of government to allow effective functioning in Europe. Having successfully implemented the 2010 bailout agreement with the Troika, Ireland is now committed to adhering to the EU rules of economic governance contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and the fiscal procedures contained in the European Semester. The unexpectedly strong economic performance since 2013 has greatly facilitated compliance with these obligations.

Citation:

For a discussion of the framework of Ireland's economic governance see <http://www.iiea.com/publications/reforming-european-economic-governance?gclid=CKCIzsatvcECFQRj2wodjz4A9w#sthash.lI8sWbHq.dpufin> return for

Latvia

Score 9 Latvia has adapted domestic government structures to fulfill the requirements of EU membership, revising policy-planning and decision-making processes. During the 2013 – 2015 period, Latvia adapted its domestic structures to comply with the demands of the 2015 EU presidency. Beginning in 2014, Latvia began adapting to

the requirements associated with OECD membership. In 2016, Latvia joined the OECD.

In order to ensure efficient decision-making and meet the obligations of IMF and EU loan agreements, Latvia created a reform-management group for coordination on major policy reforms. In 2012, this included changes to the biofuels support system, reforms in the civil service's human-resources management, tax-policy changes and reforms in the management of state enterprises. The group proved to be a useful forum for the consolidation of support across sectors for major policy changes and structural reforms. The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the group serves to facilitate support for upcoming policy changes. Although the reform management group was considered successful, at the time of writing it had not met since 2013.

Lithuania

Score 9

Lithuania's policymakers have over time significantly adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. A network of semi-independent regulatory agencies was developed during the pre-accession period. After the completion of EU accession negotiations, Lithuania's system of coordinating EU affairs was gradually moved from the core government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and decentralized to line ministries in the case of specific sectoral matters.

Lithuania has managed to maintain a rather good record of transposition and implementation of EU law, as illustrated by the low transposition deficit and relatively small number of infringement cases initiated against the country. The absorption of EU investments continues to take place relatively quickly. Indeed, 15.02% of EU payments were already disbursed by 29 September 2017, compared to the EU-28 average of 10.24%. Consequently, Lithuania ranked fifth among EU member states in terms of the payment rate of EU cohesion policy. Although the management of EU funds and control systems is functioning well and in compliance with EU requirements, it is challenging for the Lithuanian authorities to ensure the result-orientation of EU funds while maintaining a high rate of absorption during the programming period 2014 – 2020. The adoption of EU policy has largely taken place on a formal basis, rather than indicating substantial policy learning. The central bank's capacities were strengthened as a result of preparations for the introduction of the euro in 2015, while the adoption of economic-governance rules for the euro zone resulted in an expansion in the role and capacities of the National Audit Office.

Canada

Score 8

Organizational change is constantly taking place within the federal government and some of this change reflects international developments. However, unlike countries

in the European Union, Canada is not a member of a supranational organization that may directly require periodic adjustments in the organizational structure and reporting relationships of the government and its public services. One notable exception has been the many changes over time in agencies relating to international matters, which include the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In the March 2013 federal budget, CIDA was merged with DFAIT to create what is now known as Global Affairs Canada. The rationale provided for this reorganization was that an enhanced alignment of foreign, development, trade and commercial policies and programs will allow the government to achieve greater policy coherence on top-priority issues, and will result in greater overall impact. Development advocates have expressed concern that the reorganization would lead to a less focused and effective foreign-assistance program.

France

Score 8

The French government has a good track record in adapting national institutions to European and international challenges. This can be attributed to the bureaucratic elite's awareness of international issues. This contrasts vividly with the government parties' weakened ability to adapt national policies to the challenges stemming from the globalization of the economy, as there is often fierce resistance from trade unions, most political parties and public opinion at large. The defeat of the traditional party government system in 2017 has radically transformed the political landscape. New parliamentarians, most selected from outside the traditional political party framework, fully support Macron's new vision. Macro's declared European and global approach is a radical departure from the past orientations of both the right and the left. Though it remains to be seen if this shift will be accepted by the public, social actors and state bureaucracy.

Italy

Score 8

In the medium term, the most significant impact that international, and particularly supranational (EU-related) developments have had upon the structure and working of the government concerns the role of the minister of finance and of the treasury. Because of budgetary requirements deriving from European integration and participation in the euro zone, the minister of finance has acquired increasing weight in the governmental decision-making process, exercising an effective gatekeeping role with respect to the proposals of line ministries. Another example of this development is the strict internal stability pact, designed to meet the European Union's stability and growth pact obligations across all administrative levels.

The prime minister and finance minister have gained a central role in the

implementation of the government program, guiding the most important decisions. Other ministers have had a secondary role.

Starting with the Monti government, the structure of the government was streamlined, with a smaller number of ministers and undersecretaries than in the past. However, the Gentiloni government has slightly increased the number of ministers and undersecretaries. There are currently 13 ministers with portfolio, five ministers without portfolio, seven deputy-ministers and 36 undersecretaries.

New Zealand

Score 8 New Zealand has ample experience in drastically restructuring its public sector and reforming policymaking to adapt to new challenges. Major reforms were accomplished from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. However, this was done under a majoritarian regime, based on a first-past-the-post electoral system. Part of the reform package involved the change to a proportional electoral system, a move that was initiated by the voting public rather than the governing elite. Today, given the existence of a multiparty system and minority government, radical reform is much more difficult to achieve. In retrospect, institutional reforms delivered somewhat less than was anticipated and have at times been disruptive. The government at the time of writing was concerned with driving efficiency and performance improvements into the system, and was seeking to accomplish this with relatively limited emphasis on a major restructuring of government agencies.

Norway

Score 8 Government structures have remained fairly stable over time. Norway is not a member of the European Union, but is a member of the European Economic Area. EU policies are therefore routinely transposed and implemented in Norway. EU regulations and legislation affect Norwegian ministries and public administration in much the same way as EU member states are affected.

There are ongoing efforts to improve the institutional framework and further strengthen e-governance, although not primarily in response to international developments.

It is common for new governments to reallocate tasks across ministries. Examples of adaptation include the country's early establishment of an Environment Ministry, the strengthening of the political leadership devoted to development cooperation, and the recent establishment of a Directorate of Integration and Diversity separate from the body dealing with immigration issues. In general, interdepartmental coordination has increased as a result of international activity, particularly so in relation to the handling of European affairs.

South Korea

Score 8 International and supranational developments that affect South Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, South Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role in the South Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The government has also declared its intention to increase its provision of official development assistance (ODA) in order to meet global standards in the near future. More generally, South Korea has been strongly influenced by international and supranational developments and pressures. For example, it was the first Asian donor to join the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an initiative for enhancing aid transparency.

However, the country's degree of adaptability largely depends upon compatibility with domestic political goals. Indeed, action in many areas can be regarded as so-called mock compliance. For example, the government is relatively less responsive to global standards in areas such as environment, labor rights or the reduction of non-tariff barriers. Yet while some have worried that the Moon administration will be more inward-looking than predecessors, it is more likely that South Korea's strong economic dependence on global markets will ensure it remains open to adapting to most global pressures.

Citation:
KOICA. "The Republic of Korea Joins IATI." December 29, 2015.
http://www.koica.go.kr/english/board/focus_on/1321226_3563.html

Spain

Score 8 The Spanish government has largely adapted its domestic structures to agreements made at international and supranational level, although this adaptation has not always been implemented effectively. The most important impact has been produced by EU membership. The Spanish government's coordination with and adaptation to the European Union is mainly the task of the Secretariat of State for the European Union (within the Foreign Ministry). For obvious reasons, considering the economic significance of the EU agenda, the Prime Minister's Economic Office (dealing with the structural reforms), the Ministry for Economy, and the Ministry for Finance also have important responsibilities in terms of coordinating cooperation between ministries on EU matters. More generally, all line ministries have to some extent Europeanized their organizations, although most ministries lack units dealing specifically with the European Union, and interministerial coordination is weak.

Since the beginning of the eighties, cooperation between the central government and subnational governments has been progressively assumed by sectoral conferences (Conferencias Sectoriales). Sectoral conferences are multilateral cooperation bodies between the central government and subnational governments for specific policy sectors (e.g., health and environment). Each sectoral conference established a specific framework for cooperation among the administrative levels, though with a very weak organizational structure. If sectoral conferences will be convened and which topics will be discussed depends on decisions taken by the central government. Since the senate does not function as forum for the participation of the subnational governments and the sectoral conferences are mainly informal, the Autonomous Communities do not participate in matters that directly affect them nor have a veto right in central institutions.

Citation:

Real Decreto 768/2017, de 28 de julio, por el que se desarrolla la estructura orgánica básica del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación y se modifica el Real Decreto 424/2016, de 11 de noviembre, por el que se establece la estructura orgánica básica de los departamentos ministeriales.

https://www.boe.es/ diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2017-90 11

Iceland

Score 7

While not a member of the European Union, Iceland has since 1994 been a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), and has integrated and adapted EU structures into domestic law to a considerable extent. Under the EEA agreement, Iceland is obliged to adopt around 80% of EU law. Iceland is also responsive to comments made by the Council of Europe, countries belonging to the Schengen Agreement, and U.N. institutions. As one of the five full members, Iceland is bound by every unanimous decision of the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the council deals only with issues connected to Nordic cooperation. The structure and organization of Iceland's government accords well with international practice, and seems to be under constant review. The 2009-2013 government attempted to streamline and rationalize the ministry structure in order to weaken the long-standing links between special-interest organizations and the ministries. Through a process of mergers, the number of ministries was reduced from 12 to 8. The Gunnlaugsson cabinet (2013-2016) partially reversed some of these mergers and increased the number of ministers to 10. Further, the Benediktsson cabinet (2017-2017) increased the number of ministers by one by splitting the Ministry of Interior in two in January 2017.

Israel

Score 7

Following OECD and academic recommendations, the Israeli government advances various administrative reforms regarding regulatory burdens, decision-making and long-term planning. Periodic progress reports show gradual improvement in the

dissemination of information as well as in decision-making. The government continues to adapt its domestic structures to international and supranational developments in an ongoing and constructive process. The Ministry of Economy and Industry produces an annual report that reviews progress with regard to implementation of the OECD's recommendations. For example, in 2015 the report presented the progress made in the ability to regulate the imposition of labor laws. Moreover, in 2015, Israel signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of the OECD and ratified it in 2016. Many other agreements, such as the enforcement of the anti-bribery convention, have been signed, with policies adapted in Israel in accordance with OECD standards.

Citation:

"Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters", Ministry of Finance, <http://mof.gov.il/en/InternationalAffairs/InternationalTaxation/ExchangeInformationAgreements/Pages/MultilateralConvention.aspx>

OECD, "OECD Economic Surveys Israel," January 2016, <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/1016031e.pdf?expires=1518382235&id=id&accname=ocid54016459&checksum=AB0A7D48A352C994DB07DFA04F611FCB>

<http://mof.gov.il/chiefecon/internationalconnections/oecd/oecd%20enterp.pdf>

"OECD economic surveys: Israel," OECD publication (December 2013).

OECD, "OECD Studies on SMEs and Entrepreneurship SME and Entrepreneurship Policy in Israel 2016,"

"Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies," Ministry of industry, trade and labor official report (June 2012)

Slosbarg, Itay. 'Israel is joining on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of the OECD' – Funder website, 7.9.2016 (Hebrew): <http://www.funder.co.il/article.aspx?idx=70633>

"There are currently more than 200 ongoing investigations of corruption and bribery around the world," Globes, 18.7.2017, <http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001197649>

"Working plans book for 2014," official state publication (March 2014) (Hebrew).

Ministry of economy report – Review on the progression on OECD's recommendation implementation – 2015 (Hebrew): http://brookdaleheb.jdc.org.il/_Uploads/PublicationsFiles/OECD2015_SocialPolicies_HEB.pdf

Luxembourg

Score 7

Luxembourg has made progress in implementing European legislation. In terms of the transposition of EU directives, Luxembourg's performance is moderate, yet it has improved in recent years. Given the size of the country, there is limited scope for improving the government administration's human resources. A single civil servant is typically responsible for a number of tasks that would be assigned to an entire team in other EU member states. For example, European Social Fund (ESF) activities fall under the responsibility of only four civil servants who have other responsibilities in addition to European programs. Despite a lack of personnel, work expected by European and supranational institutions is completed. The government presented its national plan (Plan national pour une croissance intelligente, durable et

inclusive) in April 2013, and updated it in 2017, adapting budgetary mechanisms.

Luxembourg often responds to international requests by launching an ad hoc group. The country has also done well in conforming national law to EU directives, sometimes transposing laws verbatim. However, this does not guarantee that the law will be followed verbatim; differences between de jure and de facto interpretations have emerged.

Citation:

18th Update of the Stability and Growth Programme of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the 2017 – 2021 Period. Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2017. www.mf.public.lu/publications/programme/18th_update_stability_growth_programme.pdf. Accessed 14 Dec. 2017.

Council recommendation on the National Reform Programme 2017 of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Luxembourg. Official Journal of the European Union, 2017. [eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017H0809\(15\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017H0809(15)&from=EN). Accessed 21 Dec. 2017.

“Europe 2020 in Luxembourg.” European Commission, www.ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-your-country/luxembourg/national-reform-programme/index_en.htm. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

National plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth – Luxembourg 2020. Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2017. www.gouvernement.lu/6854313/2017-pnr-luxembourg-fr. Accessed 14 Dec 2017.

“Programme national de réforme du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg dans le cadre du semestre européen 2017.” Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2017, ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-national-reform-programme-luxembourg-fr.pdf. Accessed 21 Dec. 2017.

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Reporting table on national Europe 2020 targets and key commitments for the next 12 months. European Commission, 2014. www.ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/annex32014_luxembourg_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Secrétariat général.” European Commission, www.ec.europa.eu/info/departments/secretariat-general_fr. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Malta

Score 7

The capacity of government structures to adapt to change improved during the period of EU accession and since membership. Malta’s preparations for assuming the EU presidency required further adaptation to changing scenarios, especially at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels as well as ambassadorial and consulate levels. It also required the expansion and international training of personnel. Consequently, there is greater awareness of the need to respond to international developments. Better coordination among the bureaucracy has also contributed to improvements.

Parliament has demonstrated a greater willingness to engage with international forums. This has increased the government’s capacity to address international issues such as climate change, international financial institutions, security policy and humanitarian crises. The recent decision to provide the parliament with greater

autonomy and resources is expected to enhance improvements made over these past four years. Furthermore, a debate has finally begun on whether parliament should become a full-time institution. Indeed, the most sophisticated and complex committee in parliament (with the most subcommittees) is the committee dedicated to foreign policy and European affairs.

Portugal

Score 7

The European Union is vital to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal, organizational, security and reporting frameworks. While the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and regulations, it is steadily adopting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has had to adapt its structures accordingly.

United Kingdom

Score 7

The organization of ministries in the United Kingdom is a prerogative of the prime minister, and traditionally the precise division of tasks between ministries apart from the classic portfolios of foreign policy, defense, the Treasury, and the Home Office has been subject to considerable change. There is some evidence for international and supranational developments playing an important role in these decisions on UK government structures, a clear example being the creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) with an explicit remit to engage in international action to mitigate climate change, although it has since been subsumed within new ministries following the change in prime minister in 2016. New cabinet committees have been set up, such as a committee on Syrian refugees in 2015. There have also been developments leading to new cross-departmental structures. The establishment of the National Security Council was a response to security-related issues, while the creation of a cross-governmental joint energy unit was motivated by the Ukraine crisis.

The United Kingdom has in some areas been an early, and sometimes enthusiastic, proponent of norms and practices that have been championed by international bodies, including those overseeing financial stability and transparency in government. The Open Data Charter and the Open Government Partnership (in which the United Kingdom plays an active role) were agreed under the United Kingdom's G8 presidency. The United Kingdom is an acknowledged leader in open government and ranked 1 out of 115 countries in the 2016 Open Data Barometer.

Perhaps reflecting the prevailing UK attitude to "Brussels" before the decision to leave the European Union, there has been some resistance to policy

recommendations from the European Commission, including the country specific recommendations associated with EU semester process, unless they accord with government priorities like tax avoidance and establishing trade links. There is less resistance to recommendations from, for example, the IMF, even when the recommendations of the IMF and European Union are similar.

In addition to the obvious reactions to Brexit, such as establishing a new ministry and cabinet committee, efforts are being made to develop trade policy capability, in order to respond to the expanding UK role in trade internationally. For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has worked with the Department for International Trade (DIT) and others to develop a cross-Whitehall Trade Policy and Negotiations Faculty in the FCO's Diplomatic Academy. Nevertheless, after losing its influence on EU regulation, the United Kingdom will have to find new ways to influence international policymaking in their national interest.

Austria

Score 6

The Austrian government has adapted domestic structures to international developments, but with reservations. While the EU political agenda is generally accepted, the government has proved reluctant to implement specific policies, for example by defending the principle of bank secrecy. Contributing to this hesitancy is the fact that the government is often internally divided, for reasons both constitutional and political: First, the cabinet consists of autonomous ministers who cannot be forced to accept a general agenda. The position of the chancellor as first among equals means there is no clearly defined leadership by a head of government. Second, governments since 1983 have been coalitions. Coalition parties tend to work on a specific party agenda, and have limited interest in the agenda of the government as such.

In many cases, one governing party tends to favor implementation of international and especially supranational (EU) policies more than the other. Alternately, some parties seek to mobilize populist sentiments against the international or supranational level, identifying their own party as the defender of Austrian interests against foreign encroachment. It is especially the Freedom Party (FPÖ) – allied on the EU-level with parties like the French Front National – which plays the patriotic card against what the party identifies as “Brussels”. As the FPÖ is now a member of the government, the reluctance to adapt to European standards will increase, even as the FPÖ (in contrast to the Front National) does not favor an Austrian exit from the European Union.

Austria's hesitancy in participating in an all-European policy regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict reflects a lack of adaptability. Austrian political actors tend to use the country's neutrality status as a pretext for staying aloof. And Austria's permanent neutrality, enshrined in the constitution, creates problems for Austria's willingness to cooperate in a tighter common European defense policy.

Belgium

Score 6 Belgium is one of the founding states of the European Union and is an active member of many international agreements. In some instances, Belgium has even played a leading role in international agreements (such as banning the production of land mines).

However, this apparent enthusiasm for international and supranational coordination comes with significant caveats, as Belgium is today regularly criticized for not fully complying with rules agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations or NATO. For instance, critics have taken aim at Belgium's failures to respect the Geneva Convention, its failure to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and its slower-than-average progress in abiding by EU environmental norms. This can again be partially explained by the persistent political tension between the country's Dutch- and French-speaking camps, its complex and still-evolving institutional structure, and the fact that, due to decentralization, all governmental entities maintain (and tend to further develop) their own international relations in the area of their (sometimes overlapping) competences.

Citation:

http://www2.derand.be/livingintranslation/en/Minorities_Convention.php

<https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/fcnm-factsheet>

Bulgaria

Score 6 EU and NATO membership imposes a clear necessity on the Bulgarian government to be able to respond to and adopt changes based on international and supranational developments. Beyond changes in recent years related to this, the primary governmental structures and their methods of operation have remained largely unchanged. One area in which organizational changes related to supranational developments seem to be leading to an improvement is the implementation of EU-funded programs, especially in some spheres such as transportation and environmental protection infrastructure.

There is already a discernible attempt to begin a process to adapt government structures in Bulgaria to upcoming changes in the EU funding framework. Another source of impetus for improvement of domestic government structures is expected to come from the pending Bulgarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2018, when Bulgaria will have to be an agenda setter and facilitate strategic discussions concerning the whole European Union.

Croatia

Score 6 Croatia's accession to the European Union and NATO has been accompanied by substantial changes in domestic-government structures, ranging from the reintroduction of RIA to the passage of the Societal Consultation Codex and the strengthening of capacities for policy coordination. The reshuffling of competencies following accession, for example with the shift in responsibility for EU coordination to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the integration of the former Central Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of EU Funds (CODEF) into the Ministry of Regional Development and EU, has not always gone smoothly. The ability of the Croatian administration to absorb the newly available EU funds has remained limited. The Milanović government's long-awaited Strategy for Public Administration was passed only in June 2015 and addressed these concerns only partially. Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović, Minister of Public Administration under the Orešković administration, presented her own plan for a reform of public administration at the beginning of 2016. Announced as the nucleus of a comprehensive law to be adopted at the end of the year, it included comprehensive measures to improve the computerization of the Croatian administration, professionalize its human resources management and rationalize the organization of the various tiers of government. Due to strong resistance from within the administration and the collapse of the Orešković government, the plan was never implemented. The two Plenković governments have done little to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.

Germany

Score 6 As in other EU countries, EU regulations have a significant impact on German legislation. The country's legal system is heavily influenced by EU law, but the federal government does not have a central policy unit specifically coordinating and managing EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters within its sectoral purview related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission. Federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany did not seriously attempt to adopt government structures to the changing national, inter- and transnational context.

Greece

Score 6 No other country surveyed by the SGI has been subject to such intense or extensive scrutiny as Greece has under the Troika and the EU Task Force, which since 2015 has been replaced by the European Union's Structural Reform Support Service

(SRSS). Loan conditionality has obliged the country to respond to an external agenda.

During the period under review, the Greek government passed legislation on public administration, as the government wants to steer Greece out of the seven-year long economic adjustment program that is monitored by the country's lenders. For example, in the spring and summer of 2017, the government pressed for changes in the organization of ministries and in autumn 2017 was able to subject Greek civil servants to a first performance-based review. The government has increased the speed with which the domestic adaptation to external pressures for reform occurred, in the view of the fact that 2017 was the prior-to-last year in which the Third Economic Adjustment Program was supposed to be implemented. In August 2018, Greece is scheduled to exit this program and from then on it is uncertain whether the country will continue adapting domestic government structures to external demands and supranational developments.

Japan

Score 6

Japan's reform processes are usually driven by domestic developments and interests, but international models or perceived best practices do play a role at times. Actors interested in reform have frequently appealed to international standards and trends to support their position. However, it is often doubtful whether substantial reform is truly enacted or whether Japan follows international standards in only a formal sense, with underlying informal institutional mechanisms changing much more slowly.

Mexico

Score 6

The Mexican governing elite have traditionally been very interested in adopting international standards and had a high degree of contact with international organizations and policy institutes. The major motivation for this is that multilateralism provides a strategic avenue for counterbalancing the country's dependence on its northern neighbor. Moreover, many members of the policy elite have studied and/or worked abroad, mostly in English-speaking countries. Mexico's presidential system, with its directing authority at the center of the administration, also allows the country to make swift changes. However, while adaptability of the Mexican government is comparatively high in formal terms, implementation of new approaches and policies is much weaker, particularly when it involves subnational entities, heavily unionized sectors or counters economic interests in society. In this regard, one of the most challenging tasks for the Mexican government is currently to transfer the ambitious U.N. Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) agenda into domestic policies, adapting them to national priorities. In addition, while Mexico has signaled commitment to human rights in international arenas, within the country the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law remain low.

Netherlands

Score 6

Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years. In this time there has been no substantial reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” Although several departments have been switched back and forth between different ministries, the system of ministries itself has not been substantially reformed. The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II government largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of local and municipal governments from just over 400 to between 100 and 150 with 100,000 or more inhabitants per district, as well as its intentions to merge a number of provinces.

Since 1997, the Homogenous Group International Cooperation (Homogene Groep International Samenwerking, HGIS) has coordinated the budgets and policies of government departments involved in foreign, trade and development policy. In response to EU-level developments, Dutch financial and economic policymaking procedures were adapted to EU-level budget norms and assessments. The oversight role of the Dutch parliament has been strengthened. Information about EU policies and decisions reach the Dutch parliament through a large number of special channels. Although the number of civil servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of “Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness (beyond what has already been achieved) to adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly EU, trends and developments.

Citation:

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Nederlands Parlement en de EU (minbuza.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)

Standpunt VNG (homepage vng.nl, consulted 27 October 2014)

Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27 October 2014)

Verdrag van Lissabon vergroot rol van nationale parlementen in Europa, Parlement & Politiek, Europa (parlement.com., consulted 23 September 2015)

“Wat is HGIS?,” 2016, rijksbegroting.nl (consulted 12 October 2017)

“Macron gaat Rutte net iets te snel,” NRC.nl, 26 September 2017

“Rutte zowel kritisch als positief over toekomstvisie Europa,” Algemeen Dagblad, 13 September 2017

Romania

Score 6 As Romania looks to taking on its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019, EU affairs have attracted growing attention in the country. However, the political turbulences in 2017 have stymied all efforts to better adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. The absorption of EU funds, an important metric which had substantially increased under the government, has declined in 2017 and was lower than targeted, and remains below that of other Central and East European countries.

Citation:

N.N. (2018): In Romania absorption rate of EU funds reaches 6.5% at end-2017, in: Central European Financial Observer, January 18, 2018 (<https://financialobserver.eu/recent-news/in-romania-absorption-rate-of-eu-funds-reaches-6-5-at-end-2017/>).

Slovenia

Score 6 Upon EU accession, Slovenia developed a complex system for coordinating European affairs, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central coordinator. The Cerar government left this system largely unchanged. In order to increase the absorption of EU funds, it created a new ministry without portfolio with responsibility for development, strategic projects and cohesion and changed procedures. As a result, the absorption rate has substantially increased.

Switzerland

Score 6 Switzerland directly implements international treaties which today account for about half of the federal legislation. Whenever Switzerland agrees to cooperate with other countries or international organizations, it attempts to meet all the requirements of the agreement, including implementation of the necessary administrative reforms.

With regard to the European Union, however, the adaptation is idiosyncratic. On the one hand, the government cannot develop institutional mechanisms with Brussels, as most Swiss do not want to join the European Union and have expressed in several referenda their skepticism toward the European Union. On the other hand, adaptations to EU law reach beyond these treaties and comprise also large parts of (domestic) economic law. The strategy of bilateral treaties has been placed in jeopardy following the passage of the popular initiative capping mass immigration. The parliament solved the problem by paying lip-service to the constitutional amendment while drafting an implementation law that does not correspond to the wording and the spirit of the popular decision (“implementation light”). Moreover, there are serious concerns as to whether the “strategy of bilaterals” is sufficient or

sustainable. Conflicts between the European Union and Switzerland have escalated since 2012, with the European Union demanding that institutional solutions be developed to address the bilateral system's weaknesses. Specifically, the European Union has called for self-executing rules enabling bilateral treaties to be updated as well as independent institutions for the settlement of conflicts arising from the bilateral treaties. Switzerland has opposed these proposals. There is strong domestic opposition against any such institutional framework agreement, while the European Union is not willing to continue the previous case-by-case updating of bilateral agreements nor the limited adjudication of conflicts by a joint committee of the European Union and Switzerland. In addition, the uncertainty regarding the implementation of a constitutional rule capping immigration – which violates treaties between the European Union and Switzerland – prevented a swift development of new institutional rules. After the “implementation light,” by fall 2017 the relationship between the European Union and Switzerland seems to have strengthened or at least become more cordial. With regard to the new institutional framework, the newly elected foreign minister pleased right-wing politicians with the announcement that the government would press the “reset” button, while leaving open what that may mean. In any case, this new institutional agreement will meet strong opposition and the leader of the right-populist party has already declared that this would be the battle of his life.

United States

Score 6

The United States has developed institutional structures that are able to respond to its international obligations. Climate-change negotiations, for example, have been firmly institutionalized in the Office of Global Affairs in the State Department. Similarly, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a domestic structural response to the challenges of international terrorism. Whether the policies of these units and agencies have been successful or have facilitated multilateral cooperation has depended on the policy choices of each administration and the disposition of Congress.

The Obama administration continued to develop new institutional structures to adapt to policy challenges. The United States has been less prone to adapt domestic-policymaking structures to the requirements of the international-trade regime, in some cases resisting compliance with fully adjudicated obligations under the WTO and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Given the domestic political orientation of most members, Congress has placed low priority on compliance with international-trade agreements and regimes.

The Trump administration has been inclined, if anything, to dispense with international agreements and alliances. It has not sought to align institutions with international structures.

Australia

Score 5

Most government structures are essentially driven by domestic imperatives and are largely insensitive to international and supranational developments. The key government structures of Australia have not changed since the federation of the colonies. Indeed, only a few international events have been persuaded Australian governments in recent times to adapt domestic structures. The major exception is in relation to the treaties and conventions to which Australia is a signatory, particularly in the areas of human rights, anti-discrimination and transnational crime, where Australia has been a regional leader. Australian society has been reluctant to support a change in political structures and has resisted doing so when asked in referendums, for example with regard to proposed constitutional changes.

Australian society has demonstrated a willingness to ignore international pressure, such as international criticism of its migration policy or high levels of carbon emissions.

On 18 July 2017 the prime minister announced that the government would establish a Home Affairs portfolio that will bring together Australia's immigration, border protection, law enforcement and domestic security agencies within a single portfolio. This appears to have been primarily driven by a desire to better address international and domestic terrorism threats. However, most commentators do not view this as a positive development for strategic planning or implementation of policy.

Citation:

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/HomeAffairs

http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/un-human-rights-review-slams-australias-asylum-seeker-policies/news-story/29a4c5e8b0ecf94a327f7fe822dfec07?nk=7466221ea84d656a7525406f82e23bf2-1481452755>

Chile

Score 5

The modernization of Chile's state is still under way in some areas, but national institutions have already become quite solid over the last decade. In general terms, the reform of domestic governing structures tends to be driven by national fiscal-policy concerns, which implies that any innovations that might imply financial changes (such as a budget augmentation for a certain ministry or for a department within a ministry) are very difficult or even impossible to realize. Changes concerning topics that might be of future interest and do not directly affect current political challenges – for example, the expansion of a department's staff or the creation of a new unit dedicated to topics of possible future interest – are driven

more by fiscal or political reasons and political cycles rather than international or supranational developments. Law No. 20,600 of 2012 established environmental tribunals (Tribunales Ambientales) in three regions of the country (north, central and south), two of these had already been established, as well as a Supervisory Board for the Environment (Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente, SMA). This can be seen as a domestic adaptation responding to international and supranational developments. Chile's membership in the OECD might create incentives for more substantial adaptation in the near future.

Citation:

Environmental Tribunals:

<http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/2ta/informacion-institucional/sobre-el-tribunal-ambiental/historia/>

<http://www.mma.gob.cl/1304/w3-article-53480.html>

Cyprus

Score 5

The rigidity of the 1960 constitution along with a chronic lack of innovation from within government have necessitated comprehensive reforms. Work on improving the country's administrative structures has been slow; some reform proposals before the parliament have been outright rejected or neutralized through amendments. EU accession led to the creation of new institutions, but did not reform the overall structures of the state. With Cyprus constituting a single region under the EU's "cohesion policy," European policies aimed at strengthening the role of regions have had only very limited impact. The government's focus has been primarily on strategic planning for budgetary and fiscal purposes, with only limited consideration of administrative structures and culture.

Citation:

1. Reforms Commissioner to battle on with Civil Service Reforms, Cyprus Mail, 22 March 2017, www.cyprus-mail.com/2017/03/22/reform-commissioner-battle-civil-service-reform/

Czech Republic

Score 5

Since the mid-1990s, government activities have adapted to, and are strongly influenced by, the EU's legislative framework. The main structures of government and methods of functioning have improved over time. The disjuncture between domestic structures and EU provisions and requirements was demonstrated by recurrent issues accompanying the use of EU structural funds on the national and regional level, but this has significantly improved over the last several years. The control over the use of funds also improved, but the sustainability of EU-funded infrastructures and measures will remain a crucial issue, especially after 2020, when the current funding period concludes.

Poland

Score 5 In the past, government structures in Poland have been gradually adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably NATO and EU membership. Poland's good reputation and its growing influence in the European Union showed that adaptation had been successful, as the relatively high and increasing rate of absorption of EU funds underlines. The PiS government has been more inward-looking and has paid much less attention to the compatibility of domestic government structures with international and EU requirements in particular. In 2017, Poland closed the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Introducing the Euro and the Office of Polish Integration with the Eurozone in the National Bank of Poland, even though Poland is formally required to introduce the euro once the convergence criteria are fulfilled.

Slovakia

Score 5 In the past, Slovakia's ability to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments, most notably at the EU level, has been weak. Despite several attempts at reform, the rate of absorption of EU funds has remained low, as the absorption of EU funds has been hindered by dysfunctional planning procedures, poor project design and selection, and the failure to comply with the requirements of environmental impact assessments. Recommendations by EU or international organizations like the OECD, Council of Europe or U.N. divisions have been considered selectively.

Hungary

Score 4 The Orbán governments have paid little attention to the adaptation of domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In public, Orbán has stressed Hungarian independence, and has argued that his government is waging a freedom fight for national sovereignty against the European Union. Major institutional reforms have even reduced the fit of domestic government structures with international and supranational developments. The radical reduction in the number of ministries, for instance, has created huge problems with regard to EU affairs, as the ministries' organization no longer matches that of other EU countries or the structure of the European Union's Council of Ministers. There is often a mismatch in rank, as Hungarian ministers have to cover more Councils than their counterparts in other countries with more minister forming the government. Nonetheless, the administration ensures more or less that the *acquis communautaire* is implemented. The absorption rates in EU structural funds application are relatively good. Due to the high systemic corruption in the EU transfers by the Fidesz oligarchs, however, some transfers were suspended in the last years.

Turkey

Score 3

In contrast to former tendencies of adopting international standards and practices, centralizing power and control have become the major drivers for restructuring governance during the review period. By a state of emergency decree, the general chief of staff and head of the National Intelligent Service (MIT) were affiliated with the presidency, all armed forces were reorganized under the Ministry of National Defense and the Gendarmerie, and the Turkish Police was aligned under the Ministry of Interior – in line with EU standards to place military and defense forces under civilian control. A reorganization of financial institutions including the Capital Market Board is underway. Despite heavy pressure, the central bank remains largely independent. The justice system has again been reorganized following the recent constitutional amendments. The chairman of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), namely the Minister of Justice, appoints four members of the council and seven members are in-effect elected by the AKP, given the party's parliamentary majority.

Turkey is a signatory of several international conventions that include binding provisions, and the Turkish government has attempted to comply with these international responsibilities. However, the government has fallen short on many requirements, either legally or institutionally. On issues such as child labor, gender issues, general working conditions

Even taking into consideration Turkey's "trauma" after the failed coup and the necessary declaration of a state of emergency, the wide-ranging and radical use of state of emergency powers has diminished Turkey's ability to meet established standards of policymaking and the rule of law.

Citation:

Venice Commission, Turkey Opinion on the Provisions of the Emergency Decree Law N° 674 of 1 September 2016 Which Concern The Exercise of Local Democracy in Turkey, 6-7 October 2017, "[http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2017\)021-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)021-e) (accessed 1 November 2017)

Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, "The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey" 8 March 2017, <http://website-pace.net/documents/19887/3258251/20170308-TurkeyInstitutions-EN.pdf/bbd65de5-86d4-466f-9bc1-185d5218bce7> (accessed 1 November 2017)

Bakanlar Kurulu yeniden yapılandırılıyor, Hürriyet, 8 June 2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/17982957.asp> (accessed 5 November 2014)

Seriye Sezen, International versus Domestic Explanations of Administrative Reforms, Andrew Massey (eds.) Public Sector Reform, Vol. II, Sage Publications, 2013.

Saray Kendine Hazine Kuruyor, Taraf, 29 January 2015, <http://www.taraf.com.tr/saray-kendine-hazine-kuruyor/> (accessed 27 October 2015)

Yaşar Aydın, Erdoğan steht vor der Wegscheide, <http://www.b-republik.de/aktuelle-ausgabe/erdogan-steht-vor-der-wegscheide> (accessed 21 December 2016)

Indicator

International Coordination

Question

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
- 8-6 = The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
- 5-3 = The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
- 2-1 = The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.

Denmark

Score 9

For a small country, Denmark has a strong role in the provision of the global public good. Climate change and development aid are high on the domestic agenda and the government tries to play an active international role in these areas. Denmark also has a long tradition of working to strengthen the United Nations, often cooperating with other Nordic countries to do so. This policy is relatively uncontroversial, unlike European integration.

As an EU member state, Denmark's possibilities increasingly depend on the European Union. Since the European Union in recent years has adopted a relatively "progressive" environmental policy and has tried to exercise international leadership, there is no conflict in this area. When it comes to development aid Denmark, is among the countries that contribute the highest percentage of GDP to development aid, see discussion above.

Denmark is also a global actor in other economic areas, including trade. Danish politicians are proud of projecting Danish values internationally.

There is a long tradition for Nordic cooperation within various policy areas. The Nordic Council of Ministers is the official inter-governmental body for cooperation

in the Nordic region. The council takes various initiatives on Nordic cooperation and there are regular council meetings where representatives of the Nordic governments meet to draft Nordic conventions and other agreements.

Citation:

Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, eds., *Adaptation and Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967-1993*. Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 1995.

Martin Marcussen, *Den danske model og globaliseringen*. Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur, 2010.

Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017.

Germany

Score 9

The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the European Union, and other transnational and international organizations. In the context of the still ongoing euro zone debt crisis, the German government has played a leading role in organizing and creating stabilization mechanisms. The government strongly cooperated with European partners, particularly France, other countries, such as the United States, and international organizations in addressing the Crimea crisis and civil war in eastern Ukraine.

According to some observers, the great exception is the migration crisis, which Germany handled unilaterally. Only after Germany had opened its borders to the refugees coming from Hungary and other European states did the government start negotiating with other EU countries and the European Union to develop refugee quotas. Proponents argue that Germany's policy was well justified given its legal and humanitarian obligations. According to this view, Germany was ready to pay a high fiscal and political price for shouldering this humanitarian crisis. Based on this interpretation, the refugee crisis is an example where Germany is heavily involved in providing global public goods and acts in a non-selfish manner in-line with its international obligations.

Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives, and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize global and European public goods. It will be up to the next government to reaffirm this reputation with respect to far-reaching requests for European Union and euro zone reform from the European partners, in particular from France's newly elected president, Emmanuel Macron.

Sweden

Score 9

Sweden has maintained a rather high international profile on a number of issues requiring international collective action. These issues have traditionally included disarmament, human rights, international solidarity and more recently, climate change and a feminist approach to international relations and peacekeeping.

Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator, though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden, together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international influence through “soft power.”

Citation:

Ingebritsen, C. (2006). *Scandinavia in World Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015) *Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Finland

Score 8

Typically, global public goods are best addressed collectively, on a multilateral basis, with cooperation in the form of international laws, agreements and protocols. Finland is a partner to several such modes of cooperation and contributes actively to the implementation of several global frameworks. Finland is committed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol and EU legislation in its climate policy. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for coordinating climate negotiations, and specifically, within the framework of the EU, Finland is committed to bringing down its national annual average carbon emissions. In 2017, Finland assumed the two-year chair of the Arctic Council, announcing her commitment to promote prosperity, development and environmental sustainability in the Arctic region. In 2016, Finland was the President of the Nordic Council of Ministers and in 2017 has taken the lead in the Nordic Council. These and other commitments notwithstanding, Finland cannot be regarded a dominant actor protecting global public goals. Given its relatively high level of knowledge, research capacities, and the existence of frameworks for policy coordination and monitoring, Finland does have the institutional capacities to participate in global governance. However, the capacities are not utilized to their fullest extent.

Citation:

www.motiva.fi/en/energy_in_finland/national_climate_and_energy_strategy

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1427398/Ratkaisujen+Suomi_EN_YHDISTETTY_netti.pdf/8d2e1a66-e24a-4073-8303-ee3127fbfcac

France

Score 8

France plays an active role in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. The country contributes to the provision of global public goods. It has a long tradition of acting on an international level to take part in security/military missions, combat climate change (for instance hosting the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP 21)), provide humanitarian and development aid, and promote health, education programs and fiscal cooperation. This being said, the French government, as other governments, often takes positions that advance French (economic) interests.

Striking examples are the French government's attitude toward free trade discussions, in particular, concerning agricultural products and environmental issues, such as air and water pollution, where France has failed to implement supranational recommendations at the national level. On development assistance, there is still a big gap between official commitments and actual spending (0.37% instead of 0.70% of gross national product).

Concerning the European Monetary Union, French proposals contribute to defining EU policies and often serve as a basis for compromise. However, the credibility of these initiatives was damaged by the French government's inability to respect common rules France had signed, such as the stability rules of the EMU. This has considerably limited the government's success in steering or influencing decision-making at the European level, with France lacking credibility and political support.

President Macron has adopted a fundamentally different method. Having led an openly pro-European presidential campaign, Macron has declared his full commitment to EU rules, as well as his willingness to reduce the government's budget deficits and realize structural reforms. In doing so, he seeks not only to enhance the country's competitiveness but also to regain lost confidence and credibility in Europe, which is seen as a prerequisite for France's EU partners to seriously consider his ambitious ideas on European renewal and further integration. Under Macron, France has shown a new willingness and capacity to contribute to the European Union, as well as a new coherence between European ambitions and domestic policies.

Luxembourg

Score 8

Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in cooperation with the European Union. The legal framework for the launch of the European Citizens' Initiative was passed by the parliament in 2012.

Luxembourg ranks highly within the EU for the inclusiveness of its welfare benefits, as its programs are both generous and wide-ranging. However, with a normalized Gini index value of 31 in 2016 (2015: 28.5), Luxembourg is only a middling performer within the EU-28 (which has an average Gini index value of 30.8). The generous social transfers (47% of public expenditure in 2017) and the high share of social transfers in relation to total income, not only reduce poverty risks, but also sustainably strengthen social cohesion.

However, Luxembourg also retains a number of labor-market protection measures and unsustainable pension policies; both provide incentives to leave the labor market early and opt instead for replacement revenues. Attitudes of the insured – mainly residents and nationals – are partly still those of consumers of welfare provisions. The system's main weakness is the "early exit" attitude which is expressed by many residents.

Citation:

Fusco, Alessio, et al. Gini Country Report Luxembourg. Gini Growing Inequalities' Impacts, 2013. www.gini-research.org/system/uploads/456/original/Luxembourg.pdf?1372249144. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

"Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income." Eurostat, www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tessi190. Accessed 21 Dec. 2017.

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National plan for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth – Luxembourg 2020. Le gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 2017. www.gouvernement.lu/6854313/2017-pnr-luxembourg-fr. Accessed 14 Dec 2017.

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New Zealand

Score 8

Given New Zealand's small population and geopolitical isolation, it has been surprisingly successful at participating proactively in many international organizations and in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. Major areas include issues regarding the Antarctic region, disarmament and proliferation, environmental protection and human rights. New Zealand is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Commonwealth, the OECD, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Free trade is a central preoccupation within foreign relations, especially in the Asian region. Having signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Australia-New Zealand agreement and a bilateral agreement with Malaysia and Korea in recent years, current efforts are directed at deepening its "comprehensive strategic partnership" with China and continuing negotiations with India and Russia. In June 2017, New Zealand launched free trade agreement negotiations with the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru). New Zealand has been an enthusiastic supporter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. The government reinforced its willingness to conclude the negotiations until 2020 even after the election of Donald Trump to the office of U.S. president and the U.S. rejection of further negotiations. After strongly opposing aspects of the TPP Agreement, the new Labour/NZ First successfully negotiated several amendments to the Agreement before giving its endorsement. Negotiations on a Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (PARC) between New Zealand and the European Union (EU) were concluded in July 2014. The agreement is a platform for pursuing New Zealand's ambitions for a free-trade agreement with the EU. This, however, might be more complicated after the United Kingdom's Brexit decision. New Zealand is a member of the United Nations Security Council during the 2015 to 2016 term. It has been very active in campaigning for a humanitarian response to the situation in Syria.

Citation:

Annual Report 2014/2015 (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015).

Strategic Intentions 2015-2019 (Wellington: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015).

Trevett, Claire, 2016. Claire Trevett: New Zealand brought new perspective to U.N. Security Council but no major breakthrough. *New Zealand Herald*. 25 August 2016 (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/politics/news/article.cfm?c_id=280&objectid=11699941).

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Norway

Score 8

Norway is a small state dependent on a stable and predictable international order. Over time, Norway has invested significantly in the development of a fair international framework. Norway is active in several international cooperation arrangements, including the United Nations and OECD, and cooperates closely with the European Union. Norway is very diligent in adopting EU legislation. The country is not an EU member state, but still participates in most forms of EU policy coordination as a member of the European Economic Area, with certain exceptions in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. In addition, Norway has numerous agreements with the European Union in the field of internal and external security. However, while the agreements with the European Union are seen as important, they do not give Norway a role in EU decision-making or policy formulation.

Norway has been an active participant in and promoter of various international conventions, forums and activities. Areas of particular interest have been human rights, development and peace. Relative to its size, Norway is a founding member of NATO, and an active member of several international organizations, such as the IMF, the United Nations and the World Bank. The country participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Initiative on so-called blood diamonds. Norway actively encourages developing countries to join the EITI and is one of four contributors to the World Bank Special Trust Fund tasked with assisting with the fund's implementation. Norway also supports the initiative on climate risk financial disclosure.

However, in 2017, Norway suffered a setback in its international standing and authority. In order to “normalize” government-level relations with China, the Norwegian government was forced to accept, in a joint statement with the Chinese government, a commitment to not undertake any action that might damage the now good relations between the two countries. This has prevented the Norwegian government from criticizing the Chinese government's record on human rights and related issues.

Portugal

Score 8

Although Portugal is small, relatively poor and not very influential as a nation, it is a member of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization and

the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), among other groups. It works actively with other nations through these organizations to develop policies. Given the country's size and importance, it collaborates quite effectively in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods.

Portugal “punches well above its weight” in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission and the current secretary-general of the United Nations are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country. Previously, Portuguese politician Diego Pinto de Freitas do Amaral served as president of the General Assembly of the UN in 1995 – 1996.

During the review period, the Costa government sought to increase the country's influence in terms of shaping the European Union's future, and hosted the second summit of Southern EU countries in January 2017.

DW (2017), “Southern EU states to forge strategies in Lisbon,” 28/1/2017, available online at: <http://www.dw.com/en/southern-eu-states-to-forge-strategies-in-lisbon/a-37312241>

Australia

Score 7

Australia's comparatively small population and economy, isolated geographic location and status as a South Pacific regional power has tended to work against the country's ability to influence global reform efforts. Nonetheless, there is a governmental culture of seeking to participate in international forums or organizations, including those focused on reform. Primary emphasis tends to be on the Asia-Pacific region, although Australia is also a strong advocate of reducing trade barriers for agricultural products worldwide.

Australia's international reputation has suffered considerably in the last two decades. Previously, Australia had been a very active player in international forums, for instance in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Both the Howard and the Abbott governments failed to provide constructive inputs within the context of international forums. For example, the Abbott government permitted the G-20 summit in November 2014 to become an anti-Putin event. By contrast, Labor governments, Kevin Rudd's in particular, have been overly ambitious. Rudd's plans for an Asia-Pacific Community were hastily developed and criticized by his own government's adviser. Prime Minister Turnbull has steered a much more cooperative course over his term in office. However, Australia has not been providing significant input to policy development to promote global public goods.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tony-abbott-says-he-will-shirtfront-vladimir-putin-over-downing-of-mh17>

<http://www.smh.com.au/national/rudds-man-criticized-hasty-asiapacific-community-plan-20101223-196ln.html>

Belgium

Score 7 Belgium hosts various supranational institutions, including the majority of the offices of the European Union. The country has always displayed enthusiasm toward joint-reform initiatives. This can be illustrated by the large number of Belgian politicians involved in the highest levels of such organizations (e.g., Herman Van Rompuy, a former president of the European Council; Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament). Moreover, the country's small size makes it heavily dependent on international coordination. It therefore supports international reform efforts in areas such as tax systems, carbon-dioxide regulation, and as of 2015, on the European equivalent of the American Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. However, with regard to implementation, Belgium does not always fulfill its commitments.

Chile

Score 7 The government is endowed with the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. This is underlined by the fact that Chile represents one of the most active countries in Latin America with regard to international policymaking initiatives. However, the impacts of national policies on these global challenges are not always systematically assessed and then incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.

Ireland

Score 7 The country contributes to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods primarily through its active participation in European policymaking institutions. Irish government structures have been progressively altered to support this capacity.

Ireland has continued to maintain a relatively high level of overseas development assistance since the onset of the economic crisis. It also continues to play an active part in the development of the European response to climate change. The Irish and Kenyan ambassadors co-facilitated the final intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the UN's Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) in 2015.

Citation:

For an account of Ireland's role in negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals see <https://www.irishaid.ie/what-we-do/post-2015-negotiations/ireland's-special-role/>

Italy

Score 7

The ability of Italian governments to take a leading role in international efforts is generally limited. This is in part due to the country's relatively small size, but also because Italian politics tends to focus on internal matters. Moreover, frequent changes in political leadership have made it difficult to provide a strong and clear position in international efforts. There have been occasional exceptions when the government has been more active on a specific issue (such as the abolition of death penalty, or in the promotion of peace talks in the Middle East). The Gentiloni government has mainly focused on the EU level, with the executive actively engaged in EU policy discussions promoting the need for economic growth over simple fiscal balance. With regard to the immigration crisis, the Italian government has promoted the shared responsibility of EU member states. Overall, the government has shied away from confrontation in the European arena, and opted for cooperation with the European Commission and the main EU member states.

In general, the government has increased domestic awareness of Italy's international responsibilities and consistently worked toward increasing Italy's influence in EU decision-making processes.

Japan

Score 7

Japan is actively involved in G-7 and G-20 mechanisms. However, the country has a lower profile in international and global settings than might be expected in view of its global economic standing. Since Abe's election in 2012, there has been greater continuity and international visibility, though not in terms of spearheading multilateral initiatives.

The Japanese constitution makes it difficult for Japan to engage in international missions that include the use of force, although it can legally contribute funds. As a result of Japan's five-year participation in a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (which ended in 2017), the government has flexibly expanded various procedures stopping just short of active military engagement, such as providing ammunition to endangered military units from partner countries.

In 2015, despite considerable public opposition, new security laws were passed that allow military intervention overseas in defense of (somewhat vaguely defined) allies. The same year, Japan and the United States overhauled their Mutual Defense Guidelines to allow for deeper cooperation, emphasizing the global nature of the bilateral alliance.

Japan has actively supported and contributed to regional initiatives. In recent years, China has emerged as an increasingly influential actor shaping regional initiatives

such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). While Japan has not yet joined this organization, signs emerged in 2017 that this decision could be reversed in the near future. In 2015 – 2016, responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative, Japan started a Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, which is slated to spend \$200 billion globally by the end of 2020.

Japan has not played a leading role in global environmental-policy efforts, particularly in the post-Kyoto Protocol negotiations.

Citation:

Mitsuru Obe, Japan Parliament Approves Overseas Military Expansion, *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-parliament-approves-abe-security-bills-1442596867>

Tridivesh Singh Maini, Japan's Effort to Counter China's Silk Road, *The Globalist*, 6 April 2016, <http://www.theglobalist.com/japan-effort-to-counter-china-silk-road-india/>

Michael Bosack, What did Japan Learn in South Sudan?, *The Diplomat*, 10 June 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/>

Lithuania

Score 7

Lithuania actively engages in international policy cooperation on behalf of democracy and market-economic systems, in particular by providing encouragement to its eastern neighbors (the Eastern Partnership countries) to reform, by providing technical and financial assistance, and by serving as an advocate for their interests within the EU institutional framework. Lithuania has been part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2005. The country's policymakers have managed to coordinate their involvement in these international fields quite effectively. In 2012, Lithuania joined the OECD forum for transparency and the exchange of information for tax purposes, and completed a first compliance assessment. In 2015, Lithuania was invited to start its accession process to the OECD. In the second half of 2013, Lithuania took over the rotating presidency of the European Council, and was afterward assessed by other EU institutions and member states as performing effective work. Furthermore, Lithuania became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2014 to 2015 term. The interparty agreement, which includes a commitment to progressively increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2018, is further evidence of a willingness to support NATO. However, the government has been less willing or able to contribute to such global challenges as climate change or trade liberalization (except in the context of its presidency of the European Council presidency). In 2017, the European Commission fined Lithuanian Railways (Lietuvos geležinkeliai) €27.9 million for breaching EU antitrust rules by removing a rail track connecting Lithuania and Latvia, which hindered competition in the rail freight market. Lithuanian authorities have also experienced problems in trying to convince regional partners to agree on the preferred option for synchronizing electricity systems with the Central European grid and a common position on the safety risks posed by the new nuclear power plant being constructed in Astravets, Belarus.

Vilpisauskas, R. "Lithuania's EU Council Presidency: Negotiating Finances, Dealing with Geopolitics," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 52, Annual Review, August 2014, pp. 99-108.

Netherlands

Score 7

The Netherlands has been a protagonist in all forms of international cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) before being transposed into Dutch law. The present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid; the shift in the government's attitude toward being a net contributor to EU finances; and the rejection of the EU referendum and the recent rejection of the EU treaty with Ukraine in a non-binding referendum.

The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. However, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU level. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led to reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime minister to act as minister of general and European affairs, with heavy support from the minister of finance. In the first months of 2016, Prime Minister Rutte has acted as chair of the European Union's Council of Ministers, where he played a leading role in the negotiations with Turkey over stopping the influx of refugees from the Middle East. Immediately after the United Kingdom's Brexit referendum, Prime Minister Rutte explicitly stressed the need for the Netherlands to be part of a well-functioning European Union. The Vice-Chair of the European Commission is a former Dutch minister. The Dutch minister for Development Aid and Trade plays an important role in fostering better cooperation between governments, international companies and international aid organizations through transnational treaties on production and supply chains. The Netherlands will be part of the U.N. Security Council for the next year.

Citation:

R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of The Netherlands* (2014). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 220-228 regarding coordination viz-a-viz the EU and 251-272 for Foreign Policy in general.

"Dijsselbloem herkozen als Eurogroepvoorzitter," in *NRC-Handelsblad*, 13 July 2015

"De eerste 100 dagen van eurocommissaris Frans Timmermans," in *Europa Nu*, 31 March 2015 (europa-nu.nl, consulted 26 October 2015)

NRC.nl, Rutte staat opeens pal voor EU, daagt PVV uit over Nexit, 6 July 2016 (nrc.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)

South Korea

Score 7

As a member of the UN, the WTO and the G-20, South Korea helps to shape global rules and foster global public goods. However, it rarely plays a leading role in this regard. As of the time of writing, South Korea had contributed 652 members to UN peacekeeping missions. Development cooperation is one area where Korea could be in a good position to develop a leadership position. South Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009. As a successful case of transformation from an ODA-recipient country to an ODA-donor country, Korea has played a proactive role although absolute levels of ODA remain relatively low at 0.14% of GNI. Moreover, interministerial coordination in the area of development cooperation is slowly improving. Korea's commitment to sustainable development constitutes an important baseline for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment have played an important role in preparing for the implementation of the SDGs at both the domestic and international levels. The adoption of the Third Basic Plan for Sustainable Development 2016 – 2035 in January 2016 was a crucial component of Korea's efforts to translate the SDGs into national frameworks. The Third Plan is updated every five years and progress toward the policy targets of the Third Plan is biennially evaluated by the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Fourteen strategic targets have been set, including improved environmental policies, the promotion of social unity and gender equality, the promotion of inclusive growth, the creation of decent jobs, and the improvement of partnerships in implementing the SDGs.

The Moon administration has also indicated that it will engage in energy-policy reforms more ambitious than those of the previous government. Moon has pledged to increase the share of renewable electricity generation to 20% by 2030. Consequently, the administration is also expected to set more ambitious goals for the reduction of climate-gas emissions beyond the current goal of a 37% reduction relative to the business-as-usual (BAU) projection.

Citation:

Kalinowski, Thomas and Hyekyung Cho. 2012. Korea's search for a global role between hard economic interests and soft power. *European Journal of Development Research* 24 (2):242-260. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2012.7>.

The government of Korea. 2016 National Voluntary Review Year One of Implementing the SDGs in the Republic of Korea: From a Model of Development Success to a Vision for Sustainable Development. [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10632National%20Voluntary%20Review%20Report%20\(rev_final\).pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10632National%20Voluntary%20Review%20Report%20(rev_final).pdf)

Climate Action Tracker. South Korea Profile. November 6, 2017. <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html>

Spain

Score 7

In 2017, Spain completed its two-year mandate as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In addition to a general UNSC role, Spain chaired the Iran and North Korea sanctions committees, as well as the Committee on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Apart from its UNSC membership, Spain continues to participate in other international efforts to provide global public goods (e.g., financial stability, economic development, security, environment, education, and governance) as one of the leading EU member states, and as a permanent guest at the G-20 summits. It has also contributed to international forums and actions responding to challenges such as climate change (Paris summit), energy supply, illegal migration (in part through bilateral agreements in Northern Africa), global terrorism, and peacekeeping (with Spanish troops deployed as a part of U.N., NATO and EU missions in Lebanon, Sahel, the Horn of Africa waters and the Baltic region). In 2017, Spain assumed the UN Human Rights Council for the 2018 to 2020 term. However, Spanish governments have done little to ensure that the impact of national policies on global issues has been systematically assessed and incorporated into the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of internal policies across governments. Spain's government has also played only a very small role in addressing the refugee crisis. In March 2017, the four large euro zone countries – Germany, France, Italy and Spain – met in Versailles to discuss their next moves toward greater integration. The presence of the prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, after a long period of absence in the “directory” of the European Union, was seen as a turning point – meaning that Spain was overcoming the crisis image. Nevertheless, so far, the Spanish government has not delivered specific proposals regarding the future of the integration process.

Citation:

October 2017, Agencia EFE: “Spain gets seat on UN Human Rights Council”

<https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/spain-gets-seat-on-un-human-rights-council/50000262-3409912>

Austria

Score 6

Within the European Union, the government is obliged to collaborate with EU institutions. This collaboration is rarely controversial. In other matters (e.g., within the framework of the WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the United Nations), the Austrian government tends to play a rather low-key role, usually trying to follow a general EU policy if such a policy exists. In some fields (e.g., environmental protection), the government tends to promise more on the international level than it is willing or able to implement at home. During the debate about CETA, some members of the Austrian government (from the Social Democratic Party) attempted to improve some details even after the European Commission and the Canadian government had reached an agreement. In the end, the Austrian government, represented by the social democratic chancellor, signed CETA. Under the conditions of the new ÖVP-FPÖ government, the reluctance to collaborate with international

partners may increase – considering the FPÖ’s emphasis of Austrian positions vis-a-vis transnational agendas.

Canada

Score 6 Canada’s government definitely has the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. Indeed, it has made many contributions in this area throughout its history. The Liberal government has stated that it seeks to return Canada to active participation in international bodies like the United Nations. In September 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau spoke to the U.N. General Assembly and outlined Canada’s commitment to global affairs in an effort to win Canada a seat on the U.N. Security Council, a seat not held since 2000. Climate change is among Prime Minister Trudeau’s declared priorities, as demonstrated in the formation of recent climate policies needed to meet the Paris target. In addition, to help ease the Syrian refugee crisis, Canada has welcomed over 40,000 refugees as of January 2017.

Latvia

Score 6 Latvia largely contributes to international actions through engaging in the development of EU policy positions.

Institutional arrangements for the formulation of Latvia’s positions on issues before the European Union are formalized. The system is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with particular sectoral ministries developing the substance of Latvia’s various positions. The process requires that NGOs be consulted during the early policy-development phase. In practice, ministries implement this requirement to varying degrees. NGOs themselves often lack the capacity (human resources, financial resources, time) to engage substantively with the ministries on an accelerated calendar.

Draft positions are coordinated across ministries and approved in some cases by the sectoral minister, and in other cases by the Council of Ministers. Issues deemed to have a significant impact on Latvia’s national interests are presented to the parliament’s European Affairs Committee, whose decision is binding. The committee considers approximately 500 national positions per year.

During the first six months of 2015, Latvia held the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Latvia’s first experience with the presidency was considered a success, with the country providing appropriate leadership both on expected challenges, such as returning Europe to economic growth, and unexpected challenges, such as the rapidly escalating refugee crisis and terrorist activity in Europe.

Slovakia

Score 6 Because of its size, Slovakia's capacity to shape strategic global frameworks is limited. For a long time, the country was eager to be seen as a reliable and trustworthy partner within NATO and European Union. In recent years, however, this reputation and Slovakia's standing in the European Union has suffered from the Fico governments' positions on the Greek debt crisis, relations to Russia and the refugee issue, where Slovakia has joined ranks with the other Visegrad countries. This stance made it difficult for Fico to be accepted as an "honest broker" during Slovakia's first EU presidency in the second half of 2016. As Fico was very much willing to make the presidency a success, he faced a balancing act reconciling mainstream EU positions with his own views. In light of the democratic regression in Hungary and Poland, and increasing euroscepticism in these countries, Fico distanced himself during 2017 from the Visegrad consensus that had developed over the last two years. He clearly positioned Slovakia in the core of the European Union as a supporter of EU reform together with France and Germany. Moreover, Fico prioritized EU relations as the vital interest of the country, before the Visegrad-4.

Citation:

Jancarikova, T. (2017): Slovakia's future is with core EU, not eurosceptic eastern nations: PM, in: Reuters, August 15, 2017 (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-politics-eu/slovakias-future-is-with-core-eu-not-eurosceptic-eastern-nations-pm-idUSKCN1AV1YY>).

United Kingdom

Score 6 The United Kingdom has long played a leading role in coordinating international initiatives and the country's imperial legacy has contributed to its active stance on international commitments. It has led global responses in recent years, for example, in efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, coordinate the EU response to the Ebola outbreak, promote reform in the financial sector, and combat climate change and corruption.

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is very active in the United Nations in security matters and also plays a prominent role in NATO. Government structures, such as the National Security Council, ensure consistency. It led the way in supporting the Rohingya in October 2017.

However, following the decision to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom will have to rethink its role in the world, especially among its European neighbors. There is a risk that the demands on governance capacity of dealing with the various levels of negotiation will distract attention from wider global concerns. To this extent, domestic politics may be inhibiting international coordination.

United States

Score 6 The United States sometimes leads international efforts to pursue collective goods – sometimes, indeed, effectively controlling those efforts – while sometimes preferring unilateral approaches that withhold support from international forums. Its institutional structures and political traditions – especially the role of presidential leadership – accommodate all of these approaches. But the United States often cannot act effectively unless a national consensus or single-party control of the government enables the president and Congress to agree on a strategy.

President Obama’s strategy in the Middle East, for example, was hampered by conflict with Congress over support for Israel. Most often, the United States not only collaborates in reform initiatives promoted by international forums, but actively works to shape their agenda. The United States is also an effective participant in the G-7/8 process. The most notable change under the Obama administration was the move toward participation in broader international forums such as the G-20 that include emerging-market countries such as China, Brazil and India.

The Trump administration, with its avowed “America First” orientation, has reduced its engagement in international forums and agreements. This has included lecturing NATO members on their allegedly insufficient contributions, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement and declining to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

Croatia

Score 5 Croatia has supported major global reform initiatives, especially in environmental affairs. However, the Milanović government did not pay particular attention to improving the country’s capacity to engage in global affairs or to assessing the global repercussions of national policies. Unlike her predecessor, President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović has not been very active in improving cooperation with the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia.

Estonia

Score 5 Engagement in international development is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is an interministerial coordination group tasked with coordinating foreign-policy issues, which includes cabinet ministers. As in other areas, Estonia is good at adhering to international commitments but rarely takes the lead. Likewise, Estonia is not very good at assessing the impact of national policies

on the global challenge of human development. Assessment takes place in some policy areas (e.g., environment, energy and IT), but integrated coordination and monitoring across policy fields remains in its infancy. Yet in some specific areas, such as development aid and combatting HIV/AIDS, various interest groups do serve as active government partners.

Iceland

Score 5

Iceland is an active participant in international forums, but seldom initiates measures. Iceland was a founding member of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and NATO. In 2008, Iceland sought a U.N. Security Council seat, but eventually lost out to Austria and Turkey. Largely, Iceland has worked cooperatively within international frameworks, but has not led any significant process of international coordination. Iceland did participate in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq and modestly participates in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2009, Iceland applied for EU membership. Those negotiations were postponed at the beginning of 2013 due to dissent between the coalition partners. The 2013-2016 cabinet did not renew negotiations and finally withdrew Iceland's application for membership in 2015. As a result, the European Union no longer includes Iceland on its official list of applicant countries. Even so, the European Union may continue to view Iceland as an applicant country on the grounds that that the minister of foreign affairs was not authorized to withdraw an application approved by parliament without parliament's approval.

This question remains unsettled. It remains to be seen if a national referendum will be held on whether Iceland should resume its membership negotiations with the European Union. The cabinet of 2013-2016 rejected that option, producing a split within the Independence Party and leading to the establishment of a splinter party, Regeneration. Yet, when the Independence Party formed a cabinet coalition with the breakout party, Regeneration, and Bright Future in January 2017, the coalition agreement included only a vaguely worded intention to have a national referendum on the issue. Following the breakup of that coalition in September 2017, which led to a new election in late October 2017, the question remains unresolved. A national referendum on this issue or any issue would raise criticisms in view of the parliament's failure to respect the outcome of the 2012 constitutional referendum.

Israel

Score 5

In conjunction with its OECD accession in 2010, Israel created government agencies designed to coordinate, enforce and monitor administrative changes. Reforms aiming to improve interministerial cooperation and reinforce policy monitoring are still in the early stages of implementation. A 2015 report examined Israel's global

cooperation in the field of research and development (R&D), looking at the country's administrative and economic capabilities. It found that while Israel is considered to be a leading R&D actor worldwide, more coordination and improvements with regard to accessible information and standardization capabilities are warranted. The Israel Innovation Authority decided to stop providing grants to high-tech companies in 2016 due to budget cuts.

Citation:

Avital, Yanicm, "Which country spend the most on research and development among OECD countries?", GeekTime, 15.7.2015. <http://www.geektime.co.il/israel-leads-spending-on-rd-in-oecd-countries/> (Hebrew).

"Israel in the OECD," Minister of Treasury formal report (2010) (Hebrew).

Kaufman, Dan and Marom, Yael, "Evaluation of international cooperation programs in R&D in Israel," The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (May 2011) (Hebrew).

Orbah, Mair. "The Ministry of Economy has stopped giving grants to High-Tech companies," Calcalist, 11.8.2016. <http://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3695401,00.html>

"Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies," Ministry of Industry, trade and labor official report (June 2012).

Mexico

Score 5

The Mexican government is increasingly confident of its role in the broader world. Mexico has traditionally been supportive of international initiatives, in the hope of reducing the bilateralism imposed by Mexico's close and asymmetrical relationship with the United States. Mexico continues to play an active role in the United Nations, OECD and other intergovernmental organizations. It also remains an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Mexico has been playing an important role in the U.N. Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) process and participated in the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015. In 2016, the government was also active in global demining initiatives and in the global compact for safe and orderly migration. Numerous policy and organizational recommendations made by international bodies have been adopted in the Mexican policymaking process. Thus, it has a supportive role in many international attempts oriented toward the provision of global public goods. Whether this engagement in international affairs is sufficient to shape international efforts is questionable given the country's reduced level of international leverage in economic and security affairs. However, within its capacities, Mexico has contributed to strengthening multilateralism. In this regard, governments in recent years have also attempted to take a mediating role in international forums between the interests of developed and developing countries, which is a change compared to the traditional aspirations of Mexico to become a speaker for the developing world. Against the backdrop of the unilateralism of the Trump administration, multilateralism offers important opportunities for Mexico.

Poland

Score 5

With the new government, Poland's international orientation has changed. Although Prime Minister Szydło and her cabinet members do not reject cooperation within the European Union per se, they detest all steps toward a deeper integration and are more critical of the German role in the European Union. In 2017, Poland not only closed the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Introducing the Euro and the Office of Polish Integration with the Eurozone in the National Bank of Poland. The government also wants to leave the Eurokorps, a common EU defense unit, since the government sees NATO as the main actor in the field of defense and contests European actions in this area. Because of the PiS government's intransigence, Poland's reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. This became clearly visible when, in May 2017, Poland was the only country to vote against Donald Tusk's re-election as president of the European Council. At the same time, however, Poland wants to play an active role within NATO, and has tried to establish a closer relationship with the United States and within the Visegrad group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). While the four Visegrad countries agree on the refugee issue and climate policy, and Poland and Hungary are the main opponents of Macron's recent initiative to amend the worker's directive, they hold different attitudes toward Russia. Unlike the other Visegrad countries, Poland has strongly supported the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union.

Citation:

Fuksiewicz, A., A. Łada (2017): When two Plus Two Doesn't Equal four. The Visegrad Group on the Future of Europe, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Analyses & Opinions No. 23 /150, Warsaw (<http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/analyses/1177980591.pdf>).

Łada, A. (2017): Poland in Europe – Regional Leader or outlier? Poland's European policy in view of the changes on the continent. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych (<http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/712883116.pdf>).

Romania

Score 5

Romania's NATO and EU accessions were celebrated as significant milestones and part of a reunification process with Western Europe following the collapse of communism. Romanian governments have supported international efforts to provide global public goods. As of June 2017, Romanian military forces were deployed in 10 among 15 U.N. peacekeeping missions and one special political mission. The country's international ambitions are evident in its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council from 2020-2021.

Slovenia

Score 5 Like its predecessors, Prime Minister Cerar's government was preoccupied with domestic political and economic issues and paid little attention to improving institutional capacity for shaping and implementing global initiatives. The country's main international focus has been on shaping the European Union's policy toward the western Balkans, where Slovenia sees its strategic interests. In the period under review, the arbitration case decision on the 25-year long territorial dispute continued between Croatia and Slovenia over the Gulf of Piran and some part of the land border, was finally publicly announced by the Court in June 2017, and awaiting implementation on both sides. It might be significant in the future, not only for Slovenia and Croatia, but also for the broader Western Balkan region, if the decision is respected by both parties.

Citation:

Nielsen, N. (2017): Croatia ignores ruling on Slovenia border dispute, in: EU Observer, June 30, 2017 (<https://euobserver.com/justice/138398>).

Switzerland

Score 5 Switzerland is a fairly active member of the United Nations, the IMF, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and most of the other important international organizations. Swiss foreign economic policy works actively to defend the interests of its export-oriented economy, as for instance in the context of the WTO.

The policy of neutrality and the objective of safeguarding national autonomy set clear limits to the country's international engagement in the past, however, and direct democracy further reduced the scope of action in international affairs. During the growing polarization witnessed in Swiss politics over the past 20 years, together with the associated decline in consociational patterns of behavior, right-wing politicians have emphasized the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state surviving on the basis of smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large portions of the population support these ideas. Popular skepticism toward European integration has mounted over the course of the last years. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to repeat the cliché of Switzerland as a solitary lone wolf, as there have been various attempts to contribute to international cooperative ventures. However, the country concentrates its efforts in areas where it can realistically have some influence, such as economic matters or technical organizations dealing with issues such as transport, ecology or development. This said, there is a clear gap between the government's stated goals in terms of international cooperation and the resources – institutional or otherwise – that it has at its disposal for these tasks

Turkey

Score 5

As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, Turkey has hosted and assisted more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees, with only a limited proportion of refugees living in state-run refugee camps. The EU-Turkey Statement has become an important element of the European Union's comprehensive approach on migration. While Turkey accuses the European Union of falling behind on its promises, the European Union claims that €3 billion were allocated through the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey in 2016 and 2017.

The U.S.-led coalition campaign to destroy the Islamic State group enters its fourth year, with authorities declaring concrete improvements. However, Turkey, a key player in the coalition, has also intensified its own separate efforts in Syria. The Turkish military established its own mission in Northern Syria in 2016 and 2017. This mission has since developed into a full military confrontation with the U.S.-backed People's Protection Units (YPG). Turkey claimed the mission is part of Turkey's efforts to fight all terrorist organizations, including ISIL. In December 2016, a total of 3,359 people were taken into custody for associating with ISIL militants and 1,313 were arrested. Since November 2017, police officers have conducted almost daily raids on ISIL cells across Turkey, with increasing intensity in the past few weeks.

In addition to the consultative, coordinative and cooperative structures within NATO and the European Union, Turkey also participated in the Vienna and Geneva talks as well as – after overcoming disputes with Russia – bilateral talks with Russia, Iran and other regional players in search of a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict.

Citation:

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Bulgaria

Score 4 While the capacity of Bulgarian government bodies to correspond with, coordinate and participate in international processes and initiatives has improved markedly over recent years, the fact remains that Bulgaria is still primarily reactive in terms of international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. This is due both to a lack of capacity and a risk-minimizing strategy of avoiding the commitments involved in taking proactive positions. More often than not, Bulgaria tends to take part in international efforts but wait for the international community to formulate policies, set goals and benchmarks. It then does its best to implement those domestically. Inasmuch as there is coordination and assessment going on, it is for these reactive purposes. A recent example of this type of behavior has been Bulgaria's dithering regarding the international sanctions against Russia. The country has taken on a more active role in shaping the European Union's response to the refugee issue.

Cyprus

Score 4 Cyprus's preoccupation with its own challenges has prevented it from sufficiently seizing opportunities offered through its membership in the EU, UN and other intergovernmental organizations. Its contribution to global public welfare is limited and mechanisms or plans to ensure such contribution are largely absent. Instead, the Cyprian government's focus remains on bilateral relations and isolated contributions on specific matters in international fora. Since 2012, government resources and attention have mostly been absorbed by efforts to overcome the economic crisis. However, the discovery of hydrocarbons has yielded some initiatives aimed at coordinating with neighboring countries, given that existing conflicts are fueled by these explorations. Nevertheless, Cyprus's strategic location offers a great potential to contribute to the common good in the region and globally.

Czech Republic

Score 4 For a long time, the Czech government acted not as a leader, but as a trustworthy and reliable partner of the international community. Vis-à-vis the European Union, this changed in the summer of 2015 in the context of the refugee crisis. Together with other Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic opposed EU quotas for the relocation of refugees, a position with strong public support and encouraged by growing anti-Islamic rhetoric, notably from President Zeman. In May 2017, the Czech government did not join the Hungarian and Slovak governments in questioning the EU refugee quotas in front of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In July 2017, the ECJ upheld the mandatory refugee relocation quotas and the European Commission sent a formal

request to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland – the three countries currently in breach of their legal obligations – to begin complying with the quotas. The Czech Republic and Slovakia (unlike Poland and Hungary) have taken some refugees, but continue to cite security concerns. The lack of a credible plan to implement the euro, inconsistent attitudes toward the European integration process and numerous scandals associated with the use of EU funds, as well as the unwillingness of government ministers to attend high-level EU meetings, have resulted in the country's marginalization in European structures.

Greece

Score 4

Greece, through its membership in the euro zone and through EU summits and meetings of ministers, has participated in international efforts to foster the provision of public goods. For instance, Greece has been vocal at international forums in pressuring for a global response to migration issues, emphasizing that migration from the developing world into Europe is not solely a Greek problem arising from its geographical position between Europe and Asia. However, given its own severe economic crisis, Greece has been unable to develop institutional capacities beyond its role as an EU member state in fostering the provision of public goods nor has it been able to devote resources to ensure that its own policies are in line with international policies.

Malta

Score 4

Malta does not have the institutional capacity to actively shape a wide range of international efforts. However, Malta has sought to do this within its immediate Mediterranean region and increasingly within the EU. Since 1975, Malta has been a rapporteur of the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. It continues to support good-governance efforts in Libya and Tunisia and co-operates closely on refugee and migration issues with neighboring countries. Malta accepts more asylum-seekers per capital than almost all other countries and was one of the few EU countries to honor in full the EU relocation program by taking in its full quota (accepting 131 refugees and asylum-seekers). As such, it has invested heavily in support services since 2013. In 2015, Malta hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and contributed toward the setting up of a fund to assist small commonwealth island countries with adapting to climate change and the fight to eradicate polio. Preliminary discussions also took place in preparation for the climate change summit in Paris. In October 2015, Malta hosted a EU-Africa migration conference (i.e., Valletta Summit on Migration). It has been pressing for the implementation of agreements reached at the summit and is planning a follow-up meeting for 2017. In December 2015, it facilitated talks between Libya's rival factions in support of a UN peace plan. Malta's progress in this sphere has also been demonstrated by its success during the EU presidency.

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Malta representative in Palestine visits PLO dignitaries in Ramallah foreignaffairs.gov.mt

Hungary

Score 3

Since the beginning of the EU refugee crisis, Prime Minister Orbán has looked for an international role for himself and has increasingly been elevated to one of Europe's "strong men" in the Fidesz press. He has intensified cooperation within the Visegrád group, especially on migration policy and has boasted about his good relationship with Putin. However, all these activities have further undermined his standing with other European leaders. The conflict of the Orbán government with the EU has further deepened in the refugee crisis and by the "Stop Brussels campaign." As a result, the strongest reaction has come from the European Peoples Party, from the Fidesz party family that led to the historical event when the European Parliament resolution called to invoke Art. 7, passed by a large majority on 17 May 2017, with many MEPs from the EPP voting in favor. On top of that, the European Court of Justice on 6 September 2017 refused the Hungarian – jointly with Slovakia and supported by Poland – claim against the allocation of refugees among the member states. But Orbán has not stopped attacking Brussels, he has declared that the Commission has been working according to the "Soros Plan."

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