FRANCE

At rank 19, France’s status performance is slipping (-1 rank relative to SGI 2009).

Problems are mounting rather than diminishing. Public demand for fundamental political, economical and social reforms is on the rise. At the same time, the government’s capacity to undergo systemic reform appears beleagured.

High hopes in May 2007 that the election of Nicolas Sarkozy would usher in substantial change have been dashed. The president’s controversial leadership style has enhanced rather than combat impressions of a strict top-down hierarchy in French reform policy in the last three years.

France’s overall quality of democracy is below the OECD average (rank 20).

The electoral process is fair at all levels. Public authorities usually act in line with the existing legal framework.

In principle, media independence from public authorities is guaranteed by a complete set of constitutional, legislative and administrative rules. However, there are structural weaknesses in the media system allowing government influence through several channels.

There are solid legal provisions protecting civil rights and political liberties. Strong measures against discrimination are also in place, but many immigrants face discrimination with respect to housing and work.

At rank 26, France suffers severe shortcomings in economic policy.

President Sarkozy’s reforms have had limited effects. Contrary to his campaign promise, the state’s role in the economy has increased. Public debt and unemployment have peaked as the trade balance and industrial basis have deteriorated.

Despite high levels of spending and an impressive number of measures, labor market policy has yielded disappointing results.

The level of taxes and social contributions is one of the highest within the OECD. The social welfare system is in need of an overhaul, but high political costs deter governments from doing more than introducing slight adjustments.

Falling again at rank 16, France’s social affairs rating is buoyed by a strong concern for families.

The country’s health care system offers high-quality and inclusive care, but cost efficiency and deficit containment are outstanding problems.

By international and European standards, the French welfare state is very generous, keeping poverty at a comparatively low level. Nonetheless, high and long-lasting benefits create negative employment incentives.

The country’s highly developed family policy system of parenting benefits and child-care facilities, particularly combined with other social security elements such as social housing, contribute to the effective prevention of child poverty.

External security in France is based on active diplomacy and a comprehensive foreign policy in world affairs. Substantial budgetary efforts have targeted combining the buildup of a nuclear force and an intervention capacity abroad, particularly in Africa. In 2009, after more than 40 years, France was reintegrated in the NATO.

Domestic security policy protects citizens. Repeated outbreaks of urban violence have attracted considerable attention, though the roots of this violence lie in socioeconomic inequalities. Such events are increasingly the subject of partisan rancor.

With a gain of six ranks relative to the SGI 2009 (to rank 9), France has made notable strides in terms of resource sustainability.

Environmental performance is mediocre. France’s comparatively low CO2 emissions are due to the importance of nuclear power, while other environmental fields such as energy conservation have been neglected.

Research and innovation policies are rather good, however. Since 2007, the government has implemented several measures aimed at facilitating and promoting innovation.

Education is centralized and mainly state-run. French students score well in the PISA study. Spending on preschool level facilities is exemplary, and remains above the OECD average at the primary level.

At position 25, France ranks among the worst performers in the Management Index.

The hierarchical structure of the government permits the smooth implementation of policies, but the government’s neglect of scholarly expertise, the near-absence of critical self-assessment, and weak dialogue with social partners translates into wasted opportunities for the government.

Most improvements have been observed in institutional learning, where France has demonstrated its ability and willingness to pro-actively coordinate international activities and agreements, most notably within the EU.

At home, the French government is far from being sufficiently accountable toward citizens, the legislature, media and associations.

At rank 17, France’s steering capability rating reflects strong gains and losses in individual measures.

French governments are organized in a decidedly hierarchical manner, often using special ad hoc planning commissions but little scholarly advice. This risks letting opportunism prevail over real strategic planning.

The practice of RIA has been in place since 1995, but assessments are often general and uncritical. There is no formal requirement for a needs analysis.

Widespread anti-lobbyist sentiment inhibits societal consultation and cooperation, with social tensions rendering dialogue difficult. However, the absence of coalition partners in the government enables effective, hierarchically organized communication.

At rank 11, France’s policy implementation capacity has improved somewhat (+4 ranks) in relative comparison to the SGI 2009.

The French government can rely on a disciplined cabinet and an obedient parliamentary majority, assisting in the efficient implementation of its program. Few other veto actors are present in the system.

Compliance by ministers is strong, as they can be dismissed at any time without explanation. President and prime minister effectively monitor line ministries, which in turn possess tools sufficient to push agencies in the desired direction.

Subnational authorities are among the system’s most powerful pressure groups, and have been able to secure favorable fund transfers from the central government. There is neither a clear hierarchy between the three government levels nor a clear-cut division of competences.

At rank 12, France’s institutional learning capacity has shown strong gains in relative terms (+10 ranks) compared to the SGI 2009.

The government has effectively adapted its structure in accordance with the demands of European integration and the rise of multilevel governance. The country plays an active role in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.

There is no systematic review of organizational structures, although occasional reports are issued by the Council of State or the Court of Accounts.

The constitution was substantially revised in 2008, in one of the most far-reaching constitutional reforms of the last 40 years. One of the main elements of the reform was a strengthening of parliamentary power.

At rank 31, France is assessed as having the OECD’s lowest degree of executive accountability (-3 ranks relative to the SGI 2009).

With political interest and participation on the decline, citizens’ ability to keep abreast of the complicated post-2007 reform agenda has waned.

Parliamentary committees can typically obtain desired government documents, but lack the resources to monitor ministries effectively.

Intermediary organizations have limited capacity to play an oversight role. Media programming sometimes focuses on broad societal themes or new social challenges, but high-quality issue-focused programs are rare. Parties have largely failed in explaining pressing policy challenges to the electorate. Associations do not play a major part in the formulation of policy proposals.