SOUTH KOREA

At rank 26, South Korea’s status performance is slipping (-2 ranks relative to SGI 2009).

The quality of democracy has diminished further. Since taking office in early 2008, President Lee has sharply reversed the policies of his two left-wing predecessors. Critics claim that Lee suppresses the opposition, media and large parts of civil society.

Economic policy is largely successful, even though Korea’s performance chiefly rests on the invincible Chaebol, large business conglomerates. Governments, in particular conservative ones, have been reluctant in expanding the social security system.

Tensions with North Korea continue to pose severe security concerns.

At rank 29, South Korea’s quality of democracy fails to meet average OECD levels.

While elections are largely fair, the government occasionally infringes on media independence, and oligopolistic newspapers produce biased political reporting.

The suicide of former President Roh in 2009 amidst allegations of corruption raised questions about the independence of the judiciary. The National Security Law, which outlaws activities that could be interpreted as “benefitting or praising” North Korea remains in place.

Corruption persists as a major problem.

At rank 12, South Korea’s activist economic policy during the crisis helped push the country up five ranks relative to the SGI 2009.

President Lee’s business-friendly economic policy is centered on the ambitious “Korea 747” plan (7% growth in his term, raising per capita GDP to $40,000, and becoming the world’s 7th largest economy). The impact of the economic crisis was softened substantially through implementation of the OECD’s largest fiscal stimulus package relative to GDP.

Labor market policy has succeeded in keeping unemployment low, but problems remain, including a rise in precarious working conditions and irregular employment, and difficult career entry conditions for college graduates.

With the lowest tax burden on income in the OECD, Korea’s tax system is relatively effective. Budget policy is very sustainable.

South Korea’s rating on social affairs remains comparatively low (rank 24).

The health care system is relatively efficient, with the country showing the OECD’s highest increase in life expectancy since 1960.

Family- and group-based social transfers provide some compensation for limitations in the state-run welfare system. The gap between rich and poor has grown, however. Alarmed by a dramatic drop in birth rates, combined with a rapidly aging society, revisions to family policy are being discussed.

Migrants’ access to permanent residency and dual citizenship status has recently been improved, as have voting rights in local elections. However, cultural discrimination against international couples and the exploitation of foreign blue-collar workers remain problems.

Continued tensions with North Korea dominate South Korea’s security challenges. The country spends considerable amounts on defense and relies on security assistance from its cooperation partners, the USA and Japan, in balancing the threat from the north.

Relations between the two Korean states have deteriorated since the Lee administration reversed the “sunshine” policy pursued by preceding left-wing governments.

Domestic security is provided in most areas. South Korea has the lowest rate of burglaries and robberies in the OECD, though auto-related fatalities are high.

At rank 11, sustainable use of resources is one of South Korea’s relative strengths.

The Lee administration can be credited for shifting attention to environmental issues. In practice, however, “green growth” has often been a label for large-scale industrial and infrastructure plans such as the controversial “Four Rivers Project.” CO2 emissions have increased more in South Korea than in any other OECD country since the 1990s.

Research and innovation policies are exemplary in the large enterprise sector, but small and medium-sized firms would benefit from more investment.

Education policy has improved slightly, but remains a controversial issue. Learning outcomes are very good, as PISA results show. However, the education system has been criticized for failing to develop students’ analytical and debating skills.

At rank 22, South Korea’s management performance now numbers among the bottom third in the OECD (-4 ranks relative to SGI 2009).

The government’s steering capability has diminished considerably in almost all measures. Although the president’s sweeping powers and streamlined bureaucratic structures facilitate efficient policy-making, the Lee administration has not sought to support or expand participatory processes.

The administration’s preference for hierarchical over consultative processes has, however, spelled for swift policy implementation.

Performance in institutional learning remains mediocre, but the government has been actively engaged in international fora and took pro-active steps in combating the global economic crisis.

Citizens do not have sufficient means to hold their government accountable.

At rank 21, South Korea’s steering capability shows a dramatic decline (-8 ranks relative to SGI 2009).

The president’s political strength and comfortable parliamentary majority has improved the environment for strategic planning. However, the influence of expert commissions has decreased.

The president’s Blue House is the government’s power center, with strong oversight of the various line ministries. Most coordination between ministries is informal.

Societal consultation has deteriorated substantially in the last two years. The Lee administration governs in a much more hierarchical and authoritarian way than did its predecessor, explicitly rejecting former President Roh’s vision of participatory democracy.

At rank 13, South Korea has shown appreciable gains in policy implementation capacity (+7 ranks) relative to the SGI 2009.

The Lee administration pushed the executive in a more hierarchical, even authoritarian direction, improving efficiency as a result. However, this governance style has spurred public opposition.

Ministers depend strongly on presidential support, and thus have little room for noncompliance with government policy. The president and prime minister’s offices effectively monitor ministries, which in turn effectively monitor all executive agencies.

A complicated structure of provincial, district and neighborhood governments has been in place since 1995. Local governments, though limited in their ability to raise independent revenue, play an important role in providing services to the citizens.

At rank 12, South Korea’s institutional learning capacity has declined marginally (-2 ranks) relative to the SGI 2009.

International developments that affect Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. However, the degree of adaptability depends to a large extent on compatibility with domestic political goals. The current government wants to improve Korea’s worldwide prestige and enhance the country’s soft power.

The Lee administration came to office with a clear goal of streamlining government and bureaucracy. Reevaluations of existing institutional arrangements are likely to continue whenever they are perceived as an obstacle to the president’s goals. Significant institutional reforms have aimed at creating a smaller and more efficient government.

At rank 26, South Korean executive accountability is relatively low by OECD standards.

Citizens are well informed on the most widely discussed government policies, but overall knowledge levels on economic and social issues tend to be low. The voter turnout rate is the OECD’s lowest.

Parliamentary committees can obtain desired government documents, and can summon ministers and invite experts to hearings. The parliament does not have an ombuds office.

A commercially driven media produces relatively low-quality programming, with political journalism a particular weakness. Parties are one of the weakest links in Korean democracy, but business and other civil society organizations have reached a level of considerable sophistication.