SLOVAKIA

At rank 28, Slovakia’s status performance has deteriorated drastically (-5 ranks relative to SGI 2009).

The leftist-populist Fico government that came to power after the 2006 parliamentary elections outspokenly challenged the Dzurinda administration’s euro-atlantic orientation in foreign policy and successful socioeconomic reforms, but left these reforms more or less in place.

Policy performance has suffered across-the-board losses in all areas. The quality of democracy has diminished considerably, and the global economic crisis has had more severe consequences than in most other countries. Despite the Fico government’s promises to improve social policies, ratings in Social Affairs have slumped in this area.

At rank 28, the quality of democracy in Slovakia has deteriorated considerably (-5 ranks relative to SGI 2009).

From 2008 to 2010, the Fico government continued its hands-on approach towards the media and the judiciary. Corruption and party-cronyism flourished as the government placed limitations on public access to government information. In addition, threats waged at foreign energy companies pointed to an eroding respect for private property rights.

Ethnic tensions and social polarization were fueled by the SNS’ inflammatory rhetoric distinguishing between “real” Slovaks and the rest (Hungarian and Roma). The 2009 State Language Act and the 2010 Patriotism Act in particular infringed upon the rights of the Hungarian minority.

At rank 26, a fall of five ranks relative to the SGI 2009, Slovakia’s economic policy performance showed a relative lack of ambition.

The Slovak economy was affected strongly by the world economic crisis, but the Fico government reacted somewhat haltingly. It adopted two small fiscal stimulus packages in November 2008 and February 2009, and relaxed unemployment benefit eligibility requirements only slowly.

Key reforms of the preceding Dzurinda government were left untouched so as not to risk undermining foreign investment levels, a previously positive economic performance and the planned introduction of the euro.

Although the government coalition parties had long criticized the tax system for a liberal bias and unjust effects, the Fico government confined itself to minor changes.

Slovakia ranks 26th in the SGI’s social affairs category.

The government refrained from prolonging the maximum duration of unemployment benefits during the economic crisis, and waited until January 2010 to relax previously restrictive eligibility requirements. Nevertheless, social disparity and (relative) poverty remained limited both during and after the crisis.

Pension and health care reforms progressed further than did other areas, but the government largely retained its predecessor’s core policies.

Social exclusion is a serious problem for the Roma minority.

Slovakia’s integration into the EU and NATO provides security, but Slovak-Hungarian relations have reached their lowest point in ten years. Slovakia’s rapprochement with Russia has also given rise to concerns voiced by affected states.

Accession to the Schengen Group in December 2007 has facilitated the professionalization of the Slovak police force and border control. However, corruption continues to plague the underfunded police force which in enjoys little trust among the population.

At rank 28, Slovakia’s record of resource sustainability is poor by OECD standards.

The Fico government’s performance on environmental policy was mixed. Long-awaited measures governing waste management and biomass use were adopted. However, the government weakened the participation of NGOs in environmental decision-making.

The volume and quality of R&D activities remain low. The government increased the share of EU funds devoted to the support of research and innovation, but failed to raise overall spending on R&D.

Education reform was one of the main leftovers from the previous government. The School Act was amended in 2008, but no major reforms were enacted. The 2010 Patriotism Act included a renationalization of education.

Of all OECD member states, Slovakia’s rating on management performance fell the most relative to the SGI 2011 (-11 ranks).

Under the Fico government, performance in all measures declined. The government failed to develop any long-term strategies and pursue a coherent communication of its agenda during the period under review.

Policy implementation suffered from the lack of coordination among ministers and the absence of funding for local governments.

Preoccupied with domestic issues, the Fico administration repeatedly failed to participate in EU initiatives or adapt measures to domestic institutions.

The government’s level of demonstrable executive accountability toward citizens, the legislature and NGOs is among the weakest in the OECD.

With across-the-board, in some cases dramatic declines in individual measures, Slovakia’s steering capability ranking fell six places to rank 30.

Institutional capacity for strategic planning in Slovakia is weak. The Fico government showed little interest in developing a strategic orientation, and did not pursue any long-term strategies. The influence of academic experts decreased substantially.

Regulatory impact assessments are not obligatory, and can be circumvented relatively easily.

The government’s willingness to consult with economic and social actors was low and rather selective. Few efforts were made to streamline communication policies, and contradictory statements by ministries were consequently frequent.

At rank 29, Slovakia shows the OECD’s strongest decline (-21 ranks) in policy implementation capacity relative to the SGI 2009.

The Fico administration’s 2006 government manifesto was relatively vague. A wide discrepancy between the program’s bombastic goals and declarations and the limited measures ultimately adopted was evident.

Individual ministers showed more loyalty to parties and party leaders than to the government as such. The activities of line ministries were not heavily monitored.

In the wake of the crisis, local governments suffered substantial fiscal deficits. Additional allocations provided by the central government were too small to compensate for the decline in tax revenues.

Falling 14 ranks relative to the SGI 2009, Slovakia now sits at the OECD’s bottom in terms of institutional learning capacity.

Despite announcements to the contrary, the government adopted no institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the country’s influence in the EU or at making full use of available EU funds. The Fico administration largely focused on domestic issues rather than engaging with the EU or other international organizations.

No regular monitoring of institutional governing arrangements takes place. Compared to the Dzurinda administration, the number of audits by private sector organizations declined. No attempts at improving the strategic capacity of government through institutional reforms were made.

At rank 27, executive accountability in Slovakia has declined considerably relative to the SGI 2009.

Citizens’ familiarity with government policy is limited. While substantial information is available, media literacy and the public level of interest in policy are both low.

Parliamentary committees have the right to request most government documents. However, the Fico government frequently delivered draft bills and other documents with considerable delay, undermining the committees’ work.

The quality of media reporting has declined. Slovak parties tend not to present coherent, plausible policy platforms. The policy sophistication of trade unions and business associations varies.