CHILE

The president holds the power to ask for and ensure the production of strategic planning, whether through formal or informal channels. Line ministries, most notably the Ministry of Finance, and the president’s advisory ministry (the Secretaría General de la Presidencia, or Segpres), have considerable influence in strategic planning processes. Meetings between strategic planning staff and the head of government are held frequently.

Strategic planning, planning of policy and regulatory reforms, budget planning, and ex ante evaluation of government policies and public investment programs are carried out by specialized units and departments inside the various ministries. While there is no explicit multiyear budget planning process in place in Chile, this takes place implicitly due to the fiscal rule that links (by law) overall government expenditure to forward-looking estimates of long-term government revenue, based growth trends and copper price projections. These forecasts are provided in a transparent way by specialized budgetary commissions comprised of academic and private-sector experts (mostly professional economists).

Non-governmental organizations and academic experts play an important role in government decision-making. Experts from academia, NGOs, partisan think tanks and the private sector are very influential in the preparation of government (presidential) programs and the development of policy reform proposals by presidential or ministerial technical commissions. These technical commissions, which are charged with the task of proposing policy reforms in specific reform areas (education reform, pension reform, social and wage policies, minimum wage policy, fiscal rule reform, etc.) have been very influential in shaping government legislation as submitted to and voted on by Congress. Commissions are largely comprised of experts, and to a minor extent of representatives of interested parties, and cover a wide political spectrum. Experts (economists in particular) are very influential in drafting reform proposals submitted to the president or to ministers. As a profession, economists in particular are highly influential in the preparation of government programs and policy reform proposals, and in the execution of government policies.

The president’s advisory ministry (Segpres) has at its disposal the necessary instruments and capacities to monitor and evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals. Nevertheless, channels of evaluation and advice are not fully institutionalized, and may change with a new head of state.

The government office has the ability to return items. Given the dominance of the president in Chile’s system, the president can overrule the advisory ministry if he or she holds a strong particular interest in a special item. But in the day-to-day course of operations, this rarely happens.

The government office and line ministries have a strong tendency to coordinate activity, and in practice the president or government office and the Ministry of Finance are nearly always involved in the preparation of policy proposals. No serving minister would ignore the president’s opinion in the preparation and elaboration of a policy proposal.

A political committee consisting of the president, the minister of the interior, the ministers of Segpres and the minister of communication and press (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, Segegob), the minister of finance and the minister of justice holds weekly meetings. This committee was designed to ensure the representation of all parties participating in the Concertación coalition, which held power until 2010. Cabinet committee meetings (including all ministers) are held monthly. In both committees, the majority of issues are reviewed and scheduled before the actual meeting itself. Ministries do not participate equally in the preparation of cabinet meetings.

Full cabinet meetings, and thus senior officials themselves, have not played a central role in core government decision-making. However, ministries are normally involved in the preparation of cabinet meetings. Depending on the ministry, officials can be involved deeply or relatively less so in the preparation of these meetings.

As with senior ministry officials, line ministry civil servants have not played a central role in core government decision-making, but – depending on the ministry – can be more or less involved in preparing cabinet meetings.

Informal coordination plays an important role in settling issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates. Existing informal mechanisms could be characterized as “formal informality.”

All new law proposals must be accompanied by a report summarizing the expected fiscal impact and the financial implications for the government budget. This report is always prepared by the fiscal department of the corresponding ministry. Chile also has a constitutional restriction on policy proposals that imply budget changes. Economic and social-impact assessments are provided by ad hoc commissions that prepare draft policy reform proposals in specific policy areas, and which are appointed by the president or by line ministers. Environmental impact assessments are performed for most large public investment programs (as well as private investment programs).

Given the informal and non-institutionalized character of the instruments applied for regulatory impact assessment, reports tend not to specify the purpose of or need for proposed regulations.

Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) reports do not tend to analyze alternative options.

Frequent consultations with civil society groups and stakeholder organizations take place. Online surveys have been implemented to consult the opinion of the non-institutionalized public. Segpres is primarily responsible for initiating and monitoring consultations. Depending on the issue, sectoral institutions are involved as well. The ad hoc commissions represent another means of societal consultation, as they include representatives of interest groups and other stakeholders.

Each new government designs its own communication policy. As a result, strategic communication often tends to be rather haphazard at the beginning of a presidential term, but improves as the administration gains experience. This pattern applies to the governments of the last two years.

Implementation performance varies widely, ranging from excellent in areas where benchmarks and oversight mechanisms are strictly enforced (i.e., the general government budget) to awful in less rigidly monitored areas (i.e., implementation of some sectoral reforms such as Transantiago, the Santiago transport system).

The president’s office performs annual evaluations of ministers’ policies. In a commission consisting of Segpres and the government’s budgetary units, ministers have to present their sectoral priorities, and if necessary, arrangements are made to ensure alignment with the overall government agenda.

The president monitors his or her ministers’ policies constantly. Budget allocation serves as a strong instrument of control.

To an increasing extent, high positions in government agencies are filled through the government’s civil service department (Alta Dirección Pública), based on candidates’ technical capacity and experience. Therefore, they do not depend on political appointments. Clear goals are identified by the directors of executive agencies and the corresponding ministries. Exhaustive evaluations of the system and of personnel choices are performed annually by the minister, the civil service and Segpres. In addition, the Ministry of Finance’s Budget Office monitors decentralized agencies and public enterprises from a budgetary perspective very tightly and effectively.

Chile’s central government exercises strong control over municipal budgets, accounting for a large proportion of local revenue. However, the assignment of new duties at the municipal level does not necessarily imply the corresponding allocation of adequate funds. Municipal programs are monitored relatively closely by the central government, although spending overruns can be observed that result in local government debt.

Local governments legally enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy concerning mandates and tasks that do not touch on constitutional issues, and which are executable within the allocated budget. Furthermore, the government has tended to devolve responsibilities to local governments (i.e., in the domain of urban regulation). In comparison to the local level, regional governments enjoy a high degree of budget autonomy. At the regional level, the governors’ (indendantes) autonomy is limited by their simultaneous function as representatives of the national government and heads of the regional advisory councils.

Due to the different financing structures at the regional and municipal levels, the national government can only guarantee services at an adequate standard at the regional level. The central government has clearly failed to establish national standards at the municipal level. In addition, relatively poor municipalities and those in rural regions often lack the capacity to meet national standards for public services, especially in the fields of health care and education.

Chile’s state modernization process is still underway. In general, the Bachelet government tended to attribute more importance to fiscal-political constraints than to making changes or adaptations entailing additional expenditure, such as budget augmentations for a certain ministry or department.

The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives as often as possible. Chile participates actively in Latin America’s regional forums, meetings and institutions. However, while the country is a member of all important international organizations, Chile’s governments have been mostly either passive or irrelevant (in part due to the country’s small size) in shaping international cooperation and policy agreements. One possible exception is Chile’s relatively active role in international U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations.

Ministries have to establish sectoral goals, which are then evaluated annually. Reports are presented quarterly but do not focus directly on the adequacy of institutional arrangements. For example, the accomplishment of ministerial goals is evaluated, but not the adequacy of the ministry in general. The Ministry of Finance assesses the adequacy of institutional arrangements in the case of new law proposals, but there is no specific institution assigned to monitor already existing institutional arrangements.

Improvements in strategic capacity have been made by changing institutional arrangements (for example, with the reform of the Budget Office, Dirección del Presupuesto), but these efforts generally encounter very substantial bureaucratic resistance.

Print media discussion of policy reform proposals and government programs is relatively widespread, including discussion of reform proposals and options presented by the ad hoc policy reform commissions, as was seen with the issues of education and pension reform. Yet a large share of population is excluded from this exposure and discussion due to its low levels of education, limited understanding of in-depth analysis, and/or lack of exposure to media other than television. In addition, the oligopolistic structures of the media in Chile distort the political options offered to citizens. Disinformation and manipulations hinder public policy discussions.

Parliamentary committees or individual deputies can request documents, which must be delivered by the government within legally defined time limits. Those deadlines are generally met by the government’s office, but there are de facto limitations in the exercise of control, as the party or coalition with a majority in a certain topic can block the minority’s request. Until recently, obtaining information from state-owned companies or the Ministry of Finance was difficult.

In August 2005, a constitutional reform (Ley No. 20,050) established the process of ministerial interpellation. Committees in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have the right to summon ministers for questioning about matters concerning their area. The ministers are obliged to attend. The effectiveness of this new instrument of parliamentary control depends on the quality and quantity of information otherwise accessible to the parliament.

Parliamentary committees may summon any civil servant to interview him or her as a subject-area expert. Private experts can also be invited, but in fact the parliament lacks the financial funds to pay for the assistance of prominent private experts. However, there is a group of 50 to 60 specialists from a variety of subject areas, affiliated with the Library of the National Congress, whose task it is to offer professional support to the parliamentarians in their law-making, representative, diplomatic and oversight tasks.

The oversight role of the Chilean legislature lies mainly with the Chamber of Deputies and its 23 committees. These coincide in part with the 22 line ministries, but there are various exceptions in which a single committee is responsible for the area of various ministries, or one ministry’s area of responsibility is distributed across multiple committees. It should be noted that Chile is not a parliamentary system, and thus ministers are not directly accountable to the Chilean congress. Therefore, the degree of control exercised by the congressional committees is naturally rather weak.

Chile’s General Comptroller (Contraloría General de la República) has far-reaching competences, and is invested with strong political and legal independence. The officeholder is nominated by the president, and must be approved by a three-fifths majority vote in the Senate. The comptroller has oversight power over all government acts and activities, and investigates specific issues at the request of legislators serving in the Chamber of Deputies. The office presents an annual report simultaneously to parliament and the president. The parliament has the right to challenge the constitutionality of the comptroller’s work.

Parliament does not have a formal ombuds office. However, the parliament and its members listen informally (but not systematically) to concerns expressed by citizens and public advocacy groups, inviting them to parliamentary hearings.

Although locally produced news programs are generally of high quality and draw large audiences, particularly through radio, newspapers and especially the main public TV stations report tabloid news, and employ bold headlines and techniques of strong popular and entertainment appeal. Furthermore, statistics released by the National TV Commission (Consejo Nacional de Televisión) show that on average, less than five hours a week per channel or radio station is spent discussing in-depth political information.

As the president is the most powerful figure in the Chilean political system, presidential elections are of higher importance than parliamentary elections. Presidential candidates present electoral programs rather than the parties. The programs of candidates in the December 2009 election, Eduardo Frei and Sebastian Piñera, generally offered coherent presentations of their political ideas, with plausible discussions of how they would seek to realize those ideas. The program of Jorge Arrate provided in-depth analysis of the current challenges facing Chilean society and politics, but his concrete policy suggestions were less coherent. The program of the fourth candidate, Marco Enriquez Ominami, did not show the same coherence as the other three, appearing rather as a collage of occasionally contradictory ideas.

Proposals by economic interest groups are not necessarily and not always short-sighted or unsustainable, but tend to be partial and largely guided by their narrow interests. Exceptions to this rule of thumb do occur.

Religious, environmental and social organizations, as well as NGOs, academic groups and professional associations often present substantive policy reform proposals that contribute positively to policy discussions and government reforms.