SOUTH KOREA

Strategic planning remains an important factor in Korean governance. The content of this strategic planning has changed dramatically, from an earlier concentration on democratization, market-oriented reforms and the expansion of social security to a focus on economic growth, business-friendly policies and “green growth.” Given the strengthened position of the president and his comfortable majority in parliament, the political context for strategic planning has improved as compared with that facing the Roh administration. Compared to previous administrations, the Lee government is much more pragmatic, but also much more short-term oriented. Instead of being concerned with long-term goals, President Lee views the government as operating in a similar manner to a company, reacting pragmatically to challenges in order to remain competitive in the process of economic globalization.

Nongovernmental academic experts have considerable influence on government decision-making. Most observers believe that the influence of expert commissions has decreased somewhat, as President Lee has abolished many of the expert commissions established by his predecessors. However, he also created many new commissions, with a different focus. Commissions dealing with historical issues such as crimes committed during the periods of Japanese colonial rule or military dictatorship have been weakened or even abolished. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be disbanded in 2010, as planned when it was created in December 2005. Critics say the commission is being shut down because the current government is uncomfortable with scrutiny of the country’s past. Others, including the commission’s current president, argue that it has not been cost effective and therefore should cease work. The closure of the commission means that thousands of incidents, ranging from executions to the wartime killing of refugees, may remain uninvestigated, and that South Koreans wrongly accused of crimes against the government may lose their only chance to clear their name.
On the other hand, new commissions have been empanelled, such as the G-20 task force assigned the job of preparing for the G-20 summit. The process of naming experts remains politicized, and expert commission reports and results seem to be utilized according to their political rather than their scholarly value. Beyond their work in commissions, scholars are often tapped to serve in government positions.

South Korea’s presidential system has a dual executive structure, with the president serving both as head of state and head of government. The prime minister is clearly subordinate to the president and is not accountable to parliament. Political tradition, constitutional rules, the government’s organizational structure and the de facto distribution of political power among the two offices allow the president and the president’s office to be the dominant center of executive decision-making. The Office of the President (known as the Blue House) has the power and expertise to evaluate line ministries’ draft bills. As the real power center of the Korean government, the Blue House has divisions corresponding with the various line ministry responsibilities. The Blue House is supported in its oversight role by the Prime Minister’s Office and its Government Performance Evaluation Committee, as well as by public institutions such as the Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA). After taking office, President Lee dramatically reduced Blue House staff, potentially weakening the office’s expertise. However, many of the initially abolished positions were reinstated over time, as problems with GO expertise and implementation emerged.

The president is very powerful in the Korean constitutional system. There is extensive coordination between ministries, the prime minister’s office and the Blue House in the course of planning cabinet meetings. The president presides over regular cabinet meetings and can legally and de facto return any items envisaged for the meetings as he wishes. In practice this competence is limited only by the expertise of the Blue House and the relatively smaller size of the Blue House bureaucracy. Thus, the de facto ability to return issues depends on their political importance for the president.

The Korean political system has become more hierarchical in the last two years, and the relative position of the Blue House has been strengthened. Many line ministries have lost influence, been downsized or merged. The large majority of issues are settled between the line ministries and the Blue House before cabinet meetings. Cabinet meetings are limited in their function to an exchange of information, while most strategic decisions are made in the Blue House.

The cabinet plays a relatively small role in the political process, as all important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the relevant ministry. Committees are either permanent, such as the National Security Council, or created at need in response to a particular issue. Most experts believe that coordination between ministers is too weak, although the Blue House is playing an increasingly active role in ensuring cooperation.

Most day-to-day government business is handled by senior ministry officials, who prepare most items for cabinet meetings in an effective way. However, as mentioned above, the cabinet plays a relatively small role in the political process, as all important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the relevant ministry.

Most day-to-day government business is handled by senior ministry officials, who prepare most items for cabinet meetings in an effective way. However, as mentioned above, the cabinet plays a relatively small role in the political process, as all important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the relevant ministry.

Most coordination between ministries is informal. However, it is not very effective due to the hierarchical government system. There is also a clear hierarchy structuring the ministries. Staffers at the newly created Ministry of Strategy and Finance see themselves as the elite among civil servants, and look down on other ministries. In addition, informal coordination processes tend to be plagued by nepotism and regional or peer-group loyalties (particularly among high-school and university alumni).

There were no changes in regulatory impact assessment (RIA) policy in the period under review. RIA has been mandatory for all new regulations since 2005, and for older regulations should they be strengthened in any way. RIAs assess proposals’ socioeconomic impacts and provide cost-benefit analyses.

RIAs mention the purpose and need for regulation, but focus on cost-benefit analysis of the proposal.

RIAs are focused on a cost-benefit analysis of proposed regulations. They do analyze alternative options and discuss potential pros and cons, but experts say that in practice these alternatives play little role in the drafting of final regulations.

Societal consultation has deteriorated substantially in the last two years. The Lee administration governs in a much more hierarchical and authoritarian way than did its predecessor, explicitly rejecting the Roh administration’s vision of participatory democracy. To some extent, this is a consequence of the deepening polarization between conservatives and progressives, with NGOs and civil society groups viewed by the government as “progressive” anti-government forces. Support for advocacy NGOs has been substantially decreased, and the government has followed a course of confrontation with labor unions. The business-friendly Lee naturally has closer relationships with business interests. In May 2008 he announced the opening of a hotline for 108 selected businesspeople (including six foreign firms with domestic investments) and business associations, which they could use to call the president 24 hours a day. However, such personalized contact can hardly be termed societal consultation, even in the case of business associations.

The government seeks to coordinate communication between ministries, but contradictions between government agency statements happen frequently. The communication policies following the sinking of Korean Navy corvette Cheonan in March 2010 were particularly criticized in Korea. The Coast Guard and the Ministry of National Defense gave conflicting versions of events, and contradictions were evident even within the ministry itself. The government was criticized by many observers, civil society activists and the opposition parties for holding back information from the public.

There are conflicting views as to the efficiency of the Korean government during the last two years. Some say that efficiency has increased due to the more authoritarian and hierarchical character of the new government as compared to the discursive and ultimately hesitant approach of Lee’s predecessors. Due to the strong conservative majority in the parliament, the government is more likely to get bills through the parliament.
On the other hand, others argue that accomplishments in the last two years have been meager compared to Lee’s original plans. More importantly, many of Lee’s major policies, such as the “Grand Canal Project,” have triggered substantial criticism and opposition. In the case of the proposed new administrative city, Lee changed course suddenly and now opposes the move of government administration offices to a newly constructed city.

Ministers in Korea do not have their own political base, and depend almost solely on support by the president. The president appoints and dismisses ministers, and cabinet reshuffles occur frequently. The average tenure of a minister in Korea is about one year, which allows ministers little independence.

The offices of the president and the prime minister effectively monitor line ministry activities. The Korean government utilizes e-government software (the “policy task management system”) to monitor the implementation of policies in real time. Ministries have little leeway in policy areas that are important to the president, such as the Four Rivers Project or finance policies. In general, the Korean bureaucracy is organized in a very hierarchical way, but independence is stronger in areas that are comparatively less important for the president.

The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies, and the minister is responsible for compliance. Once again, the top-down structure of the Korean government allows for effective monitoring. Agencies generally have autonomy with respect to day-to-day operations, but even these can occasionally be the subject of top-down interventions.

While South Korea remains a unitary political system, a rather elaborate structure of provincial, district and neighborhood governments has been in place since 1995.
Local governments play an important role in providing services to the citizens, and account for about 46% of government spending (as of 2006, the latest available data). However, local governments have relatively little ability to raise their own revenue. As their own sources account for only 22% of national revenues, most subnational governments need substantial support from the central government, particularly outside the Seoul region. In addition, local administrations lack sufficient manpower; central government staff is often therefore delegated to subnational authorities.

While autonomous local governments are protected by the constitution, there is no constitutional specification of their competencies and rights. Due to the very high dependence on transfer payments, most regional and local governments are vulnerable to interference by the central government. The reality of inadequate budgetary and functional authority in many local areas, as well as the disproportionate influence of city and provincial authorities, often leaves local administrators and governments short on revenue and effective governing capacity.

The Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS), created through a merger of predecessor agencies, is in charge of ensuring that local governments maintain national minimum standards. However, many local governments, particularly in rural areas, have a much lower professional standard than the city government of Seoul or the central government. While the provision of basic services is similar in all regions, there is a huge difference between rich (i.e., self-sufficient) and poor (i.e., dependant on transfer payments) in the provision of additional services such as recreation facilities.

Korea can generally be described as an inward-looking country, but international developments that affect Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role for the Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The degree of adaptability, however, depends to a large extent on compatibility with domestic political goals. For example, the Korean government is relatively less responsive to global standards in the field of labor rights or the reduction of nontariff barriers.

One of the main goals of the current government is to improve the prestige of Korea in the world (Kukgiok), and to build Korean soft power. The government has become considerably more active in international organizations. Korea has increased its contribution to the World Bank and the IMF, and is an active participant in the G-20. In 2010, Korea chaired the G-20, and organized the leaders’ G-20 meeting in Seoul in November 2010. Korea is also increasing its efforts in development cooperation, and became a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009. The country participated actively in the Copenhagen conference on climate change in 2009, although its actual commitments to reduce greenhouse gases remain weak. The Korean government has also shown little enthusiasm for G-20 initiatives proposing the international coordination of financial sector regulation and taxation.

The Lee Myung-bak administration came to office with a clear goal of streamlining the Korean government and bureaucracy. Old institutions, procedures and attitudes were evaluated, and there was harsh criticism of real or perceived inefficiencies within the bureaucratic system. Due to tight oversight by the Office of the President, it is likely that reevaluations of existing institutional arrangements will continue to take place whenever they are perceived to be an obstacle to the president’s goals.

There have been massive institutional reforms in the last two years, with the goal of creating a smaller and more efficient government. Many agencies and ministries have been merged, renamed and downsized. For example, through the merger of the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Planning and Budget, President Lee created a new superministry, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. However, it is too early to say whether the goal of creating a “small and efficient government” will be successful or not. Some of the reforms proved not to be successful; the reorganization and downsizing of Blue House staff, for example, ultimately led to the reinstatement of many of the abolished positions (such as the senior officer for public relations). However, most experts believe that the merger of ministries and agencies will create some synergistic effects.

Many citizens are well-informed on the details of a few hotly debated government policies. However, many other important policy fields, particularly in the economic and social realms, show much lower knowledge levels. The quality of information available is often limited, because political questions are often personalized, and thus interpreted as power struggles between ambitious individuals. The political spectrum remains very narrow, limiting the scope of political discussion and making it hard for citizens to develop their own opinion. The low trust in government announcements and in the mainstream media provides fertile ground for the spread of rumors.
There is also a difference between the generations: The generation that grew up during the Korean War filters information through an anticommunist lens. The generation socialized during the struggle for democracy is highly politicized and has a general mistrust of the government, while the younger generation is less politicized and less informed about political issues.

Parliamentary committees are legally and de facto able to obtain documents they desire from the government. The government is required to deliver these documents within 10 days of a request. However, documents pertaining to commercial information or certain aspects of national security can be withheld from the parliament.

The parliament has the constitutional right to summon ministers for participation in hearings. This right is frequently used.

Parliamentary committees are legally and de facto able to invite experts to hearings. In fact, expert hearings are quite frequent.

The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries mostly correspond, but the parliament is not fully able to monitor ministries. While the parliament can summon and question ministers, the role of the minister in the Korean system is relatively weak. The professional bureaucracy in Korea is trained to be loyal to the president as the head of the government. The capacity of the ministerial bureaucracy is also vastly larger than that of the parliament. Consequently, parliamentary oversight is sufficient in fields that are hotly debated issues in the public, and are thus of interest for the parliament; however, oversight is weak in the vast majority of policy fields that fall outside the mainstream debate.

The audit office is a constitutional agency that is accountable to the president. It regularly reports to the parliament.

The Korean parliament does not have an ombuds office. Under the Lee administration, the government’s ombuds office was merged with the civil rights and anticorruption agency into the Anticorruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea. This commission is accountable to the president.

Measured against the three-dimensional understanding of democratic media that takes into account not only freedom of the press/media, but also media pluralism and media quality, the main problem with Korean media is the low quality of many media outlets in terms of their ability to serve as facilitator of a public sphere or “civic culture.” Part of the problem here is the country’s strong commercialism and associated weakness in political journalism. The main TV programs produce a mix of infotainment and quality information about government policies. Deeper analysis of information is rare on television, but takes place more often on public radio stations such as KBS 1. In the last two years, TV and radio organizations have shifted their programming in the direction of entertainment and infotainment. Political programs have either been replaced or their teams shuffled. Beginning in 2009, President Lee has instituted a biweekly radio address in which he explains government policies from his point of view.

There is almost universal agreement among political scientists, political observers, politicians and the general public that the political parties are one of the weakest links in Korean democracy. In addition to their inchoate nature and lack of internal democracy, political parties have weak ability to produce meaningful party manifestos, political programs or alternative policy proposals. In Korea’s personalized political system, party programs have little relevance and party competence is low. In general, parties remain very weak. Because they form around powerful individuals, parties are frequently renamed, split and merged. Programmatic unity is stronger in the conservative GNP and the progressive DLP, as compared to the main opposition party DP, which suffers from a lack of party loyalty, and the smaller NPP, which brings together individuals from many different progressive groups. The election platforms of individual candidates tend to be more important than party programs, but often avoid proposing coherent policies in favor of promises to achieve certain goals and secure certain benefits for the candidate’s electoral district.

The business associations (the Korean Employers Federation (KEF) and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)) and labor-union umbrella groups (the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU)) have some expertise in developing policy proposals. They are supported by think tanks that provide scholarly advice. However, all these groups are relatively weak compared to the influence of individual businesses and company-level trade unions. Some individual businesses, such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai, have their own think tanks that produce high-quality research and are able to analyze and provide alternatives to government policies.

The rise of civil society organizations has been one of the most important political trends in Korea during the last decade. Some of the largest NGOs, such as the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), the Citizen Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), have build up considerable competences in specialized fields such as environmental policies, election reform and human rights. They provide reasonable policy proposals and are supported by a large group of academics and professionals. The majority of smaller NGOs remain focused on service provision and do not develop policy proposals. However, as previously mentioned, civil society and NGOs – especially those on the left of the center – have found it difficult under the Lee administration to have any influence on the political decision-making process.