NETHERLANDS

As a country with several sociocultural minorities, a considerable floating vote, a multiparty system and proportional representation, Dutch governments are frequently minimal winning coalition cabinets. Strategic (political and policy) planning is formally laid down in a government policy accord (regeerakkoord), which formally brings coalition-building and cabinet formation to an end. Strategic issues in the policy accord are derived from three sources: political party platforms; strategy documents drafted by top-level senior civil servants within a ministerial department during the period between the fall of one and the establishment of a new cabinet; and specially prepared strategic documents by formal knowledge institutes (e.g., the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB, or the Health Council, Gr, or the Scientific Council for Government Policy, WRR), but also by powerful lobbies and interest groups (like trade unions and employers’ associations; but also Greenpeace, the Association of Homeowners or Automobile Owners).
Formally, the prime minister is responsible for coordinating policy across the government. The Balkenende IV cabinet sought to maintain a strategic focus within government and guarantee consistency in planning by installing six coordinating ministers (a weak “core cabinet”) and chairing six cabinet committees derived from the six programmatic pillars in the government’s “Work Together, Live Together” agreement. After a 100-day “meet-and-talk-to-the-citizens” period, the cabinet selected 10 projects per programmatic pillar. The minister of finance also coordinates government policy, but has considerable more budgetary resources and surveillance instruments (including regulatory impact assessments, see RIAs) at his disposal than the prime minister. If both ministerial posts are in fact occupied by the political leaders of the major political parties making up a coalition cabinet, stalemates or arduous compromise are sure to follow (as was the case during the Balkenende IV cabinet from 2008 to 2010) since these individuals will closely monitor other ministers of the same political party. The rivalry between Prime Minister Balkenende and his minister of finance, both of whom were keen on keeping a strong party-political profile in contemporary Dutch drama-democracy, especially during and after the financial-economic crisis, was the root cause of the fall of his cabinet’s demise in March 2010. The brief history of Balkenende IV is a painful reminder of the limits to strategic capacity on the cabinet level. It is telling that this cabinet, in response to the budgetary problems that resulted from the bank bailouts during the financial crisis, assigned 20 working groups of civil servants to create ideas on how to cut back €28 billion per year without any ideological-strategic political guidelines or constraints whatsoever.

Dutch government used to be surrounded by a densely populated ring of so-called planning agencies, think tanks, or centers for policy analysis in economics (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), and sociocultural (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), spatial (Ruimtelijk Planbureau, RPB) and environmental (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) issues. The government also worked with other legally mandated advisory bodies in policy sectors that somewhat mirrored divisions found in ministerial departments (e.g., in spatial planning, development aid, public health), as well as knowledge institutes for technology and innovation (TNO, Rathenau Institute), health and environment (RIVM), and statistics (CBS). After this network of cooperation was slimmed down in the late 1990s, the Balkenende IV cabinet sought to harmonize and further trim this network from 2007 to 2010. Even the number of highly reputed planning agencies was reduced by merging the MNP and RPB into one agency, the Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). In addition, the legal, financial and organizational status of the agencies – which were formally parts of departments, but with guarantees for scientific independence and rights to determine their own working programs – were harmonized. Several advisory bodies were either abolished or merged together in anticipation of broader, integrated policy fields. The recommendations made by these non-administrative advisory bodies are legally prescribed by the Government Information (Public Access) Act (WOB). However, the Council of Ministers is no longer obliged to respond. The watered-down function of advisory services in departments has been strengthened through the establishment of “knowledge chambers” and, following American and British practice, the appointment of “chief scientific officers” or “chief scientists” as advisory experts. The idea is that departments, depending on the nature of policy issues, may flexibly mobilize the required sciences and scientists, instead of relying on fixed advisory councils with fixed memberships. It appears that the political and governmental demand for advice is undergoing centralization and that there is a shift toward instrumental (rather than strategic) advice from less independent advisory bodies. Parliament’s access to services provided by planning agencies and advisory bodies has formally improved. But it is too early to tell whether parliament is going to use its increased opportunities for external advice.

As head of a coalition cabinet, the Dutch prime minister is less a “boss” than a “primus inter pares.” The other ministers serve with, not under him (Daalder). He is nonetheless formally in charge of coordinating government policy as a whole, and has a concomitant range of competencies: deciding on the composition of the cabinet agenda and formulating its conclusions and decisions; chairing cabinet meetings, committees (onderraad) and (in most cases) ministerial committees; adjudicating interministerial conflicts; serving as the first speaker to the press and in parliament, and especially in international forums and arenas (e.g., EU and the United Nations) on behalf of the cabinet and Dutch government as a whole.
Cabinet meetings involve ministers exclusively; there are no deputy ministers or top-level civil servants present at these meetings. In cabinet meetings, ministers make decisions based on documents that have been prepared, discussed and coordinated first in interdepartmental administrative commissions, or “nodes,” and interdepartmental “front gates” (so-called voorportaal, or nodes that steer and coordinate other nodes), and then in ministerial or cabinet committee meetings. The stratification of interests along line ministry or party lines is a powerful force at each stage of the process in preparing documents for the cabinet. Formally, ministers represent their respective departments and rely heavily on the advice provided by their departments in all meetings. Ministers from one coalition party are accompanied by a deputy minister (who is not part of the cabinet, but a member of the coalition partner’s party) in order to ensure ministerial bipartisanship. The forces of compartmentalization are exacerbated by the fact that parliament’s committee system stringently follows budget allocations for departments within each ministry. A further factor to consider is the fact that in the media, the prime minister must act as the political leader of his party – less so of the coalition cabinet.
The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has at its disposal only some 14 advising counsels (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants), who directly advise him on policy proposals and serve as secretaries of cabinet and ministerial committees. The advising counsels are top-level civil servants, not political appointees. In addition, the prime minister has a special relationship with the Scientific Council of Government Policy (WRR). Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning agencies play the role of secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the prime minister, his administrative staff and scientific advisors hardly have sufficient expertise to assess departmental bills and white papers in detail, although this depends on their respective leadership qualities and grasp of policy issues. (Former prime ministers such as Ruud Lubbers and Wim Kok are generally considered to have demonstrated a strong grasp of policy issues, unlike the members of the Balkenende IV cabinet).

Given the nature of Dutch politics, which features a strong departmental culture and fragile coalition governments, the Ministry of General Affairs has little more to rely upon in carrying out its gatekeeping functions than the government policy accord (regeerakkoord).
Ministerial departments have considerable power in influencing the negotiations that take place during the elaborate process of preparing cabinet decisions. Each line ministry – that is, its minister or deputy minister – has a secretariat that serves as the administrative “front gate.” By the time an issue has been brought to the cabinet level, it has been thoroughly debated, framed and reframed as a consequence of the bureaucracy between the involved ministries. Gatekeeping in the Dutch system is one-directional; policy documents are moved from lower to higher administrative levels, and (almost) never the other way around, which results in a strong tendency toward interest stratification (Korsten et al., 2010, 62). In theory, the prime minister, through his representatives, could play a prominent role in coordinating this process. But given the limited scope of his monitoring capacities and staff, he can steer the course of events for only a fairly small number of issues, even when highly ambitious.
Nevertheless, the Balkenende IV government earnestly pursued new modes of interministerial coordination through its pilot projects, Governing with Programs (Regeren met programma’s). These projects were conceived as part of a larger program for National Government Renewal. The Balkenende IV government had two program ministers for urgent problems that reach across ministerial task areas: the first for Youth and Family Affairs; the second for Affairs of Housing, Residential Areas, and Integration.

Generally, the initiative by a line ministry to start drafting new legislation or a white paper is rooted in the government policy accord and subsequent cabinet decisions to allocate drafting to one or two line ministries. With complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable jockeying for position among the various line ministries. Given the tight fiscal situation brought about by the financial and economic crises and the ensuing bailout of Dutch banks, the Balkenende IV cabinet was compelled to repeat policy accord talks. These talks resulted in 20 working groups, comprised of staff members from across all ministries, to develop proposals for several dozen billions of cutbacks. As this example demonstrates, the prime minister is always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes in the wording of the assignment itself. After that, however, it may take between six months and an entire cabinet period before the issue reaches decision-making stages in ministerial and cabinet committees, and thereby come under the formal purview of the prime minister again. Meanwhile, the prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow ministers.

Cabinet committees (onderraad) involve a separate meeting of the Council of Ministers chaired by the prime minister. Ministers directly or indirectly involved with the topic of discussion participate in these meetings. Each committee has a coordinating minister responsible for relevant input and prepared documents. Discussion and negotiations focus on issues not resolved by prior administrative coordination and consultation. If the committee fails to reach a decision, the matter is pushed up to the Council of Ministers. The Balkenende IV cabinet had six standing cabinet committees: International and European Affairs; Economics, Knowledge and Innovation; Social Coherence; Safety and Legal Order; and Administration, Government and Public Services. In addition, the Balkenende IV cabinet had another committee of six ministers involved in various aspects of financial and socioeconomic policy. Given the elaborate process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers.

According to the constitution, relations between ministers and top-level civil servants depend on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility towards parliament. Parliamentarians, instead of expanding their own professional staffing (as is done, for example in the United States), use the media to profile themselves as individuals acting to monitor the executive. This leads to avalanches of parliamentary questions and inquiries that annoy ministers and departments as “incidentalism” and hamper good governance and strategic focus. Under intensified public scrutiny, ministers have responded by narrowing ministerial responsibility from general risk accountability for all ministerial activities to accountability by guilt, which effectively shifts responsibility to their bureaucratic staffs. In addition, the 2006 and 2010 elections politicians and taxpayers together demanded a reduction in the number of civil servants of approximately 13,000 in the next years. All this has undermined the traditional relations of loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. The former have broken the monopoly held by senior staff on advice and information by relying increasingly on outside sources at an estimated cost of €1.2 billion in 2007 – 2008. Top-level officers have responded with risk-averse and defensive behavior (e.g., keep your minister out of trouble but keep your head down) and by placing more effort and energy in professionally driven organizational communication and process management. The upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in preparing cabinet meetings has probably been exacerbated. Senior officers’ primary task is to serve one’s “own” minister and civil servants’ role in preparing cabinet meetings increasingly falls to the senior officers that directly serve the prime minister as advising counsels (raadsadviseurs). Of course, these advising counsels have dense networks of informal contacts with the senior staff of other departments. Thus, the senior staff’s performance in preparing cabinet meetings depends largely on the quality of information flow and discussion taking place in the informal networks.

Line ministry civil servants on mid-management levels do not ordinarily participate in interdepartmental administrative coordination; policy design and approval follow the usual hierarchical lines. However, policy projects are increasingly defined as demanding inter-departmental coordination. Although there are examples of well-functioning interdepartmental working groups (Korsten et al., 2010), most of the time such cooperation is difficult and time-consuming. This is probably due to the two-pronged strategy by departmental top-level officers: on the one hand, a defensive, risk-averse strategy in their contacts with (deputy) ministers, and particularly in the administrative “front gates” (see also Senior Ministry Officials); on the other, an intra-departmentally oriented strategy of professionalization and contract management. Thus, mid-management policy officers (i.e., heads of divisions and sub-divisions) have to prepare policy proposals while taking into account a political landscape to which they are have no direct relation and which is filtered by the media and reports from their superiors. Unsurprisingly, (deputy) ministers complain about the political sensitivity of many line ministry officials; and many line ministry officials complain about the lack of expertise among their own administrative superiors and the political leadership with respect to policy content and implementation.

Very little is actually known about informal coordination at the (sub-)cabinet level regarding policy- and decision-making. The best-known informal procedure is the so-called Torentjesoverleg in which the prime minister and core cabinet ministers consult with the leaders of political parties that support the coalition in parliament. Criticized as too “monistic” of a process and abolished in 2002, it has since been tacitly reinstalled. Coalition cabinets cannot survive without this kind of high-level political coordination between government and parliament. In addition, it is well known that politicians and (deputy) ministers use weekends for party-political and constituency work. How much coalition-coordination work actually takes place in this time span is unknown; but it cannot be much, given that (deputy) ministers also need time for their family and private life.
Under the present conditions in which civil servants are subject to increasing parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing, informal coordination as well as personal chemistry among civil servants is what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal contacts between the senior staff working as advising counsels in the prime minister’s cabinet and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such coordination is trumped by insufficient or lacking informal political coordination. In the case of the Balkenende IV cabinet, the lack of political will to cooperate translated into insufficient informal political coordination, leading to the cabinet’s demise.

In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields: Environmental Impact Assessments (EIMs) and Administrative Burden Reduction Assessments (ABRAs).
EIMs have been legally prescribed since 1987. Everybody who needs a government license for initiating substantial spatial or land-use projects (e.g., when building a chemical factory, expanding an airport) with possible harmful environmental impacts is obliged to show these impacts through research. The EIM report mentions one or several alternative options, whose environmental impacts will also be described and analyzed. Meanwhile , more than 1,000 EIM reports have been administratively and politically processed. They guarantee that environmental and sustainability considerations play a considerable role in government decision-making.
The development of a Standard Cost Model (CBA) method for evaluating ex ante legislation regarding compliance costs to business deriving from government regulations was entrusted, in 1998, to an ad-hoc but independent advisory commission, the Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ACTAL). Since then, ACTAL’s competency has evolved beyond the think tank function of a policy and organizational infrastructure systematically aiming at the reduction of administrative burdens. Under the Balkenende IV administration, ACTAL served as the government’s watchdog, with two deputy ministers (Finance and Economic Affairs) overseeing its activities and a special-purpose interdepartmental project unit providing support. ACTAL reviews all ministerial ex ante evaluations for administrative burden reduction, assists ministerial units in its analytic tasks, and advises the cabinet and parliament about the quality and effectiveness of ministerial regulatory proposals prior to formal decision-making or policy adoption. ACTAL’s findings are always reported in the explanatory memorandums attached to bills. The cabinet also responds to ACTAL’s annual progress reports. For example, when the Balkenende IV government was compelled to renegotiate its coalition agreement as a consequence of the banking and financial crisis, ACTAL was used to identify the risks (administrative burden increases) involved with new regulations and oversight activities.

The broad rationale for socioeconomic RIAs is laid down in the government/coalition agreement of the Balkenende IV administration. The Standard Cost Model specifies all the elements that positively or negatively affect administrative costs of government regulations/subsidies for target groups. It also provides a standard against which monetized administrative cost reductions per bill revoked or per new regulation introduced may be expressed. There are overall reduction targets per department, which may have to compensate for the introduction of new legislation/regulation by abolishing the implementation of older ones. ACTAL justifies its existence by pointing out that administrative cost reduction for firms, citizens and professionals means a 1.7% increase in (macroeconomic) labor productivity and a 1.5% gain in GDP. ACTAL guards against the routine call for more and stricter regulation after incidents or calamities; its activities have also reached subnational, local governments.

The Standard Cost Model method was only recently pilot-tested on administrative burdens falling on individual citizens. ACTAL follows a step-by-step target group approach, prioritizing citizens that suffer in particular from high administrative burdens like the chronically ill, the physically challenged, elderly social benefit recipients and volunteer workers. In sum, only particular types of burdens for some social groups are measured, not all. The most conspicuously absent item from ACTAL’s and the government’s ex ante evaluation’s claims regarding comprehensiveness is that burden reduction is just assumed to be beneficial, on average, for the short- and the long-term. Like other forms of cost-benefit analysis, non-economic, less tangible, non-quantifiable costs and benefits are blended out of the consideration. There is no Standard Benefit Model to logically complement the Standard Cost Model.

As mentioned under RIA Application, EIAs are obliged to mention one or several alternative options to the option chosen by an initiator. According to ACTAL guidelines, alternative options for ABRAs are investigated; the option involving the greates cost reduction ought to be selected, in principle. It is not known to what extent practice heeds theory.

International references to the “polder model” as form of consensus-building testifies to the Netherlands’ reputation for and alleged skills in negotiating public support for public policies, sometimes as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In many policy areas, this Dutch form of neo-corporatism and network governance – in which the government consults extensively with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society during policy preparation and attempts to involve them in policy implementation – has been a strong factor in the mode of political operation and public policy-making in the Balkenende IV government. In socioeconomic policy-making, crucial issues like conditions for firing workers and changing the pension age from 65 to 67 are contingent upon agreement with and between trade unions and employers’ associations in the Socioeconomic Council (SER). A bill proposing to tackle traffic jams on high- and throughways through a road-pricing system was contingent upon agreement by the Dutch Automobile Association (ANWB), and was to be tested through a survey among its members. Integration policy through preparing and implementing renewal plans for weak neighborhoods was made dependent on (financial) cooperation from local housing corporations and municipalities.
Generally, the Balkenende IV government was a driver in the move from government to governance: the functional representation of various well-organized interest groups and civil associations in well-defined policy sectors, combined with a decentralization of policy-making functions to subnational governments (in particular the introduction of “chain management” in public health care and care for the chronically ill), has led to the creation and/or further elaboration of dense networks of consultation and shared policy responsibilities.
At the same time, and paradoxically, this mode of politics and policy-making is clearly under stress. Both trade unions and employers’ associations suffer under the erosion of representativeness and increasing fragmentation. Many interest groups are in fact commercially and professionally run “checkbook” organizations. As such, they are easy targets for criticism voiced by proponents of market liberalization as well as anti-elitist populism.

In the age of “mediacracy,” the Balkenende IV government has sought to make policy communication more coherent. In doing so, it has relied on the older instrument of the National Information Service (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD), whose director general is present at cabinet meetings and responsible for communicating policy and the prime minister’s affairs to print and other media. The RVD’s director general is also mandated with communicating all affairs concerning the royal family, including its relations with the media.
In a context of unstoppable ministerial compartmentalization, combined with the increasing importance of information service staffs (as opposed to policy officials) in managing the media, the government tries to streamline and coordinate its external communication. The “1Logo” project, for example, aims to impose a single “brand” and editorial policy on all websites run by the national government. Another government communication project is targeting the creation of a single pool of government communication and information officials to be used by all departments. The project also includes establishing a shared intranet (rijksportaal.nl) and joint digital news service for all officials working for the national government. Another effort toward centralized, coherent communication involves replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns through a unified, thematic approach (e.g. “safety’). It is too early to tell to what extent such efforts will be successful.

Like elsewhere, policy effectiveness and efficiency are hard for the government to measure and judge. In 2008, the Dutch government stated that, based on information regarding 74 policy goals, implementation was mostly “on track.” Yet, in that same year, the General Audit Chamber, an independent and well-staffed High Council of State charged with measuring policy performance and effectiveness, observed that the quality and transparency of available government information precluded parliament from determining whether promised policy performance is delivered and policy goals achieved. A mere 22 of 74 goals have been formulated in measurable terms. In just two cases, government indicated how much additional money was spent on policy implementation. Performance descriptions, usually with contestable indicators, involve just 27 goals. In the same year, budget overruns related primarily to emergency spending on bank bailouts, totaled €43 billion. Although technically illegal, these expenditures were approved by the General Audit Chamber. Whereas the government evaluated its own performance as above standard, surveys among the general population showed trust in government to be low. Given the fragmented and certainly incomplete overall picture, with partial successes here and partial or outright failures there, government efficiency may still be considered mostly adequate. There is no reason to assume that Dutch government is doing better or worse than most other countries with a similar level of education, economic well-being and technological resources.

Dutch ministers’ hands are very much tied by such devices as party discipline, government/coalition agreements (which they have to sign in person during an inaugural meeting of the new cabinet ), ministerial responsibility to parliament, and the dense consultation and negotiation processes taking place within their own departments and with other departments in the interdepartmental administrative “front gates” and ministerial committees. As mentioned under GO Expertise, ministers have strong incentives to represent their ministerial interests, which do not necessarily reflect government coalition policy in a one-to-one fashion. In addition, outright party-political differences are occasionally voiced in the media. During the Balkenende IV cabinet, one minister was forced to resign because trust in her capacities to implement government policy on the politically hyper-sensitive issue of integration was publicly questioned.

Years ago, the Ministry of Finance introduced a new system for ministerial budget reporting, called “From Budgets to Policy Performance Accountability” (Van Begroting naar BeleidsVerantwoording, VBTB). Although implementation has been difficult, the exercise began to bear fruit in 2007 – 2009, at least in the sense that the line ministries have improved their reporting of countable interventions and performances. On Accountability Day (Woensdag Gehaktdag), parliament discusses tons of annual reports issued by line ministries. Although some argue this only leads to information overload and actually prevents meaningful parliamentary debate, it is equally true that ministries, forced to include policy performance reports (beleidsdoorlichting) in their annual budget reports, have been far more transparent in their goals and priorities than ever before. In addition, the application of regulatory impact assessment procedures for administrative burden reduction gives ACTAL and the Ministry of Finance excellent opportunities for monitoring legislative initiatives by line ministries. One should bear in mind, though, that good monitoring opportunities will not always lead to faithful government policy compliance, as the nature of Dutch politics and government are more likely to lead to a new round of negotiations, bargaining and logrolling. In turn, this leads to a frequent reinterpretation of what government policy actually means.

The Netherlands has approximately 1,900 institutions/organizations, placed at arm’s length from government, charged with implementing legal tasks with public money. Some 600 of them are so-called autonomous administrative authorities (Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen, ZBO), such as the Public Broadcasting Foundation (NOS), the Commissariat for the Media, the National Forestry Service (Staatsbosbeheer), the Central Statistical Bureau (CBS), or the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW). According to the national ZBO register, in 2004, approximately €120 billion was spent by such bodies. In 2009, ministries could not give a total amount spent. Only Social Affairs and Public Health provided information on how much money autonomous administrative bodies falling under their jurisdiction generate in terms of premiums and levies. In their departmental annual reports, seven ministries do not provide performance information. In addition, there are the numerous public educational institutes, academic hospitals and museums, as well as dozens of oversight bodies and inspectorates, such as the Authority for Financial Markets and Competition or the Inspectorate for Education. In 2006 these bodies employed some 10,000 work years of civil servants. They inspect issues as manifold as youth institutes, health institutes, penitentiary institutes, environmental hazards, transport hazards, mobile phones, etcetera.

There are several shortcomings in terms of monitoring ZBO and other types of autonomous administrative authorities: since the voice of citizens is barely audible, the quality of services cannot be directly assessed through democratic processes; ministerial oversight is fairly haphazard and opportunistic, and is limited to political priorities, risks or actual crises. One example includes the case of a former minister of finance and later CEO of a private bank that went bankrupt, who in 2010 had to be cleared of professional misconduct in order for him to continue his present function as CEO in a national bank receiving bailout funds. Two oversight authorities, the Dutch National Bank and the Authority of Financial Markets and Competition, arrived at mutually contradictory verdicts. The minister of finance had to play the role of tiebreaker. However, there is also some evidence these authorities can be set up spontaneously to provide a form of horizontal accountability through peer review systems or client forums and potentially complement the hierarchical, more punitive oversight of ministries when it comes to facilitating genuine learning processes.

In 2009, revenue-sharing from the national budget (€179 billion) comprised two-thirds of the combined income of the 441 local and municipal governments; revenues raised by local governments made up one-third. One-third of income from national revenue-sharing comes from a general fund for local government (Gemeentefonds). The general fund, which is the local governments’ “pocket money” (because they may spend it as they like, see Constitutional Discretion), is allocated in ways that generally allow local governments to receive more as they need it. There are about 60 criteria for allocating money, 75% of which are related somehow to the local/municipal district size (i.e., in terms of number of residents and dwellings, total road surface, number of waterways). There are additional allowances for the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht). The general fund will not be increased for 2011 – 2012. Article 2 of the law on financial relations between national and local governments specifies that, if and when national policy imposes new tasks on local governments, the national government should also indicate how local costs may be covered (i.e., the “pay down to the nail” principle). However, increasing the general fund is just one option. National government may as well stipulate that local government ought to cover costs through increased revenue-raising efforts.
Whether or not local governments are funded adequately is monitored in nationwide financial scans and an annual update of the general fund. During the last years, the financial position of local governments has been somewhat enhanced through growth of the general fund and more-than-average use of local governments’ own revenues (minus local taxes).

Dutch local governments are hybrids of “autonomy” and “co-government” forms. However, local autonomy is defined mostly negatively as pertaining to those tasks left to local discretion because they are not explicitly mentioned as national policy issues. Co-government is financially and materially constrained in quite some detail by ministerial grants. Increasingly, Dutch national government uses administrative and financial tools to steer and influence local policy-making. Examples include administrative agreements, covenants, performance agreements, monitoring and benchmarking. Some would go so far as to claim that, violating the European Charter for Local Government, the aggregate of all these tools has created a culture of quality control and accountability that paralyzes local governments. This is due in part to popular and political opinion that local policy-making, levels of local service delivery and local taxes ought to be equal everywhere in the (small) country.
As mentioned under Task Funding, Dutch local taxes, both as revenue (% of GDP) and as tax power, are internationally insignificant. The recent abolition of real estate taxes on the use of houses has decreased local tax powers even more.
Decentralization allowances, which increase the size of the so-called general fund for local government, have, nevertheless, been given on condition of department approval of local government plans. This clearly violates the principle that the general fund is given unconditionally.

The quality of local government policy implementation and service delivery is generally fairly high. However, in spite of national quality control and accountability mechanisms, and a continued series of mergers of smaller local governments with a view to meeting minimum national standards for executive/implementation capacity (from just over 700 municipalities in 1993 to 431 in 2010), production of services is decreasing (-1.3% for 2002 – 2007), falling far behind the development of GDP (+2,3%) and population growth (+0.3%) over the same period. In addition, price per unit local service delivery increased on average 0.7% faster than the average cost per unit of GDP.
Local governments themselves also try to meet mutually agreed standards. Several studies of Local Audit Chambers involve comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have, on a voluntary basis, for several years been organizing peer reviews of each others’ executive capacities. In 2009, the Association of Dutch Local Governments established the Quality Institute of Dutch Local Governments (Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten, KING). Its purpose is to implement new information technology so as to learn from each other through better benchmarks and to have more informed peer reviews of administrative/executive capacity per local government.
Finally, it should be mentioned that experiences with environmental policy implementation show a lack of law enforcement due to staff shortages in subnational governments.

Government reform has been on (and off) the agenda for at least 40 years. To date, there has been no substantial or serious reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the early 19th century. The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are not locally elected but appointed by the national government. After a short experiment, the Netherlands has abolished the idea of larger metropolitian areas (e.g., Rotterdam, Amsterdam) constituting a “superfluous” fourth tier of government. Dutch coordination of EU policies is still a turf fight between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (not the prime minister’s office) and line ministries.

Ever since the Second World War, the Netherlands was an avid protagonist and willing partner in all forms of international cooperation. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) in being transposed into Dutch law. The present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies, the decline in popular support for the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid, the shift in the government’s attitude toward being a net contributor to EU finances, and the rejection of the EU referendum. These changes have also affected government participation in international coordination of policy and other reforms from 2008 to 2010. According to reports on Dutch civil servants’ cooperation in EU policy-making, cooperation in some technical fields (e.g., transport safety, medical issues) is smooth, whereas politically sensitive fields such as policing are met with reluctance and/or indifference. The Balkenende IV government stumbled over a decision to (dis)continue its military presence in Uruzgan/Afghanistan.

Self-reflection is a highly developed trait among professional and academic government-watchers. The Dutch have a forty-year history of reports and recommendations for adapting and reforming central government structures and procedures and reforming the electoral system (Citizen Forum on Electoral Reform). Other examples include reports on rebuilding “Thorbecke’s house” of three levels of government and decentralizing some water board functions, recommendations for local government reforms, and, quite recently (February 2010), an Advisory Council of Public Administration report on (the lack of) trust in democracy and other topics of a purely political nature. In addition, academic authors, mainly from political science, sociology, history and public administration, have extensively reflected on the pros and especially cons of the Dutch political and administrative system.

Although there is a considerable degree and scope of self-reflection and monitoring conducted in the Netherlands, the capacity – or rather, the will – to implement institutional reform is lacking. All practical recommendations with regard to electoral reforms, government structural reforms or administrative level reforms have been nipped in the bud because there was no (qualified) political majority in parliament. The only reform proposal actually implemented was the so-called dualization of local government, meaning the abolition of a highly monistic, collegial form of local politics and administration. In practice, this meant that the Board of Mayor & Aldermen and its bureaucratic apparatus were clearly identified in functional terms as the executive, to be controlled by local councils in a legislative capacity. Within the framework of decentralizing policy tasks towards subnational, specifically local governments, Local Audit Chambers were established and provided the legal mandate to assume specific competencies. However, perhaps the most important reform of introducing local elections as the means by which mayors are selected was rejected. During the Balkenende IV years, the only structural reforms pursued were a set of pilot projects targeting improved interministerial coordination and civil service professionalization and centralization.
All this is not to deny that on the level of individual organizations, reforms have become a permanent phenomenon, some of which undermine their precedents. Many professionals and civil servants complain that these organizational reforms actually prevent them from providing high-quality and personally satisfying job performance.
All in all, although some individual state organizations, mainly on subnational levels, may temporarily enhance their strategic competencies, government and administration as a whole most certainly do not.

Dutch respondents claim to spend slightly more time than the average European respondent on gathering political information via television, radio or newspapers. Nevertheless, the broader public does not seem to be well-informed on a broad range of government policies. This is due not to a lack of information, as there are abundant information sources, and thresholds to accessing information are low. As many people find political information emanating from The Hague complicated and/or uninteresting, they often fail to pay attention to it. A recent study elaborates on this issue. Four types of citizens are distinguished regarding their degree of political involvement: “wait-and-see” citizens (25%), impartial citizens (17%), dependent citizens (23%) and active citizens (35%). Active citizens show the highest motivation to become actively involved in public debate and – if possible – decision-making.

Although variation is found across citizen-types concerning political involvement, it is also necessary to reflect on trends concerning the entirety of Dutch citizens. In 2010, the Council of Public Administration pointed to an unacceptably deep “cleavage” between politics and society. This is due, however, not only to inaction among citizens. The Netherlands’ vertically organized political institutions do not create the conditions needed to establish new connections with citizens, who operate horizontally. This also applies to the media, which plays a key role in improving how citizens frame their opinions.

At the same time, Dutch society is generally characterized as featuring robust civic activity due to the presence of several active political groups. Members of these groups are usually very well-informed, although their knowledge is often focused on specific areas of government policy. Nonetheless, relatively few Dutch citizens participate actively in political parties, excepting religious parties. Membership in political parties is decreasing and comprises only 2.5% to 3% of the electorate.

Parliament’s right to obtain government documents is stipulated in the constitution. The government is obliged to respond to such requests for information within six weeks of their receipt, a period which is generally respected. Parliamentary committees face no difficulties in obtaining the government documents they need for their work. Delays may occur when needed information is required from a third party. For the most part, reports are already written in such a way that sensitive information is worded in a careful manner.
During the Balkenende IV period, parliament members criticized the prime minister for withholding information regarding the invasion of Iraq. The criticisms focused on the fact that in 2002 and 2003, the Balkenende I cabinet provided only selective information to members of parliament. From 2003 to 2009, the prime minister used his political influence to stall a parliamentary inquiry. Eventually in 2009 and 2010, resistance to an inquiry was broken, and evidence of strategic information being held was found with regard to Iraq and other issues.

Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer questions. Outright refusal to answer such a request occurs only rarely. In such instances of refusal, the parliament can exert moral pressure, and the relationship between the minister refusing an invitation and parliament might suffer. Ministers will usually accept invitations to avoid this. Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer the questions in a forthright manner, as parliamentarians might wish. If a minister happens to be abroad at the time he or she is invited to appear, a substitute might appear instead. In the Netherlands, parliamentarians have every week the opportunity to summon ministers and pose a seemingly unlimited number of questions. In the period under investigation, the government has been confronted with an increasing number of motions to appear before parliament or respond to questions. For instance, the number of motions submitted by parliament members increased from 1,968 in 2007 to 2,543 in 2008. And the number of written questions increased from 2,671 in 2007 to 3,002 in 2008. Strikingly, the parliament member who raised the most questions was the leader of the one-issue party for animal rights.

Parliamentary committees can and often do invite experts to answer questions, or to facilitate the parliamentarian committee members in asking questions and interpreting the answers. Limited finances are usually the only real constraint on the number of experts summoned. Nonetheless, expert or expert panels are not always involved. Recently, the parliamentary committee that studied the causes for the financial crisis (Commissie De Wit) failed to ask some critical questions. These questions might have been posed if experts had been involved in the public hearings. Unlike the United States, the Netherlands does not have a tradition of public hearings among members of parliament.

There are five types of parliamentary committees: fixed and temporary commissions, theme committees, parliamentary inquiry committees and residual committees. Most committees have 25 members, and each political party provides at least one member who belongs to the parliament. Parliamentary committees with jurisdictions mirroring those of the ministries monitor the ministerial departments. The committees specialize in particular topics. The fixed committees mirror the policy domains of the ministries. However, the Ministry of General Affairs lacks a fixed parliamentary committee. Committees mirroring departments in general effectively monitor their work. Other types of committees address other, more in-depth issues which are not always the responsibility of one ministry (e.g., the temporary committees on integration policy, expenditure of health care provision, and infrastructure projects). Theme committees address technology policy and senior citizens policy. Occasionally, parliamentarian inquiries are held, such as the inquiries on the fall of Srebrenica and the construction sector fraud. Residual committees may address a wide array of topics, including government expenditure, credentials, operating procedures, information and safety agencies, and the renewal of the Parliamentarian Survey Act. However, much criticism has been triggered by the high degree of task area coincidence between parliament and ministries and the way parliamentary inquiries are conducted. Instrumental discussions by parliamentarian committees are argued to have eliminated fundamental political-ideological discussions.

The Netherlands’ Court of Audit is the independent organ that audits the legality, effectiveness and efficiency of the national government’s spending. The Court reports to parliament and its members are recommended by parliament and appointed by the cabinet. Parliament frequently consults with this institution, and in many cases this leads to investigations. Investigations may also be initiated by ministers or deputy ministers. However, such requests are not formal due to the independent status of the Court of Audit. Requests by citizens are also taken into account. The Court of Audit is supported by 300 full-time staff, distributed among five departments, of which three are dedicated to research. At least 75% of this staff works in the research departments.
The reports by the Court of Audit are publicly accessible and can be found online and as parliamentary publications (Kamerstuk). Parliament policy staff at national departments or local administration bodies are quite sensitive to criticisms from the Court. Court of Audit criticism can prompt parliamentarians to summon ministers, as was the case in 2003, when a Court of Audit report on the infrastructural Betuweroute project led to considerable public debate. Every year, the Court of Audit checks the financial evaluations of the ministries.
In April 2008, the Court of Audit criticized the government for spending €0.5 billion on hiring external parties for information and communication technology (ICT) projects. The Court of Audit criticized in particular the government’s tendering practices, as ministries tend to over-appreciate the benefits of automation, have too many demands and lack knowledge about the progress of ICT projects. The Court of Audit concluded that a correction mechanism was missing. Parliament members and experts in turn criticized the Court of Audit for underestimating the budget spent by ministries on ICT.

The National Ombudsman of the Netherlands is a “high council of state on a par with the two houses of parliament, the Council of State and the Netherlands Court of Audit. Like the judiciary, the high councils of state are formally independent of the government. Another sign of the National Ombudsman’s independence from the executive is that he or she is appointed by the parliament’s Second Chamber. The Ombudsman’s appointment is for a term of six years, and reappointment is permitted.”

The institution of National Ombudsman is established in order to give individuals an opportunity to file complaints about the practices of the government before an independent and expert body. Where the government is concerned, it is important to note that the National Ombudsman’s decisions are not legally enforceable. The ombudsman publishes his or her conclusions in annual reports. The government is not obliged to act upon these reports, but – owing to the public nature of the office – the ombudsman acts as an efficient mechanism for parliamentary control of the government. The ombuds office has 140 full time personnel.

In 2008, 13,073 complaints were filed by citizens; in 2009 this number dropped to 12,222. Most complaints were filed in the domains of public finance, health affairs and social affairs. Eighty percent of the complaints were found to be rightfully filed. If deficiencies in government interventions are detected, the government agencies in question are informed by the ombuds office and adequate measures are taken to redress the citizens. Since 2008, measures have been taken to increase public awareness of the existence and mandate of the ombuds office. One such measure involves the director of the office participating in public debates. He has, for example, publicly expressed his views on the riots at Hoek van Holland beach in which the public turned against the police.

Dutch television and radio stations produce on a daily basis high-quality information programs analyzing government decisions. The main public news channel, NOS, is required to provide 15 hours of reporting on political issues every week. On the radio, the First Channel is tasked with providing primarily information. In recent years, the scope of the First Channel within society has been decreasing. This is not surprising since new media (i.e., the Internet) have grown at the expense of more traditional media and are becoming more influential in the provision of news. Strikingly, parliamentary debates are no longer publicly broadcasted on television. Nonetheless, NOS broadcasts Politiek 24, a digital television channel on the Internet that contains live streams of public debates, analyses, background information and a daily political show.

The chair of parliament has recently criticized the media for its lack of investigative reporting on public debates. Journalists are said to report only on issues for which they expect to attract a large amount of public attention rather than report on politically important issues. The Netherlands has increasingly developed the features of a mediacracy, a democracy governed by those who exercise power over the media in order to influence the populace. For example, a highly unflattering interview of the minister for housing, residential areas and integration was broadcast on public television channels and resulted in her resignation.
This, in turn, influences politicians who act strategically in order to attract journalists. Politicians now more than ever have to react to short-term issues in order to get attention by journalists instead of focusing on the content of political issues that attract less attention.

The Council for Culture, Committee Media is tasked with providing recommendations on issues relating to culture and media to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science every four years. The Council is also involved in the evaluation of public broadcasting and concession provision to channels. There is a performance contract with national government. The public broadcasting agency fears the performance agreement will lead to an increase of unwanted recommendations. Recently, the Council expressed concerns about the increasing influence of politics on news provision and media diversification among public channels. The worries are partly due to the loss of duties paid by citizens for accessing public television and radio broadcasts (kijk- en luistergeld). Other concerns relate to the growing number of public channels competing against each other within a limited amount of broadcasting time. The emphasis on news provision among public channels is fading as they aim to meet the goals of increasing their viewing figures, which entails a diversification of content.

Most Dutch political parties are mature, professional organizations. They broadly meet the criteria of plausibility and coherence in their electoral programs, though within the confines of their ideological positions. They also seem to increasingly respect financial restraints. Since 1986, all political parties have had the right to have their electoral programs checked for feasibility by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. As a result, party programs seem to have become on average more fiscally sound over time. However, recently a political newcomer, the Proud of the Netherlands party (TON) withdrew its political program from the financial feasibility check by the CPB because the party didn’t agree with the formal rules. However, these rules are equal to all political parties. Another right-wing newcomer, Geert Wilder’s PVV, did have its political program checked.
In April 2010, the CPB rejected the electoral programs of two major political parties, VVD and CDA. Criticism focused on the proposed cutbacks to civil servant wages, a measure often proposed but which has never succeeded. Due to the short time interval between the fall of the Balkenende IV cabinet and the new elections, the environmental assessment of the electoral programs can only be investigated partially.
Time constraints have also made it impossible to estimate macroeconomic effects and purchasing power impacts of specific policy program. It should also be noted that economic feasibility reports of electoral problems will only be available after the party conferences have already decided on party platforms. Secondly, an important political issue – the increase of the pension age – was never part of an electoral program. Due to the economic crisis, chances are that major budgetary issues will not be addressed before the elections, but will be of major importance once a new government coalition has come into power.

In the Netherlands, since the consultation approach to policy-making is of paramount importance, the question of association competence is relevant only to a limited extent. There is no lobbying culture in the Netherlands in the usual sense. These processes have become institutionalized. For instance, there are tripartite negotiations in which employers, employees and the Crown are fixed discussion partners in the early stages of decision-making regarding labor issues. The same takes place for regular negotiations with economic interest associations.

Policy-making in the Netherlands has a strong neo-corporatist tradition that systematically involves interest associations in the early stages of the policy-making process. Owing to their well-established positions, employers associations, trade unions and the consumer association can influence policy-making through the existing consensus-seeking structures. Trade-offs are actively negotiated with ministries, other involved governments, stakeholder organizations and even NGOs. Furthermore, non-economic interest organizations react to policy proposals by ministries and have a role in amending and changing the proposals in the early stages of the policy-making process. They may also become involved later on with the implementation of policies.
In turn, it may be stated that policies proposed by ministries are also influenced by non-economic interest groups (although to a lesser extent than economic interest groups). In the Dutch neo-corporatist society, they participate in discussions with ministries and politicians in policy-making processes.