PORTUGAL

Portugal’s situation remains much the same as outlined in the SGI 2009 report, with strategic planning having a considerable influence on governmental decision-making, due both to domestic and supranational frameworks. On the domestic side, this is grounded by Law 43/91 (the Framework Law of Planning), which defines three types of national planning: the so-called Major Planning Options (Grandes Opções do Plano, GOP) , which have to be approved in parliament; yearly plans; and medium-term plans. The GOP serve to define the “strategic orientation of the economic and social development policy.” These are thus fairly long documents, dealing with a wide variety of fields (the current plan, for 2010 – 2013, runs to 114 pages). The yearly plans describe economic and social policy measures that the government intends to carry out each year, and correspond with budgetary policy; the medium-term plans reflect national, sectoral and regional plans to be implemented over the term of a legislature. However, even beyond this domestic institutional framework, the notion of strategic planning continues to gain ground in Portugal, as highlighted in the SGI 2009 report.
The supranational framework is also generating additional pressures to engage in strategic planning. Along with the need for such planning in order to access regional and structural funds, and as a part of implementing EU policy, Portugal’s membership in the single currency played a crucial role with respect to planning in the 2008 – 2010 period. The Stability and Growth Program (SGP) has become Portugal’s foremost instrument of planning in terms of economic policy, superseding domestic instruments (including the budget). This was evidenced in early 2010, when the bulk of measures were presented not in the budget of January 2010 but in the SGP of March 2010.
Strategic planning is also becoming increasingly evident in the course of government operations. The government uses specially designated expert task forces comprised of outside experts, or permanent “offices” consisting of government employees, in formulating policies. Examples include the Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento do Ministério do Ambiente, do Ordenamento do Território e Desenvolvimento Regional; the Direcção Geral de Estudos, Estatística, e Planeamento (concerning employment); and the Gabinete de Estudos das Pescas. Most of the ministries have some kind of center or group for strategic planning.

Government receptivity to academic input continues to be high, with universities remaining a primary recruiting ground for ministers. In the new Sócrates government formed in the aftermath of the September 2009 legislative elections, a total of seven of the 17 incumbent ministers could be described as academics, with a handful of other ministers having some academic experience; and this pattern of academic prominence is equally perceptible at the junior minister level.
This pattern inevitably has an impact on the role of academic expertise in government. On the one hand, it does make the government more receptive to academic expertise; on the other, this can be occasionally provided “in-house,” and very frequently in an informal manner, given the ties that ministers have to universities.
Under the first Sócrates government (2005 – 2009), there was a trend toward the institutionalization of nongovernmental academic expertise, in the form of mission units (unidades de missão) and other types of committees and taskforces. In the period here under analysis (2008 – 2010), we find few new mission units being formed.

In this area, there has been no substantive change as compared to the 2009 SGI report. The Prime Minister’s Private Office (PMO) so-called “gabinet” has some policy expertise, but of an insufficient level to assess draft bills fully in terms of policy content. The PMO is considerably larger today than in the early 1980s, when it had a maximum of 10 advisers and four secretaries (leading one observer to write that “it is estimated that the prime minister’s cabinet has very scant intervention in the legislative process. We do not know what kind of support the PMO provides for the purpose of preparing Council of Ministers’ meetings; everything suggests, however, that it provides essential personal and political support to the prime minister”). However, while PMOs have been given increasing policy oversight since the mid-1980s, they remain hybrid and multifunctional structures, largely lacking in-depth policy assessment capabilities. The pattern thus remains as outlined in the SGI 2009 report: Bills are discussed internally by the responsible ministries, by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cases involving budgetary or foreign-policy issues), and in some (rare) cases with external social partners. The PMO also participates in these discussions, but largely in terms of political oversight rather than deep policy analysis.

Government office behavior remains largely unchanged with respect to the 2009 SGI report. The government office or PMO plays a key gatekeeping role, accentuated by the prime minister’s internal power. It exerts strong control over the agenda of the Council of Ministers, and can de facto return materials. However, this takes place on the basis of political considerations more often than on policy grounds.

There have been no major changes in line ministries’ functioning since the last report. A practice of bilateral meetings between the prime minster and other ministers has become relatively institutionalized since the mid-1980s. The extent of these varies according to policy area. While regular briefings by line ministries to the PMO continue, there has been some evident decline in the coordination and communication of policy in 2010. In particular, some dissonance was clear in April 2010 between the minister of finance and the minister of public works, over the potential continuation or suspension of major investments such as the high-speed rail link, the planned new Lisbon airport, and a third bridge over the Tagus river to Lisbon. The final decision on these projects was not clear by the end of the review period, in April 2010. Additionally, the cuts in social benefits contained in the Stability and Growth Program approved in March were also rumored to have generated substantial internal divisions in the government, leading to two extraordinary weekend Council of Ministers meetings in March 2010. While the government subsequently provided a fairly united front, with the minister of the presidency stating that the Stability and Growth Program had the “solidarity” of all government members, such allegations of internal divisions offer a sharp contrast with the previous Sócrates government period.

There has been no substantial change relative to the SGI 2009 report. The practice of meetings between the prime minister, his staff and core political ministers remains in force. Beforehand, junior ministers (known as secretaries of state) meet with PMO officials in order to prepare the agenda. These meetings serve to define the government’s agenda, and are used to assess the political dimensions of outstanding proposals. If anything, these meetings have become more relevant under the new Sócrates government. As it no longer has a parliamentary majority, the government is obliged to negotiate policy with opposition parties. The meetings of the government’s inner core serve to define the strategy of negotiation with the opposition, with little input from the Council of Ministers as a whole.

Since the mid-1980s, cabinet meetings have been prepared in advance by senior ministry officials, either junior ministers (secretaries of state) or director-generals (the top position within the ministries), depending on the issue. Both of these roles are typically filled by politically appointees. In our interviews on the topic of foreign and defense policy, it seemed clear that senior ministry officials are heavily involved. In the SGI 2009 report, we noted that a great number of issues are settled and decided within the ministries themselves, with the Council of Ministers meetings serving to rubber-stamp decisions. While this situation remains largely unchanged, the minority status of the new Sócrates government means that ministers have less latitude for decision, given the possibility that measures will not be approved in parliament.

There are no effective structures of horizontal administrative coordination between ministries. The lack of clearly established channels of communication is compensated for through personal contacts or ministerial instructions. While this process generally worked effectively in the 2005 – 2009 period, it has come under strain in the new Sócrates administration, as the government’s minority in parliament and pressures to control public expenditure have generated additional demands for interministerial coordination.

Informal coordination mechanisms are central to governmental functioning and coordination in Portugal. The absence of formal structures of interministerial coordination is both a cause and a consequence of the degree of informality within the ministries and government. Moreover, the government’s inner core has retained its role as political coordinator. The new Sócrates government, which took office in October 2009, retained half (eight) of the ministers of the outgoing government. Of these, the ministers with important political roles all remained in office, indicating that the political inner core was being maintained. Finally, the PMO’s influence on ministries and agencies is also exerted largely through informal means. While these mechanisms have on the whole served the Sócrates governments well, there is evidence of increasing strain in terms of coordination in the new Sócrates government. As highlighted above, public signs of internal splits and rifts have become more common, and the coordination mechanisms have not yet fully adjusted to the conditions imposed by minority support in parliament, or to the pressures to control public expenditure.

There remains a need for greater assessment of the socioeconomic impact of legislation. The first Sócrates government took measures to rectify this situation by means of its “Simplex Test” (an estimation of the bureaucratic footprint associated with legislation) and its “Legislating Better” Council of Ministers resolution of 2006. This drive was developed further in the 2008 – 2010 period. A Council of Ministers resolution in December 2008 (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 196/2008) sought to incorporate the Simplex Test into the EU’s action program for reducing administrative burdens, and to standardize its implementation. Moreover, another Council of Ministers resolution (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 198/2008) changed that body’s own rules of procedures, making the Simplex Test mandatory for all proposed legislation with its results submitted along with the proposal to the council. This is a positive step in terms of the implementation of ex ante assessment. However, it is not clear how effectively this has been implemented. The Council of Ministers’ rules of procedures stipulate that these assessments are for the government’s eyes only. Moreover, while Council of Ministers Resolution No. 196/2008 ordered that annual reports be prepared be made evaluating the Simplex Test assessments, “in order to facilitate its public scrutiny” (No. 18, iii), no such reports assessing the use of the Simplex Test in draft legislation were found for either 2008 or 2009.

Under the terms of a Council of Ministers resolution (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 198/2008), legislative proposals are required to incorporate an analysis of needs and purpose. Thus, Article 17, No. 1 indicates that ministers making proposals to the Council of Ministers must submit an assessment that specifies both the need for and the impact of their proposal. Article 18 stipulates that concise impact-analysis conclusions must be submitted, and that these must make clear the need for the policy proposal. Indeed, a written explanation of the need must be submitted with any policy proposal (Article 29). However, it is unclear how effectively this has been implemented, as the ministries have relatively minimal research capacities, and no evaluation of the measure’s impact has been made.

Under the terms of a Council of Ministers resolution (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 198/2008), legislative proposals are required to include an analysis of alternatives. Thus, Article 17, No. 1 indicates that ministers submitting legislation to the Council of Ministers must include an assessment of their proposal’s impact “with reference to the analysis of alternatives.”
While this is a positive step, it is not clear whether alternative options are in fact systematically assessed when legislation is developed. Indeed, the previous lack of such systematic analysis was been evident in several major decisions. An example of this was the process of choosing the location for a new airport to service the Lisbon region. The government’s initial decision, on a site north of Lisbon, was widely criticized for its lack of alternative options. A vigorous public debate as to the impact of alternative locations emerged. Indeed, this lack of analysis of alternatives, and the perception that other locations might be more effective, led a number of organizations (notably business groups) to call for their own studies on the airport’s location. The ensuing public pressure – from sources including the president of the republic and the opposition – ultimately led the government to ask the National Laboratory of Civil Engineering for an assessment of different locations, notably including one south of Lisbon. The ensuing report found in favor of this new location, and the government finally revised its decision in 2008, with the Council of Ministers resolution (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 85/2008) of May 8, 2008.

The Council of Ministers’ rules of procedure stipulate that ministers can carry out consultations with other groups they consider relevant prior to presenting draft legislation. In practice, this occurs with varying frequency. As described in the SGI 2009 report, some areas (pensions, wages and labor regulations) are still influenced by corporatist arrangements, set through formal negotiations between the government, trade unions and employers’ associations. Other interest groups have considerable influence in areas such as health, justice, defense, security and education.
The period under analysis has been marked by a relative easing in the relationship between the government and interest groups, with the government more willing to compromise as compared to the situation described in the SGI 2009 report. Thus, when a conflict emerged between the government and the powerful National Association of Pharmacies over pharmacies’ profit margin, the government ultimately decided in favor of the industry group’s position in late May 2009, overturning the Health Ministry’s initial decision. This is not to say that all such conflicts have ended; in April 2009, for instance, the government challenged the National Association of Pharmacies over its decision to replace medical prescriptions for branded drugs with equivalent generics (which are more profitable to pharmacies than branded drugs). The relationship between teachers and the government was particularly conflict-prone, over proposals to assess teacher performance. These led to a massive and unprecedented wave of demonstrations and strikes by teachers, which continued throughout 2008 – 2009, abating gradually over the course of this period. It seems that the government’s unyielding position became less intense as the 2009 legislative elections approached, suggesting an adaptation of the government’s position to the electoral cycle.
Portugal has a social concertation committee, called the Permanent Committee for Social Dialogue (Comissão Permanente de Concertação Social, CPCS), which is a part of the country’s Economic and Social Council. This latter group is “a constitutional body for consultation, concertation and participation in the field of economic and social policies.” As highlighted in the 2009 SGI report, this group has been called to provide input on policies dealing with pensions, wages and labor regulations. In June 2008, the CPCS approved new public sector hiring rules with support by the employers’ associations and one of the trade union organizations. It also approved a new system for the regulation of labor relations, employment policies and social protection in Portugal, which led inter alia to a revision of the labor code in 2009 (Law 7/2009). As with other previous measures of this kind, these provisions were approved by employers’ associations and the UGT, one of the trade union organizations. The largest trade union confederation, the CGTP-Intersindical (which is close to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)) continues to reject these measures, and accuses the CPCS of excluding the PCP from negotiations.

Two phases may be identified. The first, lasting until late 2009, is marked by the continuation of the previous pattern of very effective coordination of communication, as highlighted in the SGI 2009 report. Since that time, however, the government’s communication has been less cohesive and coordinated. An example of this is the public disagreement in April 2010 between the minister of finance and the minister of public works, highlighted above (see Line Ministries). It seems that the communication system has not yet fully adjusted to the government’s minority status (and consequent need to negotiate legislation with opposition parties), or to the need to generate substantial cuts in the budget deficit.

There is indeed a 2009 government program, but the government has not been successful in implementing much of it. This includes policies regarding the environment, economic policy, unemployment and more. There is, for example, a strategy to invest European funds, but this aim was not well realized. By the close of the period under review, just 6% of the 2007 – 2012 National Strategic Reference Framework (Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional, QREN) funds had been invested. The government did develop a plan for investing funds, and the European Union was slated to provide implementation funding. However, Portugal was to monitor the disbursement of the funds with the help of an electronic system, which took a year to develop. During this time the government of Portugal could not receive the funds from the European Union. Thus, the government could not implement its plans, since the conditions under which the funds could be received and invested had not been met.

The organization of the parliamentary/cabinet system, as well as its internal power dynamics, assists the government in implementing its program. All ministers, and the government as a whole, depend on the good will and support of the prime minister. Moreover, the prime minister’s coordination and oversight power is being increased with the implementation of Decree-Law 202 of October 27, 2006. The ministers can only operate in ways that correspond with the prime minister’s priorities.

The government is small, with 15 ministries, and the prime minister is strong. But given the lack of expertise highlighted above, the PMO sometimes lacks the capacity to monitor the activities of all line ministries fully.

Semi-autonomous executive agencies (also known as quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations, or quangos) are taking a more prominent role. These are often created to circumvent tight restrictions on public administration bodies. However, this can lead to difficulty in controlling their action. For instance, the opposition parties complained in parliament in June 2009 that they were unable to understand the precise function of the government-created Foundation for Mobile Communications. Overall, ex post monitoring of these agencies by outside bodies is minimal. Ministers of course have greater oversight power. However, members of the government appear to pay greater ex post attention to the official public administration (i.e., ministerial departments) than to the quango sector. What oversight exists is largely of an ex ante nature, most particularly through the political appointment of the senior figures in these executive agencies, with ministers often appointing individuals that are close to them on policy matters.

Portugal continues to be one of the most centralized countries in Western Europe, with autonomous self-governing areas solely in the insular regions of the Azores and Madeira. The 308 municipalities represent the main subnational level of government. This level has limited resources available. In 2007, Portugal continued to have the EU’s fifth-lowest ratio of subnational public expenditure to GDP – a position that appears considerably worse if we take into account that three of the four countries below Portugal are Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus. Subnational public expenditure represented approximately 14% of total public expenditure in 2007, more than two times lower than the EU-27 average of almost 34%.
The relatively new Law of Local Finances (passed into law in January 2007) severely limited local governments’ ability to obtain loans from financial institutions, and reduced the share of state revenue allotted to town halls. The figures for 2008 show town halls to be increasingly unable to meet their financial commitments, with a majority in debt.
The Azores and Madeira, which enjoy autonomous legal status, have their own policies. However, they too rely on central government funds, which are again in short supply. Both regions are governed by financial laws different than those affecting other local governments, in the form of the Leis de Financias Locais e Lei de Financias Regionais. These laws resulted in the resignation of Madeira’s head of government, Alberto Jardim, who argued that the available funds were insufficient to the policies he was expected to implement. The government’s very difficult economic situation has resulted in the curtailing of many of these tasks due to a lack of funds. Among these are some education and health care services, as well as such basic functions such as road maintenance, water, sewage, and the like.

The financial dependence of local governments on transfers from the central government means that the latter has considerable control over ostensibly decentralized functions. In December 2008, the central state owed an estimated €100 million to more than 100 town halls.
The central government significantly diminished its financial contribution to the autonomous region of Madeira beginning in 2010.

National minimum standards are generally met at the subnational level, though to a large extent this is because many of the services are directly provided by the central government rather than being the responsibility of local governments. However, some discrepancies between the services provided by municipalities exist, notably in the culture and infrastructure sectors.

The European Union is extremely important to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community in 1986, the country has now become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal and organizational frameworks. However, the government of Portugal has not yet adopted all EU laws and regulations. Obviously, since Portugal is so much a part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has adapted its structures accordingly. Whether these function as expected by the decision makers in Brussels is another matter.

There has been no substantial change in Portugal’s approach to international coordination vis-à-vis the 2009 SGI report. The country’s size and somewhat peripheral position in Europe limit its impact in international reform efforts. Portugal thus seeks to cooperate with others in pursuing reform initiatives, without seeking a leading role. That said, Portugal does perform well when asked to play a substantial part at the international level, as the country’s 2007 EU presidency (during which the Lisbon treaty was approved) showed.

The Council of Ministers’ rules of procedure were revised in December 2008 (see RIA Application). These changes maintained previous monitoring mechanisms and introduced additional ones that reinforce ex ante and ex post monitoring, improve cross-sector oversight, and seek to modernize administrative functions. Indeed, the latest rules of procedure identify a series of domains in which new ministerial measures require input from the minister in charge of administrative modernization. However, the reservations expressed above with respect to regulatory impact assessment are also largely applicable to the government’s self-monitoring, with little evidence showing how this is being done or how effective it actually is.

The government has shown itself willing to adapt institutional arrangements at the top, as evidenced by the amendment to the Council of Ministers’ rules of procedure in December 2008. This was aimed at improving the functioning of the government, at providing better ex ante and ex post oversight of proposals, at ensuring the use of RIAs, and at ensuring draft legislation fit more smoothly into the existing legislative framework. There have also been attempts to generate a larger quantity of information within the public administration, notably via the Rede Interminsterial de Technologia de Informação e Comunicação (Resolution 109/2009 2 October), which aimed at providing electronic links for businesses and citizens to public administration services. However, challenges remain in terms of improving the public administration’s human resources. Beyond these issues, there has been little reform in terms of providing greater strategic capacity. The primary means of generating strategy remains the semi-permanent task forces and unit missions highlighted above.

Policy knowledge is very unevenly distributed through the population, with few relatively well-informed citizens coexisting with a large number who have only a rudimentary knowledge of policy. This situation is inevitably a reflection of the deeply unequal levels of educational attainment in Portugal. However, it is compounded by the generally highly legalistic presentation of policy, in a language that tends to be exclusionary for many citizens; by a media system that very rarely provides in-depth policy analysis; by a weak civil society that does not have the capacity to engage and socialize citizens on policy issues; and by opposition parties that tend to focus on short-term political critiques of the government rather than offering in-depth policy alternatives.

Parliamentary committees are largely free in terms of what they can request from the government. However, delivery can occasionally be untimely or incomplete. Thus, 3,236 questions and requisitions were made by members of parliament to the central administration between September 2008 and July 2009, to which must be added a further 852 questions and requisitions made in the previous legislative session but which had not yet been answered. Of this total, 1,063 had not gained a response by the session’s close in July 2009. However, these shortcomings do not appear to derive from a deliberate attempt to misguide parliament, but rather from a lack of institutional procedures inside ministries, through which such documents could be easily produced.

Parliamentary committees are largely free in terms of requesting ministers’ attendance at committee meetings. Formally, ministers must be heard at least four times per legislative session. Additionally, each parliamentary group may hold ministerial hearings, varying from one to five per session, depending on the size of the parliamentary group. In general, ministers accede to requests for their attendance at hearings.

Parliamentary committees are largely free in terms of requesting the attendance of experts at committee meetings.

There are currently 13 committees in Portugal’s Assembly of the Republic. The only committee to be added since the 2009 SGI report is the Committee of Ethics, Society and Culture. By including culture, this committee partially rectifies the situation identified in the 2009 report, in which one committee monitored three different ministries, one of which was culture. However, as there are 15 executive ministries, there inevitably remain cases of committees that oversee more than one ministry. Indeed, there are two committees monitoring more than one ministry: One monitors the ministries of Justice and of Internal Administration; the other the ministries of Education and of Science, Technology and Higher Education.

The Court of Auditors is totally independent, and has real authority. It is part of the judicial system, on an equal level with other courts. The body is not accountable to the Assembly of the Republic, but must report to it regularly.

Portugal has no parliamentary ombudsman. However, the Portuguese Ombudsman Office (Provedor de Justiça) is a part of the judicial system. This office serves as an advocate for citizens’ interests.

Media reporting analyses government decisions poorly and superficially, very rarely engaging in in-depth policy analysis. Some policy analysis is carried out by in-house or guest expert commentators (often academics), but in-depth journalistic work on policy issues is almost nonexistent. In a poll of leading journalists (editors, coordinators and directors of newspapers and other media outlets), the overwhelming majority (70%) said the media coverage of the 2009 legislative campaign period focused predominantly on political controversies, as opposed to 30% that thought there was a sufficient balance between coverage of controversies and party programs. None of the poll respondents considered the campaign coverage to have been predominantly focused on parties’ policies and programs. Given that election periods are high points in political coverage, this is quite indicative of the lack of in-depth analysis by the Portuguese media.

Party manifestos are generally written by competent teams, often with academic ties. While these documents were quite long in previous elections, in the 2009 election parties sought to present shorter (thus more readable) and more cohesive programs. Nevertheless, there does remain a considerable degree of ambiguity in party manifestos, and programs are not treated as a complete road map once parties attain power.
None of the parties have developed an adequate response to the global economic crisis, and to Portugal’s very vulnerable economic position.

There are a number of associations that make policy proposals, notably trade unions and employers’ associations. These groups’ proposals are generally reactive to government measures, rather than being innovative in themselves. The influence of the CIP employers’ association was evident with regard to the location of the future Lisbon airport; indeed, its study of alternative sites helped generate momentum that ultimately forced the government to change the airport’s planned location (see Alternative Options). The study carried the argument based on technical and economic arguments by the specialists who did the study. However, these groups’ influence is generally low.

Associations’ proposals often receive government attention, largely through established communication networks between associations and governments. Relatively recently created civil society movements aimed at generating governance and public policy proposals also receive government attention, in part because of their proposals’ potential for media coverage.