PARLIAMENT
Key findings
Do parliaments have the capability and resources to control the executive?
Parliamentary resource scores are weighted composites, with each of the 13 qualitative and quantitative indicators [ 
] weighted equally.
Scores and methodology
] weighted equally. Scores and methodology
ParliamentKey findings: Parliaments' participatory competence
Each 
represents an individual country and is positioned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (best). Position cursor over to see scores for individual countries.
Click country name in list or text for details.
represents an individual country and is positioned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (best). Position cursor over to see scores for individual countries.Click country name in list or text for details.
Score distribution
8.6
1
8.0
2
7.9
3
7.9
7.7
5
7.6
6
7.5
7
7.5
7.4
9
7.4
In this top group, legislatures typically have substantial authority and capability to oversee the executive's actions.
The United States’ bicameral Congress has far-reaching powers, although committees are not necessarily chaired by the governing party.
In several countries (Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway), parliamentary committees and deputies have minimal expert staff. The Netherlands’ parliament has few powers to enforce its requests.
Legislatures in Poland and Germany have a potentially unwieldy number of committees, while New Zealand’s committees are small. In Denmark, a slight mismatch between committees and department task areas potentially complicates oversight.
The United States’ bicameral Congress has far-reaching powers, although committees are not necessarily chaired by the governing party.
In several countries (Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway), parliamentary committees and deputies have minimal expert staff. The Netherlands’ parliament has few powers to enforce its requests.
Legislatures in Poland and Germany have a potentially unwieldy number of committees, while New Zealand’s committees are small. In Denmark, a slight mismatch between committees and department task areas potentially complicates oversight.
7.1
11
7.1
6.9
13
6.9
6.7
15
6.6
16
6.5
17
6.5
6.3
19
6.2
20
In this middle group, legislatures' oversight powers vary substantially, with mixed patterns of strengths and weaknesses.
In a large number of countries (Czech Republic, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Austria, Iceland), access to expert staff is minimal.
Committees in Australia and Iceland are unusually small, while Austria has a potentially unwieldy number of committees.
Parliaments in the Czech Republic and Switzerland have few restrictions on requesting executive documents, but these rights are limited in Slovakia and South Korea.
In the review period, committees in Australia, Canada and Iceland were predominately opposition-chaired.
In a large number of countries (Czech Republic, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Austria, Iceland), access to expert staff is minimal.
Committees in Australia and Iceland are unusually small, while Austria has a potentially unwieldy number of committees.
Parliaments in the Czech Republic and Switzerland have few restrictions on requesting executive documents, but these rights are limited in Slovakia and South Korea.
In the review period, committees in Australia, Canada and Iceland were predominately opposition-chaired.
6.0
21
5.9
22
5.8
23
5.6
24
5.6
5.6
5.1
27
4.9
28
4.5
29
3.5
30
In this lower group, weaknesses in a number of areas hamper legislative oversight of the executive.
In a large number of countries (UK, Japan, Ireland, Turkey, Portugal, Italy), legislatures' ability to gain access to official government information is restricted or weak.
Mexico and the United Kingdom have a potentially unwieldy number of parliamentary committees, while committees are unusually large in Portugal, Italy and France.
Parliaments in many states (Greece, Japan, Ireland, Turkey, Spain) have relatively little access to expert staff. The capabilities of ombuds or audit offices are relatively weak in Greece, Portugal, Italy and France.
In a large number of countries (UK, Japan, Ireland, Turkey, Portugal, Italy), legislatures' ability to gain access to official government information is restricted or weak.
Mexico and the United Kingdom have a potentially unwieldy number of parliamentary committees, while committees are unusually large in Portugal, Italy and France.
Parliaments in many states (Greece, Japan, Ireland, Turkey, Spain) have relatively little access to expert staff. The capabilities of ombuds or audit offices are relatively weak in Greece, Portugal, Italy and France.
Rationale
The legislature's role in governance consists in interpreting popular interests and evaluating, not simply implementing, executive proposals. An effective legislature will not only challenge the normative justification of governmental polices, but deepen the terrain in which they are grounded by drawing upon research and expert knowledge.
This criterion examines whether the parliament can control the government, rather than being simply an implementing agent of the governing majority. The character of this control function depends on parliaments' informational and supervisory rights with respect to legislation, the budget and appointments.
Performance comparison
Use drop-down menus for selections. In all cases, higher scores reflect better performance.
