VETO PLAYERS

Key findings: Anticipation of veto players
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Each represents an individual country and is positioned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (best). Position cursor over to see scores for individual countries.

Click country name in list or text for details.
Score distribution
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10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
10
 
9.9
11
9.8
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9.7
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9.6
14
In this top group, governments face little or no threat of veto for their policies.

Many of these states have no veto-holding head of state, constitutional court, or second parliamentary chamber (Sweden, Norway, New Zealand, Iceland, Finland, Denmark).

In Poland, Ireland, and Germany, these veto holders exert little practical influence over government actions.

In Canada, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States, heads of state either have no veto power, or are the head of the government. The Netherlands has no constitutional court.
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9.0
15
8.7
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8.7
 
8.3
18
8.2
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7.6
20
In this middle group of countries, government policies face a real but infrequently exercised threat of veto.

Italy and Austria each have upper legislative chambers with the ability to reject laws.

Constitutional courts limit the executive's scope of action in South Korea, Italy, Luxembourg and Austria, while any court in Greece can make constitutional rulings.

Portugal's president and constitutional court both have exerted some limited veto authority.
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7.2
21
7.1
22
7.0
23
6.8
24
6.6
25
6.4
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5.7
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5.4
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5.3
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4.9
30
In this group, one or more institutions pose a substantial veto threat. Use of the veto power is often relatively common.

Many countries' legal systems (France, Spain, Hungary, Belgium, Slovakia, Mexico, Turkey) include influential and often well-respected constitutional courts.

Heads of states hold the power to issue permanent or suspensive vetoes in the Czech Republic, Turkey, Hungary and Slovakia.

In Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Mexico, second parliamentary chambers can delay or block legislation.
Rationale
 
Legislative success depends in part on the government’s ability to anticipate veto players in the legislative process. This includes in part the ability to mobilize the votes of government-affiliated legislators, and to ensure they support government proposals.

Low veto player influence is here considered to strengthen the government's ability to act. It should be noted that some countries either lack one or more of the veto players analyzed, or prevent these institutions from exercising a veto right.
Performance comparison
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