IMPLEMENTATION
Key findings
How effectively are governments able to translate adopted legislation into active policy?
Implementation scores are weighted composites. The first indicator [ 
] accounts for one-third of the total score, the following four indicators [ 
] collectively account for an additional one-third, and the final three [ ] collectively comprise the final one-third.
Scores and methodology
] accounts for one-third of the total score, the following four indicators [ ] collectively account for an additional one-third, and the final three [ ] collectively comprise the final one-third. Scores and methodology
ImplementationKey findings: Effective implementation
Each 
represents an individual country and is positioned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (best). Position cursor over to see scores for individual countries.
Click country name in list or text for details.
represents an individual country and is positioned on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (best). Position cursor over to see scores for individual countries.Click country name in list or text for details.
Score distribution
9.3
1
8.9
2
8.2
3
8.2
8.1
5
8.1
7.9
7
7.9
7.9
7.7
10
In this group, governments can expect smooth policy implementation, without serious resistance from lower administrative levels.
In most of these countries (New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, UK, Australia, Slovakia, Iceland), policy implementation has proved relatively easy, with little interference by self-interested departments.
Several states (Iceland, Slovakia, Switzerland) have relatively weak ability to monitor ministries.
Minority governments in Sweden and Canada required parliamentary alliances to fulfill their agendas. Switzerland’s public referendum system infuses most proposals with some uncertainty.
Australia sometimes delegates unfunded tasks to local governments. Slovakia’s enforcement of national standards is inconsistent.
In most of these countries (New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, UK, Australia, Slovakia, Iceland), policy implementation has proved relatively easy, with little interference by self-interested departments.
Several states (Iceland, Slovakia, Switzerland) have relatively weak ability to monitor ministries.
Minority governments in Sweden and Canada required parliamentary alliances to fulfill their agendas. Switzerland’s public referendum system infuses most proposals with some uncertainty.
Australia sometimes delegates unfunded tasks to local governments. Slovakia’s enforcement of national standards is inconsistent.
7.4
11
7.4
7.3
13
6.9
14
6.8
15
6.5
16
6.4
17
6.4
6.4
6.4
In this middle group, policy implementation is generally effective, but independent ministries or decentralized local governments sometimes prove to be hurdles.
The independence of ministries or agencies can interfere with government policy implementation in several states (Germany, Netherlands, Ireland). By contrast, France’s strict centralization allows little room for noncompliance.
Regional differences require complex federal funding mechanisms in Belgium and South Korea. Divided governments hamper efficiency in the United States, but implementation is otherwise effective.
Internal auditing functions are rare inside line ministries in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Norway. Nonetheless, national standards are very strong in Norway and Luxembourg, as in Germany.
The independence of ministries or agencies can interfere with government policy implementation in several states (Germany, Netherlands, Ireland). By contrast, France’s strict centralization allows little room for noncompliance.
Regional differences require complex federal funding mechanisms in Belgium and South Korea. Divided governments hamper efficiency in the United States, but implementation is otherwise effective.
Internal auditing functions are rare inside line ministries in Luxembourg, Belgium, and Norway. Nonetheless, national standards are very strong in Norway and Luxembourg, as in Germany.
6.0
21
5.6
22
5.4
23
5.1
24
5.1
5.1
5.1
3.9
28
2.9
29
2.0
30
In this group, governments have difficulties in realizing their policies, often due to the intransigence of ministers, poor control over local governments or a lack of resources.
Subnational governments are a stumbling block in many countries (Portugal, Mexico, Hungary, Spain, Italy). Japan and Turkey often impose unfunded mandates on local governing bodies.
In Italy and the Czech Republic, ministers often focus on their own interests rather than the government agenda. Poland and Greece each have a number of persistent difficulties with policy implementation.
Subnational governments are a stumbling block in many countries (Portugal, Mexico, Hungary, Spain, Italy). Japan and Turkey often impose unfunded mandates on local governing bodies.
In Italy and the Czech Republic, ministers often focus on their own interests rather than the government agenda. Poland and Greece each have a number of persistent difficulties with policy implementation.
Rationale
Once adopted, a reform program's efficacy depends on a government's ability to implement its own agenda. This criterion examines whether the executive is able to implement its laws and work programs effectively.
It assesses the overall ability of the government to achieve its own policy objectives, and whether implementation tasks are productively delegated from the cabinet to the individual ministries, from the ministries to the executive agencies, and from the central government to regional and local governments.
Performance comparison
Use drop-down menus for selections. In all cases, higher scores reflect better performance.
