PARTIES/ASSOCIATIONS

The electoral platforms of the two major parties, Labor and Liberal-National (treating the Liberal and National parties as a single entity since they have been in almost permanent coalition) are coherent and plausible. The platforms focus almost exclusively on socioeconomic outcomes (though more recently security issues have also emerged) and as a result are focused towards practical policies designed to achieve the desired outcomes.

The major parties or the two government parties in the period under review, the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, as well as the leading opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Social Liberal party, are the so-called old parties. They have existed for more than 100 years and have all regularly taken part in governments. Since they are either in power or have the prospect of being in the next government, they have a strong interest in proposing plausible and coherent policies, and indeed it is fair to say that they do so. Newer parties, including the third biggest party currently in the People’s Assembly, the Danish People’s Party, may be more tempted to propose popular, even populist, policies. But parties that have ambitions of being included one day in a government will have to moderate their views. One could argue that this has happened in the case of the Socialist People’s Party, which in some ways has moved closer to the Social Democratic Party. Recently the Social Democrats and the Socialist People’s Party put forward a joint proposal, “A fair solution, together through the crisis.” In a press release, the Social Liberal Party supported the proposal, but called for more concrete proposals. The four opposition parties, including also the Red-Green Unity List (Alliance), recently published a common energy vision, a plan to make Denmark the strongest climate nation in the world.

There are currently only two political parties supported by more than 10% of voters in the last general election, the Labour Party and the National Party. Both political parties regularly produce detailed election programs with plausible and coherent policies. These are complemented by more specific policy papers.

Seven parties are represented in parliament, of which only three receive more than 10% of the vote, the Labor Party (a traditional Scandinavian social democratic party), the Conservative Party (Høyre, a moderate conservative party) and the Progress Party (a populist right-wing party). Two fringe parties, the Socialist Left Party, to the left of Labor, and the Progress Party, to the right of Høyre, have sustained more criticism than other parties for “irresponsibility,” in particular the Progress Party for fiscal recklessness and for engaging in some anti-immigration rhetoric, although recently moderated. However, the Socialist Left Party proved eminently responsible when it joined Labor and the Center Party in a coalition government in 2005 and its chairwoman became finance minister, and the Progress Party has in recent years been hard at work to make itself “responsible” with a view to becoming a credible coalition partner with Høyre in a future government formation. None of the parties individually entertain policies that are systematically implausible and there is no potential for any “irresponsible” government formation.

At the time of writing, Sweden was heading into the 2010 election campaign and parties (for the most part as constellations of parties; the center-right incumbent “alliance” and the “red-green” trio of parties on the political left) presenting platforms and policy ideas. There is the inevitable flirting with the voters but overall parties seem to make a strong effort not to make promises beyond what can be delivered without jeopardizing the economy. The past two years have been very difficult to the economy with the international financial crisis forcing the public budget into deficit and causing increasing unemployment. Under these circumstances, acting responsibly appears to have more political currency in both political camps than being generous with the state’s fiscal resources.

The UK is traditionally a two-party system in which the manifestoes of the two leading parties are credible and coherent, and that of the third party is generally also plausible. Smaller fringe parties are more often focused on a single issue (the UK Independence Party, for example, which is focused on withdrawal from the EU, or the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales). Given that only two (or now three) parties are likely to be in government, a high score for this question is justified. Even when a hung parliament became likely in the run-up to the May 2010 general election, the programs of the three major parties retained plausibility, and the assumption was (as the events after the election confirmed) that any necessary horse-trading among the parties would mean that the more ideological proposals would be dropped.

A strong tradition of energetic public debate on issues of policy and politics exists in the United Kingdom, and is reflected both in citizens’ and media attitudes towards politicians and their proposals. Especially during the comparatively brief and very intense periods of general election campaigns, party manifestoes are scrutinized in detail by journalists. Since manifesto commitments enjoy the constitutional privilege of not being able to be vetoed by the House of Lords (under the Salisbury Convention), they are considered to be very important, and consequently parties strive for consistency and viability in them.
The absence of coalition government in the United Kingdom in recent decades has meant that parties in government usually have no excuse not to implement their manifesto commitments, which is a further incentive not to fill them with daydreams.

Six parties received more than 10 percent of votes in the national elections of 2007 (four Flemish-oriented parties and two French-speaking parties). Four of these parties (ranked first, second, fourth and fifth in terms of results) became part of the coalition government (with the addition of a smaller French-speaking party). In many areas, proposals are plausible, coherent and often consensual (maybe for the reasons described above), and party programs are detailed and extensive (among the longest and most detailed in Europe).
However, this has to be clarified for several reasons. First, the electoral programs with regard to fiscal federalism of parties are too often unrelated to the attributions of the level they are competing for, and the same program is often recycled for successive elections. Second, proposals relating to institutional reforms, which create regular tensions between the French-speaking and the Dutch-speaking parts of Belgium, are highly unrealistic, and this for a very simple reason: parties are only competing for the votes in a single language community (there are no national parties, and there is no federal or national constituency either). Third, one of these six parties is the extreme-right Flemish party Vlaams Belang and is de facto excluded from every coalition. This allows them to present a program totally disconnected from reality.

The electoral programs of major parties propose plausible and coherent policies. Although there have been no systematic or analytical studies of the content of electoral programs from recent years, scattered evidence suggests that the electoral programs of the parties and their candidates are fairly well-structured in terms of problem diagnosis as well as problem-solving. Small-scale comparisons of party manifestos thus indicate structured reasoning and a capacity to formulate coherent policies. In itself, this state of affairs is not surprising. During earlier decades party politics in Finland was clearly ideological and confrontational. However, as the cleavages between classes diminished with the post-war social leveling with political parties turning into catch-all organizations, ideological overtones and manifestations were, for rational and vote-maximizing reasons, replaced with a more systematic, matter-of-fact based and problem-oriented political propaganda.

The four major parties propose plausible programs in the sense that they involve no excessive or extravagant proposals. Luxembourg political culture is based on a form of consensus and pragmatism that converges on conservatism. Vested rights and social achievement are respected by all parties. The Christian Social People’s Party is probably the most socialist party of Europe within the Christian democratic party family; the social democrats, who still call themselves the Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP), is the party of the economics minister, who travels the world to attract new companies to Luxembourg; the Democratic Party (DP) criticizes the government’s austerity and present themselves as the defender of families, the middle class and civil servants. The Green Party holds positions on the city councils of the two major cities. In the capital, they are the junior partner of the Democratic Party and in the second largest city they are the partner of the LSAP.
The panachage system reinforces the tendency toward immobility, as candidates rely on personalized votes. A proposal that is not “plausible” to voters means a candidate will gain no votes. Given that different, sometimes contradictory, categorical interests have to be taken into account, electoral programs sometimes lack coherence. Strategic plans and innovative policy proposals are not fostered by this voting system.

Most Dutch political parties are mature, professional organizations. They broadly meet the criteria of plausibility and coherence in their electoral programs, though within the confines of their ideological positions. They also seem to increasingly respect financial restraints. Since 1986, all political parties have had the right to have their electoral programs checked for feasibility by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. As a result, party programs seem to have become on average more fiscally sound over time. However, recently a political newcomer, the Proud of the Netherlands party (TON) withdrew its political program from the financial feasibility check by the CPB because the party didn’t agree with the formal rules. However, these rules are equal to all political parties. Another right-wing newcomer, Geert Wilder’s PVV, did have its political program checked.
In April 2010, the CPB rejected the electoral programs of two major political parties, VVD and CDA. Criticism focused on the proposed cutbacks to civil servant wages, a measure often proposed but which has never succeeded. Due to the short time interval between the fall of the Balkenende IV cabinet and the new elections, the environmental assessment of the electoral programs can only be investigated partially.
Time constraints have also made it impossible to estimate macroeconomic effects and purchasing power impacts of specific policy program. It should also be noted that economic feasibility reports of electoral problems will only be available after the party conferences have already decided on party platforms. Secondly, an important political issue – the increase of the pension age – was never part of an electoral program. Due to the economic crisis, chances are that major budgetary issues will not be addressed before the elections, but will be of major importance once a new government coalition has come into power.

During the last general elections, held in 2008, the only two “major” Spanish parties (the PP and the PSOE, since no other party was supported by more than 10% of voters) did comply with the requirements of plausibility and coherence. The fact that the Spanish party system is actually a two-party one makes it quite plausible that either might take office. It is even usual that one of the two parties may enjoy an absolute majority, and indeed, in the current Spanish parliamentary system’s 33 years of existence, all governments have been single-party ones without need of coalition with minor parties. Thus, electoral manifestos may easily become governmental programs, and because of this major parties not only devote a lot of energy to their preparation, but also tend to be careful when making electoral proposals. These therefore tend to be realistic and moderate.

Nevertheless, coherence or consistency (not making internal contradictions) is easier to achieve than plausibility (providing diagnosis, defining policy goals, suggesting measures and foreseeing expected impact). It is also interesting to note that the two main parties’ electoral programs manifested more substantial differences along policy lines than similarities, contrary to the hypothesis of ideological convergence. Those differences were usually perfectly consistent with the ideological images developed by PSOE and PP along the left-right continuum and the other subordinate cleavages they tend to represent: more or less conservative in religious/moral issues and more or less federalizing along the center-periphery division. In addition to this, electoral offers have mainly been stable with respect to each party’s ideological emphases (PSOE focuses on rights, welfare and modernization while the PP looks to security, entrepreneurship and family values). From 2008 to 2010, both parties strengthened their particular think tanks (the social-democratic Ideas Foundation and the conservative FAES).

The six largest parties in Switzerland in general produce party programs that are both plausible and coherent. However, some of the parties’ election campaigns have shown a tendency toward polarization, and hence have lost plausibility.

The major parties usually have two kinds of programs: A party program, written to give the party a coherent profile for a longer period, and electoral manifestos designed only for a brief period (campaigns). In electoral platforms, which are more or less “populist,” parties tend to use these programs to maximize electoral appeal. For a party that does not enter government after the elections, this may be without much consequence. But for parties in government, this populist character creates a serious problem, because the government cannot simply implement the electoral platform.
This focus on short-term effects (maximizing votes) is counterproductive in the long run, because it causes disappointment and frustration among the voters. Coalition governments carry a special burden in this regard as each of the coalition parties is tempted to make the other responsible for the gap in credibility.

On the one hand, political parties have become little more than election-day organizations. Policy proposals are developed by party leaders and their close advisors, including a pollster or two. As a general rule, however, the greater the probability of a political party attaining power, the more seriously it takes its electoral program. Incoherent promises can place a party in a straitjacket if elected, and this is best avoided if victory is expected. The electoral programs of major parties such as the Bloc Quebecois, the Greens and the New Democrats, none of which are ever likely to form a government, are the most implausible.

As the president is the most powerful figure in the Chilean political system, presidential elections are of higher importance than parliamentary elections. Presidential candidates present electoral programs rather than the parties. The programs of candidates in the December 2009 election, Eduardo Frei and Sebastian Piñera, generally offered coherent presentations of their political ideas, with plausible discussions of how they would seek to realize those ideas. The program of Jorge Arrate provided in-depth analysis of the current challenges facing Chilean society and politics, but his concrete policy suggestions were less coherent. The program of the fourth candidate, Marco Enriquez Ominami, did not show the same coherence as the other three, appearing rather as a collage of occasionally contradictory ideas.

The main Czech political parties present coherent and recognizable policies that fit into a traditional left-right spectrum. On the right, the Civic Democratic Party, as well as a number of other emerging parties with substantial public backing, argue strongly for an urgent rebalancing of the budget without higher taxes or an increase in the progressiveness of the tax system. They see no need for an anti-crisis agenda beyond one of maintaining low taxes on business and high earners, or of cutting taxes further when possible. The emphasis therefore has to be on cutting social spending and charging for social services such as health care. On the left, the Social Democrats argue for continued state spending on social benefits and for an active anti-crisis program with state spending on infrastructural development. This is to be financed by a more progressive tax system, and they are more prepared to tolerate a budget deficit. The Communist Party has a similar bias toward supporting welfare spending and tolerating higher tax levels. However, its policy mix, including a reluctant attitude toward the European Union, appears more geared to attracting discontented voters than to providing a coherent framework for government. The outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections points to increasing doubts in the country about the plausibility and sustainability of the Social Democratic program as well.

Parties in Germany provide the link between state and society. The Basic Law (Art. 21 Para. 1) gives this role to parties due to historical reasons. They are meant to convert the various interests of the people into decisions and programs, and conversely, communicate the content of politics to citizens. Plausible and coherent manifestos are thus of vital importance. The following analysis focuses on the parties represented in parliament and their election manifestos for the 2009 general election. In a first and superficial comparison, the two major parties in particular, the CDU/CSU and the SPD, showed significant gaps in the consistency of their election manifestos. The CDU rejected tax increases and even promised some (moderate) tax relief. On the other hand, the party promised extra spending on education, family and health care. In the face of the new constitutional debt brake, and the monetary obligations resulting from the financial crisis, these appear to be conflicting goals. Similarly, the SPD tried to address every societal group with its manifesto, resulting in inconsistency. It seems that this overpromising and the internal fragmentation frequently seen in catch-all parties are inherent problems faced by these two parties. The ideas of the Liberal Democrats (FDP), particularly its tax cut plan, are hard to achieve without major expenditure cuts in the current economic environment. The program of the Left Party demonstrates fundamentally oppositional status. The party is only coherent in its complete excoriation of Germany’s existing social market economy. The Greens are no exception to this lack of realism, claiming that they would be able to create 1 million new jobs via their “green new deal.”
To sum up: Since electoral programs mainly aim at “vote-seeking” (and not at policy-seeking) in a given political competitive environment, they are often imprecise, ambiguous and sometimes even inconsistent. The manifestos in the last general elections confirm this evaluation. This is easy to explain: In the 2005 election, the Christian Democrats offered the most “honest” election program within living memory, including tax increases and substantial welfare-state restructuring. According to most observers, this program cost the CDU/CSU an election victory. Thus, it is no wonder that parties were loathe to repeat this experience.

The main political parties produce detailed electoral programs. The opposition parties are facilitated in this process by access to the civil service for factual information and for some assistance in analyzing the cost of proposed policies.
The main parties do not differ radically in their overall approach to the major social and economic policy areas. There is a strong centrist tendency, but differences do exist between support for higher levels of public expenditure financed through higher tax rates on the one hand, and emphasis on curtailing public spending and relying on lower tax rates to stimulate enterprise and investment on the other.
Extremist or crank positions, or strong positions on local issues, have tended to become the prerogative of independent, nonparty, single-issue candidates, although the need for all elected politicians, including government ministers, to remain deeply involved in local politics can undermine the coherence of national policies.
In the light of the abrupt and largely unforeseen change in the country’s economic fortunes almost immediately after the 2007 general election, it is impossible to regard any of the parties’ pre-election proposals as “plausible.”
Apart from the impact of the economic crisis and associated volatility, which rendered most economic forecasts irrelevant, there is an inbuilt tendency for party policy proposals to underestimate costs and overestimate revenue buoyancy.
The main objectives proclaimed in the manifestos tend to agree on the goals of maintaining full employment, improving the provision of public and social services (especially health, education and policing), reducing the tax burden and making it more equitable, and so forth. There is often a lack of internal coherence between these goals and a tendency not to sufficiently recognize the financial constraints and the political difficulties of implementing programs.
A serious difficulty arises from the nature of preparing political programs in a small, open economy that is at the mercy of external forces. For example, during the 2007 electoral campaign, the two main opposition parties (Fine Gael and Labour) set out quite detailed cost estimates of their proposed policy measures. Unfortunately, like the government’s own projections, these estimates were based on what proved to be wildly optimistic budgetary scenarios.
The nature of party political rivalry makes it almost inevitable that parties will compete in bidding for voters’ support by making unrealistic promises in their manifestos. The Irish election campaigns are no worse in this regard than those of other countries. The quality of the debate that follows the launch of the manifestos, and the analytical skills of the media commentators in dissecting the policies proposed by the competing parties, is high. In this regard, the Irish system works reasonably well to minimize, but not eliminate, inconsistency and implausibility in policy proposals.

Both major parties, the LDP and the DPJ, prepared detailed election programs for the 2009 lower house election. Such “manifestos” were introduced by the DPJ in the 2003 lower house election, and they represent a growing tendency to draw closer connections between parties, their policy propositions, and their candidates. Previously, elections had very much been based on personalities, candidates’ electoral networks, and pork-barrel spending aimed at supporting and maintaining such networks. Despite shortcomings in the actual programs identified, the overall positive contribution of these manifestos to Japan’s political process should not be underestimated. As for the 2009 programs, the DPJ was rather clear in its priorities, distinguishing between five major pledges, five major principles and five major policies, for instance. It provided a clear distinction between superior objectives, subordinate objectives and related policy measures. The DPJ even attached specific cost estimates and deadlines to its proposals. However, it is a major weakness in this process that it remains unclear how the various costly schemes are to be realized during Japan’s post-crisis period of economic hardship and severe fiscal strain. Some of the measures appear overly simplistic, such as the promise to find “hidden treasures” in the existing budget, or to effectively diminish the role of bureaucrats through a number of formal changes. There are also a number of obvious contradictions, such as the inherent conflict between the populist promise to eliminate highway tolls and the need for fiscal restraint and environmental incentives. Some controversial issues are not mentioned at all, like the DPJ´s stance toward the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. The LDP´s “promise” (yakusoku) was considerably less specific in comparison. For instance, it did not as clearly distinguish between principles, overarching goals, subordinate goals and instruments. Information about individual policy proposals’ cost and timeline was much more vague, an issue that has long been subject to criticism. To be fair, it should be noted that the evident specificity of the DPJ proposals may have been more apparent than real. The LDP was handicapped by having been in charge of most of the policies that it was now criticizing as having been from another era. To the LDP’s credit, it has not shied away from a number of possibly unpopular policy proposals, such as the more or less explicit demand for an increase in the consumption tax.

For Congress, electoral programs are hard to assess, as individual members run their campaigns on their own merits, often emphasizing local concerns. Well-defined party initiatives, such as the Republicans’ 1994 Contract with America, are rare. With regard to presidential elections, party platforms, written at the presidential nominating convention, make numerous commitments to specific agenda items, and the winning candidate normally works hard as president to make good on them. These party platforms of course are designed to convey issues and positions that will mobilize support and facilitate electoral success. For the most part, they are broadly consistent. But the programs typically have severe deficiencies in realism and feasibility, promising much more than they can actually achieve. During recent election campaigns, neither party’s candidate offered a coherent fiscal plan in which spending, taxation and deficit projections came close to adding up. Instead, unacknowledged, implied or inevitable long-term deficits have been massive, making the candidates’ broad claims about their plans, in important respects, bogus. Nevertheless, electing George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 meant the public would receive tax cuts. The Obama campaign identified major policy issues that it began implementing after being elected: health care reform, a stabilization of the economy and financial markets, climate change, the restructuring of the automobile industry and greater engagement in Afghanistan. What fell by the wayside were higher taxes of affluent households and immigration reform.

Parties and leaders have failed in explaining the challenges of the present and of the future to the electorate. Preference for short-term solutions, postponement of difficult decisions and a relative indifference to the fate of future generations are the characteristics of most political programs. The crude fact that the national budget has been in deficit for the past 30 years is telling. This being said, the two major governing parties since 1981, the Socialist Party (PS) and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), have improved their focus on plausibility and coherence. When they are in opposition, they tend to give way to populist propositions, but the financial coherence of programs proposed is now more often publicly discussed on the basis of independent expert calculations.

Most electoral programs consist of ambiguous promises and vague policy declarations, and do not include a description of how policies will be implemented or how long they will remain in effect. Manifestos of this kind are hard to evaluate. This general ambiguity can be traced to the tradition of coalition governments. Most of the parties try to keep their options open during electoral campaigns with respect to making coalition partnerships after the elections. In the 2009 national elections, the high level of societal uncertainty in the wake of the economic collapse caused the main parties to be even less specific than usual with respect to planned policies and the details of potential implementation.

In the 2008 elections, as in the past, the two major parties (Partito Democratico and Forza Italia/Alleanza Nazionale (afterward, the Popolo della Libertà)) participated within the framework of pre-electoral coalitions, but also produced their individual manifestos. Both electoral manifestos were structured as government programs, and listed a number of broad goals (such as support for the family, promoting economic development, improving internal security, etc.), along with more specific proposals (pledges). The programs are fairly long (though the PD platform is longer than that of the PdL) and contain more than a hundred pledges each. Not all pledges are equally well defined, and their costs, benefits and consequences are in general not specified. Some of the pledges have an essentially rhetorical nature, but a significant number also have a more practical character, so that implementation can be verified. Still, when it comes to plausible and coherent policies, there should always be some doubt as to whether pledges will be realized and implemented. Budgetary constraints should be kept in mind by all voters.

No fundamentally irresponsible party or candidate has won national elections since Mexico democratized, though some people would argue that there have been some narrow escapes. The fundamental dividing line in terms of serious politics is less ideological commitment (left vs. right) than a belief in or rejection of personalism as a serious form of politics. More than one presidential candidate has done well with an appeal little more complicated than the promise: “Vote for me, and I will solve your problems.” This frightens most party elites, which is why independent candidates cannot run for presidential office. Most policy proposals at election time are vague, which is true of many other countries as well. The fact that elections often involve coalitions of parties is another cause for pragmatism – or perhaps vacuity, depending on the outlook of the observer. It is worth mentioning that there has been a visible tendency for noneconomic, and perhaps even semi-religious issues such as abortion or homosexual rights to increase in political saliency in recent years.

Party manifestos are generally written by competent teams, often with academic ties. While these documents were quite long in previous elections, in the 2009 election parties sought to present shorter (thus more readable) and more cohesive programs. Nevertheless, there does remain a considerable degree of ambiguity in party manifestos, and programs are not treated as a complete road map once parties attain power.
None of the parties have developed an adequate response to the global economic crisis, and to Portugal’s very vulnerable economic position.

The coherence of party programs is limited. Law and Justice (PiS), the main opposition party, employs a confrontational political style and largely refrains from articulating its own policy proposals. Emphasizing national, moral and Catholic values in addition to the need for a strong state, it has called for higher social spending, but has remained vague on financing and on economic policy in general. The two small parties in parliament, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL), have also failed to present coherent policy proposals. PSL continues to focus almost exclusively on the interests of farmers and the rural population, and the SLD has yet to redefine its role after several personal and organizational changes. A good case in point is health care reform. While the more liberal wing of the party supported part of the government’s reform plans, the leftist wing opposed it and eventually turned the balance. The party with the most coherent program has been the governing PO. It has presented a number of well-designed reform proposals.

The programmatic capacity of the Slovak parties is limited. The small parties – SNS, L’S-HZDS, KDH and SMK – represent particular groups of voters, so that their electoral programs are largely tailored to the interests of these groups. Smer-SD’s electoral program for the 2010 elections had a strongly declaratory character. It stressed the positive record of the Fico government and emphasized the importance of social policy, but was short on details. The program of the SKDU, the biggest opposition party, originally focused on improving administration. Fiscal responsibility became a major issue only after the Czech elections and the culmination of the Greek crisis. Until then, the SKDU had largely refrained from criticizing the popular economic and social policies of the Fico government.

The coherence of party and electoral programs is low. This particularly applies to the two big parties. Fidesz has promised radical change for years, but has been silent on the details. Its calls for tax reductions and a flat tax have conflicted with its spending promises. The MSzP program is the lowest common denominator of its different platforms and factions. Due to the strong political polarization, political debates have focused on issues such as legitimacy and corruption rather than on policies.

With respect to issues of the economy, education, reform of the state organization and administration, and sustainability of the social security system, the governing party’s program and policies have been relatively coherent and – at least given the current environment – relatively successful. The government’s weak performance in other policy areas, particularly environmental protection and labor rights, is due to the low priority given to these issues.
A cartelization of the party system and centripetal attitudes among the public have encouraged catch-all tendencies among the political parties. Global trends have also led the mainstream political parties to adopt popular ideas such as privatization, minimal state, lifting of protectionist barriers, and other such concepts. Therefore political parties have developed similar economic, foreign policy and social policy proposals. People vote for leaders rather than programs.
For example, the economic programs of the two major opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) do not go beyond repeating commonplaces, according to economists and entrepreneurs. Neither of the two parties offer a coherent vision of how to come to terms with the country’s most serious problem, that of the Kurdish conflict that has left 40,000 people dead in the last 28 years. Neither the RPP nor the NMP grapples with the fact that Turks and Kurds for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic are developing strong resentment against each other. Neither of the two major opposition parties offers a clear-cut concept for foreign or EU policy, or deals with the influence of the military and of militarism upon Turkey’s political life.
The incumbent government differs positively from the main opposition parties, namely the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), in terms of the space provided for good governance and democracy and human rights during the last two elections.

The fact that both the 2007 and 2009 elections were called on the basis of short-term electoral calculations, a pattern followed by many Greek governments since the 1974 transition to democracy, contributed little to the elaboration and lack of cohesiveness in the policy proposals contained in the tow main parties’ electoral programs. The parties have long-established institutions which are supposed to produce problem diagnoses, policy objectives and proposals. PASOK has created the Andreas Papandrou Institute for Strategic and Developmental Studies (ISTAME), whereas ND relies on the Center for Political Research and Training (KPEE) and the Democracy Institute “Constantine Karamanlis.” All these institutes employ permanent research and administrative staff, and have been able to attract well-known academics and experts to their administrative and scientific boards. However, Greek parties, which are very personalistic in their decision-making structures, have an unpredictable relationship with these policy-making institutes, sometimes asking them to produce fully realized policy proposals and at other times completely neglecting their policy contributions.
In 2007 and in 2009, the leadership of the two major parties had groups of party cadres construct a variety of hastily formed, half-baked policy proposals, often omitting important details such as the projected cost and predicted policy impact of the proposals, so as to avoid negative reactions from the public. Periodically, parties do produce proposals which are concrete and reasonable, such as recent proposals to coordinate local governments in Greece’s two major urban centers (Athens and Thessaloniki), which are currently governed by several local authorities instead of a single metropolitan administration in each city.

There is almost universal agreement among political scientists, political observers, politicians and the general public that the political parties are one of the weakest links in Korean democracy. In addition to their inchoate nature and lack of internal democracy, political parties have weak ability to produce meaningful party manifestos, political programs or alternative policy proposals. In Korea’s personalized political system, party programs have little relevance and party competence is low. In general, parties remain very weak. Because they form around powerful individuals, parties are frequently renamed, split and merged. Programmatic unity is stronger in the conservative GNP and the progressive DLP, as compared to the main opposition party DP, which suffers from a lack of party loyalty, and the smaller NPP, which brings together individuals from many different progressive groups. The election platforms of individual candidates tend to be more important than party programs, but often avoid proposing coherent policies in favor of promises to achieve certain goals and secure certain benefits for the candidate’s electoral district.