CAPACITY

There is a significant degree of academic influence on policy-making. Economic and social research is strongly applied in orientation. Academics are regularly involved in government-appointed committees for the preparation of legislation. On a more informal level, various departments regularly consult academic experts. Academics are active in public debate (e.g., by writing newspaper articles) and their views often prompt replies and comments from senior politicians.

Many government departments and agencies have advisory committees, which can have considerable but rarely a dominant influence on policy. For example, in 2008 Finance Canada established a permanent Economic Advisory Council for economic policy, comprised of respected academic economists and business leaders. A number of government departments and agencies appoint academic experts to advisory positions or chairs within the organization for a one to two year period. Examples of this type of position – and hence of the influence of experts on policy – include the Clifford Clark Visiting Economist Chair at the Department of Finance and the Simon Reisman Visiting Fellowship within the Treasury Board Secretariat. Similar posts exist at the Competition Bureau and the Bank of Canada, among others. Government departments and agencies often commission experts to organize research projects on high-profile issues. The results of these initiatives can be influential in the course of policy development. For example, Finance Canada recently commissioned Jack Mintz, a well-known public finance economist, to produce a report on pension policy for a federal-provincial conference on this issue. Finally, external academic experts are frequently asked to meet with senior government officials, either on a one-on-one basis or as speakers at departmental retreats.

Non-governmental organizations and academic experts play an important role in government decision-making. Experts from academia, NGOs, partisan think tanks and the private sector are very influential in the preparation of government (presidential) programs and the development of policy reform proposals by presidential or ministerial technical commissions. These technical commissions, which are charged with the task of proposing policy reforms in specific reform areas (education reform, pension reform, social and wage policies, minimum wage policy, fiscal rule reform, etc.) have been very influential in shaping government legislation as submitted to and voted on by Congress. Commissions are largely comprised of experts, and to a minor extent of representatives of interested parties, and cover a wide political spectrum. Experts (economists in particular) are very influential in drafting reform proposals submitted to the president or to ministers. As a profession, economists in particular are highly influential in the preparation of government programs and policy reform proposals, and in the execution of government policies.

The administration has a certain amount of in-house expertise. However, for most policy areas there are advising councils or committees involving experts, for example doctors often are involved, consulted through various agencies, when health policies are being discussed. In addition, the Danish economic council plays an important role, and politicians listen to its members’ advice. Recently, an environmental economic council was also established. The two councils are chaired by the same four economics professors, known as the “wise men.” The chairmanship prepares reports that are then discussed by the members representing unions, employers, the central bank and the government. The reports also garner media attention.
Although unlike the American system, where a university professor can spend a few years in government administration and then return to academia, Danish academics remain outside politics.

Academic expertise in policy making appears to be less sought today compared to previous years. There are certainly instances where the government creates councils where scholars meet and produce papers that form a base for policy choice. A case in point is the “Globalization Council” created by the current government shortly after it came into office. The center-right government introduced new forms of scholarly advice beyond the traditional system of “Royal Commissions.” It remains to be seen if these new forms will ensure more scholarly advice or if these councils are used instrumentally in the political campaign. It is noteworthy that the center-right government introduced an independent council to regularly assess the fiscal policy process. It will probably always be true that academic advice will have a place in the policy process and that such advice is “filtered” through a political assessment of the value of that advice. Even with that observation in mind, however, it does seem to be the case that government rather rarely solicits advice from the academic community.

Non-governmental academic experts are influential as long as they share some of the ideological assumptions and goals of the government in power. The real avenue of influence for scholars and experts in the U.S. system is to be appointed to a government position or serve in formal or informal advisory roles. This system also affords the research networks or traditions from which these experts come a degree of influence. The Obama administration has made extensive use of tapping the scholarly talent pool, as a number of its high-level appointments show: Larry Summers of the National Economic Council, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, or Susan Rice, the U.N. Ambassador, are distinguished academics or researchers from universities or think tanks. The use of academic experts inside and outside of government may best be described as “issue networks” that are based on scholarly credentials, but at the same time serve certain ideological and value positions. It is only the latter that gives issue networks entry into the political arena. There is every indication that the exchange between academic experts and the Obama administration has been intensified. This is particularly true for the fields of economics, environment, climate change and energy, and health care. The Bush administration was widely criticized as ignoring scientific and academic research, and manipulating the membership of advisory committees, to favor conservative ideological positions and business interests–on issues such as stem cell research, the effectiveness of abstinence-only sex education, tax cuts and climate change. The Obama administration demonstrated a more sophisticated recognition of scientific and academic expertise in all these areas and more.

Since the late 1990s, and particularly since 2007, the federal government has funded a range of specialist centers and institutes aimed at undertaking fundamental research and planning, the findings from which feed into government policy. Examples include government support for regulation and compliance centers at the Australian National University, with the Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet), and the establishment of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, which is a postgraduate faculty set up by the Australia and New Zealand governments, and by the state governments in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria.

Despite these formal mechanisms, academic influence on government decision-making is relatively limited, although there have been some indications of greater receptiveness to “evidence-based” policy formulation under the Labor government, with the Prime Minister having called it a key element of the government’s agenda for the public service.

In the Mexican political system, barriers between the government and scholars are comparatively low. It is quite common for any Mexican cabinet to include recruits from academia, and there are also substantial informal contacts involving academics and public officials. By the same token, former government officials often teach at universities. The Mexican government is keen to strengthen this kind of arrangement with the more technical kind of academic expert – economists, international relations professionals and so on – particularly those who hold higher degrees from outside Mexico. This is less the case with “pure” intellectuals, who may often have reservations about working for the government in any case. In some sectors such as education and social spending, the use of highly technical methods for public policy evaluation has become increasingly important. In these cases, the evaluations are generally overseen or prepared by national or international scholars.

Dutch government used to be surrounded by a densely populated ring of so-called planning agencies, think tanks, or centers for policy analysis in economics (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), and sociocultural (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), spatial (Ruimtelijk Planbureau, RPB) and environmental (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) issues. The government also worked with other legally mandated advisory bodies in policy sectors that somewhat mirrored divisions found in ministerial departments (e.g., in spatial planning, development aid, public health), as well as knowledge institutes for technology and innovation (TNO, Rathenau Institute), health and environment (RIVM), and statistics (CBS). After this network of cooperation was slimmed down in the late 1990s, the Balkenende IV cabinet sought to harmonize and further trim this network from 2007 to 2010. Even the number of highly reputed planning agencies was reduced by merging the MNP and RPB into one agency, the Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). In addition, the legal, financial and organizational status of the agencies – which were formally parts of departments, but with guarantees for scientific independence and rights to determine their own working programs – were harmonized. Several advisory bodies were either abolished or merged together in anticipation of broader, integrated policy fields. The recommendations made by these non-administrative advisory bodies are legally prescribed by the Government Information (Public Access) Act (WOB). However, the Council of Ministers is no longer obliged to respond. The watered-down function of advisory services in departments has been strengthened through the establishment of “knowledge chambers” and, following American and British practice, the appointment of “chief scientific officers” or “chief scientists” as advisory experts. The idea is that departments, depending on the nature of policy issues, may flexibly mobilize the required sciences and scientists, instead of relying on fixed advisory councils with fixed memberships. It appears that the political and governmental demand for advice is undergoing centralization and that there is a shift toward instrumental (rather than strategic) advice from less independent advisory bodies. Parliament’s access to services provided by planning agencies and advisory bodies has formally improved. But it is too early to tell whether parliament is going to use its increased opportunities for external advice.

The relevance, in terms of frequency and intensity of policy advice, of external academic experts on governmental policymaking depends on the subject area. Non-governmental academics with technical expertise can have a significant role in policy areas such as health, energy and tertiary education. In general, the importance of scholarly advice has increased.

The Tusk government has relied heavily on scholarly advice. It has set up a number of commissions involving academic experts to prepare important reforms. Cases in point are the reform of scientific research and higher education, and the reform of the president’s competencies. In March 2010, the government also set up a new Economic Council. Composed of scientists and practitioners, the Economic Council is to provide the prime minister with independent opinions on economic affairs and government activities.

The incumbent government issued an emergency action plan in 2002 when it first came to power, underlining the fact that all regulatory reforms would be initiated in close consultation with civil society. During the first years of the government, many new regulations were prepared in consultation with civil society organizations, including academics. Governments occasionally establish “scientific committees” to prepare a draft report or “justification” paper to accompany policy implementation.
There are also academic members in the cabinet – mainly in the ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, labor and social security – who can encourage academic ideas and approaches in the course of governmental policy-making. The government occasionally asks academics to prepare opinions for “justification” purposes, or to help with surveys or reports on individual issues, but it is unclear how far these contributions in fact influence policy. There is also a trend in the executive branch for many positions to be filled by civil servants with an academic degree.

Non-governmental experts from academic and business backgrounds have played an important role in conducting independent reviews of central government policy and strategy in recent years. Examples include the Review of the Economics of Climate Change conducted by Sir Nicholas Stern (Stern was a civil servant at the time he conducted the review, although he is from an academic background), the Pensions Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Turner and the Review of Health Trends headed by Sir Derek Wanless. As is evident from the titles, such reviews are often delegated to well-established public figures who may or may not also have an academic background. They tend to draw freely on academic expertise and thought. Scholarly advice is obtained through a variety of channels, but tends to fluctuate depending on the direction given by individual ministers and the vagaries of individual appointments. From time to time, senior academics are seconded or appointed to high-profile advisory posts in government. All government departments make use of external consultants to carry out studies. These contracts are usually offered through competitive bid, and are sometimes by academics, sometimes by different sorts of consulting firms. In addition, many ministers or civil servants tend to seek informal advice from selected academics recognized to be specialists in a particular area of interest. In addition, there are examples of academics being selected to lead commissions of inquiry, such as the London School of Economics’ John Hills, who conducted a review of social housing. Finally, several leading academics have been appointed to the House of Lords.

The influence wielded by think tanks such as the Fabian Society or the Institute for Public Policy Research has been declining in the last two years, for the reasons set out above, but also because the hectic pace of dealing with the consequences of the financial market crisis has left little room for strategic long-term policy thinking. However, other think tanks such as Policy Network have increased their influence in the last two years, building on connections to powerful ministers, and a number of right-of-center think-tanks have clearly played a part in influencing the incoming government, particularly on the issue of social policy.

Scientific advice is organized mainly informally; for example, by consulting scientific experts for committee report drafts. Some formal bodies, such as temporary working groups, ad-hoc committees and permanent councils, also exist. In general, different permanent and non-permanent committees play an important role in structuring scientific advice in government decision-making. An example of a permanent group that advises the government and ministries in research and technology matters is the Science and Technology Policy Council. Attempts at steering research in other terms than those pertaining to a topic alone are as a rule regarded rather unfavorably by the scientific community. Yet academics in the field of international politics used to participate in policy preparations and in networks of the foreign policy and security policy administration, and law representatives are employed often as experts in parliamentary committee hearings. In contrast, the social sciences in Finland have generally adhered to orientations that seek to uncover, explain and criticize rather than assist and support government efforts.

The institutionalization of scholarly advice in Hungary is weak. In the hectic years from 2008 to 2010, interactions between public officials and academic experts became less regular. However, the so-called Reform Alliance (Reformszövetség), an expert group sponsored by the National Alliance of Entrepreneurs (Vállalkozók Országos Szövetsége, VOSZ), had a large influence on budget policy. The fiscal reform package of the Bajnai government drew strongly on the recommendations made by the Alliance in early 2009, and one of the Alliance’s leading figures, Péter Oszkó, served as finance minister in the Bajnai government. Academic experts proved less influential in the case of civil law. The new civil code eventually adopted after ten years of debate in September 2009 deviated substantially from the draft originally prepared a commission (Vékás Commission) consisting of nine professors and justices for the government.

The government only occasionally consults academic experts. These are primarily lawyers involved in preparing laws or participating in various fields of public administration, although they are also occasionally economic or engineering experts. Thus, nongovernmental academic experts cannot be considered as having a strong influence on decision-making. Experts consulted have often been affiliated with the political parties of the ministers seeking their advice. Independent experts sometimes feel their views are not taken seriously into account in policy-making. However, the 2008 economic collapse may have changed this pattern. The need for scholarly advice on judicial, financial and economic issues as well as questions of public administration has increased markedly. This was particularly the case in connection with the preparation of the parliament’s Special Investigation Commission report (SIC, Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis) in April 2010, which investigated the causes of the economic collapse. A number of experts in various fields – law, economics, banking, finance, mass media, psychology and philosophy – contributed to the report, which may turn out to have significant influence on Icelandic society and the reconstruction of the economy and the political system.

Members of the Irish academic community, and especially the economists, feel that they have been neglected or not sufficiently consulted during the current crisis. Of course, they have been free to offer their advice through journalism and on blog sites (such as http://www.irisheconomy.ie/ and http://www.politics.ie/). The views expressed in these outlets do influence policymakers, although to what extent is difficult to gauge.
Academics were appointed over the past two years in the Department of the Taoiseach (the prime minister’s office) and the Department of Finance. In 2009, an academic was appointed governor of the cCentral bBank, breaking with the long-established tradition that the retiring permanent secretary of the Department of Finance would succeed to the governorship. These advisers appear to be influential, and appear to meet regularly with their ministers, but no empirical evidence is available on the frequency of these meetings, or more importantly, on the impact of the advice proffered on policy-making.

Academic experts are often involved in the drafting of bills and other policy instruments, but tend to be selected more on the basis of political affiliations or their personal relationship with ministers or the prime minister than for their reputation as independent experts. For example, the current government’s university reform bill benefited from the expertise of a few university rectors and experts close to the minister, but did not go through a systematic and open consultation process. More or less the same can be said about the proposals for constitutional reform. With regard to specific, highly technical pieces of legislation such as labor law or pension reforms, the influence of academic experts can be greater.

Government receptivity to academic input continues to be high, with universities remaining a primary recruiting ground for ministers. In the new Sócrates government formed in the aftermath of the September 2009 legislative elections, a total of seven of the 17 incumbent ministers could be described as academics, with a handful of other ministers having some academic experience; and this pattern of academic prominence is equally perceptible at the junior minister level.
This pattern inevitably has an impact on the role of academic expertise in government. On the one hand, it does make the government more receptive to academic expertise; on the other, this can be occasionally provided “in-house,” and very frequently in an informal manner, given the ties that ministers have to universities.
Under the first Sócrates government (2005 – 2009), there was a trend toward the institutionalization of nongovernmental academic expertise, in the form of mission units (unidades de missão) and other types of committees and taskforces. In the period here under analysis (2008 – 2010), we find few new mission units being formed.

Nongovernmental academic experts have considerable influence on government decision-making. Most observers believe that the influence of expert commissions has decreased somewhat, as President Lee has abolished many of the expert commissions established by his predecessors. However, he also created many new commissions, with a different focus. Commissions dealing with historical issues such as crimes committed during the periods of Japanese colonial rule or military dictatorship have been weakened or even abolished. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be disbanded in 2010, as planned when it was created in December 2005. Critics say the commission is being shut down because the current government is uncomfortable with scrutiny of the country’s past. Others, including the commission’s current president, argue that it has not been cost effective and therefore should cease work. The closure of the commission means that thousands of incidents, ranging from executions to the wartime killing of refugees, may remain uninvestigated, and that South Koreans wrongly accused of crimes against the government may lose their only chance to clear their name.
On the other hand, new commissions have been empanelled, such as the G-20 task force assigned the job of preparing for the G-20 summit. The process of naming experts remains politicized, and expert commission reports and results seem to be utilized according to their political rather than their scholarly value. Beyond their work in commissions, scholars are often tapped to serve in government positions.

Non-governmental academic experts do not have a dominant influence on Spanish decision-making. There are no formal and systematic meetings between external specialists and the government as a whole. Nor does the government rely on experts for advice on matters of political strategy.
However, university scholars and other researchers are often summoned by line ministries for consultation on economic and technical issues. This is particularly common as legislative bills are initially being drafted, and as the impact of proposed legislation is being assessed. On the other hand, non-governmental experts whiled considerable influence through debate in the media. Moreover, academic experts are often recruited for senior government positions, although this may be considered internal rather than external influence. Many members of the government in fact come from the academic world (a pattern more typical when the socialist party is in office, since the conservatives tend rather to select ministers and top officials from among businessmen and career civil servants close to the party). For example, just to mention some of the appointments made in 2009, Ángel Gabilondo is a philosopher who presided over a public university before being chosen as minister of education, while the new secretary of state for the economy, José Manuel Campa, taught in a prestigious business school and had no previous ties with the government or the socialist party.

As already indicated, the Swiss political system is a corporatist system. In particular, the drafting of bills is done in extraparliamentary and parliamentary committees. Academics, representatives of interest groups and parties, individuals with particular expertise and other such experts are elected to about 140 extraparliamentary committees by the federal government. There are multiple criteria for selecting a member, in order to ensure the balanced representation of language groups, political parties and ideologies, and other societal interests. Academics are selected on the basis of academic profile, but their allegiance to political parties or other societal interests may also be taken into account. Expert commissions and their members have a dominant influence on governmental decision-making. However, many academics in these commissions are selected not only because of their academic reputation but also because of their political profile. Hence, the influence of academics per se is much more limited than the influence of expert groups. In addition, the share of academics on these commissions is rather limited, amounting to about 11% of all seats. However, in combination with the higher civil servants of the federal state and cantons (who usually have academic training), they account for 53% of all commission seats (Sciarini 2007: 471)

There is no systematic pattern of meetings between government officials and external experts. Meetings of this nature depend on the individual preferences of the different cabinet members. Although unsystematic in nature, these meetings can have an impact on policies, as seen by the influence on some ministries of advice given by the Austrian Institute for Economic Research.
A considerable amount of influence on government decision-making also derives from the institutions of social partnership (especially concerning expert assessments in legislative procedures). These institutions often rely on academic experts for their formal right to render opinions.

The consultation of non-governmental academic experts depends on the subject matter; in most policy areas, their actual influence on government decisions is relatively limited. In most matters, some academic experts are included in the minister’s team of collaborators. The advantage of this process is that such individuals become full-time government experts who then can bring their extensive experience to improve government decisions. The flip side is that, since these experts become fully tied to the minister and his or her party, they lose their political independence in the process. There is also a risk that experts are selected precisely because they share the minister’s views. The government and/or parliament consults with full-time academic experts who hold independent views, but not systematically and not necessarily with the goal of generating a genuine scientific debate. Established political parties also support study centers, with which some academic experts are involved, but such groups have little direct influence on day-to-day policies.
What is systematic in government decision-making is the summoning of “social partners,” such as representatives of trade unions or employers’ organizations, or representatives of firms or organizations directly affected by a proposed law or potential strategic decision. This means that the actual influence of academic experts is relatively limited.
With the global economic crisis, the Chamber of Deputies organized a meeting to assess the impact of the economic crisis on companies. It summoned three external experts (one academic and two bankers with strong knowledge of the economy) and one expert from the Federal Planning Bureau, a state agency. Ten other people outside the political sphere took part in the meeting. They were also present representatives of various social partners (employers and unions), the consumers’ association and a major Belgian firm.
Parliamentary investigation commissions instead consult external experts (not necessarily academics) more systematically. In the case of the Fortis bankruptcy, for example, the Chamber of Deputies relied on four experts (of which three were academics) to help members of parliament lead the investigation. Fifty people outside the government (of which two were full-time academics, one an OECD expert, and four were National Bank experts, not to mention some university professors) were summoned by the commission.

In the Czech Republic, the influence of academic experts on government decision-making is modest. The prime minister’s office and most ministries consult experts and have advisory boards. Some ministries also support, and cooperate with, research institutes. Cases in point include the Institute for International Relations, founded and partially funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Research Institute for Labor and Social Affairs, set up by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. In line with the low standing of academic life in general, however, academics do not enjoy much prestige as advisors if they do not have strong party links. A partial exception was the National Economic Council of the Government, which functioned from January to September 2009 and was intended to advise the government, and hopefully even the European Union, on responses to the economic crisis. Eventually, however, its three reports did not noticeably influence policy-making at the national, let alone the EU, level.

In some policy fields, expert commissions provide regular expert advice. Most of their members are appointed by the government or the relevant sectoral ministries. In addition, ad hoc commissions are convened to review issues related to complicated policies or major reforms. The German Council of Economic Experts and the German Council of Environmental Advice provide yearly reports and opinions on current policy problems. In addition, most ministries have external advisory bodies and finance more or less scientific studies. Not all of the advisors are academic and independent, and some give only legal advice. Their actual influence on policy-making is difficult to evaluate, but during the period under review, there were no examples of highly influential independent academic advisors.
Nonetheless, there are many issues faced by the government which are not ideologically driven, and on which the government and the ministries listen to advisors. One such example is the precise definition of active labor market policies: In this area, the in-depth academic evaluation of various instruments has had a real impact, with ineffective instruments being phased out. Other examples relate to the design of tax reform details, such as the 2008 business tax reform.

Owing to the lack of domestic expertise, the government often turns to foreign institutes for opinion and advice (e.g., OECD, the International Labor Organization (ILO), universities or private study offices). The most notable example is Professor Lionel Fontagné (Paris School of Economics) who has advised the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the issue of competitiveness. Sometimes, nongovernmental organizations such as Ecological Movement (Mouvement écologique, MECO), an environmental organization, rely on foreign academic experts to oblige the government to change its ways. The recently established university has so far brought no change to this situation.
A good example is the reform of psychiatry. A Swiss health expert who had already participated in a 1993 report presented a so-called planning study, comprising an inventory and offering recommendations. In 2008 this study was transformed into a national reform plan. In 2008 the same expert evaluated the implementation of the recommendations of his own planning study (of 2005), which led to a 2009 law on the hospitalization of persons with mental disorders (Loi du 10 décembre 2009 sur le placement des personnes souffrant de troubles mentaux).

In contrast to some other European countries, the French government does not rely much on academics. Outstanding nongovernmental academics may be chosen to sit in the numerous national reflection councils on various policy fields (integration, education, etc.), and thus help to formulate guidelines for public action. But their influence is not comparable to what can be found in many other political settings. The high civil service tends to consider itself self-sufficient. It is only in rare occasions that the government calls in academics, either because they are close to the administrators in power or because there is no real expertise within the central administration. The council of economic advisors set up by Lionel Jospin when he was prime minister never gained strong influence on economic or budgetary policies, for instance. This situation might be explained by the tradition of intellectuals refusing to be associated with power and adopting a critical attitude vis-à-vis political authorities.

Greek governments seek scholarly advice and expertise either by forming ad hoc committees to monitor and formulate policies in specific areas (e.g., pensions, public administration) or by directly hiring academics and experts as political appointees. These appointees are made ministerial advisors (staff posts), or offered roles as “general” or “special” ministry secretaries (line positions). Indeed, these line posts are high-ranking political appointee jobs, ranking above the civil service hierarchy in each ministry, with their holders accountable directly to the minister in charge. The problem is that such academics and experts come and go with each ministerial reshuffling even within a single government’s term, and certainly change whenever there is government turnover. In addition, policy advice by such experts is often overruled on the basis of electoral or patronage-related considerations, by the same ministers who sought the contribution of academic experts in the first place.

The Japanese government is supported by a large number of advisory councils, numbering roughly 90 at the ministerial level alone. These are usually composed of private sector representatives, journalists, civil servants and trade unionists. It has frequently been asked whether these advisory boards truly have a decisive influence on policy-making, or whether the bureaucracy rather uses them to legitimize its policies by nudging seemingly independent bodies into making proposals that would be forthcoming in any case. As discussed above, the new DPJ-led government is quite critical of the role of bureaucrats in policy-making. From that perspective, it is also suspicious of the ubiquity of such councils, which include a significant number of academic advisors. Following the autumn 2009 election, many councils’ work was put on hold. This does not relate to all such groups, however. For instance, a new body called the Industrial Competitiveness Committee, answering to the Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI), was added to the Industrial Structure Council in February 2010 and tasked with developing ideas about the long-term competitiveness of the Japanese economy. It includes a number of university professors and academics from institutes.

Under the Fico government, the influence of academic experts decreased substantially. Prime Minister Fico regarded most scholars and think tanks as allies of the previous government and thus was not interested in their advice. The government discontinued the cooperation and exchange with the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Slovakia’s two most important independent think tanks. Other public research institutes did not fall out of favor. The government supported “prognostic” research on a development strategy for Slovakia, which was conducted by the Slovak Academy of Sciences and by the Economic University in Bratislava. It organized a public discussion of the findings of this research and adopted them as a government document. However, the actual tangible impact of this document and other advice on government policy-making was limited.