CONSULTATION

In Finland’s consensually oriented political system, interest organizations and associations are regularly consulted to include a variety of views in policy-making. This in turn helps to generate public support for government policies.

Norway is a consensus-oriented society. Not only are interested parties fully informed of measures under discussion, but they also play an active role in the legislative process. In particular, there is a firm tradition of consultation with trade unions and business organizations. Interested parties are invited to express their views before new laws are presented to parliament. Social confrontations over policy-making (e.g., political strikes or violent forms of protest) have been almost nonexistent in recent years.

Within Switzerland’s strong corporatist system there are numerous pre-parliamentary procedures and committees designed to involve different societal groups (see also RIA Application). The task of these procedures and structures is to advise the government. These instruments are designed to prevent proposals from failing in parliament or in referenda, and to offer solutions that benefit all parties. However, recent research shows that this corporatist integration has been reduced in recent years, in particular due to more pronounced conflicts between the social partners and due to the influence of EU integration and internationalization. However, if judged from a comparative perspective, the level of corporatist integration is still very high in Switzerland.

Austrian corporatism is inclusive insofar as it features systematic links to organized interests. The ministries systematically inform specific political actors of any of their policy intentions by sending out drafts in a formalized way (Begutachtungsverfahren). In this process, interest groups are invited to articulate their opinions, but ministries and the cabinet as such are not bound by the feedback they get. The interest groups don’t have veto power. Nonetheless, the process ensures that government is informed at an early stage of the positions of important organized interests, that is, before the cabinet itself has formulated its own position. This makes it possible to plan the next steps in terms of a political cost-benefit analysis.
The procedure incorporates the following interest groups:
• economic interest groups (i.e., the so-called social partners of business, labor and agriculture);
• officially recognized religious denominations;
• state governments (Länder).
This inclusiveness is also strengthened by the fact that the economic interest groups are dominated in all cases by groups (factions) formally linked to one of the major parties.
Some argue, however, that corporatist interest intermediation in Austria is weakened by the increasing dualization of the labor market and European integration.

There is a long tradition of involving economic and social actors at all stages of the policy cycle, even sometimes implementation. Both formally and informally there are good contacts between government administration and the main interest organizations (trade unions, employers, various business organizations and NGOs), as well as heads of major companies. Interest organizations provide important information for politicians and civil servants. While corporatism has changed over the years, it still exists in Denmark.

Intensive forms of consultation between the Swedish state and organized societal interests have a long history. The corporatist system was historically influenced by the development of Swedish state structures (lean ministries) and became most clearly visible in the 1936 tripartite “Salstjöbaden Agreement.” Since the 1970s, the institutional frame for consultation eroded gradually.
Societal consultation still matters in contemporary politics. Representatives of major societal organized interests are still (albeit to a lesser extent than previously) invited to participate in Royal Commissions investigating policy problems and presenting policy proposals. Also, Royal Commissions’ reports are still circulated according to the so-called “remiss” procedure, where all societal actors (public as well as private) that are affected or at least potentially affected by a Royal Commission’s policy proposal are invited to submit their opinion to the government. In addition, there are numerous meetings, formal and informal, where societal actors are invited to voice their opinion on policy developments. Governments of both left and right have had informal meetings with leading business organizations during the most recent past to get their views on how to promote economic development and to mitigate business regulation. Similarly, the national association of regional and local authorities (SKL) has frequent meetings with societal interests in their policy fields, such as unions for teachers and health-care personnel.
The center-right government implemented a number of impartial councils to strategically prepare policy decisions (Globalization Council, Fiscal Policy Council for example). Representatives from organized interest groups were still members in these councils, however, the role scientific advice played in these forms of organized consultation increased. During the global fiscal crisis, the center-right government did not rely on formalized consultations with organized interest groups. However, informal negotiations did certainly take place.

The policy process in the United States is open and characterized by the participation of the entire pluralistic spectrum of social and economic actors. The White House maintains direct relationships with interest groups and the media and generally consults widely in the development of presidential proposals. It usually will include likely opponents of these measures, such as utility companies in the case of potential greenhouse gases measures. It will certainly line up the likely supporters. It may or may not use these consultations to shape its proposals, as opposed to merely seeking support. The main focus of political participation, however, is the legislative process in the U.S. Congress. Hearings are scheduled on most legislative initiatives and on general policy issues. The president’s program is promulgated through media-based strategies to reach the public or crucial segments of the public that are expected to support presidential initiatives – mobilization is therefore selective. Targeting strategies are crucial to ensuring that interest groups supporting the president are place on alert in advance of the congressional policy process. The Bush administration usually pursued a strategy of sharp polarization that precluded consensus-based strategies. The Obama administration, in contrast, has gone out of its way to reach a consensus, in the sense of bipartisanship. That is, it has reached out to groups opposed to its line of policy. This was particularly evident in the formulation of the stimulus package and somewhat so in the case of health care policy. In the latter case, the Obama administration communicated not only with service providers, but also with religious groups (on abortion) and unions. The Obama administration’s efforts largely won the support of the pharmaceutical firms and health insurance companies. And although this support constrained the final measure on health care, it was likely a crucial factor in getting the legislation enacted. The administration had little success with the strategy of bipartisanship, as only a few Republicans supported the bill at any stage of the process. In any case, there is no expectation that presidential or congressional consultation with societal groups will lead to consensus among those groups.

Traditionally, Labor governments have been more amenable to consultation with trade unions and Liberal governments have been more amenable to consultation with business groups, but governments of both persuasions are capable of engaging in extensive consultation on one policy, and no consultation on other policy. For example, recently, the Labor government has been heavily criticized for not consulting with mining companies prior to proposing a new profits-based mining royalties regime. At the same time, the government has engaged in a vigorous effort to engage local communities on various policy issues by hosting the Australia 2020 Summit, holding numerous Community Cabinet Meetings and hosting jobs and training summits.

The departments and agencies of the Canadian government hold many consultations with economic and social actors on public policy issues. These consultations are motivated primarily by the desire to obtain input from Canadians before the government decides on a policy course, not by the desire to sell a particular policy to the population (this is not done through consultations). The most important consultations relate to the preparation of the annual budget. While the importance of trade unions in the consultation process has fallen significantly in recent years, this is not necessarily the case for other groups.

Luxembourg is a consensus-oriented society. This includes some neo-corporatist features such as six professional chambers, three representing employers and three representing workers, which have to give their advice on any bills or regulations relating to their sphere of competence. These professional chambers also have the right to submit proposals to the government, so they play an active role in the legislative process. The Economic and Social Council (ESC) is an advisory body composed of representatives from business as well as from trade unions and government. It meets regularly, in contrast to the Tripartite Coordination Committee established in the wake of a crisis in the steel industry in 1978, which gathers only in urgent situations.
As its name indicates, the Tripartite Coordination Committee is composed of three parties with an equal number of government, trade union and business representatives. Intended as an exceptional response to an exceptional situation, it is called to life in economically difficult situations.
The tradition of some 60 years of consensual negotiation and dialogue with a high level of social stability is described as the “Luxembourg model” (Hirsch 2007).
However in spring 2010 the model came under pressure as the Tripartite Coordination Committee failed to agree on measures in response to the global financial crisis and its impact on Luxembourg’s economy. The focus of the meeting was set primarily on the competitiveness of the national economy, the situation of the labor market and the evolution of public finances. The challenge of drastic austerity measures in a country accustomed to wealth brings about a crucial test for the survival of this institution and the “Luxembourg model” in general.

International references to the “polder model” as form of consensus-building testifies to the Netherlands’ reputation for and alleged skills in negotiating public support for public policies, sometimes as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In many policy areas, this Dutch form of neo-corporatism and network governance – in which the government consults extensively with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society during policy preparation and attempts to involve them in policy implementation – has been a strong factor in the mode of political operation and public policy-making in the Balkenende IV government. In socioeconomic policy-making, crucial issues like conditions for firing workers and changing the pension age from 65 to 67 are contingent upon agreement with and between trade unions and employers’ associations in the Socioeconomic Council (SER). A bill proposing to tackle traffic jams on high- and throughways through a road-pricing system was contingent upon agreement by the Dutch Automobile Association (ANWB), and was to be tested through a survey among its members. Integration policy through preparing and implementing renewal plans for weak neighborhoods was made dependent on (financial) cooperation from local housing corporations and municipalities.
Generally, the Balkenende IV government was a driver in the move from government to governance: the functional representation of various well-organized interest groups and civil associations in well-defined policy sectors, combined with a decentralization of policy-making functions to subnational governments (in particular the introduction of “chain management” in public health care and care for the chronically ill), has led to the creation and/or further elaboration of dense networks of consultation and shared policy responsibilities.
At the same time, and paradoxically, this mode of politics and policy-making is clearly under stress. Both trade unions and employers’ associations suffer under the erosion of representativeness and increasing fragmentation. Many interest groups are in fact commercially and professionally run “checkbook” organizations. As such, they are easy targets for criticism voiced by proponents of market liberalization as well as anti-elitist populism.

New Zealand has a strong tradition of broad consultation with interest groups and its citizens. The need for consultation has been enhanced more recently by two developments. One is the change to a multiparty system and the formation of minority governments, which require the support of smaller parties to be able to pass legislation. The other relates to a greater diversity and sophistication of voters, with political views that are more difficult to predict and no longer fit in a simple “left” and “right” mold. While it may be the case that the ideologies of some parties may make them more compatible than others, under a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system it is not always easy to predict where a minor party will sit on a particular issue. Local governments in particular have a tradition of consulting with their citizens and communities and consultation is mandated in many cases under the Local Government Act 2002. Consultation is also commonly used by central government agencies with respect to new policy initiatives. When a consultation has taken place, the details of consultations, internal and external, need to be set out in regulatory impact statements. Select committees commonly hold hearings on proposed legislation once it has been introduced in Parliament, giving individuals and organizations the opportunity to provide comment on legislative proposals.

Belgium has a long tradition of consensual policymaking, whereby the government consults most stakeholders (in particular employers’ associations and trade unions for socioeconomic issues, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for environmental policies and so on) to facilitate the acceptance of its policies. For core socioeconomic matters (wage regulation as just one example), there are routine rounds of negotiation between trade unions and employers’ organizations which, if successful and if results fit within budgetary limits, are simply confirmed by the government.

Frequent consultations with civil society groups and stakeholder organizations take place. Online surveys have been implemented to consult the opinion of the non-institutionalized public. Segpres is primarily responsible for initiating and monitoring consultations. Depending on the issue, sectoral institutions are involved as well. The ad hoc commissions represent another means of societal consultation, as they include representatives of interest groups and other stakeholders.

The main formal means of consultation is a tripartite council including government, trade unions and employers’ organizations. This is an arena for consultation on economic and social policy measures, and the council members are also automatically consulted during the process of preparing legislation. No such consultation is formally required when legislation is initiated independently by members of parliament, but such cases are generally unimportant and in practice the main interest associations keep a watch on all parliamentary business and can ensure that their views are pressed by friendly legislators. This method has also been adopted by a number of NGOs, so that relevant legislation is often presented to them automatically by proposing ministries so as not to waste time with debate in parliament. The impact of any of these forms of consultation depends on the willingness of government to listen to alternative views. During the period of the Fischer government there was an exceptional willingness to listen and much of its economic policy was formulated with the help of input from trade unions and employers’ organizations. At least in that period, consultation led both to different policies and to greater acceptability for those policies.

Iceland has a long tradition of formal and informal consultation between the government and labor market associations. Despite some open conflicts with groups such as the Organization of Disabled and the Union of Professors at State Universities, in which disputes have been referred to a court, the collapse in 2008 led in general to closer cooperation than before. In February 2009, the government, the municipalities and the major labor-market actors signed the so-called Stability Pact (Stöðugleikasáttmáli). The pact was presented as a declaration from the state, the municipalities and the labor-market organizations on how the country’s economy could be revived. The main goal of this pact was to restructure the economy in such a way that by the end of 2010: (1) the inflation rate would not be more than 2.5%, the Central Bank’s official inflation target, (2) the government’s budget deficit would not be more than 10% of GDP and (3) the Icelandic króna was to have appreciated. However, open conflicts concerning aspects of this pact quickly emerged, especially between the government and labor-market organizations arguing that not enough had been done to create jobs. In general, cooperation with civil society continues to strike many observers as selective and biased. For example, the Association of Households (Hagsmunasamtök heimilanna), established after the crash to look after the interests of households whose mortgage payments climbed steeply at the same time the value of their homes collapsed, claims that the government is more willing to consult with the banks than with representatives of the association on issues concerning the large number of families on the verge of losing their homes.

The traditional practice of LDP-led governments was to pursue societal consultation through the so-called “iron triangle,” which refers to the dense links between the elected politicians, the ministerial bureaucracy, and large business concerns. However, these mechanisms tended to exclude other societal actors, including the trade union movement and the small and medium-sized enterprise sector. Since the onset of the 1990’s economic problems, tensions within this triangle have increased, and during the most recent years of LDP-led government, through 2009, relations were so strained that one could speak of a demise of the “iron triangle” system.

Since the start of the new DPJ-led government in 2009, government relations with the trade union sector have vastly improved. Since the DPJ’s founding in the mid-1990s, the trade union umbrella organization Rengo and a number of individual unions have supported the party and its candidates financially, with manpower and in terms of voter mobilization. Tellingly, the first two DPJ cabinets have included former labor union leaders, and lobbying government-affiliated members of parliament has become easier since the DPJ’s rise to power. However, it remains to be seen whether the DPJ-led government’s tighter links with the labor movement will have a major impact on policy-making.

There is a process of consultation that takes place with respect to most budgetary matters. The idea a process of societal consultation is desirable ahead of any policy-making process is increasingly accepted. Some social legislation specifically requires the government to help establish and negotiate with civil society agencies by offering financial and other sources of support in return for NGO help in achieving specific performance targets. More broadly, the government does listen to many economic and social organizations when these wish to be involved in the policy process. The main problem lies in making sure that the individuals consulted represent the various interest groups as a whole, and not just their leadership ranks. Many social organizations are still relatively inexperienced due to the comparative youth of Mexico’s democratization process.

In Poland, the consultation of economic and social actors is institutionalized in various forms, including the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs. The Tusk government has pursued a cooperative policy style. In his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Tusk promised to rebuild trust and enter into a new political contract with society. In 2009, the government negotiated with the social partners an “anti-crisis pact” within the framework of the Tripartite Commission. Over time, however, the government’s approach has become less inclusive.

Until the emergence of the economic crisis in 2008, and the realization of its serious consequences in terms of the public deficit and the destruction of jobs, the Spanish government held the engagement in social dialogue high on its agenda. This took place most prominently with the two main trade unions UGT and CCOO, but also with the leading business association CEOE and other civil society organizations. However, though facilitating acceptance of government policies among social actors continues to be an important goal, its main priorities have changed to focus on the launch of structural reforms and adjustment measures (affecting the labor market, the pension system and public employee salaries) which are strongly opposed by the unions. Thus, the government is becoming less successful at motivating economic and social actors to support its policy, and by the close of the survey period in May 2010, UGT and CCOO had begun signaling that a general strike was likely.
Regardless of this general trend, line ministries still tend to consult with the economic and social actors important in their various sectoral areas, both private (businesses, trade unions, NGOs, Catholic Church associations, environmental groups) and public (other ministries, autonomous regions, parties), in the course of making decisions. The extent and success of this consultation in preparing policy initiatives depends on the particular sector. In some cases, consultation and exchange of views is institutionalized through advisory bodies that exist in various policy areas.

Government staffers’ meetings with representatives from public interest groups are part of their daily routine. Nevertheless, neither the grand coalition nor the new CDU/CSU-FDP government has used social pacts or other bargaining institutions to explicate their policies in greater detail or to seek compromises satisfying all organizations involved. Integration policy has been a partial exception to this rule, with a conference established to develop intercultural dialogue between representatives of Muslim organizations in Germany and government officials.

The incumbent government declared in its emergency action plan that it would regularly consult with civil society, but has largely failed to fulfill this promising objective. The Law on the Establishment, Principles and Methods of Work of the Economic and Social Council established a continuous and permanent consultative body, tasked with establishing a platform for dialogue, compromise and cooperation on economic and social issues. However, the council has rarely convened (on general matters, tax and social security bills) and has not played an effective role in the law-making process. In short, the government’s consultation with non-governmental institutions is rare, insufficient and ineffective in the process of policy-making. On the other hand, the government generally has closer contact with conservative individual actors and social organizations such as MÜSİAD or HAK-İŞ. Instead of developing relations with existing organizations, it has created its own so-called civil society organizations.
A much-used and much-debated term during the period under investigation was “açılım,” meaning “the opening.” The word relates to a new government policy that accepts various societal groups that often had been more or less sidelined as stakeholders, legal interest groups, dialogue partners and thus equal citizens of the republic. Beginning in 2008, the government initiated a series of conferences with heterodox Muslim Alevi communities, the deputies of the pro-Kurdish Societal Democracy Party (DTP), and representatives of Roma communities.
Considering the “democratic opening” project, the government consulted with several other stakeholder groups in society. However, no concrete policy outcome has resulted from this process. It is argued that Kurdish broadcasts on public radio and TV stations and later on private channels, as well as the return of some Kurdish people from Iraq, had been planned earlier at the top level. Therefore, it was perceived that the government did not consult but rather sought legitimacy for already-defined policies.

The traditional distrust regarding “lobbies” which are not seen as legitimate political actors, and the difficult social relations in France that hinder social dialogue have limited the capacity of governments to seamlessly or successfully find avenues of cooperation. Corporatism in France has had a rather limited impact, and the temptation to govern “top-down,” by ukase, has always been strong. But severe, repeated conflicts and protest movements have raised and often successfully have vetoed governmental action. This is a clear hint that government has not succeeded in assessing the political power, the consideration and cooperation of civil society and its actors.
While the debate on necessary consultation between government and economic and social actors (especially concerning social partnership between capital and labor unions) goes back to 1969, it has seldom been followed by consequent action. However, in recent years, governments seek consultation of interest groups more systematically, and theses practices have been partly made into legal obligations. Since 2007, President Sarkozy has launched several consultation rounds, trying to involve interest groups in the preparation of reform bills. Moreover, the rules of social negotiations have been modernized to encourage social contracts between employers and trade unions. But, despite the awareness of the necessity of installing regular consultation procedures, governmental practice has changed only gradually.

In formal terms, the Greek political system possesses institutions specifically built for societal consultation. These include the Economic and Social Committee, set up by the social partners to discuss the government’s policy initiatives and other issues of interest to employers and employees; the negotiations on wages and salaries which take place every two years between representatives of employers’ associations and trade unions, resulting in the national collective labor pacts; Internet-based public deliberation on all new major pieces of legislation, in the form of online debates over prospective government measures organized by ministries and hosted on official websites; and ad hoc rounds of dialogue between social and economic actors affected by proposed reforms (e.g., dialogue on pension reform, on higher education reform, etc.).
The end result of all these institutions and processes of consultation is mixed. While the government aims to facilitate the acceptance of its policies among social and economic actors by consulting with them, in practice the various forums of consultation may not be used or may play a cosmetic role rather than serving as true sites of debate and policy refinement. Some of the consultative organs do not meet regularly and may be underused. An example of this is a consultative council in which representatives of the market and consumers’ associations are supposed to meet and discuss the prices and quality of goods and services offered in the market.

In Hungary, there are various institutionalized forms of consultation with economic and social actors, including the tripartite National Council for Interest Reconciliation (OÉT). In October 2008, Prime Minister Gyurcsány also convened a National Summit (Nemzeti Csúcs), an exchange of views about reactions to the global economic crisis among 66 leading personalities, including the heads of the opposition parties and representatives of economic and social actors. However, this vague attempt at producing some kind of national consensus on crisis management failed. The Bajnai government presented itself as a government of experts doing dirty – but necessary – work. Pre-occupied with crisis management, it did not pay much attention to the consultation of economic and social actors.

This is an area where there was a seismic change in 2009. The orthodox view – shared by trade unionists, employer organizations and politicians – was that the Irish model of “social partnership” played a major part in the transformation of the Irish economy from the crises of the 1980s into the “Celtic Tiger” of the 1990s. This model borrowed heavily from the Nordic and Austrian examples. It contrasted with the more confrontational model adopted in Britain by Margaret Thatcher over these years. There have been seven agreements or programs, running from 1987 to the most recent one, concluded in 2006 to cover a period lasting until 2016, called Towards 2016. (The significance of the name lies in the fact that 2016 will mark the centenary of the 1916 rising that eventually led to an independent Irish state in 1922.)
Central to all of these agreements was a national wage agreement that established an agreed rate of growth in private and public sector pay over the period. This was embedded in a socioeconomic policy framework that became increasingly inclusive over the course of successive agreements. The areas covered included housing, social welfare policy, employment and labor market policy, social inclusion and so on. Prior to each national agreement, a strategy document was developed by the National Economic Social Council (NESC). Critics complained that major areas of policy-making were being transferred away from the democratic parliamentary process into deals between “social partners” that lacked direct mandates from the electorate.
During 2009, the model was used to try to respond to the economic and fiscal crisis, but proved incapable of delivering the radical adjustments required. The pay agreement in the Towards 2016 program ran only for an initial 27-month phase. As its expiration approached in the second half of 2009, talks aimed at its renewal and extension were dominated by the problems created by the growing fiscal deficit and soaring unemployment. An increasingly bitter dispute also raged over whether public-sector employees should receive awards that had been negotiated in much more favorable conditions. The debate focused on the disparity between rising pay rates and security of employment in the public sector relative to pay cuts and increased job insecurity in the private sector.
The pay talks effectively collapsed at the end of 2009, when the government imposed income cuts of between 5% and 8% for about 315,000 public servants in the 2010 budget. This followed the earlier imposition of a 5% levy on public-sector incomes, described as a levy to help fund the generous defined benefit pensions enjoyed by public-sector workers. Belated attempts by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) Public Service Committee to rescue the deal by offering efficiencies and flexibility in public-service work practices, combined with a complicated proposal for 12 days unpaid leave to be taken by all public servants during 2010, failed to secure either political or public support, and did not prevent the income reductions.
At the end of December 2009, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC), the main employers’ organization, having failed to agree a separate pay deal for the private sector in negotiations with the ICTU, formally withdrew from the terms of the transition agreement. Explaining its action, the group stated: “We are entering a period of enterprise-level bargaining in unionized employments.” That is, centralized pay bargaining was being abandoned, and 23 years of social partnership was coming to an end.
It can still be said that the government consults with the economic and social actors on a wide range of issues, but the process has become very unstable, and its benefits are now much less evident than was the case in the past.

Consultations with economic and social actors are frequent but not systematically institutionalized. After a time in the early 1990s when it seemed that institutionalized consultations (concertazione) with the largest trade unions and employers’ associations had become almost politically compulsory, governments in recent years have been less rigorous in their sue. Under the current Berlusconi government, consultations with two of the main trade unions (but not with the third and largest one) have been frequent on matters of labor and pension policies. This practice has smoothed the acceptance of some government policies.
Dialogue with the opposition on bipartisan political or constitutional affairs has not proved productive. The government treats the governing coalition and its supporting parties as representative of Italian society. Consultation with other territorial authorities such as regions and municipalities has also proved unproductive in recent years.

The Council of Ministers’ rules of procedure stipulate that ministers can carry out consultations with other groups they consider relevant prior to presenting draft legislation. In practice, this occurs with varying frequency. As described in the SGI 2009 report, some areas (pensions, wages and labor regulations) are still influenced by corporatist arrangements, set through formal negotiations between the government, trade unions and employers’ associations. Other interest groups have considerable influence in areas such as health, justice, defense, security and education.
The period under analysis has been marked by a relative easing in the relationship between the government and interest groups, with the government more willing to compromise as compared to the situation described in the SGI 2009 report. Thus, when a conflict emerged between the government and the powerful National Association of Pharmacies over pharmacies’ profit margin, the government ultimately decided in favor of the industry group’s position in late May 2009, overturning the Health Ministry’s initial decision. This is not to say that all such conflicts have ended; in April 2009, for instance, the government challenged the National Association of Pharmacies over its decision to replace medical prescriptions for branded drugs with equivalent generics (which are more profitable to pharmacies than branded drugs). The relationship between teachers and the government was particularly conflict-prone, over proposals to assess teacher performance. These led to a massive and unprecedented wave of demonstrations and strikes by teachers, which continued throughout 2008 – 2009, abating gradually over the course of this period. It seems that the government’s unyielding position became less intense as the 2009 legislative elections approached, suggesting an adaptation of the government’s position to the electoral cycle.
Portugal has a social concertation committee, called the Permanent Committee for Social Dialogue (Comissão Permanente de Concertação Social, CPCS), which is a part of the country’s Economic and Social Council. This latter group is “a constitutional body for consultation, concertation and participation in the field of economic and social policies.” As highlighted in the 2009 SGI report, this group has been called to provide input on policies dealing with pensions, wages and labor regulations. In June 2008, the CPCS approved new public sector hiring rules with support by the employers’ associations and one of the trade union organizations. It also approved a new system for the regulation of labor relations, employment policies and social protection in Portugal, which led inter alia to a revision of the labor code in 2009 (Law 7/2009). As with other previous measures of this kind, these provisions were approved by employers’ associations and the UGT, one of the trade union organizations. The largest trade union confederation, the CGTP-Intersindical (which is close to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)) continues to reject these measures, and accuses the CPCS of excluding the PCP from negotiations.

The Fico government’s willingness to consult with economic and social actors was low and rather selective. Fico regarded most interest associations and NGOs as nuisances, if not enemies. The main exception was the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) with its strong links to Smer-SD. The government accepted some demands by the unions and strengthened the competencies of the tripartite Economic and Social Council (Hospodárska at Sociálna Rada, HSK). Trade unions complained, however, that the Fico government did not take tripartism seriously.

Formalized influence on the policy-making process by institutions such as trade unions and employers’ associations was for a long time unpopular in the United Kingdom, because of bad experiences in the 1960s and 1970s. There is a widespread view that government alone should make decisions and consequently be held accountable for them. The Blair government managed to change that perception, and succeeded in making the policy-making process more collaborative, albeit in a more informal way than is the case in many continental European countries. The “stakeholder” approach has been very popular, and the government has established a number of committees in which actors from the private sector and the third sector of voluntary bodies and charities are members, and are thus able to provide input to government consultation exercises and receive documents associated with the issues at hand.
However, this form of enhanced participation remains largely at the discretion of the government, although it has also been partially institutionalized through mechanisms such as the regulatory impact assessment movement. Perceiving its role as one of ultimate responsibility, the government has tried to keep control of the decision-making process throughout, which has repeatedly led to criticism by other stakeholders.

The government has established quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (known as quangos) in a wide range of areas, whose work has influence on the decision-making process. In some cases, their stance can be controversial; for example, there has been dissent (and resignations from the board) within the Equal Opportunities Commission over the last two years. The expertise in the House of Lords (many of the members of which are crossbenchers selected for their eminence rather than for party-political roles) can also provide a sounding-board for government. However, the government can take or leave any such advice, and rarely feels obliged to seek a social consensus, as might happen in countries where civil society has a more formalized governance function.

Societal consultation has deteriorated substantially in the last two years. The Lee administration governs in a much more hierarchical and authoritarian way than did its predecessor, explicitly rejecting the Roh administration’s vision of participatory democracy. To some extent, this is a consequence of the deepening polarization between conservatives and progressives, with NGOs and civil society groups viewed by the government as “progressive” anti-government forces. Support for advocacy NGOs has been substantially decreased, and the government has followed a course of confrontation with labor unions. The business-friendly Lee naturally has closer relationships with business interests. In May 2008 he announced the opening of a hotline for 108 selected businesspeople (including six foreign firms with domestic investments) and business associations, which they could use to call the president 24 hours a day. However, such personalized contact can hardly be termed societal consultation, even in the case of business associations.