ADAPTABILITY

The most intrusive form of international/supranational cooperation Denmark takes part in is with the European Union. Since membership in 1973, an elaborate system of coordination within government administration has developed. It involves all affected ministries and agencies and often also interest organizations. In parallel, the European Affairs Committee in the People’s Assembly (Folketing) has become an efficient democratic control of Danish EU policy. Denmark speaks with one voice in Brussels.

Government has effectively adapted its structures to meet the impact of European integration and the rise of multilevel governance, which increases the necessity of interministerial coordination. A coordination secretariat under the authority of the prime minister, the SGAE (secrétariat général des affaires européennes) bears responsibility for daily coordination; conflicts are arbitrated by the prime minister’s senior civil servants, with only serious conflicts by the prime minister or the president himself. In 2005, an interministerial committee was founded to coordinate the French position in EU councils. It meets monthly under the authority of the prime minister. The ministers of foreign affairs, Europe, finance and economy are regular participants, while other ministers partake in the meetings according to the agenda treated.

Though not an EU member state, Iceland has, as a member of the European Economic Area (EEA) since 1994, integrated and adapted EU structures to a considerable extent. Under the EEA agreement, Iceland is obliged to adopt around 80% of EU law. Iceland is also responsive to comments coming from the Council of Europe (CoEU), the Schengen Agreement states and U.N. institutions. As one of the five full members of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Iceland is bound by every unanimous decision taken in the council. However, the council deals only with issues connected to Nordic cooperation (Petersson, 2005). The government’s structure and organization accords well with international practice, and was reviewed and revised most recently in 2007. However, it has been argued for some years that additional streamlining of the ministries is desirable in order to weaken the long-standing links between special interest organizations and the line ministries. At the time of writing, the current government has already announced plans to reduce the number of ministries from 12 to nine, for example by merging the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Industry.

The key influence in this area is Ireland’s membership in the European Union and, in the financial area, of the euro zone. In the 37 years since Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community, the country has adapted institutions at all levels of government to allow effective functioning in Europe.
In the financial and monetary area, Ireland has adapted its bank supervisory and regulatory structures to comply with membership in the European System of Central Banks. The budgetary process reflects Ireland’s obligations under the Maastricht Treaty.

Since Sweden joined the EU in 1995 there has been extensive adaptation of Swedish regulation to EU rules. Today some 70 per cent of all Swedish regulation is EU harmonized. In terms of structural adjustment, the government has taken all steps required by the EU. However, most of the harmonization has been less structural and more a matter of adapting policy to the EU rules and coordinating domestic policy with EU policy. The main challenges associated with this harmonization have been integrating rules and the EU modus operandi. The EU does not prescribe any specific domestic structural adjustments. The Union has so far not advocated any particular model of public administration other than the still evolving “European administrative space” (EAS).

Successive governments have had a strong commitment to adapting domestic political institutions so that they conform to accepted international standards, and to the treaties and conventions to which Australia is a signatory. Perhaps the only major treaty in recent years to which Australia has not been an initial signatory, and which has therefore not affected domestic political institutions, is the Kyoto Agreement on climate change. The Labor government elected in 2007 ratified the Kyoto Agreement, just hours after being sworn into office by the Governor-General.

Reforms to government structures themselves are, however, generally driven by domestic considerations, since there have been few international developments in recent times perceived as requiring modifications to the organization or cooperation among ministries or between national and state and territory governments.

Organizational change is constantly taking place within the federal government, and much of this change reflects international developments. For example, there have been many changes in the structural and reporting relationships between the various departments involved in international matters, which include the Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of International Trade.

Most of the recent adaptations have occurred since 1995 in the course of EU membership. Finland was among the first wave of EU member states to adopt the euro. Domestic government structures have in several instances been adapted. The Grand Committee of parliament is tasked with preparing and dealing with EU matters. The EU secretariat responsible for the coordination of EU affairs was transferred from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister’s Office in 2001, as its responsibilities were assumed by the government secretariat for EU affairs. Also, a coordination system has been established to ensure that Finland is able to present a coordinated position which is in line with its overall EU policy on issues under consideration in the European Union at each stage of preparation. This coordination system involves competent ministries, the cabinet committee on European Union affairs, the committee for EU affairs, which is an advisory and mediatory body in the coordination of EU affairs, and its various EU subcommittees. These subcommittees are sector-specific preparative organs and they constitute the basis for the promotion of EU affairs at the civil servant level. So far European Union membership has not changed the country’s long-standing, de facto commitment to a non-aligned status.

In 2008, the Polish government streamlined its policy-making in EU affairs and began preparing the country for its EU presidency to commence in the second half of 2011. It abolished the Committee for European Integration, a cabinet committee in charge of interministerial coordination in EU affairs since 1996, moved the position of the deputy minister for European matters from the government office to the ministry of foreign affairs, and appointed a plenipotentiary for the Polish EU presidency. The usage of EU funds indicates that Polish government institutions have adapted more smoothly to EU rules and requirements.

The Spanish government has largely adapted its domestic structures to agreements made at the international and supranational level, although this adaptation has not always been implemented effectively. The most important impact has been produced by European Union membership, which has included such significant developments as the monetary union, the internal market, access to EU funds, the Lisbon Agenda (now renamed the EU 2020 Strategy), the forthcoming launch of the External Action Service and the different sectoral aspects of EU law (competition, environment, transport, justice and home affairs, etc.). The coordination and adaptation of the Spanish government to the EU is mainly the task of the Secretariat of State for the EU (an efficient department within the less efficient Ministry of Foreign Affairs), which successfully managed the country’s turn at the rotating EU Council presidency during the first half of 2010.
For obvious reasons, and considering the economic predominance of the EU agenda, the Prime Minister’s Economic Office (dealing with the post-Lisbon agenda) and the Ministry for Economy and Finance also have important responsibilities in terms of cooperation among ministries on EU matters. More generally, all line ministries have to some extent Europeanized their organizations, although most ministries lack units dealing specifically with the European Union, and interministerial coordination among them is weak. Links with subnational levels of government (since the European Union has a strong impact in many policy areas handled by the autonomous regions) are made through the network of intergovernmental councils or conferences (conferencias sectoriales), but this system offers considerable room for improvement if it is to better address the effects of the European Union on policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, the latest Internal Market Scoreboard, issued in March 2010, showed that Spain had decreased its deficit with respect to the transposition of EU directives (less than 1% of directives had not been transposed to the Spanish domestic legal order), achieving its best result ever.

The government has also responded to other international developments (such as NATO membership and the Kyoto Protocol). In 2009, it created the Secretariat of State for Climate Change within the Ministry for Environment and Agriculture, as well as the Coordination Unit for International Terrorism some years before.

In a narrow sense, the United States as a world power and creator of many international organizations has naturally developed institutional structures (e.g., from the National Security Council to the United States Trade Representative) that are able to respond to its international obligations. Climate change negotiations have been firmly institutionalized in the Office of Global Affairs in the State Department. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security can be seen as a domestic structural response to the challenges of international terrorism. As a whole, the international focus on anti-terrorism units and law enforcement strategies has grown considerably. This remains true for the Obama administration. Whether the policies of these units and agencies have been successful or have stuck to multilateral norms is a totally different issue and dependent on the policy choices of each administration. The Obama administration has emphasized multilateralism, although this has led to only minor structural change. The best indication of change is the establishment of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy, directed by Carol Browner, the former head of the EPA under the Clinton administration. Multilateralism is therefore more a matter of spirit or policy direction than of structural changes.
The United States has been less successful (or less willing) in adapting domestic policy-making structures to the nominal requirements of the international trade regime, in some cases resisting compliance with fully adjudicated obligations under the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Given the domestic political orientation of most members, Congress has placed low priority on compliance with international obligations.

Belgium is one of the founding states of the European Union, in which it plays a proactive role, and an active member of many international agreements. In some instances, Belgium has played a leading role in some international agreements (e.g. on banning the production of land mines). Overall however this enthusiasm toward international and supranational developments has to be mitigated, as Belgium is regularly criticized for not fully complying with the rules it previously agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations, or NATO level. For instance, critiques concern Belgium’s lack of respect for the Geneva Convention and its non-ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This can partly be explained, again, by the country’s complex institutional structure (which complicates effective implementation, even if there is a coherent political will), and the fact that, due to decentralization, all entities have their own international relations regarding their (sometimes overlapping) competences.

Ever since the mid-1990s, the government’s activities have adapted to, and are strongly influenced by, the EU’s legislative framework. However, the main structures of government and methods of functioning have remained largely unchanged. A more strategic vision, with more cooperation between ministries, was judged necessary for EU relations during the period of the country’s EU presidency. This was addressed by creating the department for European affairs, headed by a minister and located within the government office, which was continued after the presidency moved to its next holder. The creation of the post of minister for human rights and minorities also followed outside criticism that these issues were not being taken seriously across the government as a whole.

Germany’s adaptation of domestic institutional structures to international and supranational developments has produced a mixed record. As in other EU countries, the influence of EU regulations is significant, and the German legal system is today strongly influenced by EU law. However, the organization of the government is still based on structures laid down partly at the end of the 19th century and partly in the aftermath of World War II. The federal government does not have a central policy lead tasked with the management of EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission in its own sectoral area, although the participation of the federal Foreign Office is always required in matters of fundamental importance. The coordination role is primarily shared between the Ministry of Economics and the Foreign Office.
Federal structures, with their various layers of governments and plethora of institutional actors, pose specific problems in terms of adaptability to international and supranational developments. The federalism reform of 2006 contributed to the streamlining of the processes. To address challenges posed by the financial crisis and other structural challenges, a constitutional debt limit was introduced as part of the federalism reform of 2009, restricting the federal government’s cyclically adjusted budget deficit to a maximum of 0.35% of GDP, and requiring balanced cyclically adjusted budgets for the individual states. The aims of the provision are the establishment of clear prior commitments to fiscal consolidation, greater transparency and clarity, and consistency with the European Stability and Growth Pact.
In the ratification process for the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the German law transposing the treaty violated the participation rights of the Bundestag and of the Bundesrat. To ensure the ratification of the treaty in accordance with the Basic Law, government and opposition agreed on the duty to obtain Bundestag consent in matters of fundamental EU regulation, and to provide stronger participation rights to the states in matters of labor legislation, environmental policy and EU budgetary policy.

The most profound impact that international, and particularly supranational (EU related) developments have had upon the structure and working of the government concerns the roles of the minister of finance and the Treasury Department. Because of budgetary requirements deriving from European integration and participation in the euro zone, the minister of finance has acquired increasing weight in the governmental decision-making process, exercising an effective gatekeeping role with respect to line ministry proposals. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has significantly updated its organization and principles in order to face the challenges associated with increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations.
In strengthening the efficiency and also the speed of its decision-making, the Italian government has followed international and supranational developments. But the main structural aspect of decision-making for the government during the period under review remained the checks and balances inherent in the governing coalition. Giving politicians the rank of minister, and creating a new minister without portfolio, is common.

Luxembourg has made significant progress in implementing European legislation. Its implementation deficit reduced from 2.8% in December 2007 to 1.4% in November 2009. Due to the improved performance of most member states, Luxembourg still ranks 26 out of 27 and its implementation delay remains considerably high (15 months compared to an average of 9 months), however the quality of its implementation is satisfactory, as it ranks 5 out of 27.
The government has announced as part of its program an analysis of the current implementation system to identify potential problems, with a simplification of interplay of parliament and states council under consideration. So far no draft legislation has been submitted.

The government is mostly open to international advice, and is pragmatic in its forms of internal organization. One might even say there is too much of a good thing in this respect. There have been problems in the past when Mexican policymakers have attempted to introduce reforms without sufficient awareness of their internal complexities. However, the finance ministry has often been skeptical about significant changes to the structure of governance out of a fear of unexpected financial consequences. This ministry tends to be quite conservative in its outlook on administrative change, and has sometimes opposed new initiatives. Internationally binding agreements have a higher status in Mexican law than do the constitutions of individual Mexican states. However, formal adoption is often easier than effective compliance with such agreements.

New Zealand is experienced in drastically restructuring the public sector and reforming policy-making to adapt to new challenges. Major reforms were accomplished from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. However, this was done under a majoritarian regime based on a first-past-the-post electoral system. Part of the reform package was the change to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system. Today, given a multiparty system and minority coalition governments, radical reform is much more difficult to achieve. In retrospect, the institutional reforms delivered somewhat less than was anticipated and are disruptive. The current government is concerned with driving efficiency and performance improvements into the system and has decided to do this with relatively limited emphasis on major restructuring of government agencies.

The European Union is extremely important to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community in 1986, the country has now become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal and organizational frameworks. However, the government of Portugal has not yet adopted all EU laws and regulations. Obviously, since Portugal is so much a part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has adapted its structures accordingly. Whether these function as expected by the decision makers in Brussels is another matter.

Korea can generally be described as an inward-looking country, but international developments that affect Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role for the Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The degree of adaptability, however, depends to a large extent on compatibility with domestic political goals. For example, the Korean government is relatively less responsive to global standards in the field of labor rights or the reduction of nontariff barriers.

Almost all public entities have a unit for EU affairs. As expressed earlier, strategic planning units are included in all ministries. Some pilot studies have been conducted in the public administration, including municipal governments, under the supervision of the Department of Strategic Planning of the State Planning Organization. Transparency and accountability are part of the administrative culture, at least conceptually.
Several general and specific projects have been developed between Turkey and the European Union, aimed at increasing human resources capacity and harmonizing legislation with the acquis. The UNDP (LAR 2), the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and the Matra Pre-accession Projects Program, which address primary and secondary legislation, public administrative reform, education, justice and home affairs, health, environment, public works and more are major mechanisms aimed at adapting central and local governmental structures to supranational developments.
With respect to judicial reform, the government has created the new Higher Council of Judges and Prosecutors, modeling it on similar institutions in Italy, France, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.
Due to the unresolved Cyprus problem, France’s opposition to Turkey’s full EU membership, and domestic resistance to reforms, Turkey process toward EU membership slowed in the period under review. However, membership negotiations are continuing, allowing reforms to be grounded in the framework of the aquis communautarie of the European Union. The following chapters of negotiation have been opened: science and research, company law, copyright and related rights, environment, statistics, trans-European networks, enterprise and industry policy, consumer and health protection, financial control, information society and media, taxation and free movement of capital.

Changes made to adapt domestic structures to international developments have been moderate. This is in large part due to the Austrian government’s fragmented and inefficient decision-making, which can be attributed to coalition cabinets as well as the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the ministries and state governments. A Constitutional Convent introduced in 2004 and 2005 has not resulted in any changes.
Austria’s EU membership has nonetheless served as an incentive for certain reforms. In fact, several of the legislative novelties of recent years can be attributed to Austria’s EU membership. In principle, these reforms have sought to adapt Austrian government structures and functions to the specific necessities of the EU, such as responsibilities regarding the EU Council of Ministers.

Government structures only partly meet international and supranational requirements. At the central government level, coordination of EU affairs has improved. Moreover, the Bajnai government did a good job in preparing Hungary’s EU presidency for the first half of 2011. In contrast, the attempts at improving the policy implementation capacity of the subnational governments have been less successful. The existing administrative-territorial units still do not correspond to the EU requirements, and the representation of Hungarian regions in Brussels is rather weak. A further problem is that, due to a lack of interest in security issues, the institutional structures for organizing military missions suffer from shortcomings.

Japan´s reform processes are usually driven by domestic developments and interests, but international models or perceived best practices do play a role at times. With respect to the extensive governmental reform program initiated by the DPJ, for example, the (somewhat idealized) “Westminster system” operating in the United Kingdom has served as a role model for top DPJ personnel. Other actors interested in reform have frequently appealed to international standards and trends to support their position. However, in many cases it is doubtful whether substantial reform is truly enacted, or whether Japan rather follows international standards in only a formal sense, with underlying informal institutional mechanisms changing much more slowly.

The Swiss government has not adapted to international and supranational developments, in the sense that it did not join the European Union. However, it has tried to adapt by concluding a number of bilateral agreements with the European Union. Likewise, there has been a partial adaptation in the field of security policy, through the cooperation with other nations and the United Nations, while insisting on neutral country status. Whenever Switzerland agrees to cooperate with other countries or international organizations, it tries to meet all the requirements of the agreement, including implementation of the necessary administrative reforms.
However, there are serious concerns as to whether this adaptation is sufficient. Switzerland still starts from the assumption of sovereign nation-states negotiating with each other on an equal basis; in particular, leading politicians suggest a balanced power distribution between the European Union and Switzerland, giving Switzerland the free choice between standing alone, bilateral treaties or EU accession. However, the already evident structural problems of the bilateral solutions are increasing with EU enlargement and the decreasing homogeneity within the European Union. Hence, it is very unclear whether Switzerland can continue this “bilateral path” long into the future. Much depends on the internal development of the European Union, and the form taken by new global or European challenges that must be tackled both on the regional (European) and domestic level. In this sense, the most important issue of Switzerland’s future remains unresolved.

Ministry organization is a prerogative of the prime minister, and ministries are very often merged into single organizational units or divided into several organizational units, in such a way as to reflect the specific interests of the government and/or the officeholder. A recent example of this is offered by the Department of Trade and Industry, which Prime Minister Gordon Brown divided into the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills in June 2007. The two new departments were rejoined in June 2009 (when Lord Mandelson joined the government), but the name was changed again to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

There is a Europe Minister within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (i.e., the ministry of foreign affairs) and a secretariat within the Cabinet Office that deals with European issues, as well as a designated coordinator for the EU’s Lisbon Strategy. However, the structure of government in the UK is for the most part shaped by domestic imperatives. At the parliamentary level, changes have been introduced to procedures to allow the British Parliament to intervene in the early stages of European policy formulation.

A National Reform Program (NRP), elaborated in the autumn of 2008 and required as part of the UK’s commitments under the Lisbon Strategy, was produced and did take account of recommendations to the UK government from the European Commission. In particular, the program included proposals to deal with the skills gaps that had been highlighted by the commission. However, the NRP has no visibility in UK political and policy discourse, and it would be hard to show that either the policy focus or the structures of governance in the UK had changed much as a result of the NRP’s production. On the other hand, some responsiveness to wider trends such as ‘”green” issues can be discerned in the recent restructuring of environment and energy ministries, with the latter having been assigned explicit responsibility for dealing with climate change.

Chile’s state modernization process is still underway. In general, the Bachelet government tended to attribute more importance to fiscal-political constraints than to making changes or adaptations entailing additional expenditure, such as budget augmentations for a certain ministry or department.

The government has adapted domestic administrative structures in at least two ways. First, it has created and expanded new units within ministries which are in charge of European and international affairs. These units are staffed by civil servants and political appointees with the title of “special” or “general” secretaries, who are hand-picked by ministers when the latter assume their duties. It is not uncommon for such political appointees to leave when the minister who appointed them also leaves office. In other words, the frequent reshuffling of Greek cabinets affects not only the top level of ministry personnel (the minister and his “political bureau,” which is roughly the equivalent of the French “cabinet ministerial”), but also administrative levels below that of the minister.
Second, the government has founded new agencies, officially appended to the central hierarchy of ministries, but in fact substantively outside the realm of the civil service hierarchy, and away from the web of intraministerial relations. These units are semi-autonomous agencies, tasked with projects that the government deems inappropriate for the regular ministries either because it wants to closely monitor a certain task required by supranational developments (e.g., the absorption of EU Community Support Frameworks funds), or because it correctly calculates that the civil service would be incapable of engaging at an international and supranational level (e.g., communication and contacts with international agencies on the issue of policy transfers).
Overall, the effectiveness of such adaptations has been limited. The state administration, including such agencies, lacks sufficient high-quality resources, operating procedures and professional norms to deal effectively with external institutions in many areas.

Government reform has been on (and off) the agenda for at least 40 years. To date, there has been no substantial or serious reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the early 19th century. The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are not locally elected but appointed by the national government. After a short experiment, the Netherlands has abolished the idea of larger metropolitian areas (e.g., Rotterdam, Amsterdam) constituting a “superfluous” fourth tier of government. Dutch coordination of EU policies is still a turf fight between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (not the prime minister’s office) and line ministries.

Government structures have remained rather stable over time. There are some ongoing efforts to improve the institutional framework, although not primarily in response to international developments. It is common for new governments to reallocate tasks across ministries.
Examples of adaptation are the early establishment of an environment ministry, a strengthening of the political leadership devoted to development cooperation, and the recent establishment of a directorate of integration separate from the body dealing with immigration issues. In general, interdepartmental coordination has increased as a result of international activity, and particularly so in relation to the handling of European affairs. A decision by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish a post of anti-terror coordinator was never implemented.

Under the Fico government, government structures remained largely unchanged. Despite some announcement to the contrary in the government’s program, the government did not adopt any institutional reforms to strengthen Slovakia’s influence in the EU or to make full use of the available EU funds. Coordination in EU affairs remained ad hoc.