ADAPTABILITY

Sweden has a tradition of being a lively international partner and is deeply involved in international collaborative work in terms of foreign aid, fighting poverty, addressing environmental issues or promoting human rights. The preferred strategy for international work is to participate in collective efforts such as UN sponsored projects. Sweden has used supranational structures like the EU (Sweden was chairing the Union from July through December 2009) as opportunities to launch collective international policies and projects. During the global fiscal crisis, the center-right government emphasized the need to tackle the crisis by international coordination. The Swedish government efficiently promoted international measures helping to contain the Icelandic crisis.

Australia has been an active participant and instigator of various international conventions, forums and activities. Areas of particular interest for the Commonwealth have been security, defense, crime, the environment, human rights and economic development. In all these areas Australia has been a leader in furthering international cooperation to deal with the problems that arise. Australia has been particularly active in the World Trade Organization in seeking an end of tariff protection among the affluent countries and to liberalize international trade.

During the review period, the government’s predisposition towards participation in international cooperative efforts has heightened, following the election of the Labor government in 2007 under the leadership of Kevin Rudd, a Mandarin-speaking former diplomat with a strong interest in international affairs. The Labor government has actively promoted Australia as a regional leader. In March 2008 the government announced that it would seek a non-permanent seat in the United Nations in 2013-2014, and the government has also promoted the idea of a regional economic forum, in order to coordinate economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

Among international coordination of reform efforts, the EU’s Lisbon Process arguably has been the most important in recent years. Denmark took an active part in these efforts. We can expect Denmark to take an active part in the EU’s new 2020 Strategy, which is replacing the Lisbon Strategy, which in the end was not very successful.
For a small country, Denmark’s contribution to U.N. Security Council missions is not poor.
Danish development assistance is also considered a success in Copenhagen as well as by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee.

The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the EU and other transnational and international organizations. Nonetheless, the reaction of the German government to the budget crisis in Greece was criticized as hesitant, showing a lack of willingness to take on an important role in the European Union. It can also be argued, however, that the Greek bailout stands in sharp contrast to the Maastricht Treaty’s no-bailout clause, so that any responsible government had to be cautious on that issue given its far-reaching implications for German taxpayers.
There is no doubt that Germany is overall a very constructive partner in international reform initiatives. However, one should not confuse an active involvement in international cooperation with a complete negation of specific national interests and specific policy preferences.

Given the isolated geopolitical position of New Zealand, the country participates proactively in many international organizations and in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. Major areas include the Antarctic Region, disarmament and proliferation, environmental protection, and human rights. New Zealand is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Commonwealth, OECD, the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Free trade is a central preoccupation in foreign relations. Two free trade agreements have been recently signed (the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Agreement and a bilateral agreement with Malaysia), others are in the making, inter alia with Korea, India and Hong Kong/China. At the U.N. Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen 2009, the New Zealand delegation was particularly active.

Norway is very diligent in adopting legislation passed on the level of the European Union. The country is not an EU member, but it still participates in most forms of EU policy coordination through membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), with the exception of certain reservations with respect to agriculture and fisheries. This relationship does not give it a role in EU decision-making or policy formulation, however.
Norway has been an active participant in and promoter of various international conventions, forums and activities. Areas of particular interest have been human rights, development and peace. Relative to its size, Norway is a large contributor to U.N. and NATO peacekeeping operations and to international organizations such as the IMF, the United Nations and the World Bank. Another example is Norway’s participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Initiative on so-called blood diamonds. Norway actively encourages developing countries to join the EITI and is one of four contributors to the World Bank Special Trust Fund to assist in its implementation.

Belgium hosts various supranational institutions, including the European Commission. The country has always displayed support for joint reform initiatives in most policy fields. This can be illustrated by the large number of Belgian politicians involved in the highest levels of these organizations (the most recent examples are Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council; Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament; and Isabelle Durant, vice-president of the European Parliament). Moreover, Belgium’s size makes it heavily dependent on international coordination. It therefore supports international reform efforts, for instance, on tax systems and carbon dioxide regulations. However, when considering implementation, Belgium does not always fulfill its commitments.

It is important to note that there is a difference between participation and constructive participation. Canada is noted for the very large number of international forums in which it is active. But it can be argued that in many cases this participation is pro forma. For example, in international trade negotiations, the refusal of Canada to negotiate over the status of its marketing boards reduces the chances of significant breakthrough. In climate change talks, many consider Canada’s position a hindrance to the development of a meaningful agreement. On the issue of an international tax on banking activities, proposed for debate at the G-8 and G-20 talks in Canada in June 2010, Canada is out of line with almost all other countries.

The participation of government in internationally coordinated activities has been satisfactory. Although Finnish troops have participated in U.N. peacekeeping activities since 1956, Finnish participation in U.N. Security Council missions has been fairly modest. A recent initiative by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs seeks to intensify Finland’s involvement in peace mediation. Finland is also a candidate for a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for the term 2013-2014. In 2008, Finland held the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Neighboring area cooperation is an integral part of Finland’s foreign policy and economic cooperation, and cooperation is carried out in accordance with Finland’s strategy for cooperation in the neighboring areas, confirmed by the government in 2004. A new strategy for the arctic region has been prepared by a working group appointed by the Prime Minister’s Office. A special area of involvement has been the Baltic states.
Since the Baltic states regained their independence, Finland has given considerable aid and technical assistance to the region, and has supported the Baltic states’ accession to the European Union.

The Hungarian government has actively participated in EU institutions, supporting all moves to deepen and widen European integration. Hungary was the first member state to ratify the Lisbon Treaty and has played a prominent role in developing the Eastern Partnership and the Danube Strategy. From July 2009 to June 2010, Hungary held the presidency of the Visegrad group. However, this presidency did not produce much in the way of results and was not used for managing and improving the tense relations to Slovakia.

Ireland prides itself on its enthusiastic participation in international reform initiatives, especially with regard to social progress, human rights and environmental protection. In the environmental area, Ireland signed the Kyoto Protocol, and a report published in 2009 projects that Ireland is likely to meet its commitments under this protocol (in part because of the recession’s impact on economic activity).
In the area of overseas development assistance (ODA), Ireland has built on its historical tradition of missionary work, especially in Africa, to play an active role in international ODA policy initiatives. The Irish government is committed to meeting the United Nations ODA target of 0.7% of gross national income by 2012. It has set an interim target of 0.6% in 2010. The severe economic downturn and increased budgetary pressure has made this target more difficult to achieve. However, in the 2010 budget, a commitment was given to maintain ODA at 0.52% of GNP.
A former president of Ireland, Mary Robinson, who was the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from 1997 to 2002, has done much to promote international reform initiatives and to encourage Ireland to play an active role in these initiatives.
Ireland was one of only three of the existing EU member states to open its labor market to immigrants from the ten new EU accession states in 2004. It has adapted its labor market and social welfare regulations to accommodate a very significant influx of population from these states over the past six years.
Relative to its population size, Ireland ranks eighth out of the 27 EU states in terms of asylum seeker applications from outside the EU, with Nigerians forming the largest single group. In 2009 the Irish authorities dealt with 4,790 applications for asylum, granting it to 1,465 people, or about one-third of the total.

During the period under review, Japan was actively involved in the new G-20 mechanism designed to meet the challenges of global financial turmoil. As its part of the multilateral effort, Japan contributed a considerable economic stimulus program. In foreign and security policy, the so-called Peace Constitution, and particularly its Article 9, makes it difficult for Japan to engage in international missions that include the use of force. Under recent LDP-governments, Japan did take part in a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean to support antiterrorism operations in and around Afghanistan. However, this was domestically controversial, and the new DPJ-led government stopped the mission in January 2010. However, it promised to help international efforts financially, pledging up to $5 billion in aid to the region over the next five years. With respect to global warming, Prime Minister Hatoyama sought to show international leadership in late 2009 by promising a reduction in CO2 levels of 25% by 2020 (as compared to 1990 levels), provided that other major economies made comparable efforts. However, some observers doubt that Japan could achieve this goal without substantially undermining economic growth, thus sparking domestic opposition strong enough to derail the program. Japan has emphasized its Asia-Pacific regional roots, and has actively forwarded and contributed to regional programs. However, with respect to global and regional leadership, Japan has found it difficult to contribute visionary plans attracting support by others, although it is noteworthy that plans for regional financial cooperation, such as the Chiang Mai program, have gathered momentum in recent years and have been quite markedly shaped by Japanese proposals. Still, it is often difficult for Japan to voice its positions on international cooperation forcefully enough against the sometimes conflicting and competing views of the United States and, more recently, China.

Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in the context of the European Union. As a founding member and through its senior ministers who have a better understanding of how the system works than their colleagues, it plays a certain role that is only noticed by public opinion if it is reported in the news, for instance, during discussions on bank secrecy. This occurred in spring 2009, when it succeeded alongside Austria and Belgium in gaining exceptions in information exchange in the context of the European Savings Tax Directive.
Sometimes Luxembourg can play a more dynamic role and seize opportunities. The regulation of investment funds throughout the European Union, known as the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), is a convincing example. UCITS refers to a series of European Union directives that established a common regulatory regime for marketing collective investment vehicles throughout Europe. Luxembourg was the first country to pass the UCITS legislation into national law in 1988, granting itself a competitive advantage not lost since then, and confirmed during the transition to UCITS III in December 2002. This alertness has contributed to making Luxembourg a major center for investment funds. At the moment, lobbies are maneuvering to speedily implement UCITS IV, adopted in January 2009 into national law and their think-tanks are already looking beyond this to UCITS V.

Ever since the Second World War, the Netherlands was an avid protagonist and willing partner in all forms of international cooperation. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) in being transposed into Dutch law. The present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies, the decline in popular support for the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid, the shift in the government’s attitude toward being a net contributor to EU finances, and the rejection of the EU referendum. These changes have also affected government participation in international coordination of policy and other reforms from 2008 to 2010. According to reports on Dutch civil servants’ cooperation in EU policy-making, cooperation in some technical fields (e.g., transport safety, medical issues) is smooth, whereas politically sensitive fields such as policing are met with reluctance and/or indifference. The Balkenende IV government stumbled over a decision to (dis)continue its military presence in Uruzgan/Afghanistan.

Poland has taken an active role in international policy coordination. Compared to the previous government, the Tusk government has adopted a more constructive position within the EU. Together with Sweden, it launched the Eastern Partnership in order to improve the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbors within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. From July 2008 to June 2009, Poland also chaired the Visegrád Group and initiated a number of activities within this framework. However, Poland’s international role suffered under the major disagreements waged between the government and President Kaczyński over the competencies for foreign affairs. These conflicts delayed the signing of the Lisbon Treaty and engendered some uncertainty over Poland’s position in the international scene. A 2009 Constitutional Court decision strengthened the government’s position, but did not end the controversies.

Since 2008, Spain has actively participated in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives such as the response to the financial and economic crisis (as one of the leading EU member states, and as a guest at the G-20 summits held in Washington, London, Pittsburg and Toronto). It has participated in international forums and actions responding to challenges such as climate change (including the 2009 Copenhagen summit), energy supply, illegal migration (in part through bilateral agreements in Northern Africa), global terrorism (mainly through transatlantic relations), and peacekeeping (with Spanish troops deployed as a part of UN, NATO and CFSP missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, Somalia, and until 2009, Kosovo). This international engagement was particularly active during the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010, coinciding with the preparation for and exercise of the country’s EU Council presidency.

In recent years, the Spanish government has actively favored a multilateralist approach, but has also pursued a specific set of goals through its international cooperation (including economic development in the poorest countries of Latin America and Africa, institutional strengthening of weak states, a death penalty moratorium, gender parity, access to water, etc.). This broad agenda is among the current government’s most prominent priorities, and after several years of increases in spending on bilateral and multilateral initiatives, Spain reached its highest level ever in international development aid during 2008 and 2009 (around €5 billion, or 0.45% of its GDP), the seventh-highest level of aid among the world’s donor countries according to the OECD annual report. In some initiatives (such as humanitarian aid after the 2010 Haiti and Chile earthquakes, or the United Nations Development Fund for Women) Spain is even the world leader. However, despite Spain’s relatively recent democratization and the high international reputation of its transition to democracy, the country is not particularly active in supporting democracy abroad or in adopting a hard-line behavior vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes.

At the diplomatic level, Spain cosponsors the UN-affiliated “Alliance of Civilizations“ initiative, and generally acts as a medium-sized world power with global interests, although these are concentrated in the Western Mediterranean and Latin America. In the latter region, Spain takes advantage of its cultural, historical and more recent economic and business links (institutionalized today in the Ibero-American Summits), playing a fundamental role as a bridge between the European Union and Latin America.

Since October 2008, Turkey has been one of the 10 nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council. Turkey started to solicit support for its election immediately after the election of the first AKP government in late 2002. In the period under review and the years prior to it, Turkey diplomatically reached out to hitherto neglected regions such as the Caribbean Community, the sub-Saharan states and Latin America. It thus established for the first time relations with the least developed countries and emerged as a donor within the frame of the United Nations.
Turkey continued its participation in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and as of the time of writing was also engaged in Lebanon, contributing to infrastructure construction.
In addition, Turkey has enhanced its efforts to develop regional cooperation, applying an EU-style neighborhood policy focused initially on economic cooperation, which underlines cultural proximity and draws on the idea of a common identity.
In the process of EU candidacy, there has been some legislative progress with respect to public administration reform. A reform monitoring group convened in April 2010. The government has put great effort into collaborating with international actors, mainly the EU Commission, the OECD and the World Bank, toward further administrative reforms such as the Framework Law on Public Administration, the Law on Civil Servants, the Laws on Associations and Foundations and so on, and has even taken initiative in extending reform to other countries.

In line with its active stance on international commitments, the UK has long played a leading role in coordinating international initiatives. This has also been the case on the EU level, even if the United Kingdom has been perceived by many as a reluctant and obstructive European. In reality, in areas such as structural reform or climate change, the UK has been fairly influential. Other initiatives in recent years have included the active promotion of efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, as well as support for cooperative international security policies (e.g., over Iran’s nuclear program).
In the recent financial market crisis, the UK government under Prime Minister Brown also played a very active role in finding solutions to systemic problems in the financial sector, and in promoting a new regulatory framework for the financial system within the context of the G-20 and the European Union. The government used the United Kingdom’s chairmanship of the G-20 to initiate a November 2008 pledge by member countries to enhance their efforts at global cooperation. Since the United Kingdom, which often has pursued policies consonant with the interests of the City of London, had often been an obstacle to such cooperation on regulatory reform in the past, this was a noteworthy change of course.

Austria participates actively within the EU, especially within the EU’s system of informal structure (“comitology”). But as this participation is controlled and dominated by the formal structures of the government (the federal cabinet), and as the government is primarily interested in catering to domestic needs, the impact of Austria’s participation can be seen as the requisite minimum (as is the case for any EU member).

The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives as often as possible. Chile participates actively in Latin America’s regional forums, meetings and institutions. However, while the country is a member of all important international organizations, Chile’s governments have been mostly either passive or irrelevant (in part due to the country’s small size) in shaping international cooperation and policy agreements. One possible exception is Chile’s relatively active role in international U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping operations.

France plays an active role in international coordination of joint reform initiatives. There is a high awareness of the fact that France should actively influence EU policy formation and international cooperation, and French governments have been active (yet not always successful) in setting agendas, proposing new initiatives or reforms.
However, the French government often takes positions too much in line with French interests only and does not present its initiatives in a way that would offer them as platforms on which support and consensus can be built. This limits the government’s success in steering or influencing decision-making at the European level. In other cases, the apparent success resulting from strong impetus and active political mobilization is only a short-term victory. The success and immediate failure of the Mediterranean Union is a case in point.

Iceland’s government is an active participant in international forums, but seldom initiates measures intended to shape or better international policies. After World War II, Iceland was a founding member of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and in 1949 was a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 2008, Iceland ran for a U.N. Security Council seat but lost to Austria and Turkey. In 2009, Iceland applied for membership in the European Union. Negotiations on the terms of accession are expected to commence soon. For the most part, Iceland has worked cooperatively in international affairs, but does not take any significant initiative in the international coordination of reform. A few years ago, the country participated in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq, and it participates in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on a minimal level.

Mexico has traditionally been supportive of initiatives promoted internationally, in the hope of reducing the inevitable bilateralism imposed by Mexico’s close and asymmetrical relationship with the United States. It remains an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. It is proud to be a member of the OECD. It has signed on to the Kyoto environmental protocol. Numerous policy or organizational recommendations made by international bodies are adopted in the Mexican policy-making process. International influence on institutional reform is often evident. However, Mexico’s foreign policy has been criticized in recent years for too much rhetorical activism in international forums, while lacking a clear strategic focus.

There has been no substantial change in Portugal’s approach to international coordination vis-à-vis the 2009 SGI report. The country’s size and somewhat peripheral position in Europe limit its impact in international reform efforts. Portugal thus seeks to cooperate with others in pursuing reform initiatives, without seeking a leading role. That said, Portugal does perform well when asked to play a substantial part at the international level, as the country’s 2007 EU presidency (during which the Lisbon treaty was approved) showed.

One of the main goals of the current government is to improve the prestige of Korea in the world (Kukgiok), and to build Korean soft power. The government has become considerably more active in international organizations. Korea has increased its contribution to the World Bank and the IMF, and is an active participant in the G-20. In 2010, Korea chaired the G-20, and organized the leaders’ G-20 meeting in Seoul in November 2010. Korea is also increasing its efforts in development cooperation, and became a member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009. The country participated actively in the Copenhagen conference on climate change in 2009, although its actual commitments to reduce greenhouse gases remain weak. The Korean government has also shown little enthusiasm for G-20 initiatives proposing the international coordination of financial sector regulation and taxation.

As a world power, the United States will participate in international coordination and joint reform initiatives to the extent that these fall within the range of its interests. The position of the United States in the international system implies that transnational integration is of less relevance for American strategy. Consequently, the United States not only collaborates in reform initiatives promoted by international fora, but actively tries to determine their agenda. That is, the United States actively seeks and promotes international cooperation on its own terms. Examples include reform of the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Human Rights Commission as well as reforms of the IMF and the World Bank, and most recently the reform of the international financial system. The United States is also an effective participant in the G-7/8 process. In all areas mentioned above, from international security to human rights, the United States has made contributions. During the Bush administration, the glaring exceptions were international climate change policy and the Rome Statute, the basis for the International Criminal Court. On climate change, the Obama administration has reversed the course, although it is unclear whether Congress will follow its lead. There is little movement toward ratifying the Rome Statute. The most notable change under the Obama administration is the move toward broader international fora such as the G-20 that include emerging market countries such as China, Brazil and India. This trend is also visible in the Major Economies Forum for Climate Change. Altogether this signals a departure from the focus on Europe and the transatlantic arena. This may also imply a reduced reliance on NATO.

The Czech Republic takes part in initiatives led by international organizations, especially the EU and NATO, but its role is that of a passive follower rather than initiator. It is harmed in this regard by its political leaders’ lack of experience on the world stage, and by the strength of a domestic euroskeptic current which has ruled out playing an active leadership role within the European Union. These weaknesses were exposed during the country’s EU presidency in the first half of 2009 (Braun 2009). The stated aim was to make a major impression asserting a conception of the EU as a zone of liberalized economic relations with minimal political coordination. The slogan was to be “Europe without barriers.” Much EU work in that period was a continuation of initiatives already in process, but the Czech government’s position was difficult in three respects. First, the country had not ratified the Lisbon Treaty, but had to work to ensure that terms offered to Ireland gave the maximum chance of a positive vote in a referendum in that country. Second, the Czech government was not convinced of the seriousness of the economic crisis in early 2009, and did not favor a coordinated European response, a position that conflicted with that of major EU members. Third, during military conflict in the Middle East, the Czech foreign minister was unprepared to seek a role in mediating or attempting to resolve the conflict. The Topolánek government was replaced by the Fischer government during that period. That eased relations with other European leaders but did not lead to any new initiatives.

The Italian government is in general quite ready to participate in the international coordination of reform initiatives. However, its ability to play a leading role is reduced by Italian politicians’ preoccupation with internal matters. The attention given to international events and priorities is often overshadowed by problems arising on the domestic scene. Compared to the Prodi government, the Berlusconi government has as a rule been less keen to participate in multilateral international reform initiatives, and has preferred to establish bilateral contacts with different countries. However, in the field of international peacekeeping activities (in Lebanon, in Afghanistan, etc.), it has continued to provide a strong and active contribution.
It is true that in the period under review, the Italian government in fact contributed almost no political proposals or projects on the European level which could also have worked to resolve Italy’s domestic problems. From immigration to internal security to environmental policy, Italy has a multitude of challenges ahead, but the country lags behind in adapting European law and regulations, both in terms of formal adoption and of material or substantive implementation. The idea of a European directorate (focusing on the EU-3, or Germany, France and the UK) is quite well understood in Italy, and there have been many efforts to bring the government and the country into the “natural” club of the four relatively large EU countries. However, the country’s ambiguity in European affairs, as well as its domestic problems with respect to the status of democracy and the rule of law under the Berlusconi government, has rendered Italy less desirable as a possible strategic partner.

Swiss authorities have been somewhat reluctant to participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. The idea that reforms are defined commonly on the international level and then become in some way binding for Switzerland is alien to the Swiss political discourse. In the course of the increasing polarization of Swiss politics during the past 15 years, with the decline of consociational patterns of behavior, there has even been increasing emphasis by right-wing politicians on the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state surviving through smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large parts of the population support these ideas. The recent report on “Sicherheit 2010” by Szvircsev et al. (2010) demonstrates the increasing skepticism toward integration that has mounted during the past seven years (p. 93, p. 99).
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to repeat the cliché of Switzerland as a solitary lone wolf, as there have been various attempts to contribute to international cooperation. Switzerland is a fairly active member of the United Nations, the IMF, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and most of the other important international organizations. In order to defend the interests of its export-oriented economy, Swiss foreign economic policy is also quite active (as, for instance, in the WTO). Certainly, the country cannot take the role of a “big player” on the international scene, and it concentrates on fields where it can realistically have some influence, as in economic matters or in “technical” organizations dealing with issues such as transport, ecology or development. And indeed, Swiss diplomats have tried (often successfully) to improve international cooperation in these fields.

Greece is a longtime EU member state, but is small in terms of its national economy and is administratively and financially weak. Even if Greece had developed more efficient governance structures, it could not play anything but a minimal role in shaping international policies. Greek representatives participate in almost all international forum and initiatives, in numerous policy sectors. Still, the participation of Greek officials in international cooperative programs in fields such as international security, economic development, social progress, human rights issues and environmental protection does not guarantee that the country will follow, let alone lead, any joint reform initiatives. Moreover, Greece is a laggard in some policy sectors such as environmental protection, because it either delays the transposition of EU or other international regulations or altogether fails to implement them.

Under the Fico government, Slovakia’s role in the EU and in other international organizations decreased. Prime Minister Fico largely focused on domestic issues. For example, he did not attend a single NATO summit. Slovakia also passed on the presidency of the OECD in 2010. Foreign Minister Lajcak justified this extraordinary decision by citing reasons related to the upcoming elections.