INTEGRATION

Australia has maintained one of the largest postwar immigration programs of any established democracy, in proportion to its population size. Over one-fifth of the population is foreign-born. Successful integration of immigrants has been critical to the very functioning of Australian society and economy and has therefore been a policy priority for much of Australia’s history. In general, Australia continues to be highly successful in integrating immigrants. Increasingly, the most important contributor to this success has been a highly selective immigration policy, with migrants selected on the basis of their skills and English language ability representing a growing share of all immigrants.

Explicit integration efforts for immigrants primarily consist of encouraging them to take out citizenship, although in 2007 Australian residency requirements increased from two to four years before immigrants are eligible to take out citizenship. A citizenship test was also introduced in 2007 by which potential citizens have to demonstrate a basic understanding of Australian society, politics and culture, as well as basic English language skills. Immigrants are also encouraged to integrate into Australian society, but within the context of a policy of multiculturalism, first adopted in 1972, whereby immigrants retain their own language, culture and traditions.

A particular concern in recent years has been the large number of asylum seekers who have arrived, usually on boats from Southeast Asia. Mandatory detention was introduced for asylum seekers in the 1990s, and extended in 2001, so that detainees were excluded from the mainland, where they had certain legal rights of appeal. The incoming Labor government in 2007 abolished this so-called “Pacific Solution,” but retained mandatory detention, except for children and certain other groups deemed not to represent a security threat.

Receiving around 250,000 immigrants per year, Canada has one of the highest annual immigration to population ratios in the world. Cultural, education and social policies support the integration of immigrants, including language training and orientation courses. To promote integration, Canada allows immigrants to become citizens after three years of residency, one of the shortest residency requirements in the world. Nevertheless, these policies appear not always to have been effective, or at least adequate, as seen in the high unemployment rates and low earnings for recent immigrants, and in the high rate of return to the county of origin by immigrants. This situation is exacerbated by difficulties faced by immigrants in having their professional credentials recognized by Canadian authorities; the concentration of immigrants in a small number of major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal (immigrants to cities where immigrants are few in number experience much better labor market outcomes); language problems encountered by many immigrants; and according to some, the lower quality of education received by immigrants from developing countries.

In 2009, 43.7% of Luxembourg’s resident population were of foreign origin. The number of foreigners has increased significantly (44,570 between 2000 and 2008), but the number of arrivals and departures is even greater (125,213 arrivals and 80,643 departures during the same period). These figures show that integration policy is an important issue in Luxembourg. As xenophobia is quite marginal, or at least not openly expressed in public, we can say that the country’s integration policy works well.
The citizenship law was revised to allow for dual citizenship from January 1, 2009. At the same time knowledge of the Luxembourgish language has been made obligatory for anybody who wants to attain citizenship.
The ability to retain their citizenship of their home country while becoming Luxembourgers has encouraged new groups of well-integrated foreigners to take advantage of this opportunity. As shown in the assessment covering the first 10 months of the new procedure, the number of applications has multiplied by four compared to the same period the year before; the language test too has not been an insurmountable barrier.
Nevertheless, immigrant associations point out the vexatious and deterrent nature of the test, which – in their eyes – has no reason to exist in a multilingual country, where French is the principal language of communication. They see it mainly as a measure of appeasement, a concession to conservatives fearing foreign infiltration.
A new integration law (Loi du 16 décembre 2008 concernant l’accueil et l’intégration des étrangers au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg) reorganizes the administrative structure managing integration policy by creating the Luxembourg office of reception and integration (Office luxembourgeois de l’accueil et de l’intégration, OLAI). This office has the following responsibilities: implementation and coordination of reception and integration policy; implementation and management of the ”reception and integration contract”; facilitation of the integration of foreigners; definition of a “national action plan for integration and against discrimination”; definition of a five-year national report on the integration of foreigners; administration of accommodation facilities; supervision of asylum seekers; and action against discrimination.
The reception and integration contract, which is voluntary in nature, contains some reciprocal commitments for the government and the immigrant to organize and facilitate their integration: the government undertakes to provide language training and civic courses as well as measures to promote the social and economic integration of the foreigner; the immigrant is committed to participate in societal life.
The electoral law at the municipal level will be changed in favor of foreigners.

New Zealand is a prime destination for immigrants and the growing numbers of immigrants who take up New Zealand citizenship reflect the country’s willingness to encourage integration. Based on labor market and education system indicators, integration policy has been quite successful. This is reflected in the views of many immigrants who, despite socioeconomic difficulties, are relatively satisfied with their situation. To some degree the overall good performance has to do with the fact that New Zealand employs a points-based selection system which helps to attract immigrants that are relatively self-sufficient financially and can be easily be integrated in the labor market. Indeed, the new Immigration Act 2009 for the first time clearly states that in New Zealand, skilled immigration is preferred. The appeals procedure has been streamlined and the decision to grant entry can now be based on “classified information” with regard to security matters or criminal conduct. More problematical are lesser-skilled immigrants who experience difficulties in settling when they are unable to bring other family members to New Zealand.

All non-EU nationals who immigrate to the Netherlands are required to learn the Dutch language and develop knowledge about Dutch society.
The Civic Integration Abroad policy requires obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family reunion applicants. However, Human Rights Watch stated that this poses some concerns because it clearly applies only to family migrants from certain nationalities, mainly from non-western countries. The number of applications decreased a nd further financial restrictions (€350 for each time the test is taken) infringe upon the right to family life.

Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment security and labor market integration. In terms of political participation, the Netherlands performs very well on immigrants’ political liberties in forming associations and political parties. Nonetheless, applicants for national citizenship can be rejected for not participating in the mandatory Naturalization Day ceremony.

Integration policy is well-organized and well-funded, but the effects of immigration represent a new challenge in this country, and the policies have to date been less than fully effective. Non-Western immigrants experience higher unemployment rates and lower wages than native Norwegians. There are frequent complaints about discrimination in both the labor and the housing markets. There is notable social unrest related to problems of second and third-generation immigrants.
Integration policies include free language training, and additional school resources allocated to immigrant children. Some of these resources are devoted to preserving cultural identity. For instance, children are offered additional classes in their mother tongue. The acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is relatively quick. Applicants must have lived in the country for at least seven out of the last 10 years and either be fluent in Norwegian or have attended courses in Norwegian (or Sami) for 300 hours. Immigrants with permanent residence status are entitled to vote in local elections.
An autonomous Directorate of Integration was created in 2006, separate from the pre-existing Directorate of Immigration and Integration, a change that was generally seen as a sensible and successful reform. However, the challenges of multiculturalism stemming from immigration remain relatively unfamiliar in this traditionally homogenous society, and policies remain unsettled and in some respects immature. For example, the country continues to deny the right to dual citizenship. The state church institution stands in the way of religious equity, particularly in the eyes of alternate religious groups. Islam has become the largest non-Christian religious denomination, with a membership of about 90,000 people out of a total national population of 4.8 million.
The country’s “old minorities,” mainly the aboriginal Sami population, have in the course of two or three decades gone from facing severe discrimination to a state of equity and integration. This has been institutionalized in their formal recognition as an aboriginal people, with group rights written into the constitution and the creation of a Sami parliament, elected by the Sami population, which possesses some legislative authority.

Portugal’s integration policy is generally a very good one, albeit unevenly so. The UNDP’s Human Development Report of 2009 praised Portugal as an example of good practices in some aspects of immigrant treatment, notably in providing health care access to migrants regardless of their legal status; allowing the extension of temporary residence permits; allowing migrants to obtain permanent residence permits after five years of regular residence in the country; and providing language courses to migrants. However, this is counterbalanced by areas in which Portugal lags, with the UNDP’s report highlighting Portugal’s failure to provide “schools with teachers and educational resources of similar quality to those attended by locally born pupils.” The role played by the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME) must also be noted. This has had a prominent and widely praised role in promoting integration.

With a large share of immigrants as part of its colonial and Commonwealth history, integration issues have long played an important role in British policy-making. The 1998 Human Rights Act and the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act gave all public authorities the general duty to promote race equality, and was a major attempt to end discrimination. The Commission for Racial Equality saw its role and powers extended, and the production of statistics was much increased in order to be able to monitor and assess the prevalence of racial inequality in public life.
But the integration of migrants into British society remains an ongoing task, as the recent riots in places like Bradford, Oldham, Burnley, Leeds and Stoke have shown.
With the post-financial crisis economic difficulties hitting the labor market hard, worries about immigration have increased since 2008, and the British National Party (BNP) has sought to capitalize on this in local elections.
In terms of representation in bodies such as the House of Commons, commitments by both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party to increase diversity among their officeholders and MPs have been successful over the last decade. As a result, public life in the United Kingdom now reflects the diversity of its population much better than in the mid-1990s.

The main issues concerning the status of immigrants in the United States are less about cultural, education and social policies that either succeed or fail in integrating immigrants, and more about the ways in which immigration is managed and the handling of illegal immigrants, who account for nearly one-third of all current immigrants (roughly 12 million, though some studies estimate up to 15 million). The issue of the status of illegal migrants is closely connected to the issue of improved border security. Increased immigration in the last decade has created competition among ethnic groups for resources relating to housing, jobs and health care, a trend that predates the recession, particularly in states heavily affected by illegal immigration.
The issue was put on the agenda in late April 2010 by a controversial bill passed in Arizona that will make it a state crime to be in the country illegally. Interestingly, a federal law requires non-citizens to carry papers at all times, but it is not enforced. The Arizona measure would require migrants to produce papers verifying their status when asked to do so by a police officer. If found to be in violation of the law, these individuals are subject to fines and deportation. Critics fear that such action will lead to racial profiling. Arizona has been heavily affected by immigration, with the Latino population having grown by 180% in the past two decades and the share of the white population having dropped from 72% to 58%. There are strong anti-immigrant, anti-Latino sentiments among many senior citizens and retiring baby-boomers. Polls show that Arizona residents favor the law by wide margins. Democratic Party politicians, including President Obama, have come out against the law, and a federal district court judge in July 2010 issued a temporary injunction blocking enforcement of the most important provisions of the law. The state of affairs in Arizona can be attributed to a tradition of incoherent and ineffective policy-making on immigration. On one level, the federal government commits to exerting tight control on immigration, but then is unwilling to enforce it. Effective enforcement would require, most likely, a vastly enhanced infrastructure capable of monitoring and enforcing the requirements set for employers to verify immigration status. But such measures are opposed by business, and in fact, would disrupt production in various sectors, especially agriculture. As Washington lacks credibility in its commitment to enforcement, voter distrust grows. It is difficult to achieve a grand bargain based on a three-pronged strategy of improving the enforcement imposed on employers, developing behind the border, expanded legal immigration (perhaps through a guest worker program), and establishing conditional amnesty for those already in the United States. Given the role of Latinos as a decisive swing-vote, immigration reform will have to be dealt with, leading to difficult choices for Republicans and Democrats alike. If there are no credible solutions, unilateral attempts at the state level will continue. The fact remains that the U.S. political system has been unable to come up with credible immigration reform.

In 2009 there were approximately 530,000 immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in Denmark, which corresponds to 9.5% of the population. After the tightening of immigration policy introduced by the liberal-conservative government in 2002, immigration from non-Western countries fell but net immigration from Western countries rose. In January 2009, 11.1% of immigrants and their descendants were of Turkish origin, followed by 5.8% of German origin, 5.5% of Iraqi origin, 5.2% of Polish origin, 4.5% of Lebanese origin, and 4.2% came from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The employment frequency among 16- to 64-year-old immigrants and their descendants rose from 46% in 2001 to 57% in 2008. This latter figure should be compared with 79% for Danes. For female immigrants and their descendants, employment rose from 38% to 51% in the same period, which still means that one in two immigrant women do not work.

The employment rate for immigrants from poorer countries has been increasing in recent years, and so far this group has not seemed to suffer disproportionally from the effects of the financial crisis. This improvement can in part be attributed to a lower inflow of immigrants, which has increasing the average residence period of immigrants in general, and that more immigrants were admitted to Denmark for labor market reasons.

In relation to educational achievements, immigrants and their descendants are making progress but still fall well behind native Danes. In 2008, the percentages of 25- to 29-year-olds who had achieved a higher education were 9% for immigrants and 20% for their descendants, compared with 32% for Danes. The 24-year-old rule for family reunification introduced in 2004 has had the effect that immigrants and their descendants bring spouses from abroad now less often. The percentage fell from 61% in 2001 to 31% in 2008. Instead, immigrants increasingly marry other immigrants or their descendants already living in Denmark, as well as native Danes.

Still, it is fair to say that a number of immigrants in Denmark, especially from non-Western countries, have problems integrating. The government has therefore introduced a number of policies and measures in cooperation with municipalities designed to further the integration of immigrants.

These instruments, apart from improved language courses at all levels, include financial incentives to the municipalities, industry, NGOs and so on to assist with the integration of immigrants.

The government claims that the situation is improving. According to a recent publication from the Ministry of Refugees, Immigration and Integration Affairs, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated, have more Danish friends and fewer feel discriminated against, while many more immigrants are speaking Danish than ever before. Still, there is a long way to go.

Whereas the Finnish immigration policy previously dealt with humanitarian concerns, focusing on refugees and return immigration, it has lately assumed the task of promoting work-based immigration. During the last 10 years or so, the number of foreigners in Finland has almost doubled. However, the number is still low in absolute terms. Several factors, like geography, the difficulty of learning the Finnish language, and also prevailing negative attitudes toward immigrants in society at large, have prevented large-scale immigrant inflows. Finland’s willingness to integrate foreign immigrants has perhaps not been overwhelming and integration policies have been only partly successful. Foreign-born unemployment is still high: whereas a good 70% of immigrants satisfy labor-force age requirements, only a good 40% are actually employed. The figures for foreign upper-secondary education and foreign-born tertiary attainment are less than impressive, and immigrant education levels remain lower than those of Finnish natives. The rules for the acquisition of nationality are strict, and are duly enforced. In the period under assessment, no major governmental initiatives in migration and integration policy were made.

Over the last two decades Ireland has moved from being a sending country with high rates of net outmigration, to having the European Union’s highest rate of net immigration during the early years of the 21st century, and back to a position of net emigration since 2008. These changes reflect the movement of the economy from recession to boom and back to recession.
However, the large inflow of immigrants to the country during the boom years rapidly increased the foreign-born population resident in Ireland, a situation likely to be a lasting legacy of the period. While immigrants from a wide range of countries – European and non-European – are now resident, the most significant immigration flows in recent years have come from the new EU states, with Poland and the Baltic countries figuring very prominently. These new residents have also shown the highest outflow rate since 2008. This reflects their concentration (especially the males among them) in construction-related employment. The unemployment rate among those who have remained in Ireland is higher than among native-born workers. At the end of 2009, the unemployment rate among Irish nationals was 11.9%, compared with 19.5% among nationals of the recent EU accession states. The acquisition of nationality is not a burning issue for these immigrants who have the right to reside and work and own property in Ireland by virtue of their EU citizenship.
The increase in arrivals from non-English-speaking countries in the last 10 years has placed a strain on the educational system. Additional resources have been provided to help cope with this challenge, but these are not regarded as adequate. There are signs of increasing gaps between schools in relatively deprived areas of the main cities, which often have high concentrations of children holding non-Irish citizenship, and schools in the more affluent areas with lower such concentrations.
There is evidence that immigrants in general, and those whose native language is not English in particular, are employed in occupations below their skill levels, and that they suffer some penalty in terms of earnings relative to their Irish-born counterparts.
Nationals of non-EU countries constitute only about 3% of the adult population, and this share has been falling since the onset of the recession. However, it is among this group that the greatest problems of residency and employment rights, as well as broader integration problems arise.
Forced integration does not seem to be an issue, although there are obvious difficulties facing small minorities in a country that is still overwhelmingly Irish, while their children face additional difficulties in a school system that is still largely under Roman Catholic management.

Swedish integration policies cover a wide range of measures (from language training programs to supportive labor market policies). However, the integration of immigrants has not yet fully been solved economically, socially or culturally. Unemployment among immigrants is higher than among Swedes. Cultural integration is slow to some extent depending on the concentration of immigrants in the three metropolitan regions in the country (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö). This is not so much on account of a lack of financial resources or a weak political commitment to addressing these issues. On the contrary, integration policy has been a major political concern for a couple of decades. Central and local government together with voluntary associations and NGOs have been strongly committed to the complex issue of integration. It is very difficult indeed to explain the rather modest outcomes of these efforts (cultural obstacles, the regulated nature of the labor market, problems related to the complex immigration blending labor immigrants with political refugees, xenophobia among groups of the Swedish population, and so on). Swedish labor market regulations still block a pronounced low-wage sector, as seen in the USA, UK or other nations with a long history of immigration. Hence, ethnic segregation is more easily observable in Sweden than it is in countries with more deregulated labor market regimes and with dynamic low wage sectors.

Given the very high share of migrants in the population (about a fifth of the country’s residents), integration policy is hardly a success. There have been many attempts to integrate foreigners starting at the age of kindergarten. But while the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy is failing as a whole. Many local authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job of integration, especially for the young. Even more important in this respect are the activities of civil society organizations such as sports clubs.
However, both the success of the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party and indicators of integration suggest moderate achievements at best. For example, in 2009 – 2010, about 6% of all Swiss students at universities (either Swiss citizens or foreign students who were living in the country before studying) were foreigners. In contrast, 51% of all convicted persons in Switzerland in 2008 were foreigners (calculated from data available on the Federal Office of Statistics website). This has to be judged against the 22% share of foreigners in the population as a whole (2008). One has to add that 12% of all convictions are due to violations of the law for foreigners (e.g., illegal migrants) and that when controlling for other variables such as social status, income and education, status as foreigner alone shows very little independent effect in criminal statistics. Having said this, it is clear that foreigners have a disproportional likelihood to display criminal behavior, and do not attain university degrees in a proportion matching their population share. This latter finding might not be due to individuals’ status as foreigners per se, but rather due to their low social status. Education is still a privilege of the upper and middle class in Switzerland, a major failure of Swiss educational policies at all federal levels. As immigrants until recently belonged to the lower social strata, they are discriminated against not because they are foreigners but because their family background is of the lower classes. Since the immigration pattern is about to change, with the share of highly skilled foreigners increasing, this latter problem could disappear in the long run.

There is a political will, at all levels, to help resident foreigners and second- or third-generation immigrants acquire Belgian citizenship. However, the education system is ill-adapted to serve non-native-speaking pupils, and labor market discrimination remains a problem. The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism has been established to address such problems. At the social level, policy is thus quite proactive. At the economic outcome level, however, there is still a very long way to go to achieve social integration of immigrants.
Part of the difficulty is that a high proportion of migrant populations (even second and third generation) remains concentrated in ethnic “ghettoes,” which hampers socialization and contact with the rest of society (not least through the schooling system – many schools also become “ghettoized” in the process). A small proportion of citizens with migrant backgrounds achieve social mobility, generally by obtaining a degree that facilitates employment, but the larger majority does not. This further encourages ghettoization as well as exclusion from the host society (e.g., fundamentalist groups attracting youngsters of Muslim origin).

Traditionally, France has an open policy toward immigrants acquiring French nationality; every person born in France is considered French, or eligible to obtain French citizenship. This rhetoric as well as concrete policy objectives have been applied to migrants rather successfully up to the 1970s. Education, labor market policy and naturalization were the key instruments of that integration process.
In recent years, however, the model has produced more and more problems and conflicts, even if it still works for the majority of immigrants. The cultural awareness of young French citizens with north African background, together with the social phenomena of racism and discrimination, have created explosive situations, mainly in the problematic suburban zones where these populations are concentrated. Rising unemployment has hit migrant young people particularly hard; France shows a particular poor performance considering foreign-born unemployment. The declining integrative power of republican institutions, such as schools, has been illustrated by the “headscarf” conflicts (young Muslim female pupils wearing headscarves) when the authorities were torn between strict prohibition (in the name of the separation between church and state, which interdicts all religious symbols in public institutions) and a more liberal attitude (postulated by some factions of the public in the name of respecting cultural identity). Entire families have been living on welfare benefits for long periods of time while trafficking is becoming a profitable business for gangs of young people. Petty criminality has become more attractive than badly paid jobs. Those better educated have the feeling of being rejected from the labor market for ethnic or racial reasons.
Any judgment on the success or failure of integration policy is difficult. On the one hand, France has a long past (and present) record of success in integrating large group of immigrants. It has been calculated that a quarter of the French population has a least one grandparent of foreign origin. The acquisition of nationality also testifies of that success since every year, as more than 100,000 people become French through naturalization. On the other hand, the integration of the so-called second generation (in fact, often the third!) is very difficult, resulting from many combined factors: a failure of the education system, concentration of social ghettos at the periphery of large cities, high unemployment, identity problems and so on.

Germany is known as a country of immigration; about 15 million people (20% of the population) have a migration background, and this number is increasing. Integration policy in Germany aims at two groups of migrants.
On the one hand, the government tries to attract highly skilled employees to work in Germany, and therefore facilitates immigration for this group. This is due to unfulfilled demand for skilled workers. These migrants are usually well integrated. On the other hand, the government focuses on the integration of people with a Muslim (especially Turkish) background. Members of this group tend to be less integrated in society and usually of a lower skill level. Many of them were born in Germany (third-generation migrants). In particular, this immigrant group has fallen behind in terms of educational attainments and labor market performance. Thus, there is a strong link between the debates on immigration policy and on reform of the education system.
Overall, an explicit and consistent integration policy in Germany is still in the early stages of development; over the last 10 years, there have been several changes in integration policy, with only limited effects.
In 2009, the new government refused to create a new ministry of integration at the federal level, arguing that better integration policy was not related to creating additional bureaucracy. Today, integration policy is associated with the Federal Ministry of the Interior, through the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, and is represented by Minister of State in the Federal Chancellery (and Federal Government Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration) Maria Böhmer. Some of the federal states have their own ministries for integration. In 2005, the former governing coalition passed a national integration plan, which tried to identify the main goals for integration.
In 2006, then Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble established the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz, DIK), with the aim of developing the intercultural dialog between representatives of Muslim organizations in Germany and government officials. The design is to support societal cohesion, integration and reaching consensus with respect to values. The new government decided to continue the conference, with a new focus. The new Minister of the Interior Thomas De Mazière aims to transform the results of the first period into practical policy.
The most important goal is to support children and women in learning the German language as the main prerequisite for good education and integration. Therefore, the government provides free language courses for immigrants and has established a language test, which everyone has to pass before moving to Germany. In addition, since Sept. 1, 2008, everyone who wants to become a German citizen has to pass the citizenship test.

The laws on the civil rights of immigrants in Iceland are mainly based on Danish and Norwegian models, as well as implementing Iceland’s obligations under the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. The Danish law on immigrants is considered to be one of Europe’s most restrictive, largely by making it difficult for citizens outside the EEA to move to Denmark. Iceland too has a law on immigrants from EEA/EU countries and a separate law governing immigrants from non-EEA/EU countries (Önnudóttir, 2009). The latter law focuses on the need for foreign labor in the country and grants citizens from outside the EES/EU only temporary work permits. The authorities provide instruction in the Icelandic language for foreign citizens.
Citizens from other Nordic countries are eligible to vote in local government elections after having maintained their legal domicile in the country for three consecutive years. Other foreign citizens have to wait five years for this right (Lög um kosningar til sveitarstjórna No. 5, 1998). The right to vote in parliamentary elections presupposes Icelandic citizenship.
The Information Center for foreigners (Alþjóðahús) offers services for individuals in need of information and assistance on all kinds of issues. This is an intercultural center welcoming all kinds of practical questions concerning the basic rights of foreigners. Thus, despite rather strict laws on immigration, considerable effort is made to integrate immigrants. At the same time, a special institution for handling foreigners (Útlendingastofnun, UTL), operating under the auspices of the recently renamed Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, has been criticized in the press for routinely expelling foreign citizens on weak grounds. The UTL’s apparently foreigner-unfriendly stance manifests itself on the body’s website, which is solely in Icelandic with no English translation provided.

In the past decade, some 5 million immigrants have arrived in Spain. In all, 12% of the population is now foreign-born. Apart from some western Europeans looking for a second home “in the sun,” the bulk of immigration comes from poorer countries, typically consisting of young Eastern Europeans, Latin Americans and Africans in search of jobs and better living conditions. Spain has so far lived in harmony with these newcomers. It helps that the Treasury has for the most of the time benefited from their contribution to the social security system. In the case of Latin American immigrants, language and cultural links have been beneficial too. As for the Muslim population, although most of them are moderate and well-integrated into Spanish society, some radical groups involved in recruiting and fundraising for al-Qaeda have also been uncovered. The public perception of immigration has deteriorated somewhat recently as a consequence of the economic crisis; it is increasingly common to hear the argument that immigrants are no longer a source of revenues, but they are instead putting further pressure on the country’s social services and public spending. However, taking account of the high unemployment rate, racial conflicts are in fact scarce in Spain, and the tendency toward integration on the part of immigrants seems positive.

In 2005, an amnesty was granted to more than one million then-illegal immigrants. Today, official government policy combines measures supporting integration (see Social Inclusion Policy) with more energetic steps to prevent illegal immigration. The Spanish government backed the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, sponsored by French President Nicolás Sarkozy, and the Return Directive on illegal immigration (known in Spain as the “Shame” Directive). It has also offered bilateral aid to several northern African countries if they agree to receive illegal immigrants deported from Spain. A program has been unveiled allowing migrants to draw their unemployment insurance benefits as a lump sum if they return to their home country and renounce their residence rights in Spain.

The Czech Republic has experienced relatively high levels of immigration since EU accession. Foreign citizens made up 4.2% of the population in 2008, reaching over 7% for the 20-39 age group. The largest immigrant groups within the Czech Republic were Ukrainians, Slovaks and Vietnamese (respectively 30%, 17% and 14% of the total immigrant population). Asylum seekers are a very small part of immigration, amounting to 1,260 individuals in 2009. A more important role has been played by foreign workers hired by agencies capitalizing on labor shortages in growing regions. In many cases, these migrants have been kept in dependency by the agencies.

Both the Topolánek and the Fischer governments did little to develop a systematic integration policy for immigrants. When the economic crisis hit foreign workers, help from the Czech government took the form of programs for returning impoverished migrants to their country of origin. Another change, unlikely to encourage more immigration, has been the introduction of a language examination on the CEFRL (Common European Framework of Reference for Languages) level A1 as a condition for foreigners’ permanent residence in the Czech Republic as of January 1, 2009. Support for migrants in cultural, social and educational matters is largely provided by NGOs, which are more acquainted with the reality of migrants’ daily experiences and are more flexible in providing assistance than state institutions. These NGOs, which often receive state funding, are most active in urban centers such as Prague and Brno.

Cultural, education and social policies focused on integrating migrants into Greek society are still in a stage of infancy. Legal immigrants who are active in the labor market make contributions to the Greek social security system out of their wages and salaries, but the insurance and health care services they receive are very uneven. This is attributable to the lack of funds, the absence of sensitivity in matters of intercultural interaction, and discrimination encountered in state insurance agencies, hospitals and social care centers.
There is a lack of reliable data on the education of foreign-born pupils and students. Education is provided in primary and secondary schools for first- and second-generation migrants, who are often able to do well. OECD data show that 16% of migrants have attained tertiary education. Since many first-generation migrants from southeastern and eastern Europe obtain tertiary education skills in their countries of origin, it is not possible to draw conclusions simply by looking at data on the presence of university graduates among migrants.
Cultural policies aimed at integrating immigrants are inchoate. This is exemplified by the continuing absence of an official (rather than makeshift) mosque in Athens, which is necessary to support the worship needs of Muslims from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Albania who have settled in the greater Athens area.
During the course of the reporting period, tensions between natives of Greece and migrants rose. Migrants concentrated in very large numbers in downtown urban neighborhoods, which in the past were typical Greek middle-class areas. An example can be found in the recurrent tension between native Greek residents and migrants in the Athens quarter of Agios Pandeleimonas (in Patissia), as well as in the streets around Omonoia Square, one of the most central squares in the Greek capital.
A strong version of Hellenic identity, particularly popular among the native-born middle- and lower-class, less-educated Greek strata, hinders the integration of migrants into Greek society. This identity is characterized by a sense of belonging to a unique, introverted and embattled nation.

Hungary is still primarily a transit country and has only gradually become a destination for migrants. Policies towards migrants have focused either on security aspects or on the support of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries (i.e., “diaspora politics”). By contrast, the integration of migrants is not yet seen as a means of overcoming labor market shortages and alleviating the effects of an aging and shrinking Hungarian population.

One of the most significant deficits in Austrian politics is the absence of a consistent integration concept regarding immigrants. The only existing policy is based on the assumption of one-sided integration: Migrants have to adapt and assimilate.
The reality of integration politics is characterized by a profound dilemma. Although the economy depends on integration, as does the Austrian social system (given the demographic changes associated with an aging population), the public mood is increasingly hostile towards immigration. In consequence, politicians abstain from fostering policies favoring the integration of persons with a foreign background. This results in a vicious cycle in which the absence of constructive integration policies spells for failed integration, which in turn leads to an even more hostile mood regarding immigration.
In the school system, there are some experimental projects underway that deal with children of migrants who are unable to speak German (a common problem). Integration policy – where present – does not provide incentives such as smooth access to citizenship. The policy does not aim to segregate, but segregation is the overwhelming result of the lack of a coherent integration policy in Austria.

The state does not develop specific integration policies, as the phenomenon of immigration has not to date been considered a pressing issue. Among the reasons for this might be the fact that poorer immigrants tend to arrive from other Latin American countries, and thus share the same language and to a certain degree the same cultural background. Comprising about 1.4% of the population, the number of immigrants living in Chile is still quite low. In general, few restrictions exist for highly skilled immigrants, who find it relatively easy to obtain permission to work, without high bureaucratic barriers. It is worth noting that the relationship between emigration and immigration is changing. While in the past Chile showed higher rates of emigration than immigration, this balance is now shifting thanks to the country’s economic development and political stability. It is thus likely that migration policy will become more important in the future.

Immigration on a large scale is a relatively new issue in Italy as compared to other countries in Europe. In recent years, the number of legal (mainly from new EU member countries) and illegal immigrants has increased significantly, making immigration one of the hottest political issues. Issues associated with immigration have been cast in negative rhetoric by some parties (especially the Lega) during electoral campaigns, with immigrants portrayed as dangerous social elements.
Policies dealing with the topic have concentrated more on controlling illegal immigration than on matters of integration. However, given the failure of measures designed to prevent illegal immigration, successive governments have adopted provisions for the large-scale regularization of immigrants, especially those working for and within families. In spite of these measures, a large number of immigrants are still involved in the black economy and are thus subject to economic exploitation, dangerous working conditions and a lack of respect for their rights. The school system has proved to be a positive factor in the process of integration, but schools have not received sufficient resources for achieving the best results in this field. In many cities there are ghetto-like areas where immigrants live in extremely poor housing conditions.
After a period of ambivalence influenced by the Northern League and parts of the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PDL) party, the national government seems to have developed a more pragmatic approach to integration. A new point system will encourage migrants and their mainly Italy-born children to integrate more closely into Italian society and culture. After a series of spectacular xenophobic incidents, but also revolts by legal and illegal immigrants (Lampedusa in 2009, and Rosarno in 2010), the government has perhaps learned at last to see migrants not only as a burden but as a commodity: Employers of legal (but also illegal) immigrants often make the politicians understand that they are able to continue to operate in Italy only thanks to the high number of migrants available in the workforce. Private-sector elderly care, and often child care and private cleaning services are often dependent on illegally employed immigrants. In upcoming years, Italy’s score in this section is likely to rise.

None of the governments serving during the period under review proved to be particularly proactive in supporting integration and immigration, despite calls in 2008 by a Japanese business organization (Nippon Keidanren) and others to develop a “Japanese-style” immigration policy. Indeed, the views on foreigners expressed by former Prime Minister Aso, as well as many of the statements made by his followers, were seen by many as problematic. Prime Minister Hatoyama announced at the APEC summit in November 2009 that Japan might accept more immigrants, but he also noted that he was broaching a “sensitive issue,” and that prejudices in the population remain.

For most Mexicans, the issue of migration has to do with emigration rather than immigration. There is an overriding policy of trying to help Mexican migrants residing in the United States to the extent permitted by U.S. law. However, there is some traffic going the other way. A considerable number of retired U.S. citizens now live in Mexico. These people mostly have their own financial means, and contribute to the local economy in the more tourist-friendly parts of Mexico. They are generally welcomed. Integration at this level is not really an issue. This cannot really be said of the Central American migrants into Mexico, many of whom use Mexico as a transit point while they attempt to reach the United States. Mexicans do not treat their own undocumented migrants at all well. The problem is not so much official discrimination, but rather the general inadequacy of ordinary law enforcement, which denies to undocumented immigrants the most basic civil protections and leaves them prey to extortionists of one kind or another.

Migration to Poland has increased, but is still relatively low and thus does not feature very prominently on the political agenda. The legal framework for dealing with immigrants has emerged relatively slowly and has been shaped largely by the requirements of EU membership and other international obligations. Ethnic Poles and refugees are eligible to supportive measures such as financial support, language classes and help with the bureaucracy and accommodations for about a year. Other groups of migrants are not included in integration programs. However, there are several NGOs that take care of the needs of immigrants and cooperate with the state administration.

The number of foreign residents has increased by about 10,000 persons annually in recent years and has doubled since 2005. Because of Slovakia’s accession to the Schengen area in late 2007, the number of illegal border crossings has fallen. The Fico government paid little attention to the integration of migrants, and migrants have only very limited opportunities to participate politically or to reunite with their family. Employers complain that the procedures for recruiting foreign workers are overly bureaucratic and too time-consuming.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has transformed itself into a society that attracts immigrants rather than providing them for other nations. Driven by increasing demand for cheap labor, generational change and a shortage of women in rural areas, the number of foreign residents has increased considerably. As of March 2010, Korea was home to 870,636 registered overseas nationals, with 255,000 of these individuals living in Seoul.
In August 2005, parliament passed the “Public Official Election Act,” a suffrage law that allowed foreign residents to vote in local elections alongside Korean citizens. South Korea currently remains the only Asian country which gives voting rights to noncitizens.
In recent years Korea has made it easier for migrants to receive permanent resident status and even citizenship, particularly for highly skilled migrants. To apply for Korean citizenship, an individual must have resided in Korea for more than five consecutive years, be legally an adult, have displayed good conduct, have the ability to support himself or herself on the basis of his or her own assets or skills (or be a dependent member of a family) and have basic knowledge befitting a Korean national (such as understanding of Korea’s language, customs and culture). In April 2010, the Korean parliament also passed a law that allows dual citizenship.
Another relatively serious integration issue concerns the societal exclusion experienced by the foreign-born wives of Korean men (often from China, Southeast and South Asia). This population has drastically increased in recent years (about 10% of all marriages in South Korea are international today, in the sense that either bride or groom is non-Korean), and often faces cultural discrimination. Furthermore, cultural, education and social policies have yet to adapt to the fact of increasing immigration levels.
While ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, foreign investors and highly educated foreigners are welcomed and treated favorably, Amnesty International reports that migrant blue-collar workers are often treated as “disposable labor.” From a legal perspective, migrant workers have very similar rights to native Korean employees, but these rights are routinely neglected by employers. While courts have offered some protection to migrant workers, the government has not pursued active enforcement measures against employers that exploit this population’s precarious status.
In the early days of the global economic downturn, in September 2008, the new Korean government announced it would deport about half of all migrant workers with precarious (“irregular”) work contracts until 2012.

Despite growing levels of labor migration and settlement from the Caucasus region, the Balkans and even countries of the European Union, Turkey does not consider itself to be a destination country for migration and lacks an official integration policy. The Foreigners’ Law, passed in 1950, thus governs the life of foreign-born residents in Turkey. Neither this law nor the Law regarding Work Permissions for Foreigners, passed in 2003, grants any legal entitlement regarding residence or access to the labor market. This also holds true for spouses of Turkish citizens. Residence permits do not exceed five years, and work permits are bound to the workplace and leave the foreigner without guaranteed residence status. Although the 2003 Work Permission Law shortened the previous list of some 80 professions that had been forbidden to foreigners, many professions remain inaccessible to foreigners due to the provisions of an array of other laws that have not been amended. Religious gatherings of foreigners still exist in a legal grey zone, and there is no educational policy toward migrant children.
Access to citizenship is easy in theory, but in practice almost impossible due to lengthy administrative procedures and the provisions of the Law of Settlement that foresees naturalization only for migrants of “Turkish culture.” As of 2007, there were 98,064 foreigners living in Turkey (0.14% of the population) with official residence permits.
On the whole, the country’s cultural, educational and social policies do not focus on integrating these people into society. Although foreign students’ educational rights are regulated by law, asylum seekers and illegal migrants do not receive educational services. The Social Solidarity Fund’s resources offer limited support for health services for migrants. However, it should be emphasized that compared to some EU countries, there is relatively little bias against foreigners living in Turkey. Foreigners living in Turkey do not have the right to vote or to run for office.