EXTERNAL SECURITY

Direct responsibility for external security rests with the Australian Defence Force, which is numerically small in comparison with other Asian countries but technologically more sophisticated. External security policy is also contingent on cooperation principally with the United States, as well as with other countries in the region, most notably New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia. There is a formal military agreement with the United States and New Zealand in the ANZUS Alliance, and with New Zealand in the Closer Defence Program.

One plank in the maintenance of external security is the forward deployment of personnel, in support of UN and other operations around the world, and in support of alliance partners. A significant proportion of the ADF have served in Afghanistan and before the withdrawal of defense personnel in 2009, in Iraq. There are also detachments in the Middle East, East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

While there are currently no credible external threats to Australian security, future planning for external security is encountering several challenges. One challenge is the decline in the availability of skilled personnel, partly because of the aging of the population, and partly because of competition for skills with the resources industry. A second challenge is funding for new equipment in order to maintain the technological advantage over potential adversaries. A related concern is the ongoing cost of overseas deployments, which erodes the funding available for new equipment.

Belgium has no outstanding international disputes, and the CIA Factbook estimates military spending to be around 1.3% of GDP (ranking 126th in the world). It is also number 15 in the Global Peace Index 2009. Belgium is home to the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), as well as NATO headquarters, a significant proportion of the EU institutions, and numerous other international organizations and larger-than-average diplomatic posts. This makes the country particularly strongly protected, even if the threat of a terrorist attack on the U.S. nuclear devices at the Kleine Brogel Air Force Base is raised rather frequently. Several other cases of terrorism and jihadi cells originating in Belgium have been reported (see, for instance, the trial of Malika el Aroud, widow of Dahmane Abd al-Sattar, one of the men who killed anti-Taliban resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud), but for the moment, Belgium seems more to be suspected as a backyard for terrorism than to be actually threatened itself. Belgian military forces are engaged in peacekeeping missions in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Canada ranks very high with respect to the effectiveness of external security and defense policy in protecting citizens against security risks and safeguarding the national interest. Between the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the present, Canada remodeled its security apparatus and created a Public Safety Department, as well as implementing various new measures to monitor border crossings. The country’s political leaders recognize the importance of the global fight against Al-Qaeda. It has increased defense spending in recent years and has maintained a strong military presence in Afghanistan since 2001 (the mission is to end in 2011). Nearly 150 Canadians have been killed in Afghanistan.

During the Fifth Republic, all governments including those of the left have insisted on the necessity of an autonomous security and defense policy. This attitude reached its climax in 1966 with the withdrawal of France from the NATO military command. This period ended in 2009, when France was reintegrated in NATO. A substantial budgetary effort has been made over the past 50 years to combine the build-up of a nuclear force and an intervention capacity abroad, particularly in Africa. France comes second after Greece in the European Union for the amount of resources spent on defense; its equipment sophistication is high. In addition, its security policy is based on active diplomacy and a dedicated and comprehensive (political, economic, cultural) foreign policy in world affairs. There seems to be no major exterior threat to France. More widely (and also more recently), French governments have committed themselves to protect citizens against any potential risk (natural disasters, diseases, etc.). They have gone as far as introducing the “precautionary principle” in the constitution in particular in relation to environmental issues. While there is strong social pressure in favor of such an approach, more and more voices are claiming that one has gone too far by promoting a risk-adverse society.

Greece is a longtime European and NATO member state. It keeps an army which uses sophisticated equipment and is based on compulsory military service as well as the hiring of professional soldiers. These are preconditions for an effective external security policy, a goal which Greece fulfilled in 2008 – 2010, as in the previous reporting period. However, the global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, and the Greek fiscal crisis of 2010, may eventually lead to a decrease in military expenditures as the country strives to address its soaring public debt and worsening balance of payments.
Comparative data show that Greece ranks 26th in the world in terms of its military expenditure, which in 2005 amounted to 4.3% of its GDP. Among NATO countries Greece was outstripped in this respect only by Turkey. Since that time, military expenditure has fallen to below 3% of GDP. Indeed, for years Greece had maintained one of the highest military expenditure levels in the Western world, a fact attributable to ongoing tensions with Turkey. Disputes focused on the Cyprus question and the Aegean. The potential for conflict with Turkey decreased in the 2000s, because of a rapprochement policy followed by the Greek and Turkish governments and because of Turkey’s drive to join the European Union. However, compared to the mid-2000s, relations between the two countries made no visible progress during the period under review.

Italy’s defense and security policy is fundamentally grounded in collective security agreements (NATO in particular), but also in bilateral agreements (among which those with the United States are especially important). Membership in the European Union is the other increasingly important factor in guaranteeing national security and a friendly external environment, even if the EU’s military component is weak. Although its geographical location puts Italy close to the crisis-prone area of the Middle East, effective policies of friendship and cooperation with the states of this area have sheltered Italy from major risks (even of a terrorist nature) on this front.
Italy has been a very active participant in international peacekeeping missions, seeing this as a crucial instrument for the construction of a more peaceful external environment. Due to budgetary restrictions, the financing of the security apparatus is underfunded in comparative perspective, but the recent shift of the country’s armed forces to a professional army model has moved the country in the direction of providing a more effective instrument of national defense and international security cooperation.
Obviously Italy is no global player in security policy, but after facing quite serious challenges in a complex geographic context (sitting on the Cold War front line; being part of the Mediterranean basin, with indirect links to North Africa and the Middle East countries, as well as Turkey, Greece and the Western Balkans; its own long coast line serving as the European Union’s external border), it has used bilateral treaties with potentially disruptive countries and leaders (such as Libya) to transform its environment into a manageable area – at least for the moment. On the issue of the Middle East, the Berlusconi government has pursued a strange strategy evidently seeking to assure both sides that they have Italy’s full support. International commitments such as armed forces military missions (Afghanistan) are surprisingly strongly backed both by politicians and citizens. However, the country has yet to transform its military capabilities and its international commitment into more substantial weight inside the United Nations, NATO and European Union. Indeed, keeping its size in mind, Italy has had an impressive and mostly successful experience in stand-alone military missions abroad (Albania, Lebanon).

External security is guaranteed by Luxembourg’s membership in NATO and its military budget is expected to increase to 0.7% of GNP by the end of the most recent legislature, due to a general program of renovation of military installations and the purchase of military aircraft. Seven NATO states will purchase 180 A400M aircrafts with deliveries beginning in 2009. Luxembourg will buy one A400M in partnership with Belgium and has earmarked €120 million for this purpose. Due to delivery difficulties, this sum is expected to increase, but the Luxembourg defense minister has already said that he stands ready to cover some of the extra costs. This aircraft is used primarily to carry personnel, equipment and cargo into conflict areas.
Luxembourg’s participation in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, southern Lebanon and other humanitarian missions is not disputed, but the acquisition of the A400M is highly controversial, especially since the government is reducing social protections at the same time. This issue is particularly worrisome among core supporters of the LSAP, namely its trade union wing and its youth organization.

The New Zealand’s geopolitical situation makes it highly unlikely to become a target for terrorist threats, and therefore, the cost-benefit calculus of external security policy is very positive. Military expenditures remain low. The changed security environment in recent years has led to the launch of a “Defence Review 2009” which will eventually result in a white paper that replaces the current document, which was introduced in 1997.
The government invests in professionalizing defense forces, based on a long-term development plan. In addition, New Zealand is an active partner in international strategic defense arrangements with Australia and NATO. New Zealand has been involved in nation-building and peacekeeping missions in the South Pacific (Fiji, Tonga, East Timor, Papua New Guinea) and in Afghanistan.

Security policy is informed by a commitment to international cooperation, in particular in U.N. activities in all areas, in NATO and OSCE activity (but not EU membership), and by a determination to do good, to be liked and to be respected as broadly as possible. Norway is one of the world’s largest providers of development aid, is a participant in a range of U.N. and NATO peacekeeping missions, including in Afghanistan, and has acted as an active honest broker in trouble spots such as currently Israel/Palestine and previously Columbia, Sri Lanka, Iraq and elsewhere. Norway is not perceived to be highly exposed to the threat of terrorism; however, international involvement could also affect domestic security. The country is recognized as having influence beyond its relatively small size in various international forums and activities, and seems to be rewarded with widespread respect.
The border in the north toward Russia has been seen as a potential source of insecurity, representing a massive difference in standard of living and with extreme environmental degradation on the Russian side. The Norwegian government has put great emphasis on entering into cooperative relations with Russia in the northern regions, including with financial support for environmental cleanup on the Kola Peninsula. In April 2010, an agreement was reached between the two countries on their border in the Barents Sea, ending a 20-year dispute and eliminating a potential source of confrontation.

The profile of the external security policy in Sweden is high. The country has a long history of staying out of international conflicts. Defense and foreign policy rest on the foundation of non-alliance in peace and neutrality in wartime. Sweden was previously a big spender on defense but since the fall of the Berlin Wall defense spending has decreased. Conscription has been dramatically reduced. Instead, Sweden as a member of the EU finds itself integrated in the emerging common foreign policy of the Union and commits resources to international missions under EU or UN auspices. Thus, the long-term development is towards a smaller but more professional defense, coupled with a commitment to international missions.
This is a policy which suffers from some inertia as rearmament would require quite some time. Sudden changes in the region such as the conflict in 2009 between Russia and Belarus triggered concerns that disarmament had gone too far too quickly and that there was a strong need to raise the capacity to deal with incidents and minor conflicts which could affect Swedish security. The fact that Sweden has an advanced defense industry does not offer much short-term help in that respect. The continuous cutbacks in defense spending may have led to refraining from the acquisition of the latest technologies in the defense sector.
Despite its commitment to non-alliance and neutrality, the Swedish defense is fully integrated with NATO and conducts joint exercises with NATO troops. NATO naval vessels are allowed into Swedish ports and NATO military aircraft may enter Swedish airspace.

Chile’s armed forces are large and well-equipped enough to dissuade potential external aggressors (including neighboring countries). The armed forces effectively safeguard the country’s national interest (which is defined fully by civil society as represented by the government). Institutional reforms concerning the operational structure of the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been implemented very slowly and ineffectively since the end of the military regime in 1989. Furthermore, the allocation of funds to the military sector is not completely transparent.

The accepted political consensus in the Czech Republic, backed by a 2003 government policy document formulated after cross-party discussions, is that no serious external security threat exists in Central Europe, and that safety is guaranteed by NATO membership. In the period under review, the sharp divisions over the placing of a radar tracking station in the Czech Republic as part of a U.S. anti-missile protection system continued. The proposal was made public during 2006 and resulted in a strong public debate with public demonstrations against the plan. Moreover, Russia objected to the U.S. proposal, arguing that it undermined Russian security. Czech politics was divided, with the Topolánek government keen to show itself as a close ally of the United States, as unconcerned about Russian fears, and even unconcerned about damage to the country’s relations with Russia. Opinion polls suggested resistance to the proposal from the majority of the population, reflecting opposition to the establishment of any foreign military bases in the country, concern that it would make the country a target for external attack, and doubts that the plan would contribute anything to improving world security. The original plan was modified after the new U.S. president came to office in early 2009 amid disappointment from its enthusiastic supporters in the Czech Republic.

Denmark’s external security is based on its membership in NATO.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been no serious conventional threat to Danish territories. But terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain, Britain and other countries suggest that Denmark may too face the external threat of a terrorist attack. This risk is related both to the controversy surrounding the Muhammad cartoons and the country’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan. A broad six-party agreement on Danish defense in June 2004 defined defense goals as:

• to counter direct and indirect threats to the security of Denmark and allied countries;
• to maintain Danish sovereignty and the protection of Danish citizens;
• to work toward international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter, especially through conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking and humanitarian operations.

The changed security situation required the Danish defense “to strengthen its capacities in two central areas: 1) international deployable military capacities and 2) the ability to counter acts of terror and their consequences.” The agreement also states that “Danish security policy should primarily be aimed at countering the threats where they emerge, regardless of whether this is within or beyond Danish borders.”

The Danish defense is therefore being reorganized away from classic territorial defense to having the capabilities required for international peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Denmark has a proud tradition of taking part in U.N. peacekeeping actions, and since the end of the Cold War, Denmark has also taken part in a number of NATO activities, for example in former Yugoslavia. Similarly Denmark has been actively involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Danish defense policy has normally been based on broad agreements between several political parties. The latest such agreement was reached on June 24, 2009, involving the Social Democratic Party, the Danish People’s Party, the Socialist People’s Party, the Conservative Party, the Radical Liberal Party and the Liberal Alliance Party. The agreement continues the trend observed previously, adapting to international changes, including armed conflict, stabilization tasks and international policing in various parts of the world.
But Denmark has a problem: the opt-out from EU defense policy. So Denmark has not been able to take part in activities under European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) since they started in 2003.
Many Danish politicians would like to abolish the defense opt-out. And there has also been a majority public opinion in favor of such a step. But so far the government has not wanted to risk calling a referendum (remembering that the Danes voted against participation in the euro in 2000).

The external security strategy of Finland relies heavily on the country’s own military forces, which are based on compulsory military service, high standards of technical equipment and general support on behalf of the citizenry for defense policy. Given its history, the potential security risks related to neighboring Russia are observed closely. While the current external security policy is functional and very effective in terms of cost/benefits, joining NATO remains a serious option for the country’s future security policy. As long as NATO remains just an option and not a policy, however, Finland’s external security policy revolves for the most part around the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. Cooperation in security-related issues with the Nordic countries remains an important pillar as well. More generally, Finland endeavors to strengthen multilateral cooperation and international law as well as to increase global security by reducing inequality and social exclusion.

Germany is a well-integrated member of international alliances such as NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, and the OSCE. This integration guarantees highly professional standards and structures within which the German army, the Bundeswehr, provides an important contribution to security and defense.
In these contexts, German military forces have participated in a number of European and international peacekeeping missions in various countries. In recent years, these missions have led to vigorous debate in political and in public circles, as they are not popular among the German population. This has been particularly true since the first deaths of German soldiers, and since the Bundeswehr’s involvement in incidents resulting in the deaths of civilians, such as the Kundus air strike in September 2009.
A more fundamental debate mainly revolves around the general role of the Bundeswehr, which was originally founded as a mere defensive army, but now faces new tasks and international military engagement. A basic problem is that the military forces are not yet fully adapted to their new international role, and seem not to be well prepared for these new missions. There has been much criticism of the service’s current training and equipment, which does not meet military and logistical requirements. It is also highly questionable whether the military conscription model appropriate during the cold war remains justifiable today, or whether it rather represents an obstacle to establishment of a cost-efficient army. A transition to a more professional army would likely boost the cost-effectiveness of the German military services, given that the new government has reduced the time of service for draftees to just six months.
Overall, the German territory has thus far been effectively protected from major terrorist attacks, and there appears to be no direct military threat. Whether missions such as that in Afghanistan really serve the long-run security interests of German citizens remains a controversial question.

Given its geographical location and its membership in NATO and the European Union, Hungary’s external security risks are widely perceived as low in the country. Sensitivity to security issues is weaker than in most other European countries, and the interest in foreign affairs largely focuses on the Central European region and on the plight of the Hungarian minorities abroad. The recent attempt at fiscal consolidation contributed to a further decline in military spending. The number of tanks in services has been reduced, and a large number of garrisons have been shut down. However, Hungarian troops have participated in a number of military missions, including those in Afghanistan, Cyprus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

External security does not loom large in Irish policy-making or political debates. Irish military spending is small relative to GDP (less than 0.5%) and very small in absolute terms. Ireland has close relationships, if not formal military alliances, principally with the United Kingdom and the United States. This has allowed Ireland to enjoy a position of formal “neutrality” and minimum expenditure on defense.
In recent years, Ireland’s armed forces have been active under U.N. auspices. A recent example is the deployment of almost 500 Irish soldiers as part of the U.N.-authorized European Union Force Chad/CAR mission in 2008. In many instances, the payment received from international organizations has rendered this participation relatively profitable from a national point of view.
A new and serious external threat is the internationalization or globalization of Irish crime through involvement in the illicit drugs trade and in human trafficking.
The island of Ireland is well-placed to serve as an entrepôt for smuggling drugs from outside Europe to serve the European market. Cooperation between the Irish and European police services and coast guards has increased, and there have been major seizures of drugs in transit through Ireland in recent years, but it is difficult to gauge the efficacy of these surveillance operations relative to the scale of the problem.

The expenditures for defense increased from €7.9 billion in 2007 (1.5% of GDP) to €8.2 billion in 2008 (1.66% of GDP). During the period under review, the Netherlands took an active and leading role in the peacekeeping military campaign in Afghanistan. The Netherlands was also involved in operations in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Somalia. The Balkenende IV cabinet was unable to agree on whether the Netherlands’ military involvement in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) after December 2010 should continue. For that reason, the Labor Party ministers and state secretaries tendered their resignations, and the Christian Democrat and Christian Union ministers and state secretaries indicated their readiness to give up their portfolios.

In March 2008 the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) raised the general threat level for the Netherlands from “limited” to “substantial.” This was due mostly to the Dutch military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to the release of “Fitna,” an anti-Muslim movie by right-wing politician Geert Wilders.

Poland is protected against external security risks through its membership in NATO and the EU. The Tusk government has succeeded in improving the relationship with Germany and Russia, and in rebuilding trust by its international partners more generally. It has also tried to increase Polish security by cooperating closely with Ukraine, and by forging a special relationship with the United States. While the government ended Poland’s unpopular involvement in Iraq in October 2008, it stuck to its commitment to host parts of the planned U.S. anti-missile shield system. Polish troops have taken part in a number of international military missions. The involvement in Afghanistan has revealed a number of weaknesses of the Polish military forces. Several generals have resigned, complaining of outdated and insufficient technical equipment, and citing the lack of support by the ministry of defense. In 2008, the Tusk government speeded up the phasing-out of compulsory military service.

Defense policy, as much else in Portugal, must be analyzed in the context of EU goals and policies, and the country’s active involvement in NATO. Portugal’s ties with the United States, which result in security assistance and a very close bilateral relationship, must also be seen in terms of security policy. Portuguese defense policy with respect to security risks such as organized crime and terrorism are in fact Europe-wide defense policies. Public opinion surveys indicate that the Portuguese view Europe as more important than Portugal itself in issues of defense policy. It must be stressed that the Portuguese do not perceive their nation as having internal security problems. In the public view, everyone is integrated, and if there are terrorist cells in the country, they will attack targets outside Portugal rather than inside.
Portugal has historically and consistently hedged its bets in the relationship within NATO’s European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Atlantic relationship. Moreover, the country is undergoing very serious economic problems, and lacks the funds to purchase all of the equipment it had once foreseen. It should be noted that the Military Programming Law (Lei da Programação Militar) will be cut 42% as a result of the Program for Stability and Growth (Programa de Estabilidade e Crescimento). But even aside from financial and technological problems, and the emphasis on NATO, it has been argued that Portugal’s input to the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has been curtailed by the politico-diplomatic leadership’s mindset regarding the so-called European project. Portugal has always been against a “federal bond” or federalist model as a part of the integration process. This is evident in the country’s rejection of the “communitarization” of the security and defense pillars, and also in its complete rejection of any dilution in states’ sovereign rights to make independent decisions concerning the definition and implementation of their foreign, security and defense policies.

Reversing the trend of recent years, defense expenditure has declined, with investment in military research and innovation being the area most significantly diminished. In spite of this fact, Spain scores close to the OECD average in terms of military capability and equipment sophistication. Experts and the general population have raised some criticism of military deployment in a large number of international missions with no clear relationship to Spain’s national interests (almost 3,000 soldiers are currently deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon and Afghanistan, although the government decided unilaterally to withdraw troops from the NATO mission in Kosovo in 2009, due to its disagreement with the declaration of independence made by the young Balkan state).

The Spanish government is strongly committed to multilateralism, as exhibited by its role advocating for the recently adopted Internal Security Strategy for the European Union (aimed at establishing more effective tools for combating conventional and new threats) and its participation in Operation Atalanta (an EU military operation tasked with deterring, preventing and repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia). Spain has also signed numerous multilateral agreements to strengthen counterterrorism cooperation on a political level. In May 2010, interior ministers from Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia agreed to strengthen their exchange of information in order to prevent anyone accused of a terrorist crime from finding shelter in those countries.

Whereas the Zapatero government continues to promote its initiative Alliance of Civilizations abroad, a long-needed initiative has also been implemented at the internal level to coordinate efforts in national security matters. Previously, the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Defense worked separately, developing their own strategies and plans. However, a proposal was announced in late 2009 to develop a general national security strategy, to be coordinated by former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Javier Solana.

The United Kingdom’s historical heritage has resulted in ongoing active participation in world politics, and in institutions (such as the United Nations Security Council) that it helped shape in the past. The country is firmly integrated into the NATO security framework, and places a particular emphasis on very close cooperation and partnership with the United States in foreign policy. However, the new security challenges of the last decade, such as its military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to domestic controversy. With public support low and questions about the effectiveness of these missions being asked, a reassessment of military policy is being planned in the upcoming years in the form of a Strategic Defense Review.

Defense spending has been consistently above the EU average, although there are loud criticisms of the frequent procurement budget overruns and delayed deliveries. Criticisms have also centered on the inadequate provisioning of equipment for troops in Afghanistan (especially helicopter lift capacity and vehicles with sufficient armor to counter the threat of improvised explosive devices). The manner of the UK forces’ exit from Iraq also attracted negative comment.

Austria’s defense policy, traditionally seen as the most important policy in providing external security, is defined by a suboptimal integration into the European defense system. As this system cannot exist without at least an informal linkage to NATO, Austria’s neutrality status prevents a better internationally based external security policy from being formulated. In the past, the oft-discussed concept of a “soft” external security policy resulted in Austria’s prominent participation in UN peace keeping missions. But this aspect of Austria’s security policy has become increasingly less important, partly because Austria’s military infrastructure is insufficient for more intensive and longer missions.
Austria’s external security policy is also determined by Austria’s participation in EU transnational police network like Europol and the Schengen system.
As Austria is not even a secondary goal for direct security threats (e.g., international terrorism), the deficits of Austria’s external security policy are not really felt within Austrian society.

Iceland maintains no military force, a unique state of affairs in the world today with the sole additional exception of Costa Rica. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained a U.S. military base in the country from the end of World War II until 2006. The U.S. government withdrew its military from the base against the wishes of the Icelandic government, but an agreement between Iceland and the United States was signed stating the U.S. government’s commitment to defend Iceland if necessary. It was also noted that consultation and communication about security issues would be strengthened. Iceland is a founding member of NATO, with participation dating back to 1949, as well as of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In April 2007, Norway and Denmark signed memoranda of understanding with Iceland regarding surveillance, rescue and military operations in the North Atlantic. In May 2008, the Icelandic and British governments signed an agreement governing the British Air Force’s surveillance activities in the Icelandic navigation zone.

Under its post-war constitution, Japan has in a formal sense renounced war and is not allowed to keep military forces. While it does maintain so-called self-defense forces, Japan nevertheless has had to rely on a strong military alliance with the United States and its nuclear umbrella. At the same time, Japan has had to manage a delicate relationship with neighboring East and Southeast Asian countries, many of which it had occupied or colonized before World War II. With the rising importance of China as a military as well as economic factor in the region, triangulation between these relationships has become increasingly demanding.

There are conflicting views among Japanese intellectuals and politicians on how to reconfigure Japan’s security posture and its alliance with the United States. While some opinion leaders believe that less reliance on the United States and new multilateral security arrangements are called for in the post-Cold War era, more cautious observers (and the LDP mainstream) point out that in the face of threats from North Korea and in view of a rising China, Japan’s national security can be guaranteed only through continued reliance on the United States. Policy preferences on security and defense issues vary widely within the DPJ. Even before the 2009 election, DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama proposed the establishment of a “more equal” alliance with the United States. This seemed to suggest that he – and possibly the government led by him – wanted to distance himself somewhat from the United States and instead seek closer relationships with Pacific Asian countries.

Mexico is in an unusual situation in security terms. It has no meaningful defense against the United States, while its southern neighbor Guatemala poses no real security threat. It is true that Guatemala was briefly seen as a security threat to Mexico in the 1980s, but nobody thinks of this as a problem today. The most serious dangers to Mexico involve the spilling over of Mexico’s internal problems in a way that might involve the United States. The murder of several U.S. consular officials and their wives in March 2010 raised this issue in very direct form. However, the United States government has responded, as expected, by seeking to support and strengthen the Mexican government rather than attempting to exploit weakness.

Slovakia is well integrated into NATO and the EU, and it has participated in a number of peacekeeping missions, including Afghanistan, Cyprus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The capacity of the Slovak army has suffered from a decline in military spending, which reached a mere 1.4%of GDP in 2009. A particularly intense problem is troop transport. Slovakia withdrew from the Strategic Airlift Capability project coordinated by the U.S. Army and instead took part in the competing Airbus project. Since the latter has not been completed yet, Slovakia must rely on other countries to move troops to remote destinations. The Fico government’s foreign policy, namely its rapprochement with Russia, led to some irritations abroad, thereby weakening the country’s international position. Slovakia’s cordial relationship with Russia was illustrated by the government’s decision to extend cooperation in the military and energy sectors, Slovakia’s siding with Russia in the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict, its refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence, and the government’s confrontational approach to Hungary, which culminated in the diplomatic row over the entry of the Hungarian president in Slovakia in August 2008.

Korea’s security situation remains precarious due to the lack of a peace treaty with North Korea, despite the signing of the armistice ending the Korean War 57 years ago. The militaristic and extremely nationalistic regime in North Korea remains a major threat to South Korea’s security. In this environment, successive Korean governments have been relatively successful in preserving peace, albeit under clear leadership by the United States, which retains command over the Korean military in times of war. The Korean armed forces are well funded, with defense spending totaling 4.3% of GDP, the third-largest such share in the OECD. South Korea’s security still depends on the presence of U.S. forces and U.S. security guarantees. The other major partner in the country’s trilateral security cooperation is Japan.
In the last two years the security situation has arguably weakened due to the deteriorating relationship with North Korea, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and the northern neighbor’s tests of long-range missiles. In reaction to U.N. sanctions following one of these missile tests, North Korea pulled out of the six-party talks that had been the only functional regional mechanism allowing negotiation with the communist state.
The Lee administration has canceled most aid for North Korea, and suspended a tourism project after a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean guard for trespassing. In turn, North Korea is questioning the future of the Kaesong Industrial Park, a package of South Korean investments in North Korea. As a result, trade between the two Koreas is declining. The weakening economic ties with its northern neighbor have in turn substantially limited the South Korean government’s leverage.
The sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010 offered another test of the South Korean government’s ability to preserve peace and stability in the region. Even today, it is unclear whether North Korea was in fact involved in the incident and it remains too early to assess the situation fully. However, the Cheonan incident has deepened concerns about the capacity of the South Korean armed forces to deal with a crisis situation. In this context, is not easy for Korea to promote its own security concerns, and its willingness to cooperate in order to advance this goal is understandably quite large.
Though these remain limited, South Korea has begun military exchanges with China, another measure aimed at adapting to a changing security environment. Beyond the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government also actively participates in international cooperative efforts targeting terrorism and organized crime, and participates actively in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Swiss security policy is still in the process of redefinition. The original idea was one of “armed neutrality” and the prevention of war through defense readiness. After the Cold War, there was a shift to a concept of security through international cooperation. Today, the goals of Swiss security policy are: (1) to contribute to peace and stability through international cooperation; (2) to be capable of defending Switzerland against any military threat by other countries; and (3) to create a civil protection system capable of responding in case of natural disaster (floods, avalanches, etc.). While goals (1) and (3) may be achievable, goal (2) is questionable given the plausibly available military power and military technologies, and the Swiss army’s dependence on (technical) support by NATO.
The country’s external security policy is characterized by a substantial level of polarization. A gentle movement toward reform of the army and its functions has met with major opposition by conservative and right-wing politicians, in particular by the Swiss People’s Party. This opposition seeks a return to the basic idea of neutrality and the possibility of defending Switzerland against any aggressor through its own resources. The practical nature of these goals runs counter to the empirical evidence available; however, they remain very convincing claims for a very large share of Swiss citizens. The lack of realism among citizens and politicians, criticized in the SGI 2009 report, seems only to have increased rather than decreased.

As a bridge between Asia and Europe, with its straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean and a geopolitical location at a point where the Central Asian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern natural energy transport corridors intersect, Turkey draws the attention of the entire world. It is surrounded by Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. Currently there is armed conflict in Iraq, and armed conflict with PKK guerillas in the southeastern part of Turkey. The region is a very difficult one, with a history of armed conflict that will likely persist for some time in the future. Although the costs of providing security have been substantial for Turkey, it should be emphasized that Turkish security forces have on the whole been able to protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest. Turkey is a founding member of NATO and Turkish armed forces joined the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Somalia, have participated as a part of the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and have taken on tasks under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). As of 2008, 1.04 million people were on active military duty in Turkey. Despite these demanding conditions, the share of defense expenditures (through the Ministry of National Defense) in the general consolidated budget has gradually decreased since 2002, stabilizing below 2.5% of GDP (2008) until recently. Although Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Davutoğlu recently called for a strategy of “zero problems” with neighboring countries, Turkey’s traditional conflict with Greece, which is also a NATO member, has caused a perception of threat related to the disputed waters of the Aegean Sea. Moreover, Turkey’s role in the Middle East also requires a strong military capacity. The professionalization or modernization of the Turkish armed forces is another aspect of current discussions. Turkey seems to be in a process of defining a clear defense policy, while seeking to eliminate all confusions domestically and internationally.
Security is one of the areas where the clash between the elected government and the old republican elite, particularly the military, is most obvious. While Turkey’s membership in the NATO is not openly questioned from any side, there are strong undercurrents in the military that evidently favor a closer relationship with Russia, China and the Shanghai Five, while clearly opposing EU membership. The military pursues a clear-cut policy for Cyprus. It regards Turkish troops on Cyprus as a sine qua non for Turkey’s own security and strategic interests. The generals oppose any political concessions and demand that Turkey block the NATO membership of the Greek-dominated Republic of Cyprus, thus obstructing closer cooperation between NATO and the ESDP. In all these issues, the government is known to favor a more flexible policy.

The Obama administration has changed the tone of American foreign and security policy by emphasizing that the Muslim world is not the enemy in crucial world conflicts and that the war on terror does not define American policy objectives. President Obama has also stressed the U.S. role in the Middle East conflict as an honest broker and has stated that diplomacy should be the means of dealing with Iran. With regard to Afghanistan, a neutralization of the conflict with the Taliban is probably the greatest challenge for the Obama administration. The administration has articulated a comprehensive approach to the region, based on the relationship between the security threats posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaida in Pakistan. The administration has pursued a policy of military escalation in Afghanistan, increasing troop levels by more than one third. It favors a counter-insurgency strategy coupled with nation-building. In Pakistan, the administration has focused on defeating Al Qaida and engaging the Pakistani government in preventing the Islamic threat from spilling from the border regions into the Pakistani mainland.
The situation in Iraq was characterized by election-related infighting and violence, evidenced most notably by major bombings in Baghdad. The results of the March elections are inconclusive, but they do not seem to jeopardize the Obama administration’s announced reduction of the U.S. troop presence to about 50,000 by August 2010. Under the United States-Iraq Security Agreement that took effect January 1, 2009, and which President Obama has said would be followed, all U.S. forces are to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. On Iraq, there are continuities with the Bush administration’s approach in its second term.
Although the turmoil associated with the Iranian elections did affect the prospect for a new diplomacy toward Iran, the Obama administration has exercised caution and demonstrated toughness vis-a-vis Iran, also exploring the use of an enhanced sanctions regime. It has made some progress in bringing Russia and above all China along without reaching a final common position. The administration has not taken any options off the table. But it is clearly aware of the serious risks that an outright confrontation would entail.