INTERNAL SECURITY

Australia has not experienced a significant act of terrorism on its territory, although the 2002 Bali bombings in neighboring Indonesia killed more Australian citizens than any other nationality. There have been several failed plots involving Islamic extremists, most notably an attempt to bomb a major sporting event, and an attempt to storm a military base with automatic weapons. All resulted in long-term sentences for the defendants. Responsibility for internal security rests with the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; the latter has no powers of arrest and relies on the police for support. Both rely on the criminal law for prosecutions, as well as on the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005, the last piece of legislation to be passed to combat terrorism. International organized crime that is not terrorism-related is investigated by the Australian Crime Commission, which was established by the Australian Crime Commission Act 2003, which amalgamated several bodies with similar remits.

Canada’s internal security policy has been quite effective in protecting citizens against security risks. There have been no terrorist attacks in Canada, which suggests that the Canadian intelligence services are doing excellent work. Indeed, the 2006 capture of a Toronto-based terrorist cell (the Toronto 18, infiltrated by law-enforcement forces), which had been planning to bomb important national institutions including the Parliament Buildings and Toronto Stock Exchange, offers an example of very effective operational work.

Internal security is a longstanding issue on the political agenda, and governments provide well for it.
Two issues have recently provided challenges to internal security policy. First, extremist right- and left-wing activities are an increasing problem, arising mainly but not exclusively in the federal states of the former East Germany. Second, fighting terrorist and extremist activities has emerged as both a domestic and international phenomenon. Recent events have clearly demonstrated that even small terrorist groups of Islamic fundamentalists are able to paralyze the whole security system for weeks at a time. Today, internal security policy is closely intertwined with EU strategies and policies.
Due to the events of 9/11 and its effects on the subsequent “war on terrorism,” former Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble focused on policies strengthening internal security in order to prevent future terrorist attacks. In 2007, there was a debate on data retention, with policy mandating the storage of all phone and Internet communications for six months. In Germany, the government implemented an EU policy on data retention, but this law was overturned by the Federal Constitutional Court in March 2010.
Another law enables the police forces of the Federal Criminal Police Office to implement preventive measures against terrorism, including monitoring private communications via personal computers or telephones, and observing individuals with video cameras. There has also been some debate over how the military forces could be used domestically to prevent terrorist attacks, an idea that was ultimately dropped.
In 2009, the EU Commission recommended the implementation of body scanners at European airports to increase safety. Most European governments initially refused to use them, but another failed attack would probably lead the scanners to be implemented soon. Generally, the relationship between security and freedom consistently drives heated and controversial discussions. Nonetheless, authorities have so far been successful in preventing major terrorist attacks, at times by detecting conspiracies at an early stage.

Japan enjoys a reputation for a very low crime rate. For major crimes such as homicide or hard drug abuse, this is well deserved. Major terrorist attacks have also posed little concrete threat in recent years; the last major incident was the subway poisoning by the notorious Aum Shinrikyo cult in the mid-1990s. With respect to lesser offences, particularly with respect to burglaries and robberies, Japan now occupies only a middle rank among OECD countries. Another issue is the existence of organized gangs (so-called yakuza), which have never been eradicated, although incidents in which these groups molest ordinary citizens seem rather rare.

According the “Mercer’s 2009 Quality of Living Survey” Luxembourg is the safest city in the world (outpacing Bern, Geneva, Zurich and Helsinki) and the inhabitants of the country feel less threatened by crime than the EU average. Although crime statistics have increased over the past five years, internal security has not become a political issue.
The explanation for this probably lies in the fact that these statistics reflect an increase in police activity rather than crime. The financial resources of the police have been greatly expanded in recent years, from €90 million a year in 1999 to €160 million in 2009. Furthermore, a new law provides for the reinforcement of security forces; in five years, their number will increase by 25%.

New Zealand internal security is the responsibility of the police. The NZSIS (Security Intelligence Service) and the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) provide advisory services. Expenditures for public order and safety are relatively high and growing, as New Zealanders feel crime to be a salient issue. In the New Zealand Crime and Safety Survey 2006, rather high numbers of citizens with personal experience with victimization were reported (a report for 2009 is to be released). These numbers sharply differ from offenses actually reported to the police, although such reports have been recently increasing. The National-led coalition government has implemented a number of measures as part of their 100-day action plan, relating to addressing criminal gangs and the drug trade, youth violence and repeat offenders as well as considering victim compensation. This has been resulting in increased expenditure for police, criminal justice and prison services.
Internal security threats are also addressed through a Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG) which involves staff seconded from NZSIS, the New Zealand Police, the New Zealand Defence Force, GCSB, New Zealand Customs Service and Maritime New Zealand. CTAG provides assessments on terrorist or criminal threats aimed to create physical harm to New Zealand citizens or affect New Zealand interests at home or overseas, based on all information sources from the New Zealand government.

Norway is traditionally a safe country and the country’s security is not seriously threatened by crime. For example, the number of homicides per capita is the third lowest in the world, and incarceration rates are also small. Police presence and activism have each been relatively low, and the police continue to be predominantly unarmed. Prison sentences are relatively mild, and Norway has relied instead on long-term crime prevention policies. Reforms are under consideration, in a 2009 White Paper on Criminal Justice, to further reduce the use of prisons as a means of criminal justice. Theft and petty crime are relatively infrequent, although there has been some concern over increasing levels of narcotics- and gang-related crimes. There is a perception of increasing frequency and brutality of knife- and gun-related crime. In recent years, various reforms have been made to increase cooperation between different police and intelligence units, both internally and with respect to cross-border cooperation.
The police service is decentralized, organized in 27 relatively small police districts. In 2001, a central police directorate was established, but this was mainly a matter moving the central police authority out from inside the Ministry of Justice. The directorate is small, with about 120 officials. The head of the directorate has recently proposed a merger of police districts into larger units, but no such action has so far followed.

Switzerland has improved its internal security by integration into the Schengen/Dublin regime.

According to public opinion polls, the biggest internal security issue is the rise of ordinary crime. As migration and European integration (i.e., the lifting of borders within the EU due to the Schengen treaty) are seen as the (or two of the) primary causes of security problems, the discourse in Austrian about internal security focuses on migration as the root cause of crime. The Austrian government has responded with promises to strengthen the police force. As a result, the police force is practically the only growing public sector, despite the general budget problems. Still, crime rates, in particular those for violent crime, are fairly low in Austria.
The linkage of migration with internal security makes it very difficult to develop a consistent and rational approach to integration and migration policy.

Internal security depends both on defense forces and police work (falling under the Ministry of Justice). Cooperation between the police and defense intelligence services was increased after 9/11. So has international cooperation among Western allies.

Denmark is not a violent society. The homicide rate is low, and Danes normally trust the police. Burglaries are not uncommon, though crime related to drug use does occur.

The EU is also trying to upgrade all aspects of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation. Here too Denmark has a problem, namely the JHA opt-out from1993. Denmark has been taking part in JHA cooperation as long as the body was intergovernmental, as opposed to applying the community method of what used to be the EU’s first pillar. After passage of the Lisbon Treaty and the abolition of the pillar structure of the European Union, all JHA actions have become supranational. Denmark therefore does not take part in JHA post-Lisbon, except if it decides to opt-in, which has been made possible by the treaty.

In a Gallup poll in December 2008, when Danes were asked whether they were in favor of Denmark’s participation in the EU’s Justice and Immigration Policy, 49% said they were in favor with 34% against. A strong political coalition could thus possibly win a referendum to abolish this Danish opt-out. But the government has not called such a referendum.

Because of the Muhammad cartoon controversy in 2005, it is reasonable to expect that there are both foreign and domestic threats against Denmark. In an opinion poll of June 4, 2008, 75% of the Danes answered “probably/very probable” to the question, “How probable do you think it is that Denmark will become a target for terror attacks carried out by fundamentalist Islamic groups within the near future?” The murder plot discovered by Danish police in February 2008 against cartoonist Kurt Westergaard lends support to the feeling that Denmark may be the target of terror attacks.

Finland’s achievements in internal security are satisfactory. In fact, although the rate of violent crime, with homicides in particular, is relatively high, Finland is still one of the safest countries in Europe. As evident from opinion polls, citizens tend to regard the police as the perhaps most reliable institution in society. While expenditures on public order and safety are still fairly modest, Finland certainly has the preparedness to identify problem areas and take measures to eliminate them. In 2004, the government established the first program on internal security. This program conjoins security matters from a cross-sectoral perspective and takes account of security challenges in all areas of society, from social cohesion over border security to environmental matters. The first internal security program was modified and expanded in 2007. A national civilian crisis management strategy has also been initiated by the current government.

Iceland’s police force has long suffered from a staffing shortage. This could, of course, affect the level of internal security. However, Iceland has always been a secure place to live, with relatively few assaults, burglaries or other crimes against citizens. Thus, this type of crime does not present an everyday threat to citizens, even if recent years have seen a significant increase in random assaults in downtown Reykjavik on weekend night.
The economic collapse in 2008 changed many aspects of society. One is that the grand coalition government of 2007 – 2009 was forced from power as a result of riots in early 2009. To be sure, these were relatively peaceful riots, but ultimately helped lead to the formation of a minority government of Social Democrats and the Left Green Movement, which went on to win a parliamentary majority in the election of 2009. These riots and protests at the end of 2008 and in early 2009 led to some minor injuries and some arrests. Nevertheless, circumstances rather than police efficiency continue to ensure that Iceland is a safe place to be. That said, drug-smuggling has increased recent years.

During the period under review, several trends affecting security policy were indentified. Members of local autonomous networks have increased their contact with international jihadist groups, while the number of anti-Islam statements on Dutch web sites has increased in the last few years. Right-wing parties, in particular the Geert Wilders-led Party for Freedom (PVV), have gained traction in Dutch society, which may indicate that further polarization is underway. However, the resistance to polarization, radicalization and terrorism remains high within the Dutch Muslim communities. In addition to problems associated with terrorist attacks, there are other forms of internal risks – such as the beach riots at Hoek van Holland – that should be addressed. The incident at Hoek van Holland, in which the public attacked police, drew national attention and sparked public debate.
Citizens’ perception of safety also receives attention in Dutch policies. The aim has been to increase the perception of safety by 25% from 2002 to 2010. Perceived safety by citizens also receives attention in large policy programs, for instance the Large Cities Policy program (GSB).

Internal security in Poland has substantially increased. The number of homicides and thefts has continued to fall, and the feeling of safety has dramatically grown. In 2009, 69% of the respondents considered Poland to be a safe country. This was the best result ever since the beginning of the 1990s. Poland’s improved internal security can be attributed in part to its accession to the Schengen zone in December 2007, which has increased police cooperation with other EU members and helped modernize the Polish police force. In addition, the rising standard of living has played some role. One yet-to-be adequately tackled problem is the lack of coordination among the various organizations involved in fighting crime.

Criminality has risen with the increase in drug use and unemployment. The freedom of movement resulting from the Schengen agreement, especially with respect to the eastern European countries, has resulted in the imprisonment of individuals associated with international groups involved in illegal immigration, trafficking in women, and robbery. While the Basque terrorist group ETA does not pursue operations in Portugal, it was recently shown that the group does exist in the country. In early 2010, Portugal and Spain worked out protocols of cooperation to combat ETA, and jointly succeeded in capturing ETA cadres with explosives in Óbidos, Portugal.

While police statistics show a small increase in both violent crime and street crimes over the last few years, the crime rate in South Korea is low by international standards. The country has very strong gun control laws, making crimes involving firearms rare. There is no known terrorist activity in South Korea. A major concern in Korea that has not yet been effectively addressed is the spread of cybercrime, whose perpetrators take advantage of Korea’s excellent broadband infrastructure and lax online security measures.
Most reported crimes involve pickpocketing in tourist areas and crowded markets, and are predominately non-violent in nature. Criminal perpetrators are usually deterred by the risk of confrontation and engage principally in crimes by stealth. The lax enforcement of traffic laws remains another major concern, as Korea continues to have among the OECD’s highest road-fatality statistics.

Sweden ranks in the middle of the international indicators on crime rate and related measures. Understanding this ranking requires a look at the organization and management of the police, as well as at the societal context which this work is embedded in. The organization and management of the police has changed over the past several years, with changing models of central-local coordination and ambiguities about how to prioritize preventive police work and criminal investigations. New Public Management has been introduced rather extensively in the police sector with a focus on performance management, a strategy, which obviously does not encourage preventive police work because it cannot be measured.
Turning to the societal context of crime, it appears as if a degree of internationalization of crime is taking place in Sweden. This applies not least to the growing presence of organized crime. This has had an impact on the security of shop owners and restaurant owners in a number of big cities. There have also been a number of assassinations of gang members and violent turf battles in metropolitan areas. The police have made the fight against organized crime a priority but so far this campaign has only had a moderate effect.
In the discretionary policy packages implemented in 2008/2009, investment into Sweden’s police force and judicial system was announced. Currently, it is not possible to assess if these measures successfully contain organized crime in Sweden.

By global comparison, Belgium is a safe country, but is seen as a hub for synthetic drugs. Relative social stability has protected the country against the type of serious rioting seen in France, with the exception of some recent ethnic fights in the poor neighborhood of the western part of Brussels (Anderlecht), which saw no casualties.
However, the crime rate in Belgium is rather high compared to its neighbors. Overcrowded and unhealthy prisons are often described as part of the problem (prison employees regularly go on strike, and the federal government even started renting cells from the Dutch government in 2010). When prisons are on strike, regular police officers have to take on temporary duties in the prisons which reduces the presence of policemen on the streets and increases the population’s subjective feeling of insecurity. One of the associated structural issues is that a large proportion of petty delinquents (who are difficult to process in the judiciary system) are drawn from the ranks of the underprivileged and ghettoized youngsters of migrant origin.
Police services, though entirely restructured in the late 1990s, are not widely trusted by the population. Several particularly emotional news stories have prompted a higher demand for public security in recent years. In the last few years, different types of “peacekeeping” models aside from traditional police forces have been implemented (e.g., stewards paid by local authorities, transportation companies, etc.), but so far this has had little direct or evident effect on the public perception of (in)security.

Internal security policy is moderately effective. While organized crime is not apparent to the average citizen, there are some disturbing trends: selective ethnic-based acts of terrorism, rising drug trafficking (and related crimes), and a very sharp and systematic increase in common crime trends, ranging from petty crime to murder. Private security services are widespread in wealthy urban districts. Chile has an extremely high number of people in prison, especially among the younger age cohorts. Crime prevention measures are not well developed.
The two last governments each launched anti-crime programs, focusing more on detection and repression than on prevention. These had very mixed results. Crime repression programs such as the “Plan Cuadrante” and the strong increase in the numbers of police officers have significantly reduced crime rates. However, penal code reform and its implementation over the last eight years have significantly raised the efficiency of crime detection and criminal prosecution.

The Czech Republic has adapted itself reasonably well to the new security situation resulting from accession to the Schengen area. Police cooperation with the other Schengen countries, most notably Germany and Austria, has been smooth. In January 2009, a comprehensive police reform took effect, which has brought a clarification of tasks, an improvement in training and a modernization of equipment. In contrast, the reform of intelligence services, which have suffered from problems of coordination and control, has made less progress.

Concern about internal security has been high in recent years. Attention has focused on repeated outbreaks of urban violence in the suburban zones or other spectacular cases. Following the increasing level of petty criminality and several terrorist attacks on French territory and abroad, citizens have been more and more vocal about the need to be better protected by enforcing “law and order” measures.
Internal security has also been an issue of partisan competition since the early 2000s. Since then, every major outcry following a serious crime, a violent protest or social disorder has triggered new legislation, new measures or new enforcement policies. The issue has remained at the top of the agenda but, for the time being, the results have been disappointing.
On the whole, domestic security policy is able to protect citizens; problems of urban violence are linked to social problems and have to be managed by actions beyond security policy.

With the retreat of the security threat represented by privately organized groups such as the Irish Republican Army in its many manifestations and its counterparts in the Loyalist community in Northern Ireland, concern about internal security issues faded in Ireland. However, in the course of 2009 and 2010, there has been some increase in the number of violent incidents in Northern Ireland, and anxiety has grown that there could be a renewal of threats from this source.
At present, the main actual threat to internal security is criminal activity, and particularly crime related to the drug trade and “gangland warfare.” But despite the widespread perception to the contrary, Irish crime rates are relatively low by international standards, and with the exception of controlled drug offences have not risen very dramatically in recent years. For example, the number of homicides rose from 82 in 2003 to 137 in 2006, but fell back to 80 in 2009. The low serious-crime rate may not be due to the effectiveness of internal security policies, but is rather a fairly longstanding feature of Irish society.
The police force enjoys a good relationship with the majority of the population, although tensions exist in certain areas and between certain social groups and the police force.
The rise of “organized crime” and “gangland activities” related to the drugs trade is probably the biggest single threat to internal security today. This has been accompanied by an increase in the use of firearms by criminals. Despite this, the main police force remains unarmed. The low detection and conviction rates for this type of crime are disturbing. The difficulty of obtaining convictions is increased by witness intimidation, which has occurred in some high-profile trials.
Politicians have responded to the increase in gangland activity by approving a significant increase in the recruitment and training of police personnel, and by stricter criminal justice legislation with an emphasis on mandatory sentencing and some restrictions on the traditional “right to silence” of the accused. In 2009, the government introduced legislation which would allow gang members to be dealt with in the same way as members of the Irish Republican Army, that is, through the juryless Special Criminal Courts, in which gardaí representatives can offer expert evidence about gang membership.

The internal security situation in Italy is often portrayed by the Italian media as much more serious than it is in reality. This picture is also reflected in the wider population’s feelings of insecurity, which often emerge in public opinion polls. In reality, crime rates are in many aspects less severe than in other advanced countries, as demonstrated by international statistics. Public perceptions about the police forces are also somewhat ambiguous. For instance, polls indicate a high popular level of trust in the police forces (see the ITANES poll of 2006, with 81% of the population expressing trust, a level reached only by the president of the republic), but also show a lower confidence in their ability to enforce the law (World Economic Forum data). As for many other aspects of Italian life, it is important to make a distinction between regions. It is mainly the southern regions of Campania, Calabria and Sicily where the existence of mafia-like organizations negatively affects the security situation and creates particularly serious problems for businesses. In other parts of the country, the impact of organized crime is more limited. Though the Berlusconi government has been portrayed by the opposition as comparatively uninterested in fighting against the mafias of southern Italy, the police forces have in fact continued to conduct very effective actions against mafia and camorra groups in the region, and have been able to capture some of the leading bosses of these groups.
With regard to terrorism the ability of internal security forces to prevent serious attempts has been notable. The levels of expenditure for police forces have not been increased significantly.
The fragmentation of public security authorities between the national police (Polizia di Stato), the gendarmerie (Carabinieri), the strong and even paramilitary customs and finance police (Guardia di Finanza), and provincial and town police (Polizia Municipale) wastes money and limits efficiency. Among the biggest law-enforcement topics are corruption and white collar crime, which are very common in politics and the broader economy. When politicians and businessmen can and do routinely steal taxpayers’ money, it is certainly a question of internal security.

Slovakia’s accession to the Schengen group in December 2007, associated with training programs and foreign assistance, most notably from Austria, has resulted in a professionalization of the Slovak police force and border control. However, the Fico government did not close important loopholes in legislation, including witness protection. Moreover, the efficiency of the police force still suffers from underfunding, corruption and a low level of trust among the population.

In general, Spain performs satisfactorily in the field of internal security as compared to other European countries. Indeed, it scores comparatively low on general delinquency and homicide. According to official data, the crime rate decreased in 2009 (as compared to 2008), whereas there have been improvements in clearing outstanding cases. Nevertheless, the expenditure on public order and internal security has significantly decreased, and acute problems remain concerning domestic violence against women. Despite the introduction of GPS bracelets for domestic violence offenders in 2009, the technology is not yet broadly used, and more than half of abuses are never reported to the police in the first place.

In the last two years, the fight against the Basque terrorist and separatist group ETA has been successful, with the detention of its suspected ideological and operational leaders. Franco-Spanish field-level cooperation has intensified. Apart from ETA terrorism, the government of Spain and its citizens are concerned that the country remains a principal target of Islamic extremism. In order to face this new security threat, substantive police and intelligence efforts are now devoted to targeting terrorist recruiters and facilitators. Thus, for example, 65 suspected Islamist terrorists were detained in 2008.

In spite of these positive steps, the impact of the current economic crisis has contributed to an increase in the subjective feeling of insecurity, and public opinion continues to press for additional preventive measures.

Internal security in the United Kingdom has in recent years been perceived to be as much under threat from terrorism as from conventional crime. Before the former appeared on the scene in its current Islamist form (it should be recalled that Irish republican threats had had been a major security headache for a quarter century, up to the mid-1990s), the latter had already been a focus of policy, symbolized in the Labour Party slogan “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime.” As measured by the British Crime Survey, significant success has been achieved through reduction in the numbers of burglaries and crimes such as car theft since the mid-1990s. However, perceptions of the threat of crime have not come down in parallel with these figures, and the issue therefore remains very much in the public spotlight. Police powers have been increased in many areas, and many crimes and misdemeanors have been added to the penal code. A substantial policy emphasis has been put on technical solutions such as closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) and the National DNA Database, eliciting concerns over an erosion of civil liberties and the pervasiveness of snooping.

The persistently high number of crimes such as burglaries and robberies is also related to the persistent problem of inequality in the United Kingdom, and can therefore not be fought through the use of policing and law enforcement tools alone. New devices such as “Anti-Social Behavior Orders” (ASBOs) have had unclear results, and have drawn strong criticism from a human rights perspective.

After the terrorist attacks in London in March 2005, the police and intelligence services have managed to avert further such incidents. Whether this is really due to new powers of detention and the widely perceived loosening of the rule of law can only be the subject of speculation. A particular dilemma for the security services has been how to deal with individuals strongly suspected of being associated with Al-Qaeda, but not formally charged or convicted, and there have been several high-profile cases in which the judiciary has overturned ad hoc measures such as internment without trial or orders that restricted these individuals’ freedom of movement.

Home-grown terrorism and organized crime have become the major challenges for law enforcement during the period under review. Recent cases, such as the assassination of 13 people by an Army major of Arab descent and the attempt to blow up an airliner approaching Detroit, have shown that the heightened security measures are not waterproof. It is unclear whether these cases indicate failed coordination and communication within the sprawling U.S. intelligence community. Sometimes, as in the case of a Nigerian national who tried to blow up an airplane in December 2009, the failure of reasonable visa screening betrayed a lack of common sense on the part of operating-level officials, rather than a lack of sophisticated bureaucratic procedure.
An additional question is whether the organizational resources and structures of law enforcement and anti-terrorism agencies are up to the challenge presented by criminal syndicates and terrorist groups that have expanded their size, scope and ambitions. These groups employ global networks for technological capability, financing and information. Of particular concern is the growing confluence of organized crime with terrorist groups (in a drug-terrorism link), although the extent of this cooperation is disputed. Measuring success in combating terrorism is extremely difficult as reliable quantitative indicators are lacking or may be highly misleading. One problem is that the terrorist threat is diffuse and based on dispersed autonomous cells, rather than a defined unitary organization. Some observers have noted that the emphasis on anti-terrorism has weakened efforts in fighting more traditional crimes, particularly organized crimes. Transnational organized crime from Russia, the Balkans, Italy, the Middle East and Africa continues to be a problem. One of the greatest threats is coming from drug-related crime and extreme violence in the border region with Mexico that threatens to spill over into the southwestern United States, as a recent spate of killings on both sides of the border has demonstrated.

During the period under review, there were sporadic attacks against banks, government buildings and police stations, orchestrated by very small groups stemming from the Greek extra-parliamentary left. However, overall internal security risks are not great. The Greek state has received technical assistance from the United States and the United Kingdom in security matters, and has generally been able to offer effective protection against terrorist threats. At the time of writing, the police had been able to capture the leaders of a group (“Revolutionary Struggle”) implicated in bombings in Athens. This group was far less significant and effective than the “17 November” group captured in 2003.
Other politically motivated outrages were rare until December 2008, when the killing of a young pupil by a policeman in the Athens city center incited a cycle of violence, destruction and looting in downtown Athens that lasted for approximately two weeks. The police proved incapable of containing the situation, which included peaceful protests and demonstrations as well as violent clashes with security forces. Private and public property was destroyed. The Karamanlis government’s long hesitation and lack of coordination and planning were also to blame for the Greek state’s weak response to this challenge.
On the other hand, the scope and penetration of organized crime in economic life is very small. Political and social institutions and processes are not affected by organized crime. Greece has one of the lowest rates of homicide and incarceration among EU member sates.
In early 2010, legitimate protests against the economic austerity measures were paralleled by hooligan and anarchist violence on the streets of Athens. Notwithstanding the arrests noted above, there is a risk that continued protests against the government’s economic policies (in the context of the external bailout by euro zone governments and the IMF) will lead to crises on the streets and challenge the government’s ability to maintain order (as in December 2008, albeit for different reasons).

The primary responsibility for providing internal security is given to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The General Directorate of Security, the Gendarmerie General Command, the Coast Guard Command and the General Directorate of Civil Defense are the basic functional units of internal security. For years the major problem concerning intelligence has been the fact that the Gendarmerie has its own intelligence unit in parallel to the National Intelligence Organization affiliated with the prime minister’s office. The fields of duty for police and the gendarmerie are clearly defined, but coordination conflicts do occur. According to figures for 2009, total internal security expenditures amounted to TRY 14.2 billion (1% of the central administration budget). As expressed earlier, Turkey is a country in transition in terms of social and economic structures, and a transit country in terms of goods and human beings. The country’s internal security regime is naturally affected by all these factors. It is hard to say that the current security regime is sufficient, but Turkey is considered to be a safe country by Intelligent Risk Systems and Control Risks Group. However, the rise of separatist terrorist acts in the countryside and an increasing number of security casualties has put pressure on the idea of low domestic security risk. Moreover, the total number of registered gun owners increased to 1 million in 2009. A parliamentary subcommission ended the ban on licensing guns to certain ex-convicts. Security authorities in Turkey have effectively engaged in international cooperation with outside organizations such as INTERPOL. However, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters is not satisfactory. In this respect, a reorganization of the security services is on the reform agenda.
Notwithstanding their military success against the Kurdish PKK, the Turkish armed forces have not managed to end the terrorist attacks of the Kurdish guerilla group. After 28 years of low-intensity warfare, with approximately 40,000 casualties, the Turkish army is for the first time in the republic’s history being openly criticized. Its structure, concept of war and role in politics are all being questioned. Turkey appears to be the only Western country that fights guerillas with a conscript army.

While international cooperation within the framework of the Schengen border control agreement has operated smoothly, the internal security situation has worsened, with the state, at least partially, losing its monopoly on the use of violence. For one thing, Hungarian police forces have failed in dealing with the street riots and the political violence of the extreme right. For another, the number of small thefts has increased throughout the country. As a reaction, most municipalities have asked for, and have been ready to support financially, additional police actions. Moreover, several municipalities have also set up civil guards (Polgárőrség) alongside the state police. These activities have helped to protect individual property, but at the same time have further nourished the widespread feeling of rising internal insecurity and a broken public order. The worsening internal security situation can in part be attributed to the lack of action taken by the Gyurcsány and Bajnai governments. However, part of the responsibility also rests with Fidesz, whose accusations and intimidation exacerbated the politicization of the police.

The internal security situation in Mexico is bad and getting worse. The main security threats are twofold:
(1) Insurgency: There have been minor insurgent events at various times since the Zapatista rising of 1994, but these have not amounted to much. (The Zapatistas were more of a political phenomenon than a military threat). There has been some speculation that some insurgent group may be planning some kind of dramatic event later in 2010, which is the 100th anniversary of the Mexican Revolution and the 200th of Mexico’s initial declaration of independence from Spain. Insurgency is not so much a current threat as a potential one.
(2) Crime, particularly drugs: In 2007, President Calderón declared a war on drugs, but it must be said the drugs currently seem to be winning. Mexico is a major stop in the transportation of cocaine from South America to the United States, and there is significant drug production in Mexico as well. The result has been to bring billions of dollars into Mexico that are used to finance drug gangs, buy sophisticated weapons (which can be imported from the United States), and bribe politicians, police and judges. Calderón has tried to use the military as a front-line force in this battle, but this has led both to problems of human rights abuses and to corruption within the military. Meanwhile, the leaders of the drug gangs can afford to pay their armed guards more than the Mexican state can afford to pay its police and private soldiers.
Official judicial institutions such as the courts are not capable of dealing with drug issues, due to a lack of resources. Police organization has also been hindered by the overlapping jurisdictions of federal and municipal police forces. The army, though more respected, is capable of human rights abuses. Mexican authorities point out that drug-related violence tends to be high profile, due to the organized criminals’ objective of intimidating their enemies. This makes things seem even worse than they are. In fact, per capita homicide rates in Mexico are lower than in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. It is also the case that other countries aside from Mexico have experienced difficulties in controlling the drugs trade. However, the fact remains that Mexico is becoming globally notorious for its organized criminal violence.