Values express the non-governmental deputies’ supervisory capacity by giving the ratio of deputies from governmental parties to deputies not in governmental parties. Data from different years. Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Non-majority leverage scores

Oversight

Related downloads

Non-majority leverage

To ensure comparability, observed values are transformed into SGI scores on a scale from 1 to 10. The lowest value translates into score 1, the best value into score 10. Remaining values are transformed according to the original data distribution.

Value

Score

1	Mexico	0.42	10.00
2	Denmark	0.56	9.73
3	Chile	0.85	9.17
4	Canada	0.87	9.13
5	New Zealand	0.91	9.05
6	Spain	0.93	9.01
7	Czech Rep.	1.00	8.88
8	Greece	1.03	8.82
9	Sweden	1.04	8.80
10	South Korea	1.05	8.78
11	Ireland	1.06	8.76
11	Norway	1.06	8.76
13	Poland	1.09	8.70
14	Portugal	1.11	8.66
15	Netherlands	1.14	8.60
16	France	1.19	8.51
16	Hungary	1.19	8.51
18	Italy	1.20	8.49
19	UK	1.21	8.47
20	Australia	1.24	8.41
21	Slovakia	1.31	8.27
22	Austria	1.44	8.02
22	USA	1.44	8.02
24	Turkey	1.64	7.63
25	Finland	1.67	7.58
26	Luxembourg	1.73	7.46
27	Belgium	1.88	7.17
28	Japan	2.14	6.66
29	Iceland	2.15	6.64
30	Germany	2.57	5.83
31	Switzerland	5.06	1.00

Key concepts

The ability of a legislature to serve an effective oversight role depends not only on its internal structure, but also on powers enabling it to compel the production of information or testimony necessary to its review.

This criterion examines whether parliamentary bodies can request documents from the government, as well as the breadth of exclusions from this right. It looks at whether committees can summon ministers to provide testimony at hearings, or can invite experts to provide additional insight.

Audit and ombuds offices associated with the parliament also provide key institutionalized means of monitoring and checking executive-branch activity.

Performance comparison

Use drop-down menus for selections. In all cases, higher scores reflect better performance.