Israel

   

Executive Capacity

#21
Key Findings
Showing strides forward in a number of areas, Israel falls into the middle ranks (rank 21) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has fallen by 0.1 point since 2014.

In recent years, the PMO has become more deeply involved in policy proposal and development. Planning and strategic-capacity reforms within the PMO have facilitated this process. Draft legislation is developed within ministries, but a PMO representative is generally on the development team. Ministerial committees and informal coordination mechanisms are both influential.

A recently implemented RIA program is showing positive signs. Stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process has improved, and public consultation has become more widespread. A long-term plan orients policy toward the Sustainable Development Goals. Communication has become more coherent. In part because budgeting is highly centralized, ministries act territorially.

A tendency to outsource government services has continued, with somewhat lax oversight. The government has a good record in enforcing regulations despite interest-group pressure. A problem of ineffective or even a lack of implementation persists, though monitoring efforts have helped the government reach goals more frequently.

Strategic Capacity

#9

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
7
The director general of the Prime Minister’s Office oversees the body’s administrative and policy work. The director general supervises three main planning agencies: The National Economic Council, the National Security Council and the Policy Planning Department. In 2010, the government formed a committee to investigate internal strategic planning capacities; the results, published in late 2012, identified many structural deficiencies.

A number of steps have been taken as a consequence, with the most prominent of these being the annual publication of the Governmental Plan Book. The sixth book, published in February 2018, offers a review of strategic planning units on the Israeli government. As a continuation of the 2017 book, Israel used different consultants to define and achieve its goals for 2018. According to the book, connections between government ministries, and various professional and business experts were achieved and have improved policy outcomes. In addition, the book continues to use different markers, measurement indicators and compares the strategic goals of last year’s report to those of 2018.

The government is also conducting a series of “roundtables” in which government offices consult different professionals. Since 2008, there has been a series of policy planning initiatives called the policy planning roundtable. This started as a PMO initiative and brought together experts from the public, private and third sectors. These meetings allow the government to ask for advice from different experts. Although at the time of writing, no information was available on meetings after 2017.

In addition, in 2018, as part of reforms introduced over recent years in the field of public and professional consultation, the connection between the government and strategic planning units was tightened. For example, the Israeli government ICT authority, which is responsible for the improvement of services and public outreach, conducted a series of consultations with academic and business professionals, and public consultants and strategic planning groups in order to improve services and optimize results.

Citations:
“A guide for government planning,” The department for policy planning, September 2010 (Hebrew)

Arlozorov, Merav, “Serious, Ambitious, and Improving: Some Good Words on Netanyahu’s Government,” The Marker, 5.3.2017, https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3903271

Loten, Tomer, “The Governmental Planning Reform is Now Complete: Now is the time for an Implementation Reform.” The Marker, 27.3.2017, https://www.themarker.com/opinion/1.3954484

“Policy departments – auxiliary tool for navigation,” the Reut institute 11.6.2008. (Hebrew)

Working Plan Book 2017-18, PMO Office, March 2017: http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2017/ (Hebrew)

“Government releases 2017-2018 work plan,” Ynet reporters, 03.05.2017, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4930776,00.html

Government ICT Authority, Action Plan for years 2018-2019 (Hebrew), yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/NAP3Comments/

Working Plan Book 2018-2019, PMO Office, Feburary 2018 (Hebrew), http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2018/index.html#14

Policy Planning round tables, PMO office, June 2016 (Hebrew), http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Pages/roundtable.aspx

Cross Sector round Table, Ministry of Education, 2018 (Hebrew), http://sheatufim.org.il/subject/cross-sector/education/

Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Expert Advice
7
The government has several means of interacting with experts and academics. In 2017, the PMO published “Instructions for Public Participation Guide” to support government offices and public officials cooperate with external experts, and improve collaboration between government offices and the public.

Overall, experts can sit on independent public committees to examine the causes and consequences of a specific event or incident, such as the Trajtenberg Committee that was formed following the 2011 social justice protests. They can also serve in permanent committees that consult with the government on a regular basis, such as the National Economic Council in the PMO or be summoned by parliamentary committees to present opinions or to offer a different perspective on a certain issue. In addition, think tanks and research institutes act as a brokers between the academic world and politics, advocating and offering information on current events and policy issues.

On security and other issues such as foreign policy, the government tends to consult experts from the military rather than academics. Ministers often appoint an external advisory committee to assist with specific issues. One significant example is the Shashinsky Committee, appointed by the minister of finance to examine government fiscal policy on oil and gas. Israeli ministers also often consult informally with academic experts, primarily to receive guidance that is not influenced by political interests. In 2018, a new national program for climate control was introduced to bring the government together with environmental NGOs and ecological experts was formed.

Citations:
Blockchain Technology Takes Hold in Israel: Expert Take, Cointelegraph, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-technology-takes-hold-in-israel-expert-take

“Conclusions of the committee for the examination of the fiscal policy with respect to oil and gas resources in Israel,” State of Israel official publication, 2011 (Hebrew): http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/publications/02_Full_Report_Nonincluding_Appendixes.pdf

Hever, Shir, “The Privatization of Security,” 2012, Van Leer Institute

OECD (2015), “Scientific Advice for Policy Making: The Role and Responsibility of Expert Bodies and Individual Scientists,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 21, OECD Publishing, Paris.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js33l1jcpwb-en

Government decision number 2025 on rural development, 2015 (Hebrew): https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2014_des2025

Government Decision number 4079, “Israel’s preparations for adaptation to climate change: implementation of the recommendations to the government for a strategy and a national action plan,” 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/dec4079_2018

PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf

Interministerial Coordination

#28

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?

10
 9

The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) relies on sectoral policy expertise. Its need for a staff of independent and professional analysts originally led to the establishment of the National Economic Council, the National Security Council and the Policy Planning Department that advises the prime minister directly. The 2012 Kochik committee viewed these as positive but insufficient steps, and recommended that the PMO’s consulting mechanism be strengthened.

Recent changes have shifted this system somewhat. The PMO’s planning reforms have de facto given it the capacity to advise other ministries regarding their policy proposals and bills. This is practically done via collaboration with (and to some extent supervision of) the ministries’ vice directors of strategic planning and economy, who are officially the heads of the ministerial planning units.

The PMO also has the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills through Regulatory Impact Assessments. This is a part of a broader policy to reduce the so-called regulatory burden. Following a 2014 government decision, the PMO has delegates in government ministries who manage regulations affecting each ministry. This book also allows for closer supervision of laws and the work of government offices.

Every government ministry has a team responsible for regulation. These teams are responsible for advising government on regulations, including new law proposals. The teams are operated by PMO staff, although they are stationed in different government offices.

Citations:
Arian, Asher, “Politics in Israel: The Second Republic,” 2nd Edition 2005 (Hebrew).

“The committee to investigate the Prime Minister’s headquarter,” Official report (April 2012) (Hebrew).

Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf

“Reduction of Regulatory Burden Book”,PMO Office, March 2018 (Hebrew): http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/calcala/regulation.pdf

Transparency report of the planning and strategy units and their interaction with private consultation firms,” Knesset Committee Protocol, 21.11.2016 (Hebrew): https://oknesset.org/committee/meeting/13867/?page=2

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
7
Traditionally, the prime minister did not hold the power to return items to Israeli general cabinet meetings. However, in 2012, it filed for an amendment to standard practice, which was then ratified by the government. This included expanding the prime minister’s authority to delay the implementation of government decisions by resubmitting an issue to vote after it had been rejected, as well as authorizing the prime minister to cancel, postpone or summon meetings for government decisions. Since the passage of this amendment, the prime minister has returned several items and the prime ministerial position has been significantly strengthened.

In an indirect way, the PMO is involved in the preparation of policy proposals (see section G2.1). Each team is responsible for each government ministry’s regulation. Those teams are responsible for advising on regulations across all policy fields, including new law proposals, and are operated by PMO staff, although they are stationed in different governmental ministries. These teams allow for the PMO to be kept informed of proposals and policy developments across different government offices.

Citations:
Barnea, Shlomit and Ofer Kenig, “Political nominations in the executive branch,” IDI website June 2011 (Hebrew)

Reducing the Regulatory Burden Discussing the decision of the Ministerial Committee on Social and Economic Affairs no, 39, September 2014 (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/Regulation/Documents/dec2118.pdf

“Government bill amendment 868 from 12.8.2012,” PMO official website: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/sederyom/Pages/seder120812.aspx (Hebrew)

Weisman, Lilach, “Expansion of the Prime Minister’s authorities was approved; We must stop the madness,” Globes website 12.8.2012: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000773448 (Hebrew)

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
6
The government is authorized to appoint cabinet committees (called ministerial committees) to handle different policy issues. Moreover, it is obligated to appoint a security- and state-focused cabinet that includes the prime minister, the minister of defense, the minister of justice, the foreign minister, the minister of state security and the minister of finance. Currently, 33 ministerial committees work to address a wide range of topics.

Most ministerial committees receive limited attention in the media. The ministerial committee for legislation handles the preparation and the first approval of legislative proposals. The committee’s decisions regarding proposals determine how the coalition members will vote on the proposals in the Knesset. The committee has the right to control and delay legislation, and decide when a bill should proceed to a parliamentary vote. In 2016, about 40% of draft bills were delayed, some up to six to seven times.

Ministerial committees in Israel have become more relevant. Under the previous government (2013 – 2015), their decisions accounted for 54% of all governmental decisions. Though the current government has not yet released updated information on this topic, committee decisions appear to have remained relevant through 2015 – 2018.

Citations:
Cabinet committees and their authorities,” the ministry of Justice website 24.6.1996 (Hebrew)

Data proves: Ayelet Shaked is the real prime minister of the State of Israel, June 2018,
https://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/tomeravital/BLOG-1.6200567

Friedberg, Chen, “The Knesset’s Committees – Foretold Failure?,” The Ben-Gurion Law Proposal –Amendments of ‘Basic Law: The Government,’ 2015
‘Decade of Ministerial Committees – comparative study’ – January 2016,
Citizens’ Empowerment in Israel (Hebrew): http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/knowledge/govfunction/MinisterCommittees.pdf

“Ministerial Commitees.” PMO’s website (12.11.2015), http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/GovernmentSecretariat/Pages/MinisterialCommittees.aspx

Much housing, little health: the priorities of the government are revealed, The Marker, 2017,
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3263480

Research Institute for the Study of Israel & Zionism (January 2010) (Hebrew)

“The guidelines for government work,” PMO’s website (Hebrew)
Working Plan Book 2017-18, PMO Office, March 2017: http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2017/ (Hebrew)

The Ministerial Committee on Legislation postponed the discussion by 40% of the bills, Calcalist, May 2015,
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3688732,00.html

‘Transparency in the Ministerial Committee for Legislation’ – February 2016, The Social Guard (Hebrew): http://fs.knesset.gov.il/%5C20%5CCommittees%5C20_cs_bg_325109.pdf

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
5
Over the past decade, the government has sought to improve interministerial cooperation in order to overcome bureaucratic entanglements and political power struggles. In so doing, it has introduced roundtable meetings, director generals and vice-director generals of ministries coordination forums, guidelines and digital information platforms. However, experts say that ministries are essentially territorial in nature, and information sharing between ministries is difficult at best.

This lack of communication results at least partially from the government’s highly centralized budget process, which makes public servants defensive of limited and strictly supervised resources. In 2016, a report by the State Comptroller suggested that the lack of communication regarding foreign affairs is a result of the transfer of duties from away from main ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to other ministries. The report also asserted that interministerial disagreements are delaying the publication of regulations necessary for the implementation of laws. A report from 2015 claimed that 175 laws had not been implemented because ministries had not yet established regulations regarding those laws. According to that report, 32% of regulations are not promulgated because of internal arguments between ministries. A report from 2017 shows that this trend had improved, with 148 laws having not been implemented. Regulations under these laws were rescheduled or returned to parliament for further revision and should be resubmitted by the end of 2019.

More so, it seems that in some cases different ministerial offices are responsible for the same topic or field of expertise and that there is no coordination between these offices. This is somewhat deliberate as some of the reforms are reflect the personal interests of the prime minister’s agenda. For example, the Office of Strategic Affairs and the Israeli Office of Foreign Affairs came into conflict regarding BDS movements and the question of which office was responsible, because there was no coordination between offices.

Steps to improve communication issues include the Israeli government’s work plan for “open administration” in 2017 – 2018. This indicates that one of the government’s reasons for joining the international initiative for open administration is to improve coordination between government offices, and strengthen formal and informal mechanisms.

Citations:
“About: Public sharing,” Sharing official website (Hebrew)“ Failures of the public sector and directions for change,” The committee for social and economical change website (Hebrew)

Barda, Moshe, “Coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense,” The Knesset Research Center 2007: http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m01880.pdf (Hebrew)

Bar-Kol, Yair, “Appointing a minister for interministerial cooperation,” TheMarker 3.4.2013: http://www.themarker.com/opinion/1.1983509 (Hebrew)

Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel Democracy Institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)

Ravid, Barak.”Watchdog: Power Struggles Between Ministries Hindered Israel’s Battle Against BDS,” 24.5.2016, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.721284

Reducing the number of mandatory regulations that have not yet been enacted, Government decision number 2588, PMO, April 2017, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2588

“The committee to investigate the Prime Minister’s headquarter,” Official state report, April 2012 (Hebrew).

“The division of electronics and technologies,” Accountant General website (Hebrew) “The guide for governmental sharing: A model for cooperation between ministries,” official state publication, 2013: http://www.ihaklai.org.il/Portals/0/Documents/articles/מודל%20לשיתוף%20פעולה%20בין%20משרדי%20הממשלה.pdf (Hebrew)

The Foreign Affairs Ministry closes the department that handled BDS
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4991405,00.html

“The Leadership Academy- founding statement,” November 2014, Civil Service Commission website:
http://www.csc.gov.il/Tenders/TendersServices/Documents/LeadershipAcademyDoc.pdf

The Open Administration Work Plan for 2018-2019, Israel’s ICT Authority, http://yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/nap3hebrew/

Zinger, Ronny. “175 laws are not implanted because ministries didn’t set regulation for them” – Calcalist, 25.1.2016 (Hebrew): http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3679237,00.html

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
5
Israel’s government system is greatly influenced by informal coordination mechanisms, such as coalition obligations and internal party politics. However, due to its highly fragmented party system, it is hard to determine whether they support or undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. While coordination between like-minded parties may be made easier by the situation, fragmentation may result in stagnation over disputed policies.

Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)

Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).

“Coalition management,” the Knesset website: http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx (Hebrew)

Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).

How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?

10
 9

The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Digitalization for Interministerial C.
6
In 2017, the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit (abbreviated in Hebrew to “Katef”) was established to monitor government work and the application of laws passed by the parliament. While this body is not a digital one per-say, it does publish reports and articles online for the public and government officials. With this, the Israeli parliament hopes to better monitor and support government activities.

Israel’s government system is greatly influenced by informal coordination mechanisms, such as coalition obligations and internal party politics. However, due to its highly fragmented party system, it is hard to determine whether informal coordination supports or undermines formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. While coordination between like-minded parties may be made easier, fragmentation may result in stagnation over disputed policies.

In 2013, in order to better assist coordination between the public and different government offices, and between government offices themselves, an initiative called Digital Israel was introduced. The initiative’s purpose is to improve the digitalization of government offices. Through websites and online forms, the initiative has created a better mechanism for public engagement. This initiative was approved and implemented in 2017. According to the initiative, the government is planning to ensure a more digital and approachable government by 2020. This will allow the public, domestic and international NGOs, academia, and the government to achieve better coordination in all fields that require government action.

The Israeli Government ICT Authority was created in 2012 and was placed under the Prime Minister’s Office in 2015. The authority is tasked with making digital platforms more accessible and improving coordination between different government offices. Between 2016 and 2018, the authority recommended that all government offices utilize digital services and provide information online. This will promote public engagement and coordination between different government offices.

Citations:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged interministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)

Approval of the national digital plan, promotion of the “Digital Israel” national initiative and the reform of government decisions, https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2017_dec2733

Blander, Dana and Ben Nur, Gal, “Governmental coalitions: A steering mechanism in the political system,” in The political system in Israel 2013: http://www.idi.org.il/ספרים-ומאמרים/הוצאה-לאור/הספרים/הספרייה-לדמוקרטיה/המערכת-הפוליטית-בישראל (Hebrew).

“Coalition management,” the Knesset website (Hebrew): http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx

Headquarters for the National Digital Israel Initiative, Ministry of Social Equality, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/news/digital_israel_national_plan

KATEF – The Knesset Unit for the Coordination of Parliamentary Oversight, The Knesset (Hebrew): 2018,https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightAbout.aspx

National Initiative “Digital Israel,” Decision No. 1046 of the Cabinet, PMO Office, 2013 (Hebrew):
https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/policies/2013_dec1046

OECD report: The government has taken extensive steps to reduce regulation, Ynet news, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5310465,00.html

Rivlin, Reuven, “The intellectual independency of the Knesset member: the limit of the coalition obligation,” The Israel Democracy Institute (December 2010) (Hebrew).

The end of the fax era? A new headquarters in the Prime Minister’s Office will promote a digital vision for Israel, The Marker 2013 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/technation/1.2185272

The ICT Authority Strategical Work plan for 2016-2018, http://mag.calltext.co.il/storage/95/vzPm3XOxT0gj4vrpikuV.pdf

The Government Coordination Guide, Version 1, 2013, http://ihaklai.org.il/Portals/0/Documents/articles/%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%93%D7%9C%20%D7%9C%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A3%20%D7%A4%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%94%20%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9F%20%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%93%D7%99%20%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%94.pdf

Evidence-based Instruments

#21

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
5
In 2014, Israel launched a five-year plan to reduce “regulatory burden.” As part of the plan, the government aims to reduce the cost of bureaucratic processes by 25%. Regulators are required to formulate regulatory changes according to the RIA method defined by the government’s RIA guide. This could involve the creation, cancelation or revision of a regulation, and should help create a unified language within government and facilitate dialogue between ministries.

While the decision was not implemented immediately, and only six RIA reports were published in 2016, an improvement in the application of RIAs was made in 2017 and 2018. Nearly 50 reports were created by governmental ministries and bodies during 2017 – 2018. Each report details the RIA process conducted on a specific field or project that a ministry or governmental body was responsible for. As part of the RIA, regulators should publish RIA reports together with a draft copy of the regulation. Nevertheless, it seems that Israel is still lagging behind other countries when it comes to implementing RIA inside its own ministries. The OECD report from 2018 stated that offices inside the Israeli government have not used RIAs correctly and ignored it in some cases.

Citations:
Economic Affairs Committee, Commitee Protocol of 28.10.15 (Hebrew):
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/Economics/Conclusion/coc281015.pdf

“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy is a proposal for a multi-year plan“, IDI Website (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf

Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/default.aspx

RIA Guide, Governmental Regulation Website (Hebrew): http://regulation.pmo.gov.il/RIAguide/Pages/RIA.aspx

RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP

“Report from the committee for improving regulatory mechanisms in Israel and reviewing interfaces between various regulators in the market,” official report (2013) (Hebrew).

“The Five Year plan of 2015-2019“,Government Regulation Website, 2018,
http://regulation.gov.il/homesh_plan

“The OECD: “There will be no choice but to establish a regulatory body in Israel,” Calcalist, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3742333,00.html

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
4
Israel has recently improved its stakeholder engagement in the regulatory process. In 2017, an OECD report stated that Israel needed to improve its stakeholder engagement processes. However, in 2018, the OECD Regulatory Report Outlook ranked Israel one of the top four countries with regards to regulatory improvements, with a particularly substantial improvement in public and stakeholder participation and collaboration in RIAs.

In the last two years, most of the RIAs provided an opportunity to the public and other stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process. In addition, RIA reports were published following the conclusion of the process, ensuring transparency. The government also initiated a new group, comprising the Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) and public sector officials, which aims to improve the quality of regulation and better achieve regulatory policies on the basis of transparent criteria.

Citations:
“Improving regulation in Israel and easing the burden of bureaucracy Proposal for a multi-year program“, Israeli Democracy Institute (Hebrew):
https://www.idi.org.il/media/8867/streamlining-regulation-in-israel-and-easing-the-bureaucratic-burden-proposal-for-a-multi-year-program.pdf

“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018:
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79

RIA Report data, Government Regulation Website, 2018 (Hebrew): http://regulation.gov.il/RIA_REP

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
6
In 2015, Israel created a long-term plan for 2015 – 2030 to improve and advance a number of SDGs. The plan details 168 objectives and 230 indices in a variety of fields, including the reduction of poverty, hunger and inequality; improvement of health outcomes, life quality and educational quality; promotion of gender equality, smart consumption and innovation; and the development of infrastructure, energy and sustainable production.

Overall, the SDG indicators are used for two main purposes: promoting sustainable development in Israel and improving Israel’s foreign relations. First, by using the SDG indicators, a scientific base and new perspective can be given to an existing policy and thus help to reshape it. These indicators can be used for interministerial cooperation on different subjects, promoting sustainable development. Second, as SDGs are based on U.N. objectives and require working with the international community, Israel’s relations with other countries that use the same system improve.

In 2016 Israel, together with other members of the United Nations, started to report the application of SDGs. In 2017, Israel was applauded by the United Nations for its quick and effective application of the SDGs. According to the United Nations, Israel’s application of SDGs can be seen in a range of different areas, such as water, sanitation, education, health outcomes and well-being, innovation, and infrastructure. The United Nations mentioned that the reason for the quick and effective application of the SDG indicators is due to companies and government offices using them.

In addition, since 2011, the government has published “work books” every year, detailing the quantitative measures used to compare policies and policy goals over time. In 2016, another quantitative measure was included examining government performance and goal achievement.

Citations:
Adopting SDG goals – sustainable development goals“, Committee meeting of the 20th Knesset, Open Knesset Website, 2017 (Hebrew):
https://oknesset.org/meetings/2/0/2014108.html

“Agenda 2030 – Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations“. Ministry of the Environment Website
http://www.sviva.gov.il/subjectsEnv/InternationalRelations/InternationalOrganization/Pages/UN.aspx

“Vision of Sustainability for Israel at 2030.” Ministry of the Environment Website: http://kayamut2030.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181%3Aindicators&catid=59&Itemid=149

Arlozorov, Meirav. “The Professionalist Revolution of the Government of Israel.” The Marker website. 2018 (Hebrew): https://www.themarker.com/allnews/1.5846420.

Corporate Responsibility and Sustainable Development, Netivei Israel Company Website (Hebrew):
https://www.iroads.co.il/content/%D7%90%D7%97%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%AA%D7%90%D7%92%D7%99%D7%93%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%97-%D7%91%D7%A8-%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%90

“Israel earns UN praise at MFA-IDC conference on UN Sustainable Development,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 2017
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/InternatlOrgs/Pages/Israel-earns-UN-praise-at-MFA-IDC-Conference-on-UN-SDGs-19-December-2017.aspx

To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?

10
 9

Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 8
 7
 6


Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 5
 4
 3


Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 2
 1

Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Quality of Ex Post Evaluation
6
In 2015, the OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook stated that Israel had made progress in improving regulatory policy across several fields, including ex-post evaluations. Though the report also determined that Israel had no general policy on ex-post evaluation, and that government offices and ministries operate without clear guidelines. Since then, Israel has invested in improving its ex-post evaluations.

In 2018, an OECD report, “The Long View: Scenarios for the World Economy to 2060,” concluded that Israel had improved many regulatory fields, including ex-post evaluations. This, to our understanding, is a continuation of the process mentioned in the OECD report from 2017, which highlighted the general improvement in regulatory processes. The report also concluded that Israel has improved its consultation processes by opening the processes up to the public and integrating them into the RIA system. While Israel still focuses on reducing the regulatory burden, it seems that it is working harder on providing a solid basis for a general government regulatory policy.

Citations:
“Israel could gain from increased competition, public spending, OECD says “, Times of Israel, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-could-gain-from-increased-competition-public-spending-oecd-says/

“OECD economic scenarios to 2060 illustrate the long-run benefits of structural reforms,” OECD Website,
http://www.oecd.org/economy/oecd-economic-scenarios-to-2060-illustrate-the-long-run-benefits-of-structural-reforms.htm

“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/Israel-web.pdf

“OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018“, OECD WEBSITE, 2018
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264303072-en.pdf?expires=1540849342&id=id&accname=ocid195467&checksum=2F91C900404B34AA4EE7659685539C79

“Government at a Glance 2017 – Israel,” OECD Website,
https://www.oecd.org/gov/gov-at-a-glance-2017-israel.pdf

Societal Consultation

#10

Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?

10
 9

The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 8
 7
 6


The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 5
 4
 3


The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Public Consultation
7
The issue of consulting with the public and third-sector organizations is well acknowledged by the Israeli government. Instructions for Public Participation were published in 2017, and the emphasis placed on consulting with the public, NGOs and professionals shows that Israel continues to consult with outside sources. The ICT authority, which is responsible for improving public outreach, has conducted a series of consultations with business planning groups. In addition, a range of NGOs are having more to do with the Israeli government. The government working plan book 2018 – 2019 mentions working with outside groups to improve coordination and collaboration across different fields. In 2018, the OECD commended the Israeli government for its achievements in the field of regulation, including its progress with stakeholder and public engagement. However, there is criticism, mainly from stakeholders themselves who argue that the idea of consulting the public is vague and in many cases is nothing more than a phrase. In this case, it seems that while Israel is scoring high on the OECD goals, there is still considerable work that needs to be done particularly with the public itself.

Citations:
Census or Democracy: The public is not really involved in urban development, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001193850

Government ICT Authority, Action Plan for years 2018-2019 (Hebrew),
yoursay.gov.il/cio/File/Index/NAP3Comments/

“Israel has 200 regulators, 12 in the Netherlands, and 80 in Australia, Globes, 2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001253076

“Israeli government, civil society and business community,” PMO policy paper (February 2008):
http://beinmigzari.pmo.gov.il/Documents/Policy_English.pdf

Limor, Nissan and Avishai, Libat, “Separately and together: Structuring a relationship of cooperation between government and civil society organizations,” JDC publication 2013 (Hebrew).

PMO Office 2017, Instructions for Public Participation, 2017
http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/all%20web.pdf

“Round table interface: Three years’ summary,” PMO official brochure (August 2011) (Hebrew)

Shapira, Asaf, “Who privatized my country?,” IDI website (March 2010) (Hebrew)
Trachtenberg report website (Hebrew)

“The round table and the tri-sectoral discourse,” Civil leadership website (Hebrew)

“Tender 34067“, Ejobs Website 2015:
https://ejobs.gov.il/gius(bD1oZSZjPTI4MA==)/tender/application.do?PARAM=cmNmdHlwZT1waW5zdCZwaW5zdD0wMDUwNTZCRjAwMTExRUU0QjhCOTlGNUEzNjExQ0IzRg%3D%3D

Working Plan Book 2018-2019, PMO Office, Feburary 2018 (Hebrew),
http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2018/index.html#14

Policy Communication

#10

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 8
 7
 6


Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 5
 4
 3


Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Coherent Communication
7
By law, the PMO supervises and coordinates activity between government ministries through a designated division. In 2013, representatives from several ministries wrote the Governmental Cooperation Guide in which they presented guidelines to ensure cooperation between ministries.

However, annual reports from the State Comptroller reveal major shortcomings in ministerial coordination, emphasizing the mutual tension and recrimination between ministries. Contradictory proclamations from different ministries are not uncommon, resulting from political power struggles within the coalition as well as from the treasury’s stronghold on ministerial budgets and practices.

In recent years there has been a shift toward creating a more “open” government and improving the government’s communications vis-a-vis the third sector and the public as well as within the government itself. The new emphasis on sharing and transparency has somewhat ameliorated the technical aspect of the divides, but its influence over communicating policy is still uncertain. This trend of “open” government continued through 2016 – 2018, with greater emphasis placed on connecting government offices and services via online and computer services. This work has allowed for better communication and greater coherency in government work.

Citations:
Government ICT Overview of Activity 2018, ICT authority Website, 2018
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/mabat2018/he/Tikshuv_Activity_06_singles.pdf

Ravid, Barak and Lis, Jonathan, “After criticizing the government: Netanyahu fires deputy minister of security Danon,” Haaretz 15.7.2014: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.2377994 (Hebrew).

“Open government partnership: Progress report on action goals,” Official state publication (October 2013) (Hebrew).

“Special report regarding the Mount Carmel Forest fire – December 2010 oversights, failures and conclusions,” the state comptroller website 20.6.2012 (Hebrew).

“The governmental guide for sharing: A model for inter ministerial cooperation,” Official state publication September 2013 (Hebrew).

Implementation

#22

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Effectiveness
6
In accordance with government decision 4085, the PMO publishes yearly working plans for line ministries. The yearly plan for 2014 was the first to also publish detailed benchmarks for policy goals. However, as it does not show progress made over previous years, it is difficult to track long-term progress. Prominent topics on the government’s agenda in recent years (e.g., the housing supply, the cost of living, the unrecognized settlements for the Bedouin population and illegal immigration) have not been resolved or resulted in substantial achievements. In fact, a large proportion of government decisions are not implemented. Several initiatives for monitoring the implementation of government decisions were rejected. Therefore, the PMO director general created a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of approved law proposals and government decisions. Through this mechanism, the director general has ordered ministries to report on the implementation process. Thus, the PMO found that, in many cases, the orders regarding the implementation of government decisions did not define which ministry would oversee the decision’s execution. Therefore, the PMO suggested that those orders should be written more clearly. In addition, there were other attempts to follow the implementation of government decisions through NGOs, such as a Citizens’ Empowerment Center application.

In recent years, the government evaluates policy implementation in two ways. First, using its own reports, such as the government working plan. According to these reports, since 2017 and more so in 2018, policy objectives were achieved in accordance to the goals set during the previous year. In 2016, the Israeli PMO released, for the first time, a final report on the execution of government decisions, with another report published in 2017. The reports include all the decisions made by the 34th government, their themes and statuses. According to the latest report, about 75% of government decisions were achieved and 66% of all objectives fully achieved. In this regard, the establishment of Katef (see section 2.6) is another important step for the improvement of policy implementation. Second, the government uses reports made by NGOs, but these are often unsystematic and cover specific issues rather than providing a broad examination of policy implementation as a whole.

Citations:
Arlozrov, Merav. ‘Netanyahu’s Government: The Tale – And The Surprising Numbers’ – The Marker, 9.6.16 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.2970895

“Aspects of planning, measurements and control in government proposals brought to government’s discussion,” September 2008 (Hebrew)“

Book of working plans 2014,” PMO website (March 2014) (Hebrew):

“Deputy chancellor of the Bank of Israel, Dr. Karnit Flug, in the agenda forum meeting: where are we in achieving social-economic government goals?,” Bank of Israel website 16.4.2012 (Hebrew)

Execution Report of Governmental Decisions – Final Report of 2017, PMO Website, 2017, (Hebrew):
http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/mimshal/Documents/dm2017.pdf

“Financial stability report,” Bank of Israel, June 2014 (Hebrew).
Final Report of 2017, Execution Reports on Government Decisions, PMO Website, 2017

“Hok Ha-Hesderim,” The Knesset website (Hebrew)
https://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/hesderim.aspx

Kashti, Or, “The government made decisions, but no one monitors its compliance,” Haaretz 6.2.2015 (Hebrew):
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2558823

“Meeting the Goals: These are the worst ministries in the government,” The Marker, 2018, https://www.themarker.com/allnews/1.5956091

“Monitory policy report 2014 – first half,” Bank of Israel website 4.8.2014:
http://www.boi.org.il/he/NewsAndPublications/RegularPublications/Pages/doch-mm/IMF201401h.aspx (Hebrew)
http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2970895

‘New Application Will Allow The Public to Follow the Pace of Laws and Government Decision’s Implementations’ – The Marker, 15.7.15 (Hebrew):
http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2684691

“Report: Government performance has improved - but National Insurance is still in danger,” Walla News, 2018
https://finance.walla.co.il/item/3145866

Robinson, Eyal, “Implementation of policy as a key in planning cycle and decision-making at the national level” Citizens Empowerment Center in Israel, July 2014 (Hebrew)

“What Can the Government Learn From the Air Force,” The Marker, 2018
https://www.themarker.com/opinion/.premium-1.6359711

Working Plan Book 2018-2019, PMO Office, February 2018 (Hebrew),
http://www.plans.gov.il/pdf2018/index.html#14

“Yearly report 64a,” State Comptroller official publication 15.10.2013:
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/113.aspx (Hebrew)Zachria, Zvi.

To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
7
The OECD and global best-practice methods have influenced Israel’s organization of government in recent years. Values of transparency, planning, comparability and supervision are defined by a designated unit in the PMO, arguably improving the implementation of the overall government program by increasing ministerial accountability vis-a-vis the government and the public. These new actions accompany more traditional ways to improve compliance, such as weekly cabinet sessions and interministerial roundtable events.

According to the Basic Law: the Government 1968, ministers are accountable to the Knesset with regards to the field for which he or she is responsible. This means that ministries must support and follow government decisions. In addition, coalition agreements, created by the party system in Israel, can be considered a mechanism for the government to force its agenda on ministers. If a minster resists or fails to implement a part of the government program, the minister might be forced by their respective party leader to eventually follow it. For example, as part of the Surrogacy law of 2018, only single women were permitted the right to surrogacy, single men and gay couples were excluded. The law was highly controversial and provoked massive protests. Some Knesset members, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, acknowledged that they supported surrogacy for mothers and fathers, but voted against their stated position for the sake of “collation discipline” and due to pressure from ultra-orthodox parties.

Citations:
Blander, Dana, “Hok Ha-Hesderim: Necessary evil or necessarily evil?,” IDI website 14.1.2007 (Hebrew)

Salonim, Ori, “Measuring performance in the public service,” The eleventh annual Hertzliya conference official publication (Hebrew)

“Book of working plans 2014,” PMO website (March 2014) (Hebrew)

Guidelines of the Attorney General In matters relating to the work Government, Ministry of Justice, 2015
http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/News/Documents/AttorneyGeneralGuidelines0515.pdf

“Gay Couples Denied Right to Surrogacy in New Law, JPOST, 18.7.2018“https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Surrogacy-bill-passes-Netanyahu-flip-flops-on-homosexual-surrogacy-562810

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
7
The basic law on the issue of the government establishes the prime minister’s responsibility over the government’s advancement of policy goals. This includes monitoring and guiding the work of appointed line ministers. In recent years, the PMO has introduced best-practices reforms featuring elements of transparency, sharing and benchmarking that have improved the systematic monitoring of ministries. A special committee formed to review the PMO identified its comparative weakness when dealing with recommendations from the ministries of Finance and Defense, aggravated by the PMO’s tendency to take on the responsibility for executing policies from weaker ministries such as Welfare and Health, thus expending its workload. However, three new professional units have been established in the PMO, each in charge of monitoring related ministries. Moreover, the past two years has seen a major improvement in monitoring with the government’s annual coordination of all ministerial reports on the implementation of governmental decisions. Currently, the PMO thus has strong ministerial oversight capacities.

Citations:
“Reorganization of structure,” Civil Service Commissioner information booklet No. 2, October 2012: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/NewsLetters/newsletter2/Pages/MattePMO.aspx (Hebrew).

“Report on the implementation of governmental decisions 2016,” PMO wesite, http://www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/mimshal/Documents/dm20161607.pdf (Hebrew)

“The committee to review the PMO’s,” Official state publication, February 2012, (Hebrew)

Environment and Health Fund, Ministry of Health, “Health and Environment in Israel 2017,” http://www.ehf.org.il/magazines/he/EnvHealthIsrael2017/, (Hebrew)

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies|Bureaucracies
6
While connections between ministries, and government agencies and NGOs are defined by contractual agreements, and financial and legal oversight, the content and quality of services are not under similar appraisal. Most ministries sufficiently monitor their respective agencies, while some – notably education and welfare – are criticized for failing to implement government policies and effective monitor service provision. Therefore, the movement for quality government in Israel claims this is harming the public service provision, while others claim the state-owned enterprises are unnecessary and should be privatized.

In 2016, an interministerial team examined the outsourcing of government services. The team’s report emphasized that government monitoring of service providers is still lacking. According to the report, nearly 60% of the outsourced projects were not monitored by the government in the first year and 83% lacked information about service users’ satisfaction. Additionally, the report stated that the government only enforced 4% of all infringements that were reported on outsourcing services.

In 2017 and 2018, the tendency toward outsourcing governmental services has continued. According to media reports, government ministries still drag behind when it comes to monitoring and enforcing regulations on the service providers, including protecting the rights of customers and workers.

Citations:
Ben Aeter, Moshe. ‘Who needs the state-own enterprises?’ – Haaretz, 13.04.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/moshebatar/1.2914354


Detal, Lior, “The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” theMarker 5.10.2014:
http://www.themarker.com/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).

Haber, Carmit, “Managerial culture blocks to implementing open government policy,” The Israel democracy institute (March 2013) (Hebrew)

IDF employees: The state leads to the privatization of the production of tanks and armored personnel carriers,” Globes,10.10.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001255924

Koren, Ora, “Reform in the public sector: The ministry of Treasury’s authorities will be restrained, employees will receive incentives,” TheMarker website 9.8.2012 (Hebrew)
Limor, Nissan, “Regulation and oversight over third sector organizations,” Social security no. 70 (2005),159-187.

Maman, Daniel, “State Economy in a Neo-Liberal Age,” In Adva Center’s “30 Years for the Neo-liberal revolution In Israel,” 2016 (Hebrew):
http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/30yearsto1985.pdf

“Public service provisions using outsourcing,” JDC publication. (Hebrew)

“The Ministry of Health,” in Annual report 63c for 2012, the State Comptroller publication 8.5.2013:
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/114.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (Hebrew)

The privatization failures: “The Transportation Ministry completely smashed the examiners.,” Davar, 22.11.2017 (Hebrew)
https://www.davar1.co.il/95761/

“The state admits failures in privatization tenders and supervision of privatized service” – The Marker, 8.9.2016 (Hebrew):
https://www.themarker.com/news/1.3062114

“The state comptroller presents: “The privatization of IMI was” cooked up ” – Globes, 26.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001243060

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
7
Local authorities have three main types of income: local taxes (property tax, fines, tolls) earmarked to finance local services, government funds designated for social and educational services, and governmental balancing grants for basic services that poor local authorities are unable to fund. The government’s budgeting procedure for local government is clearly articulated and includes progressive budgetary support. However, one major problem in the government’s budgeting procedure, which was mentioned in the State Comptroller’s report from 2015, is that there is no regular procedure in the Ministry of the Interior regarding the development of budgets for local authorities.

Over the past few years, local authorities have called for a redistribution of education budget allocations according to cities’ socioeconomic ranking. A report made by TAUB Center in 2017 argued that the budget system between local authorities leads to inequality between rich and poor authorities, perpetuating the situation in which poor authorities receive insufficient funds. While the redistribution plan was promoted by poor local authorities, it was resisted by rich municipalities and for a while was not approved by the Finance Ministry.

The plan was promoted again and approved as part of the 2017 – 2018 budget under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior. The plan consists of four points. First, providing a grant to balance and support poor local authorities that face an income shortage and experience difficulties in providing services. Second, providing recovery schemes for authorities that are facing a budget deficit. Third, supporting authorities with low tax income. Lastly, supporting local authorities with a special fund.

Citations:
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “The political economy of local authorities,” IDI website 2009 (Hebrew)

Ben-Bassat, Avi, Dahan, Momi, and Klor, Esteban F., “Representativeness and efficiency in local government,” Jerusalem: IDI 2013, introduction summary in English: http://en.idi.org.il/media/2464644/ Representativeness-Abstract.pdf

Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “Strike in local authorities,” IDI website 15.1.2012 (Hebrew)

“Instructions for local authorities’ budget frame proposal for the year 2012,” Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)

Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)

Ministry of Interior budget of 2017-2018, Minstiry of Interior website (hebrew)
https://mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/statebudget/BUDGET2017_2018/MINISTERIESBUDGET/MinisteriesBudget/DocLib/Pnim_Main.pdf

Ministry of Interior Work Plan, 2017-2018, Ministry of Interior Website (Hebrew)
http://www.moin.gov.il/LOCALGOVERNMENT/local%20authority/CHMap/Documents/%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%93%20%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%9D.pdf

Saada, Aria, “Ombudsman’s report 57ב: Budgeting social services for local authorities equality lacking,” Abiliko website 9.7.2010 (Hebrew)

“The State discriminates in welfare budgets between rich and poor authorities,” Ynet News, 6.12.17 (Hebrew)
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5052419,00.html

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
5
The legal framework for local government is based on the “ultra viras” principle, according to which local government is only authorized to act within the parameters designated by law. While local government is elected, and some stronger municipalities are able to expand their influence over policy, often times local authorities act merely as a local branch for implementing central government policy. In light of frequent problems of corruption, management failures and over politicization during the 1990s, the Ministry of the Interior expanded its oversight over municipalities, allowing the ministry to appoint a permanent outside accountant, cancel an approved budget, and even dissolve the council and nominate a professional alternative.

As a part of the government’s effort to handle corruption problems, the attorney general formed a special committee in 2015. The committee recommended that the heads of local authorities increase transparency regarding finance, such as requiring senior local authority staff to provide annual declarations of capital. In 2016, a report made by the committee was submitted to the attorney general. It appears likely that the reports’ recommendations will be made law by parliament. However, in another report, published in 2018, the recommendations were shelved. Attempts to promote the legislation of the reports’ recommendations face resistance from both political sides in parliament.

The tension between the national and local governments intensified after the legislation of the “Supermarket law” in 2017. The law prohibited the opening of supermarkets on “Shabbat” (Saturday). The law was heavily criticized by local authorities with small religious populations. Some local authorities tried to legislate a Municipal Bylaw, allowing the authority to act in disregard of the national law. However, as part of the centralization of local authorities in Israel, such bylaws must be approved by the minister of interior, who in this instance denied their approval.

Citations:
Benita, Rinat, “Local Authorities in Israel“, The Knesset Research Center 17.5.2015:
http://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/committees/InternalAffairs/Documents/rashpnim.pdf (Hebrew).

Deri used the supermarket law, Channel 7 News, 21.6.2018 (Hebrew):
https://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/376136

Hayman-rysh, Noami, “Changes in the status of local government,” IDI website, October 2008 (Hebrew)
https://www.idi.org.il/parliaments/4503/4507

“Municipalities law: Position paper,” IDC, December 2011 (Hebrew)

“Government legal proposal 292,” Official legal records 1997 (Hebrew)

Lichtman, Moshe. “It’s not necessary to recommend to reduce mayors term,” 19.9.16 (Hebrew):
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001152963

Modi’in joined the “bypassing the supermarkets,” Ynet News 3.1.18 (Hebrew)::
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5065779,00.html

The report that was shelved: A new bill to combat corruption in the local government, Israel News, 18.1.2018
http://www.israelnews.co.il/%D7%94%D7%93%D7%95%D7%97-%D7%A9%D7%A0%D7%92%D7%A0%D7%96-%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%93%D7%9E%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A6%D7%A2%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A7-%D7%A9/

The Supermarkets Law was approved in second and third readings – by a vote of one vote, Walla News, 9.1.2018 (Hebrew):
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3125629

“What will be opened and what will be closed on Shabbat? All you need to know about the “Supermarket Law”“, Ynet
News 9.1.18 (Hebrew):
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html

Why and by whom is a report of recommendations for eradicating corruption in the local government shelved?, Branza News, 23.1.18, (Hebrew):
http://branza.co.il/site/article/article_view/news-1516727272
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5068454,00.html

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
7
The provision of local services in Israel is dispersed between many agents, including local authorities, NGOs, government and municipal corporations and institutions such as public and private hospitals. The bulk of social services are provided by local authorities proportionally funded according to their revenues and share of dependents. While some local authorities fair well and offer supplementary social support, weaker local authorities (e.g., largely Arab or Jewish orthodox municipalities) struggle to maintain government standards. This incited the expansion of central government’s authorities during the 2000s, authorizing the Ministry of the Interior to closely supervise and even to dissolve councils that fail to deliver proper services, at the cost of a less democratic local representation.

Another solution is the advancement of service treaties in local authorities which aim to standardize local services used by residents while informing residents of their rights and the level of general services in their city or town. A branch of the Ministry of the Interior reviews this process with pilot cities showing positive results. In recent years, many local authorities have taken part of this process and published information regarding local services on their website. The privatization of social services continues to exhibit problems as weak social ministries struggle to regulate the quality and content of care. Several reports on education services point to ideological conflicts and poor management as well as an increase in the share of privately financed activities and consequent inequality.

Citations:
Bersler-Gonen, Rotem,“Service treaty in local government in Israel – review,” Ministry of the interior website (December 2011) (Hebrew)

Dagan-Buzaglo, Noga,“Aspects in privatization in the education system,” Adva Center 2010. (Hebrew)

Detal, Lior,“The Ministry of Education inc.: This is how hundreds of private bodies receive some 11 billion shekels,” TheMarker 5.10.2014: http://www.themarker.co m/news/education/1.2450395 (Hebrew).

Paz־Fuchs, Amir and Bensimhon־Peleg, Sarit, “On the seam between the public and the private:privatization and nationalization in Israel: Annual report 2013,” The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, 2014 (Hebrew)

Specktor, Shiri, “Social rights and personal social services in Israel,” The Knesset Research Center 21.10.2010:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03158.pdf (Hebrew)

“Local government in Israel,” Knesset website (Hebrew)

“On nominated councils and democracy,” Hithabrut website (NGO) (Hebrew)

Local government in Israel, Knesset website:
http://www.knesset.gov.i l/lexicon/eng/LocalAuthorities_eng. Htm

“Quality of service provided to residents of local authorities,” State Comtroller, 2016 (Hebrew):
http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_554/8b2456e1-a1dd-450f-af0c-df9fccca5d4f/106-service.pdf

The citizen’s empowerment center in Israel: the implantation of the movement’s decision to establish a regulatory authority over hospitals – review – April 2016:
http://www.ceci.org.il/sites/citizens/UserContent/files/monitorreport/monitor%201622.pdf

To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?

10
 9

Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 8
 7
 6


Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 5
 4
 3


Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
 2
 1

Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Regulatory Enforcement
6
In general, Israel has a good record in dealing with powerful interest groups and enforcing regulation – the prime example being the Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act of 2013. The law was enacted after a public interministerial committee found that one of the most prevalent structural market failures was the presence of a small group of tycoons that used large pyramidical corporations to controll the market. Therefore, it recommended several affirmative actions to regulate the corporative structure of large businesses and ensure the public interest. The government accepted the recommendations and legislated the aforementioned law.

The law itself differentiates between two main types of businesses – a financial company and a real corporation – and imposes limitations and regulations on the control and purchase of both. The law also dictates that pyramidical corporations are allowed to be only two layers tall (excluding taller corporations that existed at the time of the law’s enactment, which are regulated by a different set of limitations), and defines when and under what conditions a company is considered a big corporation. Moreover, the law ordered the establishment of a professional interministerial committee whose role is to oversee the market and prevent the rising of centralist business structures. The committee is still active and in January 2018 it published two updates to the law.

Another example of the ability of the government to withstand interest groups can be found in the latest developments regarding the dairy products market. In Israel, the authorities monitor and dictate the pricing of basic milk products while taking into account the costs of manufacture. In May 2018, a professional committee recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance raise the prices of monitored products due to the rise in the price of crude milk, but the minister of finance, Moshe Kahlon, refused to approve the move, supposedly on grounds of public interest. After allegedly failing to reach an agreement, Tnuva, the largest dairy products company in Israel, appealed to the Supreme Court to enforce this raise. Up to now, Kahlon has remained adamant in his refusal and in fact in late October 2018 he came to an agreement with the farmers to gradually lower the price of crude milk. Still, it is unclear whether or not it would make Tnuva’s appeal redundant and at the time of writing the case is still in litigation.

Citations:
Bz, Itamar. “The Ministry of Health in the Service of the Tobacco Industry.” In the Seventh Eye website. October 18th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.the7eye.org.il/306434.

HCJ 5124/18 Tnuva Cooperative Center for the Marketing of Farm Produce in Israel Ltd. V The Minister of Finances (Hebrew) (Ongoing)

Israel. “Announcement Regarding the Update of Values [lit., sums] According to the Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act, 2013,”
Publications Digest Records [transliteration: Reshumot], 7671, Jerusalem: The
Governmental Press, 2018, p. 4194. (Hebrew). (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/law10/yalkut-7671.pdf)

Israel. “Announcement Regarding the Update of Values [lit., sums] According to the Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act, 2013,” Publications Digest Records [transliteration: Reshumot], 7679, Jerusalem: The Governmental Press, 2018, p. 4459. (Hebrew). (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_word/law10/yalkut-7679.pdf)

Israel. The Government. “Bill of the Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act, 2012,” Government Bills Records [transliteration: Reshumot], 706, Jerusalem: The Governmental Press, 2012, pp. 1084-1159. (Hebrew). (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/Law_word/law15/memshala-706.pdf)

Israel. The State Comptroller. “Ministry of Health – the Actions of State Authorities to Limit Smoking and its Harms,” Annual Report, 68(3), 2018, vol. 1, pp. 603-665. (Hebrew) (Also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_627/ec2bf97b-92ee-418a-905f-cc3c0eafdac8/208-tabak.pdf)

Koren, Ora. “Tnuva in the HCJ VS the Minister of Finances: Raise the Monitored Dairy Products’ Prices in 3.4%.” In TheMarker website. July 3rd, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/law/1.6241634.

Senior, Eli. “Netanyahu, Elovitch and the Secret Meeting in the House in Balfour.” In Ynet website. August 7th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5323968,00.html.

The Encouragement of Competition and Restriction of Centralism Act, 2013. (Hebrew). (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/Law01/500_957.htm)

Vaxman, Avi. “Kahlon: ‘The Milk’s Prices Will Decrease. It Is the First Time that Quotas are Reduced Comprehensively.” In TheMarker website. October 29th, 2018. (Hebrew). https://www.themarker.com/news/macro/1.6602506.

Vaxman, Avi. “The Ministry of Finances Signed a Deal with the Dairy Farmers – But What Will the Dairy Plants Do?,” TheMarker, October 30th, 2018, p. 10. (Hebrew)

Wittman, Ariel. “The Ministry of Finances and the Farmers Signed the Milk Agreement,” Israel Today, October 30th, 2018, p. 39. (Hebrew)

Adaptability

#20

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
7
Following OECD and academic recommendations, the Israeli government advances various administrative reforms regarding regulatory burdens, decision-making and long-term planning. Periodic progress reports show gradual improvement in the dissemination of information as well as in decision-making. The government continues to adapt its domestic structures to international and supranational developments in an ongoing and constructive process. The Ministry of Economy and Industry produces an annual report that reviews progress with regard to implementation of the OECD’s recommendations. For example, in 2015 the report presented the progress made in the ability to regulate the imposition of labor laws. Moreover, in 2015, Israel signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in tax matters of the OECD and ratified it in 2016. Many other agreements, such as the enforcement of the anti-bribery convention, have been signed, with policies adapted in Israel in accordance with OECD standards.

Citations:
“Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,” Ministry of Finance, http://mof.gov.il/en/InternationalAffairs/InternationalTaxation/ExchangeInformationAgreements/Pages/MultilateralConvention.aspx

OECD, “OECD Economic Surveys Israel,” January 2016, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/1016031e.pdf?expires=1518382235&id=id&accname=ocid54016459&checksum=AB0A7D48A352C994DB07DFA04F611FCB

http://mof.gov.il/chiefecon/internationalconnections/oecd/oecd%20enterp.pdf

“OECD economic surveys: Israel,” OECD publication (December 2013).

OECD, “OECD Studies on SMEs and Entrepreneurship SME and Entrepreneurship Policy in Israel 2016,”

“Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Ministry of industry, trade and labor official report (June 2012)

Slosbarg, Itay. ‘Israel is joining on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of the OECD’ – Funder website, 7.9.2016 (Hebrew): http://www.funder.co.il/article.aspx?idx=70633

“There are currently more than 200 ongoing investigations of corruption and bribery around the world,” Globes, 18.7.2017, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001197649

“Working plans book for 2014,” official state publication (March 2014) (Hebrew).
Ministry of economy report – Review on the progression on OECD’s recommendation implementation – 2015 (Hebrew): http://brookdaleheb.jdc.org.il/_Uploads/PublicationsFiles/OECD2015_SocialPolicies_HEB.pdf

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
In conjunction with its OECD accession in 2010, Israel created government agencies designed to coordinate, enforce and monitor administrative changes. Reforms aiming to improve interministerial cooperation and reinforce policy monitoring are still in the early stages of implementation. A 2015 report examined Israel’s global cooperation in the field of research and development (R&D), looking at the country’s administrative and economic capabilities. It found that while Israel is considered as one of the world leading countries in R&D, more coordination and improvements with regard to accessible information and standardization capabilities are warranted.

Citations:
Avital, Yanicm, “Which country spend the most on research and development among OECD countries?, GeekTime, 15.7.2015. http://www.geektime.co.il/israel-leads-spending-on-rd-in-oecd-countries/ (Hebrew).

“Israel in the OECD,” Minister of Treasury formal report (2010) (Hebrew).

Kaufman, Dan and Marom, Yael, “Evaluation of international cooperation programs in R&D in Israel,” The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (May 2011) (Hebrew).

Orbah, Mair. “The Ministry of Economy has stopped giving grants to High-Tech companies,” Calcalist, 11.8.2016. http://www.calcalist.co.il/internet/articles/0,7340,L-3695401,00.html

“Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Ministry of Industry, trade and labor official report (June 2012).

Organizational Reform

#12

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
7
The Israeli government has installed various executive-branch institutions, both internally and externally, tasked with monitoring its activities and performance in areas such as procedures, financial transfers and human resources. For example, the Accountant General regularly audits financial decisions in ministries. The Civil Service Commission ensures that internal due processes are followed, and oversees human resources. However, in recent Knesset discussion regarding reforms to the Commission’s work, critics have asserted that the Commission’s work is inefficient. The PMO monitors implementation of the State Comptroller’s recommendations as well as the internal accounting units in each ministry. Supplementary mechanisms for self-regulation include protocols and guidelines governing daily practice.

Most important in this area was the Governability Committee that was established in 2011 and submitted its policy recommendations in 2013. This committee focused on reassessing the government’s organizational deficits and challenges. The government has since that time ratified the conclusions and implemented most of them. Still, it appears that some institutional arrangements are in dire need of better definition and delineation (see section 8.2).

Citations:
“About: the Accountant General,” Ministry of finance website (Hebrew): http://mof.gov.il/AG/About/Pages/About.aspx


“About the Inspection General for State Comptroller Affairs,” PMO website (Hebrew): http://www.pmo.gov.il/BikoretHamedina/Pages/Default.aspx

Government Decision 482: adoption of the recommendations of the governability committee, 30.6.213, http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2013/Pages/des482.aspx

“Information security management and survivability of internet and computer infrastructure for government offices,” state comptroller yearly publication 63b 2013: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Report_95/8e003e9a-3404-4626-a2ab-eddb638549ed/8254.pdf (Hebrew)

“Notice number 3,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew) “About: Civil Service Commission,” Civil service commission website (Hebrew): http://www.csc.gov.il/About/Pages/Roles.aspx

Protocol – The Special Committee – Reforms in the Civil Service Commission: https://oknesset.org/committee/meeting/11826/

“Rules, procedures and guidelines for CEOs in the civil service,” Civil service commission 2013: http://www.csc.gov.il/DataBases/Rules/Documents/BrochureCEOs.pdf (Hebrew)

“The internal audit law 1992,” Official legislation (Hebrew)

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
6
Reforms regarding government planning, regulations, innovation, information sharing and performance evaluation are based on principles of decentralization, privatization and regulation. While many structural reforms are pursued with the aim of improving decision-making in the interest of the common good, some elements of the government administration still perform insufficiently, including overly complex bureaucratic arrangements, and a lack of adequate policy planning design due to politicization. As seen in the case of local municipalities, modern management tools and monitoring agencies are still unable to effectively tackle entrenched political attitudes and centralized organizational cultures, under which designated authorities and cabinets bypass formal structures in order to accelerate planning processes.

In 2017, the State Comptroller published his first report about the operation (the second was published in March, 2018), in which he detailed several deficiencies, including that the cabinet’s authorities and jurisdictions were not specified in any piece of law. Thus, it was unclear whether or not the cabinet was a consultative or an executive body, in addition to a lack of any normative obligation of proper information transfer to this body. The State Comptroller found serious deficiencies regarding the extent and the quality of information being transferred, and even found instances when strategically important information was not transferred.

Furthermore, it is very much apparent from the report that there are serious concerns regarding the decision-making authority of the cabinet, namely whether it has authority or not, even as a military operation was concurrent. In 2018, the Basic Law: the Government and the Government Act of 2001 were only slightly amended to formulate and delineate the cabinet’s authorities, as they expressly mention that, in the very least and under certain conditions, the cabinet is authorized to declare war. And yet, at the time of writing, it is unclear if the lack of an obligation to transfer information to the cabinet, any other deficiencies related to this and other questions of decision-making authority had been resolved.

Citations:
Arlozerov, Merav, “Israeli government; The reform that will end the Treasury’s single rule; Will lose a major part of its authorities,” TheMarker 13.2.2013 (Hebrew)

Azulai, Moran. “The Ministerial Committee for Legislation to Vote on the Cabinet Act.” In Ynet. June 10th, 2017. (Hebrew). https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4973923,00.html.

Base Law: The Government (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_119.htm)

Chaimowitz, Mordecai. “The Prime Minister of a State that Woke Up from a Dream to the Worst Nightmare in Its History.” In Nrg website. September 13th, 2013. (Hebrew). https://www.makorrishon.co.il/nrg/online/1/ART2/506/704.html.

Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)

“Employing and management in the public service,” Conference in the name of Eli Horovitz 2013: https://www.idi.org.il/media/2803303/public%20service%20b.pdf (Hebrew)

Israel. The State Comptroller. “Operation ‘Protective Edge’: The Decision Making Processes in the Cabinet Regardign Gaza Strip Before and After Operation ‘Protective Edge;’ The Management [lit. Coping] with the Tunnels’ Threat,” Special audit Report, 2017. (Hebrew). (Also available here: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/568.aspx)

Milman, Omri, “Mayors to Kahlon: ‘If you would promote the differential allocation we won’t build in our territory’“, Calcalist 2.9.2015

Nuri, Dalya Gabrieli. “The Kitchen that Changed the Middle East.” In Ha’aretz website. October 22nd, 2012. (Hebrew). https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/1.1847556.

“The CEO of the social-economic cabinet approved the establishment of an authority for technological innovation,” Minister of the Economy website 15.9.2014: http://economy.gov.il/Publications/PressReleases/Pages/CabinetForTechnologicalIn novation.aspx (Hebrew)

The Government Act, 2001 (Hebrew) (Full text: https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law01/999_006.htm)
Vigoda, Eran and Penny, Yuval, “Public sector performance in Israel” (October 2001), (Hebrew)

OECD, “Multi level Governance Reforms. Overview of OECD country experiences,” 2017, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/0417051e.pdf?expires=1518432676& id=id&accname=ocid54016459&checksum=BDF175C37A650FABDE6CC93D0FFBAB0E
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