The Netherlands

   

Social Policies

#14
Key Findings
With a generally effective policy approach, the Netherlands falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 14) with regard to social policies. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.6 points relative to 2014.

While education attainment levels are high, socioeconomic and parent’s attainments are increasingly predictive of students’ achievements. Study grants for tertiary students have been abolished and replaced by loans. The risk of poverty is very low in cross-EU comparison. The hybrid health care system is very costly by international standards, with satisfactory outcomes.

The government provides child benefits and maternal leave. Plans to expand parental leave, including paternal leave are ongoing. Day care is not subsidized, and is becoming a luxury item. Full-time work for women is discouraged in part by tax-system disincentives, as well as by unfavorable school times and a child-care system geared toward part-time work.

While the pension system is generally strong, a comprehensive reform has stalled. With a large immigrant population, the country has a well-developed integration policy. Anti-immigration parties gained seats in the 2017 election. Concerns are rising regarding the infiltration of organized crime into local politics and business settings.

Education

#21

To what extent does education policy deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?

10
 9

Education policy fully achieves the criteria.
 8
 7
 6


Education policy largely achieves the criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Education policy partially achieves the criteria.
 2
 1

Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Education Policy
6
In terms of quality, the average education attainment level for the population is high, somewhat exceeding the OECD average in 2017. The Ministry of Education follows a policy in which individual schools publish their pupils’ performance (as measured by the School Inspectorate), enabling parents to choose the best or most appropriate school for their children. Quality-improvement policies – including CITO testing, performance monitoring, efforts to intensify and improve teacher professionalization programs, better transition trajectories between school types, and quality-management systems at school level – do not yet appear to be effective. For the first time, the debate focused this year on substantial elements of the Dutch educational system, such as the streaming of students from age 11/12 – which is seen as excessively early and detrimental to a growing number of children.

The Netherlands continues to struggle with achieving equity in educational access. Although the school performance of pupils of non-Dutch origin has improved over time (in part due to a rise in non-native adults’ educational achievements), these children on average do far less well in science, reading and math than their Dutch-origin peers. Moreover, the gap in this regard is considerably larger than the average within OECD countries. Social background and parents’ level of educational attainment are increasingly predictive of students’ educational achievements. For all pupils, socioeconomic/cultural background determines school performance to a degree above OECD averages; this is particularly true for secondary education (i.e., after pupils have been tracked at age 12).

Equitable access to education for minority ethnic groups has not been achieved and is worsening at the university level. There remain considerable gender gaps in education. The teaching workforce is primarily female, except in tertiary education. The proportion of women studying science, technology, engineering, mathematics, manufacturing and construction is low, while women are overrepresented in the education, health care and welfare sectors. The growing gap between higher education and secondary professional education reflects differences in socioeconomic status and ethnic backgrounds.

In 2018, because of the increased demand for technically educated professionals, secondary professional schools received extra financing, while measures to improve the image of the schools and the status of the students were introduced.
Children with minor learning disabilities often get caught in a bureaucratic back-and-forth between mainstream schools and specialized youth care services who see them as “light cases.”


At the tertiary level, the system of equal access through study grants has been abolished and every student now pays for university education, with low-interest loans available to students. Calculations suggest that university fees will result in an average lifetime income loss of 0.2% for tertiary-level students. The deterrence effect of the new student loan system has proven to be more substantial among lower-income families, particularly at the higher-professional level.

The Dutch school system stresses efficiency in terms of resource allocation. Expenditure for education is below the average for OECD countries. Among primary and secondary level school teachers, following massive strikes in 2017, salaries were significantly increased in 2018, and will be further increased in 2019 and 2020. However, this does not seem to be enough to meet the substantial shortage of teachers. The Council of Education suggested that the system of teacher certification needs to be drastically changed to address the issue. Relatively high levels of education attainment and school performance in the Netherlands should theoretically have a positive impact on the country’s competitiveness. And, although the Netherlands remains competitive in certain areas, the country’s track-based school system makes it difficult to adapt quickly to changing labor market needs. As a result, the Netherlands faces a shortage of skilled technical workers. Life-long learning is poorly supported by the government.

In January 2016, the national dialogue on a reformed “curriculum for the future” for primary and secondary education received substantial input. Teachers and school managers worked together on a new curriculum. The ambition to establish three broad knowledge domains was watered down to a collaborative development of specific teaching material in the third phase of the process in the fall of 2018.

In higher professional training and university education, inadequate government funding exacerbates existing challenges resulting from increasing student numbers (particularly international students), work pressure and quality issues.

Citations:
Decentraal onderwijsbeleid bij de tijd, Advies Onderwijsraad, 7 september 2017

J. Scheerens et al., n.d., Visies op onderwijskwaliteit. Met illustratieve gegevens over de kwaliteit van het Nederlands primair en secundair onderwijs (www.nwo.nl/binaries/contents/documents/nwo/algemeen/documentation)

OECD, “Netherlands,” in Education at a Glance 2017: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris (www.oecd.org., accessed 1 November 2017)

Ministerie van OCW, Onderwijs in Cijfers (onderwijsincijfers.nl, accessed NOvember 7, 2018)

Platform Onderwijs 2032,Ons Onderwijs2032. Eindadvies, January 2016 ((rijksoverheid.nl. accessed 1 November 2016)

Scheefgroei inkomsten en prestaties universiteiten, Rathenau Instituut, 1 september 2017 (https://www.rathenau.nl/nl/nieuws/scheefgroei-inkomsten-en-prestaties-universiteiten, accessed 24 October 2017)

Curriculum voor the toekomst, http://curriculumvandetoekomst.slo.nl/, visited at NOvember 7 2018
Ruim baan voor leraren, Advies Onderwijsraad, Den Haag, November 2018

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/achtergrond/2018/30/gevolgen-leenstelsel-voor-instroom-hoger-onderwijs

Social Inclusion

#9

To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

10
 9

Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
 8
 7
 6


For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
 5
 4
 3


For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
 2
 1

Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.
Social Inclusion Policy
7
Income inequality in the Netherlands produces a score of between 0.28 and 0.29 on the Gini Index, and has not changed significantly since 2007. However, the difference between top-level incomes and lower end incomes has increased. Top salaries increased by 32% between 2010 and 2017, while lower end salaries increased by 13%. Consequently, the gap between the top and bottom incomes increased from a factor of 5.5 in 2010 to a factor of 6.2 in 2017. The gap is slightly lower when net incomes are compared, but is rising nevertheless. Interestingly, this pattern is even more visible in the incomes of women. While the incomes of the highest-earning women increased significantly, particularly for younger women, only one-quarter of all women are in full-time employment. Since 2016, of the country’s home-owning households, almost 1.4 million (32%) had mortgage debts higher than the market value of their house. This number is now rapidly declining due to a rise in house prices. The average age of first-time home buyers has increased due to precarious incomes; stricter loan regulations; increasing house prices and a shortage of new, affordable houses.

Gender-based income inequality is high. On average, personal incomes among men (€40,200) are much higher than personal incomes among women (€23,800). Women form a slight majority of people living in poverty.

With the rise of digital communication, access to care facilities is becoming increasingly problematic for a large group of citizens. While many people take advantage of electronic services, a significant proportion of people experience problems due to a lack of personal contact or timely information regarding their options and opportunities. This includes not only elderly or uneducated people, but also students and young parents.

Compared to other EU member states, the number of Dutch households at risk of social exclusion or poverty is still low. But since 2008, the beginning of the economic crisis, poverty in the Netherlands has increased by one-third. Single-parent families, ethnic-minority families, migrants, divorcees and those dependent on social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed income bracket. Since 2014, the risk of poverty is declining faster among migrants than among the general population. Of young people under 18 years old, 17% were at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion. However, in big cities, such as The Hague and Amsterdam, with large immigrant communities, this proportion increases to one in five. However, the risk of poverty and social exclusion in the Netherlands as a whole is just 15% (comparable to Sweden only), which means that around 2.5 million people face relative poverty. It should also be noted that the poverty threshold in the Netherlands is far higher than in most other EU member states (Luxembourg excepted). Responsibility for poverty policy in the Netherlands is largely held by municipal governments. Given the budgetary side effects of other decentralization policies, there are clear signs of risk for poverty policy, both in terms of quality and accessibility.

Citations:
Strengere hypotheekregels blokkade voor jongeren op huizenmarkt, Finaniceël dagblad, 9 March, 2017

Gelijk goed van start, SER, January 2016 https://www.ser.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/2010-2019/2016/20160121-gelijk-goed-van-sta rt.aspx

Starters zijn de dupe van de woningmarkt, NRC 12 juli 2018

CBS – Gestage toename vrouwen onder topverdieners – retrieved 8 november 2018 https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/45/gestage-toename-vrouwen-onder-topverdieners

Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, De Sociale Kaart van Nederland 2018

Duijs, S., A. Heijsman, T. Abma, Waarom mag de een wel koffie en moet de ander nog een halfuur wachten? Tijdschrijft voor Sociale Vraagstukken, Zomer 2017, nummer 2

Ombudsvisie op digitalisering, https://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/nieuws/2017/ombudsvisie-digitale-overheid-overheid-communiceer-met-burgers-op-het-netvlies, visited September 24, 2018

Health

#22

To what extent do health care policies provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?

10
 9

Health care policy achieves the criteria fully.
 8
 7
 6


Health care policy achieves the criteria largely.
 5
 4
 3


Health care policy achieves the criteria partly.
 2
 1

Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all.
Health Policy
6
The Netherlands’ hybrid health care system continues to be subject to controversy and declining consumer/patient trust. The latest decline in trust followed the sudden bankruptcy of two hospitals. The system, in which a few big health insurance companies have been tasked with cost containment on behalf of patients (and the state), is turning into a bureaucratic quagmire. Psychotherapists, family doctors and other health care workers have rebelled against overwhelming bureaucratic regulation that cuts into time available for primary tasks. With individual obligatory co-payment levels raised to €375 (including for the chronically ill), patients are demanding more transparency in hospital bills; these are currently based on average costs per treatment, thereby cross-subsidizing costlier treatments through the overpricing of standard treatments. The rate of defaults on health care premiums to insurance companies and bills to hospitals and doctors is increasing. All this means that the system’s cost efficiency is coming under serious policy and political scrutiny.

In terms of cost efficiency, according to the new System of Health Accounts, the Dutch spend 15.4% of GDP on health care, or €5,535 per capita. The WHO’s Europe Health Report 2015 still shows the Netherlands as the continent’s highest spender on health care, spending 12.4% of GDP on health care. The costs of care, both government spending and private contributions, show a steady increase (which exceeds inflation) since 2014. The steepest increase is in specialized medical care in hospitals, with long term care showing some decrease. Moreover, the number of people employed in health care was lower than in previous years. Labor productivity in health care rose by 0.6% on an annual basis, with the gains coming almost entirely in hospital care. Profits for general practitioners, dentists and medical specialists in the private sector increased much more than general non-health business profits. A proportion of health care costs are simply transferred to individual patients by increasing obligatory co-payment health insurance clauses. A means of improving patients’ cost awareness is through increased transparency within health care institutions (e.g., rankings with mortality and success rates for certain treatments per hospital).

In terms of quality and inclusiveness, the system remains satisfactory. However, Dutch care does not achieve the highest scores in any of the easily measured health indicators. Average life expectancy (79.1 years for males, 82.8 for women) and health-status self-evaluations have remained constant. Patient satisfaction is high (averaging between 7.7 and 7.9 on a 10-point scale), especially among elderly and lower-educated patients. Patient safety in hospitals, however, is a rising concern both for the general public and for the Health Inspectorate. Since 2013, waiting lists for specialist care have been a growing concern. The trend has continued into 2018, particularly for age-related conditions, and drastically for some regions in the country with aging and decreasing populations. Particularly troublesome is the situation in psychiatric care.

The level of inclusiveness is very high for the elderly in long-term health care. However, there is a glaring inequality that the health care system cannot repair. The number of drug prescriptions issued is much lower for high-income groups than for low-income groups. In terms of healthy life years, the difference between people with high and low-income levels is 18 years. Recent research has also revealed considerable regional differences with regard to rates of chronic illnesses and high-burden diseases; differences in age composition and education only partially explain these differences.

Citations:
Maarse, H., Jeurissen, P. and D. Ruwaard, 2016.Results of the market-oriented reform in the Netherlands: a review. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 11.2:161-178

Barometer Nedrlandse Gezondheidszorg 2018: Rentement stijgt ten koste van personeel, EY 2018

Gezond verstand, publieke kennisorganisaties in de gezondheidszorg, Rathenau Instituut, 6 september 2017

Van verschil naar potentieel. Een realistisch perspectief op de sociaaleconomische gezondheidsvershillen. WRR Policy Brief 7, August 2018

Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Plan van aanpak tegen te lange wachttijden in ziekenhuizen, (https://www.nza.nl/publicaties/nieuws/Plan-van-aanpak-tegen-te-lange-wachttijden-ziekenhuis/ )

Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Stand van de zorg 2018, (https://magazines.nza.nl/standvandezorg/2018/03/investeren-in-gezondheidswinst-voor-de-patient, consulted 6 November 2018)

“We vertrouwen de dokter blind en de zorg voor geen meter. Hoe komt dat?,” in De Correspondent, 10 August 2015

“Terug aan tafel, samen de klacht oplossen: Onderzoek naar klachtbehandeling in het sociaal domein na de decentralisaties,” Nationale Ombudsman, 2017/035

“Toezicht op de zorg is een flipperkast,” in NRC-Handelsblad, 24 September 2015

“Waarom zijn tarieven van ziekenhuizen nog geheim?,” NRC-Handelsblad, 27 August 2016

Zorgen voor burgers: onderzoek naar knelpunten bij de toegang tot zorg, De Nationale Ombudsman, 14 mei, 2018

Families

#12

To what extent do family support policies enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

10
 9

Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.
 8
 7
 6


Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
 5
 4
 3


Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.
 2
 1

Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.
Family Policy
7
Family policy in the Netherlands is formally characterized by the need to recognize a child’s best interest and to provide support for the family and the development of parenting skills. According to EU-28 data, the Dutch spend approximately 32% of GDP on social protections (health care, old age, housing, unemployment, family), but just 4% of this is spent on family costs (compared to an EU-28 average of 8%). Day care centers for young children are becoming a luxury item, as they are not directly subsidized and parents face a steep increase in costs based on higher contributions for higher taxable income. This situation was somewhat alleviated at the beginning of 2018, when community and commercial providers of child care were subjected to the same quality criteria and the same financial regime. From 2019, the child care subsidy will be significantly increased. Nevertheless, the cost and availability of day-care provisions varies substantially, depending on local municipal policies.

The government has established an extensive child protection system through its policy of municipal “close to home” youth and family centers, which are tasked with establishing a system of digital information related to parenting, education and health care. Nevertheless, parents complain of a lack of information about and access to youth and family centers. Local governments have in some cases violated decision-making privacy rules in the allocation of youth-care assistance. In recent years, there were several scandals involving the death of very young children due to parental abuse as a result of uncoordinated and/or belated interventions by youth-care organizations.

The devolution of powers in youth health care to local governments in 2016 resulted in cases where necessary psychiatric care was withheld or significantly delayed due to a lack of financing. Vulnerable children were particularly hard hit by the decentralization and fragmentation of services, which led to longer waiting times. Other issues included travel to health care facilities and coordination between services. For the first time since decentralization in 2015, the number of children and young adults in youth care declined significantly, by 11,000. Notwithstanding, the total number of children in youth care remains high, and stands at approximately one in ten children. Against the backdrop of a permanent shortage of financing at the municipal level, it is not clear whether preventive efforts are effective or parents are simply opting out of the system, choosing private providers instead.

In practice, child support for families also is an instrument designed to improve parents’ labor market participation. Enabling a work-family balance is less of a guiding policy principle. The gap between professional women working longer hours and less educated women not participating in the labor market is growing. Almost two-thirds of mid-career women experience the combination of childcare tasks and work as difficult. Full-time female labor-force participation is hindered mainly by a high marginal effective tax burden on second earners, reflecting the withdrawal of social benefits according to family income. Consequently, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2017, the Netherlands ranked 32 out of 144 countries, having ranked 16 in 2016 and 9 out of 130 countries in 2008. The drop was largely due to the inclusion of top incomes in the calculations, which revealed a glaring absence of women in highly paid positions in the country. Other factors include unfavorable school times, a childcare system geared toward part-time work, and the volatility of financing for and poor access to care policies, particularly at the municipal level. Recently, the government announced plans to increase parental leave significantly, including paternal leave, in an effort to address these difficulties.

Citations:
Nederlands Jeugd Instituut, 2018, Opvoedsteun, wat werkt?, nji.nl (downloaded November 2018)

Koolmees: meer verlof voor partner bij geboorte baby, Nieuwsbericht Rijksoverheid, 2-10-2018

http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/arbeid-sociale-zekerheid/publicaties/arbeidsmarkt-vogelvlucht/structuur-arbeidsmarkt/2006-arbeidsmarkt-vv-participatie-art.htm

http://www.cpb.nl/publicatie/ex-post-analyse-effect-kinderopvangtoeslag-op-arbeidsparticipatie

Aantal voltijds werkende vrouwen stijgt naar recordhoogte, Trouw, 10 August 2017, https://www.trouw.nl/home/aantal-voltijds-werkende-vrouwen-stijgt-naar-recordhoogte~a7e2cdf3/

Een werkende combinatie deel 1, SER, October 2016 https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/2010_2019/2016/werkende-combinatie-deel1.ashx

World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2017

Macht gemeenten ondermijnt jeugdzorg, NRC-Handelsblad, 5 November 2016
https://www.ser.nl/nl/publicaties/ser/2017/april2017/kinderen-in-armoede.aspx

https://www.lotjeenco.nl/bezuinigingen-in-de-zorg/

https://nos.nl/artikel/2200930-scoort-rwanda-echt-beter-dan-nederland-in-seksegelijkheid.html (consulted on 2 November 2017)

Roeters, A., F Bucx, Kijk op kinderopvang, SCP, Den Haag, 28 augustus 2018

Pensions

#6

To what extent does pension policy realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?

10
 9

Pension policy achieves the objectives fully.
 8
 7
 6


Pension policy achieves the objectives largely.
 5
 4
 3


Pension policy achieves the objectives partly.
 2
 1

Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all.
Pension Policy
8
The Dutch work fewer hours and retire later than people in other EU member states. The average pension age has increased from 61 years in 2007 to 64 years and 10 months in 2017. The proportion of people aged between 60 and 65 still active in the labor market has almost doubled since 2005.

The Dutch pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the basic, state-run old-age pension (AOW) for people (now) 66 years old and older. Everyone under 66 who pays Dutch wage tax and/or income tax pays into the AOW system. The system may be considered a “pay-as-you-go” system. This pillar makes up only a limited part of the total old-age pension system. Because the current number of pensioners will double over the next few decades, the system is subject to considerable and increasing pressure. The second pillar consists of the occupational pension schemes which serve to supplement the AOW scheme. The employer makes a pension commitment and the pension scheme covers all employees of the company or industry/branch. The third pillar comprises supplementary personal pension schemes that anyone can buy from insurance companies.

Although the system is considered the best after those in Denmark and Australia, like most European systems, it is vulnerable to demographic changes (related to an aging population) and disturbances in the international financial market. As of 2013, the government gradually increased the age AOW pension eligibility to 66 by 2018 and 67 by 2021. For supplementary pension schemes, the retirement age rose to 67 in 2014. However, is becoming clear that for some types of jobs, mainly physical labor, a retirement age of 67 is not feasible due to health problems. Employers are reticent in hiring aged workers for fear of high health care costs. At the same time, paradoxically, higher educated people retire a year earlier on the average, because they can afford it.

As a result of very low interest rates, pension fund assets, although still enormous (€660 billion or 193% of GDP), have not grown in proportion to the number of pensioners. The liquidity ratio of pension funds must be maintained at a minimum threshold of 105%. The timeframe for recovery after not meeting this threshold was increased by the Dutch national bank from three to a maximum of five years. In spite of this, quite a few pension-insurance companies had to lower benefits. Interim framework bills for strengthening the governance of pension funds (conditions for indexation of pension benefits, pensioners in the government board, oversight commissions, comparative monitoring) were adopted by parliament in the summer of 2014.

A more definitive reform of the Dutch pension system is still pending. Debate focuses on the redistributive impacts (on the poor and rich, young and older, high and low education) and on the creation of more flexible pension schemes that give individuals more choice opportunities versus retaining collectively managed pension schemes. The government is still considering long-term retirement policies, hoping that its social partners, employers’ organizations and trade unions in the Socioeconomic Council will work out a compromise. At the time of writing, negotiations on a new pension reform have stalled.

Citations:
Rijksoverheid, de toekomst van het pensioenstelsel, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel, consulted November 5, 2018

CBS (2018), Pensioenleeftijd met 5 maanden gestegen (www.cbs.nl, consulted 2 November 2018)

Bovenberg, L., Pensioeninnovatie in Nederland en de wereld: Nederland kampioen in pensioen?, in TPE Digitaal, 8, 4, 163-185

Den Butter, F., Pensioenadvies SER blind voor ongelijkheid, MeJudice, 18 February 2015

Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index 2018, October 22, 2018

Integration

#19

How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?

10
 9

Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
 8
 7
 6


Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
 5
 4
 3


Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
 2
 1

Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.
Integration Policy
7
The Netherlands is a sizable immigration-destination country, with a considerable integration task. In 2018, 12% of the population were first-generation immigrants. In 2011, the Netherlands ranked 5 out of 37 industrial countries in the Migrant Integration Policy Index; in 2015, the county ranked 15. The country scores relatively high on measures of labor mobility and access to citizenship for migrants, but low on measures of access to family reunion and permanent residence. It attains average scores for criteria such as education, anti-discrimination policy, health outcomes and political participation. The relative success of DENK, a newly established political party that claims to promote tolerance, is a sign that ethnic minorities do not feel adequately represented by mainstream political parties.

In a 2018 representative public opinion poll on immigration and integration issues, 38% of respondents spontaneously stated that immigration, integration and racism were the second most important public concern, after health care. In view of occasional riots and disturbances at municipal council meetings on the location of refugee settlements, integration issues flared up again. At the local elections in March 2017, national and local parties with anti-immigration agendas gained seats in municipal councils across the country, often for the first time.

Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who migrate to the Netherlands are required to learn Dutch and essential facts about Dutch society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy involves obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family reunion applicants. Refugees are expected to “deserve” their status in the Netherlands by taking language tests, and many refugees accumulate debt paying for language courses, which are also difficult to find and are often of unreliable quality. Migrants without refugee status are allowed to take a loan of up to €10,000 to pay for their integration, to be repaid within three years.

Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment and labor market integration. Nevertheless, unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high (16%) as among Dutch-born citizens (under 4% at the end of 2018). This difference is somewhat less pronounced within the 15 to 24 age group but remains twice as high. One in three young migrants without a formal school qualification is unemployed. Although the Dutch recognize and disapprove of discrimination more compared to other European countries, they still think that discriminated minorities are “exaggerating” and should “get used to it.” Recent research shows that ethnic discrimination in the labor market is widespread and difficult to sanction. Muslim citizens’ self-reported discrimination experiences and perceptions, and incidents of harassment and violence, are among the highest in Europe.

Citations:
Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015. Integration Policies: who benefits? (http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_integration-policy_po licy-brief.pdf consulted 7 November 2018)

Burgerperspectieven 2018|1, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (scp.nl, consulted November 2, 2018)

Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, Jeugdwerkloosheid (nji.nl, consulted 26 October 2017)

de Waal, T. M. (2017). Conditional belonging: A legal-philosophical inquiry into integration requirements for immigrants in Europe, UVA, Amsterdam (http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/eumidis-ii-muslims-selected- findings)

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/45/bevolkingsgroei-nederland-en-eu-vooral-door-migratie

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/44/aantal-immigranten-en-emigranten-ook-in-2018-hoog

Additional references:
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Terugkerende_monitors_en_reeksen/Monitor_Integratie
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2012/Jaarrapport_integratie_2013

Safe Living

#24

How effectively does internal security policy protect citizens against security risks?

10
 9

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.
 8
 7
 6


Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.
 5
 4
 3


Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.
 2
 1

Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks.
Internal Security Policy
6
Since 2010, opinion polling has shown that confidence in the police is consistently high and satisfaction regarding policing performance is fairly high (28% of those polled express that they are “very satisfied”). Research shows that this is independent of the actual conduct and performance of police officers. The number of registered criminal incidents per capita has declined from 93 per 1,000 citizens in 2002 to 43 per 1,000 in 2017. The total number of years people have been sentenced to serve in Dutch prisons has declined from 12,000 in 2005 to 7,000 in 2015. At the same time, the percentage of resolved cases remains steady, at about 25%. A recent CBS report calls this “the mystery of disappearing crime.” Possible explanations are the rise of organized crime, new types of crime and a declining rate of crime reporting among the public.

Cybercrime rates (hacking, internet harassment, commercial and identity fraud, cyberbullying) remained stable since 2015. Illegal cryptographic software and phishing have become standard cybercrimes. In 2015, 11% of the population were victims of cybercrime, while three-quarters of cybercrime cases were not reported to the police. In research commissioned by McAfee, the American Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated that cybercrime costs the Dutch economy approximately €8.8 billion per year (or 1.5% of GDP). Recent studies have concluded that the Dutch police lack the technical expertise to effectively tackle cybercrime. Since 2011, the Dutch government has been implementing an EU-coordinated National Cybersecurity Strategy that prioritizes prevention over detection. Regarding terrorism threats, the intelligence services (Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding, established 2004) appear able to prevent attacks. Fighting terrorism and extremism, and anticipating political radicalization and transborder crime have increased in priority. A new 2017 law on intelligence and security services was rejected in a consultative referendum, but was nevertheless enacted with minor adjustments.

There is deep concern about the infiltration of organized crime in local politics and business, which results in the unwanted “mingling of the underworld” with the formal economy and the undermining of public administration. Recently, a number of reports drew attention to the scale of illegal drug production and distribution in the Netherlands and beyond. Synthetic drugs with an estimated street value of over €18 billion and marihuana production have become a structural part of Dutch economy, thereby creating a constant danger of spill-overs into the mainstream economy. Calls for legalization and regulation have not brought about policy changes so far, although local experiments have been implemented.

The policies of the present government focus on cost reduction, and the centralization of the previously strictly municipal and regional police, judicial and penitentiary systems. In 2015, the Dutch government spent €10 billion (a reduction of €3 billion from 2010) on public order and safety (police, fire protection, disaster protection, judicial and penitentiary system). Recent reports indicate serious problems in implementing reforms, with police officers claiming severe loss of operational capacity. Meanwhile, there is profound discontent and unrest inside the Ministry of Justice and Safety. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal personnel have voiced public complaints about the “managerialization” of the judicial process and the resulting workload, leading to “sloppy” trials and verdicts. Efforts to digitize the judicial process, intended to reduce costs, resulted in a massive operational failure and a cost overrun of approximately €200 million. The government now intends to save €85 million in 2018 by cutting legal assistance to citizens. Government policy is attempting to relieve part of the burden on the judicial system by introducing intermediation procedures.

The overall picture from the safety and security, and judicial institutions of the Dutch government is one of increasing stress and challenge.

Citations:
L. van der Veer et al., Vertrouwen in de politie: trends en verklaringen, Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013

Criminaliteit en rechtshandhaving in 2014. Ontwikkelingen en samenhangen, WODC en CBS, Raad voor de Rechtspraak, 2015

Cybersecuritymonitor 2017, CBS, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2017/06/cybersecuritymonitor-2017, consulted on 29 oktober 2017

Evaluatierapport van de zevende wederzijdse evaluatie “De praktische uitvoering en toepassing van het Europese beleid inzake preventie en bestrijding cybercriminaliteit.” Rapport Nederland, Raad van de Europese Unie, Brussel, 15 April 2015 (zoek.officiele bekendmakingen.nl, consulted 26 October 2015)

https://decorrespondent.nl/7388/onze-gezondheid-wordt-bewaakt-door-de-minister-van-boerenzaken/1611292671736-051d24e6

Veiligheidsmonitor, 2018 ((veiligheidsmonitor.nl, consulted 7 November 2018)

Jurien de Jong, Het Mysterie van verdwenen criminaliteit, Statistische Trends, CBS, Mei 2018, Den Haag

Tops, P. et al, Waar een klein land groot in kan zijn. Nederland en synthetische drugs in de afgelopen 50 jaar.The Hague 2018

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/uitgelicht/georganiseerde-criminaliteit-en-ondermijning

NRC-Handelblad, Nog hogere tekorten bij rechtspraak, 21 August 2018

NRC-Handelblad, Dekker overweegt drastische hervorming rechtsbijstand, 25 September 2018

Global Inequalities

#10

To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries?

10
 9

The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.
 8
 7
 6


The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.
 5
 4
 3


The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.
 2
 1

The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries.
Global Social Policy
5
In the Commitment to Development Index, the Netherlands’ ranking has remained relatively stable over the last few years, 7 out of the 27 richest countries in 2017. In 2017, the Netherlands commitment 0.60% of its GNI to development assistance, close to the international commitment of 0.7% GNI and above average for CDI countries. In addition, costs for climate policy will be allocated to development aid budgets. Expenditure on international conflict management has added to the diminishing state budget for development aid.

Aid is no longer focusing on poverty reduction alone, but also on global sustainable and inclusive growth, and on success for Dutch firms in foreign countries. The driving idea is that “economic and knowledge diplomacy” can forge a coalition between Dutch business-sector experts (in reproductive health, water management and food security/agriculture), and business and civil society associations in developing countries. Climate has been included as a key focus area, alongside poverty, migration and terrorism. Cutbacks in the areas of women’s rights or emergency aid have been made. Good-governance aid will be focused on helping developing countries to improve taxation systems. Following OECD guidelines, there will be a reassessment of the negative side effects of Dutch corporate policies in developing countries. The Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment is an independent advisory body of experts, which won an award in 2017 for the quality of its services. It provides advisory services and capacity development to international governments on the quality of environmental assessments with the aim of contributing to sound decision-making.

The Dutch policy response to the recent refugee crisis has mimicked Denmark’s efforts, seeking to discourage refugees from coming to the Netherlands, with an additional €290 million allocated for refugee relief in local regions.

All of this shows declining commitment by the Dutch government to global policy frameworks and a fair global-trading system; the aspiration is instead to link development aid to Dutch national economic- and international-safety interests.

Citations:
Rijksoverheid, Beleidsnota Investeren in Perspectief, 2018

Netherlands Commission on Environmental Assessment, 2018 (era.nl, accessed 8 November 2018)

WRR (2010), Minder pretentie, meer ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt, Amsterdam University Press

Wat de wereld verdient: Een nieuwe agenda voor hulp, handel en investeringen, 5 april 2013 (www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2013/05/04/nieuwe-agenda…)

Center for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index, 2017 (consulted 8 November 2018)

Ontwikkelingsresultaten in beeld 2016, http://www.osresultaten.nl (consulted 29 october 2017)

Additional references:

De Correspondent,Nederland steekt het meeste ontwikkelingshulpgeld in…Nederland ()De Correspondent B.V., consulted 8 November 2016)
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