

**Integration Policy**

**Question**

How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
- 8-6 = Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
- 5-3 = Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
- 2-1 = Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.

**Canada**

Receiving around 250,000 immigrants per year, Canada has one of the highest annual immigration-to-population ratios in the world. Cultural, education and social policies, including language training and orientation courses, support the integration of immigrants. To promote integration, Canada allows immigrants to become citizens after three years of residency, one of the shortest residency requirements in the world. The high educational attainment of immigrants – the highest in the world, in fact, with around half of immigrants having university educations – also facilitates integration.

Nevertheless, these policies do appear to have weaknesses, as seen by the relatively poor labor-market performance of recent immigrants, as well as immigrants’ high rate of return to their countries of origin. A recent CSLS study found that in 2012, very recent immigrants to Canada (those with less than five years of residence) had an unemployment rate of 19.6%, an employment rate of 92%, and hourly wages that averaged just 79% of wages accruing to those born in Canada. The integration of immigrants is impeded by a number of factors, including difficulties faced by immigrants in having their professional credentials recognized by Canadian authorities; the concentration of immigrants in a small number of major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal (immigrants to cities where immigrants are few in number experience much better labor-market outcomes); the language problems encountered by many immigrants; and according to some, the lower quality of education received by immigrants from developing countries.

In 2014, the federal government passed changes to the Citizenship Act with the aim of reducing processing time for applications, better protecting the citizenship...
program from abuse, and making it easier for the Canadian government to revoke a person’s rights on the basis of security concerns, violations of human or international rights, or participation in organized-crime activities.

Citation: Andrew Sharpe, Erik Johnson and Evan Capeluck (2013) “Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in Canada, 2006-2012,” CSLS Research Report, (Ottawa: Centre for the Study of Living Standards, to be published in June

New Zealand

Until the 1980s, New Zealand’s immigration policy operated under the overriding concern of preserving the nation’s identity as a primarily European, or British, nation. This has since changed. Today, New Zealand is a prime destination for immigrants (with 40,000 to 50,000 new immigrants annually) and the growing numbers of immigrants who become New Zealand citizens reflect the country’s willingness to encourage integration. Based on labor market and education system indicators, integration policy has been quite successful. According to the immigration minister, Michael Woodhouse, the amount of time it takes to get a work visa or a visitor visa has fallen by half, and the wait for a student visa has fallen by two-thirds from 2011 to 2012. This is reflected in the views of most immigrants who, despite socioeconomic difficulties, are satisfied with their situation (87% are satisfied or very satisfied according to a survey in 2012, compared to 75% in 2011 and 70% in 2009). The government expects that the Immigration Global Management System (IGMS) and the Global Service Delivery Model (GSDM) will improve matters yet further. To some degree, the overall good performance has to do with the fact that New Zealand employs a points-based selection system which helps to attract immigrants that are relatively self-sufficient financially and can be easily integrated in the labor market. Indeed, the Immigration Act 2009 for the first time clearly states that in New Zealand, skilled immigration is preferred. The appeals procedure has been streamlined and the decision to grant entry can now be based on “classified information” with regard to security matters or criminal conduct. Nevertheless, visa procedures are still complex and dealing with immigration bureaucracy can be tricky for applicants.

More problematic are the challenges for lesser-skilled immigrants, who experience difficulties in settling in New Zealand when they are unable to bring over other family members. Sustained economic growth during the global financial crisis, together with the Christchurch rebuild following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, have provided significant employment opportunities for migrant workers.

Citation: 
Australia

Relative to its population size, Australia has maintained one of the largest immigration programs of any established democracy in the post-World War II era. Over one-fifth of the population is foreign-born. Successful integration of immigrants has therefore been a policy priority for much of Australia’s history. In general, Australia has and continues to be highly successful in integrating immigrants. Increasingly, the most important contributor to this success has been a highly selective immigration policy. Most migrants are selected on the basis of their skills and English language ability. Post migration, explicit integration efforts primarily consist of encouraging immigrants to apply for citizenship.

Despite Australia’s relatively open immigration policy, a concern in recent years has been the large number of asylum seekers who have arrived, usually on boats from Southeast Asia. Mandatory detention was introduced for asylum seekers in the 1990s, and extended in 2001 such that detainees were excluded from the mainland, where they had certain legal rights of appeal. The incoming Labor government in 2007 initially abolished this so-called Pacific Solution, but in August 2012, offshore processing of asylum seekers was reinstated. Following the 2013 election, the Coalition introduced Operation Sovereign Borders, under which the Australian navy prevents all vessels containing asylum seekers from reaching Australia. The Abbott government has promised to ensure that asylum seekers do not reach Australian territory, and this harsh policy has received broad public support. In a 2014 poll, more than 70% of Australians supported the policy.

Concern has also arisen in the review period about the large number of temporary skilled immigrants. Historically, immigration in Australia has been conceived as permanent resettlement, and the phenomenon of large numbers of temporary immigrants is relatively new. Upward of 100,000 temporary skilled immigration visas are now issued annually. By its nature, the temporary immigration program is not geared toward long-term integration of immigrants, creating some potential for breakdown in social cohesion.

Citation:

Finland

Finland, according to a policy study on immigrant integration, when compared to EU countries, the US, Canada and Switzerland, was ranked fourth in terms of how its legislation and policies help newcomers adopt to their new circumstances. The study
however does not measure in full the practical success of integration efforts in the various countries and may therefore give a somewhat exaggerated view of the Finnish situation. Second generation immigrants have had difficulties entering education or finding work, while the employment situation – when measured by indicators for employment rates for foreign-born workers, comparative employment rates between foreign-born and native-born workers, and generational concerns for foreign-born workers – is certainly troubling.

Increasing labor market participation is one of the key targets of the government’s Future of Migration 2020 Strategy. Although the Finnish immigrant population has increased sixfold from 1990 to 2009, the number of foreign-born or Finnish citizens who were born abroad living in Finland is approximately 300,000 out of a population of 5.4 million (5.5%). In general, Finland is not considered among the top destinations for immigrants. This is for various reasons. Applying for a Finnish residence permit is still a complicated process as is applying for Finnish citizenship. Finnish is a difficult language and proficient language skills are required. For example, the police recruitment process requires a very high level of language proficiency.

While sympathetic to work-related immigration, the attitude of authorities to immigration is restrictive. According to a Gallup poll the share of favorable attitudes among the public toward immigration is decreasing. The True Finns party politicizes anti-immigrant resentments.

Citation: 

Germany

Score 8

About 15 million people in Germany (20% of the population) have or come from an immigrant background, a population share that has been increasing over time. Germany, however, still lacks a modern immigration law, one driven by the country’s economic self-interest in attracting highly skilled migrants. For instance, by the close of the review period, dual citizenship was still only allowed until the age of 23, though the grand coalition government formed in late 2013 has plans to change this policy. Since the German population is aging and shrinking, this protective approach to migration is problematic.

As a consequence of its positive labor market performance and the deep crisis in southern Europe, Germany has again become an attractive destination for migrants. The civil war raging in Syria adds to the growing numbers of migrants. According to provisional calculations by the Federal Statistical Office, 1,226,000 people immigrated to Germany in 2013 – the highest level of immigration in the last 20 years. In comparison to the previous year, this amounted to an increase of 146,000 persons (13%). Additionally, 789,000 left Germany in 2013 (an increase of 11%). In
sum, the net immigration amounted to 437,000 people, which is the highest figure since 1993. These numbers pose a major problem especially at the communal level. The capacity for receiving new asylum seekers and refugees seems to have been exhausted. As a result, communal officials called for federal and regional financial aid to remedy the most severe shortcomings. Nonetheless, the naturalization rate remains low. In 2011, 106,900 people acquired German citizenship, representing a naturalization rate of just 1.44% of the country’s annual immigrants.

While Germany previously had an extremely liberal regime for migrants from EU member states, a liberalization of labor migration from non-EU countries has recently taken place. According to the OECD (2013), these reforms “have put Germany among the OECD countries with the fewest restrictions on labor migration for highly skilled occupations.”

Integration of immigrants is smooth with respect to most migrant groups from other European countries. The integration of Muslim migrants (especially from Turkey), however, has been more difficult, as evidenced by their lower educational achievement and higher unemployment rate compared to other immigrant groups. These problems are being addressed through the education system; for instance, through early German-language instruction in child care facilities, but this cannot yet be deemed a clear success story.

Lower Saxony is about to become the third German state (after Bremen and Hamburg) to sign a State Treaty (Staatsvertrag) with organizations representing German Muslims. These State Treaties express mutual respect and address important practicalities like Muslim religious holidays. Germany has a Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, but no ministry-level entity. An intercultural dialogue between representatives of German Muslim organizations and government officials was established with the assistance of the German Islam Conference (Deutsche Islam Konferenz). In addition, the government provides free language courses to support migrants’ integration. Notwithstanding, anyone who wants to become a German citizen must pass a citizenship test.

Citation:
OECD, 2013: Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Germany, Paris: OECD.
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Migration/Current.html

Luxembourg

Luxembourg’s migrant population since World War II has grown continuously; today some 85% of migrants are citizens of the European Union, while overall 92% are of European extraction, with the remaining highly qualified migrants from Japan, the United States, Canada and other countries. Luxembourg claims one of the highest performing migration populations, with an outstanding share of economic immigrants among OECD countries and a very small group of economically weak
third-country nationals. Some 50% of the total resident population in Luxembourg is immigrant-based, and as of 2008 the government significantly revised its immigration and integration policy. Furthermore, in 2010 the government introduced a national action plan to better integrate the immigrant populations as well as combat discrimination (Plan d’action national d’intégration et de lutte contre les discriminations). In addition, Luxembourg has improved consultation mechanisms with migrants and pursued stronger democratic principles with regard to migrant issues. A national body focusing on migrant issues (Conseil national pour étrangers) had its first session in March 2012, and in September 2012 members elected a president and vice-president.

Every municipality is as of the review period required to establish a integration commission (Commissions consultatives communales d’intégration, CCI) that accurately represents the region’s migrant mix. As these bodies are fairly new, no detailed evaluation is yet available.

In 2010, the Migrant Integration Policy Index gave Luxembourg an overall score of 59 (55 in 2007), ranking the country 11th out of 35 nations examined. Migrant children are fully integrated into the local primary-school or secondary-school system. Children between 12 and 15 who have recently migrated to Luxembourg are given the opportunity to attend a special class called “classes d’insertion” in the capital’s Lycée Technique du Centre, with special programs in French or German designed to facilitate integration into regular classes at a later date. Children of foreign origin have high average failure rates, a fact closely associated with the bilingual school system. As part of its evaluation though the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), Luxembourg is regularly criticized for its low performance regarding the integration of migrant children.

Luxembourg has also for some time been criticized by chambers of commerce and non-governmental organizations over the representative makeup of parliament, as it does not include representatives for migrants or cross-border commuters, who constitute 80% of the labor market and are the main driving force of the “national” economy and nearly half the country’s population. Thus, the national Chamber of Commerce and one of the most powerful migrant lobbying groups (Association de Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés, ASTI) have pushed for the participation of migrants in national elections, a request that is unprecedented within the European Union. The government plans to carry out a consultative referendum on voting rights for foreigners in 2015.

Citation:
http://www.asti.lu/2013/01/30/conference-quel-droit-de-vote-pour-les-etrangers-au-luxembourg-2/
The Netherlands ranks fifth in the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which compares 37 industrial countries. As 4% of the population is foreign-born, the Netherlands is a sizable immigration country with a considerable integration task. Integration policy was a political bone of contention until 2008, and has since become a more quiet policy field. Since 2008 – 2009 all non-EU nationals who immigrate to the Netherlands are required to learn the Dutch language and develop knowledge about Dutch society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy requires obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family reunion applicants. However, Human Rights Watch stated that this poses some concerns because it clearly applies only to family migrants from certain nationalities, mainly from non-Western countries. The number of applications decreased and further financial restrictions (€350 for each time the test is taken) infringed upon the right to family life. After one family applicant successfully brought a case before the European Court of Justice in March 2010, family reunion policy became more clear and coherent. Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment security and labor market integration. Nevertheless, unemployment among non-western migrants is three times as high (16%) as among nationals (5%). This is even more pronounced among the younger (15-24 years) generations (28% vs. 10%). Obviously, disadvantages increase with economic decline; employers can be more selective under conditions involving a larger labor supply, which affords more space for prejudice and discrimination. In terms of political participation, the Netherlands performs very well on immigrants’ political liberties in forming associations and political parties. Nonetheless, applicants for national citizenship can be rejected for not participating in the mandatory Naturalization Day ceremony. In May 2014, the Rutte-Asscher government formally withdrew a bill to criminalize illegal residence in order to speed up the re-emigration process to the country of origin.

Citation:
T. Huddlestone et al., Migrant Policy Integration Index (2011) (www.mipex.eu)

Additional references:
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Terugkerende_monitors_en_reeksen/Monitor_Integratie
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2012/Jaarrapport_integratie_2013
Norway

Score 8

Integration policy is well-organized and well-funded in Norway, but the effects of immigration represent a new challenge in this country, and policies have to date been less than fully effective. Non-Western immigrants experience higher unemployment rates and lower wages than do native Norwegians. There are frequent complaints of discrimination in both the labor and housing markets. There is notable social unrest related to problems faced by second- and third-generation immigrants.

Integration policies include free language training and additional school resources allocated to immigrant children. Some of these resources are devoted to preserving cultural identity. For instance, children are offered additional classes in their mother tongue. The acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is relatively quick. Applicants must have lived in the country for at least seven out of the last 10 years, and either be fluent in Norwegian or have attended courses in Norwegian (or Sami) for 300 hours. Immigrants with permanent residence status are entitled to vote in local elections.

An autonomous Directorate of Integration was created in 2006, distinct from the preexisting Directorate of Immigration and Integration, a change that was generally regarded as a sensible and successful reform. However, the challenges of multiculturalism stemming from immigration remain relatively unfamiliar in this traditionally homogenous society, and policies remain unsettled and in some respects immature. For example, the country continues to deny the right to dual citizenship. The privileged position of the Lutheran church stands in the way of religious equity, particularly in the eyes of alternate religious groups. Islam has become the largest non-Christian religious denomination, with the country home to about 112,000 Muslims out of a total national population of 5 million.

The country’s “old minorities,” mainly the aboriginal Sami population, have in the course of two or three decades gone from facing severe discrimination to a state of equity and integration. This status has been institutionalized in their formal recognition as an aboriginal people, with group rights written into the constitution and the creation of a Sami parliament, elected by the Sami population, which possesses some legislative authority.

Austria

Score 7

Austria’s integration policy has been the focus of recent reforms aiming to pave the way toward a new “welcoming culture” in the country. Despite these remarkable efforts it continues to be deficient in two key ways: First, there is still too little formal recognition that Austria is a country that has been and will continue to be defined by immigration. Though not a feature of official government policy, the slogan “Austria is not a country of immigration” continues to be invoked by parties
such as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ).

Second, and compared to other EU member states, acquiring citizenship in Austria is still difficult for non-nationals (despite some prominent figures such as opera performers, athletes and billionaires).

These shortcomings are reflected in education outcomes. Education in urban areas has to deal with the challenge posed by the children of first-generation migrants, in school systems with constrained resources. This means that children from migrant families have a more difficult task in qualifying for higher education, and are often stuck in the lowest type of school, called a special school (Sonderschule), undermining their chances for future labor-market success. Special support policies for such children have been recently put in place, but it remains to be seen how successful these policies will turn out to be in the short and medium term.

With respect to the labor market more broadly, the Austrian government is only halfheartedly welcoming employees newly arriving from foreign countries. Its policies (including the “red-white-red card”) are neither well received by economic actors nor are they succeeding in attracting highly skilled professionals. The indirect, undeclared alliance between organized labor (which defends the short-term interests of union-protected laborers, and is usually linked politically to the left) and the far right (which exploits xenophobic resentments, especially in the case of the Freedom Party) creates a political climate that sometimes breaks into open hostility, particularly against migrants coming from Muslim countries. This alliance between right-wing populism and organized labor is still an obstacle to the development of a more distinct integration policy.

Efforts to reform Austrian integration policy are thus headed in the right direction. However, the political climate in the country allows for little more than small steps to be taken in changing public attitudes toward integration. The integration of workers from within the EU into the Austrian labor market is improving and is much better than that seen with regard to asylum seekers.

**Denmark**

**Score 7**

On 1 January 2014 there were about 626,000 immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in Denmark, or 11.1% of the population, of which the 8.5% are immigrants (58% of this group are from non-western countries). After the tightening of immigration policies introduced by the liberal-conservative government in 2002, immigration from non-Western countries fell, but net immigration from Western countries rose. More recently there have been increases from both groups.

The employment rate of immigrants and their descendants (ages 16 to 64) is low, though it had been increasing from the mid-1980s until the onset of the financial
There is a substantial employment gap, taking into account the age distribution, immigrants from non-western countries have an employment rate which is 38% lower than that of ethnic Danes (for descendants the gap is 18%). The gap is particularly higher for women (43%) than for men (33%). For immigrants from western countries the gap is about 20% (for descendants about 11%). The gaps in employment rates should also be seen in light of the fact that employment rates in Denmark are high for both men and women, and there are high qualification requirements to find a job and high minimum wages.

Concerning educational achievements, immigrants and their descendants – especially girls – are making progress. In 2013, for the age group 30 to 39 about 47% of men and 64% of women had completed a labor market qualifying education. The corresponding numbers for ethnic Danes are 72% and 80%. For those 22 years old 49% of male and 61% of female non-western descendants are in education, which is only two and three percentage points below the corresponding rates for ethnic Danes.

The 24-year-old rule for family reunification introduced in 2004 has allowed fewer immigrants and their descendants to bring spouses to Denmark from abroad. The percentage fell from 61% in 2001 to 31% in 2008. Instead, immigrants increasingly marry other immigrants or their descendants already living in Denmark, as well as native Danes.

Still, it is fair to say that a number of immigrants in Denmark, especially from non-Western countries, have problems integrating. The government, in cooperation with municipalities, has therefore introduced a number of policies and measures designed to further the integration of immigrants. These instruments, apart from language courses at all levels, include financial incentives to municipalities, businesses, NGOs and so on that assist with the integration of immigrants.

Since these reforms have gone into effect there have been improvements. Indeed, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated and have more Danish friends, and fewer say they experience discrimination. In addition, many more immigrants speak Danish than ever before. The political rhetoric has also changed somewhat after the Social Democratic-led government came to power in October 2011. The so-called start-aid offering lower social assistance to individuals who had not lived in Denmark in 7 out of the last 8 years was abolished in 2012.

Currently (2014) Denmark is receiving many asylum seekers from Syria and Iraq, which is again affecting the political debate about immigrants and asylum seekers.

Citation:


Danmarks Statistik, Indvandrere i Danmark 2014, København.
Estonia

Since the Soviet period, Estonia has had a large non-native population. Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups compose almost a third of the population, 16% of whom are foreign born. The national immigration policy introduced in 1990s has since been regularly updated and monitored, with the government allocating substantial national and EU funds to various integration programs. In October 2014, the latest development plan (Lõimuv Eesti 2020) was submitted for review to the national parliament, and afterward to the government. The new plan significantly broadens the scope of integration policies. Whereas previous programs focused heavily on Estonian-language teaching, the new plan prioritizes identity-building, civic participation and cultural immersion. Nevertheless, supporting employability among the non-native population is still an important component of integration policy. Some progress in decreasing unemployment rates among the non-native population has already been achieved. In 2013, the difference in employment rates between natives and non-natives was 2.7%, while the difference in unemployment rates was 5.6%. It should be noted that immigrants are typically employed in regions or sectors that are not economically strong and competitive. The country’s ethnic Russian minorities, for example, have predominantly lived in the northeast, close to the Russian border, since Soviet times. In order to boost economic growth, a special development plan for the northeastern county of Ida-Virumaa was implemented in the 2010 – 2014 period.

As a result of the large Russian-speaking population in Estonia, there are a number of public educational institutions (through upper secondary level) in which Russian is the language of tuition. The Estonian public broadcaster has a radio channel and several TV programs in Russian. With regard to immigrants voting rights, permanent residents without Estonian citizenship can vote in municipal elections, but are not allowed to stand as a candidate or vote in general or EU parliamentary elections. Several public and private actions have sought to facilitate civil-society activism among immigrants, and some progress is visible in this area. However, the native Estonian and immigrant populations still live side by side rather than together.

Non-citizens’ population share has fallen by 2.9% in recent years, and is currently 6% the total. Several amendments of the Act on Citizenship were initiated by the government in 2014, aiming to decrease the number of non-citizens further (for instance by granting Estonian citizenship to the newborn children of non-citizens, allowing children below 15 to hold multiple citizenship, and requiring elderly applicants to pass only oral Estonian language tests).
Ireland

Score 7

The large inflow of immigrants during the boom years led to a rapid increase in the foreign-born population resident in Ireland. More than 70% of immigrants to Ireland have the right to reside, work and own property in the country by virtue of their EU citizenship. Despite the resumption of a high rate of emigration among Irish nationals after 2008, inward migration from abroad has continued at a significant rate.

The unemployment rate among non-nationals (especially those from the new EU accession states) is higher than among the native-born population. Many employed immigrants are not in occupations commensurate with their skills and education.

The inflow of families from non-English-speaking countries in the last 10 years has placed a strain on the education system. Additional resources have been provided to help cope with this challenge, but these are not regarded as adequate. There are signs of increasing gaps between schools in relatively deprived areas of the main cities, which often have high concentrations of children holding non-Irish citizenship, and schools in the more affluent areas with lower concentrations.

Forced integration is not an issue, although some ethnic and religious minorities face difficulties in a country that is still overwhelmingly Irish, while their children face problems in a school system that is still largely under Roman Catholic management.

The treatment of asylum seekers by the Irish authorities came under critical scrutiny in the course of 2014, with adverse attention drawn to the system of “direct provision,” which is intended to provide for the welfare of asylum seekers and their families as they await decisions on their asylum application. It provides essential services, medical care, accommodation and board, with three meals per day provided at set times. Attention has recently been focused on the poor standards of accommodation and living conditions in the facilities serving this population, as well as the enforced isolation of families waiting for as long as seven years to learn of a decision on their asylum applications.

There is no explicitly anti-immigrant political party in Ireland, and immigration was not a prominent issue in the 2011 general election.

Lithuania

Score 7

Lithuania remains a largely homogeneous society. The country’s 30,000 foreign residents (as of the beginning of 2011) represent just 1% of the country’s population. Immigration of foreign nationals to Lithuania is comparatively rare, totaling an average of about 2000 people per year. This inflow decreased further during the
financial crisis due to reduced labor demand, though the situation is changing with economic recovery. Most foreigners come to Lithuania from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, all former republics the Soviet Union. For this reason, their integration into Lithuanian society is not very difficult. However, a number of developments call for the implementation of integration measures, including the country’s rising flows of legal and illegal immigration; the economic recovery, which helped contribute to the recent increase in the number of work permits granted to third-country nationals; and the language and cultural problems faced by foreign residents in Lithuania.

Migrants from other EU member states tend to integrate into Lithuanian society more successfully than do third-country nationals. Various cultural, educational and social programs, including the provision of information, advisory, training services, and Lithuanian language courses are aimed at integrating migrants into Lithuanian society. However, labor-market services are not sufficiently developed in this regard, and foreign residents’ access to relevant education and training programs in practice remains limited. In general, Lithuania maintains a restrictive immigration regime, especially for immigrant labor.

Portugal

Score 7

In the previous report, we noted that the economic crisis has seen a decrease in immigration. This pattern has continued through this period as well. In 2013, the total number of immigrants fell to 401,000, down from 417,000 in 2012 (OECD, International Migration Outlook 2014).

This decline has taken some of the pressure off of integration programs. Overall, all evidence suggests that Portugal’s integration policies have remained successful in the current period. The only notable change has been that the Alto Comissariado para a Imigração e Diálogo Intercultural (High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue, ACIDI) was eliminated in February 2014, and was replaced by the Alto Comissariado para as Migrações (High Commission for Migrations, ACM). However, the remit of this new body remains essentially the same as that of its predecessor.

Citation:

Sweden

Score 7

Sweden has a generous immigration policy. The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq and Syria and, in 1992, from former Yugoslavia. Indeed, there
are individual local authorities (Södertälje) that have received more immigrants from Iraq than has the entire United States. In the European setting Sweden, together with Germany, stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly country. Today, Sweden offers permanent residency for all refugees from Syria. The Migration Board predicts that during 2015 Sweden is likely to receive somewhere between 80,000 and 105,000 asylum seekers.

The increasing immigration represents a significant challenge to Swedish integration policy. These policies cover a wide range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the great autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by central government to receive asylum seekers.

It is difficult to argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far reaching. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience.

Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts otherwise, thus indicates the problem lies in the design and implementation of its integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles facing young people as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against immigrants. There is some good news, however. Studies show that second generation immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary education. However, for immigrants with low education, entry into a labor market with high standards seems more or less blocked.

Citation:

Switzerland

For many years, Swiss integration policy was predicated on the perception that foreigners were “guest workers,” whose limited stay meant that broad efforts to encourage integration were unnecessary. As many foreign workers gained access to unlimited work permits between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the policy approach grew inappropriate over time. Accordingly, a number of efforts to improve integration have been made, starting as early as kindergarten. Nonetheless,
integration policy cannot broadly be called a success in Switzerland, particularly given the very high share of migrants in the population (accounting for about one-quarter of the country’s residents). Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy is failing as a whole. Many local authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job of integration, especially for second-generation migrants. According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than is the case in other European countries.

This is not to say that foreigners – who are granted rights equal to natives with the exception of political rights – have equal opportunities in all respects. If immigrants’ unemployment rates and dependence on social aid is above the national average, this is due to the fact that the share of low-skilled workers with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants may find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments.

With regard to naturalization, some 34,000 foreigners per year are granted Swiss citizenship. This figure corresponds to 40% of the net number of immigrants arriving in the country per year, or 0.4 percent of the population. This comparatively high naturalization rate as a percentage of the population is partly a result of the high share of foreigners in the population overall — about 2 million foreigners live in Switzerland as compared to 6 million Swiss citizens. This in turn means that if the number of naturalizations is compared to the number of migrants actually living in the country (as is usually done in the scholarly literature), the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other Western democracies. In 2013, only 2% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship. Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies — such as Austria or Germany — have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is regarded as burdensome. However, as naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively.

These federal differences show up also in the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes grant political-participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards.

A part of the public has tended toward support for increasingly integration-averse policies during the period under review. According to some observers, there is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term, as right-wing parties and voters are likely to oppose any such reforms.
United Kingdom

Due to the country’s colonial history, the United Kingdom has a large share of ethnic minorities (approximately 14% of the population), and integration has long been an important area of British policy. But while the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 imposed the general duty to promote race equality on all public authorities, the United Kingdom has not developed a formal integration program. The focus has been more on the protection of minorities than on the integration of migrants, but that is because the United Kingdom has a preference for multiculturalism. There are both regional and ethnic differences in integration, with some cities and smaller towns having concentrations of populations of distinct ethnic groups, and tensions over access to public housing and public services in localities where recent immigrants have concentrated.

The Equality Act 2006 merged three existing bodies (including the Commission for Racial Equality) into a new Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) – an umbrella organization in which ethnicity is only one of several dimensions in which it attempts to enforce integration and equality. In recent years, attempts to create a national narrative around “Britishness” were aimed at changing from an ethnocentric concept of citizenship to a more civic one. There have also been high-profile cases in which leading footballers have been publicly condemned for (mild) racist abuse of opponents.

Attempts to increase diversity representation in Parliament have been made by both major parties, and as a consequence, public life now better reflects society than it did up to two decades ago. In bodies such as the police, however, concerns remain that the representation of minority ethnic groups is too low. With an election ahead and the anti-immigrant, anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) on the rise, the political system seems to have lost its welcoming attitude toward immigrants. Instead, UKIP officials have lured the Conservatives and more recently even the left-of-center Labour party into a race to the bottom, in which the prime minister even publicly considered limiting the freedom of movement for EU citizens. Time will tell if this development amounts to more than the typical pre-election hysteria. A report by The Commons Public Account Committee (PAC) and regular critiques by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration revealed serious and persistent shortcomings in the UK’s immigration and asylum bureaucracy after a general restructuring in 2013, and after the recent failure of two major IT projects intended to improve the Home Office’s work.
United States

According to data provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the United States ranked ninth out of 31 analyzed countries with regard to overall integration policy, but first with respect to anti-discrimination laws and protection. The United States also ranked high on the access-to-citizenship scale, because it encourages immigrants to become citizens. Legal immigrants enjoy good (but often low-paid) employment opportunities and educational opportunities. However, the United States does less well with regard to family reunification. Many legal permanent residents cannot apply for visas for their families, and during the review period, no one in the United States had the right to apply for a visa to sponsor a foreign homosexual partner. Several states are taking the lead on integration policy. Despite efforts, complex integration laws, limited visa availability, high fees and long backlogs make it challenging for immigrants to integrate.

A large fraction of the immigration to the United States has consisted of illegal immigrants, most of whom have crossed the border from Mexico and who may live, work and pay taxes in the United States for their entire adult lives without ever becoming legal residents. These illegal immigrants account for nearly one-third of the immigrant population, numbering 12 million to 15 million individuals or 3% to 4% of the country’s overall population. These illegal immigrants have in effect been tolerated (and even virtually invited by the ease of illegal entry) for their economic contributions, often as agricultural workers or in low-paying service occupations. Children of illegal immigrants attend public schools, and businesses that employ illegal immigrants have not been subjected to effective sanctions. In the 113th Congress (2013 – 2014), the Obama administration and congressional leaders pushed for an immigration-reform bill that would improve border security, reduce illegal entry, and define a path toward legal residence and citizenship for long-term illegal immigrants. However, the effort failed, largely as the result of opposition to legalization by many in the House Republican rank and file. In November 2014, President Obama stated that if Congress does not act, he will take major unilateral action – adopting an expansive view of his legal authority – and offer a path to legal status to a few million long-term illegal residents.

Citation:

Belgium

There is a political will to help resident foreigners and second- or third-generation immigrants acquire Belgian citizenship, by providing adults with easy access to inexpensive or free training (including language, civic education and so on). However, Belgium keeps failing to adapt its education system, which is ill-adapted
to non-native language students. In some urban areas, the proportion of these students is high, and schools are unable to provide adequate education. Natives do their best to avoid these schools, which reinforces segregation. The French Community (one of the sub-governments in Belgium) implemented reforms to force mixing, but with schemes that are so inefficient that they only seem to have exacerbated the situation.

Labor market discrimination remains high. The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism was formed to address such problems. And while there are several proactive policies in place, the deep education and employment gaps between Belgian nationals and residents of non-European origin persist.

France

Score 6

Traditionally, France has an open policy toward immigrants who seek to become French citizens. Every person born in France is considered French, or eligible to obtain French citizenship. Integration policies, in terms of long-term residence permits, access to citizenship and family reunification are open and generous. Presently, the largest share of new legal immigrants is related to the reunification of families. It explains partially the difficulty of integrating new immigrants who often have no skills, no education and do not speak French. Processes of integration have to start from scratch. The characteristics of immigrants moving to France are another problem: most are unskilled and as such, subject to vagaries of the economic crisis, for instance in the construction sector.

The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, and so on. Add to this the challenges of illegal immigrants, many of whom moved to France more than 10 or 15 years ago yet have no regular job and thus do not contribute to the pension system. Although they have access to health care and their children can attend schools, the situation is often dramatic and inextricable as for many, it is impossible to fulfil the requirements for a residence permit. Immigrants must demonstrate that they have the required documents, such as tax records, employment contracts and housing contracts, while at the same time they are essentially forced into the labor and housing black market. Potential employers and landlords will not document that they employ or house illegal aliens, as this is a crime. Under such conditions, integration is difficult, if not impossible. Immigration from Eastern Europe and the southern Balkans, the “migration of the poor,” is also a sensitive subject.
Greece

Score 6

The integration of over one million irregular migrants in a society of 11 million is a very difficult task. A law was passed in 2010 that focused primarily on preconditions for the naturalization of migrants, but also somewhat improved the prospects of integration. The law went largely unimplemented. Overall, since the onset of the economic crisis, and in large part a result of long-term recession and soaring unemployment figures, migrants in Greece face considerable difficulty integrating into the labor market. In the beginning of 2013, a supreme court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) decision froze the provisions of the 2010 law which, if applied, would have allowed second-generation migrants to become naturalized under certain requirements (high school education, length of stay in Greece). The court’s decision reflected a xenophobic attitude in the sense that it was based on a very old-fashioned, if not racist, understanding of how national identity is formed. Yet in April 2014, a new Migration Code was passed. This law codified previous legislation on matters of entry, residency and social integration of irregular migrants (non-EU nationals) in Greece. It simplified the process for obtaining different types of residency permits and opened opportunities for regularizing the status of irregular migrants and stabilizing the residency permits of second-generation migrants. Importantly, the law ratified all relevant EU Directives on the migration of students, trainees, academics and high-skilled workers.

The integration of migrants into the education system is functional in primary and secondary education, but legal migrants face difficulties entering tertiary education. Entrance examinations to the universities are open to Greek citizens or migrants holding permanent residence permits. Among the latter, the sons and daughters of legal migrants who had settled down and created a family in Greece are included, as long as they have graduated from high school.

As for social integration, this was never a strong point of Greek migration policy. With the exception of Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians, who probably constitute half of all migrants in Greece and first came to the country after the fall of state socialism in Southeast Europe, the rest of the country’s migrants – including migrants from Asia and Africa – are systematically excluded from Greek society. It is telling, for instance, that Muslim migrants in Athens, where the majority of the migrant population lives, still cannot fully exercise their religious rights, as a license to build a mosque in Athens was issued by the Greek government only in early 2013 and construction of the mosque has, at the time of this writing (end of 2014) yet to begin.

Moreover, racism demonstrated on the part of state authorities impedes the integration of migrants. In 2013 and 2014, prosecuting authorities investigated cases of policemen who had mistreated migrants or had been accomplices in racist activities carried out by anti-migrant groups, such as the neo-Nazi political party
Golden Dawn. Indeed, since the crisis erupted, there has been an increase in xenophobia and racism, fueled by the tensions of the economic crisis. Violent acts against migrants and minorities have increased and the police have demonstrated neglect of and/or sympathy for far-right agendas.

Finally, some progress in the fight against racism took place in September 2014 when a new anti-racism bill was adopted by parliament. The passage of this law was timely, if not delayed, given the the rising influence of Golden Dawn since the onset of the economic crisis and the assassination in September 2013 of a young, left-wing musician by a Golden Dawn militant. The law, which provided for criminal sanctions against anyone inciting actions to hatred, discrimination and violence and higher sanctions against public officials engaging in racist or discriminatory behavior, modified previous legislation and set anti-racist policy in line with the Framework Decision 913/2008 of the Council of the European Union.

To sum up, while significant problems in terms of policy efficiency remain and policy setbacks are entirely possible, Greece has made some progress by adopting new policies on integration. Only time will show whether the two new laws, passed in 2014, will actually help alleviate the pressures faced by irregular migrants and prevent racist or discriminatory treatment.

Citation:
Information on migration was obtained from ELIAMEP’s researcher Michaela Maroufof. Information on the integration of migrants in Greece is available (in English) at http://www.eliamep.gr/en/%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B7-%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AC%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B7%CE%BD-%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB/ and also at http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/info_sheet.cfm?ID_CSHEET=50. Accessed on 02.06.2013.

Iceland

Score 6

Civil rights legislation for immigrants is largely influenced by the Danish and Norwegian models, which also reflects Iceland’s obligations under the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. Separate legislation for immigrants from EEA/EU countries and non-EEA/EU countries, makes it difficult for citizens outside the EEA to move into the country. Legislation for non-EEA/EU countries focuses on the need for foreign labor and restricts non-EEA/EU migrants to temporary work permits. Authorities provide instruction in the Icelandic language for foreign nationals. Nationals from other Nordic countries with three years consecutive residency in Iceland are eligible to vote in local elections, while for other foreign nationals eligibility follows five years of consecutive residency. The right to vote in parliamentary elections presupposes Icelandic citizenship.

The Information Center for Foreigners (Alþjóðahús) previously offered advisory services to migrants on a range of issues, including legal and civil rights issues. The
center was run by the municipality of Reykjavík, but, in June 2010, was closed due to cutbacks in municipal services. Some basic functions were transferred to a municipal neighborhood service center in downtown Reykjavík.

The Directorate of Immigration (Útlendingastofnun) – a division within the Ministry of Interior whose mandate includes processing residence permits, visas and citizenship applications – has repeatedly been criticized for expelling foreign nationals on weak grounds. The Directorate of Labor (Vinnumálastofnun) has in recent years improved its outreach to foreigners, for example by providing important information in English on its website. The Directorate of Labor is also responsible for running the European Employment Services office in Iceland.

The new government, especially the Progressive Party, has begun to articulate an anti-immigrant agenda as an appeal to its core constituency. This is a new development in Icelandic politics, but one that reflects trends in neighboring countries.

Citation:
Lög um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5, 1998 (Law on local government elections no. 5 1998).

Israel

The legal status of immigrants in Israel is based on the Law of Return (1950), the Law of Citizenship (1952) and the Law of Entrance to Israel (1952). These laws constitute strict conditions for gaining citizenship, allowing Jewish immigrants to receive a permanent legal status as part of the Zionist vision. While still relevant, these laws are unable to offer a constructive framework for dealing with current immigration challenges including Palestinian or African immigration into Israel. In the absence of a coherent framework for general immigration, a de-facto immigration policy has been established by ad hoc ministerial decisions – with negative consequences for the state and immigrants alike. Furthermore, since these non-Jewish immigrants are not officially recognized, it is unlikely that a policy for monitoring and facilitating their inclusion will be developed.

In the last significant wave of Jewish immigration during the 1990s, the vast majority of immigrants came from the former USSR and Ethiopia. Since cultural barriers create challenges for integration into Israeli society, the state offers a wide support infrastructure through education and employment programs, legal aid and so forth. The Jewish Agency, a statutory authority, is responsible for Jewish immigrants’ welfare as they arrive, providing them with financial aid while the implementation of immigrant policies is the responsibility of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.
Policies over recent years have mainly included tax breaks and subsidies. Individual committees have been formed to study the social aspects of immigration, with the aim of improving working methods. However, as noted by the Knesset’s committee for immigration, absorption and diaspora affairs, a relatively small proportion of these committees’ recommendations have been implemented.

Citation:
Davidovitch-Kuch, Flora and Almagor-Lutan, Orly, “Absorption of Ethiopia natives from linguistic, social and educational aspects,” Hed Ha-Ulpan HaHadash, Winter 2012 (Hebrew)

“Enlarged assistance to native Ethiopians,” The Ministry of Construction and Housing website (Hebrew)

Romania

Romania is still primarily a sending country in terms of migrants, and has not yet experienced significant immigration. Half of the country’s incoming migrants come from neighboring Moldova, whose citizens benefit from preferential access to the Romanian education system and can easily obtain Romanian citizenship. More recently, immigrants from Turkey, Asia (especially China) and Africa have come to Romania in search of business and work opportunities; however, their numbers have been fairly modest, as low wages reduce the country’s attractiveness to guest workers.

In the run-up to EU accession in 2007, legal rules on family reunification, long-term residence and anti-discrimination were adopted to ensure conformity with EU law. From a comparative perspective, Romania’s legislation has been fairly favorable toward immigrants. Romania scores particularly well with respect to anti-discrimination and labor-market mobility, but policies are less welcoming with respect to education access and access to citizenship. Moreover, foreign workers are not represented by local labor unions, and often fall victim to dubious contracts leading to worse work and pay conditions than initially promised.

Spain

Spain is a strikingly successful case for the tolerance of a population toward immigrants. It actually ranks first in the European Union (according to a report published by the British think tank Demos in 2013) as the most tolerant country when people are asked about having immigrants as neighbors. According to the same report, mistreatment of immigrants by Spanish citizens has diminished. And in contrast to most comparable EU countries, no relevant xenophobic populist parties
exist and violent attacks on immigrant groups are very rare. These achievements are even more striking if we consider the very high unemployment rates and the fact that, in only the last decade, some five million immigrants arrived in Spain (up to 12% of the population, although this figure is now falling with many jobless foreign-born residents returning to their countries of origin). Apart from some western Europeans looking for a second home “under the sun,” the bulk of inflows of immigrants during the 2000 – 2010 period came from poorer countries, typically consisting of Romanians, Latin Americans and Africans in search of jobs and better living conditions.

Nevertheless, if Spain has so far lived in harmony with these newcomers, it was not necessarily courtesy of effective integration-related policies. Rather, it was a positive combination of a tolerant culture, the fact that most immigrants are first-generation ones and, in the case of Latin Americans, with language and cultural links (Ecuadorians, Colombians and Bolivians represent 25% of the total foreign-born population but there are also many Argentinians, Dominicans and Peruvians). Furthermore, many of them enjoy dual nationality due to the country’s long history of people-to-people links with its old colonies. As for the Muslim population, primarily Moroccans (who comprise 20% of Spain’s immigrants), most of them are moderate and well-integrated into Spanish society, but some radical groups involved in recruiting and fundraising for al-Qaeda have also been identified.

The public perception of immigration has deteriorated somewhat recently as a consequence of the economic crisis; it is increasingly common to hear the argument that immigrants are no longer a source of revenues, but are instead putting further pressure on the country’s public spending and labor market. To be sure, unemployment is the main obstacle for effective integration and, according to a report published in 2013 by the Spanish Observatory of Racism and Xenophobia (Oberaxe), the peaceful integration of migrants coexists with a somewhat widespread support of the idea of preference for Spaniards when looking for a job or having access to social services (in fact, since 2012, undocumented immigrants have faced very restricted access to health care). However, even so, the tendency seems quite positive with guaranteed access to the education system or, for many immigrants, the right to participate in local elections and even acquire nationality. Indeed, 60% of immigrants express their intent to remain in Spain.

Citation:
http://expplotacion.mtin.gob.es/oberaxe/inicio_descargaFichero?bibliotecaDatoId=4056
Czech Republic

Score 5

The Czech Republic has experienced relatively high levels of immigration since EU accession. In the period under review, however, immigration has slightly declined. The largest immigrant groups within the Czech Republic are still Ukrainians, Slovaks and Vietnamese; there were 707 asylum seekers in 2013, yet the number is declining compared with the previous review period. In 2013, the long-term trend of increasing submitted applications for permanent residency was interrupted. While the Ministry of the Interior submits a report on the situation of migration and integration of foreigners in the Czech Republic to the cabinet every year, and while there is an official integration strategy, the government so far has not done enough to foster the integration of immigrants. Processing residential applications of immigrants is slow and the acquisition of Czech citizenship complicated. Permanent residents from outside the European Union are not entitled to stand as a candidate, vote in local elections or become members of Czech political parties. In 2013, a new law on citizenship was adopted, in effect from 1 January 2014, specifying several conditions for obtaining citizenship and introducing the obligation to sit for an exam in Czech life, institutions and language. At the same time, obtaining citizenship for second-generation immigrants was simplified. Some immigrant support has been provided over the years by municipal authorities and NGOs, with recent emphasis on language courses, social events and employment issues. Many foreign workers are employed in agencies, offering temporary and often unstable work with – apart from a few exceptions – no union representation and pay levels significantly below those of Czech employees.

Hungary

Score 5

Hungary is still primarily a transit country, with only a small number of migrants who want to stay in the country. Due to legislation that allows double citizenship for ethnic Hungarians, the integration of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries – above all from Romania, Serbia and Ukraine – has gone fairly smoothly. By contrast, the integration of other migrants remains a controversial process, as the government does not allocate sufficient resources for their cultural and social integration.

Italy

Score 5

Large-scale immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy compared to other countries in Europe. In recent years, the number of legal (mainly from new EU member countries) and illegal immigrants has increased significantly, making immigration one of the hottest political issues. Issues associated with immigration have been cast in negative or even xenophobic rhetoric by some parties (especially
the Northern League or Lega Nord) during electoral campaigns, with immigrants portrayed as dangerous social elements.

Policies dealing with the topic have concentrated more on controlling illegal immigration than on matters of integration. However, given the failure of measures designed to prevent illegal immigration, successive governments have adopted provisions for the large-scale regularization of immigrants, especially those working for and within families. In spite of these measures, a large number of immigrants are still involved in the black economy and are thus subject to economic exploitation, dangerous working conditions and a lack of respect for their rights. Some sectors of Italy’s agriculture, for example, rely heavily on a workforce of low-paid illegal immigrants.

The school system has proved to be a positive factor in the process of integration, but schools have not received sufficient resources for achieving the best results in this field. Public housing policies have been weakened by the budgetary constraints: as a result in many cities there are ghetto-like areas where immigrants live in extremely poor housing conditions. The universal health care system has in general been fairly effective in providing medical treatments for immigrants.

Employers of legal (but also illegal) immigrants often make the politicians understand that in some sectors they are able to continue to operate in Italy only thanks to the high number of migrants available in the workforce. Agriculture, the building industry, private-sector elderly care, and often child care and private cleaning services are often dependent on legally or illegally employed immigrants.

The Italian government’s efforts to save lives in the Mediterranean sea signal an increasingly more positive approach toward migration. Following the death in October 2013 of more than 300 people off the coast of Lampedusa, the Italian government introduced its “Mare nostrum” operation, sending Italian navy and coast guard units down to the Libyan coast to save migrant boat people. Continuing operations run by the Italian navy and coast guard underscore the government’s efforts to save human lives as a first step in tackling migration challenges.

### Latvia

Latvia is currently (as of May 2010) ranked last of 31 European and North American countries in the Migrant Integration Policy Index. The index states that Latvia has projects, “but no coherent strategy” for the integration of immigrants.

On 11 October 2011, Latvia adopted the Guidelines on National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (2012 – 2018). These guidelines established a set of policy goals for achieving a more inclusive and cohesive society, which include new policy proposals, increased governmental support and improved institutional
arrangements. Latvia faces a challenge in integrating two particular categories of immigrants: migrant workers and non-citizens. Non-citizens are long-term residents of Latvia who had not been eligible for citizenship when Latvia regained its independence from the Soviet Union and, since independence, have not been naturalized. Non-citizens comprise 14.1% of the total population. Approximately 55,000 migrant workers – individuals holding either a temporary or permanent residence permit – live in Latvia. They comprise 3% of the total population.

Since July 2010, Latvia has granted temporary residence permits to investors meeting monetary investment targets. The number of residence permits issued to investors has been steadily increasing from 1,674 in 2011 to 2,575 in 2012 and to 3,900 in 2013. However, this has become a highly contested policy area and parliament has debated legislation that would limit temporary residence permits to citizens of the Russian Federation.

Rights for immigrants depend on the type of residency permit. Those individuals holding temporary residency permit are particularly vulnerable, as they do not qualify for public health care, legal aid or unemployment support. An individual holding a permanent residency permit or has acquired long-term resident status within the EU has the same rights as Latvian non-citizens.

In May 2013, Latvia adopted changes to its citizenship law, legalizing dual citizenship with 38 countries. This will enable some permanent residents to retain their current citizenship if they choose to apply for Latvian citizenship.

As of March 2010, all children, including children of migrant workers holding temporary residence permits, have access to free education. In the 2010 – 2011 academic year, there were 351 foreign children in Latvian schools, which increased to 454 foreign children in the 2011 – 2012 academic year and to 546 children in the 2012 – 2013 academic year.

No restrictions are placed on the right to work for high skilled migrant workers, foreign students or immigrants who have moved for family reasons. However, access to the local labor market is restricted for migrant workers who have obtained only a temporary residence permit. These individuals’ work rights are tied to the employer who invited them to Latvia. Temporary migrant workers do not have the ability to freely change employers or their position within the company.

Access to the labor market also depends on language proficiency, as a certain level of language skill is required by law for many professions. This is true of state and local government institutions as well as commercial companies in which the majority of capital shares are publicly owned.

Latvia has few asylum seekers. Only 367 persons applied for asylum between 1998 and 2010, with 29 persons obtaining refugee status and 45 persons being granted an alternative status. In 2012, there were 189 applications for asylum. This decreased
slightly to 185 applications in 2013, with 32 people granted refugee status and 36 people granted an alternative status.

Legislative obstacles restrict the ability for immigrants to participate in society. They do not have voting rights in local elections and cannot be members of political associations. Third country nationals with temporary residence permits cannot organize protests or marches.

Citation:


**Poland**

**Score 5**

Migration to Poland has increased, but is still relatively minimal. Issues related to Poland as a sending country have featured far more prominently on the political agenda than have issues related to Poland as a receiving country. Ukrainians and Vietnamese make up the largest group of migrants to the country. In 2012, the Tusk government adopted a new law on migration and integration, as well as a reform of Polish citizenship law. Given impetus by EU law and demographic changes in Poland itself, the reforms have made it easier to acquire Polish citizenship and to apply for a work and residence permit in a single procedure. They also prolonged the period given to foreign graduates to find employment in Poland. President Komorowski signed the law in December 2013, and it took effect on 1 May 2014. However, Poland has not yet signed the U.N. Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, and the institutional framework for dealing with immigrants is still very weak overall.

**Slovakia**

**Score 5**

While the share of foreigners in the Slovak population is still low, the inflow of migrants has increased in recent years. The Radičová government adopted a new official strategy for migration policy lasting till the year 2020 which prioritized the immigration of high-skilled workers with an emphasis on culturally related countries. In line with this strategy, the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family adopted
the Action Plan of Migration Policy in 2012 – 2013. At the same time, however, Act 404/2011 on Residence of Aliens, which took effect at the beginning of 2012, featured a different approach, tightening the conditions for granting temporary residence to third country nationals. For its part, the Fico government has done little to develop consistent and sustainable policies for migrant integration. At the beginning of 2014, it passed a new document on integration policy that largely embraces the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. All in all, the inconsistencies of the last years have persisted without significant change.

South Korea

Score 5

Since the 1990s, South Korea has transformed itself into a society that attracts immigrants rather than a country from which immigrants leave. This change has been driven by an increasing demand for cheap labor, changes in generational composition of the population and a shortage of women in rural areas. In 2010, the total number of foreign nationals in South Korea reached 1.2 million.

Most migrants come from China, with Vietnam, the United States, Uzbekistan and Cambodia also contributing significantly. In August 2005, the parliament passed the Public Official Election Act, which enables foreign residents to vote in local elections. South Korea is currently the only Asian country which gives voting rights to non-citizens. In recent years South Korea has made it easier for migrants to receive permanent resident status and even citizenship, particularly for highly skilled migrants. In the 2012 parliamentary election, 110,000 naturalized citizens were allowed to vote and Jasmin Lee of the Saenuri Party became the first naturalized member of the South Korean parliament.

To apply for South Korean citizenship an individual must have resided in the country for more than five consecutive years, be legally an adult, have displayed good conduct, have the ability to support himself or herself on the basis of his or her own assets or skills (or be a dependent member of a family) and have basic knowledge befitting a South Korean national (such as an understanding of Korea’s language, customs and culture). In April 2010, the South Korean parliament also passed a law that allows dual citizenship. Another relatively serious integration issue concerns the social exclusion experienced by the foreign-born wives of Korean men (often from China, South-east and South Asia). This population has drastically increased in recent years – about 10% of all marriages in South Korea are international today, in the sense that either bride or groom is non-Korean. Such marriages often face cultural discrimination.

Furthermore, cultural, education and social policies have yet to adapt to increasing immigration levels. While ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, foreign investors and highly educated foreigners are welcomed and treated favorably, Amnesty
International reports that migrant blue-collar workers are often treated as “disposable labor.” From a legal perspective, migrant workers have very similar rights to native Korean employees, but these rights are routinely neglected by employers. While courts have offered some protection to migrant workers, the government has not pursued active enforcement measures against employers that exploit the precarious status of migrant workers. In January 2012, the parliament unanimously passed a revision to allow migrant workers to more easily change their workplace.

Citation:
Korea Times, Garibong-Dong Has Largest Number of Foreigners, 28/2/2010
“Jasmin to help Seonari lure naturalized voters”, The Korea Times, April 8, 2012

Chile

Score 4

Due to the financial crisis, the number of professionals who immigrate to Chile has increased significantly – especially from southern Europe. In general, there are low restrictions for well-skilled immigrants and professionals who tend to obtain working permits. The integration of immigrants from other Latin American countries, which represent the main group of foreigners in Chile, does not present significant difficulties as they share the same language and, up to a certain degree, a similar cultural background. About 1.5% of the population are immigrants, which represents, in comparison with its neighbor Argentina, quite a small percentage. It is worth mentioning that the relationship between emigration and immigration in Chile is changing. While in the past Chile registered higher rates of emigration than immigration, this tendency is reversing due to today’s patterns of economic development and political stability. Migration policy will thus be more important in the future, but no specific immigration policies have yet been implemented.

Cyprus

Score 4

Cyprus’ original guest-workers program (1989) provided temporary permits for workers mainly from Southeast Asia. It offered access only to specific labor sectors, and did not provide long-term visas. In the early 1990s, immigration by Pontian (Black Sea) Greeks from the former Soviet Union was encouraged, along with Russians and Central Europeans, which prompted some policy changes. Migration figures rose substantially following Cyprus’ accession to the European Union, with strong flows of immigrants from Bulgaria and Romania. Today, EU nationals form a considerable part of the labor force. Despite policy changes, the Council of Europe’s European Commission on Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report noted in March 2011 that “Cyprus has no integration policy.”
Cyprus is under pressure to comply with EU standards, but its policies discourage long-term integration. Indeed, they score poorly on most indicators, including labor market access, culture and education, family reunion, political participation and access to citizenship. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranks Cyprus fourth-last among 35 countries.

Laws are not favorable to workers’ market access or long-term labor-market integration. Non-citizen workers are often limited to market sectors that do not attract Cypriots. In addition, foreign workers have limited rights in many areas. For non-EU immigrants, time limits on working permits preclude any ability to obtain long-term resident status.

In recent years, new policies have aimed at providing education to all children as part of the compulsory education scheme, including access to language classes that may assist in integration. Timid family-reunification policies are based on restrictive eligibility criteria such as the need to show full-time employment, high fees and limited access to the labor market by dependents. Opportunities for migrants to participate in democratic life or to attain citizenship are limited, although special legal provisions offer citizenship to very rich depositors.

Cyprus remains hesitant in confronting issues related to integration. In addition, the economic crisis has led to official support for prioritizing the employment of Cypriots, increasing pressures on immigrants in the labor market.

Citation:

Japan

Score 4

In spite of its aging and shrinking population (which peaked in 2008 at around 128 million and is now close to 127 million), Japan still maintains a very restrictive immigration policy. One of the few recent exceptions are bilateral economic-partnership pacts that, since 2008, have allowed Filipino and Indonesian nurses and caregivers to enter Japan on a temporary basis.

The LDP-led government has enacted some relaxing of restrictions to attract highly-skilled foreign professionals based on its Revitalization Program, among them an amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which allows for an indefinite period of stay for such professionals. Nevertheless, the Japanese government is still reluctant to embrace immigration. The nationalistic viewpoints held by many LDP lawmakers pose particular challenges in this regard.
Given Japan’s restrictive approach to immigration, there is little integration policy as such. Local governments and NGOs offer language courses and other assistance to foreign residents, but such support remains often rudimentary, especially outside the metropolitan centers. The Supreme Court ruled in July 2014 that permanent foreign residents are ineligible for public welfare support.

**Slovenia**

The number of foreign residents in Slovenia has dropped dramatically in recent years due to the effects of economic crisis. In 2008, about 85,000 work permits were issued to foreign workers; by 2012, this figure had fallen to 20,500. In the first half of 2014, the number of workers arriving in Slovenia exceeded the number of outgoing foreign workers for the first time since 2009. Like its predecessors, the Bratušek government paid little attention to migrant integration. Slovenia does not accept jus soli or full dual nationality, and migrants have very limited opportunities for political participation or to reunite with their family. Employers complain that the procedures for recruiting foreign workers are overly bureaucratic and too time consuming.

**Turkey**

Turkey’s new Law on Foreigners and International Protection took effect in April 2014. On the same date, the General Directorate for Migration Management officially took on responsibility for implementing the law with a view to bringing Turkey in line with EU and international standards. By doing so, the Readmission Agreement between Turkey and the EU, signed in December 2013, finally entered into force on 1 October 2014.

Turkey is increasingly becoming a country of destination for regular migration. At the same time, it also remains a notable transit and destination country for irregular migration. In addition to the more than 1.7 million refugees from Syria and Iraq in the country by November 2014, Turkey hosts asylum-seekers and refugees, including children, from other countries. Although Turkish authorities have been praised by international organizations and observers for the professional assistance provided to refugees, and even for starting a process of local integration (e.g., by issuing work permits), there has been no substantial change in the broader official or public discourse regarding immigration, migrants or refugees could be stated. In 2013, 22,597 irregular migrants were returned to their country of origin.

The treatment accorded to the Roma community remains a key subject in Turkey’s integration debates. Roma still have poor access to regular employment and are subject to prejudice and discrimination. School drop-out, absentee and child-labor rates remain high among Roma children. Poor housing conditions, urban-
transformation-related relocation problems, and difficulties in accessing health and social-security services persist. A national Roma integration strategy is being prepared.

Citation:

Bulgaria

Score 3

Bulgaria does not have a developed policy for integrating migrants, largely because their number is fairly limited. Until recently, Bulgaria has only been a transit point for migration flows to other EU countries. According to estimates, the share of migrants in the total population amounts to less than 1%, with most migrants being people of traditional Bulgarian origin from neighboring countries.

In late 2013, a small wave of several thousand refugees from Syria showed the limited capacity of the Bulgarian society to accommodate migrants. Accommodations for the migrants proved to be extremely poor; food, clothing and heating were generally insufficient; and no real attempts were undertaken to integrate migrants into the local society. In many municipalities, the local population rose in protest against hosting migrants in their vicinity and against the prospect of migrant children attending local schools, thereby exacerbating the integration problems.

Croatia

Score 3

Immigration is largely limited to ethnic Croats from neighboring countries, who are de facto integrated and have citizenship and equal access to labor market, social system and education. Other groups of migrants are very small and there is no policy directed at integrating them. The treatment of returnees from among the 200,000 Croat citizens of Serbian ethnicity expelled from the country in 1995 represents a significant gap in migration policy. Nearly 21,500 minority returnees still have outstanding housing, reconstruction and civil-status issues to resolve, with most returnee families needing legal counseling to help them gain access to their basic rights. Many refugees have not been able to return to Croatia, as they were stripped of their rights to socially owned housing after the war.
Malta

Score 3

Malta has no formal integration policy. Indeed, migrant integration is seldom referred to in Maltese legislation, though there are fleeting references in subsidiary legislation. At present, there is no ministry that assumes overall responsibility for migrant integration, though the National Strategy for the Promotion of Cross-Cultural Understanding cites the Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security as being responsible for the integration of asylum seekers. The government’s Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers has some duties to provide services to asylum seekers. This includes the responsibility to provide employment, housing, education, health, and welfare-services information, and to act as a facilitator within all public services, thus serving as a pre-integration functionary. An online government portal intended to facilitate migrant integration was established in June 2014.

Migrants granted subsidiary or humanitarian protections are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and as a result, migrants wanting to seek work and their own accommodation find it difficult to do so. The 2011 Migrants Integration Policy Index stated that “Malta is only beginning to address immigration and asylum and those who stay are starting to participate in limited integration programs, often EU funded.” The report concludes that migrants can eventually become long-term residents, but that few become Maltese citizens, and that the country shows “some of the longest waits for family reunion.” The report noted that the island “has one of the most exclusionary naturalization policies in Europe.” Indeed, pathways to nationality pose problems for migrants irrespective of their country of origin. The minister responsible for home affairs has the final say on whether nationality is granted, and there is no appeal. The process for applying for naturalization is also not sufficiently transparent.

At present, the government is working on implementing an integration policy. Civil-society organizations on the island are playing an important role in this process.

Citation:
The Migrants Integration Policy Index 2011
Interview with the Marsa Open Center director Ahmed Burge. Times of Malta 31/10/11
Refugee Integration Perspectives in Mata - Nitkellmu? Aditus December 2013
National Report Malta: Integration of Vulnerable Groups. The people for change foundation June 2014

Mexico

Score 3

Mexican integration policy is weak to non-existent. The Mexican narrative and national psyche tends to assume that migration is the path to emigration. Mexico was
and remains a major source of emigration, but has not effectively addressed
problems related to immigration that have been steadily increasing during the last 15
to 20 years. There is no problem with “middle class” European and U.S. migration to
Mexico. Indeed immigration of this kind is broadly welcomed and has been
increasing – albeit from a very low level. However, there are serious problems with
migrants from Central America, both those seeking eventual entry to the United
States and also the minority who want to stay in Mexico. Few are able to acquire
formal documentation. In their desperation, such people are often preyed upon by
criminals or even recruited into local drug gangs. Homicide rates are also high
among this group. The Mexican authorities mostly do not welcome this kind of
immigration and do their best to discourage it. They also downplay the incidence of
criminal attacks with Central American immigrants as victims, although the
international media has recently cast a spotlight on this population’s predicament.
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