Integration Report
Integration Policy

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016
Integration Policy

How effectively do policies support the integration of migrants into society?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.
- 8-6 = Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.
- 5-3 = Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.
- 2-1 = Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.

Canada

Receiving around 250,000 immigrants per year, Canada has one of the highest annual immigration-to-population ratios in the world. Cultural, education and social policies, including language training and orientation courses, support the integration of immigrants. To promote integration, Canada allows immigrants to become citizens after three years of residency, one of the shortest residency requirements in the world. The high educational attainment of immigrants – the highest in the world, in fact, with around half of immigrants having university educations – also facilitates integration.

Nevertheless, these policies do appear to have weaknesses, as seen by the relatively poor labor-market performance of recent immigrants, as well as immigrants’ high rate of return to their countries of origin. A recent CSLS study found that in 2012, very recent immigrants to Canada (those with less than five years of residence) had an unemployment rate of 19.6%, an employment rate of 92%, and hourly wages that averaged just 79% of wages accruing to those born in Canada. The integration of immigrants is impeded by a number of factors, including difficulties faced by immigrants in having their professional credentials recognized by Canadian authorities; the concentration of immigrants in a small number of major cities such as Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal (immigrants to cities where immigrants are few in number experience much better labor-market outcomes); the language problems encountered by many immigrants; and according to some, the lower quality of education received by immigrants from developing countries.

Recent changes to the Citizenship Act were aimed at reducing the processing time for applications and better protecting the citizenship program from abuse. The overhauled Citizenship Act also makes it easier for the Canadian government to revoke a person’s rights on the basis of security concerns or participation in
organized-crime activities as well as imposed delays and restrictions to family reunion and citizenship. There is also the question of the increasing number of temporary workers in Canada, who are discouraged from integrating due to limited opportunities for becoming permanent residents and, eventually, citizens.

The new Liberal government is accepting 25,000 refugees from Syria by February 2016 and will take measures to ensure that these newcomers are quickly integrated into the broader society. This policy has wide popularity, a manifestation of the willingness of Canadians to be inclusive.

Citation:

New Zealand

Until the 1980s, New Zealand’s immigration policy operated under the overriding concern of preserving the nation’s identity as a primarily European, or British, nation. This has since changed. Today, New Zealand is a prime destination for immigrants (with 40,000 to 50,000 new immigrants annually) and the growing numbers of immigrants who become New Zealand citizens reflect the country’s willingness to encourage integration. Based on labor market and education system indicators, integration policy has been quite successful. The amount of time it takes to get a work visa or a visitor visa has fallen by half, and the wait for a student visa has fallen by two-thirds from 2011 to 2012. New legislation was enacted in 2015 to ensure that migrant workers had the same employment rights as all other workers in New Zealand. These measures are reflected in the views of most immigrants who, despite socioeconomic difficulties, are satisfied with their situation (87% are satisfied or very satisfied according to a survey in 2012, compared to 75% in 2011 and 70% in 2009). The government expects that the Immigration Global Management System (IGMS) and the Global Service Delivery Model (GSDM) will improve matters yet further. To some degree, the overall good performance has to do with the fact that New Zealand employs a points-based selection system that helps to attract immigrants who are relatively self-sufficient financially and can be easily integrated in the labor market. Indeed, the Immigration Act 2009 clearly states for the first time that skilled immigration is preferred in New Zealand. The appeals procedure has been streamlined, and the decision to grant entry can now be based on “classified information” with regard to security matters or criminal conduct. Nevertheless, visa procedures are still complex, and dealing with immigration bureaucracy can be tricky for applicants.

More problematic are the challenges for lesser-skilled immigrants, who experience difficulties in settling in New Zealand when they are unable to bring over other family members. Sustained economic growth during the global financial crisis, together with the Christchurch rebuild following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, have provided significant employment opportunities for migrant workers.
Although the government has been reluctant to increase its quota of refugees, public pressure led to a decision in 2015 to double the quota, with the government agreeing to take an additional 600 Syrian refugees on top of an annual intake of 750 refugees. Even Winston Peters, the leader of the New Zealand First party, supported an increase in refugee numbers, despite having built his party in the 1990s on an anti-immigration and anti-refugee platform.

Citation:

Australia

Score 8

Relative to its population size, Australia has maintained one of the largest immigration programs of any established democracy in the post-World War II era. Over one-fifth of the population is foreign-born. Successful integration of immigrants has therefore been a policy priority for much of Australia’s history. In general, Australia has and continues to be highly successful in integrating immigrants. The most important contributor to this success has been a highly selective immigration policy. Most migrants are selected on the basis of their skills and English language ability. Post-migration, explicit integration efforts primarily consist of encouraging immigrants to apply for citizenship, as well as an initial exclusion of migrants from certain welfare programs. Migrants do not receive unemployment benefits in the first two years after their arrival, which helps to explain Australia’s top score in the foreign-born unemployment-rate indicator.

Despite Australia’s relatively open immigration policy, a concern in recent years has been the large number of asylum seekers who have arrived, usually on boats from Southeast Asia. Mandatory detention was introduced for asylum seekers in the 1990s, and extended in 2001 such that detainees were excluded from the mainland, where they had certain legal rights of appeal. The incoming Labor government in 2007 initially abolished this so-called Pacific Solution, but in August 2012, offshore processing of asylum seekers was reinstated. Following the 2013 election, the Coalition introduced Operation Sovereign Borders, under which the Australian navy prevents all vessels containing asylum seekers from reaching Australia. The Abbott government has promised to ensure that asylum seekers do not reach Australian territory, and this harsh policy has received broad public support. In a 2014 poll, more than 70% of Australians supported the policy.

Concern has also arisen in recent years about the large number of temporary skilled immigrants, many from island states in the South Pacific. Historically, immigration
in Australia has been conceived as permanent resettlement, and the phenomenon of large numbers of temporary immigrants is relatively new. Upward of 100,000 temporary skilled immigration visas are now issued annually. By its nature, the temporary-immigration program is not geared toward long-term integration of immigrants, creating some potential for breakdown in social cohesion.

Citation:
https://www.justlanded.com/english/Australia/Australia-Guide/Jobs/Unemployment-Benefit

Luxembourg

Luxembourg’s migrant population since the Second World War has grown continuously. Today, some 85% of migrants are citizens of the European Union, while overall 92% are of European extraction, with the remaining highly qualified migrants coming from Japan, the United States, Canada and other countries. Luxembourg claims one of the highest performing migration populations, with an outstanding share of economic immigrants among OECD countries and a very small group of economically weak third-country nationals. Some 50% of the total resident population in Luxembourg is immigrant-based, and as of 2008 the government significantly revised its immigration and integration policy. Furthermore, in 2010 the government introduced a national action plan to better integrate the immigrant populations as well as combat discrimination (Plan d’action national d’intégration et de lutte contre les discriminations). In addition, Luxembourg has improved consultation mechanisms with migrants and pursued stronger democratic principles with regard to migrant issues. A national body focusing on migrant issues (Conseil national pour étrangers) had its first session in March 2012, and in September 2012 members elected a president and vice-president.

Every municipality is as of the review period required to establish an integration commission (Commissions consultatives communales d’intégration, CCI) that accurately represents the region’s migrant mix. As these bodies are fairly new, no detailed evaluation is yet available.

In 2014, the Migrant Integration Policy Index gave Luxembourg an overall score of 57 (59 in 2010), ranking the country 15th out of 35 nations examined. Migrant children are fully integrated into the local primary-school or secondary-school system. Children between 12 and 15 who have recently migrated to Luxembourg are given the opportunity to attend a special class called “classes d’insertion” in the capital’s Lycée Technique du Centre, with special programs in French or German designed to facilitate integration into regular classes at a later date. Children of foreign origin have high average failure rates, a fact closely associated with the bilingual school system. As part of its evaluation though the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), Luxembourg is regularly criticized for its low performance regarding the integration of migrant children.
All foreigners, EU citizens and third-country citizens can vote and run for office in local elections, provided they fulfill certain residency requirements and are registered on the electoral list. Inscription conditions have been eased over the years. However, the fact that the meetings of local councils are held in Luxembourgish (with written reports in German, English, or French) constitutes an impediment for resident aliens. Non-nationals’ interest in political participation at the local level remains low. In the 2011 municipal elections, only 16.9% of those eligible to vote actually took part. Luxembourg has also for some time been criticized by chambers of commerce and non-governmental organizations over the representative makeup of parliament, as it does not include representatives for migrants or cross-border commuters, who constitute 80% of the labor market and are the main driving force of the “national” economy and nearly half the country’s population. Thus, the national Chamber of Commerce and one of the most powerful migrant lobbying groups (Association de Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés, ASTI) have pushed for the participation of migrants in national elections, a request that is unprecedented within the European Union. During the period under review, voting rights for resident foreigners in parliamentary elections was a cross-party issue, and an issue put to public vote in the June 2015 consultative referendum. However, an absolute majority of 78.02% voted against creating full foreigner voting rights, putting a preliminary end to this ambitious project. The next referendum is not expected before 2017. In light of this experience, the government wants to accelerate the passage of a new Naturalization Act to facilitate foreigners’ civil participation in public life.

Citation:
http://www.asti.lu/2013/01/30/conference-quel-droit-de-vote-pour-les-etrangers-au-luxembourg-2/
http://www.wort.lu/de/politik/endergebnis-des-referendums-steht-fest-ein-deutliches-nein-in-allen-drei-fragen-55748177c88b6a9ece5ad18
http://www.wort.lu/de/politik/reform-geplant-neues-einbuergerungsgesetz-wird-konkret-561633110c88b46a9ce61ceec
http://www.mipex.eu/luxembourg
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=9396&IF_Language=fra&MainTheme=2&FldrName=1&RFPath=69

Netherlands

In 2011, the Netherlands ranked fifth in the Migrant Integration Policy Index, which compares 37 industrial countries; in 2015 the county ranked 15th (on a self-compiled composite index with eight equally weighted criteria). The country scores relatively high on measures of labor mobility and access to citizenship for migrants; but low on measures of access to family reunions and permanent residence. It attains average scores for criteria including education, anti-discrimination policy, health and political participation. A plurality of Dutch citizens (42%) believe the Netherlands would be a
“nice” country with fewer immigrants; 31% disagree with this statement; and 27% have no opinion or do not know.

As 4% of the population is foreign-born, the Netherlands is a sizable immigration-destination country, with a considerable integration task. Integration policy was a political bone of contention until 2008, and has since become a less contested policy field. Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who immigrate to the Netherlands are required to learn the Dutch language and develop knowledge about Dutch society. The Civic Integration Abroad policy requires obligatory integration tests in the country of origin for family reunion applicants. However, Human Rights Watch stated that this poses some concerns because it clearly applies only to family migrants from certain nationalities, mainly from non-Western countries. The number of applications decreased and further financial restrictions (€350 for each time the test is taken) infringed upon the right to family life. After one family applicant successfully brought a case before the European Court of Justice in March 2010, family-reunion policy became more clear and coherent.

Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures targeting employment security and labor market integration. Nevertheless, unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high (16%) as among nationals (5%). This difference is somewhat less pronounced within the 15- to 24-year-old age group (24% vs. 11%). One in three migrant youths without a formal school qualification is jobless. Obviously, disadvantages increase in pace with economic decline; employers can be more selective under conditions involving a larger supply of job seekers, affording greater space for prejudice and discrimination. Prime Minister Rutte prompted considerable criticism when he publicly stated that the government can do little to fight discrimination, and appealed to younger migrants to simply do better and work harder. Minister for Social Affairs Asscher announced special efforts to tackle unemployment among migrant youths. In terms of political participation, the Netherlands performs well with regard to the liberty afforded to immigrants in forming associations and political parties. Nonetheless, applicants for national citizenship can be rejected for not participating in the mandatory Naturalization Day ceremony. In May 2014, the Rutte-Asscher government formally withdrew a bill to criminalize illegal residence in order to speed up the re-emigration process to the country of origin.

Citation:
T. Huddlestone et al., Migrant Policy Integration Index (2011) (www.mipex.eu)
Burgerperspectieven 2015/2, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, June 2015
Aanpak Jeugdwerkloosheid werpt vruchten af: 23.000 jongeren aan de slag geholpen, Ministerie van SZW, Nieuwsbericht 31 March 2015 (rijksoverheid.nl, consulted 22 October 2015)

Additional references:
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Terugkerende_monitors_en_reeksen/Monitor_Integratie
http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2012/Jaarrapport_integratie_2013
Norway

Score 8

Integration policy is fairly well-organized and well-funded in Norway, but the effects of immigration represent a new challenge in this country, and policies have to date been less than fully effective. Non-Western immigrants experience higher unemployment rates and lower wages than do native Norwegians. There are frequent complaints of discrimination in both the labor and housing markets. There is notable social unrest related to problems faced by second- and third-generation immigrants. However, Norway does not have a significant political party on the political far right pursuing an openly xenophobic or anti-immigration policy.

Integration policies include free language training and additional school resources allocated to immigrant children. Some of these resources are devoted to preserving cultural identity. For instance, children are offered additional classes in their mother tongue. The acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is relatively quick. Applicants must have lived in the country for at least seven out of the last 10 years, and either be fluent in Norwegian or have attended courses in Norwegian (or Sami) for 300 hours. Immigrants with permanent residence status are entitled to vote in local elections.

An autonomous Directorate of Integration was created in 2006, distinct from the preexisting Directorate of Immigration and Integration, a change that was generally regarded as a sensible and successful reform. However, the challenges of multiculturalism stemming from immigration remain relatively unfamiliar in this traditionally homogenous society, and policies remain unsettled and in some respects immature. For example, the country continues to deny the right to dual citizenship. The privileged position of the Lutheran church stands in the way of religious equity, particularly in the eyes of alternate religious groups. Islam has become the largest non-Christian religious denomination, with the country home to about 112,000 Muslims out of a total national population of 5 million.

The country’s “old minorities,” mainly the aboriginal Sami population, have in the course of two or three decades gone from facing severe discrimination to a state of equity and integration. This status has been institutionalized in their formal recognition as an aboriginal people, with group rights written into the constitution and the creation of a Sami parliament, elected by the Sami population, which possesses some legislative authority.

Portugal

Score 8

In the two previous SGI reporting periods, we noted that the economic crisis has been accompanied by a decrease in immigration. This pattern continued in 2014, with the immigrant population falling by 1.5%, to 395,195 – the first time since 2002 this number has fallen below 400,000.
It should also be noted that Portugal is not a destination for the huge numbers of refugees and migrants currently entering the European Union.

Overall, all evidence suggests that Portugal’s integration policies have remained successful in the current period. Indeed, the 2014 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranks Portugal second in the EU (after Sweden) in terms of the most favorable migrant-integration policies. This points to the preponderance of economic conditions over specific policy in Portugal in terms of the country’s role as an attractive destination – that is, the fall in immigration in Portugal in recent years has less to do with policy than with the country’s lackluster economic performance.

Citation:
Migrant Integration Policy Index, “Key Findings - Portugal 2014,” available online at: http://www.mipex.eu/portugal

Estonia

Since the Soviet period, Estonia has had a large non-native population. Russians and other Slavic ethnic groups compose almost a third of the population, 16% of whom are foreign born. The national immigration policy has been regularly updated and monitored, with the government allocating substantial national and EU funds to various integration programs. In December 2014, the government approved the latest development plan, the “Lõimuv Eesti 2020,” which significantly broadens the scope of integration policies. Whereas previous programs focused heavily on Estonian-language teaching, the new plan prioritizes identity-building, civic participation and cultural immersion.

There are a number of public educational institutions (through upper-secondary level) in which Russian is the language of tuition. The Estonian public broadcaster has a Russian-language radio channel and a TV channel fully in Russian, called “ETV+,” that was launched in fall 2014. The Citizenship Act was amended in January 2015; under its changes, newborn children of non-citizens can be granted Estonian citizenship, children under 15 years of age can hold multiple citizenships, and citizenship applicants over 65 years of age can take a simplified language test. These measures aim to decrease the number of non-citizen residents, who currently account for 6% of the total population.

Improving employability among the non-native population remains an important aspect of integration policy. After some progress in 2013, in 2014 the difference in employment rates between natives and non-natives increased from 2.7 to 5.6 percentage points, while the difference in unemployment rates decreased by 1 percentage point.

Permanent residents without Estonian citizenship can vote in municipal elections, but are not allowed to stand as a candidate or vote in general or EU parliamentary elections. Several public and private actions have sought to facilitate civil-society
activism among immigrants, and some progress is visible in this area. However, the
native Estonian and immigrant populations still primarily live side by side than
together.

Citation:
(accessed 30.10.2015)

Finland

In a recent policy study on immigrant integration that compared EU countries, the
United States, Canada and Switzerland, Finland was ranked fourth in terms of how well its legislation and policies help newcomers adopt to their new circumstances. However, the study did not fully measure the practical success of integration efforts in the various countries, and may therefore give a somewhat exaggerated view of the Finnish situation. Second-generation immigrants have had difficulties entering education or finding work, and the employment situation – when measured by indicators for employment rates among foreign-born workers, comparative employment rates between foreign-born and native-born workers, and generational concerns for foreign-born workers – is certainly troubling. There are also great differences in labor-market attachment relative to migrants’ countries of origin, with Estonians and Russians, for example, finding their way into employment much more easily than migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Boosting rates of labor-market participation is one of the key targets of the government’s Future of Migration 2020 Strategy. While the Finnish immigrant population has increased substantially, there are still only about 300,000 foreign-born residents or naturalized Finnish citizens out of a population of 5.4 million (5.5%). In general, Finland is not considered to be among the top destinations for immigrants. This is for various reasons. Applying for a Finnish residence permit is still a complicated process, as is applying for Finnish citizenship. Finnish is a difficult language, and proficient language skills are required. For example, the police-recruitment process requires a very high level of language proficiency. While sympathetic to work-related immigration, authorities’ general attitude toward immigration is rather restrictive. Moreover, the Finns Party has used its cabinet platform to fan anti-immigrant resentments. Some demonstrations by radical anti-immigrant protesters against refugee accommodations have taken a violent turn. However, according to polls, the share of favorable attitudes toward immigration among the public is increasing, certainly in part due to the catastrophic refugee situation in Europe.

Citation:
Arno Tanner, “Finland’s Balancing Act”, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/finlands-balancing-act-labor-
market-humanitarian-relief-and-immigrant-integration
Germany

According to a 2014 micro-census, 20.3% of the people living in Germany had a migrant background. Between 2013 and 2014, the share of the population with a migrant background increased by about 3% to a total of 16.4 million. This recent increase is consistent with the trend of the last decade (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014). The Federal Statistical Office calculated that 1.46 million people immigrated to Germany in 2014, a 20-year high and an increase of 238,000 people over 2013. Additionally, 914,000 left Germany in 2014. Net immigration was 550,000 for 2014, the highest level since 1992.

This was accompanied by public debate about the need to modernize immigration legislation in order to attract skilled migrants to counter issues of population aging. In 2014, the government deviated slightly from the protective approach of previous governments by introducing the right to dual citizenship. This reform abolished the requirement for children born in Germany to non-German parents to decide between citizenship of their birth and the citizenship of their parents.

While Germany previously had an extremely liberal regime for migrants from EU member states, a liberalization of labor migration from non-EU countries has recently taken place. According to the OECD (2013), these reforms “have put Germany among the OECD countries with the fewest restrictions on labor migration for highly skilled occupations.” Nonetheless, the naturalization rate remains low. In 2011, 107,000 people acquired German citizenship. Integration of immigrants from other European countries is smooth. However, the integration of Muslim migrants, especially from Turkey, has been more difficult, as measured by educational achievement and unemployment rates. These problems are being addressed through the education and child-care systems. For instance, early German-language instruction is being offered in child-care facilities, though the success of this policy remains unclear.

Lower Saxony will shortly become the third German state, after Bremen and Hamburg, to sign a state treaty (Staatsvertrag) with German Muslim civil-society organizations. Negotiations on a similar treaty have also started in Berlin. These state treaties express mutual respect and address practicalities, such as Muslim religious holidays. While there is no federal ministry for ethnic minorities, Germany has a Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The German Islam Conference assisted in the development of an intercultural dialogue between government officials and Muslim civil-society organizations. In addition, the government provides free language courses to support the integration of migrants. To become a German citizen, among other requirements, one must pass a citizenship test.

For several years, Germany has been an attractive destination for migrants from Europe and neighboring regions. However, in 2015, the number of refugees claiming
asylum in Germany far exceeded any recent levels and represents a substantial challenge for integration policy. Instability in northern Africa and civil war in Syria, combined with deteriorating conditions in the refugee camps in Turkey, have led many refugees to seek asylum in Europe and especially in Germany. In an attempt to avert a humanitarian disaster, the German government accepted large numbers of refugees who had already made it to Germany after traversing the Balkan route. In doing so, however, the German government ignored the EU’s Dublin II Regulation without a clear plan for managing the additional administrative burden. As a consequence, the number of asylum claims skyrocketed. In 2014, a total of 173,072 applications for asylum were made. In 2015, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees reported that this had increased to 441,899 applications (BAMF 2015). Initially, the government estimated that 800,000 refugees would enter Germany in 2015. By late October 2015, the Ministry of the Interior reported that 758,473 refugees had been registered (BMI 2015).

This sudden increase exacerbated existing problems, especially at the local level. Even before the recent increase, the capacity of local governments to receive new asylum seekers had already appeared to be exhausted. As a result, local government officials urgently demanded additional federal and regional financial aid.

The reaction of civil society has been mixed. Although a majority of the population initially appeared to welcome the government’s open approach, skepticism increased as the numbers of refugees claiming asylum remained high. Furthermore, xenophobic groups, such as Pegida, quickly began to organize in opposition to the arrival of refugees in Germany. While the government’s open approach received broad support inside and outside Germany, and despite the effective “flexibility” (The Economist 2015) demonstrated in tackling local problems, the government has lacked a comprehensive crisis management strategy. However, after long disputes between the coalition parties in October 2015, the federal government, parliament and council adopted a “first step” toward solving the problem. The regulation includes substantial financial support for states and municipalities, targeted acceleration of procedures for processing asylum applications (e.g. Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro were declared safe countries of origin), early integration and provision of language courses for people with a high likelihood of being accepted, and the restriction of cash allowances for people with a low likelihood of being accepted, relaxation of the zoning law to facilitate the construction of more accommodation, and special support for child refugees travelling without their parents (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, October 2015).

The introduction of these policies was followed by further arguments between the coalition parties, which included controversial proposals to limit the number of refugees. On 5 November 2015, the coalition party leaders announced a compromise solution to the interparty dispute over the increasing numbers of asylum applications. The CDU abandoned its demand for so-called transit zones for refugees near the German borders. Instead, the parties agreed an arrangement that would include the
establishment of admission facilities for people coming from safe countries with a low likelihood of having an asylum application accepted.

The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen. Many problems are yet to emerge. For example, the integration of child refugees into the education system will increase demands on teaching and institutional resources. Furthermore, adult refugees will need support in integrating into the labor market whether high or low skilled with some refugees likely to be illiterate. Moreover, much will ultimately depend on whether broader cultural integration will work. So far, German civil society remains largely in favor of integrating refugees. However, there is a danger of strengthening xenophobic tendencies if problems of cultural alienation grow (The Economist 2015). This challenge will be much harder to manage. It will require effective integration policies and a broad political consensus. To date, the government has not provided a clear strategy to promote long-term integration and build political consensus.

Citation:
OECD 2013: Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Germany, Paris: OECD.

Ireland

The large inflow of immigrants during the boom years led to a rapid increase in the foreign-born population resident in Ireland. More than 70% of immigrants to Ireland have the right to reside, work and own property in the country by virtue of their EU citizenship. Despite the resumption of a high rate of emigration among Irish nationals after 2008, inward migration from abroad has continued at a significant rate.

The unemployment rate among non-nationals (especially those from the new EU accession states) is higher than among the native-born population. Many employed immigrants are not in occupations commensurate with their skills and education.

The inflow of families from non-English-speaking countries in the last 10 years has placed a strain on the education system. Additional resources have been provided to help cope with this challenge, but these are not regarded as adequate. There are signs of increasing gaps between schools in relatively deprived areas of the main cities, which often have high concentrations of children holding non-Irish citizenship, and schools in the more affluent areas with lower concentrations.
Forced integration is not an issue, although some ethnic and religious minorities face difficulties in a country that is still overwhelmingly Irish, while their children face problems in a school system that is still largely under Roman Catholic management.

The treatment of asylum seekers by the Irish authorities came under critical scrutiny in the course of 2014, with adverse attention drawn to the system of “direct provision,” which is intended to provide for the welfare of asylum seekers and their families as they await decisions on their asylum application. It provides essential services, medical care, accommodation and board, with three meals per day provided at set times. Attention has recently been focused on the poor standards of accommodation and living conditions in the facilities serving this population, as well as the enforced isolation of families waiting for as long as seven years to learn of a decision on their asylum applications.

During 2015, Ireland has not been affected by the growing immigration/refugee crisis in much of Europe. Ireland has agreed to accept some immigrants/asylum seekers from Syria and other war-torn countries before the end of the year. There is no explicitly anti-immigrant political party in Ireland and immigration is not likely to be a prominent issue in the 2016 general election.

**Lithuania**

Lithuania remains a largely homogeneous society. The country’s 30,000 foreign residents (as of the beginning of 2011) represent just 1% of the country’s population. Immigration of foreign nationals to Lithuania is comparatively rare, totaling an average of about 2000 people per year. As part of the EU program to distribute asylum-seekers among member states, Lithuania has committed to taking in 1,105 people over the course of two years. Most foreigners used to come to Lithuania from Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, all former republics of the Soviet Union. For this reason, their integration into Lithuanian society has not been very difficult. However, the fact that the majority of new asylum-seekers are likely to come from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea will present the Lithuanian authorities with more complex integration challenges. Furthermore, a number of developments call for the implementation of new integration measures, including the country’s rising flows of legal and illegal immigration; the economic recovery, which helped contribute to the recent increase in the number of work permits granted to third-country nationals; and the language and cultural problems faced by foreign residents in Lithuania.

Migrants from other EU member states tend to integrate into Lithuanian society more successfully than do third-country nationals. Various cultural, educational and social programs, including the provision of information, advisory, training services, and Lithuanian language courses are aimed at integrating migrants into Lithuanian society. However, labor-market services are not sufficiently developed in this regard,
and foreign residents’ access to relevant education and training programs remains limited in practice. Moreover, new integration facilities and services are necessary in order to support the expected new surge of refugees. The government has proposed shortening an initial integration period and establishing local divisions of the Foreigners Registration Center, among other measures.

Spain

Spain ranks 11th out of 38 advanced Western democracies in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (2015 edition), and is a particularly progressive country regarding the issues of family reunions and permanent residence. However, even aside from government action, the Spanish population’s degree of tolerance toward immigrants is striking. In a 2013 report published by British think tank Demos, which asked people their opinions of having immigrants as neighbors, the country ranked as the European Union’s most tolerant. According to the same report, mistreatment of immigrants by Spanish citizens has diminished. And in contrast to most comparable EU countries, no relevant xenophobic populist parties exist and violent attacks on immigrant groups are very rare. These achievements are even more striking given the very high unemployment rates and the fact that some five million immigrants have arrived in Spain in only the last decade (constituting up to 12% of the population, although this figure is now falling as jobless foreign-born residents return to their countries of origin). Apart from some western Europeans looking for a second home, most immigrants during the 2000 – 2010 period came from poorer countries, many of them Romanians, Latin Americans and Africans in search of jobs and better living conditions.

The underlying cultural tolerance is bolstered by the fact that most immigrants are first-generation, and in the case of Latin Americans, share a common language and cultural links with the native population (Ecuadorians, Colombians and Bolivians represent 25% of the total foreign-born population). Furthermore, many immigrants enjoy dual nationality due to the country’s links with its old colonies. With regard to the Muslim population, Moroccans comprise 20% of Spain’s immigrants, with most of them being moderate and well-integrated into Spanish society. However, some radical groups involved in recruiting and fundraising for al-Qaeda or Daesh have also been identified.

The public perception of immigration has deteriorated somewhat recently as a consequence of the economic crisis. To be sure, unemployment is the main obstacle to effective integration, and according to a report published in 2013 by the Spanish Observatory of Racism and Xenophobia (Oberaxe), the peaceful integration of migrants coexists with somewhat widespread support for the idea that Spaniards should be given preferences in hiring and in access to social services. Undocumented immigrants recovered free access to health care in 2015 after three years of restriction.
Sweden

Sweden has a generous immigration policy. The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq and Syria and, in 1992, from former Yugoslavia. Indeed, there are individual local authorities (Södertälje) that have received more immigrants from Iraq than has the entire United States. In the European setting Sweden, together with Germany, stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly countries.

As is the case across Europe, the war in Syria has triggered huge immigration to Sweden. The Migration Board previously predicted that Sweden would receive between 80,000 and 105,000 refugees. The current estimate for 2015 and 2016 is that Sweden will receive between 160,000 and 190,000 refugees per annum from Syria and other Middle East countries. Today, Sweden (still) offers permanent residency for unaccompanied children and for Syrian families with children. These provisions, however, are highly disputed in contemporary public discourse and in the parliament.

The increasing immigration represents a major challenge, unprecedented in size and scope, to Swedish integration policy. These policies cover a wide range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the extensive autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by central government to receive asylum seekers.

It is difficult to argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains a very important policy sector and related political activities are far reaching. The activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience.

Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts otherwise, thus indicates that the problem lies in the design and implementation of its integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles facing young people as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against immigrants. There is some good news, however. Studies show that second generation...
immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary education. However, for immigrants with low education, entry into a labor market with high standards seems more or less blocked.

Citation: Kvist, Jon et al. (eds.) (2012), Changing Inequalities. The Nordic Countries and New Challenges (Bristol: Policy Press)

Switzerland

For many years, Swiss integration policy was predicated on the perception that foreigners were “guest workers,” whose limited stay meant that broad efforts to encourage integration were unnecessary. As many foreign workers gained access to unlimited work permits between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, the policy approach grew inappropriate over time. Accordingly, a number of efforts to improve integration have been made, starting as early as kindergarten. Nonetheless, integration policy cannot broadly be called a success in Switzerland, particularly given the very high share of migrants in the population (accounting for about one-quarter of the country’s residents). Yet if the lack of a coherent federal integration policy is undisputable, this does not mean that integration policy is failing as a whole. Many local authorities are doing a good and sometimes innovative job of integration, especially for second-generation migrants. According to OECD statistics, second-generation migrants in Switzerland perform better in school and are better integrated into the labor market than is the case in other European countries. This is not to say that foreigners – who are granted rights equal to natives with the exception of political rights – have equal opportunities in all respects. If immigrants’ unemployment rates and dependence on social aid is above the national average, this is due to the fact that the share of low-skilled workers with a correspondingly higher risk of unemployment is also above average among immigrants. But the lack of a coherent integration policy may add to the problems, and social discrimination is not limited to the labor market. Within the housing market, for instance, some groups of immigrants may find it comparatively difficult to rent apartments.

With regard to naturalization, some 34,000 foreigners per year are granted Swiss citizenship. This figure corresponds to 40% of the net number of immigrants arriving in the country per year, or 0.4 percent of the population. This comparatively high naturalization rate as a percentage of the population is partly a result of the high share of foreigners in the population overall — about 2 million foreigners live in Switzerland as compared to 6 million Swiss citizens. This in turn means that if the number of naturalizations is compared to the number of migrants actually living in the country (as is usually done in the scholarly literature), the Swiss rate of naturalization is very low in comparison with other Western democracies. In 2014, only 2% of resident foreigners acquired Swiss citizenship. Only some of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and a few Western democracies — such
as Austria or Germany — have similar or lower naturalization rates. The naturalization procedure is regarded as burdensome. However, as naturalization in Switzerland is a bottom-up process that starts at the level of the commune, considerable regional differences are evident, with some communes and cantons pursuing a liberal naturalization policy, and others acting more restrictively.

These federal differences show up also in the issue of political rights. A few cantons and communes grant political-participation rights to foreigners, even though the federal government does not. Thus, with regard to integration, naturalization and legislation on political rights, we find a bottom-up approach rather than federal standards.

A part of the public has tended toward support for increasingly integration-averse policies during the period under review. According to some observers, there is limited prospect for a more generous and liberal integration policy in the near term, as right-wing parties and voters are likely to oppose any such reforms.

**United Kingdom**

Due to the country’s colonial history, the United Kingdom has a large share of ethnic minorities (approximately 14% of the population), and integration has long been an important area of government policy. However, while the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 imposed the general duty to promote race equality on all public authorities, the United Kingdom has not developed a formal integration program. The focus has been more on the protection of minorities than on the integration of migrants, but that is because the United Kingdom has a preference for multiculturalism. There are both regional and ethnic differences in integration, with some cities and smaller towns having concentrations of populations of distinct ethnic groups, and tensions over access to public housing and public services in localities where recent immigrants have concentrated.

The Equality Act 2006 merged three existing bodies (including the Commission for Racial Equality) into a new Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) – an umbrella organization in which ethnicity is only one of several dimensions in which it attempts to enforce integration and equality. In recent years, attempts to create a national narrative around “Britishness” were aimed at changing from an ethnocentric concept of citizenship to a more civic one. Despite the anti-immigration narrative of the UK Independence Party and the tensions associated with the refugee crisis (particularly concerning the refugee camp near Calais), in high-profile cases where racist language was used, for example involving celebrities or police officers, the perpetrators have been roundly condemned.

Attempts to increase diversity in parliament have been promoted by both major parties. As a consequence, public life now better reflects society than it did two
decades ago. However, in public bodies, such as the police, concerns remain that minority ethnic groups are underrepresented. Although greater control over immigration featured prominently in the general election campaign and is at the core of the renewed debate on the UK’s membership of the European Union, this issue is mainly concerned with curbing the net inflow of migrants to limit pressures on social policies and housing stock. Despite these pressures, the population largely accepts the integration of minorities and policies generally support this goal.

**United States**

On the basis of data provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the United States was ranked ninth out of 31 analyzed countries with regard to overall integration policy, but first with respect to anti-discrimination laws and protection. The United States also ranked high on the access-to-citizenship scale, because it encourages immigrants to become citizens. Legal immigrants enjoy good (but often low-paid) employment opportunities and educational opportunities. However, the United States does less well with regard to family reunification. Many legal permanent residents cannot apply for visas for their families, and during the review period, no one in the United States had the right to apply for a visa to sponsor a foreign homosexual partner. Several states are taking the lead on integration policy. Despite efforts, complex integration laws, limited visa availability, high fees and long backlogs make it challenging for immigrants to integrate.

A large fraction of the immigration to the United States has consisted of illegal immigrants, most of whom have crossed the border from Mexico and who may live, work and pay taxes in the United States for their entire adult lives without ever becoming legal residents. These illegal immigrants account for nearly one-third of the immigrant population, numbering 12 million to 15 million individuals or 3% to 4% of the country’s overall population. These illegal immigrants have in effect been tolerated (and even virtually invited by the ease of illegal entry) for their economic contributions, often as agricultural workers or in low-paying service occupations. Children of illegal immigrants attend public schools, and businesses that employ illegal immigrants have not been subject to effective sanctions. Despite congressional inaction, a few immigrants will benefit from better opportunities to participate in the society. A significant minority of undocumented immigrants have been provided with slightly improved opportunities on the U.S. labor market through the administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and executive action programs. More generally, immigrants should benefit from more work-related English and training programs approved by Congress. Another important policy change allows same-sex couples to sponsor spouses for immigration status in the same manner as heterosexual couples.
Austria’s integration policy has been the focus of recent reforms aiming to pave the way toward a new “welcoming culture” in the country. Despite these remarkable efforts it continues to be deficient in two key ways: First, there is still too little formal recognition that Austria is a country that has been and will continue to be defined by immigration. Though not a feature of official government policy, the slogan “Austria is not a country of immigration” continues to be invoked by parties such as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ).

Second, and compared to other EU member states, acquiring citizenship in Austria is still difficult for non-nationals (despite some prominent figures such as opera performers, athletes and billionaires).

These shortcomings are reflected in education outcomes. Education in urban areas has to deal with the challenge posed by the children of first-generation migrants, in school systems with constrained resources. This means that children from migrant families have a more difficult task in qualifying for higher education, and are often stuck in the lowest type of school, called a special school (Sonderschule), undermining their chances for future labor-market success. Special support policies for such children have been recently put in place, but it remains to be seen how successful these policies will turn out to be in the short and medium term.

With respect to the labor market more broadly, the Austrian government is only halfheartedly welcoming employees newly arriving from foreign countries. Its policies (including the “red-white-red card”) are neither well received by economic actors nor are they succeeding in attracting highly skilled professionals. The indirect, undeclared alliance between organized labor (which defends the short-term interests of union-protected laborers, and is usually linked politically to the left) and the far right (which exploits xenophobic resentments, especially in the case of the Freedom Party) creates a political climate that sometimes breaks into open hostility, particularly against migrants coming from Muslim countries. This alliance between right-wing populism and organized labor is still an obstacle to the development of a more distinct integration policy.

In 2015, Austria, like a number of other European countries, became the site of a mass migration of refugees into its territory. While many refugees traveled on to countries such as Germany and Sweden, many others remained in Austria to seek asylum. Unlike many other, in particular eastern European states, Austria has not closed its borders and has acted mostly in compliance with the Geneva convention and its humanitarian tradition, accepting the refugees. In 2015 alone, close to 100,000 refugees requested asylum in Austria, a figure more than triple the number of requests in 2014.
The government has responded by introducing more stringent asylum rules. Asylum is to be granted on a temporary basis only and is to be reviewed after certain periods of time. These legislative measures may function as a disincentive to integrating migrants into Austrian society. However, migration in such amounts has also clearly overburdened the Austrian system and society, and made action imperative. A solution to the evident intra-European migration imbalances will be possible only on an European level.

Citation:
New legal provisions: https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXV/ME/ME_00166/index.shtml

Belgium

Belgium has a contradictory attitude to immigration. On the one hand, it has traditionally been quite welcoming to political refugees and has had a relatively lenient policy toward “economic” migrants. The Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism was formed to address potential discrimination issues.

On the other hand, Belgium has never properly invested in education in ways that would enable immigrants and their children to integrate easily in the economic sphere. This has led to high unemployment rates among immigrants, who are largely concentrated in urban areas (particularly Brussels). Deep education and employment-rate gaps between Belgian nationals and residents of non-European origin thus persist.

The combination of these two trends has produced increasing opposition to immigration and strengthened latent racism within the population at large. It has also produced a deep feeling of alienation among some quite large groups of second- and third-generation immigrants, both in socioeconomic terms (as they feel excluded from social mobility) and in cultural/religious terms (not being recognized as full-fledged citizens, being Muslim).

The previous and the current government have sought to tighten immigration policy, but the current immigration crisis (following the protracted civil war in Syria) has de facto undermined this attempt. The minister in charge of this portfolio seems quite able to manage the immediate logistic consequences of this crisis, but its long-term effects are difficult to foresee from a budgetary perspective as well as from that of immigration and social-security policies and potential populist reactions.

Citation:
Denmark

On 1 January 2014 there were about 626,000 immigrants and descendants of immigrants living in Denmark, or 11.1% of the population, of which the 8.5% are immigrants (58% of this group are from non-western countries). After the tightening of immigration policies introduced by the liberal-conservative government in 2002, immigration from non-Western countries fell, but net immigration from Western countries rose. More recently there have been increases from both groups.

The employment rate of immigrants and their descendants (ages 16 to 64) is low, though it had been increasing from the mid-1980s until the onset of the financial crises. There is a substantial employment gap, taking into account the age distribution, immigrants from non-western countries have an employment rate which is 38% lower than that of ethnic Danes (for descendants the gap is 18%). The gap is particularly higher for women (43%) than for men (33%). For immigrants from western countries the gap is about 20% (for descendants about 11%). The gaps in employment rates should also be seen in light of the fact that employment rates in Denmark are high for both men and women, and there are high qualification requirements to find a job and high minimum wages.

Concerning educational achievements, immigrants and their descendants – especially girls – are making progress. In 2013, for the age group 30 to 39 about 47% of men and 64% of women had completed a labor market qualifying education. The corresponding numbers for ethnic Danes are 72% and 80%. For those 22 years old 49% of male and 61% of female non-western descendants are in education, which is only two and three percentage points below the corresponding rates for ethnic Danes.

The 24-year-old rule for family reunification introduced in 2004 has allowed fewer immigrants and their descendants to bring spouses to Denmark from abroad. The percentage fell from 61% in 2001 to 31% in 2008. Instead, immigrants increasingly marry other immigrants already living in Denmark as well as native Danes.

Since these reforms have gone into effect there have been improvements. Indeed, an increasing number of immigrants say they feel more integrated and have more Danish friends, and fewer say they experience discrimination. In addition, many more immigrants speak Danish than ever before.

Denmark has recently received many refugees and asylum-seekers from Syria, Iraq and other countries, which has affected political and public debates regarding immigrants. Immigration was an important issue in the electoral debate in June 2015, with most parties wanting to limit immigration. However, the great influx of asylum-seekers that followed over that summer forced the government to adopt a more realistic policy. Although Denmark does not take part in the EU’s asylum policy it offered to take some asylum-seekers beyond those that arrived in Denmark as a
contribution to a European solution. The tone in the debate is very much set by the Danish People’s Party, which became the second biggest party in the June elections. The government now wants to increase integration efforts and tighten access to the social safety net.

Citation:


Danmarks Statistik, Indvandrere i Danmark 2014, København.

France

Score 6

Traditionally, France has an open policy toward immigrants who seek to become French citizens. Every person born in France is considered French, or eligible to obtain French citizenship. Integration policies, in terms of long-term residence permits, access to citizenship and family reunification are open and generous. Presently, the largest share of new legal immigrants is related to the reunification of families. It explains partially the difficulty of integrating new immigrants who often have no skills, no education and do not speak French. Processes of integration have to start from scratch. The characteristics of immigrants moving to France are another problem: most are unskilled and as such, subject to vagaries of the economic crisis, for instance in the construction sector.

The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, and so on. Add to this the challenges of illegal immigrants, many of whom moved to France more than 10 or 15 years ago yet have no regular job and thus do not contribute to the pension system. Although they have access to health care and their children can attend schools, the situation is often dramatic and inextricable as for many, it is impossible to fulfill the requirements for a residence permit. Immigrants must demonstrate that they have the required documents, such as tax records, employment contracts and housing contracts, while at the same time they are essentially forced into the labor and housing black market. Potential employers and landlords will not document that they employ or house illegal aliens, as this is a crime. Under such conditions, integration is difficult, if not impossible. Immigration from Eastern Europe, the southern Balkans and, more recently, from the Middle East has become a very sensitive subject exploited by the National Front. The reluctance of the French socialist government to put in place a serious migration policy has been challenged by German Chancellor Merkel’s sudden decision to open the doors to migrants from Syria, forcing the government to revise its veiled but deliberate policy of restricting
entry (low level of asylum admissions, cumbersome and discouraging bureaucratic processes). The number of refugees that have come to France since the summer of 2015 is substantially smaller than in neighboring Germany. The national office on refugees (Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides, Ofpra) reported that close to 80,000 refugees came to France in 2015, an increase of 27% from 2014.

Integration remains at the heart of French political discourse, but actual policies set up to achieve this aim are notoriously insufficient.

Citation:

Greece

The integration of over one million irregular migrants in a society of 11 million is a very difficult task. A law was passed in 2010 that focused primarily on preconditions for the naturalization of migrants, but also somewhat improved the prospects of integration. The law went largely unimplemented and in 2013 a supreme court (Symvoulio tis Epikrateias) decision froze the provisions of the 2010 law. The court’s decision reflected a xenophobic attitude in the sense that it was based on a very old-fashioned, if not racist, understanding of how national identity is formed.

Yet in April 2014, a new Migration Code was passed. This law codified previous legislation on matters of entry, residency and social integration of irregular migrants (non-EU nationals) in Greece. It simplified the process for obtaining different types of residency permits and opened opportunities for regularizing the status of irregular migrants and stabilizing the residency permits of second-generation migrants. Importantly, the law ratified all relevant EU Directives on the migration of students, trainees, academics and high-skilled workers. Another major step toward the integration of migrants was taken by the coalition government of Syriza-ANEL in May 2015, when a new law opened the way for the naturalization of second-generation migrants under specific provisions. Upon its implementation, this law is estimated to facilitate the integration of 200,000 second-generation migrants.

The integration of migrants into the education system is functional in primary and secondary education, but legal migrants face difficulties entering tertiary education. Entrance examinations to the universities are open to Greek citizens or migrants holding permanent residence permits. Among the latter, the sons and daughters of legal migrants who had settled down and created a family in Greece are included, as long as they have graduated from high school.

As for social integration, this was never a strong point of Greek migration policy. With the exception of Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians, who probably constitute half of all migrants in Greece and first came to the country after the fall of state socialism in Southeast Europe, the rest of the country’s migrants – including migrants from Asia and Africa – are systematically excluded from Greek society. It
is telling, for instance, that Muslim migrants in Athens, where the majority of the migrant population lives, still cannot fully exercise their religious rights, as a license to build a mosque in Athens was issued by the Greek government only in early 2013 and construction of the mosque has, at the time of this writing (end of 2014) yet to begin.

Moreover, racism demonstrated on the part of state authorities impedes the integration of migrants. In 2013 and 2014, prosecuting authorities investigated cases of policemen who had mistreated migrants or had been accomplices in racist activities carried out by anti-migrant groups, such as the neo-Nazi political party Golden Dawn. Indeed, since the crisis erupted, there has been an increase in xenophobia and racism, fueled by the tensions of the economic crisis. Violent acts against migrants and minorities have increased and the police have demonstrated neglect of and/or sympathy for far-right agendas.

Finally, some progress in the fight against racism took place in September 2014 when a new anti-racism bill was adopted by parliament. The passage of this law was timely, if not delayed, given the the rising influence of Golden Dawn since the onset of the economic crisis and the assassination in September 2013 of a young, left-wing musician by a Golden Dawn militant. The law, which provided for criminal sanctions against anyone inciting actions to hatred, discrimination and violence and higher sanctions against public officials engaging in racist or discriminatory behavior, modified previous legislation and set anti-racist policy in line with the Framework Decision 913/2008 of the Council of the European Union.

To sum up, while significant problems in terms of policy efficiency remain and policy setbacks are entirely possible, Greece has made some progress by adopting new policies on integration. Only time will show whether the two new laws, passed in 2014, will actually help alleviate the pressures faced by irregular migrants and prevent racist or discriminatory treatment.

Citation:
Information on migration was obtained from ELIAMEP’s researcher Michaela Maroufof. Information on the integration of migrants in Greece is available (in English) at http://www.eliamep.gr/en/%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%AD%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%B7-%CE%BC%CE%B5%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%AC%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%85%CF%83%CE%87-%CF%83%CF%84%CF%87%CE%BD-%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%B8/ and also at http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/en/info_sheet.cfm?ID_CSHEET=50. Accessed on 02.06.2013.
The most relevant pieces of legislation are laws no. 3386/2005, 3838/2010, 4251/2014 and 4285/2014. The Syriza-ANEL government’s law granting citizenship, under specific conditions, to second - generation migrants is law 4332/2015.

Iceland

Civil rights legislation for immigrants is largely influenced by the Danish and Norwegian models, which also reflects Iceland’s obligations under the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. Separate legislation for immigrants from EEA/EU
countries and non-EEA/EU countries makes it difficult for citizens outside the EEA to move into the country. Legislation for non-EEA/EU countries focuses on the need for foreign labor and restricts non-EEA/EU migrants to temporary work permits. Authorities provide instruction in the Icelandic language for foreign nationals. Nationals from other Nordic countries with three years’ consecutive residency in Iceland are eligible to vote in local elections, while for other foreign nationals eligibility follows five years of consecutive residency. The right to vote in parliamentary elections presupposes Icelandic citizenship.

The Information Center for Foreigners (Alþjóðahús) previously offered advisory services to migrants on a range of issues, including legal and civil rights issues. The center was run by the municipality of Reykjavík, but, in June 2010, was closed due to cutbacks in municipal services. At present, the Center Alþjóðasetur provides only interpretation and translation services to immigrants.

The Directorate of Immigration (Útlendingastofnun) – a division within the Ministry of Interior whose mandate includes processing residence permits, visas and citizenship applications – has repeatedly been criticized for expelling foreign nationals on weak grounds. The Directorate of Labor (Vinnumálastofnun) has in recent years improved its outreach to foreigners by, for example, providing important information in English on its website. The Directorate of Labor is also responsible for running the European Employment Services office in Iceland.

In their 2012 local government election campaign, the Progressive Party in Reykjavík articulated an anti-immigrant agenda to appeal to its core constituency. For example, the Progressive Party proposed overturning a decision of the municipal council to allow the construction of a Mosque in Reykjavík. This proposal was widely perceived to have enabled them to win two out of 15 council seats. In Reykjavík, the Progressive Party has retained this anti-immigrant policy since the spring 2014. The national Progressive Party has neither supported nor condemned the local parties policy position. This is a new development in Icelandic politics, which reflects trends in several neighboring countries. However, the government of the Progressive Party has agreed to considerably increase the number of refugees that Iceland will accept.

Citation:
Lög um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5, 1998 (Law on local government elections no. 5 1998).

Italy

Large-scale immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy compared to other countries in Europe. In recent years, the number of legal (mainly from new EU member countries) and illegal immigrants has increased significantly, making
immigration one of the hottest political issues. Issues associated with immigration have been cast in negative or even xenophobic rhetoric by some parties (especially the Northern League or Lega Nord) during electoral campaigns, with immigrants portrayed as dangerous social elements.

Policies dealing with the topic have concentrated more on controlling illegal immigration than on matters of integration. However, given the failure of measures designed to prevent illegal immigration, successive governments have adopted provisions for the large-scale regularization of immigrants, especially those working for and within families. In spite of these measures, a large number of immigrants are still involved in the black economy and are subject to economic exploitation, dangerous working conditions and a lack of respect for their rights. Some sectors of Italy’s agriculture, for example, rely heavily on a workforce of low-paid illegal immigrants. New legislation introduced by the Renzi government will improve access to citizenship for children who were born or attended school in Italy.

The school system has proved to be a positive factor in the process of integration, but schools have not received sufficient resources for achieving the best results in this field. Public housing policies have been weakened by the budgetary constraints: as a result in many cities there are ghetto-like areas where immigrants live in extremely poor housing conditions. The universal health care system has in general been fairly effective in providing medical treatments also for immigrants.

Employers of legal (but also illegal) immigrants often make the politicians understand that in some sectors they are able to continue to operate in Italy only thanks to the high number of migrants available in the workforce. Agriculture, the building industry, private-sector elderly care, and often child care and private cleaning services are often dependent on legally or illegally employed immigrants.

The Renzi government’s deployment of naval units in the Mediterranean Sea to rescue migrants signaled a more constructive approach toward migration. This approach became the basis of the EU’s Frontex Triton operation, which is led by Italy. The Renzi government has also successfully promoted an EU-level discussion relating to the distribution of asylum seekers among EU member states.

Generally, right-wing extremists, such as the Northern League, have not been successful in turning the general population against migrants. The government and the Catholic Church have been supportive of the integration of migrants into society.

Romania

Romania remains a sending country in terms of immigration and fails to provide adequate incentives to reverse the trend of a shrinking and aging population. A small number of Moldovans receive preferential access to citizenship, education and basic
services. Growing numbers of non-European migrants have entered the country in recent years, most recently as part of the larger EU refugee crisis. The inflow of refugees, slight compared to other EU countries, poses a challenge to Romania’s integration capacity. Initial statements from President Iohannis revealed Romania’s preference for voluntary quotas and its ability to receive no more than 1,700 migrants and refugees who have fled to Europe from persecution and desperate economic conditions in Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan. A mandated quota of 4,837 refugees passed down by the EU initially stirred resentment, but quickly progressed into a planning and preparation process that accommodated the first arriving refugees on 15 September 2015. The issue is far from resolved. In addition to the concerns migrant accommodation raises in regards to their shelter, support and employment, the discrimination which has beset the Roma threatens to marginalize refugee and migrant peoples arriving from abroad. The influx of refugees presents both a challenge and an opportunity to Romania’s immigration and integration mechanisms. On the one hand, the resources and programming required to adequately integrate newcomers will be tested. On the other hand, an increase to the overall population will help compensate the fiscal effects of a shrinking and aging populace.

Turkey

Turkey’s new Law on Foreigners and International Protection took effect in April 2014. On the same date, the General Directorate for Migration Management officially took on responsibility for implementing the law with a view to bringing Turkey in line with EU and international standards.

Turkey is increasingly becoming a country of destination for regular migration. At the same time, it also remains a notable transit and destination country for irregular migration. Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, Turkey has hosted a large number of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, Turkey witnessed an unprecedented increase in asylum applications from Afghans, Iraqis and Iranians. Turkey has been following an open-door policy for refugees. There are about two million Syrian refugees, 100,000 Iraqi refugees, and more than 50,000 Afghan refugees in Turkey. Turkey is hosting a large number of these refugees in refugee camps equipped with schooling, health care and social services, while nearly 60% of refugees are living in cities. According to Turkish sources, the humanitarian response has cost Turkey about $6.5 billion. Yet, apart from the necessary emergency support, the authorities are reluctant to officially accept a long-term presence of refugees in the country and therefore do not actively pursue sustainable integration policies.

Most refugees, in particular women and children, are susceptible to exploitation. Poverty, insufficient health and educational facilities are major issues. A governmental draft law on work permits for certain group of refugees was prepared but, due to the recent elections in Turkey, not adopted. Whether refugees should stay
or move beyond Turkey’s borders is a subject of considerable debate among the Turkish public. Initially perceived in terms of humanitarian issues, many people are increasingly concerned about the long-term negative social and economic effects of refugees remaining in Turkey. Turkey’s open-door policy has conflicted with the efforts of some European governments to stem the flow of migrants by restricting access. In an effort to manage the influx of refugees more sensibly, the EU sought to seal a deal with Ankara by November 2015, offering Turkey potentially up to three billion euros in aid and the prospect of easier travel visas and revitalized accession talks in return for its help with stemming the flow of refugees to Europe.

Citation:
The Guardian, ‘Istanbul has more Syrian refugees than all of Europe says David Miliband’ (October 27, 2015).

Israel

The legal status of immigrants in Israel is based on the Law of Return (1950), the Law of Citizenship (1952) and the Law of Entrance to Israel (1952). These laws constitute strict conditions for gaining citizenship, allowing Jewish immigrants to receive a permanent legal status as part of the Zionist vision. While still relevant, these laws are unable to offer a constructive framework for dealing with current immigration challenges including, Palestinian and African immigration to Israel. In the absence of a coherent framework for general immigration, a de facto immigration policy has been established by ad hoc ministerial decisions, with impairments for the state and the immigrants alike.

A 2014 state comptroller report exposed the potentially dangerous consequences of this lack of policy. These include illegal construction and infrastructure that pose security risks in dense urban areas, and a lack of access to proper health and housing for immigrants. Policy solutions so far, focusing on barriers, detention centers and transfer agreements, deal with a small portion of the total immigrant population and neglect its weakest members, such as battered women, victims of human trafficking and children. Furthermore, since these non-Jewish immigrants are not officially recognized, it is unlikely that a policy for monitoring and facilitating their inclusion will be developed.

In the last significant wave of Jewish immigration during the 1990s, the vast majority of immigrants came from the former USSR and Ethiopia. Since cultural barriers create challenges for integration into Israeli society, the state offers a wide
support infrastructure through education and employment programs, legal aid and so forth. The Jewish Agency, a statutory authority, is responsible for Jewish immigrants’ welfare as they arrive, providing them with financial aid while the implementation of immigrant policies is the responsibility of the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption.

Policies over recent years have mainly included tax breaks and subsidies. Individual committees have been formed to study the social aspects of immigration, with the aim of improving working methods. However, as noted by the Knesset’s committee for immigration, absorption and diaspora affairs, a relatively small proportion of these committees’ recommendations have been implemented.

In 2015, uncharacteristic violence was seen during mass demonstrations by Jews of Ethiopian descend. These protests were the direct result of years of accumulated frustration against the state, particularly the police. As Yossi Mekelberg concludes, the failure to absorb the Ethiopian Jews is a failure to fully and genuinely integrate them into Israeli society.

Citation:


Ministry of Housing and Construction, “Enlarged assistance to native Ethiopians,” The Ministry of Housing and Construction website (Hebrew).


### Latvia

Score 5

In 2014, Latvia ranked second-to-last among 38 European and North American countries in the Migrant Integration Policy Index. The index noted that Latvia still has the weakest policies among European Union member states. There have been no significant developments since 2010, and Latvia still lacks a coherent strategy for the integration of immigrants.

While in the past Latvia has had few asylum seekers (only 367 persons applied for asylum between 1998 and 2010, with 29 persons obtaining refugee status and 45 persons being granted an alternative status), the numbers of asylum seekers are now
rising rapidly, and are expected to continue rising. In 2014 alone, 364 persons applied for asylum, and in the first eight months of 2015, 201 applications were received. A significant rise in the number of asylum seekers from Ukraine was seen in 2014 and 2015. In 2015, Latvia convened a working group charged with creating a coherent policy for accepting and integrating larger numbers of refugees as a part of burden-sharing process reflecting the broader European refugee crisis.

On 11 October 2011, Latvia adopted the Guidelines on National Identity, Civil Society and Integration Policy (2012 – 2018). These guidelines established a set of policy goals for achieving a more inclusive and cohesive society, which include new policy proposals, increased governmental support and improved institutional arrangements. Latvia faces a challenge in integrating two particular categories of immigrants: migrant workers and non-citizens. Non-citizens are long-term residents of Latvia who were not eligible for citizenship when Latvia regained its independence from the Soviet Union and have not been naturalized since independence. Non-citizens comprise 14.1% of the total population. Approximately 55,000 migrant workers – individuals holding either a temporary or permanent residence permit – live in Latvia. They comprise 3% of the total population.

Since July 2010, Latvia has granted temporary residence permits to investors meeting monetary investment targets. Approximately 7,000 of these types of permits have been issued since the adoption of the law. In September of 2014, parliament doubled the minimum investment required to attain a temporary residence permit.

Rights for immigrants depend on the type of residency permit. Individuals holding a temporary residency permit are particularly vulnerable, as they do not qualify for public health care, legal aid or unemployment support. An individual holding a permanent residency permit or who has acquired long-term resident status within the EU has the same rights as Latvian non-citizens.

In May 2013, Latvia adopted changes to its citizenship law that legalized dual citizenship with 38 countries. This will enable some permanent residents to retain their current citizenship if they choose to apply for Latvian citizenship.

As of March 2010, all children, including children of migrant workers holding temporary residence permits, have access to free education.

No restrictions are placed on the right to work for high skilled migrant workers, foreign students or immigrants who have moved for family reasons. However, access to the local labor market is restricted for migrant workers who have obtained only a temporary residence permit. These individuals’ work rights are tied to the employer who invited them to Latvia. Temporary migrant workers do not have the ability to freely change employers or their position within the company.

Access to the labor market also depends on language proficiency, as a certain level of language skill is required by law for many professions. This is true of state and
local government institutions as well as commercial companies in which the majority of capital shares are publicly owned.

Legislative obstacles restrict the ability for immigrants to participate in society. Migrants do not have voting rights in local elections and cannot be members of political associations. Third-country nationals with temporary residence permits cannot organize protests or marches.

Citation:


Poland

As migration to Poland has been relatively low, issues related to Poland as a sending country have featured far more prominently on the political agenda than have issues related to Poland as a receiving country until recently. Ukrainians and Vietnamese make up the largest group of migrants to the country. In 2012, the Tusk government adopted a new law on migration and integration, as well as a reform of Polish citizenship law. Given impetus by EU law and demographic changes in Poland itself, the reforms have made it easier to acquire Polish citizenship and to apply for a work and residence permit in a single procedure. They also prolonged the period given to foreign graduates to find employment in Poland. However, Poland has not yet signed the U.N. Convention on Migrant Workers’ Rights, and the institutional framework for dealing with immigrants is still very weak overall.

Since mid-2015, the European refugee crisis has dominated the debate about migration and integration. In September, the Kopacz government secured a waiver from the EU’s mandatory quota system with the help of other central European countries, but in the end agreed to admit 7,000 refugees and to erect two additional refugee camps. In the campaign runup to the October 2015 elections, this decision was heavily criticized by the conservative-national PiS, which pointed to the ways in which the immigration of Muslims threatens Polish culture and society. Internationally, Poland was criticized for failing to demonstrate sufficient solidarity with its fellow EU member states and with those fleeing civil war or political prosecution.
Slovenia

The number of foreign residents in Slovenia has dropped dramatically in recent years due to the effects of economic crisis. In 2008, about 85,000 work permits were issued to foreign workers; by 2014, this figure had fallen to only 17,457. Subsequent governments have made little effort to open up health services, schools and civic life to migrants, offer anti-discrimination support and foster political participation by migrants. Compared to its predecessors, the Cerar government paid more attention to migrant integration, and the National Assembly adopted new legislation on foreign employment in June 2015 that will simplify bureaucratic procedures and substantially raise levels of protection of foreign workers working in Slovenia. As of 1 September 2015, foreign workers receive a unified work and residency permit. They also enjoy improved protections against abuse from employers, a common problem in recent years.

Citation:

South Korea

Since the 1990s, South Korea’s migration patterns have shifted substantially, from net emigration to a substantial inflow of foreign employees and residents. This change has been driven by an increasing demand for cheap labor, changes in the generational composition of the population, and a shortage of women in rural areas. In 2010, the total number of foreign nationals in South Korea reached 1.2 million. Most migrants come from China, with Vietnam, the United States, Uzbekistan and Cambodia also contributing significantly.

The government has been trying to support the integration of immigrants and foreign-born residents. Unemployment rates among foreign nationals is low, while secondary and tertiary-level education enrollment rates are high. In August 2005, the parliament passed the Public Official Election Act, which enables foreign residents to vote in local elections. South Korea is currently the only Asian country which gives voting rights to non-citizens. In recent years South Korea has made it easier for migrants to receive permanent resident status and even citizenship, particularly for highly skilled migrants. In the 2012 parliamentary election, 110,000 naturalized citizens were allowed to vote and Jasmin Lee of the Saenuri Party became the first naturalized member of the South Korean parliament.
To apply for South Korean citizenship an individual must have resided in the country for more than five consecutive years, be legally an adult, have displayed good conduct, have the ability to support himself or herself on the basis of his or her own assets or skills (or be a dependent member of a family) and have basic knowledge befitting a South Korean national (such as an understanding of Korea’s language, customs and culture). In April 2010, the South Korean parliament also passed a law that allows dual citizenship. Another relatively serious integration issue concerns the social exclusion experienced by the foreign-born wives of Korean men (often from China, South-east and South Asia). This population has drastically increased in recent years – about 10% of all marriages in South Korea are international today, in the sense that either bride or groom is non-Korean. Such marriages often face cultural discrimination.

Furthermore, cultural, education and social policies have yet to adapt to increasing immigration levels. While ethnic Koreans with foreign passports, foreign investors and highly educated foreigners are welcomed and treated favorably, Amnesty International reports that migrant blue-collar workers are often treated as “disposable labor.” From a legal perspective, migrant workers have very similar rights to native Korean employees, but these rights are routinely neglected by employers. While courts have offered some protection to migrant workers, the government has not pursued active enforcement measures against employers that exploit the precarious status of migrant workers. In January 2012, the parliament unanimously passed a revision to allow migrant workers to more easily change their workplace.

Unlike migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers still face considerable legal difficulties in having their status recognized. Korea admitted just 94 out of 2,896 applicants in 2014, indicating the reluctance of the Korean government in this area.

Citation:
Korea Times, Garibong-Dong Has Largest Number of Foreigners, 28/2/2010
“Jasmin to help Seanuri lure naturalized voters,” The Korea Times, April 8, 2012

Chile

Due to the financial crisis, the number of professionals immigrating to Chile has increased significantly, especially from southern Europe. In general, there are few restrictions for highly skilled immigrants and professionals, most of whom tend to obtain working permits. The integration of immigrants from other Latin American countries, who are largest group of foreigners in Chile, does not present significant difficulties, as they share the same language and, to a certain degree, a similar cultural background. About 2.1% of the population are immigrants; this is an increase compared to the former review period, but is still a quite small share in comparison to its neighbor Argentina or other OECD member states.
It is worth mentioning that the relationship between emigration and immigration in Chile is changing. While in the past Chile registered higher rates of emigration than immigration, this tendency is reversing due to today’s patterns of economic development and political stability. Migration policy will thus be more important in the future, but no specific immigration policies have yet been implemented.

Citation:

Cyprus

Cyprus began granting in 1989 temporary permits to workers mainly from Southeast Asia. Permits offered access only to specific labor sectors, and did not provide long-term visas. In the early 1990s, the immigration of Greek-origin families from the former Soviet Union was encouraged, along with Russians and East-Central Europeans. Migration figures rose substantially following Cyprus’ EU accession (2004), with strong flows from Bulgaria and Romania. Today, EU nationals form a considerable part of the labor force. Despite some policy changes and the introduction of a few integration projects, Cyprus has to date not developed a comprehensive integration policy.

Despite pressures to comply with EU standards, existing policies and official rhetoric do not facilitate long-term integration. The country scores poorly on most indicators, including labor market access, culture and education, family reunion, political participation and access to citizenship. The 2015 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranks Cyprus third-last among 38 countries.

Laws are not favorable to market access or long-term labor-market integration. Non-native workers enjoy limited rights in many areas, with non-EU citizens facing time limits on working permits that preclude any ability to obtain long-term resident status. The crisis is also driving non-native workers into unemployment, and tens of thousands of these workers have left the island (2013-2014). As a result, Cypriot nationals facing unemployment have begun taking on jobs in sectors considered unappealing and, until recently, reserved for foreign labor.

In recent years, new policies have aimed at providing education to all children as part of the compulsory education scheme, including access to language classes that may assist in integration. Timid family-reunification policies introduce restrictive criteria such as full-time employment, high fees and limited access to the labor market by dependents. Opportunities for migrants to participate in democratic life or to attain citizenship are limited, although special legal provisions offer citizenship to very wealthy investors or depositors.
Cyprus remains hesitant in confronting issues related to integration. In addition, the economic crisis has led to official support for prioritizing the employment of Cypriots, increasing pressures on immigrants in the labor market.

Citation:

Czech Republic

Score 4

Compared with other East-Central European countries, the Czech Republic has experienced relatively high levels of immigration since EU accession. While the Ministry of the Interior submits a report on the situation of migration and integration of foreigners in the Czech Republic to the cabinet every year, and while there is an official integration strategy, the government so far has done little to foster the integration of immigrants. Processing residential applications of immigrants is slow and the acquisition of Czech citizenship complicated. Permanent residents from outside the European Union are not entitled to run as a candidate, vote in local elections or become members of Czech political parties. In 2013, a new law on citizenship was adopted, in effect from 1 January 2014, specifying several conditions for obtaining citizenship and introducing the obligation to sit for an exam in Czech life, institutions and language. At the same time, obtaining citizenship for second-generation immigrants was simplified. Some immigrant support has been provided over the years by municipal authorities and NGOs, with recent emphasis on language courses, social events and employment issues. Many foreign workers are employed in shadow economy or in agencies, offering temporary and often unstable work with pay levels significantly below those of Czech employees.

Although the country is not located on one of the major routes used by refugees for coming to Western Europe and the inflow of asylum-seekers, with 1,115 applications from January to September 2015, has remained relatively small, the European refugee crisis has stirred a strong and highly polarized debate on migration and integration. The right-wing extremist camp, formerly focused on Roma, are increasingly shifting their attention to anti-Islam and anti-refugee agendas, positioning themselves in the role of defenders of Czech national values. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as Public Defender of Human Rights Šabatová and some Czech politicians have strongly criticized the handling of refugees and migrants.

Hungary

Score 4

The refugee crisis has proven that Hungary is still primarily a transit country, with only a small number of migrants who want to stay in the country. The integration of ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries – above all from Romania, Serbia and
Ukraine – has gone fairly smoothly but has slowed down in the last years, since they have also gone to the West. By contrast, the integration of other migrants remains a controversial process. In the context of the refugee crisis, Prime Minister Orbán explicitly declared that Hungary belongs only to Hungarians. However, migration to Hungary is not the real problem; the massive brain drain of Hungarian youth who have left for Western Europe is the real problem. The government has launched a “Come home youngster” (Gyere haza fiatal) project with attractive financial conditions intended to attract and re-integrate Hungarian youth, but only about 20 people have indicated their intention to return to Hungary in the project’s first year.

Slovakia

While the share of foreigners in the Slovak population is still low, the inflow of migrants has increased in recent years. The Fico government has done little to develop consistent and sustainable policies for migrant integration. At the beginning of 2014, it passed a new document on integration policy that largely embraces the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU. In the context of the EU refugee crisis, Prime Minister Fico opposed mandatory quotas for distributing refugees within the EU and challenged the decision of the Council of the European Union at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Moreover, the government fueled anti-refugee sentiments by implicitly linking them to the threat of terrorism. Prime Minister Fico stated that Slovakia would only accept Christians from Syria chosen by the Slovak administration, prompting controversy among the Slovakian public. President Kiska criticized the government’s failure to demonstrate solidarity with both the refugees and the EU.

Citation:
-Terenzani, Michael, Kiska: Slovakia’s lack of solidarity is a failed policy, in: Slovak Spectator; 8.10.2015; http://spectator.sme.sk/c/20061421/kiska-slovakias-lack-of-solidarity-is-a-failed-policy.html

Bulgaria

Bulgaria does not have a developed policy for integrating migrants, largely because their number is fairly limited. Until recently, Bulgaria has only been a transit point for migration flows to other EU countries. According to estimates, the share of migrants in the total population amounts to less than 1%, with most migrants being people of traditional Bulgarian origin from neighboring countries.

In 2013/14, a small wave of several thousand refugees from Syria showed the limited capacity of the Bulgarian society to accommodate migrants. Accommodations for the migrants proved to be extremely poor; food, clothing and heating were generally insufficient; and no real attempts were undertaken to integrate
migrants into the local society. In many municipalities, the local population rose in protest against hosting migrants in their vicinity and against the prospect of migrant children attending local schools, thereby exacerbating the integration problems. Tensions regarding this problem increased in 2015 as the number of refugees spiked. Bulgaria’s policy response has focused on trying to prevent migrants from entering the country rather than improving the coordination of and mechanisms for accommodating and integrating them. In fact, the country continues to pursue segregation in areas such as education, where language proficiency requirements prevent most refugee/migrant children from enrolling in school.


Croatia

Score 3

Immigration is largely limited to ethnic Croats from neighboring countries, who are de facto integrated and have citizenship and equal access to labor market, social system and education. Other groups of migrants are very small and there is no policy directed at integrating them. The treatment of returnees from among the 200,000 Croat citizens of Serbian ethnicity expelled from the country in 1995 represents a significant gap in migration policy. Nearly 21,500 minority returnees still have outstanding housing, reconstruction and civil-status issues to resolve, with most returnee families needing legal counseling to help them gain access to their basic rights. Many refugees have not been able to return to Croatia, as they were stripped of their rights to socially owned housing after the war.

In autumn 2015, Croatia faced a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other Asian countries. More than 350,000 refugees passed through Croatia by early November, with only a few of them seeking asylum in Croatia. This wave of refugees and migrants built up after Hungary had stretched barbed wire along its border with Serbia, thus redirecting the movement of people to Croatia. No incidents of racist behavior directed at the refugees was recorded. This might be explained in part by the living memory of more than 700,000 refugees who found shelter in Croatia during the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-1992. Hungary’s attempts to close its borders have created fears in Croatia that – as a country still outside the Schengen system – it could be selected by the EU as a processing “hotspot” for incoming refugees. Such developments could become a source of substantial instability in Croatia and other countries in the region.

Japan

Score 3

In spite of its aging and shrinking population (which, now close to 127 million, is forecast to fall by half to 52 million by 2100 if the current low birth rate persists and immigration remains heavily restricted), Japan still maintains a very restrictive
immigration policy. One of the few recent exceptions are bilateral economic-partnership pacts that, since 2008, have allowed Filipino and Indonesian nurses and caregivers to enter Japan on a temporary basis. While some government ministers in 2015 openly called for allowing more immigration, the official line that no review of immigration policy is in the offing remains in place.

The LDP-led government has already relaxed some restrictions with the aim of attracting highly skilled foreign professionals based on its Revitalization Program. Among the changes has been an amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act that provides for an indefinite period of stay for such professionals. The government is also likely to accept more foreign labor in some sectors in preparation for the 2020 Olympics. Nevertheless, the Japanese government is still reluctant to embrace immigration. The nationalistic viewpoints held by many LDP lawmakers pose particular challenges in this regard.

Given Japan’s restrictive approach to immigration, there is little integration policy as such. Local governments and NGOs offer language courses and other assistance to foreign residents, but such support remains often rudimentary, especially outside the metropolitan centers.

Japan’s offers of asylum in response to the intensifying global refugee crisis have been beyond minimal. Out of 5,000 applications in 2014, the Immigration Bureau recognized only 11 asylum seekers as refugees.

Citation:

Malta

It is only recently that Malta has begun to consolidate its policy approach to integration issues. For example, the National Migrant Integration Strategy 2015-2020 will be launched in the coming year. Previously, the National Strategy for the Promotion of Cross-Cultural Understanding had identified the Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security as being responsible for the integration of asylum-seekers. However, under the current government, the Ministry for Social Dialogue, Consumer Affairs and Civil Liberties is responsible for the integration of migrants. Meanwhile, the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum-Seekers is responsible for the provision of some services, including employment, housing, education, health care, and welfare information. The agency is also a facilitator between public services and serves as a pre-integration functionary. An online government portal intended to facilitate integration was established in June 2014.
Migrants granted subsidiary or humanitarian protections are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and as a result, migrants wanting to seek work and their own accommodation find it difficult to do so. The 2011 Migrants Integration Policy Index stated that “Malta is only beginning to address immigration and asylum and those who stay are starting to participate in limited integration programs, often EU funded.” The report concludes that migrants can eventually become long-term residents, but that few become Maltese citizens, and that the country shows “some of the longest waits for family reunion.” The report noted that the island “has one of the most exclusionary naturalization policies in Europe.” Indeed, pathways to nationality pose problems for migrants irrespective of their country of origin. The minister responsible for home affairs has the final say on whether nationality is granted, and there is no appeal. The process for applying for naturalization is also not sufficiently transparent. The 2015 Migrants Integration Policy Index does not highlight any substantial improvements and ranked Malta 33 out of 38 countries with a slightly unfavorable score.

Citation:
The Migrants Integration Policy Index 2011
Interview with the Marsa Open Center director Ahmed Burge. Times of Malta 31/10/11
Refugee Integration Perspectives in Malta - Nittellimu? Aditus December 2013
National Report Malta: Integration of Vulnerable Groups. The people for change foundation June 2014
Developing gender-sensitive labour migration policies is fundamental to address the circumstances and needs of women and men in this area – Minister Helena Dalli, Press Release Reference Number: PR152207, 7/10/2015
http://www.mipex.eu/malta 2015
Camilleri, C & Falzon N., Malta integration Network, a way forward for a national integration policy in Malta
http://3c3dbeaf6bc49f4b9f4-a655c0f6dcd98e765a6b780c407565ae.r86.cf3.rackcdn.com/4666c2217ac2b8a2451255e1799b29783718339737.pdf

Mexico

Mexican integration policy is weak to non-existent. The Mexican narrative and national psyche tends to assume that migration means emigration. Mexico was and remains a major source of emigration, but has not effectively addressed problems related to immigration that have been steadily increasing during the last 15 to 20 years. There is no problem with “middle class” European and U.S. migration to Mexico. Indeed immigration of this kind is broadly welcomed and has been increasing – albeit from a very low level. A number of wealthy U.S. citizens retire in Mexico where the climate is better and health services are cheaper. However, there are serious problems related to migrants entering Mexico from Central America, especially Guatemala, with most seeking entry to the United States and a minority wanting to stay in Mexico. Few are able to acquire formal documentation. In their desperation, such people are often preyed upon by criminals or even recruited into local drug gangs. Homicide rates are also high among this group. The Mexican
authorities mostly do not welcome this kind of immigration and do their best to
discourage it. However, there is no effective integration, transit or migration policy
to deal with these issues. Mexican authorities also downplay the incidence of
criminal attacks on Central American immigrants, although the international media
has cast a spotlight on this population’s predicament.
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