Contents

Introduction 5

Regional Coordinators 6

The Project 7

I. Policy Performance 8

II. Democracy 10

III. Governance 12

Aggregation and Measurement 14

Assessment Process 15

Important Notes for Your Assessment 17

Period under Review 17

Dealing with Changes in Government 17

Utilizing the Entire Scoring Scale 17

Questionnaire 19
Introduction

Welcome to the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) 2017, a survey of sustainable policy performance and governance capacities in all OECD and EU countries (www.sgi-network.org).

Our goal is to assess sustainable policymaking by analyzing institutional frameworks, governance capacities and outcomes in key policy areas.

This codebook is intended to ensure a common understanding of SGI methodology and the assessment procedures. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us or your regional coordinator at the contact information provided here and on the next page.

The SGI Team

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Senior Project Manager
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Gütersloh, Germany
daniel.schraad-tischler@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
+49 5241 81-81240

Christian Kroll
Project Manager
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Gütersloh, Germany
christian.kroll@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
+49 5241 81-81471

Pia Paulini
Project Office
Bertelsmann Stiftung
Gütersloh, Germany
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
+49 5241 81-81468
Regional Coordinators

**Northwest Europe**

**Prof. Dr. Nils C. Bandelow**  
Institute for Social Sciences  
Technical University Braunschweig  
Braunschweig, Germany  
Nils.Bandelow@tu-braunschweig.de  
+49 5313918900

**Eastern Mediterranean Countries**

**Prof. Dr. Cesar Colino**  
Faculty of Political Science and Sociology  
National University for Distance Education  
Madrid, Spain  
ccolino@poli.uned.es  
+34 913-987 009

**Asia and Oceania**

**Prof. Dr. Aurel Croissant**  
Institute of Political Science  
Ruprecht Karls University  
Heidelberg, Germany  
aurel.croissant@urz.uni-heidelberg.de  
+49 6221-542 882

**Northern Europe**

**Prof. Dr. Detlef Jahn**  
Institute of Political Science  
Ernst Moritz Arndt University  
Greifswald, Germany  
djahn@uni-greifswald.de  
+49 4221-916 0217

**Americas**

**PD Dr. Martin Thunert**  
Heidelberg Center for American Studies  
Ruprecht Karls University  
Heidelberg, Germany  
mthunert@hca.uni-heidelberg.de  
+49 6221 54 3877

**Central Europe**

**Prof. Dr. Reimut Zohlnhöfer**  
Institute of Political Science  
Ruprecht Karls University  
Heidelberg, Germany  
reimut.zohlnhoefer@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de  
+49 6221-542 868

**Eastern Mediterranean Countries**

**Dr. Roy Karadag**  
Institute for Intercultural and International Studies  
University of Bremen  
roy.karadag@iniis.uni-bremen.de  
+49 421-218 67468
The Project

■ How successful are OECD/EU member states in achieving sustainable policy outcomes?

■ How well developed are the governance capacities of OECD/EU countries in terms of the interaction between government and societal actors?

■ What is the quality of their democratic order?

The SGI answer these key questions by carrying out a systematic, indicator-based comparison of all OECD and EU countries, thus providing insight into the analyzed nations’ political and social sustainability.

Some 100 international experts participate in this broad-based study, carried out by the Bertelsmann Foundation. The first three editions of the SGI were published in 2009, 2011 and 2014, the fourth and fifth edition in 2015 and 2016.

Based on qualitative and quantitative indicators, the SGI provide a detailed picture of the countries’ strengths and weaknesses in terms of sustainable governance.

The individual country reports as well as all quantitative data are freely accessible online at www.sgi-network.org.

With the SGI, we seek to contribute to the debate on “good governance” and sustainable policy-making, identify successful models and foster international learning processes within the OECD/EU and beyond.
I. Policy Performance

This pillar of the SGI examines each country’s policy performance in terms of three dimensions of sustainable development.

If the goal of politics is to promote sustainable development, and if citizens are to be empowered to live their lives in accordance with their own individual talents, then governments must be able to establish and maintain the social, economic and environmental conditions for such well-being and empowerment. The conditions for social progress must be generated by suitable outcomes in certain policy fields. Such outcomes are examined by the Policy Performance pillar, which is comprised of 16 policy fields grouped in terms of economic, social and environmental sustainability. Each policy field is addressed by a qualitative assessment and additional quantitative data. The point here is to examine domestic policymaking as well as the extent to which governments actively contribute to the provision of global public goods. The areas examined are:

(1) Economic Policies: economy, labor markets, taxes, budgets, research and innovation, global financial system

(2) Social Policies: education, social inclusion, health, families, pensions, integration policy, safe living conditions, global inequalities

(3) Environmental Policies: environment policy, global environmental protection
Figure 1: Policy Performance
II. Democracy

This pillar of the SGI examines the quality of democracy in each country.

From the perspective of long-term system stability and political performance, the quality of democracy and political participation are crucial aspects of a society’s success. The stability and performance of a political system depends in large part upon the assent and confidence of its citizens. Democratic participation and oversight are also essential to genuine learning and adaptation processes, and to the ability to change. In this sense, guaranteeing opportunities for democratic participation and oversight, as well as the presence of due process and respect for civil rights, are fundamental prerequisites for the legitimacy of a political system.

The quality of democracy in each country is measured against a definitional norm that considers issues relating to participation rights, electoral competition, access to information and the rule of law. Given that all OECD and EU member states constitute democracies, the questions posed here focus on the quality rather than the presence of democracy. Individual indicators monitor the following criteria:

(1) Electoral processes
(2) Access to information
(3) Civil rights and political liberties
(4) Rule of law
Figure 2: Democracy
This pillar of the SGI examines the governance capacities of a political system in terms of its executive capability and accountability.

Sustainable governance is defined here as the political management of public affairs that adopts a long-term view of societal development, takes into account the interests of future generations, and facilitates capacities for social change. The Governance index examines how effective governments are in directing and implementing policies appropriate to these three goals. As a measuring tool grounded in practical evidence, the Governance index draws on 37 qualitative indicators posed in an expert survey that measure a country’s institutional arrangements against benchmarks of good practices in governance.

Governance in this context implies both the capacity to act (“executive capacity”) and the extent to which non-governmental actors and institutions are endowed with the participatory competence to hold the government accountable to its actions (“executive accountability”). This includes citizens, legislatures, parties, associations and the media, that is, actors that monitor the government’s activities and whose effective inclusion in the political process improve the quality of governance.

The dimension of Executive Capacity draws on the categories of steering capability, policy implementation and institutional learning. Steering capability questions explore the roles of strategic planning and expert advice, the effectiveness of interministerial coordination and regulatory impact assessments, and the quality of consultation and communication policies. Questions about implementation assess the government’s ability to ensure effective and efficient task delegation to ministers, agencies or subnational governments. Questions on institutional learning refer to a government’s ability to reform its own institutional arrangements and improve its strategic orientation.

The dimension of Executive Accountability is comprised of three categories corresponding to actors or groups of actors considered to be important agents of oversight and accountability in theories of democracy and governance. The questions here are designed to examine the extent to which citizens are informed of government policies, whether the legislature is capable of evaluating and acting as a “check” on the executive branch, and whether intermediary organizations (i.e., media, parties, interest associations) demonstrate relevance and policy know-how in exercising oversight.

This approach is based on a dynamic understanding of governance in which power and authority is dispersed throughout the institutions, processes and structures of government. In order to account for the diversity of institutional arrangements, the index explicitly considers functional equivalencies in different countries, and pays equal attention to formal and informal as well as hierarchical and non-hierarchical institutional arrangements.
Figure 3: Governance
To operationalize and measure the concepts used in constructing the SGI, we decided to rely on a combination of statistical data drawn from official sources as well as the qualitative assessments of country experts. In sum, the SGI’s composite indices are based on around 150 qualitative and quantitative indicators. The qualitative assessments are provided by country experts based upon the questionnaire (see below), and the quantitative indicators are collected by the SGI Team from official data sources.

While the expert ratings are based on a unified scale ranging from 1 to 10, the quantitative indicators are based on different scales and units of measurement. In order to aggregate the latter into composite indices and to ensure the comparability of all data on a scale from 1 to 10, the quantitative indicators are standardized through a linear transformation.

The aggregation of all items and components into the composite indices follows a simple weighting model by assigning equal weights to each component and by using an additive method of aggregation.
Assessment Process

First Expert
Enters text and scores for first draft of the country report

Second Expert (Reviewer)
Revises first draft, adds to the text, comments if necessary
Gives independent scores

Regional Coordinator
Further revises text
Gives quantitative scores within range of experts 1 and 2
Contacts country experts about points of disagreement to decide on common position

Calibration
Coordinator Meeting: interregional comparability verification; Board: verification, approval.
Coordinators check country reports for the last time.

Editing
Editing
Special studies based on results
Editing policy papers
Print

Publication
Event

Figure 3: Assessment Process
Step 1: September 1 to November 8

The first country expert answers the questionnaire in the database, www.sgi-data.de. The expert produces a 40-page (approx. 12,000 words) country report. All further steps in the process are based on this initial country report. In addition to the report, the expert provides scores.

Step 2: November 8 to December 18

The second expert (reviewer) begins his/her work. The task is to check and edit the first expert’s report by revising formulations, giving comments and new information. The reviewer will also give his/her scores independently from the first expert’s scores, thus providing an independent second opinion. He/She will not be able to see the numerical scores of the first expert.

Step 3: December 2 to February 25

The coordinator will cross-check both the text and scores of the first and second expert in order to make further adjustments. At a certain stage, the coordinator’s work will be open for joint examination by the first expert and reviewer. This enables all experts to get into a discursive process in order to finalize the text. While consulting the first experts and reviewers, the coordinator calibrates scores to reflect differences among countries and ensure intra-regional comparability.

Step 4: March 3-4; April 1

The coordinators and the SGI team review the ratings across regions. In this calibration conference, scores are calibrated to ensure inter-regional comparability. Immediately after the calibration conference, the SGI Board reviews these ratings resulting in final scores.

The coordinator checks country reports for the last time. All country experts remain available for questions until the report is ready-to-edit.

Step 5: April to May

The coordinator sends the finalized country report to the editor. Questions by the editors are resolved by the coordinator, resulting in a ready-to-publish report.

Step 6: August

The country report is published with both country experts and the regional coordinator listed equally as authors on our website www.sgi-network.org.

Major results of the SGI 2017 project will also be published in print and online. To this end, the SGI Team, in close cooperation with the SGI Board, will commission special studies by experts in specific fields. These studies are to enrich current political debates on sustainability and governance by substantiating them with aggregated and disaggregated data of the SGI 2016 project (e.g. cross-country comparisons, reviews of regional trends, policy-specific studies, etc.).

Deadlines

Because of the consecutive manner in which three experts will produce the report, adhering to the deadlines will prove decisive for the success of the project. Therefore, country experts should begin early and keep in mind the volume of the work required.
Important Notes for your Assessment

Period under Review

The period under review for the SGI 2017 stretches from November 7, 2015 to November 8, 2016 (end of the assessment from the first country expert). Developments after November 8, 2016 can therefore not be considered. All country experts should have the entire period of investigation in mind when writing the text and giving scores. Only in this manner can developments and processes be adequately accounted for and appraised.

Utilizing the Entire Scoring Scale

In answering the SGI Questionnaire, it is essential to carefully read the complementary explanations to the questions. Only in this way can it be guaranteed that each expert has the same understanding of the question – a prerequisite for the comparability of the answers and scores of all experts for each question.

Simultaneously, it is important to study all answer options carefully before a selection is made. In selecting an answer, experts should always keep in mind that their assessment will later be considered in the context of the entire sample of OECD/EU countries. For this reason, experts should, to the extent possible, utilize the entire scale of answer options in order to avoid a skewed data distribution. In this context, each score should always be verified for the greatest possible consistency with the qualitative assessment (text).

Dealing with Changes in Government

In the case of a change in government during the period of evaluation, the country expert must decide how each of the governed periods should be assessed and where necessary weighted. If the change in government occurs at the very end of the assessment timeframe, the country expert should afford the new government minimal attention. If the change in government occurs at the very beginning of the period under review, the country expert should concentrate his/her attention predominantly on the new government. In each case, experts should make clear in the qualitative text of the assessment to which government period he/she is referring for each context-sensitive appraisal.

Taking Quantitative Indicators into Consideration

For most policy areas there are several quantitative indicators for which data are provided in the SGI database. Before answering codebook questions, experts should consider the quantitative indicators and data, which provide important information for qualitative assessments.
Policy Performance

Economic Policies
P 1  Economy
P 2  Labor Market
P 3  Taxes
P 4  Budgets
P 5  Research and Innovation
P 6  Global Financial System

Social Policies
P 7  Education
P 8  Social Inclusion
P 9  Health
P 10  Families
P 11  Pensions
P 12  Integration
P 13  Safe Living
P 14  Global Inequalities

Environmental Policies
P 15  Environment
P 16  Global Environmental Protection
P1.1  Economic Policy

How successful has economic policy been in providing a reliable economic framework and in fostering international competitiveness?

This question addresses the existence of a government’s general strategy to support the future-oriented development of its economy through regulatory policy. Sound economic policy is expected to adhere to the following principles: clear-cut assignment of tasks to institutions, refraining from unnecessary discretionary actions, frictionless interlinkage of different institutional spheres (labor market, enterprise policy, tax policy, budgetary policy) and the coherent set-up of different regimes (e.g. dismissal protection, co-determination rights, efficiency of anti-monopoly policies, income taxation). Countries following these principles are able to increase overall productivity, become more attractive for internationally mobile factors of production and thus raise their international competitiveness.

When answering the question, focus on the use and interplay of different regimes with regard to the aims of economic policy.

- Economic policy fully succeeds in providing a coherent set-up of different institutional spheres and regimes, thus stabilizing the economic environment. It largely contributes to the objectives of fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. 10
- Economic policy largely provides a reliable economic environment and supports the objectives of fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. 9
- Economic policy somewhat contributes to providing a reliable economic environment and helps to a certain degree in fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. 8
- Economic policy mainly acts in discretionary ways essentially destabilizing the economic environment. There is little coordination in the set-up of economic policy institutions. Economic policy generally fails in fostering a country’s competitive capabilities and attractiveness as an economic location. 5

P.2  GDP per Capita

P.3  Inflation

P.4  Gross Fixed Capital Formation

P.5  Real Interest Rates

P.6  Potential Output, Growth Rate
How effectively does labor market policy in your country address unemployment?

This question addresses a government’s strategies to reconcile the following objectives: unemployment reduction and job security, and balancing supply and demand on the labor market by providing sufficient mobility of the labor force according to the needs of potential employers. To assess labor market policy comprehensively, special emphasis should be placed on the positive or detrimental effects resulting from labor market regulation (e.g., dismissal protection, minimum wages, collective agreements) and from the modus operandi of unemployment insurance.

Where possible, please refer to evidence supporting a causal relationship between government’s labor market policy and unemployment trends.

Successful strategies ensure unemployment is not a serious threat.  

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labor market policies have been more or less successful.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategies against unemployment have shown little or no significant success.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Labor market policies have been unsuccessful and rather effected a rise in unemployment.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P2.2 | Unemployment  
P2.3 | Long-term Unemployment  
P2.4 | Youth Unemployment  
P2.5 | Low-skilled Unemployment  
P2.6 | Employment  
P2.7 | Low Pay Incidence
To what extent does taxation policy realize goals of equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues?

The objectives of justice and allocative efficiency suggest that taxation policies do not discriminate between different groups of economic actors with similar tax-paying abilities, such as corporate and personal income taxpayers (horizontal equity). Tax systems should also impose higher taxes on persons or companies with a greater ability to pay taxes (vertical equity). Tax rates and modalities should improve or at least not weaken a country’s competitive position. However, tax revenues should be sufficient to ensure the long-term financing of public services and infrastructure. “Sufficiency” does not assume any specific ideal level of public expenditure, but refers only to the relationship between public revenues and expenditures.

Please provide a short paragraph for each of the three objectives of taxation policy. Please also score each objective individually with the comment function in the SGI database (www.sgi-data.de).

| Taxation policy fully achieves the objectives. | 10 |
| Taxation policy largely achieves the objectives. | 8 |
| Taxation policy partially achieves the objectives. | 5 |
| Taxation policy does not achieve the objectives at all. | 2 |
To what extent does budgetary policy realize the goal of fiscal sustainability?

This question focuses on the aggregate of public budgets and does not assess whether budgets reflect government priorities or induce departments to manage efficiently. Sustainable budgeting should enable a government to pay its financial obligations (solvency), sustain economic growth, meet future obligations with existing tax burdens (stable taxes) and pay current obligations without shifting the cost to future generations (inter-generational fairness).

Note that for this question, a temporarily limited loosening of fiscal discipline in times of severe economic crisis does not per se constitute a lack of fiscal sustainability if such goals are/will be bindingly re-prioritized after the crisis is over (e.g., a “truly anti cyclical” economic policy strategy may be legitimate).

| Budgetary policy is fiscally sustainable. | 10 |
| Budgetary policy achieves most standards of fiscal sustainability. | 8 |
| Budgetary policy achieves some standards of fiscal sustainability. | 5 |
| Budgetary policy is fiscally unsustainable. | 2 |

P4.2   Debt to GDP

P4.3   Primary Balance

P4.4   Debt Interest Ratio

P4.5   Budget Consolidation
Research and Innovation Policy

**To what extent does research and innovation policy in your country support technological innovations that foster the creation and introduction of new products?**

This question comprises subsidies and incentives for research institutions conducting basic and applied research, as well as subsidies and incentives for establishing start-up companies that transfer scientific output into products and enhanced productivity. Bureaucratic impediments to research and innovation should also be taken into account.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research and innovation policy effectively supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and innovation policy largely supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and innovation policy partly supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and innovation policy has largely failed to support innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P5.2 Public R&D Spending

P5.3 Non-public R&D Spending

P5.4 Total Researchers

P5.5 Intellectual Property Licenses

P5.6 PCT Patent Applications
## Stabilizing Global Financial System

**To what extent does the government actively contribute to the effective regulation and supervision of the international financial architecture?**

Sustainable development requires a stable financial system. This question asks whether the government actively engages (i.e., takes initiative and assumes responsibility) in identifying and implementing new policies targeting a stable, legitimate financial system by restructuring the international financial architecture. This restructuring aims to ensure the effective regulation and supervision of financial markets and the monitoring of cross-border financial flows. The international regulation of financial markets is concerned with institutions such as banks and financial service providers (e.g., stock exchanges, rating agencies or institutional investors). Regulations should aim to:

1. prevent/combat high-risk or criminal financial activities that pose systemic risks;
2. ensure fair cost- and risk-sharing among financial market actors in the event of an international financial market failure; and
3. enhance information transparency in international financial markets and strengthen consumer protection.

The government (pro-)actively promotes the regulation and supervision of financial markets. It demonstrates initiative and responsibility in such endeavors and often acts as an international agenda-setter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government (pro-)actively promotes the regulation and supervision of financial markets. It demonstrates initiative and responsibility in such endeavors and often acts as an international agenda-setter.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government contributes to improving the regulation and supervision of financial markets. In some cases, it demonstrates initiative and responsibility in such endeavors.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government rarely contributes to improving the regulation and supervision of financial markets. It seldom demonstrates initiative or responsibility in such endeavors.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government does not contribute to improving the regulation and supervision of financial markets.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Tier 1 Capital Ratio

## Banks’ Nonperforming Loans
To what extent does education policy in your country deliver high-quality, equitable and efficient education and training?

This question assesses the extent to which a government’s education policy facilitates high-quality learning for everyone with the most efficient allocation of resources between the different education systems (pre-school, schools, universities etc). Your response should focus on the following issues, irrespective of the education system’s organization: the contribution of education policy towards providing a skilled labor force, the graduate output of upper secondary and tertiary education, and equitable access to education. While the latter pertains to issues of fairness and distributive justice, it also has implications for a country’s international competitiveness as unequal education implies a waste of human potential.

Of the three criteria – quality, equity in access and efficiency in resource allocation – efficiency should be given less weight if the first two criteria can be considered fulfilled.

Please provide a short paragraph for each of the three criteria for education policy. Please also score each criterion individually with the comment function in the SGI database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education policy fully achieves the criteria.</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education policy largely achieves the criteria.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education policy partially achieves the criteria.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education policy does not achieve the criteria at all.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P7.2 Upper Secondary Attainment

P7.3 Tertiary Attainment

P7.4 PISA Results

P7.5 PISA, Socioeconomic Background

P7.6 Pre-primary Expenditure
To what extent does social policy in your country prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

Reducing the various risks of social exclusion is a core task of social policy. The prevention of poverty and the provision of enabling conditions for equal opportunity in society are essential elements of such a policy. In addition to poverty, please take also into account additional dimensions of exclusion like the experience of marginalization and the desire to be appreciated when evaluating socioeconomic disparities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P8.2 Poverty Rate

P8.3 NEET Rate

P8.4 Gini Coefficient

P8.5 Gender Equality in Parliaments

P8.6 Life Satisfaction
Health Policy

To what extent do health care policies in your country provide high-quality, inclusive and cost-efficient health care?

Public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population and at the lowest possible costs.

Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency – efficiency should be given less weight if the first two criteria can be considered fulfilled.

Please provide a short paragraph for each of the three criteria. Please also score each criterion individually with the comment function in the SGI database (www.sgi-data.de).

Health care policy achieves the criteria fully. 10
Health care policy achieves the criteria largely. 8
Health care policy achieves the criteria partly. 5
Health care policy does not achieve the criteria at all. 2

Spending on Health Programs

Life Expectancy

Infant Mortality

Perceived Health Status
P10.1 Family Policy

To what extent do family support policies in your country enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

Traditional family patterns confine mothers to opt out of gainful employment and focus on household and child care work, a division of roles that has lost acceptance among an increasing number of women. This question is based on the assumption that an optimal system of family support should enable women to decide freely whether and when they want to take up or proceed with full- or part-time employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.</td>
<td>5 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P10.2 Child Care Density, Age 0-2

P10.3 Child Care Density, Age 3-5

P10.4 Fertility Rate

P10.5 Child Poverty Rate
To what extent does pension policy in your country realize goals of poverty prevention, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability?

An optimal pension system should prevent poverty among the elderly due to retirement and should be based on distribu-
tional principles that do not erode the system’s fiscal stability. It should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor
force and the adolescent generation. These objectives may be achieved by different pension systems: exclusively public pen-
sion systems, a mixture of public and private pension schemes, or publicly subsidized private pension plans. Accumulating
public and private implicit pension debt is undesirable.

Please provide a short paragraph for each of the three objectives of pension policy. Please also score each objective indi-
vidually with the comment function in the SGI database (www.sgi-data.de).

| Pension policy achieves the objectives fully. | 10 |
| Pension policy achieves the objectives largely. | 8 |
| Pension policy achieves the objectives partly. | 5 |
| Pension policy does not achieve the objectives at all. | 2 |

P11.2 | Older Employment

P11.3 | Old Age Dependency Ratio

P11.4 | Senior Citizen Poverty
P12.1 Integration Policy

How effectively do policies in your country support the integration of migrants into society?

This question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. Policies fostering the integration of migrants will ensure migrants’ equal access to the labor market and education, opportunities for family reunion and political participation, the right of long-term residence, effective pathways to nationality as well as protection from discrimination and equality policies. The objective of integration precludes forced assimilation.

- Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.  
  - 10 □  
  - 9 □
- Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.  
  - 8 □  
  - 7 □  
  - 6 □
- Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.  
  - 5 □  
  - 4 □  
  - 3 □
- Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.  
  - 2 □  
  - 1 □

P12.2 Foreign-born to Native Upper Secondary Attainment

P12.3 Foreign-born to Native Tertiary Attainment

P12.4 Foreign-born to Native Unemployment

P12.5 Foreign-born to Native Employment
P13.1  Internal Security Policy

How effectively does internal security policy in your country protect citizens against security risks?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks like crime, terrorism and similar threats that are more and more internationally organized can be achieved by many different ways and combinations of internal security policies. For example, an effective policy includes objectives such as the internal integration of domestic intelligence and police communities and their regional cross-border cooperation with regional/international intelligence and police communities, the domestic strategy of intelligence and police communities and so on. Whereas expenditures on public order and safety alone say little about the effectiveness of internal security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit-ratio of this policy.

Note that security threats emerging from inter-state conflict only play a role for a small set of SGI countries. While we encourage you to report about the credibility and effectiveness of security policies addressing such threats they shall not form part of your score.

| Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively. | 10 □ | 9 □ |
| Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively. | 8 □ | 7 □ | 6 □ |
| Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks. | 5 □ | 4 □ | 3 □ |
| Internal security policy exacerbates the security risks. | 2 □ | 1 □ |

P13.2  Homicides

P13.3  Thefts

P13.4  Confidence in Police
Global Inequalities
Category: Social Policies

P14.1  Global Social Policy

To what extent does the government demonstrate an active and coherent commitment to promoting equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries?

This question explores the extent to which the government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries by demonstrating initiative and assuming responsibility or acting as an agenda-setter within international frameworks. It also examines the extent to which the government’s actions and policies are in alignment with international strategies in this regard.

For reasons of comparability, the question focuses on:

(1) To what extent the government – both formally and in practice – shapes and advances social inclusion beyond its borders as expressed in global frameworks such as the United Nation’s MDG and post-2015 development agenda.

(2) To what extent the government promotes a fair global trading system in order to guarantee developing countries free access to global markets. Protectionist trade barriers such as tariffs on imports or subsidies for domestic producers run contrary to this goal. Please note, however, that non-tariff barriers reflecting codified international social standards or consumer and environmental protection norms are legitimate.

The government actively and coherently engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. It frequently demonstrates initiative and responsibility, and acts as an agenda-setter.

The government actively engages in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. However, some of its measures or policies lack coherence.

The government shows limited engagement in international efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries. Many of its measures or policies lack coherence.

The government does not contribute (and often undermines) efforts to promote equal socioeconomic opportunities in developing countries.

P14.2  ODA
Environmental Policy

How effectively does environmental policy in your country protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?

This question covers a government’s activities aimed at safeguarding the environment and thereby securing the prerequisites for sustainable economic development. Holistic environmental policies not only address climate protection but also the protection of renewable water resources, forest area and biodiversity. Instruments of environmental policy range from greenhouse gas regulation protecting the global climate to the establishment of protection zones for animals or forest.

Please provide a short paragraph for each of the four targets of protection: climate, renewable water resources, forest area and biodiversity.

Environmental policy effectively protects, preserves and enhances the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 10

Environmental policy largely protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 8

Environmental policy insufficiently protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 5

Environmental policy has largely failed to protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment. 2
To what extent does the government actively contribute to the design and advancement of global environmental protection regimes?

Protecting the climate and preserving natural resources worldwide depends on effective collective action carried out on a global level. The question asks whether the government actively contributes to international efforts to promote and shape the global framework of environmental policies. Examples of active contribution include: demonstrating initiative and responsibility, acting as an agenda-setter within international frameworks, and/or achieving an alignment of purpose among conflicting interests in international negotiations.

The government actively contributes to international efforts to design and advance global environmental protection regimes. In most cases, it demonstrates commitment to existing regimes, fosters their advancement and initiates appropriate reforms.

- The government contributes to international efforts to strengthen global environmental protection regimes. It demonstrates commitment to existing regimes and occasionally fosters their advancement or initiates appropriate reforms.
- The government demonstrates commitment to existing regimes, but neither fosters their advancement nor initiates appropriate reforms.
- The government does not contribute to international efforts to strengthen global environmental protection regimes.
Democracy

D 1   Electoral Processes
D 2   Access to Information
D 3   Civil Rights and Political Liberties
D 4   Rule of Law
**Candidacy Procedures**

**How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?**

Everyone has equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The registration of candidates and parties may be subject to restrictions only when in accordance with law and if deemed reasonably necessary in a democratic society. This includes protecting the interests of national security or public order, public health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.</td>
<td>5 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Media Access**

**To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?**

Every candidate for election and every political party has equal opportunity of access to the media and other means of communication, which allows them to present their political views and to communicate with the voters. Access to the media may not be restricted or refused on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.</td>
<td>5 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?

To participate in national elections, every adult citizen must have the right to access an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for voting and voter registration. Voting rights also apply to convicts and citizens without a permanent residence in the country. No eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter, otherwise than in accordance with objectively verifiable criteria prescribed by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the State's obligations under international law. Every individual who is denied the right to vote or to be registered as a voter shall be entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review such decisions and to correct errors promptly and effectively. Every voter has the right of equal and effective access to a polling station or alternative voting method, including a feasible absentee voting option. The way in which voter registration is organized, the location of polling stations, and the date and time frame of voting do not constitute disincentives to voting for specific groups in society.

When useful references to OSCE election observation data may be made. In your assessment, please consider as well any significant variations in the implementation of voting and registration rights at the subnational level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and non-discriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?

This question refers to the obligations of the receiving entity (parties and entities connected with political parties) to keep proper books and accounts, to specify the nature and value of donations received and to publish accounts regularly. Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively funding of political parties and electoral campaigns is supervised (monitored by an independent body such as electoral or parliamentary commission, anti-corruption body, audit institution etc. with checking, investigative, sanction and regulatory powers) and infringements are sanctioned (taking into account administrative, civil and criminal liability).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?

This question examines whether citizens have the legal right to propose and take binding decisions on matters of importance to them, as well as the effective opportunity to act on this right. Forms of popular decision-making include popular initiatives and referendums conducted at different levels of government (i.e., local/municipal, regional/state, national/federal). Popular decision-making may be restricted to a few issues of interest (e.g., only municipal exclusively) or it may cover an extensive range of issues being of concern to citizens. For this question, please consider only those forms of popular decision-making that meet the following criteria:

1. They are initiated by citizens or are mandatory according to constitutional provisions.
2. They do not require agreement or initiation of any main political office (e.g., core executive, parliament).
3. Decisions made are legally binding and cannot be overturned.
4. They have already been used in practice at least one time (they do not exist on paper alone).

Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.

Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.

Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.

Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
D2.1 Media Freedom

To what extent are the media independent from government?

This question asks to what extent are the media subject to government influence and the influence of actors associated with the government. The question focuses both on media regulation and government intervention. The rules and practice of supervision should guarantee sufficient independence for publicly owned media. Privately owned media should be subject to licensing and regulatory regimes that ensure independence from government.

Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government. 10 □

The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence. 8 □

The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media. 5 □

Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests. 2 □

D2.2 Media Pluralism

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?

This question does not assume that the predominance of either private or public ownership guarantees a pluralism of opinions. Rather, the underlying assumption is that a diversified ownership structure is likely to best represent the views and positions existing in society.

Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions. 10 □

Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions. 8 □

Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions. 5 □

Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized. 2 □
To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

To assess the accessibility of government information, you should examine

(1) whether a freedom of information act exists or equivalent legal regulations exist,

(2) to what extent do the rules restrict access to information (e.g., exemptions, deadlines for responding to requests etc.) and justify these restrictions, and

(3) whether mechanisms for appeal and oversight exist to enforce citizens’ right to access information (e.g., administrative review, court review, ombudsman, commission etc.)

You may consult www.freedominfo.org for information specific to your country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.</th>
<th>10 □</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D3

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

D3.1  Civil Rights

To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?

Civil rights contain and limit the exercise of state power by the rule of law. Independent courts guarantee legal protection of life, freedom and property as well as protection against illegitimate arrest, exile, terror, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life, both on behalf of the state and on behalf of private and individual actors. Equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law are both basic civil rights and also necessities to enforce civil rights.

All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.  

8

The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.

7

Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.

4

State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.

1

D3.2  Political Liberties

To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?

Political liberties constitute an independent sphere of democracy and are a prerequisite of political and civil society. They aim at the possibility of the formulation, the presentation and the equal consideration of citizens’ preferences and are embodied in the codification and unlimited validity of every individual’s right to speak, think, assemble, organize, worship, or petition without government (or even private) interference or restraints.

All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.

9

All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.

7

State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.

4

Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?

This question evaluates policies of state institutions aimed at preventing discrimination based on factors such as gender, sexual orientation, physical and mental ability, health, age, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion. The evaluation should refer to the measures taken by state institutions and their impact. The extent of observable discrimination may be used as an indicator of anti-discrimination policies’ efficacy.

Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively the state protects the rights of disadvantaged persons or persons belonging to minorities by positive discrimination measures, special representation rights or autonomy rights.

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare. 10

State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed. 8

State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed. 5

The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society. 2
## Legal Certainty

**To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?**

This question assesses the extent to which executive actions are predictable (i.e., can be expected to be guided by law).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Judicial Review

**To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?**

This question examines how well the courts can review actions taken and norms adopted by the executive. To provide effective control, courts need to pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of incumbent governments, powerful groups or individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?

This question regards supreme or constitutional courts’ sufficient independence from political influence as a prerequisite of a functioning democratic system. The appointment process is a crucial factor which determines judiciary independence.

The prospect of politically “neutral” justices increases accordingly with greater majority requirements and with the necessity of cooperation between involved bodies. A cooperative appointment process requires at least two involved democratically legitimized institutions. Their representative character gives them the legitimacy for autonomous nomination or elective powers. In an exclusive appointment process, a single body has the right to appoint justices irrespective of veto points; whereas in cooperative procedures with qualified majorities independence of the court is best secured.

When answering the question take also into account whether the process is formally transparent and adequately covered by public media. If your country does not have a supreme or constitutional court, evaluate the appointment process of the appellate court that is responsible for citizens’ appeals against decisions of the government.

Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements. 10

Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements. 8

Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements. 5

All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions. 2
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

This question addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption.

Note: Please be aware that the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International uses the data and information given in response to question D4.4 for their assessments. To avoid circularity of assessments, please do not base your evaluation on the CPI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public officeholders from abusing their positions.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>officeholders from abusing their positions.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governance

Executive Capacity

Steering Capability
G 1  Strategic Capacity
G 2  Interministerial Coordination
G 3  Evidence-based Instruments
G 4  Societal Consultation
G 5  Policy Communication

Policy Implementation
G 6  Effective Implementation

Institutional Learning
G 7  Adaptability
G 8  Organizational Reform Capacity
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

Institutionalized forms of strategic planning include planning units at the center of government and personal advisory cabinets for ministers or the president/prime minister or extra-governmental bodies. To count as effective agents of strategic planning, such units and bodies must be devoted to planning that takes a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions in practice.

One indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between strategic planning staff/bodies and the head of government. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

| Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making. | 10 □ | 9 □ |
| Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact. | 8 □ | 7 □ | 6 □ |
| Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making. | 5 □ | 4 □ | 3 □ |
| In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. | 2 □ | 1 □ |

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decision-making?

Effective and legitimate consultation with non-governmental academic experts should take place during the early stages of a decision-making process, that is, when outcomes can still be altered and this consultation should be transparent to the public. Pro forma consultations of experts lacking genuine government interest do not constitute effective consultation.

Indicators of consultation may be the frequency of meetings between government and non-governmental external academic experts, the existence of expert commissions, or cooperation projects between government bodies and academic institutions. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

| In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making. | 10 □ | 9 □ |
| For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making. | 8 □ | 7 □ | 6 □ |
| In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making. | 5 □ | 4 □ | 3 □ |
| The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma. | 2 □ | 1 □ |
### G2.1 GO Expertise

**Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?**

This question examines whether the government office (referred to in some countries as the prime minister’s office, chancellery, etc.) has capacities to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G2.2 Gatekeeping

**Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?**

Please assess whether the GO/PMO is de facto, not only legally, able to return materials on the basis of policy considerations. In case this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer this question according to possible functional equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### G2.3 Line Ministries

**To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?**

Please assess whether line ministries involve the GO/PMO de facto, not only legally, in the preparation of policy proposals. If this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G2.4 Cabinet Committees

**How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?**

This question studies whether cabinet committees (composed exclusively of cabinet members) or ministerial committees (composed of several ministers and individual non-cabinet members) effectively filter out or settle issues prior to cabinet meetings.

Please assess whether ministerial or cabinet committees are de facto, not only legally, able to coordinate cabinet proposals. If this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interministerial Coordination
Category: Steering Capability

G2.5 Ministerial Bureaucracy

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
This question refers to administrative/bureaucratic coordination and examines to what extent ministry officials and ministry civil servants of individual ministries effectively coordinate the drafting of policy proposals with other ministries before proposals reach political coordination bodies (such as ministerial committees or the cabinet). Coordination may take place at different levels of bureaucratic hierarchy.

If this question does not fully apply to the structure of relevant institutions in your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G2.6 Informal Coordination

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
This question examines whether there are informal coordination mechanisms (e.g., coalition committees, informal meetings within government or with party groups, informal meetings across levels of government) which support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evidence-based Instruments
Category: Steering Capability

M3.1 RIA Application

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

If RIA activities are not centrally registered, please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country. **Please Note: If RIA are not applied or do not exist, please give your country a score of "1" for this question AND for G3.2 and G3.3.

RIA assess a regulation's impacts on socioeconomic and other indicators (e.g., impacts on public budgets; compliance costs for businesses, public administration or citizens). The application of RIA differs in topical scope, whether it is only applied to new or also to some existing regulations, and whether the analysis is streamlined by minimum standards prescribing RIA methodology.

If this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

| RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards. | 10 □ |
| RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards. | 8 □ |
| RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards. | 5 □ |
| RIA are not applied or do not exist. | 2 □ |
**G3.2** Quality of RIA Process

**Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?**

This question seeks to assess the procedural quality of RIA. In the analysis stage, the participation (consultation or collaboration) of relevant stakeholders increases the quality of RIAs by providing empirical information about the needs and likely reaction of individuals with regard to a regulatory change. Once RIA results are available, their accessibility and communication fosters their relevance to the political process. Finally, quality evaluations of RIA assessments (with regard to results and process) by an independent body provide opportunities to improve the RIA process in the future.

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.

The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.

The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.

**G3.3** Sustainability Check

**Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?**

This question examines whether RIAs also analyze a regulation’s impacts on sustainability. Effective sustainability checks fulfill three criteria. First, they are integrated into RIAs in order to form a common basis for decision-making rather than standing on their own. Second, they draw on an exhaustive set of impact indicators addressing social (e.g., youth unemployment), economic (e.g., public debt) and environmental (e.g., CO₂ emissions) issues. Third, they analyze the impacts on such indicators in the short-, mid-, and long-term.

Please also indicate whether there is a formally adopted sustainability strategy in your country.

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.

Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.

Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

This question assesses how successfully the government consults with societal actors such as trade unions, employers’ associations, leading business associations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups in preparing its policy. Successful consultation is conceived here as an exchange of views and information (beginning at an early stage of policy development and continuing through to policy implementation) that increases the quality of government policies and induces societal actors to support them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government consults with societal actors.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government rarely consults with any societal actors.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

This question assesses whether the government achieves coherent communication by (a) effectively coordinating the communication activities of ministries and (b) sending messages that are factually coherent with the government’s plans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries;</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ministries closely align their communication with government strategy.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government coordinates the communication of ministries.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coherent with the government’s plans.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government’s plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factually coherent with the government’s plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

This question seeks to evaluate a government’s implementation performance against the performance benchmarks set by the government for its own work. The assessment should therefore focus on the major policy priorities identified by a government and examine whether declared objectives could be realized.

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.

The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.

The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

Organizational devices providing incentives for ministers include prime ministerial powers over personnel, policies or structures, coalition committees, party summits, comprehensive government programs/coalition agreements and cabinet meetings. If this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.

The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.

The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Effective Implementation
Category: Policy Implementation

G6.2b Monitoring Ministries

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

This question assumes that effective delegation from the core executive to ministries is reflected in the monitoring of line ministry activities by the administration of the core executive. While such monitoring is not sufficient to prevent line ministries from prioritizing sectoral over government interests in implementation, the presence or absence of monitoring is taken here as a proxy of effective delegation.

If this question does not fully apply to your country, please answer by referring to possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.  

10 □  9 □

The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.

8 □  7 □  6 □

The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.

5 □  4 □  3 □

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.

2 □  1 □

G6.2c Monitoring Agencies/Bureaucracies

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

An effective implementation may be constrained by bureaucratic drift. To ensure that bureaucracies/agencies act in accordance with government policies and implement the government’s program, this question assumes that federal/subnational ministries and their leading officials should monitor the activities of semi-autonomous bureaucracies/executive agencies in their task area.

In federal states with few bureaucracies/executive agencies at the central level of government, the assessment should also consider regional-level decentralized bureaucracies/agencies acting on behalf of federal or subnational governments.

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.  

10 □  9 □

The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.

8 □  7 □  6 □

The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.

5 □  4 □  3 □

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.

2 □  1 □
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

A high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity. Rather, this question focuses on the delegation problem associated with decentralization.

If the central government delegates a public task to lower levels of government (as a rule: regional self-government and in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government), the central government needs to ensure that such tasks are adequately funded. The absence of corresponding funding sources ("unfunded mandates") indicates a lack of responsibility and strategic design. Funding may be provided through grants (shares of centrally collected taxes) from the central budget or by endowing subnational self-governments with their own revenues.

Please note that subnational self-government refers to directly elected subnational administrative authorities with considerable discretion. The broad concept of "delegation" applied here is taken from principal-agent theory and includes independent powers of subnational self-government enshrined in the constitution. Thus, no difference is made between independent powers and those central government powers that have been delegated by laws or executive regulations to subnational self-government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?**

As a high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity, this question takes the constitutional scope of regional self-government or, in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government autonomy, as a point of reference.

Central government institutions are assumed to enable subnational self-governments to fully exercise their constitutional right of implementation autonomy. Subnational implementation autonomy may be curtailed by legal, administrative, fiscal or political measures of the central level. Such de facto centralizing policies may be deliberate or unintentional, unconstitutional or in accordance with the constitution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Effective Implementation**  
Category: Policy Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G6.3c</th>
<th>National Standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?**

This question seeks to assess how central government ensures that the decentralized provision of public services (e.g. health care, public transportation, waste management) complies with standards (rules, performance figures, etc.) agreed upon and set on the national level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.</td>
<td>10 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.</td>
<td>8 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.</td>
<td>5 □</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.</td>
<td>2 □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G7.1 Domestic Adaptability

**To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?**

In order to effectively shape, adapt and implement policy relevant to a country's specific international setting, governments sometimes adapt their domestic government structures to meet new international demands (e.g., to improve the speed of decision-making, facilitate new means of distributing information, improve the packaging of topics at the international level). Government structures include the organization of ministries, the cooperation among ministries and in cabinet, the center of government and relations with subnational levels of government. This question asks whether these structures have been adapted to address inter/supranational developments and what effects these changes have on policy formulation and implementation.

Note that if your government has little room left for improvement, please assign a high score on this item, even if no change has taken place.

Please note that structural reforms are also studied in view of their role in institutional learning (question G8.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### International Coordination

**To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?**

This question explores the extent to which the government has the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. This capacity is manifest in collective action and cooperation aimed at complex global challenges such as climate change and inclusive economic and social development.

At one level, this requires institutional capacities to help shape and implement strategic global frameworks for such international efforts. An indication of such capacity might be the existence of appropriate interministerial coordination groups with leadership from centers of government.

At another level, it involves ensuring that the impact of national policies on these global challenges are systematically assessed and then incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.

On both levels, communication with the legislative branch and domestic stakeholders is critical.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G8

Organizational Reform Capacity
Category: Institutional Learning

G8.1 Self-monitoring

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

Institutional arrangements include the rules of procedure and the work formats defined there, in particular the cabinet, the office of the head of government, the center of government, the portfolios of ministries, the advisory staffs of ministers and the head of government as well as the management of relations with parliament, governing parties, ministerial administration and public communication.

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.  

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.

The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.

There is no monitoring.

G8.2 Institutional Reform

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

For a list of institutional arrangements, see question G8.1. Strategic capacity is the capacity to take and implement political decisions which take into account the externalities and interdependencies of policies, are based on scientific knowledge, promote common goods and represent a long-term orientation.

Note that if your government already excels in strategic capacity (G1) and therefore has little room left for improvement please assign a high score on this item, even if no change has taken place.

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.

The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.

The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Citizens
G 9 Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Legislature
G 10 Legislative Actors’ Resources

Intermediary Organizations
G 11 Media
G 12 Parties and Interest Associations
Citizens’ Participatory Competence
Category: Citizens

G9.1 Policy Knowledge

To what extent are citizens informed of government policymaking?

This question assesses the extent to which citizens have information and knowledge enabling them to evaluate government policymaking adequately. The question focuses on policies, not the personnel or political composition of government or the power struggles that often dominate government. A high level of information about policies presupposes that citizens understand the motives, objectives, effects and implications of policies.

Please rely on local opinion survey data to substantiate your evaluation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of government policies.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many citizens are well-informed of individual government policies.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few citizens are well-informed of government policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of policies.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most citizens are not aware of government policies.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G9.2 Voicing Opinion to Officials

G9.3 Voter Turnout
### G10.1 Parliamentary Resources

**Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?**

In order to effectively monitor government activity members of parliament must possess the resources to obtain self-produced or independent information and expertise. Resources like deputy expert staff, or administrative support staff (e.g., parliamentary libraries or parliamentary research units) as well as monetary allowances for the commission of independent research are key preconditions for effective monitoring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G10.2 Obtaining Documents

**Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?**

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to obtain the documents they desire from government. Specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may not ask for government documents.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G10.3  Summoning Ministers

**Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?**

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to summon ministers to committee meetings and to confront them with their questions. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

G10.4  Summoning Experts

**Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?**

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to invite experts to committee meetings. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited. This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may summon experts.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

The main structural precondition for effective monitoring of ministries by parliamentary committees is a match between committees’ and ministries’ task areas. If the task areas of parliamentary committees match the task areas of ministries, each parliamentary committee may focus on monitoring the activities of its corresponding ministry, thereby increasing the control capacity of the legislature. There are two possible ill-fitting constellations between committee and ministerial portfolios. If there are fewer committees than ministries, the committees may be overburdened with monitoring ministerial activities. If there are more committees than ministries, control responsibilities are split and the legislature may act non-cohesively. Other structural factors important for effective monitoring include adequate size of committees, the frequency of meetings and their organisation.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring of ministries.

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
### G10.6 Audit Office

**To what extent is the audit office accountable to the parliament?**

This question assesses the extent to which the parliament can rely on its own auditing capacities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The audit office is accountable to the parliament exclusively.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audit office is accountable primarily to the parliament.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audit office is not accountable to the parliament, but has to report regularly to the parliament.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The audit office is governed by the executive.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### G10.7 Ombuds Office

**Does the parliament have an ombuds office?**

This question asks whether parliaments have institutions that listen to the concerns of citizens, publicly advocate the issues raised by citizens and initiate governmental action to address them.

The term “ombuds office” is used here as a label representing these functions and may be institutionalized in different organizational formats. Please also consider possible functional equivalents and substantiate your answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The parliament has an effective ombuds office.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The parliament does not have an ombuds office.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To what extent do media in your country provide substantive in-depth information on decision-making by the government?

This question seeks to assess the extent to which the media provide timely and contextualized information, analysis, as well as background information that enables the broader public to evaluate the government’s decisions.

The question refers to a country’s 10 most important mass media brands (print, tv, online, radio). It focuses on decisions taken by the government (and not political issues/debates or the political process in general). To enable the public to evaluate decisions, media have to provide in-depth information not only when decisions are taken, but also in advance, that is, when they are prepared and discussed among government members, members of parliament, experts, bureaucrats and stakeholders. A lack of in-depth information is not tantamount to a complete lack of information but to the dominance of “infotainment content programs” that frame government decisions as personalized power politics and divert attention away from the substance of decision toward entertaining events and stories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing government decisions.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing government decisions. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing government decisions. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Intra-party Democracy

**How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?**

Parties make decisions with regard to personnel (e.g. candidates for prime minister/president) and with regard to issues (e.g. electoral programs). Party decision-making can be more or less inclusive, that is, parties can allow every party member and even party supporters to participate in decisions, or they may restrict participation to elected delegates or even to a small number of party leaders. Moreover, decision-making can be more or less open, that is, lists of candidates or agendas of issues may be proposed by everyone participating in decision-making or such powers may be restricted to a small group of party leaders.

“Major” parties are conceived here as parties which gained at least 10% of the popular vote in the last general election. For answering and scoring this question, please (briefly) consider each major party separately and then provide an overall score based on the “sub-scores” for each major party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are rather open.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are largely controlled by the party leadership.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G12.2  Association Competence (Business)

To what extent are economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

“Relevant” policy proposals draw the attention of a significant part of the population, they propose concrete policy measures and they analyse effects or costs/benefits of implementation. In order to formulate such policies, interest groups will draw on capabilities such as their own academic personnel, associated institutes and think tanks, or they undertake cooperative efforts with academic bodies.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: employers’ associations, leading business associations and trade unions.

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 10 □  9 □
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 8 □  7 □  6 □
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 5 □  4 □  3 □
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies. 2 □  1 □

G12.3  Association Competence (Others)

To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

“Relevant” policy proposals draw the attention of a significant part of the population, they propose concrete policy measures and they analyse effects or costs/benefits of implementation. In order to formulate such policies, interest groups will draw on capabilities such as their own academic personnel, associated institutes and think tanks, or they undertake cooperative efforts with academic bodies.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: social interest groups, environmental groups and religious communities.

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 10 □  9 □
Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 8 □  7 □  6 □
Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies. 5 □  4 □  3 □
Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies. 2 □  1 □
Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Phone +49 5241 81-81240
daniel.schraad-tischler@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christian Kroll
Phone +49 5241 81-81471
christian.kroll@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christof Schiller
Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini
Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de