Implementation Report

Government Efficiency, Ministerial Compliance, Monitoring Ministries, Monitoring Agencies and Bureaucracies, Task Funding, Constitutional Discretion, National Standards

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017
**Government Efficiency**

**Question**
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

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<th>Score</th>
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**Finland**

Score 9

Given that Finland has lately been governed by broad or fairly broad coalition governments, the political conditions for a satisfactory implementation of government plans have been good. A February 2013 session reviewing the implementation record under former Prime Minister Katainen (2011 – 2014) concluded that approximately 80% of the measures outlined in the government program had at that point been undertaken successfully or were about to be accomplished. However, the review also indicated shortcomings in several interrelated areas. In fact, according to the review, the largest and most difficult program issues remained unsolved. The global economic crisis of course hampered the cabinet’s efforts regarding the economy, but the difficulties were also partly because of internal tensions in government. Following a cabinet reshuffle, the government program under Prime Minister Stubb (2014 – 2015) was submitted to parliament in June 2014 and was fairly well received. Given the circumstances, this program in the main carried forward the policies introduced by the previous government. The present Sipilä government announced its program at the end of May 2015; in comparison with earlier programs, which resembled a telephone directory in size, the Sipilä program is much shorter and more strategic and focused. The program announced five strategic priorities that are manifest in 26 key projects, the primary goal being to bring the Finnish economy onto a path of sustainable growth. An action plan for implementation was published in February 2016, and a Legislation Assessment Council was appointed in April 2016. At the time of writing, this government’s likelihood of success in implementing its objectives still remains an open question. However, the government has already been forced to back away from several of its proposals.

Citation:
Ville Pitkänen, “Kenen ääni kuuluu hallitusohjelmassa?”, Kanava, 2015, Nr 6, 40-42.
valtioneuvosto.fi/implementation-of-the-government-programme
Latvia

The government has a good track record in achieving its own policy objectives. In issue areas considered by the government as high priority – recent examples include economic recovery, euro zone entry criteria, budget reform and fiscal discipline, OECD entry requirements – government performance can be considered excellent. The government has proven to be particularly efficient in implementing policies that have been recommended by international partners (the European Union, NATO, Council of Europe, OECD).

However, second-tier policy objectives show mixed success rates. For example, despite the fact that successive government declarations have identified education reform as a policy priority, little demonstrable progress has been made toward fulfilling the outlined policy objectives. Furthermore, in the prime minister’s annual reports to the parliament in 2012, 2013 and 2014, no significant education policy achievements are recognized. In 2016, however, a reform of the teacher compensation system was passed. Opposition to the implementation of education-policy objectives has been strong not only on the part of stakeholder groups and opposition parties, but also among the government coalition parties’ own parliamentarians.

The PKC monitors progress with respect to government-declaration goals on an annual basis, providing a report to the prime minister. In 2015 this report included an evaluation of Latvia’s progress toward its long-term development goals (included in the National Development Plan 2020 and the Latvia 2030 long-term development strategy). The prime minister provided parliament with a progress report on 24 separate performance indicators, reporting good progress in nine cases, adequate/weak performance in 10 cases, and poor performance in eight cases, requiring a reprioritizing or revision of policy measures.

The government has exhibited capacity for appropriate policy reactions to acute emergent issues. In November 2013, 54 people died and dozens more were injured following the collapse of a large building. In the aftermath of the event, then-Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovsksis resigned and a new government was formed. Institutional changes were introduced addressing systemic failures contributing to the event, such as the reestablishment in October 2014 of a construction-supervision authority at the central government level, and through legislative changes such as increases in liability for safety violations and construction-code violations and a redefinition of the division of responsibilities and assignment of liabilities in the construction process. Despite a false start regarding public engagement in an investigative committee, the then Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma established an open communications channel with victims’ families and NGOs to monitor the progress of investigations and systemic changes, and to highlight any hurdles that the
families may be facing. However, in 2016, three years after the event, an NGO monitoring report concluded that only five of 37 tasks undertaken by the government in the wake of this disaster had been completed, and six partially completed.

Citation:


New Zealand

Score 9

Throughout the review period, National governments held minority status, although the current one, with 47% of the vote and 59 out of 121 seats, has come closer to majority status than any other under MMP (indeed, the last time a party gained over 50% of the vote was in 1951). Minority status implies that the government has to anticipate the policy preferences of other parties in parliament and needs to seek legislative support on an issue-by-issue basis. Nevertheless, minority and minority-coalition governments have been relatively successful in implementing their agendas. The current National minority government’s medium-term priorities continue to focus on: building a stronger and more competitive economy; responsively managing the government’s finances and ensuring a budgetary surplus; and selectively funding major infrastructure developments and public services.

Although it is too early to comment definitively, the government is making progress toward most of these objectives.

Citation:

Poland

Score 9

Favored by its absolute majority in parliament and the internal discipline of PiS, the PiS government has been quite effective in implementing its policy objectives. It has succeeded in realizing its major campaign pledges, such as the increase in the
minimum wage and the family allowance, tax relief for small businesses, the lowering of the retirement age or the reversion to a higher age for entering school, and it has realized them rather quickly. Since the opposition in parliament does not have much leverage, the main obstacles to the government have been street protests, e.g., the withdrawn abortion law reform, and the EU, as in the case of the suspended taxes on banks and supermarkets.

**Sweden**

**Score 9**

The implementation capacity of the Swedish government is strong. The circa 330 executive agencies are the key actors in the implementation of policy. Over the past few years, the departments have increased the steering of their agencies. Also, performance measurement and management have become increasingly important in monitoring the agencies and the implementation process.

Yet like the challenge of efficient policy coordination, policy implementation is also a challenge under the restrictions of new governance forms. The relationship between the government and the agencies no longer follows a strict command and control pattern; rather, it is a more interactive form of governance where departments utilize the expertise in the agencies during the early stages of the policy process. This pattern is largely due to the fact that policy expertise is located not just in the departments but also in the agencies. The total number of staff in the departments is about 4,600, whereas the number of staff at the agency level is about 220,000. To a large extent, and with considerable variation among policy sectors and even specific issues, agencies provide informal advice to government on policy design. In some cases, there is a weekly dialogue between departments and agencies, not just on what departments want agencies to do but also on matters of policy design. This means effectively that agencies are involved in shaping the policies they will later implement. This arrangement obviously increases the agencies’ commitment to a policy, but at the same time it complicates the implementation process.

Citation:

**Switzerland**

**Score 9**

The Swiss polity contains many different potential veto points, including political parties, cantons that have veto power in the second chamber, and interest groups with the power to trigger a referendum. Thus, the government must hammer out compromises carefully when drafting legislation. This is done in the pre-parliamentary stage of legislation. Once a bill is introduced into parliament, many of the necessary compromises have already been reached. For this reason, a substantial number of bills are passed in parliament without being modified.
Canada

As a result of a parliamentary system in which members of Parliament are elected in single-member constituencies through first-past-the-post voting, the Canadian federal government frequently holds an absolute majority in the House of Commons and thus has considerable freedom to pursue its policy objectives unilaterally.

In recent years, the government has focused on skills training, promoting innovation, reducing barriers to job mobility and tax credits to promote employment. Although the unemployment rate has steadily dropped over the past years, many economists regard the Canadian labor market as weaker than it appears. Labor market conditions are arguably more dependent on the business cycle and international trade conditions than on most government policy measures. Furthermore, the continued low price of oil and China’s economic slowdown have dampened the country’s economic outlook, with Canada officially slipping into recession in September of 2015. Along with a contracting economy, government revenues have fallen, limiting the government’s resources to address policy goals. Non-financial constraints regarding policy implementation exist as well. Many social problems targeted by public policy, such as persistent gaps in education and health between Canada’s Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations, are in fact complex social phenomena that are only partly amenable to public policy action. In addition, many of the programs funded by Canada’s federal government – including health care, post-secondary education, social services and the integration of new Canadians – are implemented by provincial governments, thus requiring provincial cooperation to achieve federal policy objectives.

The Liberal government has already implemented many policies that the party ran on in the October 2015 election. These include gender parity in the cabinet, reinstating the long-form census, revoking regulations that muzzled scientists, introducing a new child benefit system, and cutting taxes for middle-income earners while increasing them for top earners. A number of new funding measures were introduced in the government’s first budget, with critics noting that many campaign promises are scheduled to appear in subsequent budgets. Budgeting a deficit of CAD 29.4 billion for the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the Liberals failed to keep an election promise limiting the federal deficit to CAD 10 billion. The next few years will reveal how effective the Liberal government is in enacting its ambitious policy agenda. The public mandate letters given to each minister will allow the assessment of Ministers’ performances relative to expectations.
Denmark

Score 8

The current as well as former governments have been minority governments. They have therefore had to seek parliamentary support for their policies from other parties. The Liberal-Conservative government of Lars Løkke Rasmussen lost the elections in September 2011 to a coalition of the Social Democratic Party, the Social Liberal Party and the Socialist People’s Party, the latter for the first time taking part in a government. That government was headed by the first female prime minister, Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Social Democratic Party). The June 2015 elections led to the formation of a single party government: the Liberal Party government led by Lars Løkke Rasmussen. In the autumn 2016 a minority government was established between the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Alliance, still with Rasmussen as prime minister. This is a minority government with parliamentary support from the Danish People’s Party. Together these so-called blue parties have 90 seats in the parliament, a majority of one.

The Danish government administration is reasonably good at implementation. It is important to point out that local governments carry out a large part of implementation, as Denmark is a relatively decentralized state. Decentralized units provide much of the services of the welfare state and the intention is actually to allow some geographical variation. Even so, through stipulations in framework laws and budget constraints, the government is quite successful in steering agencies and administrative bodies even if they are not in a direct hierarchical relationship with the central government.

In recent years, however, tensions have developed between the municipalities and the government/political system. Specifically, tensions have resulted when policymakers at the national level have not accepted the choices made by local governments and thus attempted to control local actions via rules and regulations. The difficult financial situation in most municipalities and the need to coordinate local needs with national budget constraints have caused tension. In the past, the municipalities failed to keep expenditure growth below the level agreed to with the central government. As a consequence, a tighter system has been implemented that includes possible financial sanctions for municipalities that exceed the agreed targets.

A major structural reform effective in 2007 changed the organization of the public sector. Fifteen counties were replaced with five regions, that were mainly responsible for health care provision, and 270 municipalities merged into 98 larger units.

Citation:
Germany

Score 8

The current government has successfully realized many of the pledges made in the coalition agreement (cf. Coalition Agreement 2014). It introduced a pension reform that allows eligible workers to retire at 63 and increases pension payments to older mothers and those with a reduced earning capacity. The Bundestag also approved the country’s first general statutory minimum wage, set at €8.50 per hour at the time and increased to €8.84 in 2016. In addition, the coalition parties agreed to introduce legal gender quotas for corporate boards in order to help break the glass ceiling for women in corporate leadership positions. Even for the motorway toll project, the responsible minister has been able to come to an agreement with the European Commission which makes compensatory tax cuts for German car drivers compatible with European law.

A less favorable example concerns a much more complicated project, Germany’s energy transition toward renewable energy (Energiewende). A recent National Audit Office report fiercely criticized the project for lacking proper coordination, and being subject to the whims of too many federal and state ministries that often work against each other. In addition, the government was deeply divided over the topic of how to implement the energy transition. A first government agreement was only finalized in the summer of 2015 and since then frequently changed. The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy termed the 2015 agreement a “historic package” for Germany’s energy transition and economic future. Germany’s target of cutting carbon emissions by 40% by 2020 was reaffirmed. The Energiewende’s implementation presents significant governance challenges. It is a complex challenge that requires cooperation from and coordination between various public and private actors as well as top-down decision-making. It also comprises diverse political levels and jurisdictions – global, European, federal, state, and municipal – as well as interest groups, cooperatives, alliances, banks, and individuals. As a result, political-programmatic goals as well as implementation strategies are continuously in flux.

Refugee and migration policies are a further imposing challenge. The government agrees on the need for smoothing asylum processes, with quicker decision-making in order to speed up the integration of refugees into the education system and labor market. Through a comprehensive reorganization and staff expansion of the responsible agency (BAMF), the objective of reducing the backlog in asylum applications made progress over 2016. Nonetheless, at the end of November 2016, almost half a million asylum applications had still not been decided upon (Asylgeschäftsstatistik November 2016).

Citation:
http://www.spiegel.de/thema/energiewende/
https://www.mckinsey.de/energiewendeindex
Norway

Score 8

The government is a minority government and they depend upon support from two smaller parties in the parliament. A negotiated agreement governs this relationship. However, it can be expected that over time this agreement will become considerably strained. The potential for conflict between the parties in government has represented one possible impediment to government efficiency, another challenge is gaining support in the parliament. The government can rely on a large, well-trained and capable bureaucracy to implement its policies. However, major educational, health care and local vs regional government reforms have exposed the difficulties in implementing such reforms and demonstrated the need for the government to carefully navigate the needs of different stakeholders and veto players. During the period under review, there have been reports of legally mandated services not being delivered. This involves, for example, the failure to provide follow up health care services to individuals suffering the effects of dangerous working conditions (e.g., asbestos, radiation).

United Kingdom

Score 8

The United Kingdom’s political system is highly centralized. For example, there are no “veto players” outside of the central government who could challenge or undermine the government’s core policy objectives. There is no written constitution and no constitutional court to challenge government decisions directly and effectively. However, there is provision for judicial review, something the government is currently trying to limit given its extensive use in recent years. The devolution of certain powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has meant that some national policy goals are subject to decisions at the subnational level over which the central government has only limited powers. In particular, the influence of the Scottish parliament, based in Holyrood, has increased substantially following the close outcome of the Scottish Referendum and the massive gains made by the Scottish National Party across Scotland in the last UK general election.

Historically, problems in achieving policy objectives have mainly arisen through intra-party disunity and parliamentary party rebellions. Even under the exceptional coalition government, Premier Minister David Cameron had more trouble controlling his own party’s right-wing than dealing with the demands of the junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats – until the United Kingdom returned to its traditional one-party government in 2015.
Since David Cameron’s resignation, his successor, Theresa May, has been constrained by having to accommodate similar divisions. Some of her most vocal opposition has come from “remainers” and former government ministers with the Conservative Party, most visibly around Brexit. With only a small working majority in parliament, she faces limitations on her ability to implement her preferred strategy, not just in relation to Brexit, but also in achieving other new priorities.

**Austria**

**Score 7**

The evaluation of policy success in Austria strongly reflects the reality of coalition governments. Following the formation of a government, coalition parties agree on policy priorities. Implementation success is used as a vehicle to promote party agendas, rather than the government overall, while each coalition party typically blames the other in cases of failure. This can be regarded as a kind of oppositional behavior within the government: One party acts almost like an opposition regarding the agenda of the other party.

This said, if the coalition partners agree on a policy, it is most likely to be adopted, given the high degree of party discipline in parliament and the limited influence of the second chamber.

Given that the majority held by the two still-governing coalition parties has decreased in 2013 and a (likely) further decline would render this coalition an impossibility after the 2018 election, the current term could be a final opportunity of this government to implement policies on the basis of a broad political and social consensus. At the moment, the government is not making use of this opportunity. It has, for example, dropped the ball on a long-overdue comprehensive reform of the educational system. Similarly, the coalition has promised but not yet implemented a systematic reform of the military draft system. These are just two cases of the government failing to take advantage of the potential held by a stable governing majority.

The failure of the two governing parties to secure their respective candidates a spot in the second (final) round of the presidential elections in 2016 has further increased the nervousness of the coalition partners and opened an ongoing debate about an end of this coalition government.

**Estonia**

**Score 7**

The cabinet under Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas took office after the March 2015 parliamentary elections. A document outlining the government’s program was signed on 8 April 2015. The Government Action Plan 2015-19 and the Annual Progress Review against targets were publicly available on the government website.
Assessing the government’s performance became more complicated than in previous coalitions due to the increased number of indicators and small targets. There were 621 objectives and targets to be accomplished in 2015-19 compared to 321 in 2007-2011. In total, 321 (40%) had been accomplished by September 2016. Thus, in terms of quantity the government has been sufficiently effective. In terms of quality, two issues come up. First, the majority of indicators anticipate very minor progress (less than by 1% in 4 years). Hence, little effort was needed to achieve the benchmark. Second, there was a lot of criticism among parliamentary opposition, social partners and even some coalition parties that instead of making fundamental decisions the government was busy with fine tuning and producing non-binding dense analyses. As a joint effort by the think-tank Praxis and Estonian Employers’ Confederation, an independent project Riigireformi Radar (Governance Reform Radar) was launched in order to monitor the government’s performance in this key area. An expert panel has evaluated the government’s performance every three months on five dimensions. The evaluation in September 2016 was more critical than previous ones as the experts argued that the governance reform was at a standstill.

Ireland

Score 7

The coalition government formed in 2011 agreed on a program called Government for National Recovery 2011 – 2016. This set out a legislative program and goals for economic management.

Five annual progress reports on the implementation of this program have since been published. These present favorable views of the government’s achievements during its four years in office. However, a good deal of the reported progress represents initial steps, such as the publication of bills and plans as well as the commissioning of reports, rather than final outcomes.

The increased volume of activity undertaken by the previous coalition government (2011-2016) has been maintained. One (admittedly crude) way to measure this is the amount of legislation passed. For example, the Programme for Government’s 2013 annual report listed 57 new pieces of legislation that had been enacted in the previous 12 months. In the 12 months ending in March 2014, a further 51 were enacted and in the 12 months ending in March 2015 a further 44. Among the significant laws enacted were the new Companies Act and the Regulation of Lobbying Act. The final progress report published in January 2016 lists all 170 new items of legislation passed since the Fine Gael-Labour Party coalition took office in 2011. This means that on average 42.5 legislative acts were passed each year, slightly higher than the 1959 to 2008 average of 37 per year (Gallagher 2010, p.208).

The continuing Irish Water saga and the uncertainty surrounding widespread non-registration for water billing are examples of the government failing to achieve a key
policy objective. However, water also represents a substantial infrastructural challenge. PwC calculated that the average age of water mains in Ireland is between 65 and 85 years old, compared to an EU average of 36 years. Some water mains indeed date back to the 19th century. The average leakage rate of 41% from these mains is very high with only six of the 34 local authorities having leakage rates of below 30%.

In May 2016, the incoming minority government agreed to suspend water charges and establish an expert commission on the issue. This resulted in the publication of the Report on the Funding of Domestic Public Water Services in Ireland in November 2016. The report’s two main recommendations were that there should be a constitutional provision for the public ownership of water utilities and that public water services should be funded through taxation. The report also recommended that excessive or wasteful use of water should be discouraged by charging for such use, consistent with the polluter pays principle.

While these recommendations may mitigate some public criticism, the government still needs to find an estimated €13 billion for infrastructure improvements. It also needs to determine whether it repays the roughly 60% of households who paid their water charges bill or force the remaining 40% of households to pay their water charge.

To accomplish the increased level of activity, parliamentarians are taking fewer holidays: the number of days that the dàil is in session increased by 33% and the use of the guillotine was reduced by 75% during 2014.

Citation:


Italy

Score 7

After the failure of the previous government, the Renzi government realized that it had to increase the speed and scope of policy development. The Renzi government therefore announced a broad and ambitious set of economic and institutional policy reforms. Traditionally, Italian governments have experienced significant difficulties in securing parliamentary approval for their policy agenda. As such, the Renzi government has used law decrees (“decreti legge”) and delegating laws shrewdly to overcome parliamentary delays. Law decrees are temporary legislation that becomes immediately effective and only requires parliamentary approval within 60 days. Meanwhile, delegating laws establish the general legislative principles, but leave the government in charge of defining these principles in practice. The implementation of the Renzi government’s reform program occasionally proved more difficult than
expected, but overall the government has succeeded in achieving its reform agenda. Over the last period, the government concentrated particularly on the constitutional reform and, following parliamentary approval, on its referendum campaign. This attention has to some extent distracted the government from focusing on economic problems and revising aspects of economic reforms that have not proved as effective as expected.

Citation:

Lithuania

Score 7

During the fast process of transition and accession to the European Union, Lithuanian governments’ narrow focus on this task produced a lag in policy implementation. The performance of the Kubilius government in terms of implementing its policy priorities was mixed. Although its policy of fiscal consolidation represented one important success, few major structural reforms occurred in Lithuania during the 2008 to 2012 period, with the exception of higher-education reform, a partial optimization of the health care network and a restructuring of the energy sector. Although the Butkevičius government outlined a broad set of policy priorities, its implementation record was also mixed. The government introduced the euro in 2015, approved the new “social model,” completed the construction of the liquefied-natural-gas terminal in Klaipėda and advanced the renovation of apartment blocks. However, less progress was achieved in other policy areas, including structural reform of higher education and training, health care, and public administration. Coalition politics, shifting political attention, the conflicting strategies of various advocacy coalitions, weak political leadership, and a mismatch between government priorities and the allocation of resources during the budgeting process largely explain the failure to implement some major policy objectives.

The government should also continue improving the effectiveness and efficiency of its spending. In the World Bank’s 2015 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Lithuania scored 85.6 out of 100 for government effectiveness, up from 78.9 in 2014. However, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017 report, Lithuania ranked 89 out of 138 countries for wastefulness of government spending. In her 2015 speech to the parliament, President Dalia Grybauskaitė identified several examples of unsustainable government projects previously supported by EU structural funds.

Citation:
The Worldwide Governance Indicators of World Bank are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home
Luxembourg

Score 7

In general, the government can implement its policy objectives, usually outlined in electoral promises or coalition government programs. This might take longer than planned, given that a policy based on maximum consensus is often cumbersome. But projects are sometimes not only slowed down but delayed indefinitely, especially when powerful lobbies are involved. This is particularly the case for major infrastructural or zoning projects, such as the tramway system for the city of Luxembourg, which was under discussion for 25 years before agreement was reached in 2013. A law proposal, that was already very far advanced, was postponed before the 1999 election. Since then, different aspects have been discussed, studies have been carried out and constructions on the first elements of the tram project have started.

Citation:


Netherlands

Score 7

In its overall assessment of government performance, the General Audit Chamber still finds most departmental reports inadequate in terms of policy effectiveness and efficient monetary expenditure. This is especially true for progress made in cutback policies and, according to parliamentary inquiries, for information- and communications-technology applications and large infrastructure (rail, roads) projects. The government frequently formulates broader or more far-reaching policy goals than are pursued in practice. Recent policy failures have involved train and rail infrastructure, job creation, flexible labor market relations, and tax and pension reforms, which were postponed and will need to be addressed by the next government. Nevertheless, the government will claim credit for renewed, modest economic growth, budgetary equilibrium, and important austerity measures (e.g. an increase in working hours, reduced public funding for home care, a gradual decrease in tax relief on mortgages and capping health care costs).

The national government has devolved a significant quantity of tasks to subnational governments, which makes government and administrative responsibilities more fuzzy, and policy performance harder to evaluate. Provincial and local audit chambers, which have since 2013 demonstrated horizontal and vertical cooperation
and cooperation with the national-level audit chamber, do what they can, but the amount and scope of decentralized tasks is simply too large for their capacity at this moment. Policy implementation in the fields of policing, youth care and care for the elderly in particular are increasingly sources of grave complaints by citizens and professionals; and thus becoming matters of grave concern. In academic and professional evaluation circles, a debate is emerging on how to tailor evaluation research designs to the need for more policy-oriented learning.

Citation:
Eindrapport Parlementair onderzoek naar ICT projecten bij de overheid, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014-2015, 33 326, nr. 5
Provinciale en lokale rekenkamers, Algemene Rekenkamer Verslag 2013 (rekenkamer.nl, consulted 27 October 2014)
Pierre Koning, Van toezicht naar inzicht, Beleidsonderzoek Online, July 2015 (beleidsonderzoekonline.nl, consulted 26 October 2015)
“Fyra mislukt door NS en politiek”, in NRC-Handelsblad, 27 October 2015
NRC-Handelsblad, Hervormingskabinet Rutte II liet belangrijke hervormingen liggen, 21 September 2016
RTL Nieuws, Overheid grijpt in: ProRail niet langer zelfstandig, 16 October, 2016

**Portugal**

**Score 7**

The Costa government has published a very impressive Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 to 2019. In its first year in office, it has implemented several measures to alleviate austerity to secure the parliamentary support of the Portuguese Communist Party, the Left Bloc and the Ecologist Party. More ambitious goals, such as administrative modernization, are being developed. The Costa government has proved to be considerably more stable than initially predicted, which may allow it to implement its ambitious policy objectives. At the same time, the Costa government faces keen scrutiny from the European Union and financial markets regarding fiscal consolidation, and from its parliamentary allies regarding austerity alleviation. These pressures will constrain policy options. However, in its first year in office, the Costa government has been largely successful in negotiating these pressures and advancing its policy agenda.

Citation:

**Spain**

**Score 7**

The Spanish government has not set a system of benchmarks to evaluate its own performance but has been relatively successful in the implementation of major policy objectives. Two main obstacles stand in the way of the government realizing its
declared objectives more easily: First, the weak mechanisms of coordination with the 17 autonomous regions (which are responsible for implementation in many policy areas), and second, the ministerial fragmentation that sees line ministries often more oriented toward their individual departmental or bureaucratic interests than toward the government’s strategic objectives.

However, thanks to the significant constitutional and political resources at their disposal, the prime minister and core executive gradually built their internal executive power between 1982 and 2015, ultimately creating conditions under which a coherent set of major objectives can be developed and policy priorities successfully achieved at the national level. The government has also gained power and autonomy as a result of the country’s EU membership. The loss of absolute parliamentary majority in 2016 may weaken centralized control and render the implementation of government priorities less effective.

Australia

The federal election in September 2013 saw the Liberal-National coalition win a solid majority in the lower house, but it did not secure control of the upper house. Passing legislation required negotiating with the minor parties and independents with senate seats. The government was frustrated in implementing its policy agenda on a number of fronts, including cuts to welfare payments and higher-education funding, deregulation of higher-education fees, and the introduction of patient co-payments for out-of-hospital medical services. These implementation problems were a factor contributing to Tony Abbott’s fall. In September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull became prime minister. This change in prime minister increased public optimism that the government would successfully implement its policy agenda. However, optimism soon faded and the government called a “double-dissolution” election in July 2016. Under a double-dissolution election, all 76 senate seats are contested, rather than the usual 40 seats. The strategy backfired. The coalition government only won a very narrow majority in the lower house and a reduced number of seats in the upper house. Policy gridlock has increased since the July 2016 election.

Citation:

Belgium

On 9 October 2014, the newly instituted government published its government agreement, the document meant to guide its policy over the whole government term. Its first objective has been to increase the employment rate from 67.5% to 73.2%. The activity rate actually peaked in the fourth quarter of 2014 at 68% (according to
Eurostat data) and has since hovered between 67% and 67.7%. Although the drop was less pronounced, a similar pattern was observed in Germany, hinting at economic fluctuations across the euro zone. Employment rates remained flat over the last year, even though they are about 12 percentage points below the German level. This gap is mainly due to the lower employment rate of those aged 55 to 64, which is about 23 percentage points below the German level and, more generally, very low compared to other advanced EU economies. The government did tighten the conditions for early retirement and this may be the cause of a slight uptick in the employment rate. It may also be that a more significant impact has only been delayed. The forthcoming regulatory tightening may have prompted some firms to time their layoffs around the second and third quarters of 2016 to take advantage of the still-lenient conditions for early retirement. If this diagnosis is correct, the government may see more significant results from these reforms next year.

Another challenge that this government has committed to resolve is the past differential in wage inflation, which made the Belgian labor force less competitive. One reform has been to cut social security contributions on a firm’s first employee and all company-paid social security contributions. Another, more contentious, reform has been to block “automatic wage indexation,” a legal constraint that aligns nominal wage growth on inflation. This latter reform induced massive protests and strikes as well as restrained domestic demand. The jury is still out regarding the overall effectiveness of these and other tax reforms in delivering higher investment and employment.

A second objective has been to reform the pension system. The short-term policy objective was to tighten early retirement rules. This reform passed despite substantial dissent from unions and opposition parties. In the longer term, the government aims to create a self-sustaining pension system in which pension outlays will be indexed to GDP growth, therefore fixing the pension-transfers-to-GDP ratio. The government did establish a specialized commission (Comité National des Pensions) that includes academic experts and all major stakeholders. Actual reforms were passed in 2015, but were deemed insufficient and discriminatory by the Comité’s academic experts. One of the main criticisms has been that recent reforms still do not make the system sustainable (by, for example, aligning the progression of pension outlays to GDP growth).

The government agreement’s third objective has been to ensure the sustainability of the social security system. Here, the government articulates a clear direction: it is cutting expenses, reimbursements and coverage across the board, at the risk of disenfranchising the lower-middle class. Another stated objective has been to increase GDP, but the government arguably has little control on economic growth, which largely depends on economic evolutions across the euro zone.

The government’s fourth objective was to reform the tax system and enhance the government’s budget balance. Actual reforms have been too timid to produce a substantial gain in efficiency but large enough to increase the budget deficit.
The fifth objective is much broader and concerns energy, environment, and science policy. Ministers in this area are comparatively weak within their respective parties, in some cases without experience in their portfolio areas, and achievements have accordingly been less clear cut.

The sixth objective is to improve “justice and security.” The main policy lever envisioned here is to improve the “efficiency” of the justice system – that is, to make it work with less funding. Progress has been limited thus far.

The other five stated objectives concern (7) asylum and migration policy, (8) public administration and enterprises, (9) a projection of Belgian “values and interests” in international relations, (10) improvements in mobility and road safety (a largely hopeless task given the complexity of Belgian institutions), and (11) transversal issues that include “equality and fairness”, “sustainable development” and “privacy and personal information protection.” The government still seems quite determined to make progress on several of these issues, but only time will tell what exactly it will achieve.

Citation:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/belgium#protecting-minority-investors
http://www.premier.be/fr/%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-du-gouvernement-3

Bulgaria

Score 6

In general, Bulgarian governments avoid setting policy-performance benchmarks that are available to the public. The two main exceptions are within the area of macroeconomic policy, especially regarding the budget, and compliance with the high-profile requirements of EU membership. The second Borissov government has succeeded in significantly decreasing the fiscal deficit. With respect to the European Union, Bulgaria has been relatively successful in contracting EU funds, but has not yet achieved its long-standing objectives of joining the Schengen Area and of starting the process of joining the euro area. Despite the government’s rhetoric about introducing programmatic budgeting, which necessarily includes performance benchmarks and efficiency measurements, budgeting in Bulgaria in fact remains primarily based on historical expenditures.

Chile

Score 6

Implementation performance varies widely, ranging from excellent in areas where benchmarks and oversight mechanisms are strictly enforced (i.e., the general
government budget) to weak in less rigidly monitored areas (i.e., implementation of some sectoral reforms such as Transantiago, the Santiago transport system). The Piñera government, for example, did not follow through on policies in the field of crime reduction and public safety, while the current Bachelet government has had to downsize its tax- and education-reform proposals. In general terms, far-reaching reforms that would require constitutional change and thus support by at least three-fifths of the national deputies and senators have not been considered as a part of government programs. Thus, this high hurdle has not yet proved to be a practical obstacle in the achievement of governments’ policy objectives. Nevertheless, Bachelet has launched a debate on a constitutional reform.

**Iceland**

**Score 6**

As a rule, the strength of the executive branch vis-a-vis the legislative branch ensures that bills proposed by the government are rarely rejected by parliament. Thus, governments are usually able to achieve all of their policy objectives.

However, legislative proposals by the 2009-2013 left-wing cabinet were twice overturned by the public in national referendums, in 2009 and 2011. On both occasions, the referendums concerned the introduction of government guarantees for losses experienced by Icelandic bank account holders based in the UK and the Netherlands. In both cases, the president refused to sign into effect the government’s legislative proposal, which triggered a constitutional clause referring the proposed legislation to a national referendum.

Other examples of executive weakness include the failure of the 2009-2013 cabinet to deliver on three important elements of its platform: a new constitution, a reform of the system managing Iceland’s fisheries, and a deal on Iceland’s accession to the EU that could be put to a national referendum. These failures were due to internal disagreements between the coalition parties (Social Democrats and Left-Green movement) and the obstructive tactics of the opposition, including extensive filibustering.

The cabinets of Gunnlaugsson (2013-2016) and Jóhannesson (2016), both with a parliamentary majority of 38-25, have had no problems in implementing their policy objectives, even though some ministerial initiatives have been thwarted.

**Israel**

**Score 6**

In accordance with government decision 4085, the PMO publishes yearly working plans for line ministries. The yearly plan for 2014 was the first to also publish detailed benchmarks for policy goals. However, as it does not show progress for previous years, it is difficult to track long term progress. Prominent topics on the
government’s agenda in recent years such as the housing supply, the cost of living, the unrecognized settlements for the Bedouin population and illegal immigration did not reach visible resolutions or substantial achievements. In fact, a large share of government decisions are never implemented. According to several sources in the PMO, in the recent years the PMO has outright rejected calls for monitoring the implementation of government decisions. Some of these sources claim that the government avoids monitoring its implementation of policy decisions because it expects the outcome would be unflattering. In response to these concerns, the PMO’s director general created a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of approved legislation and new government decisions. Through this mechanism, the director general ordered ministries to report on the implementation process. As a result, the PMO discovered that, in many cases, orders regarding the implementation of government decisions did not direct which ministry would oversee their execution. In response, the PMO suggested that those orders be written more clearly. There were also other attempts to follow the implementation of government decisions, such as an effort by the Citizens’ Empowerment Center.

The Israeli central bank’s periodic evaluations show that the Israeli government performs fairly well in most economic criteria such as inflation, unemployment and crisis aversion. However, the growing deficit is seen as a cause for concern, especially considering the high cost of the “Protective Edge” military operation and further political commitments for social expenditures in 2015. While the Israeli government has been modestly efficient in achieving its policy goals, it has done so by resorting to a highly disputed emergency law (the Arrangements Law) instead of through regular legislation.

Citation:
Robinson, Eyal, “Implementation of policy as a key in planning cycle and decision-making at the national level”, Citizens Empowerment Center in Israel, July 2014 (Hebrew).
“Aspects of planning, measurements and control in government proposals brought to government’s discussion”, September 2008 (Hebrew)
“Book of working plans 2014,” PMO website (March 2014) (Hebrew)
“Deputy chancellor of the Bank of Israel, Dr. Karnit Flug, in the agenda forum meeting: where are we in achieving social-economic government goals?”, Bank of Israel website 16.4.2012 (Hebrew)
“Hok Ha-Hesderim,” The Knesset website (Hebrew)
“Yearly report 64a”, State Comptroller official publication 15.10.2013: http://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Reports/Pages/113.aspx (Hebrew)
http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2970895
Zachria, Zvi. ‘New Application Will Allow The Public to Follow the Pace of Laws and Government Decision’s Implementations’ - The Marker, 15.7.15 (Hebrew):
http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2684691
Japan

Score 6

The LDP-led government elected in late 2012 achieved remarkable economic policy success during its first months in office through the initiation of an extremely loose monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy. The “third arrow” of the government’s reform program – growth-oriented measures that were meant to include institutional reform – have proved far less successful. The major successes of economic policy include a rise in employment, including among women and the elderly, and a stabilization of the inflation rate in positive terrain, although still quite far from the 2% goal. However, the introduction of three new arrows in mid-2015 (a strong economy, better childcare and improved social security) take the focus away from the key concern for the future: decisive, innovative, structural reform. The Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens of mid-2016 confirms this serious concern. The central bank plans to push the inflationary goal further into the future (2018), and its governor has grown increasingly vocal about the lack of economic reform. While the government has earmarked labor for 2017 legislation, the focus on equal pay for equal work points to a social and distributional agenda rather than a growth and productivity agenda.

With respect to the second major objective, constitutional reform, important legislation to engage in collective self-defense (i.e., militarily support for allies under attack) was pushed through parliament in September 2015. Despite two-third majorities in both houses for the ruling coalition since July 2016, the Abe government still hesitates to start the institutionalized process of constitutional reform. The population is very divided and the coalition partner Komeito is not in agreement. The opportunity costs of a more assertive security policy in terms of strained regional relations is noticeable, although there has been some relaxation of tensions during 2016, evidenced by high-level meetings.

Citation:

Malta

Score 6

Government efficiency has continued to improve. Central to this improvement has been the Prime Minister’s Office and the work of the Principal Permanent Secretary’s Office. Policy implementation is measured against agreed benchmarks. The preparations over the last year for the EU Presidency has improved public service efficiency. Ongoing training has been the key. However, problems remain. The government was able to back track on reforms between 2008 and 2013, but now problems are being addressed. The Auditor General’s 2015 report identified some persistent failings, including spending in excess of budgets, inventory management, lack of control over service providers, unreliable attendance records, controls related
to personal emoluments, missing documentation, deficiencies in stock management and lack of adherence to the Public Procurement Regulations (with respect to Direct Orders obtained retroactively for a number of services). Local councils’ performance was suboptimal, with the Auditor’s report stating that “accounts lacked documentation, were improperly recorded, missing key components and sometimes contained conflicting figures. Effectively, this prohibited the NAO from analyzing their performance.”

Citation:
Gozo projects lacking good-governance rules Times of Malta 16/12/2015
Briguglio, M An F for Local Councils Times of Malta 12/12/16
Report by the Auditor General Public Accounts 2015

Slovakia

Score 6
The government manifesto of the second Fico government was very vague. While the government met its fiscal and employment goals, self-declared reform projects such as health care reform, the adoption of a new construction act or the amendment of the Civil Service Act were not completed and had to be carried over to the new term. The government manifesto of the third government reiterates many goals of the previous one. Although it comprises around 70 pages, it lacks action plans, timelines and budgets.

Slovenia

Score 6
The Cerar government’s coalition agreement has been relatively comprehensive and more detailed than those of previous governments. However, many goals and deadlines stated in the agreement have not been met. The announced health care and education reforms have been postponed several times. The tax reform eventually adopted in summer 2016 has been more modest than initially announced. On pensions, the government has so far only come up with a White Book without any concrete reform proposals. As for privatization, the coalition agreement took a cautious approach and remained relatively vague. Given the lack of consensus among the coalition partners about the remaining role of the state, it did not come as a surprise that some privatization decisions led to cracks in the coalition. The promised privatization of Telekom Slovenije, the largest communication company in the country, fell victim to political opposition from within and outside the governing coalition. The same occurred with the promised privatization of Slovenia’s largest bank NLB, which was postponed until 2017, after the initial public offering (IPO) had been expected to start in second half of 2016.
Turkey

Score 6

The government’s performance has been mixed at best during the review period. The economy has weakened compared with the situation some years ago, while its onetime proactive and strategic foreign and security policies have become less coherent, particularly with regard to regional conflicts. The AKP’s credibility was itself undermined by the party leadership’s unwillingness to accept the results of the June 2015 elections. The contradictions between the goals of political liberalization and the government’s conservative-religious ambitions have become increasingly visible. Seeking to consolidate its control over the government, the AKP has instead sought to create a legal framework for a “monopolization” of power. Admittedly, oppositional forces inside and outside of parliament often play into the ruling party’s hands.

Governmental inefficiency in several sectors are worthy of special mention, especially in the economy. The first nine months of implementation of the government’s annual economic objectives varied sharply from official forecasts in the budget and the Medium Term Plan of 2015-2017. Ultimately, the government had to correct its end-year expectations with regard to unemployment, inflation rates, growth and per capita income. The decrease in the current account deficit has been attributed to the shrinking economy. Results were similarly mixed in other sectors. For instance, the Ministry of Education realized half of its 130 performance objectives, while the Ministry of Health completed 10 of 34 service-oriented performance objectives and 12 of 17 institutional performance objectives in 2014. During the review period and not least due to the high number of terrorist attacks, the more accommodationist approach towards the Kurdish population on social and cultural policy has been replaced with a security-related and increasingly nationalistic approach that opposes the values of a liberal society.

Foreign policy faced a number of significant challenges associated with regional and international dynamics within the Middle East, especially the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. On the one hand, Turkey’s own involvement in the conflict – particularly with regard to the Kurdish issue within Turkey and in northern Syria – as well as President Erdoğan’s tactical approach created tensions with Turkey’s main Western allies, as well as neighbors such as Russia and Iran. On the other hand, the government’s doctrine of humanitarian diplomacy, with a special focus on the refugee crisis, has been effectively implemented by the main actors, including the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD).

No significant progress was made concerning EU accession, although two more chapters have been opened (No. 17 - Economic and monetary policy on 14 December 2015, and No. 33 - Financial and budgetary provisions on 30 June 2016). Yet no previously opened ones has been preliminarily closed. During 2015, the
refugee issue led to the mutual awareness of a common problem requiring joint action; however, the mutual commitment between the EU and Turkey on handling the inflow of refugees was finalized only in late November 2015, and agreement on a final package, then including visa liberalization and other aspects, was reached on 18 March 2016.

Citation:


Pelin Ünker, Ekonomide tüm hedefler şaşırt, Cumhuriyet daily newspaper, 10 September 2015. (accessed 27 October 2015)


Czech Republic

Score 5

The Sobotka government has tried to reconcile conflicting objectives and interests of coalition partners, but only with partial success. While it has made substantial progress with anti-corruption legislation and R&D, the initiated education reform has not been implemented. Despite growing public support for alternative forms of child care, most notably so-called children’s groups, child-care provision has remained limited, hampering female labor market participation. The growing tensions between the coalition partners, which culminated in the amendment to the conflict of interest law against the will of ANO and with the support of the opposition parties, has reduced the governments’ ability to achieve its objectives over the course of the period under review.

Greece

Score 5

Significant structural reforms have been legislated by successive Greek governments in the last six years, but their mix and implementation were, and continue to be, uneven. Greece has implemented important labor market reforms, but progress has been less on reducing oligopoly power, the regulatory burden and weaknesses in the public administration due to administrative capacity constraints, little ownership of past reform programs and the blocking influence of vested interests.
Policy implementation efforts have been problematic throughout the period under review and even more so since the government turnover of January 2015. From time to time, administrative incapacity coupled with resistance on the part of affected interest groups (e.g., the liberal professions) and economic recession (which has clipped opportunities to raise capital), have delayed the implementation of important policies. Examples of a lingering implementation gap include the problems still encountered by young entrepreneurs and professionals when it comes to establishing and operating a new business or entering a market in a previously restricted profession (e.g., starting a commercial transport business using trucks, opening a pharmacy).

However, in major policy sectors, such as pension reform, in which the government found itself pressed by Greece’s lenders, it proceeded to pass the relevant legislation and started implementing it. The same can be claimed to some extent with regard to privatization of state-owned property (e.g., the sale of the vast, state-owned Hellenicon area in Athens, where the old Athens airport used to be). There was also some progress as far as the reception and registration of refugees is concerned. In the period under review, many of the relevant competences were taken away from the regional public administration and local government services and were handed over to the better-organized Greek armed forces. Overall, during the period under review, the ministries and state agencies made some progress regarding policy implementation.

Citation:
OECD Economic Surveys, Greece, March 2016
(https://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/GRC%202016%20Overview%20EN.pdf)

**Hungary**

**Score 5**

The Orbán governments have been quite successful in consolidating political power, centralizing policymaking, and weakening the remaining checks and balances. At the same time, they have largely failed to meet broader goals such as fostering sustainable economic growth or increasing employment in the private sector. The low degree of government efficiency has been illustrated by frequent policy changes in all policy fields and by the lack of coordination of policy fields. A central problem has been the implementation of new bills and regulations. Overhasty policymaking has led to incoherent and contradictory legal texts, causing extreme difficulties for local and county administrations. The government’s low level of efficiency has been acknowledged by PMO minister Lázár himself several times.

**Romania**

**Score 5**

As a caretaker government, the agenda of the Ciolos government was limited. At the beginning of its term in November 2015, Prime Minister Ciolos emphasized that the aim of the government was not to reform the Romanian society on all fronts, but to
lay the foundations for such reform. The main goals laid out in the government manifesto were the amendment of electoral law and the organization of the 2016 general elections, improved access to European development funds, expanded investment in infrastructure (especially completing some of the main highways and railways already under construction), an improved relationship with the European Union, a contingency plan to deal with Brexit, and more active involvement in negotiating the number of accepted refugees. The government succeeded in meeting most of these goals, even though some amendments of electoral law remained controversial and the government’s plan to have mayors elected in two rounds was killed by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the Ciolos government made little progress with policy reform.

United States

Policy implementation in the separation-of-powers system is conditioned by the potentially conflicting goals of the legislative and executive branches, especially when they are controlled by different political parties (so-called divided government). In the current highly polarized state of the political parties, cooperation between the branches can be virtually nonexistent. From 2011 to 2016, with a Democratic president, Republicans controlling one or both houses of Congress, and an aggressive far-right (“Tea Party”) Republican faction that was often able to block action, the U.S. government has had profound difficulty in accomplishing any policy goals. The two Congresses of this period have been the least productive, i.e., enacting the fewest laws, of any Congress in the modern era (since 1920s pre-Depression era). As of 2016, the president has been unable to secure enactment of his priorities on immigration, climate change, gun control, and other areas, and is likely to fail in securing ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

In 2015, with the Republican congressional leadership eager to avoid further blame for disruption and deadlock, the president and Congress had some notable successes in reaching agreement, for instance forging a bipartisan budget agreement and authorizing necessary debt-limit increases for the duration of the Obama presidency. However, the Tea Party Republicans were so incensed by their party’s compromises with the Democrats that Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner felt compelled to resign his position.

As for implementing legislation, the U.S. government has shown poor implementation performance on several matters. Most importantly, the rollout of the Affordable Care Act website was disastrous, delaying sign-ups for millions of potential clients for many months. A number of states led by Republican governors have declined to participate in the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, which provides coverage to low-income individuals. Despite public acceptance of some parts of the program and its considerable success in expanding coverage, the government has been unable to address significant problems, such as the lack of competitive
insurance providers in some markets. Other administrative calamities have concerned the Veterans’ Administration hospitals, the Internal Revenue Service, the Secret Service (protective services), and the National Security Agency.

Croatia

Score 4

The Orešković government eventually came up with a comprehensive reform program at the end of April 2016. This program included 60 reforms with four main goals: macroeconomic stability and economic security, an improved business and investment climate, public sector efficiency and transparency, and education aligned with the labor market. The list of measures was extensive, ranging from improving public debt management and increasing the efficiency of budget planning and expenditure control, to setting in order cadastral maps and land books, to stimulating higher investments in research and development, to reorganization of the courts, to curricular reform in education. The package came with clear implementation deadlines, most of which ranged from May 2016 to late 2017. As a result of conflicts in the governing coalition and the latter’s eventual breakdown, the Orešković government’s reform program was not implemented.

South Korea

Score 4

During the first half of her term, Park Geun-hye enjoyed a clear mandate from the public, and maintained fairly high approval ratings. However, in the April 2016 parliamentary elections, President Park’s Saenuri Party suffered a surprising defeat and lost its parliamentary majority. In October, the Choi Soon-sil scandal was revealed, and the president’s approval rating dropped to just 4% in November 2016 — the lowest such figure ever recorded for a South Korean president. More than a year before the next presidential election, Park was thus considered to be a lame-duck president. By the close of the review period, it seemed unlikely that she would be able to implement any future major initiatives. But even before the events of 2016, the Park administration had failed to achieve many of its policy objectives. Even some government officials conceded the presence of implementation problems due to a lack of comprehensive plans.

Citation:
“S. Korea ‘bureaucracy risk’ derails economic innovation,” Mael Business Newspaper, March 26, 2014
“Park’s approval rating hits record-low of 5% “, Korea Times, November 4, 2016,

Cyprus

Score 3

The government successfully stabilized the situation and contained the crisis in the fiscal and financial sectors. However, the response to clauses of the MoU signed with creditors relating to long-term actions and extensive reforms has not been adequate.
There is a need for economic shifts to bring about sustainability, public-sector reforms and the privatization of semi-governmental organizations, such as operation of a NHS. The negative impact on individuals’ lives and welfare increases the risk of poverty and exclusion. Thanks to the relative success of some of the government’s economic and budgetary policies, the Cypriot economy has experienced more appreciation in the fields of business confidence and competitiveness.

France

Score 3

The government is efficient in implementing its programs, as it can rely on a relatively disciplined cabinet and an obedient majority. Resistance, if any, comes from social actors. The question whether government policies are effective is another matter. One of the major issues facing the government during the review period is a lack of credibility concerning the commitments it has taken in relation to growth, unemployment and the reduction of deficits. Optimistic forecasts have been disappointed by poor results on all fronts. Most international organizations (the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the European Union), think tanks or even national organizations (the French central bank, the statistical institute, the Court of Auditors) have pointed out the impossibility of reaching set targets based on over-optimistic data or forecasts. This situation has not changed over the period and might worsen in 2017‒2018, as the Hollande administration has taken on many financial commitments with a delayed impact that will be imposed on the next government.

Mexico

Score 3

The government’s ability to implement policy is geographically and functionally uneven. While there are islands of technical expertise and competence, overall policy implementation is hampered by several factors. The most significant of these have been: (a) the state’s lack of financial resources due to insufficient taxation capacity, (b) the organizational weakness of subnational governments and the decentralized agencies overseen by federal ministries, (c) high levels of crime and impunity, and (d) the ineffective rule of law.

The central government has been able to find the necessary financial resources for prestige projects and highly visible policy priorities. Overall, however, the state remains ineffective in providing basic public goods, including education, public health and security. Mexico is a federal country, and the quality of governance by state and municipal governments varies enormously. Some municipalities are professionally organized, but others lack basic capacities to provide those public goods that fall within their local responsibility. Until recently, municipal authorities were elected for three-year terms of office with no re-election permitted. This system
created some very unconstructive incentive structures, as officeholders were not rewarded for considering long-term challenges. However, a recent constitutional reform now allows municipalities to set their own term limits with respect to re-election.

While the president has embarked on several major reform projects, all of these initiatives are left underfunded in the current austerity budget.
Indicator
Ministerial Compliance

Question
To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8-6 = The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5-3 = The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2-1 = The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.

Australia
Score 10
Strong party discipline and adherence to the Westminster doctrine of cabinet collective responsibility ensure that ministers have strong incentives to implement the government’s program, rather than follow their own self-interest. Australian prime ministers are very dependent on their party caucuses and cannot govern against the majority in the caucus. Labor prime ministers in particular are limited in their choice of ministers, and have to accept the nominations of the various party factions. The recent successful challenge demonstrated that Liberal prime ministers are also increasingly dependent on their caucuses.

Citation:

Canada
Score 10
In the Canadian system, the prime minister, in consultation with political staff, forms the Cabinet and appoints his or her ministers, who serve on a discretionary basis. Any Cabinet minister who is not perceived by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to be a team player, or is seen as a political liability, will have a short career. Cabinet ministers are evaluated and hence promoted and demoted on the basis of their ability to deliver on the government’s agenda. The prime minister and his office (PMO) have an important role in appointing deputy ministers and chiefs of staff. Deputy ministers are appointed by the prime minister on the advice of the clerk of the Privy
Council Office. Deputy ministers are promoted (or less often demoted) for a variety of reasons, including the attempt to match their talents to the requirements of the department, efforts to establish a gender and linguistic balance, and so on.

Hungary

Score 10
Ministerial compliance has diminished in the period under review. The replacements for the purged Simicska followers have been loyal, but incompetent, so that their actions have often been chaotic. The increasing disorder has led to soft resistance by János Lázár, the head of the PMO, who has sometimes criticized the official line indirectly but publicly. The creation of two new cabinet committees - economic cabinet with Mihály Varga and strategic cabinet with János Lázár - in summer 2016 aimed at demonstrating the power of the prime minister, but also at pushing for more policy compliance of ministers and senior officials.

South Korea

Score 10
Ministers in South Korea do not have their own political base and depend almost solely on the support of the president. The president appoints and dismisses ministers, and frequently reshuffles the cabinet. The average tenure of a minister has continuously declined over the past two decades. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, the average period of service was about one year. This high degree of turnover limits ministerial independence, as they are unable to develop their own voice to pursue their own or institutional policy ideas. The role of National Assembly confirmation hearings for ministerial candidates should not be underestimated. Under Park Geun-hye’s administration, three prime-ministerial candidates failed to survive these hearings in combination with the media’s scrutiny.

Sweden

Score 10
In Sweden, ministers and departments do not implement policy. The task is handled by the executive agencies. A major concern in Sweden is the degree to which ministers can, and should, steer the agencies. Swedish agencies are highly autonomous but departments can formally steer them by appointing the Director General of the agency, deciding on the regulatory and institutional framework of the agency, and allocating financial resources to specific tasks and programs.

In Sweden, as in many other countries, the relationship between departments and agencies, and the willingness of the latter to implement policies defined by the former, can hinder or enable implementation. In Sweden, the relationship between
departments and agencies is an institutional relation, not a personal relation between a minister and the director of an agency. Thus, to the extent that it is meaningful to talk about incentives, they have to be organizational incentives. Furthermore, implementing policy is a core role for the agencies, so incentives are hardly necessary.

Citation:

United States

Score 10
The president has a high level of control over appointments such as agency and department heads. They serve at the president’s discretion, and need the support of the White House for their success, both in terms of agency missions and individual careers. Conflicts between the department heads and the White House occasionally emerge, but they are usually limited to a speech or remark that conflicts with presidential policy. As recent presidents have upgraded their ability to monitor agency activities and to draw major issues into the White House, conflicts between the agencies and the White House have largely disappeared.

Chile

Score 9
The president annually evaluates his or her ministers’ policy performance. In a commission consisting of the president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and budgetary units of the government, ministers have to present their sectoral priorities, and if necessary, arrangements and modifications are made to ensure alignment with the government program.

Denmark

Score 9
Denmark has parliamentary rule. The government can be forced to retire any time if in the minority in parliament. The prime minister is the leader of the government, and he or she does not allow ministers to pursue private interests that are not compatible with the declared goals of the government. Close scrutiny by parliament, including its committees, and an attentive press, seldom lets rogue ministers behave this way for long. The prime minister can both fire and promote ministers, so there are incentives to do what the prime minister expects. Party members can of course revolt against a prime minister, but this happens rarely in Denmark. There is a high degree of party discipline.
France

Score 9

Compliance by ministers, if assessed comparatively, is good, as a minister can be dismissed at any time and without explanation. In the French majority system and in the absence of real coalition governments, the ministers, who are nominated by the president, are largely assigned to him. Together with the effective hierarchical steering of governmental action, ministers have strong incentives to implement the government’s program, following guidelines set up by the president and prime minister. This statement remains true but is highly dependent on the leadership capacities of the president and prime minister. Up to 2014, due to insufficient presidential leadership, cases of rules infringement by prominent ministers occurred, undermining the credibility of governmental action. Former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, who came into office in March 2014, put an end to this and restored strict compliance rules. However, he remained squeezed between a reluctant party and a feeble president, further weakened as his term wound down.

Iceland

Score 9

Ministers usually follow party lines, but individual ministers have considerable authority to make independent decisions. However, non-collective decisions are rare.

Under the 2009-2013 cabinet, dissent between ministers had little to do with specific ministerial actions. For example, when the parliament voted in 2009 on Iceland’s application for EU membership, one government minister, Jón Bjarnason from the Left-Green Movement, voted against the resolution. Bjarnason repeatedly expressed his opposition to Iceland’s accession to the EU throughout his tenure. The following cabinets have experienced no such ministerial divisions - except the aforementioned episode of former prime minister Sigmundur Davið Gunnlaugsson in early April 2016 as the Panama Papers scandal broke.

Italy

Score 9

Although Italian prime ministers have historically held weak executive powers, the dominant role played by Prime Minister Renzi – who also heads the Democratic Party – has generally guaranteed that ministers will promote the main points in the government’s program. A significant number of ministers are Democratic Party members and are intensely loyal to Renzi. There are also ministers from other parties, but these parties are weak and their ministers cannot exercise a great deal of
autonomy. However, departmental self-interests have obviously not disappeared, and this may mean that decisions adopted are not always followed with adequate speed by the more detailed implementation measures required.

Latvia

Score 9

Organizational devices that encourage ministerial compliance include: a public statement of policy intent, a government declaration signed by each minister, a coalition agreement outlining the terms of cooperation between the governing parties and an informal weekly coalition-council meeting. Additionally, the government office monitors compliance with cabinet decisions, while the PKC monitors implementation of the government declaration. Both reporting streams enable the prime minister to fully monitor individual ministers’ progress in achieving the government’s program. Nevertheless, disagreements between ministers regularly become public and can be divisive. Most recently, ministers have disagreed over the EU migrant relocation scheme and tax system reform.

New Zealand

Score 9

There is a strong tradition of collective responsibility of the cabinet. Ministers are allowed to disagree over policy initiatives, even in public, but once a decision has been made in cabinet they have to follow the collective will. The Cabinet Manual 2008 is very explicit about this. The prime minister has the power to appoint and dismiss ministers (formally it is the governor general who does this on the advice of the prime minister). In reality, however, whereas the National cabinet is chosen by the prime minister, Labour’s is subject to an election by all of its MPs, with the prime minister’s direct power being largely limited to the allocation of portfolios. Naturally, in coalition governments or minority governments with support agreements with other parties, the prime minister’s power over the personnel of another party is restricted. Collective responsibility within a formal coalition arrangement is strengthened by an extensive list of coalition management instruments based on a comprehensive coalition agreement with regard to the legislative agenda but also procedures to ensure coalition discipline. On the other hand, there are procedures for dealing with a minority government. The current National minority government has been building on the experience of earlier minority governments on how to ensure ministerial compliance under a confidence and supply mandate. In its Cabinet Office Circular CO (15) 1 “National-led Administration: Consultation and Operating Arrangements,” the government at the time of writing specified the nature of its agreements with support parties that receive ministerial appointments outside of cabinet. While such ministers may disagree with government policy if it lies outside their ministerial responsibility, they are bound by collective responsibility on issues within their portfolio.
Norway

Score 9

There is a strong tradition of cabinet government in Norway. The cabinet meets several times a week, and government decisions formally need to be made in cabinet. The convention of close ministerial cooperation increases ministers’ identification with the government’s program and makes the government work as a team. As long as divisions between coalition partners are not strong, this system guarantees relatively strong cabinet cohesion, as has been the experience in recent years.

Spain

Score 9

All prime ministers since the restoration of democracy have presided over single-party governments – Spain being the only EU country aside from Malta in which there has not been any experience with coalitions at the central-government level. Thus, Mariano Rajoy has the capacity to impose his views on the Council of Ministers and the party meetings that he also chaired. He is free to reorganize government structures and to dismiss ministers he does not consider able or willing to implement the government’s program. He did so during the period under review, reorganizing the government and ministers after the 2016 elections.

The constitution (which stipulates that parliamentary confidence rests personally with the prime minister and his comprehensive government program), the Spanish party system (featuring prime ministers that have up to this point also been the strong leaders of very disciplined parties), and the organization of the executive thus provide strong incentives for all ministers to implement the overall government program rather than seeking the sectoral interests of their individual departments. However, the fact that the government’s hierarchical organizational devices provide these potentially strong incentives does not necessarily ensure that ministers always subordinate their sectoral self-interest to the general interests of the government. They actually enjoy some degree of political autonomy, in some cases as important mid-level or regional leaders of the governing party.

United Kingdom

Score 9

The prime minister has traditionally had more or less absolute power to appoint politicians to government positions. She can thus use this power of patronage to earn the loyalty of backbench MPs and to ensure that ministers stick to the government agenda. Despite occasional leaks, the collective responsibility of cabinet is a well-
entrenched doctrine and standards of behavior are recorded in the Ministerial Code. The prime minister’s power is partly dependent on the incumbent’s political strength and calculations by their party as to their future electoral success (which is directly linked to their own job security). Party whips also play a key role in passing legislation and thus in supporting the government, and – although Conservative MPs elected since 2010 are sometimes considered to be more prone to rebellion – any MPs with strong political ambitions have to be wary of being branded as mavericks. However, this label has become significantly less stigmatizing over the past years.

**Belgium**

Score 8

One should distinguish de jure powers from the government’s de facto powers to provide incentives to each minister. De jure, the prime minister has little power to exclude ministers from the government. The main architects of government positions are the party presidents who, at the government-formation stage, negotiate for control of the various portfolios, and then nominate their people. Every minister’s primary incentive is thus to push his or her own party’s views, rather than the government’s potential view.

That said, this hierarchical structure is actually able to impose strong discipline on each minister when the incentives of party presidents are sufficiently aligned with those of the government.

**Estonia**

Score 8

Estonia typically has coalition governments, and reaching an agreement on priorities and goals of the future government is the core issue of the cabinet-formation process. When the coalition cabinet has a mandate from the president, it acts in accordance with the government program and rules of procedure signed by all coalition partners. The process of program implementation is coordinated by the coalition committee, comprised of four representatives from each coalition partner. The coalition committee meets weekly, and coalition partners make decisions by consensus. However, the coalition government that came to power in 2015 was less coherent than its predecessors.

**Finland**

Score 8

A number of mechanisms are in place that serve to bind ministers to the government’s program. Government programs result from negotiations between the political parties forming the government; in consequence, the coalition partners and ministries closely monitor implementation. Cabinet agenda issues are generally
prepared, discussed and coordinated in cabinet committees as well as in informal
groups and meetings. On the whole, ministers are closely watched, and are expected
to be integral parts of cooperative units. They would no doubt find it difficult as well
as unrewarding to pursue narrow self-interests. Nevertheless, individual figures’
profile-raising attempts have been discernible in the Sipilä cabinet, largely within the
so-called Finns Party.

Germany

Score 8

In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies that fall under their
jurisdiction. Therefore, individual ministers have some leeway to pursue their own or
their party’s interests. This leeway is substantial in international comparison.
Ministers sometimes pursue interests that therefore clash with the chancellor or
correlation agreements. In the case of the current government, the coalition agreement
bears considerable political weight and has thus far proved effective in guiding
ministry activities. In terms of budgetary matters, Minister of Finance Wolfgang
Schäuble is particularly powerful and able – when he has the chancellor’s support –
to reject financial requests by other ministries.

Coalition agreements provide for clear rules when a coalition committee will meet
and who will join the meetings. As in previous coalitions, it consists of the
chancellor and the vice-chancellor, the leaders of parliamentary groups and party
leaders (if they are not already covered by the persons mentioned above). During the
period under review, the coalition committee informally became the most important
institution in resolving political disagreements within the government.

Mexico

Score 8

Whatever problems there may be with the Mexican system, it does deal effectively
with the so-called agency problem, except perhaps at the very end of the presidential
term, when the lame duck phenomenon occurs. Cabinet secretaries mostly have a
strong incentive to avoid incurring presidential displeasure. This is less true at the
very end of the presidential term, when the cabinet becomes more politicized and
some political figures may jump ship to serve the new administration. Usually the
government acts as a lame duck during its last months in office, and not much is
expected of it.

Poland

Score 8

Since the cabinet consists of a group of people who were more or less hand-picked
by PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the need for using specific organizational
devices for exerting pressure on ministers to stay in line with the government’s program has been limited. Despite some internal debates and power struggles, ministers have largely been committed to implementing the government’s program, one bullet point after another.

**Switzerland**

*Score 8*

Government in Switzerland is not (primarily) party-driven. Ministers are expected to work together as a collegium, and to abstain from any politics or policies that benefit their party or themselves as individual politicians. In general, this worked quite well so long as all members of government felt bound by the rules of collegiality. In recent years, due to growing political polarization and an attack on consociational politics by the right-populist party, there have been some deviations from this course. However, even in periods of polarized politics, the Swiss government and its policy implementation is much less driven by the interests of individual politicians or parties than is typically the case for parliamentary governments. In the current review period, ministerial compliance and cooperation were much more pronounced than between 2003 and 2007.

**Bulgaria**

*Score 7*

The prime minister does not have significant legal powers vis-à-vis his ministerial colleagues. The 1991 constitution defines the Council of Ministers as a collective body, with the prime minister being only “an equal among equals.” The position of the prime minister thus strongly depends on his or her informal political authority. When the prime minister is a party leader and features a relatively strong personality, as in the case of the Borissov governments, the informal influence is significant. This was demonstrated by the resignation of the minister of education in early 2016 following the prime minister’s demand. The right of the prime minister to fire deputy ministers is a major power in ensuring that ministries comply with the cabinet’s priorities.

**Ireland**

*Score 7*

The current minority-led government represents a range of different agendas and priorities. The allocation of ministries between them has a significant influence on the overall coherence of government policy.

Individual ministries are to a significant degree independent fiefdoms that can be used by individual ministers to pursue their self-interest – including boosting their chances of reelection – rather than any comprehensive government objective. The
system requires even senior ministers to spend considerable time and energy in local constituency work, because few are sufficiently distanced from the risk of losing their seat at the next election. One newspaper recently estimated (informally) that ministers spend only about 10% of their time on national issues.

The two ministries with overarching responsibility for coordinating this program are the Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of Finance.

Ministers are not involved in the appointment or promotion of civil servants; at the higher levels of the civil service, appointment is now in the hands of the independent Top Level Appointments Commission. However, a 2014 conflict over the roles of the minister for justice and the commissioner of the Garda Síochána (the police force) led to the resignation of both men, and eventually the departure of the secretary general of the Department of Justice as well.

Ministers select their own advisers and consultants and these exercise considerable influence. For the most part, however, individual ministers do implement government policy. But over time there is a tendency for some to pursue increasingly idiosyncratic goals. The ultimate sanction can be exercised by the taoiseach, as occurred in the major cabinet reshuffle of July 2014, which was designed to increase the government’s cohesiveness.

**Israel**

Influences from the OECD and global best practice methods have altered Israel’s organization of government in recent years. Values of transparency, planning, comparability and supervision from a designated unit in the PMO were introduced, arguably improving implementation to the overall government program by increasing ministerial accountability vis-a-vis the government and the public. These new actions accompany more traditional pathways to better compliance such as weekly cabinet sessions and interministerial roundtable events.

Structural elements contradict this trend by imposing centralization. The government’s budget process essentially undermines the authority of individual ministers by creating a negative incentive for cooperation and forcing ministers into a more combative stance against each other. The Arrangements Law (an omnibus law which includes bills and amendments specifically aimed at restricting expenditures and achieving economic goals) is another bold expression of the additional power given to the budget department of the Ministry of Finance. This bill is often used to cancel or negate reforms or legislation already passed by other ministries, thus undermining their commitment to the government’s program.

Citation:
Blander, Dana, “Hok Ha-Hesderim: Necessary evil or necessarily evil?,” IDI website 14.1.2007 (Hebrew)
Salonim, Ori, “Measuring performance in the public service,” The eleventh annual Hertzliya conference official
Japan

Score 7

Japan’s political framework formally provides the prime minister with powerful tools to control ministers. Prime ministers can appoint and fire ministers at will. Moreover, prime ministers can effectively veto specific sectoral policies. In practice, however, prime ministerial options have been more limited, as most have lacked full control over their own parties or over the powerful and entrenched bureaucracy.

Recent governments, including the current Abe government, have sought to centralize policymaking within the core executive. Some measures have been institutional, such as giving new weight to the Cabinet Secretariat attached to the Cabinet Office and to the Council for Economic and Fiscal Policy, a cabinet committee in which the prime minister has a stronger voice. Other measures include a stronger role in top-level personnel decisions, aided by the formal introduction of the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in mid-2014. Such institutional measures have proved quite successful.

Lithuania

Score 7

The government’s organization provides ministers with various incentives to implement the government’s agenda. The primary organizational instruments include coalition agreements, government programs, annual government priorities, identified priority actions and monitoring processes, cabinet meetings and deliberations, and the assignment of ministerial responsibility for policy areas. Since prime ministerial powers within the executive are limited by constitutional provisions and the fragmentation of coalition governments, officeholders need to seek support from other cabinet ministers (including ministers of finance, who tend to share the prime minister’s party affiliation), from parliamentary factions, and from the president (who has a veto power over draft laws) as they seek to implement the major objectives of the government program. In addition, as they implement governmental policy, line ministries tend to focus on the sectoral-policy aims falling under their responsibility at the expense of related horizontal-policy aims.

Luxembourg

Score 7

The Luxembourg electoral system combines proportional representation of candidate lists and a type of majority system that allows a voter to pick individual candidates by giving them preferential votes on more than one list.
Consequently, the voters, and not the party, decide on the composition of parliament and even of the government, since those candidates with the best results usually become ministers. This system encourages politicians to pursue personal initiatives, but as they generally address small lobbies, such projects do not typically conflict with the government’s agenda.

“Go-it-alone” actions are not uncommon because ministers and candidates want to raise their profile to benefit precisely from these personal votes that ultimately make the difference. Especially in pre-electoral periods, this kind of deviant behavior is quite frequent. Ministers are usually allowed to pursue their pet topics, provided they manage to convince their colleagues in government and the prime minister.

Citation:


Netherlands

Dutch ministers’ hands are tied by such devices as party discipline; government/coalition agreements (which they have to sign in person during an inaugural meeting of the new Council of Ministers); ministerial responsibility to the States General; and the dense consultation and negotiation processes taking place within their own departments and with other departments in the interdepartmental administrative “front gates” and ministerial committees. Ministers have strong incentives to represent their ministerial interests, which do not necessarily directly reflect government coalition policy. The hasty coalition agreement of the present Rutte II Council of Ministers – which was more of a mutual exchange of incompatible policy preferences than a well thought-out compromise – and its relatively weak parliamentary support have led to party-political differences frequently being voiced in the media. When the Rutte II cabinet reached out to three smaller political parties not supporting the government agreement, interministerial commitment and coordination visibly increased.

Citation:
Portugal

Score 7

The organization of power relations in the cabinet system ensure that ministers have incentives to implement the government’s program. While Prime Minister António Costa will be able to rely on his Socialist Party ministers, depending on three other political parties, with very different policy agendas, will make policy implementation much more difficult. Furthermore, the Costa government must deal with a relatively powerful president, who has a veto on government policy and the ability to dismiss the government, as well as a terrible economic situation. Even though the European Union did not impose sanctions on Portugal for its huge public debt equivalent to 4.4% of GDP, there remain severe restraints on the ability of the government to provide incentives.

Slovakia

Score 7

Under the second Fico government, the prime minister’s dominant position within Smer-SD and the strong party discipline ensured a high degree of ministerial compliance. In the third Fico government, ministerial compliance has been more precarious since it rests on an “unnatural” coalition that includes parties as diverse as the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the mostly Hungarian minority based party Most-Híd (Bridge). Moreover, the ministers nominated by the SNS are not party members and have little experience as civil servants, which means they are less loyal than would normally be the case.

Turkey

Score 7

The entrenched single-party government, with strong party leadership and high demand for ministerial positions among party members, provides strong incentives for the promotion of the government program. Therefore, it is difficult even for those ministers who are professionals in their fields to come independently to the forefront. The charisma and standing of the party leader and the tendency of political parties to leave personnel decisions to the party leader prevent ministers from pursuing their own interests during their time in office.

The AKP government under former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made it even more difficult for ministers to follow their own agendas, a situation which has continued under Erdogan’s successors since 2014. A number of key ministries during the review period were under the leadership of ministers with substantial professional expertise, but these figures had little support from the party apparatus, leaving them dependent on the prime minister. This ensures that the
strong leadership of the prime minister and party leader, rather than other incentives, drives ministers to implement the governmental program. After Erdoğan was elected to the presidency, additional loyalist ministers were appointed to the cabinet. Erdoğan rejected claims that the new prime minister would merely do his bidding; however, he continues to maintain his grip on the government, stressing his intention to be an active president, and interfering in virtually every policy field and ministerial portfolio.

Erdoğan also intervenes in the nomination of deputies, appointment of higher civil servants and the organization of electoral campaigns by taking part actively in these events. In other words, it is argued that the office of the president, now located in a lavish presidential palace and entrusted with increasing powers, has replaced those otherwise established by the constitution. Thus, the current constellation raises the question whether the effectiveness of the executive in general and the government in particular will be diminished by the existence of several centers of power and suggests that the democratic separation of powers as a whole are eroding.

Citation:

**Austria**

**Score 6**

Ministers are primarily concerned with the agendas of their parties, rather than with that of the government as such. Ministers are selected by the head of each party – typically the chancellor and vice-chancellor. Their first loyalty is thus to party rather than to government. For this reason, ministers have incentives to implement the government’s program only as long as this is identified with the program of his or her party. Nonetheless, there are a number of informal mechanisms that help commit individual ministers to the government program. For example, the parties in the current government have worked out a lengthy coalition agreement. The two partners have therefore reached compromises on the most important policy issues, and agreed on procedures for dealing with conflicts should they arise during the legislative period. For example, the governing parties have agreed not to vote against one another in important parliamentary votes, and have agreed not to support referendums against government policy. The coalition government, re-established after the 2013 general elections, has given priority to presenting a more unified image at the cost of promoting open debates. As a result, several decisions have been blocked by conflicting interests and positions within the cabinet.
Czech Republic

Governments have tried to ensure ministerial compliance largely through the use of well-defined government programs and coalition agreements. Differences between individual ministers and the government generally take the form of disagreements between parties, and are played out by threats of resignation. Under the Sobotka government, ministers from all coalition partners were removed for different reasons by various coalition partners. Following the October 2016 elections, in which the Czech Social Democratic Party lost significant power in the regional governments to its junior coalition partner ANO, Prime Minister Sobotka orchestrated a significant overhaul of social democratic ministers. This included letting go of government members without justification or replacement. This change is largely viewed as an attempt by Prime Minister Sobotka to consolidate his power within the party.

While the prime minister has the formal power to remove ministers from other coalition parties, the coalition agreement stipulated that this is only possible in agreement with the respective coalition partners. And when in November 2016, Prime Minister Sobotka called on the junior coalition partners to also replace ministers, no other party did so. The prime minister’s position is weak both within his party and in the government. Given the fragile state of the government coalition, each party seeks to maintain an image of providing driven and effective ministers before the 2017 general elections.

Greece

After its second electoral victory, in September 2015, Syriza and its coalition partner, ANEL, set out to implement, with some delays, the reforms included in the Third Economic Adjustment Program. The period during which individual ministers could voice divergent views in order to appease the disappointed Syriza voters or to follow their own policy plans was probably over. Foreign assistance funds were to be channeled to Greece under strict conditionalities. Incentives for ministers to implement policies were probably the negative sanctions, such as their replacement by Prime Minister Tsipras, which they would face if they further burdened the already problematic fiscal situation of the Greek state. Thus, it is probably true that any minister whose competences included policy measures affecting fiscal policy were ready to toe the line, following Prime Minister Tsipras’s shift away from anti-austerity policies. This held true for most ministers. Thus over time one can claim that ministers had more incentives, in fact, externally imposed constraints, to implement the government’s (new) plans. A few other ministers, however, such as the Minister of Culture or even the Minister of Education, had no incentive to follow the radical shift toward austerity which Syriza made in the summer and the autumn of 2016. These ministers pursued Syriza’s pre-electoral government program or, more often than not, tried various untested ideas or plans of their own.
Malta

Score 6

The cabinet is the most important organizational device at the disposal of the government providing incentives to ensure ministers implement the government’s program. Second to this are the weekly meetings of Permanent Secretaries. Meanwhile, the powers of the Prime Minister’s Office have increasingly been used to drive policy implementation. The ministerial secretariat is generally responsible for overseeing the implementation of a program. In addition, the Management Efficiency Unit in the PMO provides ministries with advice and capacity-building tools. Informal coalitions, such as those between civil society groups and individual ministries, can drive implementation in certain policy areas, such as the extension of LGBT rights. Government has touted the idea of appointing ministers who are not members of parliament in order to improve efficiency in program implementation, However, this would require a constitutional amendment.

Citation:
PM wants powers to appoint ministers who are not MPs Times of Malta 15/02/16

Romania

Score 6

Ministers in Romania have historically held significant leeway in terms of deciding policy details within their departments. Ministers’ dismissals often triggered political backlash and the allocation of smaller budgets to disobedient ministries was often constrained by coalition politics and political costs. Under the Ciolos government, the situation differed. Its non-political nature empowered the prime minister to dismiss ministers not only in the case of scandal (as was often the case with the preceding Ponta government), but also if they were simply failing to perform to his standards. From November 2015 to September 2016, nine ministers were dismissed or asked to resign.

Slovenia

Score 6

As head of a coalition government, Prime Minister Cerar primarily relied on frequent coalition meetings of narrow (including only the presidents of coalition parties) or broader composition (including ministers and members of parliament as well) in order to ensure the implementation of the government’s program. While five ministers resigned or were removed from the Cerar government in first year in office, with two more ministers and the head of the Government Office departing in the period under review, these changes were only partly due to controversies over the government’s course.
Croatia

Score 5

As the strong conflicts within the governing coalition (between HDZ and MOST) and the weak policy record of the Orešković government have shown, the organization of government has provided only weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.

Cyprus

Score 4

Under the presidential system, the lack of any mechanisms for ensuring implementation of state policies can only be balanced by a minister’s desire to stay in office. This is achieved when the president appreciates the quality of work, mostly determined by each officeholder’s personality and dedication. The initiation of reforms and strategic-planning structures designed to improve government coherence is still in its early stages. Successful implementation may be a motivating factor for quality work.
**Indicator**

**Monitoring Ministries**

**Question**

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
- 8-6 = The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
- 5-3 = The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
- 2-1 = The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.

**Australia**

**Score 10**

There is strong central oversight of the line ministries by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which reports directly to the prime minister. The Commonwealth public service, while independent of the government, is strongly motivated to support the government’s program.

**Canada**

**Score 10**

When appointed to a portfolio, a minister receives a mandate letter from the prime minister, while a deputy minister receives one from the clerk of the Privy Council. The importance of mandate letters depends on the department, and more importantly on changing political and economic circumstances. In the case of the current government, ministers’ mandate letters detail priorities for their departments as seen from the center. The minister is subsequently evaluated on his or her success in achieving the objectives set out in the mandate letter. This procedure results in the PCO continually monitoring line-department activities to ensure they are in line with the mandate letter.

The new Liberal government has, for the first time, made public the mandate letters. The media and the general public will now be monitoring the activities of ministers to assess the degree to which they achieve the tasks set out in the mandate letters.
Hungary

Score 10

The Prime Minister’s Office has successfully monitored line ministries in all stages of the policy process, enforcing obedience to the political will of the central leadership. As all core executive figures have been Fidesz party stalwarts, control has functioned largely through party discipline. Those who have failed to keep discipline, even in comparatively insignificant matters, have lost their positions. The existing civil-service legislation has made it easy to dismiss public employees without justification.

Iceland

Score 10

In March 2016, revised regulations regarding the monitoring and oversight of ministries were introduced, replacing those from 2013. Under these regulations, the Prime Minister’s Office must review bills from all ministries, with the exception of the national budget bill. Accordingly, all bills need to be sent to the Prime Minister’s Office no later than one week before the respective cabinet meeting. Before the bill can be discussed by the cabinet, a statement from the Prime Minister’s Office needs to be processed (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar, No. 292/2016). This regulatory change is a step toward stronger, formal monitoring of ministerial bills.

Citation:

Chile

Score 9

The president’s advisory ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the respective budgetary units of the government monitor the line ministries (especially within the annual performance evaluation). If necessary, arrangements and modifications are made in order to ensure effective alignment with the government program. Monitoring of effectiveness seems to have improved slightly since 2011.

New Zealand

Score 9

Following from the experience of fragmented policymaking in vertically integrated networks, all recent governments have strengthened the steering capacity of the core executive. All contracts between cabinet and line ministries and ministers and chief executives are based on a whole-of-government policy approach. The National government has introduced a performance-improvement framework intended to
strengthen a central-agency approach to assessing, supporting, informing and focusing performance across state services.

Citation:

South Korea

Score 9

The offices of the president and the prime minister effectively monitor line-ministry activities. The South Korean government utilizes e-government software (the Policy Task Management System) to monitor the implementation of policies in real time. However, political monitoring or pressure, rather than e-government, is more influential and the usual tool to supervise ministries. Ministries have little leeway in policy areas that are important to the president. In general, bureaucracy is organized in a very hierarchical way, but independence is stronger in areas that are comparatively less important to the president.

The task of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea (BAI), a monitoring agency, is ostensibly to ensure accountability in the public sector and improve public-sector performance. However, the BAI lacks political independence from the Blue House, a fact that many observers have criticized. The Park government’s Blue House has tended to intervene directly and control line-ministry activities through political pressure or personal punishments; however, the government office is not good at monitoring some line ministries’ implementation activities. Indeed, the Park government failed to cope effectively with numerous crises. The spread of infectious diseases such as bird flu and MERS, as well as the sinking of the Sewol Ferry, represented cases of failed monitoring.

Sweden

Score 9

Formally, ministries are not very involved in the implementation of policies. It is rather the task of agencies to implement policies. Nevertheless, Swedish ministries still control the implementation process of the agencies. The relationship between ministries and agencies implies monitoring by communication and mutual adaptation, less than through a hierarchical chain of command.

Switzerland

Score 9

Switzerland’s government features neither a prime minister’s office nor line ministries, but does offer functional equivalents. Given the rule of collegiality and the consociational decision-making style, as well as the high level of cooperation at lower levels of the federal administration, there is little leeway for significant deviation from the government line. Monitoring is built into the cooperative process of policy formulation and implementation.
**United Kingdom**

The tight integration between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office enables prime ministers to be effective in determining the strategic direction of the government. Through Treasury Approval Point processes, the Treasury has long had an important monitoring role, which goes beyond the role of finance ministries in other countries. Decision-making is concentrated in strategic units and in informal meetings. Ministers have to reveal their preferences in cabinet meetings, cabinet committees and bilateral meetings with the prime minister or chancellor. Consequently, monitoring is relatively easy for the core executive, also by means of the single department plans.

Several additional monitoring and coordination measures introduced under the coalition government have since become obsolete with the return to a one-party government. However, some recent initiatives have reinforced central oversight, including the merger of the Major Projects Authority and Infrastructure UK into the Infrastructure and Projects Authority, which reports to both the Cabinet Office and HM Treasury. An initiative on Financial Management Reform launched in 2014 has been evaluated as a success by the Institute for Government.

Citation:
Whitehall’s Financial Management Reform

**United States**

The president and the White House monitor activities in departments and agencies to widely varying degrees, depending on the centrality of the activities to the president’s political agenda. Agencies and programs that are not the focus of presidential policy initiatives and are not politically controversial may get little attention from the White House, and in fact may receive most of their political direction from Congress or the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the policy area. Recent years have seen a number of serious failures of administrative control.

In 2015, agents of the Secret Service responsible for protecting the White House and the president were discovered asleep on the job after working shifts that required severe sleep deprivation. Separately, the National Security Agency has been exposed as having violated the legal terms of its surveillance authority, even eavesdropping on the phone calls of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
**Denmark**

Score 8

For sensitive political issues, the prime minister has a strong incentive to monitor line ministries. Yet when it comes to less important issues or details, he or she has neither the time nor the means for close monitoring. The prime minister’s control is indirect. It is exercised through the members of the cabinet. Non-implementation will quickly become a political issue.

Citation:

**Finland**

Score 8

The government monitoring of ministries is indirect in nature and the same mechanisms that foster ministerial compliance tend to have monitoring functions as well. These include the preparation and coordination of matters in cabinet committee meetings as well as other formal and informal meetings. In general, the various forms of interministerial coordination also fulfill monitoring functions. However, these forms are characterized by cooperative and consultative interactions rather than critical interactions. While the Prime Minister’s Office does monitor ministries, the monitoring is implicit rather than explicit.

**France**

Score 8

Line ministry activities are generally well monitored, but several factors influence the impact of oversight, including: the strength of the prime minister; the relationship of the minister with the president; the political position of the minister within the majority or as a local notable; media attention; and political pressure. This traditional pattern under the Fifth Republic failed to work during the first 30 months of the Hollande presidency due to the president’s weakness and reluctance to arbitrate between ministers and divergent preferences. Since the September 2014 crisis and the resignation of the dissident ministers, Prime Minister Manuel Valls has proven able to exercise improved oversight of the ministries.

**Ireland**

Score 8

The annual budgetary process, and in particular the preparation of expenditure estimates, involves individual ministries submitting preliminary estimates to the Department of Finance. This is the opening of a battle for resources, as the department seeks to reconcile the sum of departmental claims with the total available
for public spending. Whereas monitoring and oversight of most line ministry spending and policy implementation have been effective in recent years, the problem of large cost overruns in the Ministry of Health and confusion about the medium-term strategy for public health are long-standing and unresolved issues.

Having corrected its excessive deficit in 2015 and 2016 Irish policymakers were constrained by the rules of the EU fiscal compact in framing their 2017 budget. These reduced flexibility at the national level with regard to tax cuts and expenditure increases. However, these constraints were somewhat offset by revenue buoyancy resulting from unexpectedly rapid economic growth.

**Italy**

Score 8

The monitoring of the implementation of the government program is delegated to a minister without portfolio, who is attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and supported by a special office of the presidency (Ufficio per l’attuazione del programma di governo). The current minister is one of the more powerful government figures and is a close confidant of the prime minister. This office monitors the main legislative activities of the ministries and more recently has started to monitor regularly also the implementation activities related to the legislation adopted. The office publishes a monthly report.

Citation:
http://www.programmagoverno.gov.it/monitoraggio-dellattuazione-programma/monitoraggio-su-attuazione/

**Latvia**

Score 8

The government office monitors ministry performance in implementing legislation, cabinet decisions and prime ministerial decisions. A high degree of compliance has been reported.

The PKC monitors how ministries are achieving the policy goals stated in the government declaration and reports to the prime minister. Progress reports are not only a monitoring tool, but also provide substantive input into the prime minister’s annual report to parliament.

**Lithuania**

Score 8

The Government Office effectively monitors policy implementation, through several channels. First, it administratively tracks the execution of government actions assigned to different ministries and other state institutions. Second, through its system of information monitoring, it assesses the achievement of government
priorities and linked policy objectives on the basis of performance indicators. Progress in the implementation of policy is discussed during cabinet meetings and other government-level deliberations. However, information derived from this monitoring process is only infrequently used to propose corrective action when progress is deemed insufficient. Thus, the monitoring process does not always prevent the prioritization of sectoral or bureaucratic over full-government and horizontal interests in policy implementation. As part of one EU-funded project, the Government Office reviewed monitoring and evaluation practices, and made a number of recommendations as to how performance measurement could be improved in line ministries (including the development of key performance indicators or indicator libraries in various policy areas). Despite the implementation of this project, the National Audit Office stated that the country’s monitoring and reporting system continues to lack quality information.

Norway

Score 8
Norway has a small, consensual and transparent system of governance. The Office of the Prime Minister knows what is going on throughout, or is assumed to know. The cabinet is quite cohesive. There is always a tug-of-war between line and coordinating ministries, but line ministries virtually never deviate from the government line. To do so would require a degree of intergovernmental disagreement and breakdown of discipline that has not been seen for a very long time. The terrorist attacks of July 22 did in part represent a failure to follow up on government decisions made by the relevant line ministries, but these failures have subsequently been by and large rectified.

Poland

Score 8
Ministries are obliged to keep the Chancellery of the Prime Minister informed about legislative progress on a regular basis. If ministries seek to maintain their autonomy, the prime minister, through the Chancellery, or Jarosław Kaczyński, as party leader, can intervene.

Israel

Score 7
The basic law “The Government” establishes the prime minister’s responsibility over the government’s advancement of policy goals. This includes monitoring and guiding the work of appointed line ministers and directing their respective offices. In recent years, the PMO introduced best practice reform elements of transparency, sharing and benchmarking, which have improved systematic monitoring of ministries. A special committee formed to review the PMO noted the office’s
professional weakness when faced with recommendations from the finance and defense ministries. This is aggravated by the PMO’s tendency to take on executing responsibility of weaker ministries (e.g., welfare and health), thus expanding its workload. Gradual change commenced with the establishment of three new professional units in the PMO, each in charge of monitoring related ministries, but future steps are uncertain.

Citation:
“The committee to review the PMO’s”, Official state publication, February 2012, (Hebrew).

Mexico

Score 7

There is inevitably some arbitrariness in evaluations, but the presidential office can choose who it evaluates and how. There are two caveats to this statement, however. First, Mexico is a federal system, and there are thus limits to the central government’s power. If anything, decentralization is increasing. Second, independent agencies headed by individuals of cabinet rank have taken on an expanding role. Yet where the central authority has power, it uses it. Ministerial turnover is in general relatively high for a presidential system and President Peña Nieto has reshuffled his cabinet several times. However, while sanctioning ministers is a sign of the president’s power, it does not necessarily reflect the output of a systematic monitoring process.

Portugal

Score 7

The government in the period under review is relatively small, with 17 ministries and 41 secretaries of state. Ministries in Portugal are not independent of the prime minister. The prime minister is also assisted by the Presidência do Conselho dos Ministros and by the Adjunct Secretary of State of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can thus monitor implementation activities of all line ministries. However, the lack of in-depth policy capacity within the PMO constrains the overall degree of control, although this is partially compensated by the government’s political staff.

Citation:

Spain

Score 7

The activities of all line ministries are monitored by the Spanish Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the Government Office (GO, Ministerio de la Presidencia), and ultimately the Council of Ministers. The PMO oversees the flow of political and sectoral information, and keeps the prime minister abreast of the activities of all line ministries. The head of the Prime Minister’s Economic Office has also coordinated
the important weekly meeting of the government’s Delegate Committee for Economic Affairs since 2012.

The GO, headed by the powerful deputy prime minister, monitors the activities of line ministries through the weekly meetings which prepare the way for Council of Ministers meetings. The capacity of the GO to monitor ministers will likely improve once the new law on general administrative procedure (passed in October 2015) has fully taken effect, as it introduces a new system for systematically assessing policy implementation in the form of a periodic evaluation report that would be prepared in close consultation with line ministries. Nevertheless, this monitoring cannot guarantee that no sectoral ministry will ever prioritize vertical over horizontal interests. The organizational resources of the prime minister’s direct entourage and the GO as a department are limited, and these bodies rarely engage in direct coordination of ministerial departments. Only the prime minister or the deputy prime minister are entitled to play this role.

Turkey

Score 7

The Prime Minister’s Office has, among other measures, established the General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and the General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication to examine the congruity with the constitution of draft bills, decrees, regulations and resolutions of the Council of Ministers, as well as to review in general laws, plans and the government’s program. These bodies are the primary government centers for the drafting and coordinating of regulations.

However, there is no systematic monitoring of the activities of line ministries. In some cases, the ministerial bureaucracy resists policy handed down by the government without serious consequences, particularly in issues of democratization. In general, however, ministries work in cooperation with the prime minister’s office because the single-party government has staffed leading ministerial posts with bureaucrats who operate in sync with the ruling party’s program and ideology.

The PMO has a total of 2,243 employees, a quarter of whom are experts or advisors, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established in 2011 to provide the PMO consultation. Beginning in May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public institutions were assigned to this unit.

Citation:
Austria

Score 6

The main instrument for monitoring ministry activity is the Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof). Constitutionally, this is a parliamentary institution, and its president is elected by parliament for a term of 12 years. The Court of Audit has the reputation of being wholly nonpartisan.

Within the government itself, there is no specific institution for monitoring ministries, though the coalition’s party leaders have significant influence over the individual ministers affiliated with their party. The Federal Chancellery is tasked with coordinating line ministries’ activities rather than monitoring them per se. However, this coordination does allow it to monitor ministry activities, particularly regarding implementation of the coalition agreement.

Belgium

Score 6

The hierarchical structures inside ministries is such that the line minister (or ministers, when a ministry’s set of responsibilities are shared by more than one government portfolio) controls the ministry at the political level. The ministry itself is presided over by a general administrator, whose nomination used to be purely political, but is now (at least partly) determined through a competitive exam.

The fact that the tenure of the general administrator and the minister are different opens the gate to potential tensions between the minister and the ministry. A concrete example is that of the minister for mobility, Jacqueline Galant (MR, francophone liberals, i.e., the party of the prime minister), who was eventually forced to step down. She had to handle particularly sensitive issues in the Belgian multiregional context, including security at the Brussels airport. The head of her administration was appointed before her term and they were not politically aligned. She instead systematically worked with external advisers over whom she had more political control and sometimes acted against the recommendations of her own administration.

Greece

Score 6

After the government turnover of January 2015, monitoring was first relaxed because the PMO, under Syriza’s leader and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, was completely absorbed by the futile effort to change the course of Greece’s bailout program, overturning the austerity program imposed since 2012. After the failure of Syriza’s effort to block previous agreements between Greece and its lenders, the PMO turned inwards and slowly started to monitor the implementation activities of line
ministries. Such monitoring was initially unpredictable, given that the prime minister had publicly stated that neither he nor his ministries believe in the policies which they are required to implement. However, in the period under review, the PMO, understanding that Greece is still, if not also increasingly, dependent on funds flowing into the Greek economy from the country’s lenders, gradually intensified its monitoring of implementation activities of line ministries.

Japan

Score 6

Generally speaking, the Cabinet Secretariat, upgraded over a decade ago, offers a means of monitoring ministry activities. In recent years, its personnel has expanded, improving its monitoring capacity. However, effective use of the secretariat has been hindered in the past by the fact that the ministries send specialists from their own staffs to serve as secretariat employees. It de facto lacks the ability to survey all activities at all times, but the current chief cabinet secretary is considered a decisive power in the enforcement of government-office positions.

Luxembourg

Score 6

There is no formal monitoring by the Prime Minister’s Office, as no institutional resources exist to carry this out. The small size of the government administration and ongoing discussions between ministers, foster a high level of transparency without the necessity of explicit monitoring tools. In case of conflicts, the prime minister moderates and acts as conciliator.

Romania

Score 6

The government has a special office in charge of monitoring the activities of line ministries and other public bodies, the Control Body of the Prime Minister. While suffering from having limited staff and resources, this office monitors the activity of most line ministries fairly effectively. In 2016, it identified a number of situations in which payments were made with disregard to the law.

Slovakia

Score 6

Although Prime Minister Fico has been able to count on a significant degree of ministerial compliance, he nevertheless expanded the Government Office’s responsibilities in monitoring line ministries, particularly with respect to European affairs and economic and fiscal issues, during his second term. Under the third Fico
government, monitoring has remained strong in the case of ministries in the hands of Smer-SD, but has weakened in the ministries led by its coalition partners.

**Czech Republic**

*Score 5*

In the Czech Republic, the government office formally monitors the activities of the line ministries. Under the Sobotka government, the effectiveness of monitoring was complicated by the nature of the coalition government and the competition between Prime Minister Sobotka and Vice Prime Minister Babiš for the control of key ministries. The adoption of the conflict of interest law and the success of Babiš’ ANO party in the regional elections in October 2016 has further aggravated this problem.

**Estonia**

*Score 5*

The Prime Minister’s Office has a small staff that performs mainly supportive and technical tasks. Thus the capacity to monitor the line ministries’ activities from the core executive is limited. Even though the prime minister has little power over ministers, they rarely challenge the government program. Still, sometimes line ministers break with consensus, which results in bilateral talks with the prime minister.

**Germany**

*Score 5*

According to the Basic Law, ministers are fully responsible for governing their own divisions. However, they are bound to the general government guidelines drawn up by the chancellor or the coalition agreement. Concerning topics of general political interest, the cabinet makes decisions collectively. The internal rules of procedure require line ministers to inform the chancellor’s office about all important issues. However, in some cases, the Chancellery lacks the sectoral expertise to monitor line ministries’ policy proposals effectively.

**Malta**

*Score 5*

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries and the structures for doing so effectively are being continually refined. The PMO now has an office dedicated to monitoring. Furthermore, the cabinet office, which is part of the PMO, monitors policy implementation by line ministries and ensures that the respective ministry implements the decisions of the
PMO. There are constant attempts to improve coordination, and the upcoming EU Presidency has accelerated this. However, competition between ministries hinders some efforts.

Citation:
Bartolo insists that ministries should support each other, pull the same rope Independent 10/06/15

Slovenia

Score 5

The weak capacity of the Government Office (GO) and the predominance of coalition governments have limited the GO’s role in monitoring line ministries’ implementation activities. The GO tends to respect the assignment of ministries in the coalition agreement, and most monitoring takes places in coalition meetings.

Bulgaria

Score 4

The Council of Ministers’ administration lacks the capacity to monitor the implementation activities of the line ministries. The chief secretary of the Council of Ministers’ administration and the specialized directorates of the administration can, however, oversee most of the line ministries’ policy activities, especially in the areas financed through EU funds. The chief secretary and the directorates also provide some administrative support to the prime minister and the head of his political cabinet, who exercise more direct control over the ministries on a political basis. The exercise of this control tends to be informal, through the party apparatuses, rather than formal.

Croatia

Score 4

The Secretariat General of the Government is just one of the central-government organizations involved in monitoring the activities of line ministries. Its restrictive remit constitutes a major capacity gap. More important has been the Ministry of Finance, as the 2010 Fiscal Responsibility Act has given it far-reaching powers to monitor the activities of any organization drawing funds from the central budget.

Cyprus

Score 4

The constitution provides that overall coordination lies with the Council of Ministers meaning a kind of circular relationship with line ministries. Also the DGEPCD performs generic monitoring and coordination functions. It links to a task-force team
with guidance from the presidency. Recent powers assigned to the finance minister may be deemed as creating a central oversight and coordinating mechanism for planning and policy implementation, albeit on budgetary and fiscal issues.

**Netherlands**

**Score 4**

Given the Prime Minister’s Office’s lack of capacity to coordinate and follow up on policy proposal and bills, systematic monitoring of line ministries’ implementation activities is scarcely possible. In the event of crises, ad hoc monitoring does occur.

Parliamentary debate on ministerial monitoring should have been limited to a well-defined set of “focus subjects” in full accordance with the policy-program budgeting system philosophy developed in the 1970s. However, political developments (the election campaigns in 2010, a Council of Ministers breakdown in 2012) have in recent times prevented this. In 2012, yet another system of program budgeting – this time called “responsible budgeting” – was introduced. Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have indeed focused on particular subjects, and following some consultation, on departmental domains. In 2016, the government cut financing for the General Audit Chamber by €1.2 billion, meaning a personnel reduction from 273 full-time employees to 233 full-time employees and outsourcing research for specific programs.

Citation:
Algemene Rekenkamer, Onderzoeksrapporten (rekenkamer.nl, consulted 5 November 2014)

Algemene Rekenkamer, Een toekomstbestendige Algemene Rekenkamer, 13 October 2016 (rekenkamer.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)

Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
- 8-6 = The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
- 5-3 = The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
- 2-1 = The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.

Hungary

Score 10

The third Orbán government has closely controlled the appointment and activities of the heads and core executives of all state agencies at the national level. Simicska followers, some of which were among the most professional pro-government experts, have been removed from state agencies. The frequent changes in administrative positions have contributed to high discipline. The centralization of state administration in county-level government offices has extended the government’s control over all subnational agencies, since they have been concentrated in these county offices. As in the case of line ministries, the government has adopted a hands-on approach and has closely monitored the agencies’ implementation activities.

Australia

Score 9

The performance of ministries in monitoring the activities of executive agencies varies, in part due to differences in the degree of independence granted to agencies. For example, central bank independence is core to the credibility of monetary policy and is legislatively protected, which constrains Parliament’s capacity to monitor the agency. This notwithstanding, the general pattern over recent years has been one of increasing accountability of the 170-plus statutory authorities and officeholders to the relevant federal minister. The most notable concrete indicator of this trend is that in 2002 the Australian government commissioned a review of the corporate
governance of Commonwealth statutory authorities and office holders, the Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (the Uhrig Review). The objective of the review was to identify issues surrounding existing governance arrangements and provide options for the government to improve the performance and get the best from statutory authorities, their office holders and their accountability frameworks. The review was completed in 2004 and a number of the recommendations have since been adopted.

**Austria**

**Score 9**

Ministries are responsible for monitoring the bureaucratic structures individually subject to them. All bureaucracies (except those within the judicial branch) are legally bound by instructions issued by their ministers (according to Art. 20 of the constitution), and have to report regularly to the ministries. The Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof) is the only institution aside from the parliament that monitors the government and its bureaucracies on a broader, cross-ministerial basis. The Court of Audit is officially an institution of the parliament and the coalition parties have not always succeeded in presenting a common position – as in 2016, when the coalition was unable to present a common candidate for the president of the Court of Audit. This gave opposition parties the possibility to influence the decision. Opposition parties also have the opportunity to establish investigating committees in parliament – even against the will of the ruling majority. This development represents a broadening of the scope of political oversight and potentially involves the need and opportunity to monitor bureaucracies more thoroughly.

**New Zealand**

**Score 9**

The monitoring of executive agencies is based on the same procedures governing line ministries.

Citation:

**Sweden**

**Score 9**

Government departments in the GO monitor the activities (not just implementation) of the agencies quite closely. Since the introduction of performance management some 15 to 20 years ago, agencies report to their parent department on their performance targets. In fact, many believe the reporting, which requires agencies to spend a lot of time and effort reporting on their performance to their respective department, is so extensive it has become burdensome.
It should be noted that there is a significant imbalance between the departments and the agencies. The GO has a total staff of about 4,600. The total staff in the agencies is about 220,000. Thus, the steering structures in the system are considerably smaller than the targets of that steering. This state of affairs has encouraged the use of informal communication between departments and agencies to supplement formal steering.

Citation: Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State: The Organizational Dimension of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Canada

Score 8

Ministry procedures for monitoring operating agencies is less formal than the parallel monitoring of line departments by the PCO, in part because operating agencies are generally not responsible for policy formulation. In addition, these agencies may have a degree of autonomy. Nevertheless, ministries do monitor the activities of most operating agencies. Recently, the federal government has attempted to play a greater role in the administration of certain agencies such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), especially in the area of labor relations.

Denmark

Score 8

Executive agencies have some autonomy, but given the formal norms of minister rule, the minister is ultimately responsible for what happens in the agencies. It is therefore in a minister’s political interest to monitor activities closely.

The work of the agencies is often based on specialized expertise; as long as an issue is not politicized, the minister will normally defer to the decisions made by the agencies.

Citation: Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen et al., Politik og forvaltning. 3. udgave, 2011.

Estonia

Score 8

Estonian government is horizontally decentralized. This means that besides 11 ministries, there are 25 executive agencies and several foundations established by the government. Foundations have specific policy objectives, often managing implementation of the EU structural funds in Estonia. Foundations are led by a counselor and appointed by a minister. Agencies implement policies within the broader policy area, and are accountable to the relevant ministry. Ministers appoint
agency directors. These organizational arrangements enable ministries to monitor the activities of executive agencies. However, agencies have grown substantially both in terms of staff and task volume; this may ultimately produce negative effects such as a lack of coordination between the ministry and agency, or misuse of administrative power by executive-agency CEOs. This latter problem is illustrated by the increase in corruption offences within these institutions.

Finland

**Score 8**

All ministries use results-management practices to monitor agencies in their various task areas. In many cases, a balanced score system is used. However, not all agencies are monitored to the same extent. Some agencies, such as the National Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes), which operates under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment have a high degree of autonomy, with monitoring taking place only on a general level. Other agencies are accorded a somewhat lesser degree of autonomy. However, as a rule, they do have autonomy with respect to day-to-day operations. Monitoring takes many forms and a system of political undersecretaries of state has been designed to support the individual ministers in their monitoring activities.

Germany

**Score 8**

Executive agencies’ competences and responsibilities are explicitly detailed in law, edicts, statutes and other regulations. Their activities are not only subject to legal, but also to functional supervision, meaning that agencies’ decisions and administrative instructions will be reviewed. However, the ministries have not always made appropriate use of their oversight mechanism. A number of independent agencies, including the Federal Employment Office, the Federal Network Agency, the Bundesbank and others have deliberately been placed beyond the effective control of the federal government. It is important that monitoring agencies maintain organizational independence, so that they may monitor government effectiveness and financial impacts. The National Regulatory Control Council has tried to increase its powers over legislative and bureaucratic processes at federal and state levels. The Taxpayer’s Association monitors levels of waste in the use of public resources.

Greece

**Score 8**

In Greece, most ministries supervise dozens of state agencies. For instance, the Ministry of Transport supervises the state-owned public transport companies in Athens and Thessaloniki, the Ministry of Health supervises all public hospitals and the Ministry of Finance supervises numerous state-owned enterprises. Before the
crisis, supervision was lax – a tendency which resulted in very high debts incurred by state agencies such as those identified above. After Greece’s first bailout in 2010, the supervision of state agencies tightened considerably. In fact, the Ministry of Finance acquired substantive powers to oversee the management of state agencies even in cases where the latter still nominally belonged to the jurisdiction of other line ministries. In the period under review, after two consecutive elections in 2015, government stability has helped improve monitoring of bureaucracies and agencies. Moreover, after the realization on the part of the Syriza-ANEL government that, if left unattended, activities of bureaucracies and agencies could derail the finances of the Greek state once more, there is a tightening of the relevant monitoring and supervisory role played by ministries.

Luxembourg

Score 8

Executive agencies and the administration usually lack the autonomy to pursue a course of action independent of guidelines issued by the responsible ministers. Sometimes the strong personality of an agency head leads to conflict. If this happens, the views of the minister or his key collaborators usually prevail. In the domain of social security and public finance, monitoring is more centralized and effective, since the financial implications for the state are much more consequential. The two agencies that wield considerable control are the Social Security Inspectorate General (Inspection Générale de la Sécurité Sociale, IGSS), which is attached to the Ministry of Social Security and the General Inspectorate of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is attached to the Ministry of Finance.

Citation:

Norway

Score 8

Government agencies are subject to monitoring through direct bureaucratic channels and by the activity of the free press. As a rule, executive agencies do not act against the directives of the ministries, and there have been very few cases in which agency officials have taken action that could be seen as contrary to government policy. The Office of the Auditor General (Riksrevisjonen), which reports to the parliament, plays a key role in monitoring implementation. However, administrative inertia in policy implementation is more prevalent than would be expected in such a well organized system.
Poland

Score 8

There is a large number of executive agencies in Poland. Agencies report to ministries, and ministries have special units responsible for monitoring the activities of agencies and auditing their finances. Under the PiS government, the leadership of state agencies has become highly politicized. As a consequence of the new civil service act that came into effect in January 2016, all employment contracts of previous directors turned invalid, and the positions were no longer filled by open competition, but by personal appointment. A previous provision was cancelled requiring directors of state institutions to have not been members of a political party for five years before assuming a leading position in state administration. Thus, compliance between ministries and administration has become easier, but the administration has also become dependent on the political will of the majority. Hence, an increase in oversight also means a decline in democratic checks and balances and professional, non-politicized relations between ministries and agencies.

Portugal

Score 8

Portugal has seen a proliferation of quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organizations and other structures in addition to an already complex direct administrative structure in the 1990s and 2000s. These structures were often left with little in the way of ex post monitoring. In the context of the bailout and the continuing need to reduce public expenditure, the previous Coelho government increased its scrutiny of the number and operation of these non-governmental organizations as well as the state administration. However, this interest was fundamentally centered on financial and budgetary aspects rather than the implementation of policy per se. Since the bailout, there has been little change. Indeed, the Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 to 2019 makes no mention of these.

Spain

Score 8

Spain’s ministries have the capacity to monitor the activities of the administrative bureaucracy and executive agencies with regard to implementation. One of the main ingredients of the administrative-reform process launched in 2012 (coordinated from the Government Office through the Commission for the Reform of the Public Administrations (CORA)) consisted of reinforcing central control over these public bodies, and in some cases entailed the absorption of the smallest agencies by the ministry in charge of their task area.

This reorganization included the first comprehensive register of all existing agencies or any other semi-autonomous bureaucracy in Spain (Inventario de Entes del Sector
Público Estatal, Autonómico y Local), and resulted in several mergers and the liquidation of many public companies. In 2014, the Council of Ministers unified internal monitoring of all public entities, giving this responsibility to the Auditor General’s office.

In addition, the recently passed Law 40/2015 promotes the introduction of mechanisms to prevent the “unnecessary creation of future entities and the continuous review of the functions, goals and structures of existing bodies, in order to facilitate their subsequent restructuring if decided.” An integrated framework of evaluation, monitoring and independent audit of all agencies will be also be introduced as a result of this recent legislation. Thus, the ministries can now monitor the activities of all executive agencies and force them if necessary to act in accordance with the government’s program. However, it is also true that thanks to bureaucratic drift and/or flexibility in their functioning, some of these semi-autonomous public bodies have been able to elude this control. Ministers have particular difficulties in effectively monitoring the largest ones.

Citation:
Latest quarterly report on the follow-up of CORA Public Administration Reform, May 2016.

**United States**

**Score 8**

Federal departments have central units attached to the relevant secretary’s office that monitor the activities of subordinate agencies. There are no semi-autonomous agencies in the U.S. administrative system. Independent regulatory commissions – including the Federal Reserve Board (both a regulatory agency and the central bank, responsible for monetary policy) – are headed by bipartisan commissions with fixed terms of office, and are in some respects outside the executive branch. The White House and certain executive agencies such as the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department monitor the activities of regulatory agencies, despite lacking formal authority to impose changes. State-level agencies which administer federal programs are subject to highly inconsistent federal supervision.

**Belgium**

**Score 7**

Belgium has relatively few agencies that are funded and controlled by the government, but are also formally independent of the government. Agencies of this type include public radio and television stations, Child Focus, a foundation for missing or sexually exploited children, the Center for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism, some official job placement agencies, and public social service centers (Centres Publics d’Action Sociale (CPAS) / Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn (OCMW)). The monitoring of these agencies works
through several channels. Two are most relevant here. First, a government or party
delgate will generally sit on the board of these agencies. Second, each year, the
agency will have to submit a report to the government or to the ministry responsible
for its activities. This monitoring is extremely controlled and effective, partly thanks
to party discipline.

Nonetheless, effective monitoring is not necessarily synonymous with efficiency. A
recent analysis by the Federation of Belgian Enterprises, a lobby group, reports that
Belgium has exceedingly high management costs in its public agencies. These costs
reach 15.2% of GDP, higher than the 12.2% average for France, Germany, and the
Netherlands, even though Belgium does not stand out for the efficiency of its
agencies and public administration.

Citation:
mies_a_faire_dans_les_services_publics.9776078-7320.art?utm_campaign=app&utm_medium=tablet&utm_source=IPAD

Chile

Score 7

To a certain extent, high positions in government agencies are filled not via political
appointments but through the government’s civil-service department (Alta Dirección
Pública, ADP), based on candidates’ technical capacity and experience. Clear goals
are identified by the directors of executive agencies and the corresponding
ministries. Exhaustive evaluations of the system and of personnel choices are
performed annually by the minister, the civil service and the president’s advisory
ministry (Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres). In addition, the Ministry of
Finance’s budget office monitors decentralized agencies and public enterprises from
a budgetary perspective very tightly and effectively. Nevertheless, the changes in
government in 2011 and 2014 showed that the selection of candidates through the
ADP is in fact quite weakly established, as there is still an understanding that a
successful candidate is a “government officer” rather than a “state officer.” The
monitoring of bureaucratic activities and executive agencies, especially at the
subnational level, tends to be distorted by this effect.

France

Score 7

In a centralized system like France’s, the central machinery is unable to monitor
fully and constantly the implementation of government policies. There exist huge
sectoral and geographical variations. In some areas, decisions are not implemented or
instead are badly implemented or flexibly interpreted. For instance, education is one
of the most centralized policy fields in France, but implementation varies so starkly
that parents have adopted strategies (such as the crucial choice of where to live) to
register their children in the “best” schools. Implementing centrally designed policies
requires local or regional adaptation of rigid rules that are applicable to all. Even the prefects, supposedly the arm of central government, refer to this practice, as may be witnessed for instance in the absent, or insufficient, implementation of water directives in some regions.

**Japan**

*Score 7*

Japanese ministries are traditionally run by civil servants that work within that ministry for their whole career. Government agencies that belong to a specific ministry’s sectoral area are thus also directed by civil servants delegated from that ministry, who may return to it after a number of years. From that perspective, control of executive agencies below the ministerial level can be quite effective. This mechanism is supported by budget allocations and peer networks. 

In 2001, so-called independent administrative agencies were established, following new public management recommendations for improving the execution of well-defined policy goals by making them the responsibility of professionally managed quasi-governmental organizations. Such independent agencies are overseen by evaluation mechanisms similar to those discussed in the section on regulatory impact assessment (RIA), based on modified legislation. In recent years, voices skeptical of this arrangement have gained ground, because the effectiveness of this independent-agency mechanism has been hindered to some extent by the network effects created by close agency-ministry staffing links. In addition, the administrators in charge have typically originated from the civil service, and thus have not always possessed a managerial mindset.

**Latvia**

*Score 7*

The executive branch is organized hierarchically, with ministries each having a group of subordinate institutions. Some institutions are directly managed by the ministry, while others are managed at arm’s length when there is a need for the autonomous fulfillment of functions.

All institutions are required to prepare annual reports. Beyond the reporting requirement there is no centralized standard for monitoring subordinate agencies. Ad hoc arrangements prevail, with some ministries setting performance goals and requiring reporting relative to these goals.

The government office has recently taken steps that compensate for poor monitoring and communication with subordinate agencies. In 2013, the prime minister set specific policy goals for ministries and agencies, and has required semiannual reporting on progress toward these goals. The government office has also begun including agency heads in interministerial coordination meetings, as a response to
the observation that information flows between ministries and their subordinate agencies are neither reliable nor adequate.

**Turkey**

Turkey is a unitary state divided into 81 provinces (Article 126 of the constitution). Power is devolved in such a way as to ensure the efficiency and coordination of public services from the center. Ministerial agencies are monitored regularly. The central administration by law holds the power to guide the activities of local administration, to ensure that local services are delivered in conformance with the guidelines set down by the central government, as well as ensuring services are uniform, meeting local needs and in the interest of the local population (Article 127). The central government has provincial organizations that differ in size and capacity and are regularly scrutinized by the central government. Independent administrative authorities such as the Telecommunications Authority and Energy Market Regulatory Authority are not monitored, but are subject to judicial review.

The Internal Audit Coordination Board, affiliated with the Ministry of Finance, was established under Article 66 of the Public Financial Management and Control Law (Law 5018). It ensures that administrative bodies cooperate with public auditing bodies, and makes its own proposals to eliminate fraud or irregularities.

All public agencies maintain an internal audit body; however, such bodies do not function effectively or operate to their fullest capacity.

Law 5018, adopted in 2004, introduced a strategic-management approach under which all public agencies must prepare a strategic plan, annual program and activity reports. The subunits’ performance is assessed on the basis of these documents. However, neither strategic management principles nor internal oversight mechanisms have been effectively implemented by the administration.

The State Supervision Board, which is subject to the Presidency of the Republic, provides supervision and prepares in-depth reports upon the request of the Presidency. These reports were made public until recently; since 2009 only summaries of the reports are available.

Citation:
http://eprints.sdu.edu.tr/id/eprint/690

**United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom was an early adopter of delegating civil-service work to executive agencies in order to improve performance and reduce costs, which has been going on since the early 1990s under the Next Steps Programme. There is,
moreover, an expectation that the departmental minister takes responsibility for any agencies that the ministry oversees but no expectation that the minister will have to resign if problems arise in an agency. The ongoing Civil Service Reform also seeks to introduce new instruments of performance control and individual accountability, for example, through guidance, such as Managing Public Money. The Cabinet Office has recently revised its guidance on public service reviews and issued a code of good practice for partnerships between departments and arm’s length bodies.

Nevertheless, problems have arisen. After repeated criticism, the UK Border Agency, which is responsible for the entry and management of foreign nationals, was taken back into the Home Office to improve transparency and political accountability. It still attracts some negative headlines and there are evident stresses arising from the management of prisons by private contractors. Several child-abuse scandals revealed shortcomings in the monitoring of local-level entities, including local childcare, youth and police services. To some extent, quality control bodies – for example, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for the police – provide safeguards through setting standards. However, some public agencies have been heavily criticized. For example, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee has been very critical of HM Revenue and Customs, the tax collection agency.

Citation:


Israel

Score 6

As many other westernized countries, the Israeli government is undergoing a process of agencification and outsourcing in recent decades in order to enhance its regulatory functions and retract its role in direct public provision. While ministries connections with agencies and NGOs are restrained by contractual agreements as well as by financial and legal oversight on conduct, the content and quality of services are not under similar appraisal. Thus, while most ministries sufficiently monitor their respective agencies, some ministries – notably education and welfare – are criticized for failing to implement government policies by effective monitoring of services. The Movement for Quality Government in Israel claims this phenomenon is harming efficiency within public services, while others claim that state-owned enterprises are unnecessary and should be privatized. Various government committees and reports issued recommendations to improve professional and organizational capabilities of ministries but as of yet there is no clear comprehensive plan to deal with such failures.
Israel also suffers from “ politicization” of its public service and state-owned enterprises. For example, the electricity authority is subordinate to the minister of energy following a 2015 reform. This has raised concerns that appointments of senior officials will be made based on political considerations, rather than professional competence. Such concerns were validated when the current energy minister, Yuval Steinitz, sought to appoint his close associate to the position of CEO, even though he did not have the required experience and without holding a public tender. This appointment was later reversed by a committee tasked with inspecting appointments to state-owned enterprises.

Citation:
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Koren, Ora, “Reform in the public sector: The ministry of Treasury’s authorities will be restrained, employees will receive incentives,” TheMarker website 9.8.2012 (Hebrew)
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Ben Aeter, Moshe. ‘Who needs the state-own enterprises?’ – Haaretz, 13.04.16 (Hebrew): http://www.haaretz.co.il/blogs/moshebatar/1.2914354

Lithuania

Lithuania’s fragmented structure of agencies and other public-sector organizations undermines the effective monitoring of bureaucratic performance. While agencies subordinate to the central government or individual ministries can be monitored relatively efficiently, autonomous organizations such as public nonprofit institutions, foundations and state-owned enterprises that carry out administrative functions are more difficult to control. Parent ministries and third parties acting on behalf of the ministries use a combination of ex ante and ex post oversight mechanisms, including the assessment of agency results. However, many Lithuanian ministries have no professional staff specifically assigned to monitor agency activities, and the interest shown by ministers and other politicians in the performance of agencies depends on the changing salience of political issues. In 2012, the Governance Coordination Center was established as part of the State Property Fund. Among other tasks, it monitors the implementation of state-owned enterprises’ goals, and produces regular reports on the performance of these enterprises. Beginning in 2013, the scope of annual public-sector reports produced by the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior was expanded to include municipal organizations. However, this ministry’s reports remain of a descriptive nature, lacking specific recommendations as to how the
performance of individual organizations or their groups might be improved. In 2015, the Sunset Commission reviewed the performance of public nonprofit institutions and proposed a number of recommendations, some of which were related to improving monitoring of these institutions.

South Korea

Score 6

The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies and the minister is responsible for compliance. Once again, the top-down structure of the government allows for effective monitoring. Agencies generally have autonomy with respect to day-to-day operations, but even these can occasionally be the subject of top-down interventions. However, ministries fail in some cases to monitor executive agencies’ implementation activities effectively. Moreover, Park’s leadership style was not conducive to effective monitoring or voluntary compliance. For example, nuclear-power-industry scandals emerging in 2014, which concerned bribery and faked safety tests for critical plant equipment, were an example of supervisory failure. In the same year, President Park also abolished the Coast Guard due to its failure during the sinking of the Sewol. In 2015, the MERS outbreak revealed some serious flaws in the hospital-regulation system.

Citation:

Switzerland

Score 6

Switzerland’s governance system offers considerable flexibility in implementing decisions. The central administration is very small; this does not prevent bureaucratic drift, but in all likelihood the opportunities for such drift are much smaller than in huge administrations.

A number of factors mitigate for close coordination between the federal government and the federal administration. The country’s direct democracy means that citizens have the ability to limit the maneuvering room of both government and administration. In the collegial governmental system, coordination is essential to success, and government and administration alike depend on efficient collaboration given the reality of parliamentary control. There is little evidence of an administrative class that acts on its own; moreover, administrative elites perceive themselves to be politically neutral.

Furthermore, Switzerland’s system is not characterized by a unitary federalism such as in Germany. Rather, it resembles the federalism of the United States. This implies that cantons have considerable responsibility for implementing policy, while the federal state has a subsidiary role. According to Article 3 of the constitution: “The
cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution; they shall exercise all rights which are not transferred to the confederation.” Even in areas in which the federal state has tasks and powers, such as social insurance, environmental protection or zoning, implementation is carried out by the cantonal and sometimes municipal administrations. These bodies have considerable flexibility in performing their work, and implementation of federal guidelines frequently varies substantially between cantons. Zoning policy has offered examples in which the same federal regulation has led to opposite outcomes in different cantons. In addition, much implementation is carried out by interest organizations though the corporatist channel.

A 2016 study by Fritz Sager and Eva Thomann on cantonal asylum policies showed that implementation was mainly dependent on the extent of the problem, politicization and partisan power distribution in the respective canton as well as the previous policy. This analysis allows for many different constellations, which can explain the large variation in cantonal implementation of federal laws.

Citation:

Czech Republic

Score 5

There is not much delegation of responsibility away from the government in the Czech Republic. Agencies take diverse organizational forms and are monitored in different ways. Most of them enjoy little autonomy, and are monitored relatively tightly. In many cases, both the government and parliament are directly involved in supervision.

Ireland

Score 5

The number of government agencies has been steadily increasing. In 1950, there were around 130 agencies. By 2010, there were more than 350 agencies (see MacCarthaigh, 2012).

The Health Services Executive (HSE) is the government agency responsible for providing public health care. It is the largest semi-autonomous bureaucracy in the country. It was formed by the amalgamation of local health boards 10 years ago; it remains difficult to identify the savings that were promised due to this rationalization. On the other hand, cost overruns and low delivery standards have been a persistent feature of the agency. The history of HSE weighs heavily on public perceptions of the new Irish Water agency.
In other areas, the autonomy of executive agencies has yielded mixed results, and the monitoring of these agencies is not sufficiently close to ensure that government policy is being implemented efficiently.

The Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG) is responsible for auditing and reporting on the accounts of all public bodies, ensuring that funds are applied for the purposes intended, and evaluating the effectiveness of operations. The OCAG does not regularly monitor all executive agencies. It seems to select those where it knows or suspects that problems have arisen. Its mission statement says it “selects issues for examination which are important in the context of the management of public funds.” Its reports contain details of overspending and inefficiencies, and make recommendations for improving financial administration within the public sector.

In summary, a system of monitoring executive agencies is in place, but recent high-profile cases show that it all too often discovers failings and shortcomings after they have occurred and has not been very effective in averting them.

Citation:
The latest (2013) OCAG reports on the accounts of the public services are available here:


A list of special reports on value for money in the public sector is available here:


Malta

Malta is a unitary state. As such monitoring of bureaucratic agencies is undertaken by, for example, parliamentary oversight, such as during parliamentary committee sessions or annual budget debates A Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also exists. The National Audit Office produces an annual report on all public service entities (departments, agencies, etc.). The Ombudsman also produces a procedural audit, while the Department of Local Government assesses the performance of local government bodies. There is also an internal audit office within ministries. The Prime Minister’s Office, through the Principal Permanent Secretary’s Office, has become more involved in monitoring processes. Follow-up of reports remains problematic, though government has pledged to address administrative shortcomings identified by the Audit Office.

Citation:
73% of budget measures to be implemented by the end of 2016 Malta chamber of commerce
The process of monitoring tends to work better at the national level than at the subnational level, where the general process of accountability is more heterogeneously developed. Monitoring is considerable at particular times and places, but limited otherwise. Moreover, monitoring is selective due to uneven state capacity, which hampers greater coverage. Essentially, it depends on politics. Ministries can scrutinize bureaucratic agencies if they want to, but there are good subjective reasons why they do not always do so – for example, because of political considerations. Decentralized agencies often try to exercise autonomy by going over the top of the governing secretariat and contacting the president directly. Pemex, the state-owned petroleum company, is notorious for such attempts, although it does not always succeed. In addition, ministers or the cabinet are not monitoring the military and the police effectively.

The politicization of agencies has continued. Prime Minister Fico has gradually replaced a majority of the heads and core executives of all state agencies at the national level. As he has not yet succeeded in weakening the legal powers of independent executive agencies, he has sought to control them via personnel changes, as well as by increasing their financial dependence on the central government. As with the line ministries, the government has closely monitored the agencies’ implementation activities.

The capacity of ministries to monitor the implementation activities of the bureaucracies and executive agencies within their task areas is quite limited in institutional terms. The monitoring that does take place tends to focus only on priority areas – such as the absorption of EU funds – and tends to rely on informal rather than formal mechanisms.

Croatia has about 75 executive agencies, six of which are regulatory agencies. The tasks of these agencies are determined by law. The two most important monitoring instruments are certain reporting requirements and the representation of ministers or senior civil servants on the agencies’ management boards. Reports are not based on redefined performance indicators, but are more a loose and often self-congratulatory
review of agencies’ activities in the past year. They are seldom discussed after publication. As a result, the agencies enjoy a relatively large amount of discretion and face primarily political constraints. The proliferation of agencies has been a source of waste and inefficiency. The Orešković government continued the evaluation of agencies begun under the Milanović government and eventually proposed the elimination of nine agencies. However, this proposal has not yet been implemented.

Italy

Score 4

Autonomous executive agencies are not very common in Italian ministries, but they have increased with time. Although their activities are monitored, this monitoring is neither systematic nor particularly effective. There are some exceptions: for example, the monitoring of the tax agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) by the Ministry of Finance is more effective than many other oversights. The Corte dei Conti – the main Audit Office – performs a systematic monitoring of bureaucratic offices and also of executive agencies but this monitoring is mainly focused on legal and procedural aspects and is much less effective in covering other aspects such as cost efficiency. Monitoring of regional health care agencies, and health care expenditure and procurements is still inadequate. Despite major regional differences and deviations from “standard costs,” established by recent studies, systematic oversight is not yet in place. After long discussions about the introduction of nationally defined “standard costs” in the health sector this decision is yet to be implemented. The capacity of regional governments to properly manage and monitor health care resources can vary significantly from region to region, which has cast doubt over further decentralization and the ability of the central government to control this sector.

Netherlands

Score 4

The national Framework Law on Agencies/Bureaucracies has insufficient scope: too many agencies are exempted from (full) monitoring directives, while annual reports are delivered too late or are incomplete. Hence, the government lacks adequate oversight over the dozens of billions of euros of expenses managed by bodies at some distance from the central government. The original intention was that the Framework Law would apply fully to some 75% of the agencies; by 2012 it had less than 25% of its intended function. In 2014 – 2015, it became clear that several oversight agencies and inspectorates, such as the Inspectorate for Health Care and the Authority for Consumers and Markets, were not quite up to their tasks. ICT projects for the national government too were not being properly monitored, resulting in huge time- and cost-overruns. The Social Insurance Bank (Sociale Verzekeringsbank, SVB) was for far too long unable to disburse personal benefits to
special-education students and senior citizens eligible for day and home care on time and in the correct amount. The Implementing Institute for Workers’ Insurances (Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen, UVW) has struggled for a long time with apparently unsolvable problems, including delays in medical check-ups and increasing fraud, while the inaccessibility of its ICT-system is undermining communication with clients. Implementation of human resource plans for the National Revenue Service (Belastingdienst), following substantial political pressure, were put under external supervision. Some MPs believe the Revenue Services’ organizational continuity may be at stake.

Citation:
Algemene Rekenkamer, Kaderwet zbo’s. Rijkwijdte en implementatie, juni 2012
Instellingsbesluit Onderzoekscommissie intern functioneren Nederlandse Zorg Autoriteit (NZa), 27 October 2015
Financieel Dadblad, Algemene Rekenkamer gaat effectiviteit UWV onderzoeken, 29 January, 2016 (fd.nl., consulted 9 November 2016)
NRC.nl, Wiebes plaatst Belastingdienst onder curatele, 12 October 2016 (nrs.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
Nu.nl, Deel Tweede Kamer niet overtuigd dat de continuïteit van de belastingdienst niet in gevaar is, 2 November 2016 (nu.nl., consulted 2 November 2016)

Romania

Score 4

The monitoring of agencies in Romania has been plagued by political clientelism and the capacity reduction suffered by many ministries following the often-haphazard personnel reductions associated with the austerity measures adopted in 2010 – 2011. Many agencies fail to provide information on their websites, which is in violation of decisional transparency legislation. Under the Ciolos government, the situation did not change.

Slovenia

Score 4

Following the passage of the 2002 Civil Service Act, which has made it easier for the government to get rid of unwanted personnel, politicization has increased in Slovenia’s executive agencies. Despite a rhetorical commitment to depoliticization in public administration in the 2014 coalition agreement, the Cerar government has replaced a number of experienced senior and even some mid-level civil servants with less qualified staff loyal to the coalition parties, and has filled leading positions in executive agencies with politically loyal personnel. Also, ministerial cabinets are largely filled with politically loyal personnel that usually lack the requisite expertise to carry out its functions and aid the minister. Political and personal ties have prevented the prosecution of misconduct and incompetency.
Cyprus

Score 3

The crisis led to the need for close scrutiny and to significant reforms of the broader public sector. Ambivalent measures introduced thus far enhance powers of control rather than oversight. Over the years, oversight and general policy guidance to semi-governmental organizations (SGOs) lied with line ministers. The Council of Ministers appoints their governing bodies and approves their budgets after line ministries review it and before a vote in parliament. Deficient monitoring resulted in financial and other mismanagement. Clientelistic practices prevailed, serving governments and partisan objectives. Amendments to the law on SGOs governing bodies (2014) appear to offer room for closer oversight but also ample ability to continue favoritism.

Efforts to reform local authorities resulted in draft laws sent before the parliament (October 2016). These laws and the law on fiscal responsibility (20(I)/2014) were expected to improve municipalities’ management. They respond to chronic problems that resulted in some municipalities even facing bankruptcy.

Citation:
2. Law on the appointment of governing bodies of SGOs, http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1988_1_149/full.html (in Greek)

Iceland

Score 3

The monitoring of public agencies by ministries is weak. Public agencies and government ministries have often spent more money than allotted to them in the government budget. This problem has been exacerbated due to the limited capacity of the National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) to monitor the activities of those agencies within its jurisdiction. From 2000 to 2007, the National Audit Office audited only 44 out of 993, or 4.4%, of the agencies within its jurisdiction. In 2009, almost half of the National Audit Office’s efforts (43%) were diverted to financial auditing related in some way to the economic crash and its consequences. Moreover, National Audit Office’s resources have been cut. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of personnel was reduced from 47 to 42. At the end of 2015, the National Audit Office had 41 employees. This reduction in personnel is hardly going to increase the effectiveness of the National Audit Office which seems to be getting gradually weaker.

Citation:
Task Funding

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
- 8-6 = The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
- 5-3 = The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
- 2-1 = The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.

Canada

Canada’s central government typically ensures that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded. Education and health care are largely the responsibility of provincial governments, and the federal government transfers funds earmarked for these functions through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). In addition, Canada has a system of Equalization and Territorial Formula Finance (ETFF) payments in place, which are unconditional transfers to the provinces and territories designed to equalize the level of public service provision across provinces and territories. The block-funding structure is intended to give provinces and territories greater flexibility in designing and administering programs.

In 2016-2017, the provincial and territorial governments will receive CAD 70.9 billion in federal transfers. The CST will continue to grow at its current rate of 3% annually. The Liberal government indicated that CHT spending will be capped at 3.5%, down from 6% in previous years. This reduction will lead to a CAD 1 billion shortfall in the 2017-2018 fiscal year. Most provinces have not yet accepted the 3.5% increase in the CHT and are asking for an increase to 5.5%. However, their bargaining power on this is limited. Additionally, the federal government is calling for more transparency from provincial and territorial governments on CHT spending, suggesting that subnational governments are not spending health care dollars adequately. Both the CHT and the CST will be reviewed in 2024.
New Zealand

Score 9

The New Zealand governmental system is highly centralized. Local-government structures, which are lean and generally uniform, raise only about 5% of total government tax revenues. However, local autonomy in setting tax rates and bases is greater than in any other OECD country. The main source of local tax revenues is the so-called rates, which are taxes on real-estate holdings. At the time of writing, local governments had full discretion to set rates, subject to a general balanced budget requirement. Other revenue sources include user charges and fees. Local government officials have been lobbying central government for the right to raise revenue from additional sources, including road tolls and a gasoline tax. To date, their lobbying has been unsuccessful. There are no block grants from central to local government, but the central government contributes funding to specific local-government functions, in particular transportation as well as road construction and maintenance. For example, a major new city rail link in Auckland is being funded by a combination of local and central government money. The National government has reformed the Local Government Act with the aim of limiting local services more to their core tasks to keep costs under control.

Citation:

Switzerland

Score 9

In Switzerland, cantons and municipalities levy most of the country’s tax revenues. They determine local tax rates and decide how tax revenues will be distributed. Between 2004 and 2007, Switzerland passed a rather successful reform of its financial federalism, which has now taken effect. The basic idea was to establish a clear division of tasks between the federation and the cantons, and create transparency with regard to the flow of resources between the federal state and the cantons. In this reform, the basic principle of fiscal equivalence was strengthened. This means that communes, cantons and the federation each are responsible for the funding of their own tasks, and for the balance of their own budgets. The fiscal equalization scheme has been retained, as it is necessary to reduce certain geographical, economic and social disparities, but the danger of providing badly aligned incentives through earmarked subsidies is eliminated through the use of grants. Funds thus continue to flow vertically (from the federal state to the cantons...
Implementation

...as well as horizontally (between communes and cantons). Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the new fiscal equalization scheme will help cantons that have serious problems in fulfilling their tasks or in meeting their goals due to their small size, lack of resources, or other reasons. In any case, there is a divide between those cantons that pay more and those receiving payments.

### Austria

**Score 8**

Under Austria’s federal system, individual federal states are constitutionally weak as compared with individual states in other federal systems. Yet politically, the federal states enjoy significant power due to the principle of federal or indirect administration and the federal structure of all major parties. Successful party leaders on the state level often determine the fate of their party’s national leadership.

In part because of this ambivalent power structure, responsibilities shift and are shared between levels. In some cases, this functions well: In the case of the most recent health reform, for example, state administrations and the federal government, working closely with the umbrella organization of public insurance companies, together developed a formula that is expected to limit increases in care costs. In other fields, such as the school system, the conflicting structures and interests of the state and federal governments have led to inefficiencies and finger-pointing.

The Austrian constitution mandates that tasks delegated to regional or municipal governments must be adequately funded, although this does not always entail 100% national funding. This principle is in most cases effectively implemented, with some exceptions on the municipal level.

### Denmark

**Score 8**

Part of the tax paid in Denmark is municipal income tax, and the tax rate varies between municipalities. The municipalities also receive money from the state (bloktilskud), and there is an equalization arrangement that moves funds from richer to poorer municipalities. There are annual negotiations with the municipalities and regions about the financial framework agreement. Since municipalities act independently – though coordinated via their organization (Kommunernes Landsforbund) – the financial decisions of the municipalities have not always added up to a sum consistent with the overall targets set by the Ministry of Finance. This implied for some years that expenditure growth exceeded targets. This has led to a new system – part of the Budget Law approved by Parliament in 2012 – which includes financial sanctions. The sanctions have both an individual and collective element. If the sum of expenditures exceeds the agreed target, the “bloktilskud” is reduced by an equivalent amount. This reduction is levied 60% on the municipalities which exceeded expenditure targets and 40% on all municipalities (distributed...
according to population size). The new system has been very effective and municipalities have been well within targets in recent years. Since 2002, municipalities have been part of a so-called tax freeze implying that taxes (e.g., income and building sites) cannot increase. If one municipality increases some tax it should be matched by a decrease in another municipality.

Many municipalities currently find themselves in a very tight financial situation and have had to reconsider resource use on core activities like child- and old-age care and schooling.

Citation:
Jørgen Grønnegård Christiansen et al., Politik og forvaltning, 2011.


**Finland**

**Score 8**

Municipal governments have a right to assess taxes, collecting more than twice as much as the central government in income taxes. A government grant system additionally enables local governments to continue to provide public services even when experiencing a funding gap. In essence, a portion of locally collected taxes is put into a common pool, from which transfers are made to financially weak local governments. The central government establishes strict standards and service-provision requirements intended to cover all citizens. However, local governments are tasked with providing these services, which means that some municipalities are unable to meet the standards without increasing taxes. Given that local government units differ greatly in size and resources, they are in unequal positions in terms of capacity and performance efficiency. A large-scale reform of municipalities and services, started in 2006 and yet unfinished, has led to a reduction in the number of municipalities from 415 to 348 in 2009. Among other goals, the reform aims to secure sufficient financing and an efficient provision of services across the country. The government has also introduced a further and much contested reform project to create larger entities tasked with providing social and health services in a more efficient way (SOTE). However, according to expert assessments, the final compromise solution of 18 social services and health care entities is less satisfactory in terms of efficient funding and democratic organization than was an original proposal for a maximum of nine to 12 SOTE regions.

Citation:
http://alueuudistus.fi/en/frontpage
Iceland

Score 8

The issue of grant-based funding has been a constant source of conflict between local and central governments. Meanwhile, the division of responsibilities between the central government and local governments has changed, but not radically. In 1996, full responsibility for primary education was transferred from the central government to local governments. In general, this transfer of responsibilities has been achieved without imposing a heavy financial burden on local governments. However, some of the smallest municipalities have experienced fiscal difficulties as a result of these transfers, and have either been forced to amalgamate or cooperate on service provision with neighboring municipalities. Full responsibility for services for disabled individuals was transferred to local governments in 2010 and took effect in January 2011, without conflicts concerning funding arrangements arising between the central government and local governments. Further transfers of responsibility have been planned - though without any dates set, including responsibility for elderly care. Negotiations on the transfer of elderly care have been repeatedly postponed due to disagreements over funding arrangements between central and local governments. The negotiating and preparation committee with representatives from state and local levels has in fact had no formal meeting since August 2013 (www.velferdarraduneyti.is/yfirfaerslan/).

The issue on state funding once again came to the fore in 2015 when several music schools were threatened by bankruptcy due to a funding dispute between central and local governments, still unsettled in late 2016.

Citation:

Norway

Score 8

There is a constant tension between central and local government over the funding of responsibilities imposed on local governments. As welfare policies move more toward ensuring universal rights, the financial and administrative demands placed on the various local units have become more challenging, particularly for some of the smaller units. As a result, local-government funding has been increased. This policy was initially met with great satisfaction by local authorities; however, these bodies rapidly adapted their activities to these new financial flows and relaxed budget discipline which, in turn, led to growing public debt at the local level. Local governments later again began asking the central government for additional funds. In general, regional governments and municipalities are adequately funded, but there have been efforts to promote voluntary structural reforms that would create larger units. However, these reforms have been rejected by many voters in local units.
United States

The United States has a federal system in which the 50 states are independent sovereign governments, although the federal constitution is “the supreme law of the land.” States have unrestricted power to raise their own revenue, although the federal government takes full advantage of their more productive sources, such as the income tax. There is no general presumption of uniform standards for public services. Rather, the federal government imposes standards or seeks to induce certain levels of performance in varying degrees on different issues.

State officials have often complained that federal mandates required substantial expenditures without providing the necessary funds. In 1995, the Republican Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The act provides incentives for Congress and regulatory agencies to identify potential unfunded mandates in the legislative or rule-making process, but does not prevent them from setting mandates. As a result, complaints from state officials have subsided. The Obama health care reform seeks to expand coverage of low-income individuals by raising the income ceiling for eligibility for Medicaid, a program administered and largely funded by the states. According to the law, the federal government will pay 90% of the cost of the expanded coverage if states pay 10% of the cost of health coverage for the new beneficiaries. However, many states with Republican leadership have thus far opted out of the Medicaid expansion.

Czech Republic

The regional tier within the Czech system of governance has taken on greater importance following a process of consolidation of various administrative functions. The budgetary allocation of taxes, tax autonomy and financial decentralization have enabled regional governments to exhibit more autonomy in fulfilling governing functions and managing basic infrastructure. European structural funds constitute an important resource for regional development. All negotiations over regional budgets remain complicated by opposing political majorities on the central, regional and municipal level. This problem has been aggravated by the 2016 regional elections, in which new governing coalitions emerged, sometimes bringing the parties of the current governing coalition into opposition.

France

Over the past 30 to 40 years, the powers of communes, provinces (départements) and regions, delegated by central authorities or taken over de facto by local entities, have increased considerably. Normally a delegation of powers was accompanied by corresponding funding. However, as formerly centralized policies were notably
badly managed or insufficiently funded, local units had to face huge expenditure increases that were not fully covered by the central government. Local lobbying groups are so powerful (given the tradition of accumulating elective mandates, most national parliamentarians are also elected local officials; furthermore, the local lobby controls the second chamber, the Senate) that they have managed to secure substantial fiscal transfers not earmarked for special purposes. Thus, more than two-thirds of non-military public monies are spent by local/regional actors, a figure comparable to the situation in federal states. While in theory local governments are agents of the central government, they have, actually, secured ample discretion. The recent regional reform reducing the number of regions from 22 to 13 has had quite an important consequence: the new regions will benefit from a fraction of the VAT, whereas before they did not receive taxes but only transfers from the central government.

On the other hand, the piecemeal and ad hoc reforms of local taxation, such as the elimination of the local business tax (taxe professionnelle) and its compensation by national state allocations in 2009, or President Hollande’s cut of state subsidies to local government as a move toward budget consolidation, have not improved the situation. On the contrary, local investment diminished in 2014 by 14% according to a recent report by the Court of Accounts. A dozen departments face great difficulties to meet their obligation to pay for the welfare benefit offered to people with insufficient income (Revenu de solidarité active, RSA). The crucial issue will be to make the local authorities more financially responsible since large amounts of their resources are granted without strings by the central government.

### Germany

**Score 7**

The delegation of tasks from the national to the subnational level without commensurate funding has been a sore point of German fiscal federalism. For instance, municipalities suffer under the weight of increasing costs of welfare programs. However, a number of adjustments over the last years have substantially rejuvenated municipalities and states. The Hartz IV reform, which merged welfare benefits with unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed, shifted minimum income payments for individuals capable of work from municipalities to the Federal Employment Agency. In 2009, the federal government began compensating municipalities for basic income support provided to pensioners, the percentage of which reached 100% in 2014. Financial burdens associated with education and childcare have also been shifted to the federal level.

For months, the federal government and state (Länder) governments wrangled over the costs of the migrants and refugees. In July 2016, the federal government increased the flat-rate payment for integration by about €8 billion until 2018, which is an exceptional improvement.
With respect to the future of the fiscal equalization system, an important compromise on the new system (in effect from 2020 onwards) was achieved in October 2016. In this compromise, the Länder receive higher shares of VAT revenues and a system of exclusively vertical equalization payments (from the federal to the state level) is replacing the current horizontal system (where richer states pay to poorer states). Taken together, a comprehensive shift of financial resources from the federal to the state and municipal level has been achieved and remains under way. Complaints from the Länder about underfunding increasingly lack credibility.

Citation:

Ireland

Score 7

One of the motivations for the creation of Irish Water in 2013 was to remove responsibility for the provision of water services from local governments, many of which had failed to provide a reliable supply of high-quality water to their populations and had seriously under-invested in water infrastructure over the years, perhaps largely due to inadequate funding from the central government. The water initiative paralleled the decision in 2005 to remove the provision of public-health services from regional health boards, centralizing this power instead in the Health Services Executive. As we have seen, this has not resulted in a smoothly functioning health care delivery system.

The functions and services that remain the responsibility of subnational units of government are largely funded by the central government rather than from local resources. In 2013, grants from the central government accounted for 43% of the current revenue and 90% of the capital revenue of subnational governmental units. Local taxes accounted for only 28% of their current receipts. While the introduction of the local property tax raised the proportion of funds coming from local sources, subnational units of government still remain heavily dependent on the central government for resources. This dependence is proportionately greater in the case of smaller and poorer local units.

The receipts from the new local property tax (LPT) are to be distributed as follows: in 2015, 80% will be retained locally to fund vital public services, while the remaining 20% will be redistributed to provide top-up funding to certain local authorities that have lower property-tax bases due to variance in property values.

No local authority will receive less income from the LPT in 2015 than they received from the Local Government Fund in 2014.
Luxembourg

Since 2015, the Ministry of the Interior has overseen 105 municipalities in Luxembourg. This supervision is paired with substantial financial transfers from the central government to local entities, which, apart from a substantial share in corporate income tax (CIT) revenues, lack autonomous sources of revenue. Two-thirds of local entities have fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, a size which is believed to be far too small to handle modern political, administrative and technical matters. The government had planned to reduce the number of local municipalities to 71 by the end of 2017. However, the new government has weakened this objective, as it does not correspond to a top-down strategy for municipal mergers. The aim is to have no municipality under 3,000 inhabitants, thus reducing operational costs and improving administrative and technical efficiency. Municipalities frequently complain that funding from the central government is insufficient. The government has used financial transfers to overcome local resistance to municipality mergers. So-called municipal associations (syndicats intercommunaux) exist in fields, such as culture and sports, to help improve the quality of local government. In December 2016, parliament voted in favor of a reform of the municipal finance system. The reform aims to provide municipalities financial and planning security.

Citation:


United Kingdom

Within the United Kingdom, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have devolved governments, which have responsibility for major public services, such as health care and education. England has no devolved government, though local authorities in England have responsibility for a more limited range of public services, including schools. The central government exercises tight control over the finances of the devolved governments and local authorities in England. The bulk of local authority revenue in England comes from central government grants, even the rate of property tax is controlled centrally. As a result, local authorities have been among the hardest hit by government spending cuts. Given the absence of a written constitution, there is no mechanism to govern the allocation of funds to finance these devolved tasks. As
such, any decisions about funding is subject to political and administrative negotiations through formula-based need assessments. Agreements such as the “Barnett Formula” for Scotland, Wales and England provide some stability of funding. However, despite their recent reaffirmation, these agreements could change if a future government decides that fiscal consolidation requires severe spending cuts.

The Scotland Act 2012 gave the Scottish Administration new taxation and borrowing powers. After the close outcome of the Scottish Referendum and as a result of the Smith Commission’s Report, the new Conservative government announced the devolution of further tax powers – including income tax powers – to the Scottish parliament. The details of additional borrowing powers for the Scottish parliament are currently being negotiated.

The new government has announced a reform of local governance. This would mainly include a decentralization of decision-making, monitoring, and spending powers to local mayors (an office which is quite unusual in the United Kingdom). Challenges are sure to arise in relation to task funding.

The Welsh Assembly has far less fiscal discretion, but central government has agreed that borrowing powers should also be devolved to the Welsh assembly and agreed on a fiscal framework. A new settlement for Northern Ireland has also been under discussion for quite some time, but agreement had not been reached at the time of writing. A debate on financial matters in England must also be expected. Some new infrastructure initiatives, housing and “growth deals” for England were announced in the government spending plans unveiled in the November 2016 Autumn Statement.

Citation:

Australia

Tasks are delegated to the states and territories not by choice, but by constitutional requirement, yet the states and territories are highly reliant on the Commonwealth to finance the myriad services they provide, including primary, secondary and vocational education, police, justice systems, public transport, roads and many health services. This dependence has been a source of much conflict, and many would argue it has led to inadequate provision of state-government provided services. The federal government’s commitment to completely pass on to the states all revenue raised by a broad-based consumption tax introduced in 2000 only marginally reduced the tension between the two levels of government. Certainly, it has not helped that
prices in education and health care have in recent years risen faster than general price levels, while the proportion of expenditure subject to the consumption tax has declined from 56% in 2005 to around 47% in 2015. In response, the previous Labor government attempted to address underfunding of health care and education, reaching funding agreements on health care with most jurisdictions in 2011 and making progress on agreements for school funding in early 2013. The coalition government has not shown the same commitment to increasing health and education funding, and indeed has indicated an intention to scale back federal funding. Since its rise to power in September 2013, the coalition government has delivered a significant budget deficit in every fiscal year. Consequently, task funding likely to fall further than rise over coming years.

Citation:
Australian Government ‘Re:think Tax Discussion Paper’, March 2015:

**Chile**

Chile’s central government exercises strong control over municipal and regional budgets, and accounts for a significant proportion of local revenue. Currently, about 18% of the federal government’s budget is redistributed to the regional and local level (OECD average is about 45%). However, the assignment of new duties to the municipal level does not necessarily imply a corresponding allocation of adequate funds.

Municipal programs are monitored relatively closely by the central government, although spending overruns do sometimes occur, resulting in local-government debt. The quality of services (e.g., the public health and education systems) provided by less wealthy municipalities are sometimes below average as some municipalities are unable to raise the income required to effectively provide the services themselves. This challenge is characteristic of Chile’s centralized political system and must be regarded as a structural problem. The current government convened a commission to study decentralization, with the ultimate goal of addressing these ongoing issues. The commission’s proposal, which was presented publicly in October 2014 and supported by President Bachelet, included several proposals designed to strengthen regional governments. Two such measures are slated for implementation by the end of 2017:

- Regional governors (Gobernadores Regionales) will replace the current regional mayors (Intendentes Regionales) and be directly elected, enabling citizens to hold them accountable for promises made in their political campaigns.

- Regional governors (Gobernadores Regionales) will be given responsibility for regional and urban planning, administration of the National Fund for Regional
Development, and implementation of social and economic policies at the regional level. The regions will create three new divisions for this purpose: Industrial Advancement (Fomento e Industria), Human Development, and Infrastructure and Transport.

In addition, the amount of federal funds provided to regional governments will be increased. The decentralization proposal contains an implementation timeline stretching through 2016, but the final draft regarding the exact competences and budgeting for regional governors must still be approved by Congress.

Citation:
http://descentralizacion.cl/

http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2015/01/16/699525/presidenta-bachelet-firma-indicaciones-a-proyecto-de-ley-de-descentralizacion-del-pais.html


http://chiledescentralizado.cl/eleccion-de-gobernadores-regionales/

Israel

Local authorities have three main types of income: local taxes (property tax, fines, tolls) earmarked to finance local services, government funds designated for social and educational services, and governmental balancing grants for basic services that weak local authorities are unable to fund. The government’s budgeting procedure for local government is clearly articulated, and includes progressive budgetary support. One major problem in the government’s budgeting procedure was highlighted in the state comptroller’s 2015 report: there is no regular procedure in the interior ministry for managing the development budget for local authorities.

In 2015, the heads of more than ten local authorities championed a plan to redistribute education budget allocations according to cities’ socioeconomic ranking. This group, headed by Jerusalem mayor, Nir Barkat, asserts that the current method of education budget allocation does not take the economic and social situation of the local authorities into account, and perpetuates social gaps. However, this plan provoked resistance among rich municipalities, and has not been accepted by the Finance Ministry. Similar plans and legislative proposals regarding alternative distributions of the budget were rejected by the Finance Ministry in 2015. In June 2016, heads of local authorities decided to protest, calling for the education budget to be distributed more equitably. In response, in August 2016, during discussions in the Committee of Social Justice about the protest, the head of the committee promised that the subject of education budget distribution would be dealt with as a part of the Arrangements Laws.
Over the years, the Ministry of the Interior expanded its oversight over local authorities, as issues of politicization, corruption and management failures resulted in unwieldy deficits or even municipal bankruptcies. Research focusing on social services show that although Israel funding levels are comparable to other OECD countries, its local authorities receive less government funds when taking into account the proportion of responsibilities the government delegates to the local level.

Citation:
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “The political economy of local authorities,” IDI website 2009 (Hebrew)
Saada, Aria, “Ombudsman’s report 572: Budgeting social services for local authorities equality lacking,” Abiliko website 9.7.2010 (Hebrew)
Ben Basat, Avi and Dahan, Momi, “Strike in local authorities,” IDI website 15.1.2012 (Hebrew)
Dahan, Momi, “Why do local authorities hold back pay?,” IDI website 15.11.2009 (Hebrew)
“Instructions for local authorities’ budget frame proposal for the year 2012,” Ministry of Interior website (Hebrew)

Italy

Score 6

In recent years, a double and to some extent contradictory trend has taken place in the relationship between central government and local administrations (regions, provinces and municipalities). On the one hand, constitutional reforms and normal legislative and administrative changes transferred broader tasks to local governments. This has particularly been the case for regions where the devolution of functions in the field of health care has been particularly extensive, for example. On the other hand, however, because of budgetary constraints and strong pressure from the European Union and international markets, the central government has increasingly reduced transfers to local governments in order to balance its own budget. The Renzi government, guided in part by a spending review that found considerable financial waste at the local and especially at the regional levels, has continued this approach. Local governments have tried to resist this fiscal squeeze without great success and have had to increase local taxation. At the same time, the government has reduced the autonomy of municipalities to levy property taxes. As a result, functions delegated to subnational governments are now often underfunded, and local authorities have been forced to cut services.

In 2016, the government made the “internal stability pact” more flexible. The pact significantly restricted the budgetary autonomy of municipalities and in particular damaged the “virtuous” ones, which could not spend their budgetary surpluses. This change should enable virtuous municipalities to increase investments. Furthermore, the central government transferred special issue funds to the regions to allow them, among other things, to better align with EU law.
Japan

Score 6

Local governments – prefectures and municipalities – strongly depend on the central government. Local taxes account for less than half of local revenues and the system of vertical fiscal transfers is fairly complicated. Expectations to reduce expenditures have increased, as local budgets are increasingly under pressure given the aging of the population and social-policy expenses related to growing income disparities and poverty rates. The deficit situation of local governments has somewhat eased in recent years.

Japanese authorities are well aware of these issues. Past countermeasures have included a merger of municipalities designed to create economies of scale, and a redefinition of burdensome local-agency functions. In addition, the LDP and others have contemplated a reorganization of Japan’s prefectural system into larger regional entities (doshu). Such a reform is highly controversial, however. Since 2014-15, special economic zones (tokku) where national regulations are eased and regional vitalization special zones serve as field experiments for improved policymaking. Many observers doubt whether the approach being taken is bold enough.

Citation:


Latvia

Score 6

Local governments enjoy a comparatively high degree of autonomy. The local government share of public expenditure was 24.3% in 2015, slightly above the EU average of 24.1%.

Local governments have autonomous tasks, delegated tasks and legally mandated tasks. Each type of task is meant to be accompanied by a funding source. In practice, however, funding is not made available for all tasks. The President’s Strategic Advisory Council has described local governments as having a low degree of income autonomy and a relatively high degree of expenditure autonomy. In its 2011 report on Latvia’s adherence to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, the Council of Europe concluded that local authorities have inadequate access to independent resources and urged Latvia to increase local authorities’ financial autonomy.

The adoption in 2012 of a medium-term budget-planning process envisions the inclusion of three-year budget cycles for local government. While this will provide medium-term budget clarity for local governments, there is also a concern that it will
prevent local governments from gaining access to budget increases in proportion to the rate of economic recovery. Data from 2015 showed an imbalance between central and local government budget pressures. In 2015, local government expenditure decreased by 1.1%, while central government expenditure increased by 3.8%. However, local government income increased by 1.7%, while central government income increased by 3.4%.

Citation:
1. The President’s Strategic Advisory Council (2013), Management Improvement Proposals, Available at (in Latvian): http://www.president.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/Pasvaldibas_EGPP_FINAL.pdf, Last assessed: 21.05.2013
2. Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (2011), Local and Regional Democracy in Latvia, Available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1857271&Site=COE, Last assessed: 21.05.2013.

Lithuania

Score 6

Lithuanian municipalities perform both state-delegated (funded through grants from the central government) and independent (funded through a national tax-sharing arrangement and local sources of revenue) functions. Lithuania has a centralized system of government with powers and financial resources concentrated at the central level. The central government provides grants for the exercise of functions delegated to the local level, as local authorities have minimal revenue-raising powers. In 2012, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities expressed its concern that Lithuanian municipalities have limited capacities and insufficient resources to deliver the services delegated to them. Municipal concerns, including that of adequate funding, are addressed by a joint commission that includes the government and the Association of Lithuanian Municipalities. After the constitutional court ruled that the existing legal framework governing the allocation of municipal revenue was not in line with the constitution, the government introduced a new procedure for allocating revenue to municipalities. However, this decision will increase municipalities’ dependence on targeted central-government grants.

Citation:
State of local and regional democracy in Lithuania, see https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1925765&Site=Congress&BackColorInternet=00e0e0&BackColorIntranet=00e0e0&BackColorLogged=FFC679

Portugal

Score 6

Portugal, unsurprisingly given its extremely small size, is one of the most centralized countries in Western Europe, with autonomous self-governing areas in the island regions of the Azores and Madeira. A total of 308 municipalities represent the main subnational level of government. OECD figures for 2016 show Portugal to have among the group’s lowest relative levels of subnational public expenditure in several
areas of education, health and security. These are among the lower levels in the OECD, but have improved significantly since 2012.

The subnational sector has long been burdened with increasing debts, and several municipalities have needed the support of the Municipal Support Fund (Fundo de Apoio Municipal, FAM), which requires beneficiaries to undergo an adjustment program. During the period under review, several municipalities have initiated or requested these Municipal Adjustment Programs, including Aveiro, Vila Nova de Poiares, Vila Real de Santo António and Portimão.

The Costa government has expressed its commitment to decentralization and has placed the issue at the center of its proposal for state reform. However, there has been little substantive change during the period under review.

Citation:
www.portalautarquico.pt=PT/financas-locais/transferencias/freguesias


http://www.fundodeapoimunicipal.pt/category/noticias/

Slovakia

Score 6

In Slovakia, the degree of decentralization is relatively high. However, funding for subnational governments has been precarious. While the shares of both municipalities and regional self-governments in personal income tax revenues have substantially risen from 2014 to 2016, subnational governments have continued to complain about unfunded mandates. At the same time, their own fiscal discipline is poor, and a portion of their fiscal problems stem from their leaders’ irresponsible behavior.

Turkey

Score 6

Municipal governments depend on financial contributions from the central government. Many municipalities do not have the sufficient resources to finance basic duties. Thus, many have declared bankruptcy. Municipal borrowing constitutes a large share of Turkey’s total medium- and long-term debt. Financial decentralization and reform of local administration have been major issues during the review period. The central administration (mainly through the Bank of Provinces) is still the major funding source for local governments. During the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the government allocated €118 million to a village infrastructure project (KÖYDES), €189.9 million to the Drinking Water and Sewer Infrastructure Program (SUKAP), €74 million to the Social Support Program (SODES).
The previous governments have been frequently accused of taking a partisan approach toward the distribution of funds. Since 2009, transfers from the central government to municipalities via the Bank of Provinces have taken into consideration the number of inhabitants and the locality’s relative position on development indices. However, the new model has not eased the difficult financial situation of Turkey’s municipalities, which are seriously indebted to central-government institutions.

The recent change in regulations governing metropolitan municipalities was designed to generate funds for them. However, this shift is expected in turn to cause smaller administrative units to be fiscally and administratively dependent on the metropolitan municipalities. In other words, the authority held by subunits such as villages and small towns are expected to be undermined in the long run.

Bulgaria

Score 5

Local governments in Bulgaria receive most of their revenues from the central government and have a very limited revenue base of their own. Municipalities receive funding by the central government in two ways; a portion of the revenues from some general taxes is designated for the municipal budgets and the central government pays a subsidy. Assessments by the Ministry of Finance, and by the National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria on whether tasks assigned to municipalities have been adequately funded widely differ. Due to the fact that, with the exception of a few large city municipalities, central government transfers constitute a large share of a municipality’s budget, most of the shortages in mandated budgets remain covered by the central budget.

Malta

Score 5

Local councils in Malta are primarily municipal bodies, and cannot raise revenue through local taxes. Nearly all funding for local-government activities comes from the central government, with a small fraction sourced from local traffic fines. The funding formula for local councils is based on geography and population, but –
despite legal provisions – local councils run budget deficits, both because of inadequate funding and mismanagement by the councils themselves. At the beginning of 2015, the government launched a fund for local councils’ capital projects however it remains inadequate. Regional committees were generating revenue from contraventions through the local enforcement system, however this task was taken over by a central government agency in 2014.

Citation:
44 local councils request devolution of government property Malta Today 11/09/2015
Money for local councils Times of Malta 14/02/2015
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160111/opinion/Auditing-local-governance.598374

Mexico

Score 5
Mexico has three levels of government – central, state and municipal. In Mexican federalism, state governments are politically and economically more powerful than municipalities. The state governors’ association is a powerful lobby group that bargains effectively with the central government. In general terms, Mexico’s intergovernmental transfer system must reduce vertical imbalances and discretionary federal transfers. The latter are distributed from the center across states with political, rather than policy goals in mind and constitute a substantial share of government spending. Moreover, Mexican states need to increase their own revenues in order to become less dependent on central government transfers.

Due to government austerity, underfunded mandates and insufficient resources are a challenge for the successful completion of many government tasks.

Netherlands

Score 5
In 2011, revenue sharing from the national budget comprised two-thirds of the combined income (€53.6 billion) of the 441 local and municipal governments; revenues raised by local governments themselves made up the remaining one-third. Half of the income derived from national revenue sharing comes from a general fund for local government (Gemeentefonds). The other half of the national budget share comes from policy-related national subsidies (doeluitkeringen). In recent years, the financial position of local governments has improved somewhat thanks to growth in the general fund and greater reliance on local governments’ own revenues (minus local taxes).
At present, the decentralization and integration subsidies comprise 14% of all income from the general fund (Gemeentefonds). Policy-related national subsidies have decreased in total income share (falling from 62% in 1990 to 34% in 2011) and in number (from over 400 in 1985 to less than 50 at present). As of 2015, the national government has pursued a far-reaching decentralizing of policy tasks (in youth work, chronic patient care, social benefits, worker-activation employment programs). However, local-government budgets are supposed to contribute to meeting the European Monetary Union 3% government-deficit norm by accepting a decrease in their total budget. In 2014, local governments on average received €1,091 per inhabitant; in the coming years this will decrease to approximately €950. In addition, the national government has placed new restrictions on the way municipal governments spend their own income.

Local governments will be expected to “do more with less” in the upcoming years. The Center for Economic Policy Analysis recently proposed that local governments expand their local tax base; combined with a decrease in national taxes, this would simultaneously be good for the national economy and local democracy. The Association of Dutch Local Governments (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) has installed a special advisory commission to look into the issue. All local governments desire stability, predictability and calmness, and expect more trust from national government as a reliable partner. However, local governments are internally divided on the desirability of more local input into the expansion of the tax base.

Citation:
VNG, De wondere wereld van de gemeentefinanciën, 2014 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)
Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaat van het gemeentefonds voor het jaar 2014, fig. 2.2.3, p. 13, Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2013-2014, 33 750 B, nr.2
“Laat gemeente meer belasting heffen”, in NRC-Handelblad, 25 April 2015
VNG, Terugblik VNG-Conmissie Financiën, 17 October 2016 (eng.nl., consulted 9 November 2016)

Poland

Since 1999, Poland has supported three tiers of subnational governments: municipalities, districts and regions. Since the 2015 elections, the relationship between the central government and the majority of local governments still controlled by parties of the previous government has been strained. The reform of the school system has been associated with a shift of costs to the local level. PiS distrust in the politicians running the 50 biggest Polish cities has led to selective support for other localities, thus sending a strong clientelistic signal to the local authorities that funding and support will be distributed not on merit, but on political grounds.
Spain

Score 5

Spain has a very decentralized political and administrative structure, with 17 autonomous regions (“Comunidades Autónomas”) controlling over a third of public spending, including services such as health care and education. The system has also been occasionally associated with deficiencies in the process by which tasks are delegated to regions without adequate funding sources. It is also true that regions enjoy some power to raise revenue in order to counterbalance this insufficiency of funding, but they have tended not to use this power for fear of political backlash. In the context of the deep economic crisis and austerity that have characterized Spain in recent years, public-spending cuts and reinforced central control of the regional accounts have led to criticism of the central government for deliberately shifting unfunded mandates to the regions. As a result, some regions have been incapable of adequately fulfilling their delegated tasks without help. In 2016, the central government reiterated tough budget-deficit targets for the regions, even though the EU had decided to loosen fiscal targets for the country as a whole. In addition, the period under review was deeply affected by the earlier enactment of Organic Law 2/2012 on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability of Public Administrations. Under this legislation, regional governments must now approve an expenditure ceiling in keeping with a stability target and expenditure rule. The debate over the criteria through which solidarity funding for regions and territories is allocated continues to be intense, with richer regions seeking a profound revision of the general funding system. Catalonia’s bid for independence has been fueled by widespread social unrest related to the region’s limited fiscal capacity to support the taxes collected there. At the same time, in 2012, the central government introduced a program providing inexpensive liquidity to the regions. This remained in force in 2016. The program includes the general Regional Liquidity Fund (FLA) and the so-called Supplier Fund (FFPP), which addresses funds owed by subnational administrations to public-procurement suppliers (usually small and medium-sized companies). Most regions depend on these funds in order to service their debt without paying exorbitant interest rates, since rating agencies have downgraded their credit ratings to so-called junk status, making it very difficult to obtain alternative funding.

Sweden

Score 5

Unfunded, or insufficiently funded, mandates has been a longstanding issue in Sweden; indeed recent studies show an almost complete unanimity among local governments with regard to their frustration of insufficiently funded mandates. Subnational governments enjoy extensive autonomy in relation to the central government in Sweden. Local governments and their national association, Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR), have insisted that all tasks placed upon them by central government must be fully funded.
SALAR has made this claim an overarching principle, which it now emphasizes
every time the central government delegates tasks to local authorities. Instead of
fully funded mandates, though, the central government frequently negotiates the
funding aspect of delegated tasks with the local governments and SALAR.

As a reaction to the large number of asylum-seekers in 2015, the red-green
government to a great extent funded the additional work required of local authorities.
However, this additional funding does not change the fact that in more routine
exchanges between the central government and local government, funded mandates
remain usually insufficient.

Citation:

Belgium

Score 4

Several core responsibilities of the Belgian central government have been delegated
to regional or sub-regional levels over the recent decades: to the three regions
(Flanders, the Brussels region and Wallonia), to the linguistic communities (Flemish,
French and German), and to the municipalities (communes/gemeenten; a city may be
subdivided into several communes). Due to recurrent political stalemates between
the Flemings and Francophones, the Brussels region has been chronically
underfunded. Municipalities in rich areas are typically funded sufficiently, but this is
often not the case in poorer areas. The tightening of unemployment benefits also has
spillover effects on these municipalities, since they are financially responsible for
minimum income support for the poor.

Likewise, the government agreement also implies serious cuts in financial transfers
from Flanders to Wallonia over the next years. But since Wallonia is a post-
industrial region with unemployment levels twice as high as in Flanders, it is
difficult to see Wallonia not continuing to suffer from chronic underfunding.

Another part of the government agreement was to start decentralizing taxation, but
the main sources of state financing (direct taxes and VAT) will remain centrally
controlled and collected, before being redistributed according to pre-agreed sharing
rules. Redistribution issues remain a point of conflict between the main regions and
communities, even more so during the recent financial crises.

Croatia

Score 4

The division of competencies between central and subnational governments has been
relatively stable. By far the most important revenue source of subnational
governments is the personal-income tax, which contributes about 90% of all tax
revenues and slightly more than half of total revenues. The remaining taxes account
for only around 6% of total revenue, the most important being the property tax (approximately 3.3% of total revenue). The second most important source of revenue is the various types of administrative fees (user charges being the most significant among them, as they collectively make up approximately 17% of total subnational revenues). Grants from the central government (often administered via counties) and various assistance funds from abroad rank third. Finally, about 8% of subnational governments’ revenues derive from the various types of property they own (business premises, apartments). Strong regional and local differences have long hindered subnational governments from being properly financed. Many municipalities and towns, most of them in rural areas, are poor and therefore face severe difficulties in providing public services.

As part of a broader reform of public administration, Dubravka Jurlina Alibegović, Minister of Public Administration in the Orešković government, proposed to replace the 20 existing counties with 5 to 8 more homogeneous regions. However, this proposal was blocked by a grand coalition between the ruling HDZ and SDP, the main opposition party.

Citation:

Cyprus

Score 4

Local government bodies receive substantial subsidies from the state budget, with funds often earmarked for specific projects. The overall amounts have been decreasing; in addition, the ministers of interior and finance have large powers on the management of municipalities’ finances. Creation of new municipalities recently, was increasing local government budget needs. Draft laws for municipality reforms were sent to the parliament in 2016. They aimed at their re-organization and better management, including greater centralization and control of state funding. However, in view of local elections in December 2016, the prospects for progress are inconclusive.

Citation:
1. Press report on financial management by municipalities, Cyprus Mail, http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/04/04/audit-watchdog-eyes-fat-mayoral-pensions/

Estonia

Score 4

Estonian local governments are heavily dependent on financial resources from the central budget, as revenue from local taxes is negligible. During the economic recession, the central government cut funds allocated to the local governments by
13%, and despite improvement in the economic situation, pre-recession rates have not been fully restored. As a result, local governments have serious difficulties in financing the tasks required by law. These unfunded tasks have produced heated debates between the local and central governments, and have resulted in several court cases, with favorable outcomes for the local governments. However, in response to recent Supreme Court rulings, the central government has sought to pass new laws that make the problem of unfunded mandates even more complicated (for example, by refusing to continue central-government subsidies for private schools).

In 2016 the government launched a radical administrative reform to enhance accessibility of quality public services across the entire country. At the moment of writing, no legislation specifying funding of revised tasks has been sent to the parliament.

South Korea

While South Korea remains a unitary political system, a rather elaborate structure of provincial, district and neighborhood governments has been in place since 1995. Local and state governments play an important role in providing services to citizens, and account for about 15% and 45% of government spending respectively (according to the latest available data in 2008). However, local and state governments have relatively little ability to raise their own revenue. As their own sources account for only 17% and 22% of national revenues respectively, most sub-national governments need substantial support from central government, particularly outside the Seoul region. In addition, local administrations lack sufficient manpower and central government staff are often delegated to sub-national authorities.

Recently a new conflict between central and local governments arose over social welfare funding. Park Geun-hye’s election pledge to expand social welfare programs, without raising taxes, led to local government challenges to central government. In September 2014, local governments took the unprecedented step of challenging the central government over the lack of support for welfare funding, criticizing the central government for shifting a huge financial burden to the local level. They also accused funding policy of being politically motivated, criticizing Park Guen-hye’s election commitment to fund regional governments even though local governments were already deeply troubled financially, and unable to execute basic administrative functions such as repairing roads or sewer systems.

Citation:
OECD, Government at a Glance 2009
OECD, Government at a Glance 2011
“High welfare-related costs stymie local governments,” Korea JoongAng Daily, Oct 14, 2014
Greece

Score 3

After the formation of the Syriza-ANEL government in January 2015, the realization that the state’s coffers were being rapidly emptied, as Greece had not received any loan installment since August 2014, led to the compulsory transfer of funds from subnational authorities (regional governments, municipal authorities) to the central government. The Syriza-ANEL government resorted to this measure because for most of 2015 it was under pressure to find money in order to pay the salaries and pensions of public employees, while government revenue was not forthcoming. In the period under review, task funding took place primarily in the pension system. A few times, individual pension funds ran the risk of finding their coffers completely empty. In such cases, the government intervened and shifted resources to the pension funds under peril.

Romania

Score 3

The funding of subnational governments has proved a serious problem in Romania in the past. Most localities are strongly dependent on discretionary allocations from the central government, which are predominantly allocated along partisan criteria. The Ciolos government did not expand funding for subnational governments.

Slovenia

Score 3

Municipal governments – the sole tier of subnational self-government in Slovenia – have suffered substantial fiscal difficulties for some time. The Cerar government has focused on bringing down the bureaucratic burdens without reducing the number of municipalities. However, the measures taken have not been very effective, and municipalities have suffered from the government’s decision to postpone the re-introduction of the property tax. Government proposals to lower central government transfers have met resistance by the Association of Municipalities and Towns of Slovenia (SOS), the Association of Municipalities of Slovenia (ZOS) and the newly-formed Association of City Municipalities (ZMOS). In September 2015, SOS and ZOS filed a lawsuit to Ljubljana District Court against central government, arguing that the latter has broken an agreement on the amount of central government transfers for 2015. In October 2015, ZMOS filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court arguing that the municipal financing system is not in accordance with the constitution. In December 2015, 144 out of 212 mayors of Slovenian municipalities demanded the resignation of Finance Minister Dušan Mramor because he failed to follow the law regarding proper financing of municipalities. After lengthy negotiations, all three municipal associations and the Cerar government failed to reach an agreement regarding municipality financing for 2017, causing an even deeper divide between both sides.
Hungary

Score 2

The second Orbán government merged small local authorities and shifted a portion of subnational self-governments’ former competencies to the central government administration. However, the transfer of competencies from the subnational to the national level has gone hand in hand with an even stronger reduction in subnational governments’ revenue sources. As a result, the latter have fewer resources for the remaining tasks than before. Moreover, central government grants have been discretionary and unpredictable. Municipalities and counties with an influential Fidesz leader have been in a better position to get additional funding; other have been confronted with the newly introduced “solidarity tax” imposed upon rich municipalities. A good case in point of the problems associated with the discretionary budgeting of the central government is the delayed reconstruction of the M3 metro line in Budapest, the most important transport facility in Budapest, carrying more than 500,000 people every day. The project has suffered from funding conflicts between the government and the city, which has a Fidesz mayor but is perceived by most Fidesz leaders as a left-liberal stronghold.
Constitutional Discretion

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8-6 = Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5-3 = The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2-1 = The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.

Belgium

The federal state has no formal authority over regions and communities because there is no hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. When compared with other federal systems, this creates major complications. For instance, on international treaties, one region has the possibility to block a treaty because it has exactly the same prerogatives as the federal state. This occurred September and October 2016, when the Walloon region singlehandedly blocked the signing of a major treaty between the EU and Canada (i.e., CETA). That treaty was eventually signed on 30 October, after weeks of pressure and tense negotiations.

On some policy dimensions (e.g., spatial planning, transport, education, culture, applied research, local authorities, etc.), the regions and communities are actually becoming more powerful than the federal government. The tensions between the country’s linguistic communities as well as between its geographically defined regions (both the communities and regions have their own political institutions and administrations) reinforce this trend.

Citation:
Iceland

Score 10

Local government in Iceland has no constitutional status, beyond a paragraph in the 1944 constitution that states that municipal affairs shall be decided by law. The Local Government Act (Sveitarstjórnarlög) states that local governments shall manage and take responsibility for their own affairs. The parliament or the responsible ministry – the Ministry of the Interior – have the power to make decisions that affect local government. However, beyond these decisions, local governments are free to engage in any governing activities that are not forbidden by law.


Switzerland

Score 10

Municipalities and cantons have a high degree of autonomy, while the federation has only a subsidiary role. The central government has little opportunity to counter decisions made by cantonal parliaments or governments. Municipal discretion in policymaking is a constitutional norm. Article 50 of the constitution states: “(1) The autonomy of the municipalities is guaranteed within the limits fixed by cantonal law. (2) In its activity, the confederation shall take into account the possible consequences for the municipalities. (3) In particular, it shall take into account the special situation of cities, agglomerations and mountainous regions.” The municipalities and cantons make use of their competences to the maximum extent possible.

Canada

Score 9

Canada’s central government takes substantial steps to ensure subnational self-governments are able to use their constitutional scope of discretion. Canadian provinces, especially large ones such as Quebec and Alberta, guard their constitutional powers closely and allow the federal government little scope to increase its power. Indeed, certain responsibilities that have traditionally been under joint federal-provincial jurisdiction, such as labor market training, have in recent years been decentralized and delegated completely to the provinces. This devolution of powers is not always permanent, however, as has been illustrated by the Canada Job Grant Program. The program, which came into effect in 2014, exists under federal authority but is administered by the provinces and covers a significant amount of the training costs associated with each eligible worker.
Even when the federal government has tried to assert its authority in economic areas it believes to be under exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the regulation of securities markets, certain provinces have vociferously objected and taken the federal government to the Supreme Court, and won.

**Finland**

Municipalities in Finland have a long tradition of independence in specific policy areas, while also implementing policies of the central government. In particular, municipalities are responsible for the implementation of educational, health care, social and infrastructural services. Municipalities may not be burdened with new functions or with financial or other obligations, nor may they be deprived of their functions and rights, except by an act of parliament. The control that the state exercises over municipalities does not imply any general state right to intervene. Control may be exercised only in accordance with specific legal provisions. Thus, subnational autonomy is guaranteed and protected by law. Still, the autonomy of local government may be curtailed in practice by financial pressures. The SOTE reform of November 2015, with its resulting 18 autonomous regions for the organization of social-welfare and health care tasks will lead to greater complexity in terms of financing structures, accountability and responsibilities.

**Sweden**

Although unfunded mandates have been much debated, central government overwhelmingly respects local autonomy. Local government enjoys extensive autonomy, which is guaranteed by the constitution. Indeed, the strength of local autonomy adds to the fragmented nature of the Swedish political system and sometimes creates problems in governance and coordination. In terms of crisis, extraordinary challenges or when there are major national interests at stake, however, government can increase its pressure on local government, despite the latter’s formal autonomy. In these cases, the usual procedure is first to negotiate with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the Regions (SALAR) and, if that proves unsuccessful, introduce stronger regulatory measures. For instance, in 2015, to what extent the central government should force all local authorities to receive asylum-seekers was thoroughly debated.

Pre-policy studies conducted in 2016 show that state control over autonomous local governments has increased gradually during the past several years. Such control reaches not across the board but is generally targeted at specific issues and programs such as education. The government is currently reviewing intergovernmental relations as part of the preparation of a reform proposal that will be presented to parliament in 2017.
Austria

Score 8

The competences of the federal states and municipalities are limited by the constitution. However, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies, which gives the federal states considerable (de facto) political power.

Hence the main challenge lies in the contradiction between the fact of constitutionally weak states and a constitutionally strong national government, and a political environment that renders the states quite influential and the national government quite weak. Although the national government has a de facto monopoly on the power to raise taxes and other revenues, state governments have considerable leverage in financial negotiations over how these funds are to be distributed.

Thus, in general terms, the Austrian political system ensures that subnational self-governments are able to utilize their constitutional scope of discretion quite effectively. Examples include health and education policies and the relative authority held by states (Länder) in these areas, which successfully precludes the central government from taking on a stronger role.

One aspect is the increasing difference in the way coalitions are built between the federal and state level: More and more, state governments are formed by an alliance between one of the parties of the federal government and another party which is in opposition at the federal level. This underlines the growing complexity of the party system, reflected in the ongoing decline of the two traditionally dominant parties.

Denmark

Score 8

Section 82 of the Danish constitution dictates that “The right of municipalities to manage their own affairs independently, under state supervision, shall be laid down by statute.”

The constitution thus assumes some autonomy of municipalities, but leaves it to parliament to determine the scope. Indeed, in a comparative perspective, Denmark is a decentralized state, but it is not a federal state. In recent years there has been a tendency to curtail the effective discretion of lower layers in the public sector, in particular the municipalities. The parliament can, at any time, change the scope of local autonomy and its organization. The regions are mainly responsible for health care provision and regional development, while the municipalities have a wider range of tasks. They are the main provider of welfare services: schools, day care, care for the elderly, libraries, sports and roads. They play an important role in employment policy as well.
Germany

Score 8

The allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the federal and state governments is defined in the Basic Law. Thus, police functions, cultural tasks, and education, including both schools and universities, are the responsibility of the states. This distribution of tasks is largely respected by the federal government. A far-reaching equalization system and an ongoing shift of tax revenues from the federal to the state level has also been improving the financial capabilities of states to fulfill these tasks (see Task Funding).

United States

Score 8

Whether the federal government permits the states to exercise their constitutional authority without undue interference is one of the central constitutional controversies in U.S. politics. In one sense, there is no such thing as the federal government depriving states of their constitutional discretion. Whatever decisions the federal government imposes on the states can be appealed to the federal courts. Given the availability of appeals, one can assume that states are able to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction as it is currently interpreted. In 2012, the Supreme Court, supporting the Obama administration, invalidated most of an Arizona law that provided for aggressive state-level investigation and prosecution of undocumented immigrants.

Czech Republic

Score 7

The discretion of local and regional governments over exactly how resources should be spent does not face formal limitations. Effective discretion is limited by budget limitations, but money can be transferred between uses. More significantly, regional governments are effectively constrained by the need to meet the standards set for key services, notably education, which limits the scope for transferring funds between uses. Irregularities in public procurement, against which NGOs campaigned, have been somewhat addressed due to EU pressure and strong oversight in respect to EU structural funding.
Italy

Score 7

The constitutional and legislative changes, which had substantially increased the powers and scope of regional government activity over the last 20 years, did not make the relationship between different levels of government less antagonistic. Across an increased number of policy fields, central and regional governments have concurrent legislative powers. In these areas, the central state should simply define general guidelines, leaving the definition of specific legislative contents to regional assemblies. However, the national government and parliament have a tendency not to respect this division of authority, impinging upon the sphere of regional autonomy instead.

For their part, regions often adopt a posture of resistance to national rules. This has produced an exceeding amount of litigation before the constitutional court. Tensions between the two levels have also increased as a result of the strained fiscal context. The central government has sought greater oversight over local governments (often perceived as the culprits of unrestrained spending). In order to balance the national budget, central government transfers to local authorities are repeatedly cut. These cuts are typically applied universally, rather than selectively. However, in several emergencies, the national government has given substantial financial aid to municipalities and regions. Moreover, central government has provided the necessary funds whenever local governments have been close to defaulting. The Renzi government’s constitutional reform, finally approved by parliament in May 2016 and awaiting a public referendum in December 2016, is an attempt to reduce the areas of legal conflict between central and local governments by recentralizing a number of concurrent powers.

Luxembourg

Score 7

Local government increasingly depends on transfers from the central government. Land use regulation was centralized during the review period. Nevertheless, a serious conflict between local interests and the aims of the government’s transport and land use planning body (Integrierte Verkehrs- und Landesplanung, IVL) occurred when the construction of a large business center in a rural region near the capital was not authorized. Following a reform of the education system, municipalities lost one of their major prerogatives, which was the autonomous management of primary school (students four to 12 years old) teaching staff. In return, the government has promised to provide more autonomy, through territorial reform, especially in the form of expanded financial autonomy and the provision of support for municipal finances through regional funds.

Citation:
United Kingdom

Score 7

A distinction must be made between local authorities of England, on the one hand, and the Scottish parliament, the National Assembly of Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly, on the other hand. The devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland enjoy considerable autonomy from central government, in contrast to the strong restrictions on local authorities in England. In recent years, the trend has been reversed through measures stemming from the 2011 Localism Act. These measures substantially increased local authorities’ decision-making and spending powers over, for example, health care, skills training, transport, employment support, physical infrastructure investment and housing. In addition, the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, in what can be seen as a limited push toward English devolution, established directly elected mayors for combined local authorities in England and Wales, so-called metro mayors. Eight elections for metro mayors will be held in 2017. The devolved parliaments in Scotland and Northern Ireland have ruled against creation of directly elected mayors.

The establishment of a directly elected mayor in England or Wales normally follows a local referendum, although neither Leicester nor Liverpool held a popular vote. However, in the majority of cases, voters opposed the establishment of a new mayoral office, and one even revoked an existing office (in Stoke on Trent 2009). In November 2016, 17 cities had directly elected mayors, including London. Further, there exist several indirectly elected mayors with comparable political powers and many localities have a purely ceremonial Lord Mayor.

The political weight of these subsidiary authorities varies strongly and the substance of mayoral offices in the traditionally centralized political system of the United Kingdom is hard to measure. The number of mayors is clearly increasing, but remains remarkably low in comparison to the total number of authorities. However, several of the largest and most important cities of the country (e.g., London, Bristol, Greater Manchester and Liverpool City Region) have directly elected mayors. Notably, the Greater London Authority is headed by its mayor, the Rt. Hon. Sadiq Khan, and culturally and politically can almost be seen as a federated state within the United Kingdom.

An evaluation by the Council of Europe notes a general satisfaction with recent developments in the UK, but expresses concern about funding and “the limitation of local authorities’ discretion to manage local affairs through the intervention by various ministries of the central government.”
The Scottish parliament and the Scottish government have become major political actors, especially through the Scotland Act 2016. Although the powers of the Scottish parliament are revocable by central government, they should be considered permanent for political reasons. The Welsh and Northern Irish parliaments have considerable autonomy, granted for instance in the Wales Bill. However, these powers differ in degree from those held by the Scottish parliament, although new financial powers are being devolved, such as the proposed introduction of a Northern Ireland rate for corporation tax. Even if some decisions by the Scottish government have antagonized central government, the central government has not intervened.

Citation:

France
Score 6

Some instances of recentralization have occurred through fiscal or administrative means, but despite the usual stereotypes about French hyper-centralization, it is fair to say that subnational government enjoys much freedom of maneuver. Legally, subnational government is subordinate. Politically, the influence of local elites in parliament and in particular in the Senate is decisive. The most efficient but contested instruments of control derive from the legal, technical or economic standards imposed by the Brussels and Paris bureaucracies. Violating such standards can involve high political, monetary and legal costs for local politicians. Prime Minister Valls has announced some measures designed to rationalize powers and spending, which would be a welcome reform. At this stage, however, the government has not yet overcome the varied and strong oppositions to its still rather vaguely formulated projects.

Lithuania
Score 6

The central government generally respects local authorities’ constitutional scope of power, but centrally determined political, legal, administrative or fiscal measures sometimes constrain subnational policymaking and implementation autonomy. In addition to the problems of limited powers and insufficient fiscal resources, the elimination of county administrations and other central-level decisions have reduced municipalities’ policymaking and implementation capacities in areas such as territorial planning, construction, and the regulation of land ownership.
Mexico

Score 6

The Mexican constitution gives subnational entities, in particular states, considerable opportunity to influence policy. However, fiscal federalism in Mexico still relies heavily on transfers and thus gives the central government considerable leverage over states. The economic heterogeneity of states is so substantial that there is a need for a solidarity-oriented transfer system. Considerable administrative capacity deficits and illiberal political practices persist at the state and municipal levels. Political processes in several states fall short of democratic practices and the federal government has generally refrained from reining in the illiberal practices of local elites.

New Zealand

Score 6

There is a clear legal framework for local-government autonomy, consisting of the Local Government Act 2002, the Local Electoral Act 2001 and the Local Government (Rating) Act 2002. In addition, the comprehensive reform program, “Better Local Government,” was put into action during the review period, culminating in the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Act 2014. The Amendment Act became law in August 2014. According to the Department of Internal Affairs, the act includes, among others things: changes in regard to what development contributions can be used for; more collaboration and shared services between local authorities; new requirements for infrastructure strategies and asset management planning; elected members to use technology to participate in council meetings, rather than attending in person; local councils to disclose information about their rating bases in long-term plans, annual plans and annual reports; and discloses risk management arrangements for physical assets in annual reports. In addition, the act includes provisions that enable the Local Government Commission to establish local boards as part of new unitary authorities, and in existing unitary authorities. There is no de facto infringement of this scope. Local governments do not enjoy constitutional status, as they are creatures of statute. As noted already, local governments in New Zealand are unusual in terms of their relatively narrow task profiles and their inability to tap into other commonly used sources of subnational revenue such as sales and/or income taxes. Local governments therefore raise a relatively large proportion of revenue from rates and charges; and given concerns about rating levels, they are fiscally constrained from expanding their roles and functions.

Citation:
Norway
Score 6
There is ongoing tension between Norway’s local and central governments over the discretion allowed to local governments. The central government has increasingly tied the hands of local governments, for example by controlling local-level expenditure by earmarking the transfer of funds for specific purposes. As part of the current reform agenda, the government has offered to grant greater autonomy to those units that decide to merge and form larger units.

Australia
Score 5
The responsibilities of the Commonwealth and of the states and territories are clearly laid out in the Australian Constitution. However, they have been subject to judicial review over the course of the century, which has resulted in the increasing centralization of executive power. In turn, the policies of the major political parties have been to increase this centralization in the interests of fiscal and administrative efficiency. However, given the restrictions of the Australian constitution, the federal-state relationship is suboptimal, but not as problematic as some state representatives suggest. The states and territories have sought legal redress through the courts on occasions when they have felt that their authority has been diminished by the Commonwealth government. On a number of occasions, the federal government has also used its superior financial position to coerce state governments to relinquish powers or adopt favored policies of the federal government, which has had the effect of subverting their constitutional scope of discretion. However, the relationship between the federal and the state level has improved in recent years, although there is room for additional improvement. Considering the asymmetrical relationship of the past, the current situation is much improved.

Chile
Score 5
Chile is a centrally organized state. This represents a structural problem given the wide-range of differences between the respective regions regarding geography, productivity and density of population. Nevertheless, local governments legally enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy concerning mandates and tasks that do not touch on constitutional issues and can be executed within the allocated budget. Furthermore, the government has tended to devolve responsibilities to local
governments (i.e., in the domain of urban regulation). In comparison to the local or municipal levels, regional governments enjoy a high degree of budget autonomy. At the regional level, however, governors’ autonomy is limited by their simultaneous function as representatives of the national government. A draft law has been elaborated that would enhance regional governors’ (Gobernador Regional) financial autonomy. This draft law had not passed the parliament by the end of the period under review. An agreement on the technical details is expected by March 2017.

Citation:
http://chiledescentralizado.cl/eleccion-de-gobernadores-regionales/

Ireland

Ireland is a unitary state, without a significant degree of autonomous local or regional self-government. Article 28a of the constitution simply states: “The state recognizes the role of local government in providing a forum for the democratic representation of local communities, in exercising and performing at local level powers and functions conferred by law and in promoting by its initiatives the interests of such communities.”

In keeping with its weak constitutional foundation, the role of subnational government is viewed by the electorate as confined to a narrow range of functions. Most of the units of local government – the counties and county boroughs – are small, and many have weak economic bases.

The role of subnational units of government has been progressively reduced, most notably by the removal of their responsibility for the provision of health and water services (respectively in 2005 and 2014). However, the government decided that local authorities that stand to receive more income in 2015 from the LPT than they received from the Local Government Fund in 2014 will be entitled to use a certain portion of that additional funding for their own discretionary purposes as part of their normal budgetary process.

While the Local Government Reform Act 2014 introduced some important changes in the structure of local government (merging three pairs of city/county councils and replacing town councils with municipal districts), it did not radically alter the structure or functions of local government. The act also replaced the existing regional authorities with three new Regional Assemblies that are tasked with preparing Regional Spatial and Economic Strategies by 2016. Local Community Development Committees have also been established. It remains to be seen if these developments will significantly increase subnational implementation autonomy.
Israel

Score 5

The legal framework for local government is based on the “ultra vires” principle, according to which local government is only authorized to act within the parameters designated by law. While local government is elected, and some stronger municipalities are able to expand their influence of policy, often times it acts merely as a local branch for implementing central government policy. In light of frequent problems of corruption, management failures and over politicization during the 1990s, the Ministry of the Interior expanded its oversight over municipalities, allowing the ministry to appoint permanent outside accountants, cancel an approved budget and even dissolve the council and nominate a professional alternative. As part of the government’s effort to address corruption, the attorney general formed a special committee in 2015. The committee recommended that heads of local authorities increase financial transparency, such as through an annual declaration of the earnings of senior staff of local authorities. However, this recommendation has not been implemented yet.

These steps of centralization are intentional and constitutional, but often prevent local autonomy. However, in 2014 the Knesset approved an amendment to the municipalities law, which defined standards for the recognition of “Strong Municipalities.” Strong municipalities, according to this new amendment, would gain some concessions to lessen their dependence on the central government, enhancing decentralization of authorities between the central government and local government.

Citation:
Hayman-rysh, Noami, “Changes in the status of local government,” IDI website, October 2008 (Hebrew)
“Municipalities law: Position paper,” IDC, December 2011 (Hebrew)
“Government legal proposal 292,” Official legal records 1997 (Hebrew)

Latvia

Score 5

Local governments have a constitutional right to autonomy. This right is reinforced by Latvia’s commitments as a signatory of the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which have been upheld by the constitutional court. The Ministry of Environment and Regional Development monitors local-government regulations for legal compliance and has the right to strike down regulations deemed to be in violation of legal norms.

The President’s Strategic Advisory Council has noted a tendency for central government to over-regulate, which has negatively affected local governments’ discretionary authority.
Public discussion about the appropriate division of responsibilities and the burden of financing erupted in 2012, when central government simultaneously reduced the guaranteed minimum income benefit and transferred responsibility for financing the program to local governments.

Citation:
The President’s Strategic Advisory Council (2013), Management Improvement Proposals, Available at (in Latvian): http://www.president.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/Pasvaldibas_EGPP_FINAL.pdf, Last assessed: 21.05.2013

Poland

Score 5

The process of government decentralization that started in 1998 has been broadly accepted. However, since the PiS government has perceived local governments as a bastion of the opposition, it has tried to restrict their role.

Portugal

Score 5

Formally, the central government enables subnational governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation. However, subnational governments do not have their own sources of revenue, instead being dependent on central-government transfers. This means that the central government generally has considerable control. This control increased with the bailout, and continues to be substantial afterward as the country seeks to reach the euro zone deficit targets. For example, the central government imposed its own conditionalities on the Madeira regional government in a bailout package that ended on 31 December 2015, as well as on municipalities that have requested central-government help. However, much the same is true of municipalities that have not sought a central-government bailout, as the increasing tightening of financial expenditure has resulted in budget cuts for programs that involved partnerships between central and local governments.

There has been some indications that municipalities will have a great role in managing public services, but it will not happen before the end of 2017.

Slovenia

Score 5

The Slovenian Constitution, the European Charter on Local Government (ratified in 1996) and the Local Government Act give municipalities responsibility for all local public affairs and some autonomy in implementing national legislation. In practice, however, financing constraints and a limited administrative capacity in the larger number of small municipalities limit local autonomy. The Cerar government has
started to address this issue through the adoption of the Public Administration Development Strategy in April 2015 and a separate strategy for the development of local government in September 2016. Both strategies aim at fostering closer cooperation between municipalities in the fields of public services and tourism.

Citation:

South Korea

Score 5

While autonomous local governments are protected by the constitution, the constitution does not clearly define specific competencies and rights. A major obstacle to sub-national, self-governments is the lack of fiscal autonomy for local governments. Due to the very high dependence on transfer payments, most regional and local governments are vulnerable to interference by the central government. The fiscal self-reliance ratio in over 90% of local governments (220 out of a total 243 local governments) was under 50% in 2016. The reality of inadequate budgetary and functional authority in many local areas, as well as the disproportionate influence of city and provincial authorities, often leaves local administrators and governments short on revenue and effective governing capacity. However, as local political autonomy takes root, local governments are trying to expand their executive authority as much as possible, leading to policy disputes with the central government. The decision to create a government-written history textbook for secondary students has caused huge conflicts between the Minister of Education and local governments’ superintendents of education. While many superintendents of education are opposed to the government policy, the central government has pressured local governments to follow the policy.

Citation:

Spain

Score 5

As discussed under “Sustainable Budgets” and “Task Funding,” Organic Law 2/2012 on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability of Public Administrations imposes drastic austerity conditions and debt targets on all public administrative
bodies. With this legislation, the central government is – despite formally respecting autonomous regions’ constitutional autonomy – de facto narrowing their scope of discretion with regard to implementation. The fiscal regulation is even tougher in its treatment of local governments (which bear responsibility for roughly 15% of total public spending in Spain) and the central government has forbidden them from carrying out any tasks on policies for which the legal competence is not explicitly local. The Ministry of Finance’s attempt to impose stronger expenditure rules at the regional level may have primarily been intended to appease potential bond buyers, but the central government may also have taken advantage of this situation to seek to weaken the regions politically. Some regions (particularly those like Catalonia and the Basque Country, which are governed by peripheral nationalist parties) have tried to protect themselves from what they deem excessive central control. Since 2012, Catalonia has even threatened secession as a consequence of several central initiatives that the regional government alleges have severely reduced its economic capacity and political autonomy.

**Bulgaria**

Score 4

Bulgaria is a unitary state with two levels of government – national and municipal. The constitution vests municipalities with a relatively broad set of powers and competencies, and the law generally respects this independence. However, in reality most Bulgarian municipalities are financially dependent on central government transfers, because their own revenue base is inadequate for generating the necessary revenues. On occasion, the central government attempts to capitalize on this dependence or has favored local governments affiliated with the governing coalition.

In 2016, the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works adopted a new decentralization strategy for the next ten years. Compared to its largely ineffective predecessor, it has a broader scope and covers not only fiscal matters, but the functions of different tiers of government as well. The strategy is accompanied by an implementation program for 2016-2019. Its implementation will be monitored by a newly created council on the decentralization of state government.

**Croatia**

Score 4

The autonomy of local and regional self-government units is very limited. In violation of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, local units are usually not allowed to regulate and expand their autonomous scope of activities on their own. In the case of activities devolved to local self-government units by the central government, a central-government body issues instructions to county prefects and mayors. The Ministry of Administration can dissolve the representative bodies of local or regional self-government units if they violate the constitution or laws. The
Milanović government established an Advisory Council for Decentralization headed by Deputy Prime Minister Neven Mimica in February 2012, but eventually failed to clarify the relations between the different tiers of government.

Cyprus

Score 4

The constitutional status of local government is vague. Placed originally under the authority of communal chambers (Art. 86-111) that were abolished with the collapse of bi-communality (1964), local authorities are governed by the Law on Municipalities. Having only begun in 1986, municipal elections exhibit limited experience and capacity.

The law restricts municipalities’ powers. Budgets, management decisions regarding selected financial issues and assets, are subject to approval by the Council of Ministers. Additionally, a reorganization and restructuring of local government bodies envisaged by draft laws (November 2016) and the law on fiscal responsibility (20(I)/2014) impose stricter controls. Arguments about an excessive number of municipalities and chronic deficient management put local government in an unfavorable position.

Citation:

Estonia

Score 4

According to the Estonian constitution, local self-governments can independently decide on all local issues. The rights and responsibilities of local governments are stipulated in detail in the Local Government Organization Act. In Spring 2016, the government launched a radical administrative reform, which includes merging smaller local governments (fewer than 1,000 residents), into bigger units comprising at least 5,000 residents. If municipalities will not merge voluntarily, the process will be carried out by the central government. Several municipalities appealed to the court, claiming that the reform violates local government autonomy stipulated in the Constitution. The hearings in the Supreme Court were underway at the time of writing.

Japan

Score 4

The Japanese constitution guarantees local-government autonomy. However, articles 92 to 95 of Chapter VIII, which discuss local self-government, are very short and lack specifics. The central state makes its power felt through three mechanisms in particular: control over vertical fiscal transfers, the delegation of functions that local entities are required to execute, and personnel relations between local entities and the
central ministry in charge of local autonomy. Moreover, co-financing schemes for public works provide incentives to follow central-government policies.

Over the course of the last decade, there have been a growing number of initiatives aimed at strengthening local autonomy. One major reform proposal envisions the establishment of regional blocks above the prefectural level, and giving these bodies far-reaching autonomy on internal matters (doshu system). There are no indications that the current government will seek to turn this controversial idea into practice.

**Netherlands**

*Score 4*

Dutch local governments are hybrids of “autonomous” and “co-government” forms. However, local autonomy is defined mostly negatively as pertaining to those tasks left to local discretion because they are not explicitly mentioned as national policy issues. Co-government is financially and materially constrained in rather extensive detail by ministerial grants. Increasingly, the Dutch national government uses administrative and financial tools to steer and influence local policymaking. Some would go so far as to claim that these tools have in sum created a culture of quality control and accountability that paralyzes local governments, violating the European Charter for Local Government. This is due in part to popular and political opinion that local policymaking, levels of local-service delivery and local taxes ought to be equal everywhere in the (small) country.

*Citation:*


**Turkey**

*Score 4*

According to Article 127, Paragraph 1 of the constitution, local administrative bodies are public entities established to meet the common needs of the local inhabitants of provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose decision-making bodies are determined by the electorate as described in law, and whose structure is also determined by law. However, according to Article 127, Paragraph 5 of the constitution, the central administration has the power of administrative trusteeship over local governments, under a framework of legal principles and procedures designed to ensure the functioning of local services in conformity with the principle of administrative unity and integrity, to secure uniform public services, to safeguard the public interest and to meet local needs in an appropriate manner.

Past reforms driven by the process of alignment with the European charter of local self-government have changed Turkey’s administrative structure and the relationship between the center and subnational bodies. A December 2012 law revised the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities with the goal of making the provision of
public services more effective and productive. The law has been criticized, as it appears to set aside the principle of subsidiarity despite its “official” goal of strengthening democracy at the local level. First, the legal status of provincial administrations, villages and municipalities cannot be changed through a special law without consultation or referendum; such changes require a constitutional amendment. Second, the 2012 law essentially violates the principle of self-government. And finally, it is questionable whether the effective delivery of social services is indeed relevant to strengthening local democracy.

In mid-2014, some mayors in southeast Anatolian provinces called for the transfer of half of the state’s share yielded from oil drilling to the municipality of the province in which oil is produced.

Soon after the 7 June parliamentary elections, a total of two towns and 16 municipalities (14 towns and two neighborhoods in İstanbul) declared self-government. The government took a strong stand against these declarations, and judicial investigations were initiated against mayors and other people in charge. Moreover, in the wake of the 15 July coup attempt and the government’s declared state of emergency, numerous democratically elected mayors and municipality staff of larger and smaller local administrations in various provinces have been detained and replaced with trustees by the central government.

Citation:

Hungary

Score 3

Hungary has undergone a far-reaching reform of local government. The government has established new tiers of state administration at the county and district level that were given some of the functions previously exercised by local and other subnational self-governments. This stripping of competencies has been especially severe in the case of the city of Budapest, a traditional liberal stronghold which has since lost its special role in national politics. On the one hand, the reform lifted a significant burden from smaller units, as it professionalized services in deconcentrated state bodies. On the other hand, the general shift of competences did not at all improve self-governments’ performance flexibility in those areas remaining under their control. As a result, both the formal powers of subnational self-governments and their capacities to make full use of these powers have declined. Local Fidesz strongholds like Debrecen seem to have enjoyed special treatment in the process of allocating EU funds.
Malta

Score 3

Local councils have no constitutional right of implementation autonomy, and all their activities and responsibilities are monitored and can be challenged by the Department of Local Government. All by-laws have to be approved by the central government and decisions taken may be rescinded. These constraints are intentional, to prevent local councils from assuming responsibilities independent from the central government or adopting policies which conflict with those of the central government. Consequently local councils intent on taking decisions that conflict with central government, for instance in the area of local planning, have to resort to sui generis tactics, often working with civil society organizations, in order to support the views of the locality.

Romania

Score 3

Autonomy of subnational units is often curtailed by fiscal measures enforced from the central level. The allocation of discretionary financial transfers and investment projects to municipalities and counties along partisan lines has continued under the Ciolos government. Another problem is that allocations are often made with considerable delay, which affects the capacity of subnational units to initiate and complete projects. This problem seems to be especially pronounced in the predominantly Hungarian counties of Transylvania, Covasna and Harghita.

Slovakia

Score 3

Unlike its predecessor, the second Fico government pursued a hands-on approach limiting the constitutional discretion of subnational governments. The government’s plans to streamline the administration raised concerns that the role of subnational self-governments might be further limited. Critics fear that the creation of the new district offices will lead to a concentration of power and a further politicization of local government bodies. Under the new coalition government, no changes have been introduced so far.

Greece

Score 2

While the autonomy of subnational self-governments is nominally guaranteed by the constitution – which requires that the government provides them with all legislative, regulatory and financial means to accomplish their tasks – in practice, particularly in the period under review, subnational self-governments had very few means at their disposal. The government narrowed the scope of discretion of subnational self-
governments because the state’s finances were on the brink of collapse, a prospect that came too close to becoming a reality in the summer of 2015. Moreover, in the period under review, a few municipalities in the region of Attica (the Greater Athens Area), e.g. the Salamis municipality and the Acharnes municipality, declared official bankruptcy and the government rescued them financially while imposing further restrictions on their implementation autonomy.

Citation:
Article 102 of the constitution provides for the autonomy of subnational governments.
National Standards

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
- 8-6 = Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
- 5-3 = Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
- 2-1 = Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.

Denmark

Score 9

National laws set standard with varying degrees of discretion for local authorities. The central government can supervise whether standards are met through benchmarks and tests and can require that performance indicators be published, such as hospital waiting lists, school performance results, and so on. Here, too, an active press plays a role in exposing problems, and the central government, which is ultimately responsible politically, can intervene by setting stricter standards or transferring extra money to certain activities. Rhetorical action, such as shaming underachievers, is also sometimes part of the strategy.

An example of the tension between central government concerns for welfare arrangements and local authorities’ push for flexibility and freedom are proposals to introduce minimum standards for various public services, which intend to reduce variation across the municipalities.

Citation:

France

Score 9

Policymakers in France share a common interest in ensuring national cohesion. This is the basis for a large number of national standards and rules that canalize local and regional policies. National standards are determined by national regulations and constitutional and administrative courts serve as arbiters in disputes over whether these standards are met. The application of national standards is facilitated by the
fact that most public utilities are provided by large private or semi-public companies with a vested interest in having the same rules and standards across the country. Services such as energy supply, water distribution or garbage collection are run by many different companies, most of which belong to two or three holding companies. Market uniformity is often much stronger (for the sake of efficiency and profit) than bureaucratic uniformity, since individual actors in companies, unlike politicians and bureaucrats, have less leeway in interpreting and adapting the law to local concerns. Following the protest of business and local politicians against a flood of norms and standards, the government has started an enquiry and taken a few measures of “simplification.” However, to date, no significant results have been observed with the exception of the construction sector where norms have been simplified, after imposing extremely cumbersome rules and standards.

**Luxembourg**

The Ministry of the Interior supports local administration. As part of territorial reforms, the administration responsible for monitoring municipal finances, will be integrated within the existing national Auditing Court (Cour des Comptes). The government is not entirely free to optimize and improve local government. More than one-third of members of parliament also have a local mandate and in 2013 17 worked as city mayors. This is one reason why conflicts of interests between national and local mandates sometimes arise in parliamentary processes, depending on the issues being discussed. In its 2013 program, the government declared that dual mandates would no longer be allowed. Though no reform has yet been implemented.

Citation:


**Iceland**

A diverse set of special laws set national minimum standards for the provision of local government services. These laws relate particularly to primary education, child protection, and standards of social services. Nevertheless, central government monitors compliance with some standards, and has even raised certain standards to an unattainable level in view of the financial support available to local governments.
Japan

Score 8

Japanese government authorities put great emphasis on the existence of reasonable unitary standards for the provision of public services. The move toward decentralization makes it particularly important to raise standards for the local provision of public services. Within the central government, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications is in charge of this task, which involves direct supervision, personnel transfer between central and local entities, and training activities. While, as a result of a 2000 reform that abolished local entities’ agency functions in a strict sense (direct administrative supervision has lost some importance compared to legal and judicial supervision) other channels remained important during the period under review. At the local and particularly the prefectural level, there is a rather elaborate training system that is linked in various ways with national-level standards. The “top runner” program will soon set standards for 16 public services based on advanced localities. Local government public services make up an important element of the Basic Plan for economic management.

A unified digital “My Number” system (the new social security and tax number system) was introduced for citizens in 2015 to help authorities with providing and enforcing uniform services. It faces some opposition and foot-dragging by citizens, however.

Citation:

Cabinet Office, Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and Reform 2016. Road Map to a 600 Trillion JPY Economy, Draft for cabinet decision, 2 June 2016

Norway

Score 8

The Norwegian government is committed to providing public services that are as uniform as possible across the country. Given the large distances involved, and the remoteness of some regions, this implies that peripheral parts of the country receive large (and expensive) transfers, both directly and in the form of infrastructure investments.

Although services are reasonably uniform across the country, this has not been the case for local-government performance in all respects, in particular with respect to financial management.

A number of bodies including the regional prefects (fylkesmannen), the national ombudsman, and similar agencies in the fields of health, patients’ rights and more have been established to ensure the effective and uniform application of rules.
Estonia

Score 7

The issue of national standards is relatively new to Estonia. First the European Union and later the OECD brought it to the government’s agenda. Until recently, transportation and water management were the only issues subject to quality standards. Local governments were not part of this national system and were responsible for ensuring service quality on their own.

Based on recommendations made in the OECD Governance Report 2011, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications established a special unit responsible for elaborating a comprehensive system of public-services standards. The new system was supposed to include local self-governments and local services as well. In 2013, a green paper on public services was approved by the government cabinet, establishing online-service standards as the main priority. In 2015, the government cabinet launched a follow-up project aiming to set up a comprehensive system for measuring the quality of all e-services no matter what the provider, content or location. This process is currently underway, since 2016 governmental agencies must publish information regarding public services, including quality indicators, on their websites. At the moment, the amount of available information greatly varies across ministries and agencies.

Finland

Score 7

Since local authorities have the constitutional right to use their own discretion, the central government has limited capacity to ensure that national standards are consistently met. Local governments are separate from the central government, with municipal authorities recognized as existing independently of the state. Still, appeals to administrative courts regarding decisions taken by local authorities are possible on grounds that the decisions were not made in proper order or were otherwise illegal. In certain and very few specific matters, such as environmental or social-care issues, local government decisions must be confirmed by state authorities. The reform of municipalities and services now ongoing for years aims to increase the effectiveness of public-services provision in peripheral regions and improve local governments’ fiscal sustainability. The extent to which these reforms can meet the stated goals remains an open and much-debated question.

Germany

Score 7

In Germany, public services are provided by various levels of government: the federal administration, the administrations of federal states, municipalities, indirect public administrations (institutions subject to public law with specific tasks, particularly in the area of social security), nonpublic and nonprofit institutions (e.g.,
kindergartens or youth centers), and finally judicial administrations. While some standards have a national character and thus have to be respected at all levels, this is not the case in areas, such as education.

Ireland

Score 7

Most of the main public services (health, social welfare, education, public transport, building and maintaining the primary national road network, and, since 2014, the provision of water services) are provided by the central government or national public utility companies; there is little scope for subnational governments to influence standards.

The attainment of national (or, more usually now, EU) levels of public services is prescribed and monitored in other areas where local government plays a greater role, notably environmental services and standards.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays a key role in enforcing standards across the country. The Office of Environmental Enforcement supervises the environmental protection activities of local authorities by auditing their performance, providing advice and guidance, and in some cases giving binding directions. It can assist the public in bringing prosecutions against local authorities found to be in breach of significant legislation. In other areas – the provision of social housing, maintenance of local roads, and other such issues – the attainment of national standards is largely constrained by the resources made available by the central government. There is significant variation between local providers in these areas.

Israel

Score 7

The provision of local services in Israel is dispersed between many agents, including local authorities, NGOs, government and municipal corporations and institutions such as public and private hospitals. The bulk of social services is provided by local authorities proportionally funded according to their revenues and share of dependents. While some local authorities fair well and offer supplementary social support, weaker local authorities such as largely Arab or Jewish orthodox municipalities struggle to maintain government standards. This incited the expansion of the central government’s authorities during the 2000s, authorizing the Ministry of the Interior to closely supervise and even to dissolve councils that fail to deliver proper services, at the cost of local democratic representation.

Another solution is the advancement of service treaties in local authorities which aim to standardize local services used by residents while informing residents of their rights and the level of general services in their city or town. A branch of the Ministry of the Interior reviews this process with pilot cities showing positive results. In
recent years, many local authorities have taken part in this process and published information on local services on their websites. The privatization of social services continues to exhibit problems as weak social ministries struggle to regulate the quality and content of care. Several reports on education services point to ideological conflicts and poor management as well as an increase in the share of privately financed activities and consequent inequality. In 2014, following the recommendations of a special committee on the state of health services, the regulation of hospitals was transferred to a new authority in order to prevent conflicts of interest in the management of government hospitals. Like health services, other policy arenas are expected to undergo restructuring in order to strengthen regulation and ensure standards are met. However, the establishment of this authority was cancelled by the 34th government.

Citation:
Bersler-Gonen, Rotem, “Service treaty in local government in Israel - review,” Ministry of the interior website (December 2011) (Hebrew)
Dagan-Buzaglo, Noga, “Aspects in privatization in the education system”, Adva Center 2010. (Hebrew)
“Local government in Israel,” Knesset website (Hebrew)
“On nominated councils and democracy,” Hithabrut website (NGO) (Hebrew)
Local government in Israel, Knesset website: http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/LocalAuthorities_eng.htm

New Zealand

Score 7

It is not central government as such but a dense network of agencies that are involved with the development and monitoring of local government. This includes the Minister of Local Government, the Department of Internal Affairs, the Local Government Commission, Local Government New Zealand (representing local councils on the national level), the Office of the Controller and Auditor General, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. Their roles range from strategic development, policy formulation, regulation and monitoring, to handling complaints about the activities and operation of local government. At the end of 2013 a comprehensive reform program, “Better Local Government,” was introduced, whose provisions are part of the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Act 2014. In June 2016, the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Bill (No 2) passed its first parliamentary reading, which includes the Better Local Services reforms. The bill continues the general trend of increasing
central government scrutiny and control over local government. These reforms have been the subject of criticism, especially in Auckland with its relatively new “super-city” structure and population of 1.4 million. However, smaller municipalities have also been critical of the reforms, describing them as being undemocratic, especially the “draconian” powers granted to the Local Government Commission. Smaller municipalities argued that they could be forced amalgamate their services. In an open letter to then-Prime Minister John Key, Invercargill Mayor Tim Shadbolt called the legislation the “crushing of local government democracy and seizing control of their assets bill.”

Citation:

Poland

Score 7

Previous governments have set national standards with the aim of guaranteeing a minimum quality of public services. Institutionally, the regions have a centrally appointed head of regional administration who is responsible for ensuring that national policies are implemented, and that state institutions operating in the region perform their functions properly. The politicization of the civil service under the PiS government has put the meeting of these standards at risk by reducing the professionalism of the administration. Moreover, because of the conflicts between the government and the Constitutional Tribunal, the standards themselves are contested.

South Korea

Score 7

The Ministry of Public Administration and Security, created through a merger of earlier agencies, is in charge of ensuring that local governments maintain national minimum standards. However, many local governments, particularly in rural areas, have a much lower professional standard than the city government of Seoul or the central government. While the provision of basic services is similar in all regions, there is a huge difference in the provision of additional services such as recreation facilities between affluent (i.e., self-sufficient) regions like Seoul or the southeast and less prosperous (i.e., dependent on transfer payments) regions in the southwest. Recently, a number of local governments have begun paying out child benefits larger than those dictated by national standards. As local-government autonomy develops, a greater number of customized policies are being introduced for residents.
Switzerland

Score 7

The Swiss political system is one of the most decentralized systems in the world. Cantons and municipalities enjoy very substantial autonomy. Within the scope of their quite significant competencies, it is up to the cantons and municipalities to decide what public services they want to offer, to what extent and at what level of quality. Therefore, there are no national standards for public services except with regard to those limited parts of the administration that implement federal law. However, all public services have to comply with the rule of the law and the human rights set out in the constitution. A comparatively small number of issues (i.e., social policies) are decided at the federal level, and are thus subject to national standards. In these cases, federal laws are implemented by cantonal administrations, which have to follow national norms.

Multilateral agreements between some or all cantons (“Konkordate”) for common standards of public services can be seen as a functional equivalent to national policy standards.

United Kingdom

Score 7

There are supposed to be national standards for service delivery by local authorities or the parallel networks of agencies for specific policies such as the trusts running health care, but recent scandals have shown that implementation can be unsatisfactory and thus that there can be “postcode lotteries” in standards. Recently, the Care Quality Commission, a body designed to oversee the quality of health and social care, was criticized for a lack of transparency. A subsequent report by the National Audit Office found that, while there had been considerable improvements, shortcomings still needed to be addressed.

Although central government has the capacity to ensure national standards on this issue, it does not always do enough to “watch the watchers.” All members of the civil service are pledged to a range of codes (such as the Civil Service Code, the Directory of Civil Service Guidance) to ensure national standards in performance, conduct and delivery. In 2012, the Standards Board for England – which has scrutinized civil service commitments to the codes since 2000 – was abolished. The central government has encouraged local authorities to set up regional standards boards. This is in line with the Localism Act 2011, which changed the powers and scrutiny of local government in England. The ongoing Civil Service Reform, which started in 2012, established a new range of national standards, especially in skills, accountability, transparency and diversity, as recorded in the New Public Appointments Governance Code.

Citation:
HM Government 2012: The Civil Service Reform Plan; http://resources.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-
Australia

Score 6

The Commonwealth has a strong commitment to providing uniform national services, and it makes considerable effort to ensure that program delivery, particularly in health and education, is as uniform as possible across the country. This attempt at uniformity is necessarily complicated by differences in sizes of states and population distribution, and by resistance from state governments keen to preserve their independence. Variation in funding levels according to need (as determined by an independent statutory authority, the Commonwealth Grants Commission) helps to ensure uniformity. Moreover, contingent funding is regularly used by the Commonwealth to achieve uniformity in minimum standards.

Austria

Score 6

The national and state governments share responsibility for many issues, including schools and health care. Each side tends to blame the other for specific implementation shortcomings. In most cases, the parties governing on the national level also control the state governments. Party alliances do not prevent the emergence of conflicts deriving from this structural division of power, but the conflicts are somewhat muted by party links. In parallel with overall growing voter volatility, political majorities in the nine states have grown subject to greater volatility, which has prompted officials at the federal and state levels to demonstrate greater political openness toward each other.

The national government has relatively few instruments by which to make state governments comply with its formal policies. Oversight of municipalities, by both the states and the federal government, is more effective. In 2016, there has been a to reach an understanding between the national government and the nine states. The reason is the inability of the national government to form a consistent position for itself.

Conflicts between state and federal governments have to be brought to the Constitutional Court.

Canada

Score 6

In many areas of provincial jurisdiction, perhaps most notably in education, the federal government does not in principle have the authority to ensure that provinces meet national standards. Contrary to most other advanced countries, Canada has no minimum funding levels, national educational goals or overarching curriculum. Yet despite the complete control exercised by the provinces, Canada’s educational
system is arguably quite successful, and remains similar across the various provinces, which invest in mandatory education at comparable levels and achieve comparable results for their students. Graduation rates are similar, as are the results on pan-Canadian and international tests, such as the Program for International Student Achievement (PISA), operated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

In other areas where the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it has the leverage to insist on certain standards. Health care is the main area in which this occurs. The Canada Health Act of 1986 requires provinces to meet five principles for health care: care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered. All five principles must be met by the provinces if they are to receive full federal funding. The federal government has challenged certain provinces for failure to meet these standards. However, no funds have been withheld since 1993. Some feel that the federal government should be more aggressive in ensuring that national standards are met in the health area.

In environmental policy, the federal government recently announced a plan for a national carbon tax for provinces that do not adopt their own carbon reduction strategy. The policy intends to encourage provinces and territories to implement their own cap-and-trade or carbon tax policies to ensure Canada reaches both national and international standards for carbon emissions.

Czech Republic

A department within the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for overseeing subnational self-government. Its concern is compliance with existing laws and not the assessment of efficiency; laws cover such issues as regular financial accounting, the fair conduct of elections, the avoidance of conflict of interest, the compliance with rules on the disposal of waste materials and freedom of information. Its annual reports show regular monitoring of all levels of self-government, as well as substantial efforts to inform councils of existing legal constraints. The number of breaches of the law, following consultation and advice from the ministry, continues to decline. However, a gap still exists between national and EU standards, which threatens the effective use of EU structural funds.

Latvia

Autonomous local government functions are subject to laws and regulations emanating from the central government. These regulations delineate common standards and define the scope of local government autonomy. The President’s
Strategic Advisory Council has warned that over-regulation is seriously encroaching on local government autonomy. The council has called for a limit to bureaucratization and a reduction in the volume of regulations governing functions that are mandated as autonomous.

The executive has said it would create a new one-stop client-service system across the country, which would centralize the contact point for accessing public (central and local government) services. The new system will also introduce national standards for local government services by 2016. The policy was approved by the cabinet in 2013 and pilot projects have been implemented by a number of local governments. An evaluation conference, in September 2014, documented many instances of successful pilot projects as well as favorable client-satisfaction responses to surveys. In 2015, 59 one-stop agencies were launched. After only one year of operation, they have proven to be useful, processing more than 25,000 different types of applications to state and municipal agencies. A further 20 one-stop agencies are planned to open in 2016. However, the comparability of data sets between institutions remains a challenge.

Citation:
1. The President’s Strategic Advisory Council (2013), Management Improvement Proposals, Available at (in Latvian): http://www.president.lv/images/modules/items/PDF/Pasvaldibas_EGPP_FINAL.pdf, Last assessed: 21.05.2013


Lithuania

Score 6

National public-service standards at the subnational level are ensured through centralized or regional governance arrangements. For example, landfills are connected in a regional network of service providers. The decentralized provision of other public services at the local level has produced uneven quality in areas such as school education or the accessibility of primary health care services. The Public Management Improvement Program aims at defining minimal-quality standards for various public functions such as health care, education and social services. In addition, the Sunset Commission – a commission tasked with finding ways to improve state administrative functions – has advised the central government to provide recommendations to municipal authorities regarding general administrative functions such as personnel policies. However, any such recommendations have yet to be systematized.

Citation:
The Public Management Improvement Program (in Lithuanian) is available at http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpeska.showdoc_i?p_id=418407&p_query=vie%F0ojo%20valdymo%20obulinimo%20programa&p_tr2=2
Malta

Score 6

It is the Department of Local Government and the National Audit Office which seek to ensure standards within local councils. The first is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the performance of individual local councils. Central departments set the benchmarks for services provided by local councils. The second is the National Audit Office, which independently investigates local council activities both from a purely auditing perspective and from a “value for money” perspective. It is the latter that has by and large driven reform of local councils. National standards at the local level are also reinforced through the councilors’ code of ethics and the Local Councils Association.

Citation:
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160111/opinion/Auditing-local-governance.598374
Report by the auditor general on the workings of local government for the year 2015

Portugal

Score 6

National standards are largely uniformly applied, albeit as a result of the control and provision of most public services by the central government. There are, however, differences between municipalities in some services, such as infrastructure, culture and extracurricular educational offerings.

Sweden

Score 6

Public services have been extensively decentralized over the past decades. Once services are transferred from central to local government, safeguarding national standards and even defining and sustaining those standards becomes problematic. The same problem applies to increasingly privatized services, where the oversight over national standards becomes even more challenging.

Decentralization and local autonomy are essentially institutional choices and, as all choices, these arrangements have their downsides. One of the problems with a decentralized system is that it becomes very difficult to enforce national standards. This became obvious to the government after the extensive decentralization reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. In primary and secondary education, the past two decades have witnessed central government trying to regain some control in order to
ensure some degree of national standards. The main strategy toward this objective has been to carefully evaluate the performance of schools and publicize evaluation reports (i.e., to “name and shame” underperforming schools). In addition, central government has tried to increase equality among local authorities by revising the general regulatory framework of primary and secondary education, and by targeting financial resources to improve the quality of teaching.

Belgium

Formally, the national (federal) government has no authority over regional governments and administrations, but it can impose some standards and policies. Environmental policies, for instance, have been largely regionalized, but environmental standards and norms are set at the federal level. As a result, environmental-policy coordination has been deadlocked since 2012. In addition, subnational and local executives have to abide by budgetary constraints set by the central government. Responsibilities for several policy levers are shared by different government levels, in which case the central government has partial authority over regional governments’ courses of action.

Altogether, the central government does not have the ability to enforce or control more detailed standards in terms of things like performance figures, as just one example. The government can only try to maintain influence through more general (legal or budgetary) levers.

Italy

Minimal standards for decentralized public services (such as public health, utilities, etc.) are agreed upon and set at national level in a number of areas. The permanent conference for relations between the state, regions, provinces and cities (Conferenza Stato-Regioni ed Unificata) is an important forum in which national standards are discussed. However, the implementation of these standards is still far from satisfactory: as the administrative quality of different local authorities varies significantly, standards can differ substantially from one area of the country to another. In many fields the north–south divide remains significant, and seriously affects equality of opportunities and national cohesion. So far, efforts to overcome it have not proven very successful.

National standards have increasingly been adopted for utilities (e.g. water, electricity and communications), but in most cases independent authorities are responsible for the definition and implementation of standards. Implementation in this field is fairly adequate.

The Renzi government has demonstrated a willingness to enforce national standards by overruling regional administrations. The constitutional reform will provide if finally approved new instruments for the government to act in this field.
Netherlands

Score 5

There is no single institution that monitors national standards for services at local level. Monitoring is left to the various ministries allotting “doeluitkeringen” or policy-related national subsidies.

Local governments themselves also try to meet mutually agreed-upon national standards. Several studies by local audit chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of each others’ executive capacities. In 2009, the Association of Dutch Local Governments established the Quality Institute of Dutch Local Governments (Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten). Nevertheless, due to the implementation of strong decentralization plans, including funding cutbacks, it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the delivery of municipal services will diminish.

Citation:
Kwaliteits Instituut: https://www.kinggemeenten.nl/

Romania

Score 5

The central government generally tries to ensure that subnational governments realize national public-service standards. The prefects have an important role in this respect. However, enforcement is sometimes undermined by the inadequate funding provided to subnational governments, which undermines their capacity to deliver services meeting national standards. This issue was not prioritized by the Ciolos government, therefore there has been no tangible change.

Spain

Score 5

The central government has in principle always been committed to ensuring uniform national standards for public services, but this has never been completely effective. In some cases, regional governments design and implement their own public policies without following clearly defined national standards. As a result, there may be some variation in the quality of public services offered by Spain’s regions. In general, minimum standards are set by basic national legislation, but are not subsequently
enforced. In fact, instruments of enforcement vary greatly according to policy field, with education and the pension system perhaps the best-defined areas, while housing, family policy and social care are among the most heterogeneous. The formal administrative method for monitoring the provision of services by the autonomous regions through supervision (the Alta Inspección) has not been particularly effective. Since 2012, new regulations on financial sustainability within public administrations and local governments have strengthened the tools through which the central government can ensure that regional and local governments realize national minimum standards. The health care reform, with its emphasis on the so-called Common Services Portfolio of the National Health System, is a very good example of a recent development through which central government has sought to ensure that the decentralized provision of a public service is universal, free and complies with standards set on the national level, but also cedes some control to the regions.

**Turkey**

**Score 5**

The Ministry of Interior Affairs closely monitors the structure and quality of services provided by municipal governments, through its own local agencies and administrative trusteeship (through internal and external audits, and audits by civil service inspectors). The Union of Municipalities of Turkey also offers nationally or EU-funded training and technical support for municipalities in this respect.

While United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support for the implementation of local-administration reform in Turkey (LAR Phase 2) has been concluded, Turkey still aims to fulfill some requirements of the European Local Self-Government Charter. In this context, municipalities work to establish departments tasked with monitoring, investment and coordination. The main duties of these departments are to provide, monitor and coordinate public institutions and organizations’ investments and services; to provide and coordinate central-administration investments in the provinces; and to guide and inspect provincial public institutions and organizations. However, the most significant outstanding issues with regard to standardizing local public services are essentially financial, technical and personnel-driven. Within the OECD, Turkey remains the country with the largest regional disparities.

Currently, all municipalities (metropolitan, province and town) have developed service standards for health, transportation, environmental protection, real estate, construction etc. in proportion to their size and scope of activities. However, there is no effective mechanism to assess whether these standards are met or not.

Citation:
United States

Score 5

Due to the dual nature of the U.S. federal system, the issue of national standards applies mostly to co-financed federal programs, where the federal government asserts its right to set and monitor compliance with these standards. The bulk of public services are delivered by local and state agencies with minimal intervention by the federal government. The question of enforcing federal standards arises in specific areas where federal policymakers have sought to impose such standards, sometimes to enforce citizens’ rights under the federal constitution, and other times for policy reasons. The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, requires states to meet air-quality standards under the Clean Air Act. On the other hand, states exercise broad discretion in setting standards of eligibility for Medicaid coverage or with regard to unemployment insurance. The Obama administration has granted waivers that allow individual states to relax work requirements for welfare recipients (under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families).

Bulgaria

Score 4

In Bulgaria, the effectiveness of national-government oversight and compliance with national standards in the decentralized provision of public services differ among functional spheres. For example, education is provided by local schools on the basis of funds delegated by the national or the local government, with standards upheld relatively objectively and effectively through external evaluation and regional and local inspection. However, in the sphere of environmental, waste-management and forestry standards, as well as in the local-level health care sector, monitoring is uneven and some localities have much lower standards than others.

Citation:

Mexico

Score 4

Insufficient funding, corruption and inefficiency inhibit the effective implementation of nationwide public policy standards in many sectors. Currently, this is playing out particularly visibly in the education sector, where not a single government entity seems to know how many teachers there are in the public schools, let alone how effectively they teach. Part of a recent education reform requires the statistical agency INEGI to conduct a census of the education sector. The discrepancy in the number of teachers in official data provided by the Ministry of Education and those encountered by census-takers when they visited schools is significant. In several states, INEGI’s work was disrupted by unions, especially the CNTE, which sought to
prevent census-takers from entering schools. Overall, the education reform has increased pressure for accountability and transparency but the country still has a long way to go before all schools and teachers meet national standards.

**Slovakia**

**Score 4**
Public-service standards are poorly defined, especially with regard to the independent functions of subnational governments. Moreover, the monitoring of compliance with these standards is often fragmented. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for overseeing subnational self-government, but largely focuses on formal compliance with existing laws and cost efficiency. While the ministry regularly monitors all levels of self-government, the number of breaches of the law and the extent and effects of ministerial intervention are not transparent. Clearly, there are differences between national and EU standards that negatively influence the effective use of EU structural funds. The second Fico government’s ESO project has focused on increasing the administrative capacity of subnational governments by realizing economies of scale and by sharing and centralizing services such as facility management, procurement and payroll management. However, implementation of these envisaged changes has been slow.

**Chile**

**Score 3**
Due to the different financing structures at regional and municipal levels, the national government can only guarantee services at an adequate standard at the regional level. The central government has clearly failed to establish national standards at municipal level. In addition, relatively poor municipalities and those in rural regions often lack the capacity to meet national standards for public services, especially in the fields of health care and education. This segregation is also evident in Santiago itself, where public schools in richer districts clearly tend to show higher standards and better results than public schools from poorer districts.

**Greece**

**Score 3**
In the period under review, after the end of the meandering policies of the Syriza-ANEL government in the first ten months of 2015, there was some improvement in the implementation of national standards. It was realized by the incumbent government that non-implementation of such standards could put the state’s finances in danger, particularly since subnational self-governments are heavily dependent on the central government for their finances.
Hungary

Score 3

In Hungary, the quality of subnational public services has suffered as a result of the reorganization of subnational governments. The state administration’s new subnational tiers lack experience in providing services. Preoccupied with getting started, they have not paid much attention to service quality. The provision of those public services that have been left with subnational self-governments has in turn suffered from self-governments’ lack of financial resources and administrative capacities. The central government has exercised strong control, but has not focused on quality issues. As a result, national standards have increasingly been undermined, especially in the fields of health care, education and social services.

Citation:

Slovenia

Score 3

In Slovenia, public-service standards are poorly defined, especially with regard to the independent functions of municipal governments. As every municipality is autonomous in providing such services, their extent and quality differ substantially across the country. Financial controls and inspections are often ineffective due to the lack of resources and staff. Moreover, the monitoring of standards is often highly fragmented. In the case of health care, for instance, the Public Agency for Drugs and Medical Accessories, the National Institute for Health Protection, the Public Health Inspectorate and the Office for Drugs and Pharmaceutical Control all play oversight roles.

Croatia

Score 2

There are no national standards for public services in Croatia. Modern systems for the improvement of service quality such as ISO, EFQM or similar public-management standards are not implemented in the Croatian public sector. Moreover, the productivity, efficiency and quality of local self-government units are not systematically measured, and local-government budgets are currently monitored only on the basis of the economic purposes of local-government spending, rather than on its outcomes. There is not even a catalogue of services that local and regional self-government units (municipalities, towns, counties) should provide to the local community. The absence of clear national standards is particularly visible in the field of social policy. Here, the implementation of central-government regulation has differed strongly among municipalities. Some have even ignored legal requirements such as the provision in the Act on Social Welfare that municipalities should use 5% of their budgets for housing allowances for socially marginalized groups.
Cyprus

Score 2

Standards and indicators at the central government level generally lack consistency and universality. Plans for extensive reforms aim at creating a complete framework and improving implementation that tends to be incoherent. The promotion of strategic planning and budget design introduce general standards and procedures, in particular on fiscal issues. They must apply consistently across all government levels, including local authorities. This would reduce individual discretion regarding interpretation and implementation of fiscal and other policies. However, generalized planning and the setting of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are still pending.

Citation:
Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Phone +49 5241 81-81240
daniel.schraad-tischler@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christian Kroll
Phone +49 5241 81-81471
christian.kroll@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christof Schiller
Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini
Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.sgi-network.org