Interministerial Coordination Report
GO Expertise, GO Gatekeeping, Line Ministries, Cabinet Committees, Ministerial Bureaucracy, Informal Coordination

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2017
GO Expertise

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.

8-6 = The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.

5-3 = The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.

2-1 = The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.

United States

Score 10

The closest comparison to a government office or prime minister’s office in the U.S. system is the White House staff, along with other units of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council). Because of the separation of powers, Congress or particular congressional committees sometimes compete with the president to shape policymaking in executive agencies. In response to these challenges, presidents have gradually built up a large executive-office establishment designed to help assert presidential control over the departments and agencies, and to enable the independence of presidential policy decisions. The total professional staff in the presidential bureaucracy vastly exceeds that of a parliamentary system’s GO or PMO, with roughly 2,500 professionals and a budget of $300 million to $400 million.

Indeed, White House may not allow the departments and agencies to play a major substantive role in drafting bills. In recent presidencies, it has increasingly dominated executive-branch policymaking. President Obama has gone even further than previous presidents, appointing a number of high-level presidential adviser, or so-called czars, to oversee executive-branch policymaking in specific areas.

Australia

Score 9

The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is responsible for policy coordination, and as such evaluates and provides advice on all major line ministry
proposals. The department has significant resources, and has authority to draw from, and consult with, appropriate sources across the whole of the government system.

Canada

Score 9
Draft bills are vetted primarily by the Privy Council Office and to a lesser extent by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board. These central agencies are prestigious places to work, and indeed, central-agency experience is highly valued (some even say a prerequisite) for advancement to senior levels within the federal public service. Consequently, central-agency staff members are generally highly skilled and possess the comprehensive sectoral-policy expertise needed for the regular and independent evaluation of draft bills based on the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.

Chile

Score 9
The president’s advisory ministry (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, Segpres) and the Government or Cabinet Office (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, or Segegob) have at their disposal the necessary instruments and capacities to monitor and evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals. Nevertheless, channels of evaluation and advice are not fully institutionalized, and may change with a new head of state.

Finland

Score 9
As a ministry in itself, the Prime Minister’s Office has the capacity to evaluate proposed policy. The primary function of the Prime Minister’s Office is to support the duties of the prime minister, who directs the work of government and coordinates the preparation and consideration of government business. The Prime Minister’s Office monitors the implementation of the government program and coordinates Finland’s EU policy. In addition, the Prime Minister’s Office is tasked with coordinating communications between the government and various ministries, planning future-oriented social policies, and promoting cooperation between the government and the various branches of public administration. The Prime Minister’s Office has four departments: European Union Affairs, Government Administration, Government Ownership Steering, and Government Communications. Additionally, it has three units: the Government Session Unit, the Government Policy Analysis Unit and the Government External Economic Relations Unit. The Prime Minister’s Office has a secretary of state, a permanent undersecretary of state and some 550 employees arranged within several task-specific departments. In addition, the steering of the Team Finland network takes place within the Prime Minister’s Office. Team Finland is a network tasked with promoting international trade and relations, improving the
efficiency of business cooperation abroad, and increasing the ease with which Finnish customers can access international business services.

Citation:
http://vnk.fi/en/frontpage
http://team.finland.fi/en/frontpage

United Kingdom

Score 9

The primary coordinating role is undertaken by the Cabinet Office, which has expertise in all areas of government since Cabinet Office officials commonly worked in other departments before. According to its website, the Cabinet Office has over 2,000 staff, is responsible for the National Security Council and is central to “making government work better.” The Cabinet Office’s Economic and Domestic Secretariat is responsible for coordinating policy advice to the prime minister and the cabinet, and the attached Parliamentary Business and Legislation (PBL) Secretariat provides advice on legislation and supervises progress made by bill drafting teams. The head of the Economic and Domestic Secretariat is also responsible for the Implementation Unit and the operation of the Implementation Task Forces, which oversee the implementation of government policies, and coordinates between ministers and public officials. Implementation Unit staff are policy experts from the civil service with good ministerial networks and excellent substantive expertise. The role of the Treasury in putting pressure on departmental spending also contributes to interministerial coordination.

Latvia

Score 8

The formation of the PKC, which reports directly to the prime minister, has ensured a mechanism enabling input from the government office on the substance of policy proposals from line ministries. The PKC evaluates all proposals to be addressed by the cabinet on a weekly basis, focusing on three issues: cross-sectoral impact, adherence to the government declaration and compatibility with long-term strategy documents (such as the National Development Plan and Latvia 2030).

While expectations of the PKC are high, its ability to deliver on these expectations is limited. For example, the PKC’s ability to deliver high quality cross-sectoral analysis has been undermined by staffing capacity constraints. Furthermore, the PKC has no financial capacity to engage short-term or ad hoc consultants on specific substantive issues.

Citation:
Mexico

Score 8

The presidential office offers positions of high prestige in Mexico. It is involved with the legislative process to a decisive degree. Due to the absence of a high-level career civil service, both the cabinet and the presidential office are staffed with presidential appointments. The independence of figures within the executive is thus questionable since everyone of influence in the presidential office is a political appointee. It is relevant to note that the majority of legislative proposals introduced by the executive failed in post-1997 Mexico; however, this has shown a distinct turnaround in the last two years, with proposals succeeding at what might be comparatively viewed as a radical level. Political roadblocks rather than any lack of policy expertise were responsible for the earlier problems.

New Zealand

Score 8

The policy-advisory group in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) currently consists of 14 staff members covering a broad spectrum of policy expertise. They are in constant contact with the prime minister and provide advice on all cabinet and cabinet committee papers. They also engage in coordinating interministerial cooperation. The policy-advisory group provides direct support to the prime minister on specifically commissioned initiatives, such as the prime minister’s “Tackling Methamphetamine” Action Plan. In 2015, a Legislation Design and Advisory Committee (LDAC) was established with the aim of improving the quality and effectiveness of legislation. The LDAC advises departments regarding the design and content of bills while still in the development stage.

Citation:
Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2014 (Wellington: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014).

Norway

Score 8

The Office of the Prime Minister has a small to medium-sized staff of 30 to 50 people, about 10 of which are political advisers, with the rest being professional bureaucrats. The office is not tasked with evaluating policy proposals in detail, but rather works to coordinate activities, ensure that government policies are roughly aligned, and monitor whether policy planning is adequate and is following prescribed procedures. The office has sufficient expertise and capacity for these purposes, and is considered to be an elite department with very highly skilled employees. The tradition of coalition governments in Norway involves strong coordination activity among the coalition partners.
South Korea

South Korea’s presidential system has a dual executive structure, with the president serving both as head of state and head of government. The prime minister is clearly subordinate to the president and is not accountable to parliament. The presidential office, known as the Blue House, has the power and expertise to evaluate draft bills. As the real center of power in the South Korean government, the Blue House has divisions corresponding with the various line-ministry responsibilities. The role of the president’s office has become even stronger under President Park with power becoming still more centralized. The Blue House is supported in its oversight role by the Prime Minister’s Office and its Government Performance Evaluation Committee as well as by public institutions, such as the Korea Institute of Public Administration. President Park Geun-hye has established two vice prime ministers, one for the economy and one for society, education and culture, with the aim of promoting interministerial coordination. Recent scandals have revealed serious flaws in leadership by the president’s office, and the president herself proposed a constitutional reform that would move Korea away from its presidential system and toward parliamentary democracy.

Citation:
The Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA), http://www.kipa.re.kr

Spain

Spain’s Government Office (Ministry of the Presidency, Ministerio de la Presidencia) and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) (both the Private Office and the Economic Office) are tasked with evaluating line-ministry proposals from the political and technical points of view. From a functional and even physical point of view, these bodies are nearly one, and form the very powerful political core of the executive. In general, these different units have ample staff with specific policy expertise, whose task is to substantively assess draft bills and other important sectoral initiatives to ensure they are compatible with the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities. The internal structures of the prime minister’s Private Office and Economic Office vaguely reflect the various ministerial portfolios, although without achieving a comprehensive policy expertise that enables perfect oversight throughout the executive. Moreover, evaluations made by the advisers working there are not truly independent, since most staffers are insiders bureaucratically connected to their ministries of origin. For its part, the Government Office, which is also responsible for organizing the Council of Ministers’ cycle of sessions, and whose head is the powerful deputy prime minister, has no sectoral-policy expertise, but also evaluates the substantive content of draft bills to some extent. Nevertheless, despite
the extensive constitutional and political strength of the Spanish premiership, these units enjoy only limited administrative resources. Their relatively small size is perhaps explained by the hierarchical, single-party nature of the Spanish government, in which it is not particularly necessary to monitor sectoral ministers from the center.

**Sweden**

Score 8

Interministerial coordination has been a significant problem in the Swedish system of government for a long time but has now been addressed in a comprehensive strategy. The previous government (2006-2014) implemented a major program (“RK Styr”) in order to strengthen the coordination among departments. This goal was believed to be a necessary step to increase the capability of the GO to steer the agencies more effectively.

In formal and legal terms, the government and its departments act as a collectivity. All decisions in government are made collectively and there is no individual ministerial accountability. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) plays a significant role in the coordination process. This is also the case for the Department of Finance. Furthermore, when the incumbent government is a coalition government, as has been the case since 2006, policies must be coordinated not just among the relevant departments but also among the governing parties.

The practice of governing and coordination is much more complex. Each department has a fair amount of autonomy in their respective sector. Coordination among departments takes places at different organizational levels depending on whether the issue is a technical and administrative issue, or whether it is a more political matter. With the latter, political actors make the final decisions. When bills involving more than one department are drafted, coordination is achieved through meetings where drafts of the bill are discussed. There are instances where drafts have gone through a very large number of revisions as part of the coordination process. In pro-growth policies in the mid-2000s, for instance, the bill that eventually was submitted to the Riksdag was the 56th version of the bill.

The lack of coordination has to some extent been resolved by increasing the centralization within the Government Office. The Ministry of Finance has become a “primus inter pares” among the departments; a pattern that emerged in the wake of the financial crises in the early 1990s but that has remained ever since.

The PMO rarely coordinates policy content, which generally takes place during the process of deliberation or drafting of bills.

Citation:
Belgium

Score 7

The Prime Minister’s Office contains a “strategic cell” that helps the prime minister evaluate and steer policy across all levels. Typically, this oversight function is shared with deputy prime ministers (one per coalition party, apart from the prime minister’s party) in a regular “core” meeting. Each of the advisers and experts in the cell specializes in one field. They assess only the most important issues, as the relatively small size of the team limits its ability to deal with all issues at hand. The fact that governments are always coalitions (comprised of at least four parties) also gives a central role to party advisers of the corresponding minister in the lawmaking process.

Denmark

Score 7

The Danish Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is relatively small. In 2015 it had a staff of 74, spread between three groups (i.e., academics, technical and administrative staff), the academic group being the largest.

The office is divided into two main sections, one dealing with foreign policy and the second with domestic political and economic issues. There is also a law division and an administrative division. The High Commissioner for the Faroe Islands and the High Commissioner for Greenland also fall under the PMO. The prime minister has the following portfolio tasks: the North Atlantic area (e.g., Greenland and the Faroe Islands), the press, constitutional law and relations with the Royal Family.

Given its small size, the PMO does not have the capacity to evaluate the details of all laws. But some officials are seconded from important line ministries to give the PMO a certain capacity. This capacity has been strengthened since the 1990s.

There is a strong tradition of so-called minister rule (ministerstyre). A minister is in charge of a certain area, but the cabinet is a collective unit and is supposed to have only one policy focus, for which the prime minister has the overall responsibility. Coordination takes place through special committees. Most important is the coordination committee which meets weekly. Other committees are the committee on economic affairs, the security committee and the appointment committee. There is also a tradition of two-day government seminars once or twice per year where important government issues are discussed.
France

Score 7

There are three main loci of policy evaluation once a policy proposal has been forwarded to the prime minister. The first is the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the second is the President’s Office, and the third, in cases of legislation or regulation, the Council of State. This hierarchical organization gives the prime minister the option of modifying ministers’ draft bills. In important cases, this steering function is located in the President’s Office. Both the president and the prime minister appoint adviser from all ministries as policy adviser in a given sector. All ministerial domains are covered. Several hundred people are involved in government steering, checking, controlling and advising functions.

However, considering these various checks a method of evaluation is probably overstated. The PMO mainly coordinates and arbitrates between ministries, takes into consideration opinions and criticisms from involved interests and from the majority coalition, and balances political benefits and risks. The President’s Office does more or less the same in coordination with the PMO. More than offering a thorough policy evaluation, these two institutions serve as a place where the ultimate arbitrations between bureaucrats, party activists and vested interests are made. The power of the last word belongs to the President’s Office, and this informal hierarchy gives considerable influence to the president’s cabinet, and in practice, to the person in charge of a given policy area. The Council of State is supposed to offer legal advice only. However, the Council takes advantage of this mandatory consultation step to trim a proposed bill or decree, pointing out weaknesses or contradictions. This advice, however, goes much beyond legal issues, yet the government has a choice between accepting the council’s advice or dropping the questioned elements of policy, given international, European or constitutional requirements. The policy road, under these circumstances, might be narrow. It has to be noted that none of these “evaluations” are made public. Some of their content, however, do become known as many involved parties have a vested interest in leaking information in order to mobilize groups and lobbies in support of or against the envisaged policy.

The Hollande presidency (since May 2012), especially in its first two years, has been marked by a striking lack of political and administrative coordination. Multiple contradictions and tensions appeared over policy choices and issues. Divergences and fights between ministers reflected tensions within the left coalition and within the Socialist Party itself. A major battle was fought when the minister of the economy himself expressed disagreement with the government’s economic policy. In
August 2014, the new prime minister, Manuel Valls, had to step in and request that dissenting ministers resign. Since then, the situation has normalized. The Macron law (2015) and the Labor Law reform (2016) illustrate the extent to which the process is now supervised and controlled by the prime minister and the president.

**Hungary**

The Orbán governments have steadily expanded both the competencies and the resources of Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). The number of state secretaries and undersecretaries in the PMO has been further increased, and now stands at about 30. Altogether 1,602 persons are employed in the PMO and in its surrounding expert groups. Under minister Antal Rogán, the personal cabinet of Orbán has developed into a ministry with state secretaries and undersecretaries responsible for government communication. The PMO is supported by five background institutes with 206 employees. Three of them, the Veritas Institute (an institute of contemporary history), the Institute for Linguistic Strategy (for language guidelines for Fidesz media) and the Institute for National Strategy (Hungarians in neighboring countries) deals with “strategic” issues (26-20-100 employees respectively). The Institute of Systemic Change and Archives and the Institute of National Heritage focus on documentation (31-29 people respectively). The strategic institutes were in the forefront in 2014-2015, but have lost importance in the period under review. Recent rumors suggest they may be dissolved by PMO head Lázár as part of his program to reduce the size of the state machinery. So, expansion may have reached its peak.

**Ireland**

The influence and effectiveness of the Irish prime minister’s office (Department of the Taoiseach) is limited by a dearth of analytical skills. The department is focused on strategic policy issues and the delivery of the Programme for Government.

An expert group on strengthening civil-service accountability and performance reported to government in May 2014. Among the numerous recommendations it made, it proposed the establishment of an accountability board for the civil service, chaired by the taoiseach but including external members. This board would be tasked with reviewing and constructively challenging the performance of senior management as well as monitoring progress on the delivery of agreed-upon priorities. It also recommended that the Irish Civil Service be given an appointed head. The government rejected the proposal for a head of civil service, but an accountability board with independent members was established in May 2015.

Citation:
The report of the Independent Panel on Strengthening Civil Service Accountability and Performance is available here:
http://www.per.gov.ie/civil-service-accountability-consultation-process/
Japan

Score 7
The Cabinet Secretariat has more than 800 employees with expertise in all major policy fields. These employees are usually temporarily seconded by their ministries. While these staffers possess considerable expertise in their respective fields, it is doubtful whether they can function in an unbiased manner on issues where the institutional interests of their home organizations are concerned. Moreover, the system lacks adequate infrastructure for broader coordination (including public relations or contemporary methods of policy evaluation).

Citation:

Lithuania

Score 7
Under Prime Minister Kubilius, the Government Office was reorganized into a Prime Minister’s Office, and given the task of assisting in the formulation and execution of government policies. This reform increased the capacities of the core government to assess the policy content of draft government decisions, at the expense of its capacity to review their legal quality. However, this latter function was moved to the Ministry of Justice. Shortly after taking power, the Butkevičius government reversed this organizational reform, reorganizing the Prime Minister’s Office once again into a Government Office.

The recent development of evidence-based decision-making instruments such as a monitoring information system, a budget-program assessment system and an impact-assessment system has increased the capacity of the core government to monitor and evaluate draft government decisions based on the government’s political agenda. However, the degree of effectiveness has varied by instrument, as well as with the relevance and quality of the empirical evidence available for decision-making.
Assessing the coordination of regulatory policy in Lithuania, the OECD has recently recommended establishing an integrated strategic plan for better regulation, a high-level coordination body, and a better-regulation unit within the central government. The new prime minister, Mr. Skvernelis, has outlined his plans to increase the capacities of the Government’s Office to enable it to become an active participant in public sector reform, offer expertise and guidance, rather than functioning merely “as a secretariat of the government.”

Citation:
Germany

Score 6

The Chancellery is organized into six directorates, with various numbers of subgroups that are again subdivided to better mirror the line ministries (Spiegelreferate). With respect to European politics and international tasks, the Chancellery seems to coordinate with partners and to function quite effectively. However, national policies are predominantly worked out in negotiations between the party leaders of the respective coalition parties or by the individual ministries in accordance with previously struck political compromises. In general, the Chancellery does not autonomously evaluate important draft bills or assess them according to strategic and to budgetary government guidelines. In addition, it appears that its capacities are generally lower than those of the line ministries.

During the recent refugee crisis, the Chancellery gained some ad hoc competences to manage, coordinate and evaluate the related policies of line ministries. However, in all other policy areas the powers of the Chancellery remain astonishingly limited.

Greece

Score 6

The center of government has traditionally struggled to coordinate and evaluate government legislation. As with previous governments, in the period under review, under the Syriza-ANEL government, draft legislation has rarely been subjected to substantive review and evaluation. In fact, ministers have often been able to insert last-minute amendments to legislation and thereby foster clientelism.

Under Syriza-ANEL there have been several offices and/or committees that have been entrusted with steering the individual ministers and government initiatives in sectoral policy. As was the case before 2015, a primary role is played by the PMO. A second relevant organ, which collects, registers and circulates documents is the General Secretariat of Coordination of Governmental Tasks, which is also very close to the prime minister. A third such organ is the Office of the Vice-President of the Government, which oversees policy in some crucial sectors such as public debt management. It is unclear if these organs, all of which are monitored more or less by the PMO, have the relevant sectoral policy expertise. For instance, there is clearly more expertise on economic policy in the competent ministries, and particularly in the Ministry of Finance, than in the PMO or in any of the aforementioned government councils or offices. On the other hand, after a first period of experimentation with policy structures in early 2015, the Syriza-ANEL government seems now to have clearer ideas about who should be assigned the task of evaluating sectoral policies and how the process should be carried out.
Iceland

Score 6

The Prime Minister’s Office has the fewest staff members of any of the country’s ministries and a limited capacity for independently assessing draft bills. The Sigurðardóttir cabinet (2009-2013) merged a number of ministries together, reducing the total number of ministries from 12 to 8. A primary justification was that some ministries lacked broad-based expertise and the merger would make this expertise more widely accessible, which has in some cases been achieved. The Gunnlaugsson cabinet (2013-2016) partially reversed this reform in 2013 by appointing separate ministers to head the Ministry of Welfare’s subdivisions of Social Affairs and Housing, and Health Affairs. Furthermore, a separate Minister of Environment and Resources was appointed at the end of 2014. These changes increased the number of ministers from 8 to 10. Facing parliamentary elections at the end of October 2016, opinion polls indicate that only a 3-5 party majority government is possible. That might lead to pressure to increase the number of ministries.

Italy

Score 6

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) as a rule evaluates all draft bills before they are submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. This scrutiny however mainly deals with legal aspects (which now increasingly concern compatibility with European laws) as the PMO itself does not have the systematic sectoral expertise that would allow it to conduct a detailed policy scrutiny. This means that intervention by the PMO is in general more reactive than proactive. The office gets more deeply involved in issues when problems emerge during the policymaking process. Important draft bills are in general scrutinized by the office with regard to the effects a bill may have on the cohesion of the majority coalition. A detailed scrutiny of the financial implications of each bill is conducted by the Treasury, which has a kind of preventive veto power. Prime Minister Renzi’s dominant role in the current government means that both he and his personal political staff have significant influence in steering the cabinet on legislation. The PMO’s staff has recently been strengthened, but its limited size does not allow it to fully control the technical aspects of legislation. As a result, corrections to legislative proposals are often necessary during parliamentary approval.

Luxembourg

Score 6

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) employs around 40 civil servants, mostly trained in law, economics and political sciences. As a result, the PMO does not have sufficient resources to assess all the activities of government ministries. Due to the limited capacities of all ministries, including the PMO, there is no management body
or special committee designated to manage interministerial coordination. After the inauguration of the new government in December 2013, interministerial coordination presented some difficulties.

Senior civil servants in the ministries prepare a “pré-conseil” or pre-briefing for the weekly meeting of ministers (conseil de gouvernement). All draft bills have to be adopted at both stages, before being introduced to parliament, as well as revised within these two interministerial meetings. The Inspectorate General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF) evaluates draft bills and participates in numerous committees.

Citation:


Netherlands

Score 6

The Dutch prime minister is formally in charge of coordinating government policy as a whole, and has a concomitant range of powers, which include deciding on the composition of the Council of Ministers’ agenda and formulating its conclusions and decisions; chairing Council of Ministers meetings, committees (onderraad) and (in most cases) ministerial committees; adjudicating interministerial conflicts; serving as the primary press spokesperson and first speaker in the States General; and speaking in international fora and arenas (e.g. European Union and the United Nations) on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the Dutch government as a whole.

The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has some 14 advising councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) at its disposal. The advising councilors are top-level civil servants, not political appointees. In addition, the prime minister has a special relationship with the Scientific Council of Government Policy. Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning agencies play the role of secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” To conclude, the Prime Minister’s Office and the prime minister himself have a rather limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals unless they openly clash with the government platform (regeeraccoord). Of course, personal skills and experience make a difference, but structural capacity remains weakly developed.
Poland

Score 6

The policy expertise of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister was strengthened under the Tusk government. Under the PiS government, the quality of the staff has declined.

Portugal

Score 6

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy expertise. While it can assess proposed legislation, it lacks in-depth policy assessment capabilities. Under the previous Coelho government, the assessment of policy largely centered on fiscal implications, notably in reducing public expenditure or increasing revenue. Under the current Costa government, fiscal implications remain important, as the government seeks to maintain its euro-zone commitments. However, the Costa government must now balance these commitments against its parliamentary entente with the Portuguese Communist Party, the Left Bloc and the Ecologist Party.

Romania

Score 6

The Chancellery of the Prime Minister is one of the bodies responsible for the evaluation of national programs, and consists of about 15 state counsellors with varying degrees and depths of expertise. However, there is no particular unit for policy evaluation, so that ministry proposals are not always assessed properly in terms of their content.

Austria

Score 5

Two aspects of Austria’s governance system limit the efficiency of interministerial coordination. First, members of the cabinet (“Ministerrat,” which is officially translated as the Council of Ministers but is essentially a cabinet) all enjoy the same
legal status. The federal chancellor, who chairs the cabinet, is only first among equals. He or she has no formal authority over the other members of the council. Secondly, with the exception of the years between 1966 and 1983, Austria has been governed by coalitions since 1945. This further reduces the authority of the head of government, as another member of the government – typically the vice-chancellor, is head of another part in the coalition. The result is a significant fragmentation of strategic capacities. Responsibility within the government is distributed among highly autonomous ministers and among political parties linked by a coalition agreement but nevertheless competing for votes.

The Federal Chancellery does have a department called the Legal and Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), which is responsible for checking the constitutionality of policy proposals coming from the various ministries. Another instrument of oversight is the evaluation of policy effects (Wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung, WFA) that as of 2013 must be integrated into every policy proposal. Under this policy, every draft law has to include an evaluation of its effects in financial, social and other terms, thus enabling other members of government to evaluate its consequences. The cabinet is de facto a collective leadership, complicated by the conflicting interests of coalition partners.

The 2013 elections and the resulting coalition government, which consists of the same two parties, have not led to any significant changes regarding interministerial coordination. However, in 2016 when a new chancellor created the term “New Deal” to signify improved strategic planning within the cabinet, new interministerial working groups (reflecting the balance between the two coalition partners) were established and are expected to make potentially significant policy proposals.

**Czech Republic**

**Score 5**

The Office of the Government is relatively small and has little sectoral policy expertise. It prepares cabinet meetings but lacks the capacity to evaluate draft bills. To partially compensate for this weakness, the Office of the Government also uses the services of consultants on the basis of commercial contracts.

**Estonia**

**Score 5**

The GO and prime minister’s support structures primarily provide consulting services, monitor governmental processes and provide technical (judicial) expertise. There is no capacity to perform substantial evaluation of line-ministry proposals. Two OECD governance reports (2011; 2015) have pointed out that national policymaking lacks coherence and interministerial cooperation. Despite the action plan for the implementation of OECD recommendations (2014), no significant improvement has been achieved so far. The OECD 2015 report recommends that the
government sharpen its focus and concentrate on five policy priorities at maximum.
It also recommends giving the GO more discretion in (re)allocating organizational,
financial and human resources for the implementation of key priorities.

Citation:

Israel

Score 5

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) relies on sectoral policy expertise. In recent years, it adopted a principle that it should maintain a staff of independent and professional analysts; this led to the establishment of the National Security Council and the Economics Committee, which directly advise the PMO. The 2012 Kochik Committee viewed these as positive but insufficient steps and advised strengthening the PMOs consulting mechanism.

Citation:
Arlozerov, Merav, “To be a minister in the government? I wouldn’t touch that job with a stick, the Treasury castrates them all”, theMarker 1.8.2012:
http://www.themarker.com/career/civil-service/1.1790839 (Hebrew).
“The committee to investigate the Prime Minister’s headquarter”, Official report (April 2012).

Malta

Score 5

Government ministries in Malta enjoy almost complete autonomy, with limitations only in the form of budgetary constraints imposed by the Ministry of Finance and cabinet approval. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) relies largely on the attorney general’s office to evaluate draft bills, while consulting specialists on non-legal issues. Before going to the Attorney General’s Office, draft laws and policies are scrutinized in cabinet. The employment of more sectoral policy experts has added to this improvement.

In March 2013, the government appointed a minister, as part of the PMO, to oversee the implementation of the government’s manifesto. Furthermore, the PMO has demonstrated a greater ability to respond to policy implementation failures more recently. However, a number of policy failures indicate that more needs to be done.

Citation:
Sansone, K Justice to be transferred to OPM - Labor MP is Commissioner Against Bureaucracy Times of Malta 18/06/13
Slovakia

Score 5

Slovakia has a strong tradition of departmentalism and collegial cabinets, and these two features are likely to deepen under the new coalition of three very different parties. So far, the junior coalition partners have not exercised any substantial influence in the Government Office, which is fully under the control of Robert Fico. The GO focuses on the legal and technical coherence of draft bills, but lacks the capacity and sectoral expertise to evaluate their policy content.

Citation:

Switzerland

Score 5

The Swiss political system does not have a prime minister or a prime minister’s office. The government is a collegial body. However, there are several instruments of interministerial coordination and various mechanisms by which ministries’ draft bills are evaluated. Departments engage in a formal process of consultation when drafting proposals, the Department of Justice provides legal evaluations of draft bills, and the Federal Chancellery and Federal Council provide political coordination.

Turkey

Score 5

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has established a General Directorate of Laws and Decrees and General Directorate of Legislation Development and Publication to scrutinize bylaws prepared by ministries and public agencies, examining their congruity with the existing body of draft bills, decrees, statutes, regulations and Council of Minister resolutions. The directorates also review laws, general legal principles, development plans and programs, and the government’s program. These units are the primary government-office entities charged with drafting and coordinating new regulations. However, not all draft bills are the product of expert advice. Recently, the number of adjustments to draft bills made during the parliamentary-approval process indicated that standards were upheld only partially.

During the review period, the PMO had a total of 2,243 employees, a quarter of whom were experts or advisors, or able to provide similar services. A Sectoral Monitoring and Assessment Unit was established to provide advice to the PMO in 2011. As of May 2015, about 266 career employees from various public institutions were assigned to this unit. Critics argue that these senior civil servants lack sufficient resources, as well as incentives for effective action. Until the “cleansing” activities of the government following the 15 July coup attempt, the unit was also alleged to be
a “detention camp” for bureaucrats supposedly close to illegal Gülenist organizations.

Citation:

Bulgaria

Score 4

The official government office in Bulgaria, the Council of Ministers’ administration, plays a mainly administrative role. It prepares cabinet meetings but lacks the capacity for in-depth evaluation of the policy content of line-ministry proposals. Specialized directorates within the Council of Ministers’ administration do review submissions from the line ministries, but deal less with substance than with ensuring that submissions are presented in the appropriate format. The prime minister’s own political-cabinet staff is relatively small and has little expertise to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals.

Slovenia

Score 4

Slovenia has a strong tradition of departmentalism and collegial cabinets. The Government Office focuses on the legal and technical coherence of draft bills, but lacks the capacity and sectoral expertise to evaluate their policy content, especially since the recruitment of expert staff is limited and often subject to political pressures and political compromise. Prime Minister Cerar has done little to change this situation.

Croatia

Score 3

Until 2014, the Prime Minister’s Office lacked a central policy unit able to evaluate and coordinate the activities of the line ministries. At the beginning of 2014, a unit for public policy coordination and support to the prime minister was established in the Prime Minister Office. The unit has jurisdiction for coordination and monitoring public polices performed by line ministries. However, the capacity of the staff to provide reliable applied policy analysis is limited.

Citation:
Cyprus

Score 2

Under Cyprus’ presidential system, competent line ministries draft bills and send them to the secretariat of the Council of Ministers. The secretariat supports the cabinet’s work and forwards its decisions to concerned offices. Advice, limited to the constitutionality of drafts, is provided by the Attorney General’s Office.

There is no GO with the task or sufficient sectoral expertise or capacities to evaluate draft laws in relation to fiscal and strategic planning. However, the law on fiscal responsibility empowers the finance minister to control and/or decide upon budgetary proposals.
GO Gatekeeping

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
8-6 = The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
5-3 = The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
2-1 = The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.

Australia

Score 10

All major policy proposals must pass through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. In its role of coordinating government policy and ensuring a consistent and coherent legislative program, the department has the capacity to return any item that conflicts with the government’s overall policy agenda. However, such an occasion rarely arises, since the department is involved at an early stage in assisting with the drafting of any significant policy initiatives, so it does not reach an advanced stage without department approval.

Chile

Score 10

The Government or Cabinet Office (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, or Segegob) has the ability to return items. The president can overrule the advisory ministry if he or she holds a strong particular interest in a special item. But in the day-to-day course of operations, this rarely happens. Under the previous government, however, some proposals were blocked directly by then-President Sebastián Piñera.

France

Score 10

The Prime Minister’s Office has strong powers vis-à-vis line ministers. Since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the authority of the prime minister has been indisputable. The only exceptions to this iron rule derive from the presence of heavyweights in the cabinet, or when a minister has privileged access to the
President (such as former the minister of culture, Jack Lang, during Mitterrand’s presidency in the 1980s). President Hollande’s reluctance to impose a strong line weakened the prime minister vis-à-vis the ministers during the term of the first prime minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault. His successor, Prime Minister Manuel Valls, has imposed a return to strict discipline and forced dissenting ministers to resign. This turmoil has shown that beyond the formal rules, it is political leadership that enables the full application of the prime minister’s powers. The dominance of the prime is comparable to the leadership of the British prime minister.

Hungary

Score 10

Under the Orbán governments, all important personal, political and policy decisions have been made by the prime minister and the small groups of his confidents. The gatekeeping role has long been played by the Minister of the PMO János Lázár and the head of the personal political cabinet of Orbán Antal Rogán. Rogán is a close ally of Árpád Habony, the closest adviser to Orbán, who has no official position and no public presence. As Orbán has tried to play a bigger role in the EU in the period under review, Lázár und Rogán have been joined lately by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó.

Iceland

Score 10

The Prime Minister’s Office has no formal authority. Formally issues can only be approved in cabinet if a unanimous decision is reached by ministers. In practice, however, prime ministers can return items to cabinet despite this authority not being explicitly granted by law.

United States

Score 10

The comparable issue for the U.S. system concerns the ability of White House staff to control the presentation of issues, proposals, policy papers and decision memoranda to the White House or cabinet-based presidential-advisory committees. In fact, the president and his or her staff assign the responsibility for coordinating decision processes on major issues, and may choose to emphasize White House or cabinet responsibility in varying degrees as he or she organizes the White House and establishes advisory arrangements. In recent presidencies, a strong and consistent trend has favored White House control. In the Obama administration, for example, the White House controls policy management and thus the presentation of decision materials almost completely, with cabinet officials in subordinate roles.
Canada

Score 9

In general, Canada’s government office, the PCO, can both legally and de facto return items to initiating departments on the basis of policy considerations. Indeed, this happens frequently. On the other hand, as one deputy minister in Ottawa once observed, “He who writes the first draft, controls policy.” To be sure, central agencies have significant influence within the machinery of government in Ottawa. However, there is ongoing dialogue between central-agency staff and line-department officials. Things tend to be sorted out before items are “returned” to line departments. Moreover, unless draft legislation has a financial resources component to it, neither Finance nor Treasury Board officials are likely to take a strong interest.

Denmark

Score 9

The prime minister has the discretionary power to take the actions deemed necessary. The tradition of “minister rule” (ministerstyre) implies that this possibility is rarely exercised. Moreover, the fact that most governments have been minority governments implies that consensus and negotiation is involved.

Ireland

Score 9

The Department of the Taoiseach reviews draft memoranda designated for discussion by the cabinet. Its views are taken into account when these memoranda are revised. The Taoiseach’s office exercises tight control over the government agenda; as does the Department of Finance. Most policy originates in the line departments, but the Department of the Taoiseach has grown in size and competence in recent years, and has the capacity to block most items. In 2010, the Department of the Taoiseach had a total of 179 civil service staff, as well as seven advisers serving the Taoiseach directly (see O’Malley 2012). The Department of the Taoiseach has several different policy divisions. Though these have varied over the years depending on the Taoiseach’s priorities, divisions on the economy, the EU and Britain and Northern Ireland have been a constant. In 2017, there were also divisions on international affairs, social policy and public sector reform, and economics, regulation and climate change.

Citation:
Italy

Score 9

In Renzi’s cabinet, the position of the prime minister vis-à-vis the other ministers is particularly strong. This has in part to do with the strong leadership style pursued by Renzi, who is also the unchallenged leader of the heavily reformed Democratic Party, but is also a result of the limited impact waged by other coalition parties. As a result, the Prime Minister’s Office has played a particularly strong gatekeeping role throughout the period under review. This is particularly evident in policy matters given top priority by the prime minister.

Malta

Score 9

Malta’s system of government is based on the Westminster system, and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can return most items on policy grounds. In practice, policies are adopted or rejected following cabinet discussions. Although the PMO has not established procedures for sectoral policy overviews, it now employs a number of offices to achieve this, including the Policy Efficiency Unit and Internal Audit Offices. Much also depends on the powers of persuasion of the prime minister among his cabinet colleagues. The cabinet has a great deal of leverage, and its members are the most likely to object to policy or a draft bill.

Mexico

Score 9

The role of the presidential office is significant in Mexico. Because Mexico does not have a prime minister, there has been no real counterweight to the power of the presidency within the executive branch of government. Much of the power thus comes from the presidential office. Whatever the legal situation might be, it makes no sense to press ahead with items to be discussed in cabinet if the presidential office opposes them. Good relations between the presidential office and an individual member of cabinet matter more to the cabinet secretary than to the presidential office.

New Zealand

Score 9

The key policy adviser in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) plays an influential role in policy processes and regularly intervenes to “pull” cabinet papers that are deemed to be inadequate in some way.

Citation:
Confidential information by a policy adviser in the DPMC.
Norway

**Score 9**

The Office of the Prime Minister plays an important role in coordinating government policy and ensuring a consistent and coherent legislative program, especially in situations when line ministries are in disagreement. It is able to and often does return materials to departments for further elaboration, and frequently works directly with departments on draft proposals. Both the gatekeeping and general policy-oversight functions are shared with the ministries of Finance and Justice.

South Korea

**Score 9**

There is extensive coordination between ministries, the prime minister’s office and the Blue House in the course of planning cabinet meetings. The president presides over regular cabinet meetings and can legally and de facto return any items envisaged for meetings as she wishes. In practice this competence is limited only by the expertise of the Blue House and the relatively small size of the Blue House bureaucracy. Thus, the de facto ability to return issues depends on their political importance to the president.

Spain

**Score 9**

Materials earmarked for cabinet meetings (usually draft bills or appointments of top officials) are not frequently returned, but the Government Office (Ministerio de la Presidencia, GO) can do so, citing either formal or substantive considerations. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) does not have the official mandate to return items on policy grounds but, given its political weight within the core executive, does so nonetheless.

The head of the GO (who is also the deputy prime minister) has since 2011 been Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría, a state attorney and powerful member of the Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP) who can reject initiatives either in her political or legal position as chair of the committee that prepares Council of Ministers meetings (the Comisión General de Subsecretarios y Secretarios de Estado). The powerful directors of the prime minister’s Private Office, Jorge Moragas, and the prime minister’s Economic Office, Eva Valle, can de facto return items but only by taking advantage of their proximity to the prime minister.

Nonetheless, the prime minister’s Economic Office has also been, since 2012, officially responsible for coordinating economic matters. It does so through a specialized ministerial committee on economic affairs. This constellation grants the
Economic Office some legal capacity to accept or return on economic policy or budgetary grounds items that have been submitted by a ministry.

A legal reform of the new general administrative procedure passed in October 2015 introduced the so-called Annual Normative Plan, along with the idea of “better regulation” as a guiding principle for Spanish lawmaking. This will probably reinforce the GO’s role as a central gatekeeper able to monitor whether sectoral ministries sending legal proposals to the cabinet meeting have respected formal and policy considerations, and that new proposals are compatible with previous plans.

**Sweden**

**Score 9**

The GO or PMO always have the final say on policy decisions and can return items on political or technical grounds. The only exception to this rule is when there is minority government and the parliamentary majority makes a decision which is in conflict with the government’s proposal.

However, given the distinct top-down nature of the work in the GO, items rarely proceed very far without an approving note from upstairs, so it is not very common that policy items are returned in the final stage of the decision-making process. When this happens, it is usually because the timing of a given proposal is not politically advantageous or it is unclear how the policy will be funded. It can also be the case that the European Union adopts a policy that render a domestic policy moot. A final observation is that for the current government, which is a coalition government, policy-progress must be coordinated not just among departments, but also among the governing partners.

Citation:

**Turkey**

**Score 9**

According to Article 112 of the constitution, the prime minister, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, is tasked with ensuring cooperation among ministers and with supervising the implementation of government general policy. The members of the Council of Ministers are jointly responsible for the implementation of policy. Each minister is responsible to the prime minister and is responsible for the conduct of affairs under his or her jurisdiction and the acts and activities of his or her subordinates. The prime minister ensures that the ministers exercise their functions in accordance with the constitution and the law, and can take corrective measures. Article 109 of the constitution, which gives the prime minister the power to appoint ministers, also makes his or her oversight power over ministerial proposals clear. However, ministries have been able to exercise greater influence during periods of coalition government. In those times, to prevent this, a special coordinating body
composed of ministers from coalition parties sets the agenda for cabinet meetings. In contrast to that, since the presidential election in 2014, and the re-election of the AKP into power in 2015, the presidency evolved into another strong power center in the policymaking process, indicated by the regular times President Erdogan has been chairing cabinet meetings.

An example of the exceptional power of the Prime Minister’s Office in terms of policymaking is the fact that all public institutions, entities and corporations in which more than 50% of assets are publicly held – excluding municipalities and special provincial administrations – must get permission from this office before selling, renting, transferring, allocating or bartering any real-estate holdings (Circular 2012/15).

There is also a hidden (discretionary) budget which is allocated through the approval of the prime minister and the minister of finance. This budget was increased to €429 million in the January-October 2015 period. Expenditures through the president’s discretionary budget, which was created after the 2014 presidential elections, totaled €89.6 million during the first nine months of 2015. These expenditures are not audited.

Citation:

United Kingdom

Score 9

The Conservative government, in power since 2015, faces fewer difficulties than its predecessor, because there is no longer a need to coordinate between two different political parties. During the coalition government, 2010 to 2015, a complex mechanism had to be set up to ensure bipartisan approval and consistency with the coalition agreement. Since the return of a majoritarian government in May 2015, the situation has returned to the pre-2010 status quo. The Cabinet Secretariat, the most important political unit within the Cabinet Office, sets the agenda for cabinet meetings and prepares a forward program, which is agreed by the prime minister. The Cabinet Secretariat may contact ministerial offices to request that a minister makes a presentation, presents a paper or raises an issue orally. The prime minister is thus in a very strong position.

Citation:
Luxembourg

Score 8

The long period of leadership of former Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker (in office 1995 – 2013) gave him the authority to reject policy proposals or inspire new policy projects. In general, the prime minister can withdraw a project or a draft bill without formal procedures. However, the prime minister is considered the first among equals (primus inter pares) and should avoid interfering where possible, particularly in issues that are the responsibility of ministers from other coalition parties. Consultative bodies, interministerial meetings and the Inspection General of Finance (Inspection générale des finances, IGF), which is affiliated with the budget ministry, function as arbiters in policymaking.

Citation:

Portugal

Score 8

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is able to return proposed legislation for revision. Considering the understanding among the four main political parties, the PMO’s decision on returning policy must also anticipate political consequences. The priority given to fiscal consolidation has meant that the Ministry of Finance remains important, though less so than under the Coelho government.

Belgium

Score 7

Before implementation, each government project is submitted to the ministers’ council, which meets weekly. The council is composed of a secretariat, which scrutinizes technically and politically each proposal before it is debated and prepares the ministers’ council agenda, and 14 line ministers and the prime minister, who debate each proposal. Decisions are made on the basis of political consensus, not a majority vote.

Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block any item presented and either return it for redrafting or turn it down completely. This may be because a project does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with one of the coalition parties’ agenda, but can be for any other reason as well. All government members must by contrast defend an accepted project collegially. In general, the detailed government agreement, informally referred to as “the bible,” provides an easy justification for the rejection of projects that might be politically difficult to handle; if a project does not directly relate to the governmental
agreement, it is likely to be turned down either by the prime minister or through maneuvers by some other coalition parties in the “core.”

Citation:

Finland

Score 7

The Prime Minister’s Office can return items envisaged for cabinet meetings on policy grounds. As the Prime Minister’s Office coordinates the drafting of proposals, and also arranges the agenda for cabinet meetings, there is rarely reason for it to return items. The rule is that ministers can place items on the cabinet’s agenda even against the wishes of the prime minister. The handling of conflicts can be delicate, especially in cases when the prime minister and minister represent different parties, and perhaps differing political interests which need to be reconciled. Yet controversial items are often discussed in informal meetings beforehand. In previous times, an institutionalized unofficial meeting of the cabinet led by the prime minister, called the Iltakoulu, played an important function in consensual decision-making; for reasons that are not entirely clear, this arrangement is no longer used.

Greece

Score 7

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) can return all items on policy grounds, but the Syriza-ANEL government has created a rather complex set of posts of adviser and consulting organs surrounding the prime minister. The prime minister has the final word regarding what will be discussed in cabinet meetings. Owing to the relative increase of Prime Minister Tsipras’s credibility in his relationship with Greece’s lenders after he accepted to implement the August 2015 adjustment program, chances are that his powers to return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting have increased. It is still true, however, that it is the Ministry of Finance, along with the PMO, which may play the role of gatekeeper, as Greece’s finances are closely inspected by the country’s lenders.

Israel

Score 7

Traditionally, the PM did not have the power to return items to the Israeli general cabinet meetings. However, in 2012 it filed to amend this standard practice; this was later ratified by the government. It included expanding the PM’s authority to delay the implementation of government decisions by resubmitting an issue to a vote after it was rejected as well as authorizing him or her to cancel, postpone or summon meetings on government decisions. Since the amendment has only recently been enacted, it could be argued that it has not been de-facto enforced for purposes of
resubmitting an issue. Some legal experts claim that the amendment was mainly designated for rare or critical matters.

Citation:
Barnea, Shlomit and Ofer Kenig, “Political nominations in the executive branch,” IDI website June 2011 (Hebrew)
Weisman, Lilach, “Expansion of the Prime Minister’s authorities was approved; We must stop the madness”, Globes website 12.8.2012: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000773448 (Hebrew)

Japan

Score 7

Present guidelines for policy coordination make the Cabinet Office the highest and final organ for policy coordination below the cabinet itself. This has de jure enabled prime ministers to return items envisaged for cabinet meetings on policy grounds. In reality this rarely happens, as items to reach the Cabinet stage are typically those on which consensus has previously been established. However, contentious policy issues can produce inter-coalition conflicts, even at the Cabinet level.

Formal input into law-making processes is provided by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. This body’s official mandate is to make sure that bills conform to existing legislation and the constitution, rather than to provide material evaluation. Ministry representatives are seconded to the Bureau to provide sectoral competences, creating influences difficult to counter in the absence of independent expertise at the central level. In 2016, the lack of minutes for some key 2015 meetings led some to question whether the Cabinet Legislation Bureau had become politicised and thus less independent under its former and its current top official, both installed by Prime Minister Abe.

Citation:
N. N., Cabinet Legislation Bureau chief defends self over process of reinterpreting Article 9, The Mainichi, 17 March 2016

Latvia

Score 7

The government office has the ability to return materials submitted for cabinet consideration based on procedural considerations. Procedural evaluation includes assessing the quality of the accompanying annotation (often in the form of regulatory impact assessment) and ascertaining whether consensus-building procedures have been followed (i.e., whether agreement has been achieved among ministries) and whether public consultation procedures have taken place.

The prime minister has the right to decide when to put issues on the cabinet agenda. These assessments are informed by expert opinions from the PKC and the
government office. Controversial issues are raised in informal political consultations (coalition council) prior to placement on the cabinet agenda.

Lithuania

Score 7

Draft government decisions advance primarily as a result of coordination between line ministries and other state institutions at the administrative and political levels. The Government Office has no power to return items envisioned for the cabinet meetings on the basis of policy considerations. However, the prime minister formally sets the agenda of cabinet meetings, thus serving a gatekeeping function. There have been cases in which prime ministers have removed highly politicized issues from a meeting agenda, or on the contrary included such items on an agenda despite the absence of interministerial agreement.

Romania

Score 7

Both the Prime Minister’s Chancellery and the Secretariat General of the Government can formally return proposals to line ministries. Whereas the Secretariat General of the Government focuses on technical issues, the Prime Minister’s Chancellery can and does return items on policy grounds.

Citation:

Cyprus

Score 6

The constitution provides that the agenda of the Council of Ministers is set by the president “at his discretion,” implying power to withhold action on an item. Decisions are made by the Council of Ministers as a whole, with the president chairing the meeting and having only the right to take part in the discussion. The cabinet can decide to send a proposal back to a line ministry. When Council decisions are communicated to the president by the secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the president has the right to return a decision for reconsideration or to veto decisions on specific matters (security, foreign affairs, defense). If the Council of Ministers insists on their initial position on a matter returned for reconsideration, the decision must be promulgated through publication in the official gazette. Despite this constitutional option, no specific cases of discord between the president and the Council of Ministers have ever been reported. The extent to which decisions echo the views of dissenting parties in case of actual differences is unclear.
Czech Republic

Score 6

The Government Office of the Czech Republic has primarily administrative functions. It supports the work of the various expert bodies attached to the government, including the Government Legislative Council, as well as the work of ministers without their own department. The government office takes part in the interministerial coordination process, but has no formal authority beyond that of any other participant in the discussion.

Estonia

Score 6

Since the evaluation capacity of the PMO is very limited, policy considerations rarely serve as a reason to return the proposals. The coalition government program and political arguments between coalition partners tend to be more important in this context.

Germany

Score 6

The Chancellery, and particularly its head, sets the agenda for cabinet meetings. However, real political power lies elsewhere. The cabinet’s agenda is negotiated in advance between the top politicians of coalition partners, and the cabinet mostly works as a certificating institution for policy matters decided by the heads of the political parties. Thus, the Chancellery will only in exceptional cases refuse items envisaged for the cabinet meetings on the basis of its own policy considerations. Generally, the heads of political parties, rather than the Chancellery, act as gatekeepers. During the refugee crisis, the government decided that every cabinet meeting would start with a discussion of this pressing challenge.

Netherlands

Score 6

Given the nature of Dutch politics – a strong departmental culture and coalition governments – the Ministry of General Affairs has little more to rely upon in carrying out its gatekeeping functions than the government policy accord (regerakkoord). Ministerial departments have considerable power in influencing the negotiations that take place during the elaborate process of preparing Council of Ministers’ decisions. Each line ministry – that is, its minister or deputy minister – has a secretariat that serves as the administrative “front gate.” By the time an issue has been brought to the Council of Ministers, it has been thoroughly debated, framed and reframed by the bureaucracy between the ministries involved. Gatekeeping in the Dutch system is one-directional; policy documents are moved from lower to
higher administrative levels. The prime minister, through his representatives, does play a prominent role in coordinating this process. But given the limited scope of his monitoring capacities and staff, he can steer the course of events for only a fairly small number of issues. The euro crisis has provided the prime minister with a clear range of agenda-setting and policy-coordination priorities. Furthermore, pressure from the European Union on member states to improve the coordination of economic and fiscal policy has resulted in both the prime minister and minister of finance taking on a more prominent role in shaping the Netherlands’ fiscal and economic policies. The European Semester arrangement forces the government to update its economic policies every half year in the Nationaal Hervormingsprogramma in response to EU judgment. Under both the Rutte I and II cabinets, this has been a major driver of better gatekeeping and policy coordination.

Citation:
Europa NU, Coordinatie nationale economieen (www.europa-nu.nl/id/vg9mu7o8zqzu/coordinatie-nationale-economieen)
Ministerie van EZ, Nederlands Nationaal Hervormingsprogramma 2013 (ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/nrp2013_netherlands_nl.pdf)

Additional reference:

M. Rutte, De minister-president: een aanbouw aan het huis van Thorbecke, Lecture by the Prime Minister, 12 October 2016 (rijksoverheid.nl, consulted 8 November 2016)

Poland

Score 6

All draft bills are reviewed by the Chancellery’s Council of Ministers Committee Department before their presentation in the Council of Ministers, and the prime minister is formally allowed to return items on policy grounds. However, a number of factors have limited the actual gatekeeping role of Prime Minister Szydło. First, the number of ministries has increased from 17 to 21 under the PiS government. Second, there is a core group of ministers who enjoy a special standing in the government, including Defense Minister Macierewicz, Minister of Justice Ziobro, Minister of Science and Higher Education Gowin and Minister of Development Morawiecki. Finally, PiS party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński serves as the ultimate gatekeeper in the PiS government.

Slovenia

Score 6

In Slovenia, the Government Office has the formal power to return draft laws on policy reasons or any other grounds. In practice, however, the gatekeeping role of the Government Office is of limited importance, since most legislative projects are initially discussed at coalition meetings, generally between the presidents or leadership of the coalition parties, and subsequently undergo a complex process of interministerial coordination.
Austria

Although the chancellor chairs cabinet meetings, his or her office is not in practice able to control meeting agendas. The cabinet is a body of equals and must reach unanimity in its decisions. The chancellor is first among equals only. In advance of each formal cabinet meeting, coalition parties internally coordinate issues within their party. In a second step, issues identified as potentially subject to opposition or veto by other coalition parties are sent for discussion to an informal group usually comprised of one cabinet member from each party. If agreement concerning a specific proposal does not seem possible, the item will not be placed on the cabinet’s agenda.

The Chancellor’s Office’s only true gatekeeping privilege involves its capacity to oversee the constitutionality of policy proposals. The Legal and Constitutional Service of the Chancellor’s Office is widely respected for pursuing a nonpartisan agenda. If this department identifies a proposal as a potential violation of the constitution, the proposal is either put aside or sent back to the originating ministry for revision.

Apart from constitutional matters, the chancellor’s gatekeeping powers are restricted to his or her own party. As head of government, the chancellor can informally return materials within his or her own party’s cabinet faction, as can the vice-chancellor within his or her cabinet faction.

The chancellor’s position may have been strengthened by the following recent development: The Treaty of Lisbon has reduced the numbers of national participants at the meeting of the European Council to one. Within the context of a coalition cabinet such as that currently in place in Austria, the single Austrian representative – the chancellor (currently a social democrat) gains political visibility and this can be interpreted as eroding the political significance of the foreign minister (currently a conservative).

Croatia

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has the political authority to return policy proposals it receives from ministries. However, its gatekeeping role is limited by its weak sectoral-policy expertise. Under the Milanović government, the PMO has played only a subordinate role in interministerial coordination. Prime Minister Orešković tried to change this by appointing Jakša Pujž, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds in the Milanović government, chief integration officer in charge of interministerial coordination. This attempt at strengthening the gatekeeping role of the PMO was not followed up by the current Plenković government.
Slovakia

**Score 5**

The Government Office (GO) has primarily administrative and technical functions. It mostly supports the work of the various advisory bodies of the government, including the Legislative Council and the Council for Solidarity and Development (which includes selected civil society actors), as well as the work of ministers without their own ministry. The GO takes part in the interministerial coordination process, but while it has the formal power to return draft laws on policy grounds, its gatekeeping role has traditionally been limited. In the period under review, bodies tasked with monitoring the distribution of EU structural funds have become subsumed under the GO, which suggests that the GO is increasingly concerned with policy implementation.

Citation:

Switzerland

**Score 5**

There is no prime minister in Switzerland. The Federal Chancellery manages and prepares the agenda of the Federal Council, and can return items and postpone consideration of political issues if they are deemed to conflict with other policies.

Bulgaria

**Score 4**

In Bulgaria, neither the Council of Ministers’ administration nor the prime minister and his political cabinet have formal authority to return materials on the basis of policy considerations. However, the prime minister has some informal influence on the preparation and formulation of legislation.
Indicator

Line Ministries

Question

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.

8-6 = The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.

5-3 = Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.

2-1 = Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.

Belgium

Score 10

Before implementation, each government project is submitted to the ministers’ council, which meets weekly. The council is composed of a secretariat that scrutinizes each proposal before it is debated and prepares the ministers’ council agenda, and 14 line ministers and the prime minister, who debate each proposal. Decisions are made on the basis of political consensus, not of majority vote.

Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block any item presented and either return it for redrafting or turn it down completely. This may be because a project does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with one of the coalition parties’ agenda, but can be for any other reason as well. All government members must by contrast defend an accepted project collegially.

Citation:
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres

United States

Score 10

In the U.S. system, this item relates to how the executive departments and agencies involve the president and the White House in their work. In fact, however, president and the White House are dominant within the executive branch, and can therefore prioritize issues they see as important to the president’s agenda. This tends to happen in two general ways. If a department or agency is seeking significant legislation, then the White House is essentially in charge of policy development. It may allow a cabinet official to have major influence or even appoint him or her to chair a
committee tasked with formulating options for the president, or it may relegate the relevant cabinet officials to secondary roles.

If the agency is developing an important administrative regulation or other policy that does not require legislation, then the administration’s generally numerous political appointees in the agency will respond to White House direction. If the matter is judged important for the president, the relevant White House experts may make the main decisions.

Australia

Score 9
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC) is always involved at an early stage in assisting with the development and drafting of any significant government policy and the resulting legislation. The PMC and the other relevant department have to both agree on a policy before it can be tabled in cabinet or considered by the relevant minister or ministers.

Canada

Score 9
Line departments and central agencies have interrelated or complementary capacities for the coordination of policy proposals, with ultimate authority lying with central agencies. Thus, line ministries in Canada have a relatively high level of responsibility to involve the government office, the PCO, in the preparation of policy proposals. On the other hand, it is well known that line departments are not always forthcoming with information that may cast their departments in a bad light.

Chile

Score 9
The Government or Cabinet Office (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, or Segegob) and line ministries have a strong tendency to coordinate activity, and in practice the president or Government Office and the Ministry of Finance are nearly always involved in the preparation of policy proposals. No serving minister would ignore the president’s opinion in the preparation and elaboration of a policy proposal.

Denmark

Score 9
The norms of “minister rule” and the “resort” principle (where ministers are in charge of certain areas) give the line ministries a fair amount of autonomy. It is also the line ministries that have the most technical expertise. Nonetheless, to achieve coherent government policy, interdepartmental coordination takes place. Since most
governments are coalition governments this is particularly important. This is not a hierarchical coordination, but is rather based on negotiations. The prime minister has a special place given his/her constitutional prerogatives as the person who appoints and dismisses ministers. Major issues and strategic considerations are dealt with in the government coordination committee (regeringens koordineringsudvalg) involving the prime minister and other key ministers. The standing committees are also important coordination devices. In addition, there are ad hoc coordination meetings between the leaders of the parties constituting the governing coalition. In the case of single party minority governments – such as the current Liberal Party government of Lars Løkke Rasmussen – the prime minister must maintain contact with the leaders of the other parties to assure him a parliamentary majority on legislation.

The Ministry of Finance also plays an important role whenever financial resources are involved. No minister can go to the finance committee of the parliament (Folketinget) without prior agreement from the Ministry of Finance. The position of the Ministry of Finance has been strengthened by the “budget law” adopted in 2012, establishing a clear top-down approach for the budget process.

Apart from coordinating the preparation of next year’s finances, the Ministry of Finance is also involved in formulating general economic policy and offering economic and administrative assessments of the consequences of proposed laws.

Citation:


Finland

Score 9

The guiding rule in Finland is that each ministry is, within its mandate, responsible for the preparation of issues that fall within the scope of government and also for the proper functioning of the administration. Given this framework, rather than line ministries involving the Prime Minister’s Office in policy preparation, the expectation is that the Prime Minister’s Office involves ministries in its own policy preparations. In practice, of course, the patterns of interaction are not fixed. For one thing, policy programs and other intersectoral subject matters in the cabinet program are a concern for the Prime Minister’s Office as well as for the ministries, and efforts must be coordinated. The government’s analysis, assessment and research activities that support policymaking across the ministries are coordinated by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). In addition, because decision-making is collective and consensual in nature, ministry attempts to place items on the cabinet’s agenda without involving the Prime Minister’s Office will fail. Finland has a recent tradition of fairly broad-based coalition governments; this tradition amalgamates ideological
antagonisms and thereby mitigates against fragmentation along ministerial and sectoral lines.

Citation:

Hungary

Score 9

Orbán has designed a new structure for line ministries in order to facilitate greater control from the center. The number of line ministries was reduced to eight in the second Orbán government, with portfolios for foreign trade and foreign affairs, defense, interior, justice, national economy, national development, human resources, and agriculture. Recently, Rogán has become the ninth minister. Line ministries have mostly acted as executive agencies following orders from above, and their activities have been subject to detailed oversight by the PMO. In practice, however, ministers have been unable to oversee their portfolios, especially in the huge Ministry of Human Resources (EMMI). The regular involvement of the PMO has led to delays, disorientation and frequent policy failures.

Ireland

Score 9

The Prime Minister’s Office is involved in legislative and expenditure proposals. The process is a highly interactive one, with much feedback between the line ministries, the prime minister’s office, and the office of the attorney general. The Department of Finance has considerable input into all proposals with revenue or expenditure implications. Any significant policy items have to be discussed in advance with the Department of the Taoiseach. The Cabinet Handbook lays out detailed procedural rules for the discussion of policy proposals and the drafting of legislation. It is publicly available on the website of the Department of the Taoiseach.

New Zealand

Score 9

If line ministries prepare a policy proposal, they are obliged to consult other ministries that are affected as well as the coordinating units, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), the Treasury and the State Services Commission. There are clear guidelines which not only de jure but also de facto govern the coordination of policy formulation in the core executive.

Citation:
South Korea

Score 9

Executive power is concentrated in the president. Given Park Geun-hye’s preference for top-down, secretariat-centric decision-making, the political system has become more hierarchical. There is less autonomy of line ministries and the relative position of the Blue House has been strengthened. Many line ministries have lost influence, been downsized or merged. The large majority of issues are settled between the line ministries and the Blue House before cabinet meetings. Cabinet meetings are limited to serving the purpose of information exchange, as most strategic decisions are made in the Blue House. There are no active debates or discussions in ministerial meetings presided over by President Park. This hampers the efficiency of horizontal interministerial coordination. But the relationship between the Blue House and the line ministries varies according to the policy cases and the political situation. The Blue House tries to dominate all ministries, but in some cases, for example during the president’s lame-duck period, the Blue House has been unable to overcome bureaucratic politics. The Blue House sometimes lacks sufficient knowledge and human-resources capacity to act effectively in certain policy areas. The Blue House gets involved with and coordinates certain policies through the exertion of political dominance rather than through administrative capability.

United Kingdom

Score 9

The Cabinet Office is at the center of policymaking. Since the May 2015 general election, all line ministries are required to prepare single departmental plans (SDP), building on a process already launched during the previous coalition government. As explained by John Manzoni, the Chief Executive of the civil service appointed in October 2014, these SDPs are intended to bring together inputs and outputs, clarify trade-offs, and to identify where departments and the cross-departmental functions need to work together to deliver the required outcomes.

The creation of implementation taskforces, working alongside cabinet committees, is intended to strengthen the central oversight of policy proposals.

France

Score 8

Line ministers have to inform the prime minister of all their projects. Strong discipline, even at the public communication level, is imposed, and this rule is reinforced by the attitude of the media, which tend to cover any slight policy difference as the expression of political tension or party divergence. Not only the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) oversees the policy process but also his cabinet
assistants, in each area, supervise, liaise and coordinate with their counterparts in line ministries about the content, timing and political sequences of a project. The secretary general of the PMO (and his alter ego at the Elysée) operates in the shadow, but he is one of the most powerful people within that machinery. He can step in if the coordination or control process at that level has failed to stem the expression of differences within the government. As in other fields, the well-established tradition of the Fifth Republic has been shaken up by the hesitations and vagaries of the Hollande presidency, particularly in the first two years. For instance, the young and ambitious minister of Finance, Emmanuel Macron, was sidelined in his last months in office and priority was given to the faithful (Sapin) or the subordinate ministers (El Khomry).

Iceland

Score 8

Due to a strong tradition of ministerial independence, ministries have considerable flexibility in drafting their own policy proposals without consulting the Prime Minister’s Office. Yet, where a minister and prime minister belong to the same party, there is usually some Prime Minister’s Office involvement. However, where the minister and prime minister belong to separate coalition parties the Prime Minister’s Office has little or no involvement in policy development. After the publication of the Special Investigation Commission report, a committee was formed to evaluate and suggest necessary steps toward the improvement of public administration. In order to improve working conditions within the executive branch, the committee proposed introducing legislation to clarify the prime minister’s role and responsibilities. In March 2016, new regulations on governmental procedures were approved (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar), requiring ministers to present all bills they intend to present in parliament first to the cabinet as a whole.

Citation:

Italy

Score 8

The Prime Minister’s Office is regularly kept informed of the development of policy proposals generated by line ministries. With regard to the policy proposals of particular political relevance for the government program, the consultation process starts from the early stages of drafting and is more significant, involving not only formal but also substantive issues. It is not uncommon for the prime minister and his political collaborators to propose initiatives that would otherwise be the responsibility of a particular ministry. In the fields less directly connected with the main mission of the government, exchanges are more formal and occur only when proposals have been fully drafted.
Japan

Score 8

In Japan, the role of line ministries vis-à-vis the government office is complicated by the influence of a third set of actors: entities within the governing parties. During the decades of the LDP’s postwar rule, the party’s own policymaking organ, the Policy (Affairs) Research Council (PARC) developed considerable influence, ultimately gaining the power to vet and approve policy proposals in all areas of government policy.

Under the LDP-led government since December 2012, Prime Minister Abe has tried successfully to make certain that he and his close confidants determine the direction of major policy proposals. The reform program does indeed show the influence of the Cabinet Office, with the ministries either following this course or trying to drag their feet. The main instrument of Abe is the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, which grants control over more than 600 appointments, possibly half a dozen political appointees per ministry.

In the shadow of the strength of the Cabinet Office, ministries can try to regain former clout over their areas. For example, the industry ministry METI, has become somewhat more assertive again in trying to influence industry, guided by the priorities of Abenomics.

Citation:

Latvia

Score 8

Since its establishment in 2011, the PKC has become increasingly involved in line ministry preparation of policy proposals. PKC representatives are invited to participate in working groups. However, capacity constraints prevent full participation in all working groups. Involvement of the PKC is at the ministry’s discretion. Informal lines of communication ensure that the PKC is regularly briefed on upcoming policy proposals.

Latvia has a “fragmented” cabinet government system. Consequently, ministers enjoy relatively substantial autonomy, weakening the power of the prime minister. As a result, ministers belonging to a different party than the prime minister will attempt to block the prime minister’s office from interfering in sensitive policy issues whenever possible.
 Luxembourg

Score 8

The Prime Minister’s Office is not legally allowed to be involved in the preparation of bills or proposals by line ministries. Sensitive political proposals are often contained in the coalition program. There are no institutionalized mechanisms of coordination between line ministries and there is no unit dealing with policy assessment and evaluation. Informally, however, no sensitive proposal is presented to the Council of Ministers without being approved beforehand by the prime minister. An informal body of ministerial civil servants meets ahead of the Council of Ministers, to prepare the agenda and make adjustments if needed. Even though the prime minister has not held the influential finance portfolio since 2009, his central role in the governance process has not been weakened.

Citation:


Netherlands

Score 8

Generally, line-ministry legislative or white-paper initiatives are rooted in the government policy accord, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to one or two particular ministries. In the case of complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable jockeying for position among the various line ministries. The prime minister is always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes in the wording of the assignment itself. After that, however, it may take between six months and an entire Council of Ministers’ period before the issue reaches the decision-making stage in ministerial and Council of Ministers committees, and again comes under the formal review of the prime minister. Meanwhile, the prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow ministers.

Citation:

Norway

Score 8

Responsibility for the preparation of policies lies with line ministries. As a matter of routine, they will involve the Office of the Prime Minister when addressing potentially controversial matters and for the purpose of coordinating with other policies. This interaction often involves ongoing two-way communication during the
planning process. Initiatives lacking support by the Office of the Prime Minister would not win cabinet approval.

Israel

Score 7

The PMO has been under continuous structural reforms since the mid 2000s. Several committees, including Trajtenberg and Kuchik (both established in 2011) issued recommendations regarding its working dynamics with other line ministries, taking into account the country’s highly fragmented party system (where ministers are nominated according to political alliances) and the overly centralized budgeting process.

In recent years the PMO became more involved in the preparation of policy proposals in the ministries through various channels. For example, the PMO’s chief of staff heads a forum for the CEOs of all line ministries, advancing policy agendas and interministerial cooperation. The PMO is also involved with policy proposals through its professional councils and roundtable initiatives. Its oversight capabilities, demonstrated by its yearly publication of the government working plans, stimulates further involvement. However, the Kuchnik Committee noted that facing weaker ministries the PMO tends to overreach and control policy formation more than is advisable.

Citation:
Koren, Ora, “Line ministries will submit budget drafts - and will not be able to blame the treasury,” TheMarker website 13.11.2012 (Hebrew)
“About: The governance committee,” PMO website (Hebrew)
“Book of working plans 2012,” PMO website (March 2012) (Hebrew)
“Failures of the public sector and directions for change,” Public sharing - The committee for economic and social change (2011) (Hebrew)
“Governmental planning guide,” PMO website (September 2010) (Hebrew)
“Strengthening government’s governability, planning and execution - Continue discussion,” PMO website 25.12.2011 (Hebrew)
“The system,” Policy planning PMO website (Hebrew)

Lithuania

Score 7

Under the Butkevičius government, the Government Office proposes annual political priorities, coordinates their implementation and regularly monitors progress. As a result, it focuses on policy proposals related to these annual priorities. The majority of policy proposals are initiated by ministries and other state institutions, but the Government Office is kept informed with regard to their status and content. The fact that all policy areas are legally assigned to particular ministers, coupled with the fact that since 2000 governments have been formed by party coalitions rather than a single party, has meant that line ministries enjoy considerable autonomy within their
policy areas. The Government Office is sometimes called upon to mediate policy disagreements between line ministries.

**Mexico**

**Score 7**

Given Mexico’s presidential system, cabinet ministers are respectful of and even deferential to the presidential office. Moreover, cabinet ministers dismissed by the president rarely find a way back into high-level politics, which promotes loyalty to the president and presidential staff. Accordingly, senior figures in the presidential office are very powerful, because they determine access to the president and can influence ministerial careers. Yet there are problems of coordination, particularly on security related issues, where anti-drug policies were sometimes frustrated for this reason. Thus far, President Peña Nieto has built his cabinet around two super-ministries and ministers, the finance minister and the minister of interior. In this regard, even the September 2016 resignation of Finance Minister Luis Videgaray did not challenge the steering capacities of the presidency.

**Portugal**

**Score 7**

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.

**Spain**

**Score 7**

Both the Government Office (Ministerio de la Presidencia, GO) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) are regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals by line ministries. Although these offices are formally autonomous, the legal and political hierarchy within the Spanish government facilitates and even encourages this pattern of consultation with the prime minister’s entourage. Consultation with the GO tends to focus on drafting or technical issues, while the PMO is more interested in political and strategic considerations.

The process is firmly institutionalized and takes place weekly, since representatives of all ministries gather at the cabinet meeting preparatory committee (Comisión General de Subsecretarios y Secretarios de Estado), which is held every Wednesday and chaired by the GO head and the deputy prime minister. Advisers from the PMO also participate in this committee and in the important specialized ministerial committee on economic affairs (see “Cabinet Committees”) that also assists the Council of Ministers. However, even if the primary joint role of the GO and the PMO is horizontal coordination, their administrative resources are limited, and the
deputy prime minister and prime minister’s advisers cannot be briefed on the whole range of government activity. Therefore, they normally focus on each ministerial department’s most important sectoral developments, as well as the prime minister’s particular interests.

A legal reform of the new general administrative procedure passed in October 2015 may help reinforce coordination between the GO and line ministries (see “GO Gatekeeping”). Under the terms of a new provision, all policy proposals implying legal changes would be communicated in advance by the line ministries to the GO, which would produce a centralized Annual Normative Plan.

Citation:
Ley 39/2015, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas

Sweden

The leadership of the GO and the PMO are primarily involved when policies are initiated; when final decision are to be made; and if a disagreement emerges among the governing parties or ministers. However, the line nature of the GO organization – and the chain of command between the political and the administrative levels – means that the top leadership, apart from initiating and deciding on policy, does not routinely monitor its development. There are instead regular briefings and informal consultations. This informal coordination procedure nevertheless ensures that the PMO, in line with the Ministry of Finance, play a crucial role in policy developments. Also, there are established but informal rules regulating procedures when there is disagreement among the non-political advisers on how to design policy. Essentially, the political level of the department should only be consulted when its ruling is critical to policy formulation; otherwise policy design should rest with non-partisan members of staff.

It should also be noted that line ministries frequently ask for advice from the executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process.

Citation:
Switzerland

Score 7

Switzerland’s government consists of only seven ministries, each of which has a broad area of competency and is responsible for a large variety of issues. There are no line ministries. However, there are federal offices and institutions connected to the various ministries. These work closely with the minister responsible for their group. Since ministers must achieve a large majority on the Federal Council in order to win success for a proposal, there is strong coordination between offices. Indeed, political coordination among the high ranks of the administration can be rather intense, although the limited capacity and time of the Federal Council members, as well as their diverging interests, create practical bottlenecks.

Turkey

Score 7

The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has a twofold role in the preparation of draft bills. It checks the congruity of laws from a legal point of view, and collects ministries’ legal and political opinions along with opinions from civil society, interest and pressure groups, expert groups and institutions. Thus, the PMO is always directly involved in the preparation of policy proposals at a relatively early stage.

However, line ministries do not always provide all the information necessary for draft bills, particularly in the case of information that may cast their ministry in a bad light. From time to time, policymaking is tarnished by issues of bureaucratic competition, including among politicians. The PMO’s inability to foster interministerial cooperation has been a serious institutional shortcoming. A recent reorganization of the PMO and line ministries led to some performance declines. Conflicting announcements regarding policy proposals made by the PMO and line ministries have been a sign of weak coordination.

In 2014, the Ministry of Development was assigned as the primary consultation body in preparing policies according to the decision on the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the 2015 government’s program. After the parliamentary election of 1 November 2015, government proposals to restructure the ministries and increase their number were made. Several new public units such as the National Mine Institute were additionally established. It remains to be seen whether this kind of institutional fragmentation of policymaking will hinder or enhance the effectiveness of policy coordination and accountability.

Citation:
Bulgaria

Score 6

Line ministries tend to prepare policy proposals independently and introduce them to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers when they are completed. The prime minister and the Council of Ministers’ administration are consulted in advance only when the proposals cross ministerial lines and on issues related to legal compatibility with other proposed or existing legislation. Even in such cases, the involvement of the Council of Ministers’ administration tends to focus mainly on technical and drafting issues and formal legal considerations. There are no official procedures for consulting the prime minister during the preparation of policy proposals.

Czech Republic

Score 6

The legislative plan of the government divides tasks among the ministries and other central bodies of the state administration and sets deadlines for the submission of bills to the cabinet. The line ministry has to involve, and take comments from, a range of institutions, including the Government Office and the Government Legislative Council. This consultation process primarily focuses on technical issues.

Estonia

Score 6

Two different forms exist to communicate line ministries’ proposals to the GO. Firstly, all policy initiatives are discussed in coalition council. Second, the cabinet informally examines all substantial issues at its weekly meetings. No binding decisions are made in the meetings, the main function being to exchange information and to prepare for formal government sessions. However, the coalition that came to power after the 2015 elections is less cohesive and acts in a less coordinated manner than its predecessor. In the period under review, tensions in communication between the PMO and line ministers have increased. Line ministers are dissatisfied with never ending fruitless discussions and indecision by the prime minister and his office. As a sign of protest, line ministers stopped briefing the PMO about their ongoing activities.

Germany

Score 6

The preparation of bills is mainly the prerogative of the line ministries (Ressortprinzip). Over the course of regular policy processes, the Chancellery is well informed throughout, but is not strongly involved in ministerial initiatives. Most disputes between ministries and the Chancellery are discussed and resolved in the often-weekly meetings between the state secretaries and the Chancellery’s staff.
Greece

Score 6

Before the economic crisis, the PMO was not capable of imposing much restraint on individual ministries from pursuing their own policy agendas, particularly if a minister was a member of one of the high-ranking governing party cadres. In other words, the prime minister was a sort of primus inter pares. Since the onset of the crisis in 2010, the PMO has gradually acquired more power and resources to supervise line ministries, the policies of which were streamlined to fit the fiscal consolidation effort of Greece.

However, during the period under review, the PMO’s consultation with line ministries has been rather haphazard, while coordination with individual ministers was practiced on a trial-and-error basis. In fact, as the implementation of the Third Economic Adjustment Program for Greece unfolds, line ministers actually often turn to the Ministry of Finance for technical and drafting issues, in case legislation under development in individual ministries runs into financial constraints imposed by its international lenders.

Citation:

Poland

Score 6

Under the PiS government, the Chancellery has kept its enhanced formal involvement in the preparation of policy proposals by the line ministries. As its gatekeeping role has declined, however, so has its actual influence on the development of policy proposals.

Malta

Score 5

Since 2013, a sustained effort at coordination has subsequently been made in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and in line ministries. During the period under review, the government established an office within the PMO to coordinate the policies contained in the ruling party’s electoral manifesto. Decisions taken by ministries have more than once been rescinded by the PMO, a practice less common in the past. The PMO may also seek to review its own policies with the help of the Management Efficiency Unit and occasionally employs consultants. Cabinet meetings have allowed experts to give direct advice to ministers, a departure from the past. From time to time, cabinet meetings are held in different regions for the purpose of consultations.
Romania

Score 5
Policy proposals are usually drafted within ministries. The Secretariat General of the Government provides technical support for policymaking. The Prime Minister’s Chancellery usually becomes involved only after the compulsory public-consultation procedures are finalized. While the prime minister occasionally gets publicly involved in debating certain legislative proposals and may contradict line ministers, the final decision on the content of the policy proposal tends to be made by the line ministry.

Croatia

Score 4
Line ministries consult with the government’s Legislation Office, but this consultation is mostly formal, focusing on technical and drafting issues. Ministries normally enjoy huge leeway in transforming government priorities into legislation, and there is no stable and transparent arbitration scheme that would give the Prime Minister’s Office a formal role in settling interministerial differences.

Slovakia

Score 4
In Slovakia, the government manifesto defines certain priorities that are elaborated in legislative plans. These additionally divide tasks and responsibilities among the line ministries and other central bodies, and set deadlines for the submission of bills to the cabinet. In their policy-development process, the line ministries legally must include a range of institutions and interest groups that are defined as stakeholders in their respective fields. Ministries are also obliged to consult with the Government Office (GO) and its legislative council as they develop bills. However, full responsibility for drafting bills has traditionally rested with the line ministries, and consultation with the GO is mainly technical. In its attempt to formalize his leading position within the government, Prime Minister Fico has increased the monitoring activities of the Government Office, especially those related to EU structural funds.
Austria

Score 3

As all ministers are equal, the autonomy of line ministries is substantial. The chancellor cannot determine the outlines of government policy and does not have to be involved in the drafting of legislation. Normally, however, proposals are coordinated by the prime minister’s office. Formally, the Federal Ministry of Finance can offer its opinion as to whether a proposal fits into the government’s overall budget policy, even if such consultation is not required. The Ministry of Finance thus has a kind of cross-cutting power.

Cyprus

Score 3

The structure of functions within the presidential palace has an ad hoc character, determined for the duration of a president’s mandate. The Council of Ministers’ secretariat is tasked with offering bureaucratic support and services to the cabinet, with no capacity to draft laws or review proposed policies. The Attorney General’s Office is involved in the examination of policy proposals and draft laws, providing no more than legal advice. Ministries tasked with drafting laws can refer to policies formulated by the government, or to frameworks proposed by interministerial committees or issued by the cabinet. Draft laws are discussed only during the deliberation process in the Council of Ministers.

No concrete evidence exists regarding systematic consultation between line ministries and the presidency or the Council of Ministers’ secretariat prior to a draft law proposal. However, new strategic-planning structures and mechanisms that have been harmonized with the law on fiscal responsibility are expected to entail a central coordinating body, enabling compliance with the government’s strategic fiscal plan.

Slovenia

Score 3

The Government Office is not directly and systematically involved in line ministries’ preparation of policy proposals. Once the coalition agreement and government program have defined certain projects, full responsibility for drafting bills rests with the line ministries or with inter-ministerial teams. The Government Office is seldom briefed about the state of affairs. If it is, consultation is rather formal and focuses mostly on legal and technical issues.
Cabinet Committees

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.

8-6 = Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.

5-3 = There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.

2-1 = There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.

Belgium

Score 10

The council of ministers (conseil-des-ministres), which is one of the central components of the government, meets every week. Each minister is responsible for drafting a proposal, which gets submitted to the council. The council’s secretariat then checks whether the proposal can be debated: is it complete, technically sound, does it conflict with other decisions made in the past, is it contained in the governmental agreement? Proposals are debated by ministers only if they pass this first filter, which allows them to focus on the strategic aspects of the issue. However, the most important strategic considerations are mainly political.

To reach the council of ministers, a given project is always discussed beforehand in formal or informal inter-cabinet meetings that include experts and senior officers of the relevant ministries. Most negotiation is performed at that stage and, if necessary, further fine-tuned in the “core” meeting in the case of particularly important or sensitive policy issues.

Finland

Score 10

Cabinet committees effectively prepare cabinet meetings. The government has four statutory cabinet committees: the Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (which meets with the president when pressing business issues arise), the Committee on European Union Affairs, the Cabinet Finance Committee and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy. Additionally, ad hoc cabinet committees can be appointed by the government plenary session. All these committees are chaired by the prime minister, who also chairs sessions of the Economic Council, the Research and
Innovation Council, and the Title Board. In addition, there are several ministerial working groups. The primary task of these committees and groups is to prepare cabinet meetings by helping to create consensus between relevant ministries and interests. In all, a large majority of issues are reviewed first by cabinet committees and working groups.

**Denmark**

**Score 9**

Policy preparation tends to take place in cabinet committees (regeringsudvalg) involving a smaller number of ministers. The number of such committees has varied over time. Currently, the following standing cabinet committees exist: the coordination committee (chaired by the prime minister), the economy committee (chaired by the finance minister), the security committee (chaired by the prime minister), the appointments committee (chaired by the prime minister) and the government’s EU implementation committee (chaired by the Minister of Business and Growth).

This system was strengthened under the previous liberal-conservative government and there are parallel committees of high-level civil servants.

Citation:
Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen et al., Politik og forvaltning, 2011.


**New Zealand**

**Score 9**

There are clear guidelines for policy formulation in the New Zealand core executive. All policy proposals are reviewed in cabinet committees. Full cabinet meetings therefore can focus on strategic policy debates and policy conflicts between coalition partners or between the government and its legislative support parties in the House of Representatives. In quantitative terms, from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015, the full cabinet met 39 times while cabinet committees met 121 times. A revised cabinet committee structure was implemented in October 2014 following the formation of the government after the 2014 general election. This resulted in the disestablishment of one cabinet committee, reducing the overall number from 11 to 10. Key committees include Economic Growth and Infrastructure, Social Policy, and Cabinet Legislation.

Citation:
Spain

Score 9

Two powerful ministerial committees effectively prepare cabinet meetings in Spain: the Committee for Economic Affairs, and the Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State. The Committee for Economic Affairs normally meets on Thursdays (a day before the Council of Ministers meetings) to review and schedule economic or budgetary interministerial coordination. Since 2011, this committee has been chaired by the prime minister himself, with the help of the director of his Economic Office, and is also made up of ministers and secretaries of state with economic responsibilities.

For its part, the Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State effectively filters out and settles issues prior to cabinet meetings. This committee of top officials meets every Wednesday to prepare the Council of Ministers’ weekly sessions, which are held every Friday (see “Ministerial Bureaucracy” for further details). No cabinet member participates apart from the deputy prime minister, who serves as its chairperson. Spain’s only Council of Ministers committee composed exclusively of cabinet members is the Foreign Policy Council (Consejo de Política Exterior), which meets only about once a year, despite plans to revitalize it under a new law on external action and the foreign service passed in 2014. Other ministerial committees (composed of several ministers and individual non-cabinet members such as secretaries of state) are regulated by Royal Decree 1886/2011 (as modified by RD 385/2013).

United Kingdom

Score 9

The importance of cabinet meetings and committees increased under the previous coalition government, because of the need to ensure fair representation of both coalition parties. In addition, a powerful coalition committee, chaired jointly by the prime minister and deputy prime minister, existed. The latter became redundant when the new Conservative government won power in May 2015. A number of other committees, such as a committee on banking reform, were also discontinued. However, the creation of implementation taskforces alongside conventional committees has meant a net increase in numbers. Since the change of prime minister in the summer of 2016, two noteworthy innovations are the establishment of the European Union Exit and Trade Committee and the Economy and Industrial Strategy Cabinet Committee, both of which are chaired by the new prime minister. Additionally a committee on social reform was created. This evolution is characteristic of the UK government’s tendency to create new committees rapidly in response to shifts in political priorities.

Since the Conservative government of Edward Heath (1970-1974), it has become an established norm that decisions settled in cabinet committees are not questioned in full cabinet unless the committee chair or the prime minister decide to do so.
Australia

Score 8

Committees serve a purpose in dealing with various matters, which include: highly sensitive issues, for example revenue or security matters; relatively routine issues, for example a government’s weekly parliamentary program; business that is labor intensive or requires detailed consideration by a smaller group of ministers, for example the expenditure review that takes place before the annual budget, or oversight of the government’s initiatives in relation to a sustainable environment. The prime minister usually establishes a number of standing committees of the cabinet (e.g., expenditure review, national security, parliamentary business). Additional committees, including ad hoc committees, may be set up from time to time for particular purposes, such as handling a national disaster.

Canada

Score 8

Cabinet committees have both the legal and de facto power to prepare Cabinet meetings in such a way as to allow the Cabinet to focus on vital issues. The de facto power to sort out issues before they go to Cabinet belongs to senior officials in the PMO and PCO, not to Cabinet committees. Still, this allows the Cabinet to focus on strategic policy issues.

Ireland

Score 8

Cabinet committees are established by the government and managed by the Department of the Taoiseach. Cabinet committees derive their authority from government. Membership of cabinet committees includes two or more members of the government, and may also include the attorney general and government ministers. Typically, committees have between four and 12 members. In 2011, the smallest cabinet committee was the Irish and the Gaeltacht Committee with four members and the largest was the European Affairs Committee with 13 members. This means that many government ministers will serve on multiple cabinet committees. In 2011, the Minister for Finance was a member of five out of eight cabinet committees. The essential job of cabinet committees is to coordinate policy initiatives, especially when substantive policy proposals concern multiple line departments.

There are currently 10 cabinet committees. The most recent addition focuses on Brexit, while the others focus on the economy, trade and jobs; housing; health; social policy and public sector reform; justice reform; European affairs; regional and rural affairs; infrastructure, environment and climate change; the arts, Irish and the Gaeltacht.
Cabinet committees are chaired by the taoiseach or a senior official of the Department of the Taoiseach. Cabinet committees generally make policy recommendations, which are followed up by a formal memo to the government.

Citation:
For information about Cabinet Committee see:
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Taoiseach_and_Government/Cabinet_Committees

Niamh Hardiman, Aidan Regan and Mary Shayne ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.

Italy

Score 8
A significant number of policy proposals require de jure scrutiny by a Council of Ministers committee or even the explicit consent of a plurality of ministers. In a number of cases this is only a formal exercise and the Council of Ministers committee is not a very important mechanism. It is more significant that a number of important issues are de facto dealt with through consultations among a few ministers (and their ministerial cabinets) before being brought to the Council of Ministers, or are sent to this type of proceeding after preliminary discussion in the council. These consultations usually include the Treasury. In meetings of the Council of Ministers discussion of policy proposals are typically very cursory. Most problems have been resolved before meetings of the Council of Ministers, either in formal or informal meetings. The increased activity of the prime minister tends to reduce the importance of cabinet committees.

Latvia

Score 8
Cabinet committees are an integral part of the official decision-making process. If ministerial agreement on draft policy proposals cannot be reached at the state-secretary level, issues are automatically taken up by a cabinet committee for resolution. The cabinet committee’s mandate is to iron out differences prior to elevating the proposal to the cabinet level. In 2015, cabinet committees considered 106 issues, of which 85 were sent on to cabinet.

The cabinet committee may be complemented by informal mechanisms such as the coalition council if agreement cannot otherwise be reached.

Citation:
State Chancellery (2014), Report, Available at (in Latvian):
Luxembourg

There are no cabinet committees, in the strict sense. The Council of Ministers (Luxembourg’s cabinet) has to rely entirely on the work of line ministries or interministerial groups, if more than one department is concerned. Generally, the Council of Ministers is well prepared, as only bills that have been accepted informally are presented. Moreover, bills must be scrutinized by experts at the Ministry of Finance and the inspector general of finance (Inspection générale des finances), which is comprised of senior civil servants and chaired by the secretary general of the Council of Ministers. This informal body insures that coherence prevails. The Prime Minister’s Office has assumed some horizontal competences on issues that concern more than one ministry, notably in the field of administrative simplification, ethical and deontological questions.

Citation:

Netherlands

Council of Ministers committees (onderraad) involve a separate meeting chaired by the prime minister for the ministers involved. Each committee has a coordinating minister responsible for relevant input and documents. Discussion and negotiations focus on issues not resolved through prior administrative coordination and consultation. If the committee fails to reach a decision, the matter is pushed up to the Council of Ministers. Since the Balkenende IV Council of Ministers there have been six standing Council of Ministers committees: international and European affairs; economics, knowledge and innovation; social coherence; safety and legal order; and administration, government and public services. Given the elaborate process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers. However, since the Rutte I and II cabinets have consisted of two or more political parties of contrary ideological stripes (the conservative-liberal VVD and the PvdA or Labor Party, in the case of Rutte II), political pragmatism and opportunism has tended to transform “review and coordination” to simple logrolling, or in Dutch political jargon: “positive exchange,” meaning that each party agrees tacitly or explicitly not to veto the other’s bills, avoiding a tit-for-tat conflict. This tendency has negative consequences for the quality of policymaking, as minority views effectively win parliamentary majorities if they are budgetarily feasible without first undergoing rigorous policy and legal analyses.
Slovenia

Score 8

Cabinet committees play an important role in the preparation of cabinet proposals in Slovenia and settle issues prior to the cabinet meeting. There are three standing cabinet committees: the Committee of State Matters and Public Issues, the Committee of National Economy and the Commission of Administrative and Personnel Matters. In addition, temporary committees are from time to time established for particular tasks. In its first two years in office, the Cerar government established ten of them, including cabinet committees for youth issues, problems of the disabled, migrant issues, student questions and protection against natural disasters.

United States

Score 8

The question for the U.S. system is whether, on major issues, White House advisory processes prepare issues thoroughly for the president, and on lesser issues with interagency implications, whether interagency committees prepare them thoroughly for decision by the relevant cabinet members. The U.S. system of advisory processes varies considerably, even within a single presidential administration, but is largely under control of the president’s appointees in the White House. The process is to a great extent ad hoc, with organizational practices varying over time and from one issue area to another, based partly on the personnel involved. Typically, important decisions are “staffed out” through an organized committee process. However, the ad hoc character of organization (compared with a parliamentary cabinet secretariat), along with the typically short-term service of political appointees – resulting in what one scholar has called “a government of strangers” – renders the quality of these advisory processes unreliable.

Chile

Score 7

Ministerial or cabinet committees are not necessarily central when it comes to decision-making on policy matters. Depending on the topic, ministerial committees are more or less involved in preparing cabinet proposals, especially those of relatively significant strategic or financial importance. These proposals are normally coordinated effectively.

France

Score 7

Coordination is strong within the French government, and is in the hands of the PMO and the President’s Office, which constantly liaise and decide on issues. Coordination takes place at several levels. First at the level of specialized civil servants who work as political appointees in the PMO (members of the cabinet, that
is political appointees belonging to the staff of the prime minister), then in meetings chaired by the secretary general and finally by the prime minister himself, in case of permanent conflicts between ministers or over important issues. In many instances, conflicts pit the powerful ministers of budget or finance against other ministries. Appeals to the prime minister require either a powerful convincing argument or that the appealing party is a key member of the government coalition, as it is understood that the prime minister should not be bothered by anything but the highest level issues. A powerful instrument in the hands of the prime minister is his capacity to decide which texts will be presented to the Parliament with priority. Given the frequent bottlenecks in the process, ministerial bills can end up indefinitely postponed.

**Hungary**

**Score 7**

In summer 2016 two new cabinet committees were established, the strategic committee led by János Lázár and the economic committee led by Mihály Varga. These committees have a clear profile, but an uncertain mandate, since it has not been decided whether they are advisory-preparatory or decision-making bodies. However, their function is certainly to relieve Orbán from the everyday burden of management and to create a new rivalry in the government between the two important personalities. Particularly, the economic committee may be a positive step towards increasing coherence of economic policies.

**Lithuania**

**Score 7**

Although Lithuania’s government can create advisory bodies such as government committees or commissions, the number and role of such committees has gradually declined since the beginning of the 2000s, when coalition governments became the rule. Top-priority policy issues are frequently discussed in governmental deliberations organized before the official government meetings. However, the Butkevičius government decided to reestablish the Strategic Committee, which is composed of several cabinet ministers and the chancellor, a top prime-ministerial deputy. A European Union Commission continues to act as a government-level forum for discussing Lithuania’s EU positions, but this is made up of relevant vice-ministers, and chaired by the minister of foreign affairs.

**Mexico**

**Score 7**

Mexico is unusual, because the constitution does not recognize the cabinet as a collective body. Instead, Mexico has four sub cabinets, respectively dealing with economic, social, political and security matters. As a result, Mexico in practice has a
system of cabinet committees each of them normally chaired by the president. The full cabinet never or hardly ever meets. Mexico’s cabinet, as a collective, matters less than in most countries. The cabinet is not a supreme executive body as it is in, say, Britain. For one thing, there are a number of heads of executive agencies, with cabinet rank, who are not directly subject to a minister. The government is in the process of increasing these. Under the current administration, cabinet reshuffles have frequently taken place, often in response to unpopular policy outcomes or political pressure.

**Portugal**

**Score 7**

Most ordinary meetings of the Portuguese cabinet – the Council of Ministers – are used for policy decisions rather than strategic policy debates. More political issues and strategic policy considerations are by-and-large prepared by the Council’s inner core of a few ministers, augmented by other ministers and staff when required.

Citation:

**South Korea**

**Score 7**

The cabinet plays a relatively small role in the political process, as all important issues are discussed bilaterally between the Blue House and the relevant ministry. Committees are either permanent, such as the National Security Council, or created in response to a particular issue. Although the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OPC), a body headed by Minister of the OPC in subordination to the Prime Minister’s Office, plays a major role in policy coordination on routine issues, the Blue House has taken an increasingly active top-down approach toward ensuring cooperation or pursuing politically sensitive issues, despite the lack of consultation and coordination.

**Austria**

**Score 6**

There are no regular (or permanent) cabinet committees. In rare cases, ad hoc committees are established to deal with a specific matter. As coalitions are the rule in Austria, such committees usually consist of members of both coalition parties in order to ensure an outcome acceptable to the full cabinet. In 2016, some ad hoc committees within the cabinet were established to prepare a reform agenda under the “New Deal” the chancellor has promised.
Croatia

Score 6

The rules of procedure of the Croatian government provide for different kinds of cabinet committees and assign a major role in policy coordination to them. The prime minister and the vice prime ministers form the core cabinet (Uži kabinet vlade). In addition, there are various permanent and non-permanent cabinet committees that focus on particular issues. As there is little ex ante coordination among ministries, controversies are often pushed upwards, with cabinet committees playing an important role in resolving conflicts. However, the quality of coordination suffers from the fact that cabinet committees are absorbed by these disputes and other matters of detail.

Iceland

Score 6

Cabinet committees rarely prepare cabinet meetings, although the Budget Committee and some ad hoc committees are exceptions. However, the majority of items on cabinet meeting agendas are prepared by ministers often with two or more ministers coordinating the cabinet meeting. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 economic collapse, cooperation between ministers increased, particularly between the prime minister, the minister of finance, and the minister of commerce. However, this change was temporary and intended only to facilitate the cabinet’s immediate reactions to the 2008 economic collapse. In February 2013, new regulations were introduced permitting the prime minister to create single-issue ministerial committees to facilitate coordination between ministers where an issue overlaps their authority areas.

Records must be kept of all ministerial committee meetings, but these are not made public.

The number of ministerial committees to coordinate overlapping policy issues has been reduced since the preceding review period from 7 to 3. These committees are: the Ministerial Committee on Public Finances (Ráðherranefnd um ríkisfjármál), with four ministers and the Ministerial Committee on National Economy (Ráðherranefnd um efnahagsmál), with four ministers. The newly established Ministerial Committee on Coordination of Issues that concern more than one ministry (Ráðherranefnd um samræmingu mála er varða fleiri en eitt ráðuneyti) encompasses the former ministerial committees on Equality, On Solutions for the Debts of Families, on Arctic Affairs, and on Public Health Affairs. Even though this includes all possible issues, four are specifically mentioned: Equality, issues of refugees and immigrants, arctic affairs, and public health.

Citation:
http://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/nefndir/radherranefndir/
Israel

Score 6

According to the basic law “The Government” and standards of practice, the government is authorized to appoint cabinet committees (i.e., Ministerial Committees) for various policy issues and is obligated to appoint a security- and state-focused cabinet that includes the PM and ministers of defense, justice, foreign affairs, state security, and finance. The 34th government of the state of Israel established 29 committees during 2015, dealing with policy issues including housing and education.

While most ministerial committees receive little attention in the media, an exception is the ministerial committee for legislation, which handles the preparation and first approval of new legislation. The committee’s decisions on proposed legislation largely determine how coalition members will vote on in the Knesset. The committee does not detail meeting discussions in its protocol nor the ministries’ stances on proposed legislation. NGOs and opposition members have called on the committee to publish protocols that clarify the government’s stance on new legislation. In 2015, opposition members proposed an amendment to the basic law “The Government” to ensure that the committee’s protocols are published on the PMO’s website. In 2016, the proposal passed the parliamentary debate stage. However, the committee itself did not approve this amendment.

Citation:
Ravid, Barak, “Ministers in the cabinet: There was no real discussion during the cease fire negotiations”, haaretz 11.8.2014: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/premium-l-2402635 (Hebrew)
Cabinet committees and their authorities,” the ministry of Justice website 24.6.1996 (Hebrew)
“The guidelines for government work,” PMO’s website 12.8.2012 (Hebrew)
http://fs.knesset.gov.il/%5C20%5CCommittees%5C20_cs_bg_325109.pdf

Japan

Score 6

Following the government reform in 2001, government committees were established in a number of important fields in which coordination among ministries with de facto overlapping jurisdictions plays an important role. The most important is the Council for Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), headed by the prime minister. However, in two respects, this was never a “ministerial committee” in a strict sense. First, it has
only an advisory function. Second, individuals from the private sector – two academics and two business representatives in the current configuration – were included. This can increase the impact of such a council, but it also means that it stands somewhat detached from concrete political processes.

Prime Minister Abe again strengthened the role of the CEFP and set up the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization as a “quasi sub-committee” of the CEFP that encompasses all state ministers. While the cabinet has to approve considerations developed in the CEFP or in the Headquarters, there is indeed a shift toward first discussing policy redirections in the committees, including a discussion of basic budget guidelines.

There are currently four councils operating directly under the Cabinet Office, including CEFP and the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation that have been given budgetary primacy over related ministries.

The creation of the National Security Council in 2013 was a similar case in which interministerial coordination was intensified in the interest of asserting the prime minister’s policy priorities.

The structure is becoming ever more complex and could lead to confusion. For instance, under the Headquarters, mentioned above, the Japan Revitalization Strategy 2016 foresees a “Public-Private Council for the Fourth Industrial Revolution”.

Citation: Cabinet Office, Japan 2016 Revitalization Strategy, Provisional Translation, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/2016_hombun1_e.pdf

Slovakia

Score 6

The importance of cabinet and ministerial committees has varied over time in Slovakia, with every government modifying the committee structure. The second Fico government had only one cabinet committee composed exclusively of ministers, the Council for National Security. Other ministerial committees consisting of ministers and senior civil servants and chaired by the four appointed vice prime ministers or line ministers have played a major role in the preparation of government proposals, and have been quite effective in settling controversial issues prior to cabinet meetings. However, they are still neither formally nor systematically involved in the preparation of cabinet meetings.

Turkey

Score 6

The Better Regulation Group within the PMO ensures coordination among the related agencies and institutions and improve the process of creating regulations. In addition, the government has created committees – such as the anti-terror
Interministerial Coordination

commission under the Ministry of Interior, which includes officials from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, as well as other security departments. These are composed of ministers, experts, bureaucrats and representatives of other bureaucratic bodies (such as those on legislation techniques, legislation management and administrative simplification, and regulatory impact analysis) in highly important policy areas or when important or frequently raised issues were under consideration.

Other such committees include the Economy Coordination Board, the Money Credit Coordination Council, the Investment Environment Coordination Board, the Coordination Board for Combating Financial Crimes and the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Board.

In addition, the Reform Monitoring Group was renamed to Reform Action Group to coordinate policy measures in line with EU legislation. It has been extending its predecessor’s tasks and mission. The new body is tasked with monitoring political reforms, preparing draft reform bills, and playing an active role in securing proposals’ parliamentary passage and in the subsequent implementation process. However, this body had convened only three times until December 2015, raising doubts about its impact on policymaking.

Citation:
Daily Sabah, PM asks other parties to support passing EU bills, 11 December 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2015/12/12/pm-asks-other-parties-to-support-passing-eu-bills

Cyprus

Score 5

Interministerial committees are regularly formed in Cyprus. Committees are established on ad hoc basis, on procedural and sector-specific matters (e.g., promoting road safety, combating fire hazards, and on defense and other topics). Their work is to formulate general policy frameworks, and are supported by services or technical committees mainly from within ministries, though in some cases contributions from external experts are sought. The scope of work and the degree of efficiency in the committees’ coordination are not easy to assess, as their reports are rarely made public. Coordination promoted since 2014 has focused mostly on specific topics and short-term actions and processes, rather than being a sustained result of strategic planning and implementation.
Czech Republic

There are about 20 ministerial committees in the Czech Republic. Depending on the set of issues they are tasked to address, some are established on a temporary basis while others are permanent. The most important permanent committees include the Council for National Security, Legislative Committee and the Committee for the European Union. The committees discuss and approve policy documents, thereby filtering out issues and saving time in cabinet meetings, but they do so in an ad hoc fashion and are not systematically involved in the preparation of cabinet meetings.

Germany

As a rule of thumb, the cabinet functions as an institution that formally ratifies policy decisions that have been made elsewhere. In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies within their own jurisdiction. Therefore, they have at least some leeway to pursue their own or their party’s interests, though each ministry must to some extent involve other ministries while drafting bills.

Formal cabinet committees do not play an important role in policymaking and are rarely involved in the review or coordination of proposals. Instead, the coalition committee is mainly responsible for coordinating policies (see Informal Coordination).

Malta

While government officials do organize cabinet committees to assist in clarifying issues prior to full cabinet meetings, these do not necessarily correspond to line ministries but to individual issues. Occasionally ministers form cabinet subcommittees to coordinate policies between ministries. The chair of the subcommittee, however, would not be from the ministry from which the policy originated. Although plans to set up cabinet committees on EU affairs, including the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, were announced, little has been achieved. However, a cabinet committee was established to prepare for Malta’s presidency of the EU in 2017.

Citation:
Harwood Mark, Malta in the European Union 2014 Ashgate, Surrey

Romania

In Romania, ministerial committees, composed of one minister, deputy ministers and public servants, feature prominently in interministerial coordination. By contrast, committees consisting only of ministers or with several ministers are rare.
Bulgaria

Score 4

The Bulgarian cabinet does not resort to specific cabinet or ministerial committees as a way of coordinating proposals for cabinet meetings. However, there are many cross-cutting advisory councils that include several ministers or high-ranking representatives of different ministries and have some coordinating functions. These might thus be seen as functional equivalents to ministerial or cabinet committees. However, the role of the councils, which often have a rather broad membership, is quite limited in substantive terms.

Greece

Score 4

There are cabinet committees tasked with overseeing specific policy sectors. However, these committees meet only when a major policy decision has to be made and are not subject to systematic organization. Substantive policy work is done at the line ministries and by the PMO before issues are presented to the cabinet. Ministerial committees often perform a more symbolic function. A possible exception is the Council of Administrative Reform, which was established by the Syriza-ANEL government in the beginning of the period under review. The new council is composed of six major government ministers, including the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy and Development, and is presided over by the prime minister. The scope of this council is not as narrow as its title indicates, but rather wider. It is a governmental organ founded in November 2015 to pursue any reform plans of the incumbent government which have been left out of the remit of Greece’s Third Economic Adjustment Program. Thus, in contrast to its first ten months in power (January - October 2015), the Syriza-ANEL government has tried to improve upon it coordination capacity.

Citation:
Information on the new Council is available at the official site of the Ministry of Administrative Reconstruction:
http://www.minadmin.gov.gr/?p=12496

Poland

Score 4

As with the preceding Tusk and Kopacz governments, the number and role of cabinet committees under the PiS government have been limited. However, the latter set up an Innovativeness Council, consisting of five ministers, in February 2016 and an Economic Committee at the end of September 2016. The latter is in charge of coordinating the finalization and implementation of the Strategy of Responsible Development.
Estonia

Score 2
Estonia does not have a committee structure within government, or any ministerial committee. Ministers informally discuss their proposals and any other pending issues at weekly consultative cabinet meetings, as mentioned above. No formal voting or any other selection procedure is applied to issues discussed on consultative meetings.

Switzerland

Score 2
Not surprisingly, given the small number of ministries, there are no cabinet committees in Switzerland’s political system. However, there is considerable coordination, delegation and communication at the lower level of the federal government. Every minister is in a sense already a “ministerial committee,” representing the coordination of a large number of cooperating departmental units.

Norway

Score 1
There is little use of formal cabinet committees within Norway’s political system. The whole cabinet meets several times a week, and generally works together as a full-cabinet committee.

The coalition partners have created a subcommittee within the cabinet that coordinates issues on difficult or sensitive topics, and a special subgroup for European affairs.

Sweden

Score 1
There are no standing cabinet committees in the Swedish system of government. Cabinet proposals are coordinated through iterations of sending drafts of bills to the concerned departments. This usually takes place at the middle level of the departments and thus does not involve the political level of the departments.

The cabinet is both a policy-shaping institution as well as the final institution of appeal on a wide range of issues. There is also a requirement that the cabinet has to be the formal decision-maker on many issues. This means that the cabinet annually makes more than 100,000 decisions (mostly in bulk).
Indicator

Ministerial Bureaucracy

Question

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
8-6 = Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
5-3 = There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2-1 = There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.

Estonia

Score 10

Formal procedures of coordinating policy proposals are set in the rules of the national government. According to it, all relevant ministries must be consulted and involved in a consensus-building process before an amendment or policy proposal can be brought to the government. An online draft-bill portal (Eelnõude infosüsteem, EIS) is used for the purposes of inter-ministerial coordination and public consultations. In addition to this formal procedure, senior civil servants from the various ministries consult and inform each other about coming proposals; deputy secretaries general are key persons in this informal consultation process.

Finland

Score 10

Cabinet meetings are prepared by ministry officials and civil servants. Findings from a large-scale analysis several years ago into the internal politics and practices of the cabinet and ministries emphasized the existence of a cyclical culture of dependence between ministers and senior officials. One expression of this mutual dependence, according to the same analysis, was that ministers put greater trust in the advice of their subordinate civil servants than in the advice of ministerial colleagues. This pattern extends to all aspects of the cabinet’s agenda. With regard to policy programs and similar intersectoral issues, coordination between civil servants of separate ministries happens as a matter of course. In specific matters, coordination may even be dictated. For instance, statements from the Ministry of Finance on economic and financial matters must be obtained by other ministries. On the whole, given the decision-making culture, civil servants in different ministries are expected to engage in coordination. An unwritten code of behavior prescribes harmonious and smooth
activity, and ministers or ministries are expected to subject projects that are burdensome or sensitive to a collective examination and analysis.

Citation:

Switzerland

Score 10

The federal government deliberates behind closed doors, and minutes of these meetings are not public. A leading expert on government decision processes has estimated that in most decision-making processes, “either the preliminary procedure or the co-reporting procedure leads to an agreement.” The preliminary procedure consists of interministerial consultations at the level of the federal departments. After the departments have been consulted, the co-reporting procedure begins. The Federal Chancellery leads the process by submitting the proposal under consideration as prepared by the ministry responsible to all other ministries. These then have the opportunity to submit a report or express an opinion. A process of discussion and coordination ensues, designed to eliminate all or most differences before the proposal is discussed by the Federal Council.

Two instruments, the large and the small co-reporting procedures, are specifically designed to coordinate policy proposals between the ministries. These processes invite the ministries to take positions on political issues. The co-reporting procedure is largely a process of negative coordination, which highlights incompatibilities with other policies but does not systematically scrutinize the potential for synergy.

Denmark

Score 9

Coordination through the cabinet is collegial, and officials largely carry out interdepartmental coordination through negotiations between their affected ministries, often via interdepartmental committees or working groups. There is a certain degree of congruence between such interdepartmental committees and cabinet committees, with different ministries leading on different issue areas. The PMO plays an important role, especially for issues that involve the Parliament. Other important ministries are the Finance Ministry, which prepares the annual budget, the Justice Ministry, which checks the legal aspects of all bills, and the Foreign Ministry, which gets involved in security, defense and development policies.

Citation:
Luxembourg

Score 9

Senior ministry officials and interministerial meetings are important in the preparation of draft bills and for cabinet meetings. There is both formal and informal coordination in the conception of new policy, in policy modification or in the conception of a pre-draft bill. As part of the process, interministerial ad hoc groups are formed. Normally, a pre-draft bill is already the result of consultation with social partners and civil society groups. Once the pre-draft bill is published, official consultation rounds start again.

Citation:

New Zealand

Score 9

The cabinet process is overseen by the cabinet office on the basis of clear guidelines. Departmental chief executives typically meet with ministers prior to cabinet meetings to discuss the agenda and clarify matters. The amount and effectiveness of policy proposal coordination varies a great deal depending on the policy field. However, there is clearly coordination in the preparation of cabinet papers and demanding processes specified in cabinet office circulars.

Citation:

Portugal

Score 9

Since the mid-1980s, cabinet meetings have been prepared in advance by senior ministry officials such as junior ministers or director-generals (who are also political appointees), depending on the issue. Under the MoU and the subsequent continuing conditions of budgetary constraint, this coordination has been carried out in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance. This entity closely monitors all expenditure.

Australia

Score 8

There is generally a high level of coordination between line ministry public servants. In most cases, ministries must coordinate with the Department of Finance and the Treasury, since they are responsible for finding the resources for any new policy developments, and such developments must feed into the government’s spending and
budget cycle. Where there are legal implications, there must be coordination with the Attorney General’s Department. Departments least likely to coordinate their activities across the government portfolio are Defense and Foreign Affairs and Trade, since their activities have the fewest implications across the other portfolios.

Coordination is especially effective when the political leadership is driving proposals, but less effective on policy matters initiated at the level of the minister or department, in part reflecting greater uncertainty among civil servants as to the support for the proposal from the political leadership. It also reflects differences in policy priorities and culture across departments, as well as inherent competition between departments for power, relevance and resources.

Canada

Score 8  Many policy proposals are coordinated by line ministries with other line ministries. However, due to issues of departmental mandates and authorities, this process is generally not as effective as the central-agency coordination process. On certain issues, the line department may be unwilling to recognize the role or expertise of other line departments, or have fundamental differences of perspectives on the issue, and hence may fail to consult and/or coordinate a policy proposal with others. The paramount role of central agencies in policy development means that departments have in fact little ability to effectively coordinate policy proposals.

France

Score 8  If a ministry wishes to get its proposals accepted or passed, there are no other options than to liaise and coordinate with other ministries or agencies involved. For instance, the “Loi Macron” (2015) had to be co-signed by 13 ministers. In case this consultation has not taken place, objections expressed by other ministers or by the Council of State might deliver a fatal blow to a proposal. All ministries are equal, but some are more equal than others: for example, the finance minister is a crucial, omnipresent and indispensable actor. Usually the coordination and consultation process is placed under the responsibility of a “rapporteur,” usually a lawyer from the ministry bureaucracy. The dossier is always followed as well by a member of the minister’s staff who communicates with his/her counterparts and tries to smooth the process as much as possible. In the most difficult cases (when ministers back up strongly the positions of their respective civil servants), the prime minister has to step in and settle the matter.

Italy

Score 8  Before every Council of Ministers meeting there is a preparatory meeting – the pre-consiglio – where the heads of the legislative offices of all the ministries filter and coordinate the proposals to be submitted to the Council of Ministers meeting. Further
informal meetings between officials of ministries take place at earlier stages of drafting. However, the bureaucracies of individual ministries are jealous of their prerogatives and are not very keen to surrender the autonomy of their ministry.

**Latvia**

**Score 8**

The official decision-making process mandates the coordination of policy proposals at the state-secretary level. New policy initiatives are officially announced at weekly state-secretary meetings, after the draft proposals are circulated in a transparent process providing all ministries with an opportunity to review and comment on the issues. The process is open to the public and input from non-governmental entities is welcomed. Ministry responses to draft proposals are collected and ministerial coordination meetings on particular drafts are held to achieve consensus on the substance of the proposals. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the proposals move to cabinet committee for further consideration at the political level.

Issues can be fast-tracked at the request of a minister. Fast-tracking means that the usual procedures for gathering cross-sectoral and expert input can be circumvented, putting the efficacy of coordination at risk. In 2011, 2012 and 2013, a respective 35%, 34% and 31% of all issues before cabinet were fast-tracked. In 2014, however, the percentage of measures fast-tracked increased markedly to 42%. In 2015, 32% of all issues before cabinet were fast-tracked, a significant drop from 2014.

At a lower bureaucratic level, coordination occurs on an ad hoc basis. Ministries conduct informal consultations, include other ministry representatives in working groups and establish interministerial working groups to prepare policy proposals. These methods are widely used, but are not mandatory.

Citation:

**Lithuania**

**Score 8**

The process of drafting laws and resolutions requires consultation with the ministries and state institutions affected by the issue. The coordination process is led by the ministry responsible for a given issue area. Coordination takes place at different levels of administrative hierarchy: coordination at the civil-servant level followed by that of managers representing the ministries at the government level. Coordination is a lengthy, well-documented process. Joint working groups are sometimes established, while interministerial meetings are used to coordinate the preparation of drafts and resolve disagreements before proposals reach the political level. All draft legislation must be coordinated with the Ministry of Justice. However, the substance
of coordination could be improved if the initiators of draft legislation were to use consultation procedures more extensively in assessing the possible impact of their proposals. The importance of coordination should be recognized not only during the planning phase, but also during the implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases of the policy process.

**United Kingdom**

Score 8

The interministerial coordination of policy proposals is an official civil service goal. However, problems of capacity and capability in this area have been revealed by surveys undertaken within the civil service. Examples of civil service disruption are, on the one hand, the Civil Service Reform Plan of 2012 and, on the other hand, the coalition’s spending cuts, which have hit parts of the ministerial bureaucracy very hard and led to considerable job cuts. Relations between the civil service and the government have been affected, but the situation does not seem to have had a great impact on the efficiency of policy-proposal coordination. As explained above, the Cabinet Office assures coordination at the level of officials.

There are concerns that the workload required to deliver Brexit will undermine coordination within government.

**United States**

Score 8

In general, there is an expectation of interagency coordination at various levels of the bureaucracy. The quality of this coordination varies, and as with cabinet level coordination, it is adversely affected by the short-term service of political appointees, which results in underdeveloped working relationships across agencies. The overall or average performance has not been systematically evaluated, however.

**Chile**

Score 7

Ministry staff and civil servants do not always play a dominant role in the drafting of policy proposals before those proposals reach ministerial committees. Depending on the ministry and the importance of the proposal, officials and civil servants are more or less effectively involved in the preparation and coordination process.

**Iceland**

Score 7

Ministry officials and civil servants play an important role in preparing cabinet meetings. Even so, no cooperation between ministries is presumed in cases when the ministers themselves are not involved. As a consequence of the strong tradition of ministerial power and independence, the involvement of too many ministries and ministers has been found to be a barrier to policy making. Currently, coordination
between ministries is irregular. The prime minister has the power to create coordination committees, but the number of active committees is currently low.

**Japan**

*Score 7*

The LDP-led government has sent clear signals that it would like to work effectively with the bureaucracy, which marks a clear policy reversal from the governments led by the Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012). The collaboration between politicians and bureaucrats has since become smoother. In 2014, the government introduced a Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs, which is supposed to help the prime minister make appointment decisions regarding the 600 elite bureaucrats staffing the ministries and other major agencies. This significantly expanded the Cabinet Office’s involvement in the process and its influence over the ministerial bureaucracy, including the personal influence of the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga who has been in office since 2012. There are more political appointees in the ministries than before, and as Abe has been prime minister for four years already, the average stay of such appointees has become longer, giving them more expertise and clout within their ministries.

**Norway**

*Score 7*

Senior civil servants and political appointees play an important role in preparing cabinet meetings. This process follows fixed procedures, and matters must be appropriately prepared before being presented to the cabinet. This includes the creation of documentation alerting cabinet ministers to the essentials of a proposal, thus allowing cabinet meetings to focus on strategic issues and avoid being distracted by routine business details. Most issues on the agenda have been prepared well before the meeting.

**South Korea**

*Score 7*

Civil servants of different ministries regularly coordinate over commonly concerned policies. This coordination and cooperation among related civil servants across ministries can be either formal or informal, hierarchical or horizontal. Attitudes in the ministries are shaped by departmentalism that obstructs coordination. Different ministries compete with their policies for support and approval from the office of the president. There is also a clear hierarchy delineating the ministries. Civil servants in important ministries, such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, consider civil servants from other ministries, such as the labor ministry or the environment ministry, as “second tier.” In 2013, the Park Geun-hye administration introduced the so-called Government 3.0 policy, aimed both at improving interministerial coordination and access to information by citizens. In October 2013, the government enacted the 2013 Act on Promotion of the Provision and Use of Public Data. This opens a considerable body of government data to use by the public. The Ministry of
the Interior (MOI) has taken charge of coordinating relevant policies, while the Open Data Center has been established inside the National Information Society Agency (NIA) to support implementation of open-government data (OGD) policies. In addition, chief OGD officers have been designated, and an Open Data Mediation Committee was created to expedite the opening of government data to the public. In 2016, the MOI was poised for a full-scale release of government data in 22 categories by the end of the year. In addition, the ministry had plans to ensure the quality of government data through the implementation of quality-control evaluation procedures. The government also planned to promote startup creation through its OGD policies by aiming to identify and open up new classes of government data that were highly relevant to citizens’ daily lives, and by continuing to offer government support for OGD nationwide.

Citation:

Spain

Score 7

The two most important senior bureaucratic positions in the 13 ministries are the secretaries of state, who play a role much like that of junior ministers in other European countries, but do not belong to the government in Spain; and the undersecretaries, who are career civil servants that typically act as department administrators. These figures meet every Wednesday in the so-called General Committee of Undersecretaries and Secretaries of State (Comisión General de Subsecretarios y Secretarios de Estado). This committee effectively prepares the Council of Ministers weekly sessions, which are held two days later, on Fridays. The Government Office (Ministerio de la Presidencia, GO), directed by a minister who is also the deputy prime minister, chairs the meetings of this preparatory committee in which all draft bills, all appointments and any other ministerial proposals are discussed and scheduled as a part of the Council of Ministers’ agenda. A provisional agenda (known as the “black index”) is published by the GO a week before the cabinet meeting. The GO also collects and circulates all relevant documents for discussion by the line ministers. On Tuesday mornings, senior Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) officials assess the relative importance of agenda items on the black index and identify where there are likely to be divergent positions. Thus, the Wednesday meetings of the preparatory committee perform an important gatekeeping function in returning problematic proposals to the appropriate line ministry and forwarding the remaining proposals to the Council of Ministers (now classified into two indexes: the green index, which covers ongoing administrative matters, and the red index, for issues which are more controversial either by nature or because a lack of ministerial consensus).

While policy proposals are efficiently coordinated at the highest level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the tradition of interministerial coordination at mid-level
administrative bureaucracy means efficiency is weaker here. To be sure, the role of high-ranking civil servants (normally the subdirectores generales) is crucial in the preparation of policy proposals within every line ministry, but their subsequent involvement in horizontal coordination with other ministries is very limited. In fact, and as a consequence of the strong departmentalization, every ministry tends to act within its area of competence or jurisdiction, avoiding proposals which may involve other ministries. Although many administrative interministerial committees formally exist, in practice these committees do not coordinate the drafting of policy proposals or decision-making between different ministries. As administrative committees do not tend to work efficiently, they have fallen by the wayside and now usually simply facilitate the exchange of information or try to settle jurisdictional conflicts.

Sweden

Score 7

As mentioned earlier, most of the daily coordination on policy matters does not involve the political level of the departments, but is instead handled at the administrative level. However, as soon as coordination takes place on a political dimension, it is “lifted” to the political level.

Coordination within the GO remains a significant problem, although some measures have been implemented to address that problem. Many departments still find it difficult to coordinate policy across departmental boundaries. Departments that were formed through mergers of departments tend to display “subcultures” of the former departments.

Citation:

Ireland

Score 6

Responsibility for policy coordination lies with the Prime Minister’s Office (Department of the Taoiseach). However, to be truly effective in this area the office would require greater analytical expertise across many policy areas than it has at present. Despite much rhetoric about “joined-up government,” the coordination of policy proposals across ministries has traditionally been relatively weak, with conflicting policies pursued in different parts of the civil service. For example, employment creation can take precedence over environmental considerations and local planning processes often do not mesh with national housing policies.

While coordination across government is often an up-hill battle, the development of the cabinet committee system has somewhat improved matters. Hardiman et al
(2012, p.120) conclude, “perhaps the most significant organizational change aimed at improving cross-departmental coordination has been the growing reliance on the cabinet committee system: ‘Most of the major policy initiatives - health, environment, climate change, economic renewal - all will have gone through the cabinet committees. So that is a big change in the system of governance … They provide a mechanism to manage complex cross-cutting issues’ (Interview B, 1 Nov 2009).”

Citation: Niamh Hardiman, Aidan Regan and Mary Shayne ‘The Core Executive: The Department of the Taoiseach and the Challenge of Policy Coordination, in Eoin O’Malley and Muiris MacCarthaigh (eds, 2012), Governing Ireland: From Cabinet Government to Delegated Governance. Dublin: IPA.

Netherlands

Score 6

Since the 2006 elections, politicians have demanded a reduction in the number of civil servants. This has resulted in a loss of substantive expertise, with civil servants essentially becoming process managers. Moreover, it has undermined the traditional relations of loyalty and trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. The former have broken the monopoly formerly held by senior staff on the provision advice and information by turning increasingly to outside sources such as consultants. Top-level officers have responded with risk-averse and defensive behavior exemplified by professionally driven organizational communication and process management. The upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in the preparation of Council of Ministers meetings has increased. Especially in the Ministry of Justice and Safety, the quality of bureaucratic policy and legislation preparation has become a reason for serious concern.

Citation: R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

H. Tjeenk Willink, Een nieuw idee van de staat, Socialisme & Democratie, 11/12, 2012, pp. 70-78

“Is justitie politiek te managen?, in NRC-Handelsblad, 1 October 2015

Romania

Score 6

Much of the coordination takes place in interministerial committees, usually presided over by a minister and composed primarily of deputy ministers (political positions) and top civil servants. In the absence of these committees, bills are subject to interministerial consultation by being sent for review to the ministries affected by each act. If ministries do not respond to the review request within five days, the non-response is considered tacit approval. Prior to government meetings discussing a particular legislative proposal, the Secretariat General of the Government organizes working groups between the representatives of ministries and agencies involved in
initiating or reviewing the proposal in order to harmonize their views. While these procedures promote coordination, the capacity limitations of many ministries and the short turnaround time allowed for review undermine effective review and hence allow for only superficial coordination in many cases.

Slovenia

Score 6

In Slovenia, a substantial amount of interministerial coordination is performed by civil servants. Senior civil servants and cabinet members are always heavily involved in the coordination of legislation. However, the effectiveness of this coordination has suffered from the deteriorating quality and increasing politicization of the upper echelons of civil service, especially among high-ranking civil servants. Under the Cerar government, several prominent and experienced high-ranking civil servants were replaced by party loyalists with limited administrative experience and even less expert knowledge.

Turkey

Score 6

Ministerial undersecretaries, under the authority of a minister and his or her aide, executes services on behalf of the ministers. This is a political position that is achieved through merit and a successful political career. Deputy undersecretaries in the ministries also help to conduct ministerial affairs.

During the review period there was an increasing tendency to draft and adopt legislation without appropriate consultation. The creation of new ministries and agencies and the resulting fragmentation of responsibilities has complicated ministerial coordination, for example in the areas of budgeting and medium-term economic policymaking. The oversight bodies under the Prime Minister’s Office are responsible not only for coordinating and overseeing legal proposals, but are also tasked with monitoring legislative implementation.

The 2014 Annual Activity Report of the Prime Minister’s Office stressed that although coordination between various national and international policymaking activities had improved, performance goals in this area are not in general satisfactorily achieved. Similar observations have been made by the Ministry of Development, the primary policy-coordination body. Accordingly, a serious problem is inefficient coordination due to institutional ambiguity and conflicts.

Citation:
Austria

Austria’s federal bureaucracy is characterized by structural fragmentation. Each federal ministry has its own bureaucracy, accountable to the minister alone and not to the government as such. Each minister and his or her ministry is regarded as having a party affiliation according to the coalition agreement. Policy coordination is possible only when the ministers of specific ministries agree to establish such a specific coordination. As fitting in the government’s ministerial structure of the government, individual ministers fear loss of control over their respective bureaucracies, and thus lasting and open contacts are possible only between the (politically appointed) personal staff of ministers belonging to the same political party.

Because the Austrian bureaucracy is organized along the lines of a (British-style) civil service system, the different ministerial bureaucracies are stable in their political makeup and therefore immune to short-term political influences. Specific ministries are generally dominated by one party over the long term (e.g., the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (social democratic) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment (conservative)).

Belgium

While ministries are not significantly involved in preparing cabinet meetings, each minister has a large team of close collaborators and advisers (the ministerial cabinet) to prepare projects, which are first submitted to the minister, and then to the council of ministers. For some decisions, responsibilities are shared among several ministers, a situation that happens regularly. In this case, ministerial teams must coordinate their actions in inter-cabinet meetings before being able to submit a proposal to receive the approval of each minister. Only at this stage may the proposal be submitted to the ministers’ council.

The bottom line is that top civil servants do not play a significant role – in most cases, they are at best informed of ongoing discussions and are simply asked to deliver data and information.

Cyprus

Line ministries appear as fiefdoms, with each claiming sovereign rights within its area of responsibility or competence. Ministry officials and civil servants may participate in ad hoc bodies assigned to deal with specific issues, or seek coordination with other ministries in drafting proposals or implementing policies if this is deemed useful.
During the period under review, new units formed as a result of administrative reform processes have contributed to intensifying ministries’ interactions. This has led to greater consultation between line ministries on policy matters and efforts to coordinate implementation of decisions.

Czech Republic

Score 5

As part of the interministerial coordination process, some coordination among line-ministry civil servants takes place. Senior ministry officials are generally a crucial link in collecting and discussing comments on proposed legislation. The definition of their roles and responsibilities should be improved through the new civil service law, which went into effect on 1 January 2015 and regulates the legal status of state employees in administrative offices and represents a significant step toward establishing a stable and professional public administration.

Germany

Score 5

Ex-ante coordination between the line ministries’ leading civil servants has not been particularly strong under past German coalition governments. In addition, an entrenched political practice ensures that no ministry makes any proposal that might be postponed or blocked by other ministries. The federal Ministry of Finance must be involved when budgetary resources are concerned, while complicated legal or constitutional issues necessitate the involvement of the federal Ministry of Justice. But generally, every ministry is fully responsible for its own proposed bills. All controversial issues are already settled before being discussed by the cabinet. The dominant mechanism for conflict resolution is the coalition committee.

Hungary

Score 5

Given the small number of ministries in Hungary, interministerial coordination has, to some extent, been replaced with intraministerial coordination, especially within the Ministry of Human Resources (EMMI), the biggest superministry, and the Ministry of National Economy (NGM), which expanded in 2016. In addition to policy coordination by the PMO, there is some coordination by ministry officials, since senior ministry officials meet in order to prepare cabinet meetings. There is also a special Interministerial Coordination Committee for European Affairs (EKTB), a committee consisting of senior ministry officials tasked with coordinating EU-related issues that is also under the auspices of the PMO.
**Israel**

The government initiated actions to improve interministerial cooperation over the past decade in order to overcome its bureaucratic entanglements and political power struggles. Among others, it introduced roundtable meetings, CEOs coordination forums, guidelines and digital information platforms. Nonetheless, experts find that ministries are essentially territorial in nature, and the sharing of information between ministries is difficult at best.

This lack of communication at least partly results from the government’s highly centralized budget process, making public servants defensive over limited and strictly supervised resources. In 2016, a report by the state comptroller suggested that a lack of communication on foreign affairs is the result of a transfer of duties from the main ministries (e.g., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to other ministries. The report also cited interministerial disagreements as delaying the publication of regulations that would detail how to implement particular legislation. Moreover, a 2015 assessment found that 175 laws were not implemented because the ministries had not defined regulations based on those laws. According to the 2015 report, 32% of regulations are not promoted because of internal arguments between the ministries.

The result of this lack of communication between ministries is the dominance of non-sectoral offices (e.g., the PMO) in policy development as well as the frequent use of interministerial ad hoc committees (e.g., the housing cabinet) in order to energize policy proposals. In response to the numerous entities involved in implementing national goals, an expert committee recently recommended establishing a mechanism for coordination and decision-making. The committee suggested strengthening the authority of the PMO and emphasizing its role as coordinator between ministries.

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Malta

Score 5

Civil servants from a ministry typically coordinate policy proposals with other line ministries before policy is officially drafted. During the review period a new system was established. The cabinet director general is in charge of administrative decisions, and ensures that cabinet decisions are implemented in the different ministries. On Mondays, the chiefs of staff meet to draft memos for the cabinet. On Tuesdays, the cabinet meets and makes a decision. On Wednesdays, the permanent secretaries meet to decide on how to implement the cabinet’s decisions. A commissioner for the simplification and reduction of bureaucracy has been established.

Occasionally interministerial committees help coordinate policy before the drafting process is started. Increasingly this has become normal practice as a number of interministerial committees were created to support Valletta’s campaign to be the 2018 European Capital of Culture, and prepare for the Commonwealth Head of State Summit in Malta, an EU-Africa Summit and Malta’s presidency of the EU in 2017.

Mexico

Score 5

Traditionally, there was little real distinction in Mexico between civil servants and politicians, though the relationship between them has significantly varied over time. The upper administration overly consists of presidential appointments, with only a limited number of career bureaucrats. Two exceptions are the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where bureaucratic expertise play a major role.

Traditionally, the political system has been weighed toward presidential appointments. The cabinet today is much more heterogeneous, however, with some figures personally close to the president and others more independent. The politicization of the cabinet, which has increased under recent administrations, is constraining its ability to coordinate policy proposals given the centrifugal tendencies. Modernization has, however, slowly changed the administrative landscape, with technical expertise increasing in many sectors (e.g., social sectors) and the number of policy experts with an administrative background increasing in the upper administration; this trend continues in the current administration.

Poland

Score 5

Senior ministry officials play a substantial role in interministerial coordination. All meetings of the Council of Ministers, the Polish cabinet, are prepared by the Council of Ministers’ Permanent Committee, which is made up of deputy ministers from the ministries. The Committee for European Affairs, which is in charge of EU
coordination, also relies strongly on coordination by top civil servants. In contrast, bureaucratic coordination at lower levels of the hierarchy is still relatively limited, even though the joint administration of EU funds has helped to intensify interministerial exchange. Changes in personnel, especially in the security agencies, have secured the dominance of the government over administration.

**Slovakia**

**Score 5**

In Slovakia, senior ministry officials have traditionally been heavily involved in the interministerial coordination process at the drafting stage. In contrast, coordination at the lower levels of the ministerial bureaucracy has suffered from a strong departmentalist culture and the top-down approach taken in most ministries. Under the second Fico government, the role of senior civil servants in interministerial coordination decreased and coordination within the Smer-SD party gained importance.

**Bulgaria**

**Score 4**

While a comprehensive framework for coordination between ministry officials and civil servants exists, the quality of the coordination process is low, meaning that many issues have to be resolved at the political level. Within the ministries, a departmentalist culture prevails. This is especially true during coalition governments, when coordination between line ministries under ministers from different parties is virtually nonexistent. Even when ministries change hands between representatives of the same party, as in the case of the Ministry of Education in early 2016, strategies and planned reforms may change significantly within months.

**Croatia**

**Score 4**

The direct coordination of policy proposals by ministries is limited. There is no stable and transparent scheme for settling interministerial differences within the bureaucracy. The ministries in charge of drafting proposals rarely set up working groups that include peers from other ministries or government bodies. Deadlines for comments by other ministries are often too abbreviated, capacities for comments are sometimes inadequate, and comments made by other ministries are often not taken seriously.

**Greece**

**Score 3**

Greek bureaucracy is over-politicized and under-resourced. Political party cadres rather than civil servants coordinate policy proposals. Civil servants in line ministries often lack modern scientific and management skills. Policy proposals are usually assigned to ministerial adviser, who are short-term political appointees and can be
non-academic experts, academics and governing party cadres. Top civil servants contribute to policy proposals by suggesting what is legally permissible and technically feasible, although even on those issues ministers often tend to trust their own legal and technical adviser. The remaining civil servants at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy rarely, if ever, know of, let alone contribute to policy proposals. Moreover, there is little horizontal coordination among civil servants working in different ministries. Ministers assign the task of horizontal interministerial communication to their adviser.

Since Syriza’s rise to power in January 2015, in coalition with the ANEL party, the politicization of Greek bureaucracy has been further exacerbated. This pattern continued during the period under review, i.e. after November 2015. New appointments of governing party cadres to ministerial cabinets and various advisory posts in ministries, have been continuously taking place since then.
**Indicator**

Informal Coordination

**Question**

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- **10-9** = Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
- **8-6** = In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
- **5-3** = In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
- **2-1** = Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.

**Finland**

Score 10

Intersectoral coordination has generally been perceived as an important issue in Finnish politics, but rather few institutional mechanisms have in fact been introduced. One of these, the Iltakoulu (which translates as evening session), was previously an important unofficial negotiation session for the cabinet, but this system is no longer systematically used. To a considerable extent, then, coordination proceeds effectively through informal mechanisms. Recent large-scale policy programs have enhanced intersectoral policymaking; additionally, Finland’s membership in the European Union has of course necessitated increased interministerial coordination. Recent research in Finland has only focused tangentially on informal mechanisms, but various case studies suggest that the system of coordination by advisory councils has performed well.

**Hungary**

Score 10

The strong formal role of Orbán and his PMO is complemented by informal coordination mechanisms. As the power concentration around Orbán has increased, informal decision-making plays an increasingly dominant role, and the formal mechanisms only serve to legalize and implement these improvised and hastily made decisions. Orbán travels with his personal staff and rules the country by phone calls as a “remote control” that terrifies medium-level politicians and leads to big policy failures in implementations. If Orbán is not available or not ready or able to decide, issues remain in the air without any decision. Orbán regularly brings together
officials from his larger circle in Kötcse in order to give instructions. Many decisions originate from these meetings, which subsequently ripple informally through the system before any formal decision is made. These informal coordination mechanisms make rapid decision-making possible. Given the pivotal role of the prime minister, this system encourages anticipative obedience, but also creates a bottleneck in the implementation of decisions and precludes any genuinely efficient feedback.

Belgium

Belgian governments have typically been broad coalition governments (the current government is more homogeneously right-wing, but still includes four parties), and mechanisms such as the council of ministers were established to enforce effective coordination. It is also important to note that party discipline is strong and party presidents are dominant figures able to enforce coordination both within and across government levels (subnational and national). In addition, some of the larger parties have well-organized study centers that provide extensive policy expertise.

The government agreement, signed at the government-formation stage, operates as an ex ante contract that limits possible deviation once the coalition operates. Once the government is formed, decisions are made collegially, and all government officials must defend the decisions made by the council of ministers. Thus, as long as governmental decisions remain within the boundaries of the government agreement, policy proposals are well coordinated.

Importantly, the last elections produced highly asymmetric coalitions at the federal and regional levels. The federal government must be composed of the same number of Dutch and French-speaking ministers. However, only one French-speaking party is part of that government: the liberal-right MR. The coalition in Flanders is made up of all the Flemish parties in the federal government. In Wallonia, the coalition is composed of parties that are in the opposition at the federal level: the Socialists (PS) and the Christian Democrats (CDH). The Brussels government is a six-party coalition with a partial overlap between the federal and regional coalitions. The capacity to coordinate policy between the federal and the regional governments is thus much more limited than it has been in recent times.

Moreover, the fact that the MR is the sole French-speaking party at the federal level, as well as a minority party in its electoral districts, puts it in an awkward position, limiting the capacity of the MR prime minister to dictate policy and behavior to coalition partners.
Italy

Score 9

During the Letta government, interministerial coordination was predominantly based on traditional forms of interparty consultations among the coalition partners. However, Prime Minister Renzi has exerted much greater control over his own party and, as the other small parties of the coalition have a diminished role, he has been able to steer the government using informal mechanisms of coordination, including the undersecretary to the presidency. Nevertheless, the Treasury continues to have a crucial role in these informal coordination mechanisms. The importance of these informal coordination mechanisms can result in the production of hasty and ill-prepared decisions. This sometimes requires a revision of the decision.

Japan

Score 9

Informal relations and related agreements are very common in Japan. Such interactions can facilitate coordination, but can also lead to collusion. In terms of institutionalized informal coordination mechanisms in the realm of policymaking, informal meetings and debates between the ministries and the ruling party’s policy-research departments have traditionally been very important.

With the LDP-led coalition government in power again since late 2012, informal, closed-door agreements on policy are again of considerable importance. The leadership has to skillfully navigate between the coalition partners, including the Komeito party and LDP (and its Policy Research Council), line ministries and their bureaucrats, and a more inquisitive public. The position of the Chief Cabinet Secretary has become a key component of this approach. There is some evidence that cabinet meetings are essentially formalities, with sensitive issues informally discussed and decided beforehand. Ministries collect and make public few, if any, records of meetings between politicians and bureaucrats as they are supposed to do under the 2008 Basic Act of Reform of the National Civil Servant System. The general trend toward more transparency may have even strengthened the role of informality in order to avoid awkward situations.

Citation:

N. N., None of Japan’s 11 ministries kept records of contact between bureaucrats, politicians, The Mainichi, 24 February 2016, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160224/p2a/00m/0na/007000c

N. N. Cabinet staff kept records of contact between legislators, bureaucrats ‘voluntarily’, The Mainichi, 25 February 2016, http://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160225/p2a/00m/0na/014000c
**Luxembourg**

**Score 9**

There are many opportunities for informal coordination, given Luxembourg’s small size, its close-knit society and government administration. Those in public administration responsible for early policy research and formulation, are well familiar with representatives of social organizations and members of civil society research institutions. There are many opportunities for informal contact between public servants and experts from research institutions, businesses and civil society. Senior civil servants simultaneously responsible for various projects, have an enormous workload and represent the government within different bodies, boards and committees.

**New Zealand**

**Score 9**

In addition to formal coordination, there are a number of informal channels between coalition partners, government and legislative support parties, and ministers and their parliamentary parties. However, the Cabinet Manual seeks to at least formally clarify which procedures should be used as a guideline in case of informal coordination. For instance, Cabinet Office Circular CO (15) 1 “National-led Administration: Consultation and Operating Arrangements” defines the relationship between government ministers and ministers from parties that are not officially part of the government: “Support-party ministers are not members of cabinet. From time to time, support-party ministers and other ministers outside cabinet may seek the prime minister’s agreement to attend cabinet when significant matters within their portfolios are being addressed.”

Citation:

**Switzerland**

**Score 9**

Given the small size of the federal administration and the country’s tradition of informal coordination, there is reason to assume the continuing presence of strong and effective informal coordination.

**United Kingdom**

**Score 9**

Informal coordination was a hallmark of the Labour governments under Tony Blair (1997 to 2007). However, informal coordination was reduced during the Labour government of Gordon Brown (2007 to 2010) and largely abolished under the
coalition government (2010 to 2015), because of the need for avoiding tensions within the coalition. Having returned to one-party government in May 2015, it was expected that informal forms of coordination would become more common again. The divisions within the governing Conservative Party, including among senior ministers, over the aims and likely “red lines” in negotiating the UK’s future relations with the EU could make informal coordination across government harder to achieve. Though there is no clear evidence that this is the case yet. The Government Hubs program is a novel efficiency measure to pool the coordination of different departments under one roof.

Citation:
Collaborative Civil Service: https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2016/04/28/a-model-for-a-more-collaborative-civil-service-the-estate-strategy-in-action/

United States

Score 9

The U.S. government is highly prone to informal coordination, relying on personal networks, constituency relationships and other means. As with more formal processes, the effectiveness of such coordination is adversely affected by underdeveloped working relationships resulting from the short-term service of political appointees. The overall or average performance of informal coordination mechanisms has not been systematically evaluated.

Australia

Score 8

Information coordination procedures exist at the level of the party, where informal consultations on policies take place on a regular basis to make sure that the party leadership supports the government’s direction; this occurs regardless of which party is in office. The federal system and the division of responsibilities between the federal government and the state and territory governments means that informal coordination is always an important component of any policy that may involve the states. These procedures are ad hoc, and take place at two levels, among ministers from different jurisdictions, and at the level of senior public servants.

Chile

Score 8

Informal coordination plays an important role in settling issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic-policy debates. Existing informal mechanisms might be characterized as “formal informality,” as informal coordination mechanisms are de facto as institutionalized as formal ones in daily political practice. The functionality of this coordination mechanism did not change significantly during the review period.
Denmark

Score 8

The Danish administrative system is a mix of formal rules and norms and more informal traditions. As a few examples, officials hold informal talks in the halls of government, over lunch and during travel to and from Brussels. The informal mechanisms can make formal meetings more efficient. Of course, important decisions must be confirmed in more formal settings. At the political level, informal mechanisms are probably more important than formal ones among officials. The fact that most governments have been coalition governments (and often minority governments) has increased the importance of information coordination mechanisms.

France

Score 8

A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” of former students from the grandes écoles (École nationale d’administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech and so on) or membership in the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection générale des Finances, Diplomatie, Conseil d’État and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by an informal solidarity. These high civil servants (especially “énarques” from ENA) also work in the PMO or the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is both efficient and not transparent, from a procedural point of view. It is striking, for instance, how much President Hollande has relied on people who trained together with him at ENA, whom he has offered key positions in the political administration – ranging from ministerial positions to the chair of the central bank to many other high offices.

Ireland

Score 8

Every government in Ireland since 1989 has been a coalition government. The 2016 general election produced a Fine Gael-led minority government with nine independent deputies, a coalition which is dependent on the abstentionism of the main opposition party, Fianna Fáil, in votes relating to confidence and supply. The impression conveyed by accounts of cabinet meetings is that the agenda is usually too heavy to allow long debates on fundamental issues, which tend to have been settled in various ways prior to the meeting. On the whole these informal coordination mechanisms appear to work effectively.

Citation:
The two most recent Annual Reports on the Programme for Government are available here:
Poland

Score 8
Informal mechanisms of coordination have played an important role under the PiS government. PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński has served as the grey eminence behind the scene. He has taken many important decisions himself, and the standing of government ministers has been strongly dependent upon their relationship with him.

South Korea

Score 8
Most coordination between ministries is both formal and informal. Informal coordination is typically more effective. There is also a clear hierarchy structuring the ministries. Staffers at the newly created Ministry of Strategy and Finance see themselves as the elite among civil servants. However, the leading role of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance is defined by the president’s mandate. In addition, informal coordination processes tend to be plagued by nepotism and regional or peer-group loyalties, particularly among high-school and university alumni. There has been both cooperation and competition between the ministries. Informal networks between the president and powerful politicians work very effectively in forwarding specific policies. However, these practices lead to corruption and an inefficient allocation of resources.

Sweden

Score 8
Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and higher-ranking politicians alike are common and important in the Swedish system, although they may not always be effective. And yet, informal contacts between departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively filter many, but not all, policy proposals.

Turkey

Score 8
Informal bodies, which are usually made up of senior party members and their personal networks, are typically used to sketch the framework of an issue in consultation with experts, while civil servants develop proposals, and finally the
upper administrative echelons finalize policy. The higher levels of the ruling party in particular, in cooperation with ministers who have considerable experience in their fields, continue to form a tight network and contribute significantly to policy preparation.

However, the recent allegations of and fight against an illegal parallel structure within existing state structures linked to the network of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen placed significant strain on these informal mechanisms. As a consequence, a new generation of cabinet and administrative staffers with a high degree of loyalty and commitment to the party-state system is being groomed.

Informal coordination between the PMO and the Presidency has allegedly become more relevant since President Erdogan took over office, and especially after Binali Yıldırım became prime minister. This type of informal coordination, however, cannot be considered constructive, but rather it has the potential to replace formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.

Citation:

Canada

Score 7
Many, but not most policy proposals are coordinated through informal mechanisms, such as informal meetings with government members or across levels of government.

Czech Republic

Score 7
Informal coordination mechanisms have featured prominently in Czech political culture. Under the Sobotka government, the principles of coordination and problem solving within the government are described in the coalition agreement. Fundamental problems are solved by so-called coalition troika, consisting of the chairmen of the governing parties. The most important body is the coalition council.

Greece

Score 7
Most coordination mechanisms are informal and complement the more meager formal coordination mechanisms such as the infrequently convened cabinet and ministerial committees. Most informal mechanisms are ad hoc meetings among ministers convened at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Such meetings are followed up by person-to-person contacts between staff members of the PMO and adviser to ministers. In the period under review, informal coordination was frequent
and was organized by close associates of Prime Minister Tsipras, minister of the state, Nicos Pappas, and minister of the state for government coordination, Alekos Flambouraris, at the headquarters of the PMO. They were assisted by several close associates of the prime minister, such as the General Secretary of the PMO (and former leader of Syriza’s youth organization) Dimitris Tzanakopoulos, and other Syriza party cadres who participated in daily briefings in the PMO. It is probable that Syriza, after its first ten months in power, during which various party officials around Prime Minister Tsipras experimented with policy making and government structures, has now settled down for a more predictable type of informal coordination.

Iceland

Score 7

There is evidence that informal cooperation between ministers outside of formal cabinet meetings is increasing. These cooperative ministerial clusters were referred to in the Special Investigation Commission’s 2010 report as “super-ministerial groups.” The SIC report pointed out that examples of such cooperation immediately after the 2008 economic collapse demonstrated a need for clear rules on reporting what is discussed and decided in such informal meetings.

The SIC report also identified a tendency to move big decisions and important cooperative discussions into informal meetings between the chairmen of the ruling coalition parties. In March 2016, revised regulations on the procedures for cabinets were introduced but this only addresses formal cabinet meetings and not informal ministerial meetings. Therefore, we can conclude that the SIC report’s call for clearer regulation has partly been addressed. However, informal meetings continue without proper reporting.

Citation:

Latvia

Score 7

A coalition council that represents the political parties forming the governing coalition meets for weekly informal consultations. Despite its regular meetings with formal agendas, the council is not a part of the official decision-making process. Given that cabinet meetings are open to the press and public, coalition-council meetings provide an opportunity for off-the-record discussions and coordination. The council plays a de facto gatekeeping function for controversial issues, deciding when there is enough consensus to move issues to the cabinet. The coalition council can play both a complementary role, creating an enabling environment for consensus-building, and a destructive role, undermining the legitimacy of the official decision-making process.
Lithuania

**Score 7**

Formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination still dominate the decision-making process, despite the emergence of new informal coordination mechanisms and practices at the central level of government. Political councils are created to solve political disagreements within the ruling coalition. In addition, the leadership of political parties represented in the government is often involved in the coordination of political issues. Informal meetings are sometimes called to coordinate various issues at the administrative level. Furthermore, the 2012 to 2016 government planned to develop a senior civil service strata, which could actively engage in policy coordination at the managerial level. However, a revised Civil Service Law is yet to be approved.

Netherlands

**Score 7**

Very little is actually known about informal coordination at the (sub)-Council of Ministers level regarding policymaking and decision-making. The best-known informal procedure used to be the Torentjesoverleg, in which the prime minister and core of the Council of Ministers consulted with the leaders of the political parties supporting the coalition in the States General. Coalition governments cannot survive without this kind of high-level political coordination between government and the States General. Given the weak parliamentary support of the Rutte I and II councils of ministers (October 2010 – present), such informal coordination is no longer limited to political parties providing support to the governing coalition.

Under the present conditions, in which civil servants are subject to increasing parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing, informal coordination and the personal chemistry among civil servants are what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal contacts between the senior staff (raadsadviseurs) in the prime minister’s Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such bureaucratic coordination is undermined by insufficient or absent informal political coordination.

Citation:

S. Jilke et al., Public Sector Reform in the Netherlands: Views and Experiences from Senior Executives, COCOPS Research Report, 2013
Norway

Score 7
Cabinet ministers meet frequently and keep in close touch with one other on issues of policy. Efforts have been made to encourage cross-ministerial relationships on the level of lower officials as well. There is extensive informal coordination between cabinet and parliamentary committees and party organizations.

Portugal

Score 7
Informal coordination mechanisms are central to government functioning and coordination. The horizontal informal links between ministries help compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal linkages. Informal coordination has become even more important under the current Socialist Party government of Prime Minister António Costa, which depends on the Portuguese Communist Party, the Left Bloc and the Ecologist Party for parliamentary support.

Slovakia

Score 7
Informal coordination has played a significant role in policy coordination under both the second and the third Fico government. Under the second Fico government, Fico complemented the extension of the formal role of the Government Office by informal negotiations with individual ministers, advisers and economic and social stakeholders. The fact that Fico took care of filling 7 of 13 minister positions as well as 15 state secretaries in 13 ministries by Smer politicians indicates that Fico continues to rely on coordination within the Smer-SD party under the new coalition government. The third Fico government also decided to form a system of coalition councils. The main coalition council, which coordinates the work of various sub-councils, meets at least once a month, consists of the chairmen of the parties in government and adopts decisions by a consensus of all members.

Citation:

Slovenia

Score 7
Slovenia’s tradition of coalition governments has meant that informal coordination procedures have played a significant role in policy coordination. Under the Cerar government, the leaders of the three coalition parties met frequently, making major decisions at coalition meetings that were often also attended by the ministers and sometimes also by the leaders of parliamentary majority groups and coalition
members of parliament. In press conferences and public statements after these meetings, very little information about the decisions made was provided to the public. The dominant role of the party leaders within their parties has also meant that a considerable amount of policy coordination takes place in party bodies.

Spain

Score 7

The relative weakness of formal coordination among ministry civil servants in Spain (see “Ministerial Bureaucracy”) is to some extent compensated for by helpful informal procedures. When administrative coordination is needed because interministerial problems are real and cannot be solved by the non-effective existing committees or by invoking vertical hierarchy, informal contacts or meetings between officials of the various ministries involved are organized. Many policy proposals can in fact be coordinated in this fashion (ad hoc working groups are rare but may also be created). As Spanish senior civil servants are clustered into different specialized bureaucratic corps, informal mechanisms rely often on the fact that officials involved in the coordination may belong to the same corps or share a network of old colleagues. Nevertheless, the existence of specialized corps tends to aggravate Spanish administrative fragmentation, since every corps tends to control a department according to its specialization. Within the cabinet, these informal mechanisms are less necessary, since the stable Spanish experience of single-party governments with strong prime ministers has up to this point required less coordination than would coalition cabinets. However, informal coordination procedures do exist, with exchanges of views and occasional or urgent meetings of an inner core of ministers politically close to Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.

Austria

Score 6

Existing coordination mechanisms – the weekly informal meetings within each Cabinet factions and the cabinet as a whole, as well as the regular informal meetings between the chancellor and vice-chancellor – are efficient. They do not in any way guarantee a smooth decision-making process based on consensus, but do allow the cabinet to make a realistic assessment of what collective decisions are either possible or impossible. Informal coordination mechanisms are also used to seek compromise when a proposal from one party’s minister is unacceptable to the other coalition party. Each party nominates one cabinet member to a small group tasked with finding this compromise. There is no regular policy coordination, whether formal or informal, on the level of civil servants.

Initially, informal coordination within the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition seemed to function smoothly as evinced by the introduction of two separate commissions for tax and
Educational reform. These commissions have enjoyed relative seclusion from the press, which has allowed the coalition partners to reach joint compromises more readily. Recent developments with regard to the refugee crisis and the marketing of the tax reform have, however, cast doubt on the coalition’s capacity for informal coordination.

**Estonia**

Score 6

Informal coordination has played an important role in ensuring efficient policy-making. In addition to contacts between high-ranking civil servants in ministries, the coalition committee and governing bodies of political parties have been key players in this regard. Getting support from coalition partners is generally the first step in successfully passing legislation. However, Prime Minister Rõivas (in office until November 2016) very rarely discussed upcoming issues with key coalition partners or most relevant ministers informally. Instead, he preferred to bring the issues straight to the cabinet meeting.

Almost as important as the political support of coalition partners is the backing of local governments. However, local governments often hold positions in opposition to the central government, which makes reaching agreement difficult. Because local governments and their associations cannot veto the policy process, their position is often ignored. In 2016, several local governments appealed to the court to controvert the government plan of compulsory municipality mergers.

In sum, there are several mechanisms to coordinate policy proposals informally. These mechanisms, however, at times facilitate, and at other times complicate, coordination.

**Germany**

Score 6

There are a number of informal mechanisms by which government policy is coordinated. The most important of these is the coalition committee, which comprises the most important actors (the chancellor, the deputy chancellor, the chairpersons of the parliamentary groups and the party chairpersons) within the coalition parties. According to the coalition agreement from November 2013, the coalition committee is expected to meet regularly at least once a month, or can be convened at the request of any of the coalition partners. The coalition committee rarely meets regularly. Only at the peak of the refugee crisis did the coalition committee meet frequently. Even then, it was sometimes unable to resolve political conflicts and develop coordinated policy responses.
Malta

Score 6

The government tendency toward informal coordination mechanisms has increased since Malta joined the European Union in 2004. Many directives from Brussels cut across departments and ministries, and this encourages ministries to talk to each other and work more closely together. Preparations for the EU Presidency in January 2017 has raised this informal coordination to unprecedented levels. Currently, the PMO exercises an expanded coordinating role which has advanced progress on some domestic issues and policies. Overall, this is the result of establishing the Ministry for European Affairs and Implementation of the Manifesto. Nevertheless coordination between ministries remains suboptimal, with a lot of room for improvement.

Mexico

Score 6

A number of informal mechanisms for coordinating policy exist, and given the lack of “formal” coordination capabilities within the Mexican administration, informal coordination often functions as a substitute. This is normal in a presidential system where only a few cabinet secretaries have independent political bases. Ministers retain their positions, for the most part, at the will of the president. It is important to note, however, that some cabinet secretaries are more equal than others. The Finance Ministry, and Ministry of the Interior and Police have assumed hegemonic roles under President Peña Nieto. As in previous periods, toward the end of the president’s term, competition to succeed President Peña Nieto is likely to further politicize the cabinet and constrain informal coordination. Moreover, Peña Nieto’s extremely low approval ratings make association with the administration a potential political liability.

Bulgaria

Score 5

Given the weakness of formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination and the fact that all recent governments have been either coalition or minority governments, informal coordination mechanisms have played a vital role in Bulgaria. Save for the 2005-2009 coalition government, the rules of coordination between the parties in the coalition or the parties supporting the government have not been announced and communicated to the public. While this informal coordination and consultation is helpful in overcoming gaps in the formal coordination procedures, it also makes the policymaking process more susceptible to penetration by illicit, special interest agendas.
Israel

Score 5

Israel’s government system is greatly influenced by informal coordination mechanisms, such as coalition obligations and internal party politics. However, due to its highly fragmented party system, it is hard to determine whether they support or undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. While coordination between like-minded parties may be made easier by the situation, fragmentation may result in stagnation over disputed policies.

Citation:
“Annual report 61 for the year 2010: Treatment of prolonged inter-ministerial disagreements,” The State Comptroller office website (Hebrew)
“Coalition management”, the Knesset website: http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/coalition-management.aspx (Hebrew)

Croatia

Score 4

Informal coordination in the form of meetings between the coalition partners featured prominently under the Milanović government. Meetings were mostly held between Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP) and Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (Hrvatska narodna stranka – liberalni demokrati, HNS) leaders, with the other coalition partners – the Istrian Democratic Assembly (Istarski demokratski sabor, IDS) and the Croatian Party of Pensioners (Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika, HSU) – playing a minor role. A strong reliance on these informal-coordination mechanisms helped maintain the tradition of keeping strategic decisions and policy coordination largely within the political parties’ ambit, preventing the development of more formal and transparent mechanisms of policy coordination or a strengthening of the public administration’s role.

Informal coordination mechanisms under the Orešković government also tended to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination. Interparty coordination between HDZ and MOST did not work, and the difficult accommodation of different party factions undermined coherent policymaking.

Cyprus

Score 4

A practice of informal meetings exists but are of low frequency. During the post-2010 economic difficulties, a practice of more formal meetings at various levels and between a variety of actors began to occur. During the period under review, a low number of ad hoc formal meetings took place, mainly information and consultation
Meetings between the president and/or ministers and party leaders, or local government officials. The period featured more discord between political actors than consultation, parties hindering decisions, and numerous laws referred to the Supreme Court.

Citation:

Romania

Score 3

Under the Ciolos government, the relationship between the government, with its non-partisan affiliation, and the parliament, with its PSD majority, remained tense. The Ciolos government struggled with difficulty to get a parliamentary majority for some of its measures and to prevent parliament from adopting measures not supported by the government. These struggles grew stronger the closer the parliamentary elections came. To gain parliament’s favor, cabinet members attended parliament one day per week for informal meetings with parliamentary groups. However, this informal coordination mechanism did not prove very effective.
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