



Social Inclusion Report

Social Inclusion Policy

Sustainable Governance
Indicators 2017

Indicator

Social Inclusion Policy

Question

To what extent does social policy prevent exclusion and decoupling from society?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Policies very effectively enable societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities.
- 8-6 = For the most part, policies enable societal inclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
- 5-3 = For the most part, policies fail to prevent societal exclusion effectively and ensure equal opportunities.
- 2-1 = Policies exacerbate unequal opportunities and exclusion from society.

Luxembourg

Score 9

Luxembourg's strong economic performance over the last three decades has provided successive governments with the means to build an outstanding welfare system, which includes generous insurance plans, benefit programs and public service provision. Most recently, the health care sector has been significantly expanded. Replacement revenue levels exceed Scandinavian standards. Since the 1970s, the welfare system has been consistently expanded, even when neighboring countries cut public welfare expenditure.

Over the decade, rental prices have risen by 43%. The government recognizes the challenge that this presents to households and is supporting the construction of about 11,000 new housing units. This should ease the pressure of inward migration and population growth, which grew by 2% in 2015. The government has allocated about €600 million between 2010 and 2025 for this housing program. Despite the scarcity of social housing, only 29% of the new housing units are intended for rental and 81% for sale to low-income groups. However, this will exclude the working poor and welfare beneficiaries with low credit ratings.

A delayed new housing allowance was finally introduced in 2016. The housing allowance will benefit around 19,000 low-income households, providing a monthly subsidy of €124 for a single household and a €174 for a family with two children. The allowance acknowledges the importance of social housing, especially in providing affordable rental properties for low-income people.

Nevertheless, the quantity of social housing is still below the European average. Some municipalities have decided to impose a special tax on unoccupied houses to create disincentives for leaving spaces empty and encouraging existing residential property to be rented or sold. In addition to local programs, public social housing

companies (Fonds du Logement and SNHBM) are intensifying their activities. The National Housing Fund was recently exposed to criticism following an audit and is currently being reformed with an eye to establishing effective quality control measures.

Citation:

“Erwerbstätigenquote nach Geschlecht.” Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de&pcode=t2020_10&plugin=. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

How’s Life in Luxembourg 2014? OECD Better Life Initiative, 2014. www.oecd.org/statistics/BLI%202014%20Luxembourg%20country%20report.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Income and living conditions.” Eurostat, ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/data/main-tables. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Le Fonds du logement, www.fondsdulogement.lu/fdl/home-de-j_6. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research, www.liser.lu. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Luxembourg.” OECD Better Life Index, www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/luxembourg/. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Paramètres sociaux. Ministère de la Sécurité Sociale, 2016. www.mss.public.lu/publications/parametres_sociaux/ps_20160801.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Rapport d’activité 2015. Ministère de la Famille, de l’Intégration et à la Grande Région, 2015. www.gouvernement.lu/5962520/2015-rapport-activite-snas.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Rapport d’activité 2015. Ministère de la Famille, de l’Intégration et à la Grande Région, 2016. www.mfi.public.lu/publications/01_rapports-activite/rapp_act_2015.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

SNHBM, snhbm.lu/index.php?p=52. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

“Social Expenditure.” OECD, stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Subvention de Loyer 2016. Ministère d’État, 2016. data.legilux.public.lu/file/eli-etat-leg-recueil-subvention_loyer-20151224-fr-pdf.pdf. Accessed 21 Feb. 2017.

Norway

Score 9

Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway is a relatively equitable society. Poverty rates are among the lowest in the world. The Norwegian government has assumed responsibility for supporting the standard of living of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. As a result, expenditures for social policy are well above the EU average. Government-provided social insurance is strong in almost all areas. Family-support expenditures exceed 3% of GDP, in the form of child allowances, paid-leave arrangements and child care. Social-insurance spending related to work incapacity (disability, sickness and occupational injury benefits) is also generous.

A major reform of the social-security administration was launched in 2006, the implementation of which has proved more protracted and expensive than anticipated and remains fraught with administrative problems.

As Norway's population is becoming increasingly heterogeneous, debates regarding the rules governing access to welfare benefits, the level of such benefits, and whether it should be possible to export benefits have grown. Increased immigration and unemployment rates are also likely to increase inequalities which, though having increased somewhat in the last decade, remain low compared to many other European countries, the United States and China.

Denmark

Score 8

Measured in terms of inequality and poverty, Denmark has a high degree of social cohesion and the country is fairly egalitarian.

There is ongoing discussion on various marginalized groups, especially the number of working age people who receive public support (about 800,000 persons) is attracting attention. Measured in terms of employment rates, Denmark is among the top performers in the OECD area. An important distinguishing welfare feature is that most people not in employment are entitled to some form of social transfer. Somewhat simplified, the debate is split between those arguing that the welfare state is creating a low incentive to work and those arguing that most unemployed suffer from various problems (from social problems to lack of qualifications) which make it difficult/impossible for them to find jobs.

A government appointed expert group proposed a new poverty line based on a relative poverty definition operationalized using the median-income method (2013), but this was abolished by the new government (2015).

Most social transfers have recently been reformed to strengthen the focus on employment. Thus, the disability pension scheme has been changed such that, for persons below the age of 40, the granting of disability pension is temporary (except for cases of severe and permanent loss of work capability); instead, the focus has shifted to using and developing the individual's remaining work capabilities. Likewise, the social assistance scheme has been reformed with a particular focus that young workers (below age 30) should attain education. For other age groups, the system now offers more flexibility and individualized solutions. Moreover, there is now a cap on total transfers as well as a work requirement (225 hours paid work within the last year) for full social assistance. For migrants (outside EU), Danish residence in seven out of the last eight years is required to qualify for normal social assistance otherwise a lower assistance is offered. The aim of these reforms is to strengthen the incentive to work, but for those failing or unable to respond to these incentives, poverty may result.

Overall, policy debates have focused on how to strengthen the economic incentives for recipients of social assistance to be in work. A 2015 report from the Council of Economic Advisers found that most unemployed persons obtain an economic gain from work; their discussion centers on whether this gain is large enough.

Citation:

John Campbell, "Note to Denmark: Don't Change a Thing," <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~vox/0506/0417/denmark.html> (accessed 19 April 2013).

"Det betyder kontanthjælpsreformen," <http://www.stakato.dk/det-betyder-kontanthjaelpsreformen/> (accessed 19 April 2013).

Ekspertudvalg om fattigdom, 2013, En dansk fattigdomsgrænse - analyser og forslag til opgørelsesmetoder, København.

Økonomisk Råd, 2015, Dansk Økonomi (efterår) København.

Økonomisk Råd, 2016, Diskussionsoplæg 11 oktober. http://www.dors.dk/files/media/rapporter/2016/E16/E16_DISK.pdf (assessed 21 October 2016)

Finland

Score 8

The Finnish constitution safeguards basic economic, social and educational rights for all people, with these rights guaranteed both by the state and by municipal authorities. However, reality does not completely measure up to this ideal. While social policy largely prevents poverty and the income-redistribution system has proven to be one of the most efficient in the European Union, pockets of relative poverty and social exclusion still prevail. In particular, poverty rates among elderly women are comparatively high due to the low pensions accrued within this population. Furthermore, inequalities in well-being exist between regions and municipalities, depending on demographic composition and economic strength. In general, the global economic crisis has exposed an increasing number of people to long-term unemployment and poverty.

In terms of life satisfaction and gender equality, Finland has embarked on a number of programs to improve its performance. The government has passed an Act on Equality between Women and Men, and gender discrimination is prohibited under additional legislation. Despite this legislation inequalities prevail between men and women, especially in the workplace. The government has placed a particular emphasis on programs for at-risk youth from 15 to 17 years old who experience social exclusion, as well as on programs to create equal opportunities for disabled individuals. Immigrants are another group that faces social exclusion, especially due to poor integration in the labor market.

Citation:

"Socially Sustainable Finland 2020. Strategy for Social and Health Policy", Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Helsinki, 2010.

Slovenia

Score 8

Slovenia has a strong tradition of social inclusion, with its Gini coefficient being the lowest among EU member countries. In the past, social policy focused on providing

selective benefits to the elderly and to families with children. Since the onset of the economic crisis, however, social disparities have widened. The Fiscal Balance Act, adopted by the Janša government in May 2012, cut several social-benefit programs and reduced the generosity of social benefits for the unemployed. Since then, however, most of these cuts have been reversed. In autumn 2015, the Cerar government launched a new National Housing Program 2015-2025.

Sweden

Score 8

An analysis of Sweden's social inclusion policy probably yields different results depending on whether it is conducted diachronically or synchronically. In the first approach, which observes Sweden over time, it is not difficult to see that social inclusion in some areas, particularly gender equality, works extremely well while other aspects of social inclusion are more problematic. Young people find it very difficult to find a job; large groups of immigrants are far from being integrated in Swedish society (see "integration policy"); poverty is low, but increasing; and the Gini coefficient measuring the distribution of wealth is still low but rapidly increasing. Thus, the empirical data point at significant problems in the areas of intergenerational justice and justice between native Swedes and immigrants.

If we compare Sweden with other countries, we find that recent developments challenge the country's historical position as a leader in the public provision of welfare through wealth redistribution and as a country with extremely low levels of poverty. Together, the data and recent developments suggest that Sweden is gradually losing its leading role in these respects and is today largely at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and income distribution. If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today. Reflecting on the 2014 general elections, Bo Rothstein concludes that "the days of Swedish exceptionalism are over." Not only does Sweden now have a strong anti-immigration party in its parliament, core data on Sweden's welfare state are moving toward levels found among comparable, average-performing countries. It remains to be seen whether the current red-green government will be able to reverse this development.

Citation:

Kvist, Jon et al. (eds.) (2012), *Changing Inequalities. The Nordic Countries and New Challenges* (Bristol: Policy Press)

Rothstein, Bo (2014), "The End of Swedish Exceptionalism", *Foreign Affairs*, September 18.

Switzerland

Score 8

In contrast to many Western European countries such as Germany, Switzerland has recorded no major increase of income inequality over the past 20 years. The country has largely been successful at preventing poverty. This is due to an effective system of social assistance, in particular with regard to older generations. It is rare to fall

into poverty after retirement. The main social-insurance programs regulated on the federal level (addressing sickness, unemployment, accidents and old age) work effectively, are comparatively sustainable and provide a generous level of benefits. Social assistance is means-tested, consequently some stigma is attached to its receipt.

Life satisfaction is very high, income inequality is moderate and stagnant, the share of working poor in the population is small and gender inequality has been reduced substantially in recent years. Nonetheless, some problems and tensions relating to social inclusion are evident.

First, the transition to a knowledge-based service economy entails new social risks. These will be faced most by workers unable to cope with the challenges of this new economy. These vulnerable workers include young people who lack either the cognitive or psychological resources to obtain sufficient training and begin a career, single mothers who are unable to finish vocational training, highly skilled female employees who cannot reconcile work and family, and persons (typically women) who must care for elderly relatives. Like most continental welfare states, Switzerland has not sufficiently reformed the welfare system to address the challenges of a service-based economy. There is, however, considerable variance between local communities in the degree to which they address these challenges.

Second, tensions between Swiss citizens and foreigners over the benefits provided by the welfare state, as well as their financing, are increasing. In 2016, foreign workers (representing 31% of the workforce) recorded an unemployment rate that was 2.5 times that of Swiss workers and in 2013 immigrants accounted for nearly 50% of all social assistance recipients. It should be noted that unemployment and poverty is most pronounced among low-skilled workers, where immigrants are over-represented. At the same time, highly skilled foreign employees subsidize a Swiss welfare state that benefits low-skilled foreign workers and middle-class Swiss workers (BSV 2015).

Also, some native workers view the growing population of foreign workers as burdening infrastructure (e.g., railways and highways), increasing competition on the housing market, and tightening competition for highly paid and desirable jobs. This state of affairs has fueled a number of conflicts, sparking tensions and frustration on all sides. To date, there has been no constructive discussion and search for solutions within Swiss society, a process that could include the termination of the mythology attached to sovereign Swiss citizenship. Instead, right-wing populism is on the rise, with the right-wing populist Swiss People's Party (SVP) becoming the strongest political force in the country.

Citation:

BSV (Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen), 2015: Faktenblatt - Auswirkungen der Personenfreizügigkeit EU/EFTA auf Sozialversicherungen und Sozialhilfe, available at: <http://www.bsv.admin.ch/themen/internationales/aktuell/index.html?lang=de>

Austria

Score 7

Austria's society and economy are rather inclusive, at least for those who are Austrian citizens. The Austrian labor market is nevertheless not as open as it could be. For those who are not fully integrated, especially younger, less-educated persons and foreigners (particularly non-EU citizens), times have become harder. The global and European financial crisis had less impact in Austria than most other countries. Nevertheless, competition within the rather well-protected system of employment has become significantly tougher. This can be seen in the rise in the country's unemployment rate, which is now higher than Germany's unemployment rate.

Outside the labor market, unequal outcomes within the education system and the remnants of gender inequality perpetuate some problems of inclusiveness. An additional challenge is the situation of migrants, political asylum seekers and refugees that poured into the country in high numbers during 2015. Austrian society and the political system are facing a very specific cross-pressure: to integrate the newcomers and to defend the prerogatives of Austrian citizens.

Social divides continue to exist along generational, educational, citizenship, and gender cleavages. Moreover, governments at the national, provincial and municipal levels have shown a decreasing ability to counter these trends, as their policy flexibility has been undermined by debt and low revenues. Income inequality has persistently risen in recent years, with the richest quintile growing always richer and the poorest quintile growing poorer. The income differential between men and women is also widening: Correcting for part-time work, women earn around 13% less than men. The number of people living in poverty has remained stable until 2015. Amongst others, families with three or more children are vulnerable to poverty or material deprivation.

According to recent OECD data, the distribution of wealth in Austria has grown increasingly more unequal in recent years. According to the OECD, efforts for fiscal consolidation after the crisis have contributed to an ever-more unequal distribution of wealth, resulting in a dire outlook for future economic growth.

During the period under review, the prospect of gender quotas for management positions in the business sector were debated. Advocates of this idea say it would help bring women into the most attractive and best-paid positions the economy has to offer.

Citation:

IMF, Fiscal Monitor October 2012, Washington D.C.

Poverty rates: <http://www.armutskonferenz.at/armut-in-oesterreich/aktuelle-armuts-und-verteilungszahlen.html>

Canada

Score 7

Most social policies, such as income transfers (e.g., child benefits, pensions) and educational policies, support societal inclusion and ensure equal opportunities. A Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS) study found that Canada's after-tax income Gini coefficient, which measures inequality after taxes and transfers, was 23.7% lower than the market-income Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers. The study also found that while the market Gini coefficient increased by 19.4% between 1981 and 2010, almost half of the increased market-income inequality was offset by changes in the transfer and tax system, thus providing strong evidence that Canada's redistribution policies reduce market-income inequality to a considerable degree.

However, certain groups, such as recent immigrants and aboriginal Canadians, are to a considerable degree excluded or marginalized from mainstream society. For these groups, social policy has done an inadequate job of preventing social exclusion. For immigrants, social disparities tend to diminish with the second generation. Indeed, second-generation immigrants often outperform the mainstream population on a variety of socioeconomic measures (including education, for example). The same cannot be said of the aboriginal population, where the young generation often performs significantly worse than the mainstream. In 2011, the proportion of aboriginals without a degree or diploma was 28%, more than twice as high as that of other Canadians. Aboriginal children represent almost half of all children in foster care across Canada, even though native people account for just 4.3% of the total population.

Citation:

Andrew Sharpe and Evan Capeluck (2012) "The Impact of Redistribution on Income Inequality in Canada and the Provinces, 1981-2010," CSLS Research Report 2012-08, September. <http://www.csls.ca/reports/csls2012-08.pdf>

Jeffrey G. Reitz, Heather Zhang, and Naoko Hawkins, 2011, "Comparisons of the success of racial minority immigrant offspring in the United States, Canada and Australia," *Social Science Research* 40, 1051-1066.

Statistics Canada (2013), *Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Métis and Inuit*, National Household Survey 2011 Analytical document 99-011-X

Statistics Canada (2013), *Education in Canada: Attainment, Field of Study and Location of Study*, National Household Survey 2011 Analytical document 99-012-X

Cyprus

Score 7

Poverty risk and social exclusion rates rose to 28.6% in 2015, against 27.4% in 2014, and five points above the pre-crisis rates (2008, 23.3%). Until 2011, poverty rates (7.80%) were lower than the EU average, with the elderly at highest risk. In view of the crisis, the country's social-welfare system has been routinely amended through the identification of and provision of support for vulnerable groups. Combating social exclusion focuses on the risk of poverty, participation in the labor market, assistance for children and young persons, and adaptation of the sector's institutions and mechanisms when necessary.

Since 2013, the government has been engaged in restructuring public-aid policies, allowances and targeted measures, including existing programs such as public sector employment quotas for persons with disabilities, housing programs for young families and other needy populations; special pensions and allowances to specific groups are provided. Policies were put in place aimed at assisting young people and other groups affected by the restructuring, benefits reductions, or the loss of employment and income. The “not in education, employment or training” (NEET) rate is relatively high in Cyprus. However, as mentioned above, larger groups are today at risk of poverty and exclusion (AROPE). At significantly higher risk are EU (33%) and non-EU (46.1%) citizens. Despite the trend, AROPE rates declined for people over 65 from 33.4% in 2012 to 20.8% in 2015. Elderly single women are at higher risk than other groups.

A guaranteed minimum income introduced in summer 2014 appears to have benefited a significant portion of the country’s households. Strict eligibility criteria such as income, property holdings and savings apply.

Citation:

1. At-risk-of-poverty indicators 2008-2015, Cyprus Statistics Service, 2016, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_25main_en/populationcondition_25main_en
2. EU assessment of the reform programme, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/swd2014_cyprus_en.pdf

France

Score 7

By international and European standards, the French welfare state is generous and covers all possible dimensions affecting collective and individual welfare, not only of citizens but also of foreign residents, and keeps poverty at a comparatively low level. Therefore, social inclusion in terms related to minimum income, health protection, support to the poor and families is satisfactory and has permitted that, up to now, the impact of the economic crisis has been less felt in France than in many comparable countries. The challenge for France at a time of economic decline and unemployment is, first, to provide sufficient funding for the costly system without undermining competitiveness with too-high levels of social contributions (which demands an overhaul of the tax and contribution system as a whole); and second, to recalibrate the balance of solidarity and individual responsibility, for instance by introducing more incentives for the jobless to search for employment.

The performance of the welfare state is less convincing when it comes to equal opportunities. Some groups or territorial units are discriminated against and marginalized. The so-called second-generation immigrants, especially those living in the suburbs, as well as less vocal groups in declining rural regions feel excluded from broader French society: abandoned to their fate, their situations combine poor education and training, unemployment, and poverty. A substantial share of young

people do not possess basic reading, writing and counting skills when they leave the school system. The situation in the suburbs (banlieues) has further deteriorated as the impact of the crisis is more directly felt in these areas with the highest concentration of French-born youth from migrant families. In addition, gender equality and, in particular, the right to equal pay is still an issue despite progress in recent years.

Germany

Score 7

Germany has a mature and highly developed welfare state, which guarantees a subsistence level of income to all citizens. The German social security system is historically based on the insurance model, supplemented by a need-oriented minimum income. Unemployment benefits have required some supplementation over the last decade and have to some extent even been replaced by need-oriented minimum levels of income.

There are a variety of minimum income benefit schemes, comprising unemployed (“Hartz IV”), disabled, old age minimum income support and asylum seeker assistance. The total number of recipients across all of these schemes increased in recent years and reached 8 million in December 2015 (9.7% of the population, Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). The composition of this number has been changing, with a declining number of Hartz IV recipients (due to the employment boom) and an increasing number of asylum seekers and old age minimum income recipients. About 540,000 are people over 65 and their numbers continue to grow. Generally, the risk of poverty for current pensioners is lower in comparison to the general population but is expected to rise significantly for future generations. This risk is already much higher for women than for men; the risk of poverty for women is also higher in the general population.

Until recently, income support for the working poor was provided through tax financed government transfers. However, in January 2015, this approach was fundamentally augmented with the introduction of a national statutory minimum wage designed to increase the market income of this at-risk segment of the population. Whether this innovation fosters or damages social inclusion will largely depend on its employment effects. No massive job losses are as yet noticeable.

In addition to the increasing threat of poverty in old age, the massive increase in asylum seekers and refugees since 2015 constitutes a second major challenge for the successful inclusion of all segments in the population. At the time of writing, it is not possible to forecast how well refugees will socially integrate. However, in 2016, public agencies, supported by civil society organizations, were largely effective in managing the crisis and providing essential living conditions to asylum seekers. However, increasing costs and concerns are making integration policies and social inclusion much more difficult than in previous years.

Citation:

Statistisches Bundesamt (2016): 8,0 Millionen Empfängerinnen und Empfänger von sozialer Mindestsicherung am Jahresende 2015, Pressemitteilung vom 28. November 2016 - 419/16.

Iceland

Score 7

Before 2008, the degree of inequality in Icelandic society increased dramatically. This was driven by a regressive tax policy, which in real terms reduced the income threshold at which households are exempt from paying income tax, and a rapid increase in capital income. High inflation rates further increased the burden on low-income wage earners, although the rate of inflation fell to around 2% at the beginning of 2014 and has since remained at a low level. The left-wing cabinet of 2009-2013 made the tax system more progressive by imposing the smallest tax increases on the lowest income groups. Consequently, according to Statistics Iceland (which failed to publish any information on income distribution until after the crash of 2008), the Gini coefficient for Iceland, excluding capital gains, rose from 24 in 2004 to 30 in 2009 and then fell back to 24 in 2015. Including capital gains, however, the Gini index for total disposable income in Iceland rose by one point a year from the mid-1990s onward until the crash of 2008, an unprecedented development (Gylfason, 2015, based on data from Internal Revenue Directorate; Ólafsson and Kristjánsson, 2013). Little is still known about the distribution of wealth and whether it became more skewed after the 2008 crash.

Nevertheless, this does not tell the whole story. The Organization of Disabled in Iceland argues that their members are being left behind as wages increase. Significant cuts in public expenditure followed the 2008 economic collapse. For example, pensions and social reimbursements were cut, and have not yet been fully restored to their former level. In October 2016, just before the elections, the Jóhannsson cabinet announced a raise in pensions to the same level as minimum wages in 2018. These raises will, however, not impact the disabled who seemingly have to wait longer for improvements.

After the crash, many families were dependent on food aid offered by volunteer organizations, a phenomenon not seen in Iceland for decades. Even so, Iceland performs quite well in international poverty comparisons, suggesting that social policies during the economic crisis were reasonably successful. For some households, however, the economic situation remains difficult but is gradually improving.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2015), "Social Capital, Inequality, and Economic Crisis," Challenge, July.

Internal Revenue Directorate (2016), <http://www.rsk.is/>.

OECD website, <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/income-distribution-database.htm>

Ólafsson, Stefán, and Arnaldur Sölvi Kristjánsson (2013), "Income Inequality in Boom and Bust: A Tale from

Iceland's Bubble Economy," in Gornick, Janet C., and Markus Jäntti (eds.), *Income Inequality Economic Disparities and the Middle Class in Affluent Countries*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 416-438.

Statistics Iceland (2015), Gini-index, quintile share ratio and At-risk-of-poverty threshold 2004-2015, http://px.hagstofa.is/pxen/pxweb/en/Samfelag/Samfelag__launogtekjur__4_tekjur__2_tekjur_silc/LIF01110.px/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=74cea146-49af-49e4-849c-8acf366a0b3a.

Ireland

Score 7

During the recession, Irish social and economic policy continued to place a high priority on poverty reduction. The poorest groups in society were protected from the worst effects of the recession. Although the rise in the unemployment rate and the fall in the employment rate drastically reduced household income for many, the real value of the principal social welfare payments has been protected in successive budgets since 2008 over a period when the take-home pay of those in employment fell significantly. Public spending on social protection rose to a peak of 11.0% of GDP in 2011, but had fallen to 9.4% in 2015 as economic growth resumed and the unemployment rate fell. However, the aging population structure continues to push up the cost of the state pension scheme.

Recent budgets have made no significant changes to the structure of the system of social protection. The most recent published results of the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) show that while the incidence of poverty rose from 14.1% in 2009 to 16.5% in 2012, it fell to 15.2% in 2013. However, the incidence of consistent poverty rose from 5.6% in 2009 to 7.7% in 2012 and continued to rise, to 8.2%, in 2013.

The incidence of homelessness is on the rise in the country's principal cities and towns. The virtual cessation of residential construction since the crash of 2008 combined with a recovery in house prices and rents since 2013 have made affordable housing increasingly difficult to obtain, especially in the Dublin area. The government responded to the growing public concern about these problems by increasing the 2016 budget allocation to social housing and asking the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) to rise to the challenge of providing 20,000 new residential units from its resources by 2020. However, many have been disappointed by the scale of this response relative to the magnitude of the problem.

In the 2016 budget, first steps were taken to restore the funds available for the education and support of people with intellectual disabilities that had been cut during the crisis period.

Netherlands

Score 7

Income inequality in the Netherlands produces a score of between 0.28 and 0.29 on the Gini Index, and has not changed since 2007. In 2015, highest incomes (top ten

percent) were 4.5 times larger than the lowest incomes (lowest ten percent). However, wealth inequality has a Gini coefficient of 0.894 and has increased since 2008, largely because of a decrease in the value of housing stock. In 2014, 6% of total wealth was owned by the lowest income group, while the highest owned 35%. Of the country's home-owning households, almost 1.4 million (32%) had mortgage debts higher than the market value of their house. This number is now rapidly declining due to a rise in house prices. Levels of health inequality in the Netherlands are high; wealthier and comparatively highly educated people live longer (on average seven years compared to low-income and less-educated populations), with healthier lives. Gender-based income inequality is high: on average, personal incomes among men (€40,200) are much higher than personal incomes among women (€23,800). The risk of long-term poverty has risen again since 2011, with a sharp increase in 2012. The number of households with a consistently very low income (i.e., a low income for more than 4 years) has generally decreased since 1996, though it rose from 2.4% in 2011 to 3.3% in 2014. The percentage of households with an income lower than the low-income threshold increased from 7.7% in 2011 to 9.4% in 2012 to 10.3% in 2014. Observers expect that this represents a peak, and 2015 will have marked the beginning of a decline in the poverty rate. Compared to other EU countries, the number of households at risk of social exclusion or poverty is still extremely low. Since 2008, the beginning of the economic crisis, poverty in the Netherlands has increased by one-third. Single-parent families, ethnic-minority families, migrants and those dependent on social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed income bracket. Of young people under 18 years old, 17% were at risk of poverty and/or social exclusion. Elderly people, until recently rarely exposed to poverty (with the exception of single women), were also affected by growing poverty rates due to a policy-triggered reduction in the purchasing power of pensions. All in all, the long economic crisis has manifested in higher levels of poverty. However, the risk of poverty and social exclusion in the Netherlands is just 15% (comparable to Sweden only). It should also be noted that the poverty threshold in the Netherlands is far higher than in most other EU countries (Luxembourg excepted). Responsibility for poverty policy in the Netherlands is largely held by municipal governments. Given the budgetary side effects of other decentralization policies, there are clear signs of risk for poverty policy too; for example, local governments have increasingly been tempted to require performance of unskilled labor (street cleaning, park maintenance, etc.) in return for assistance benefits. Moreover, they (too) easily punish benefit recipients for (alleged) fraud and abuse, and sometimes exclude illegal aliens from assistance benefits.

Citation:

CBS (2015), *Armoede en social uitsluiting 2015*, Den Haag

CBS (2016), *Welvaart in Nederland 2016. Inkomen, bestedingen en vermogen van huishoudens en personen*, Den Haag

"Dat opjagen van werklozen maakt armen steeds armer", in NRC.nl, 10 April 2015

New Zealand

Score 7

New Zealand has a long tradition of developing a more egalitarian society. Governments have established a comprehensive system of social security benefits, including income support. Increased efforts have been put into reducing general disparities, most evident between New Zealand Europeans and the Maori, Asian and Pasifika populations. These differences, however, are more of a reflection of economic, structural and geographic influences than race-based discrimination. With regard to gender equality, based on the ratio of female-to-male earned income, New Zealand has slipped behind in recent years, although, with a pay gap of 11.8% in 2015, it continues to rank among the top countries. In contrast, the rate of unemployment among Maori youth in 2014 was 22%, some four times above the national average. Pacific Island youth unemployment for the same year was at 25%. In recent years, there has been growing public awareness of the incidence of child poverty within New Zealand.

The housing problem is an ongoing and substantial social problem. Housing in New Zealand is more expensive than the OECD average, which affects the poor hardest. Today, the median house price in Auckland is about 10 times the median household income. The government is being criticized for responding too slowly and underestimating the seriousness of the housing problem. In January 2015, it announced the introduction of a Social Housing Reform Programme. In September 2016, housing legislation came into force, which aims to further stimulate house building in Auckland and free up land for low-cost housing, especially for first-home buyers.

Citation:

New Zealand Income Survey – June 2015 Quarter (Wellington: Statistics New Zealand 2015) (http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-work/Income/NZIncomeSurvey_HOTPJun15qtr.aspx) (accessed 18 September, 2016).

Editorial: Of course house prices must come down. The Dominion Post. 30 July 2016 (<http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/comment/editorials/82623765/editorial-of-course-house-prices-must-come-down>).

Children's Commission, 'Solutions to Child Poverty in New Zealand' (Wellington: 2012).

Collins, Simon, 2016. Government abandons social housing target of 65,000. New Zealand Herald. 15 July 2016 (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/politics/news/article.cfm?c_id=280&objectid=11674684).

Social Housing Reform Programme on track. 11 September, 2016 (<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/social-housing-reform-programme-track>) (accessed 13 September, 2016).

Dykes, Peter, 2016. The Quasi-Market Approach: the answer for social housing in New Zealand? Institute for Governance and Policy Studies. University of Wellington. Policy Quarterly – Volume 12, Issue 2. May 2016 (<http://igps.victoria.ac.nz/publications/files/bd7694d5606.pdf>) (accessed 18 September, 2016).

Poland

Score 7

Social inequalities have visibly declined since the early 2000s. This has partly been due to Poland's strong economic performance and the EU structural funds which were predominantly aimed at helping less-developed regions and relatively poor households. In addition, previous governments have been successful in mitigating

regional disparities through regional-development policies. Moreover, government policies have helped improve families' financial conditions, especially those suffering from poverty, and have increased average educational attainments. The most dramatic pockets of poverty have shrunk, and income inequality has fallen substantially since the early 2000s. In-depth sociological studies have shown that poverty in Poland is not inherited across generations. Still, the PiS was able to capitalize on looming popular dissatisfaction with social inclusion in the country. By raising family allowances and increasing the minimum wage, the PiS government has contributed to a further decline in social inequality.

Citation:

Matthes, C.-Y. (2016): The state of democracy in Poland after 2007: Analyzing the linkage between economic development and political participation, in: *Problems of Post-Communism* 63(5-6): 288-299, 290-292.

United Kingdom

Score 7

A traditional system of social class has long been a feature of British society. Since 1997, successive governments have sought, through a variety of policy instruments and initiatives, to overcome these divisions and to promote social mobility and inclusion. In his short second term as prime minister, David Cameron followed a classic one-nation conservatism policy that aimed to make the United Kingdom “a place where a good life is in reach for everyone who is willing to work and do the right thing,” which echoed the “welfare to work” policy approach of the previous coalition and Labour governments. His successor, Theresa May, followed this path by declaring her “mission to make Britain a country that works for everyone” in her first statement as prime minister in July 2016, although with a slightly more leftist spin. It remains to be seen how this rhetoric will coagulate into social policy.

However, while applauding a sharp reduction in child poverty and an increase in the enrolment rate of students from disadvantaged backgrounds in tertiary education, the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission's latest State of the Nation report also observed that “progress to date has been too limited and too slow.” The report noted the persistence of divisions around various social criteria, including class, geography and race. Although the UK's Gini coefficient has fallen significantly, a common phenomenon after a grave recession, it remains relatively high compared to other OECD countries and the distribution of wealth has become more unequal. While youth unemployment had fallen to 13.1% by September 2016, it is still more than double the overall unemployment rate of 4.8%. A policy innovation has been the creation of a social mobility index.

Overall, the proportion of “NEETs” (people who are not in employment, education or training), continued to decline, but is still high in some of the less affluent cities. In addition, the average income of young people has started to lag behind the average income of other working-age population groups. A chronic shortage of affordable housing has further exacerbated the situation of low-income households in the more

prosperous metropolitan areas across the south-east of England. This shortage has made it especially difficult for young people to get on to the housing ladder.

Despite persistent economic inequalities, the United Kingdom has a relatively good record in promoting the inclusion of disadvantaged groups and ethnic minorities, and also has a relatively good record on gender equality. There has been a discernible social shift against forms of discriminatory language or action, with a number of public figures being ostracized as a result of inappropriate comments. Legislation allowing same-sex marriage came into force in 2014. While reservations regarding multiculturalism and anti-immigrant sentiments remain common, immigrants tend to be more socially integrated than in many other countries. However, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of some “leave” campaign messaging, and widely reported attacks on immigrants and social minorities in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum testify to the persistence of hostile attitudes in some quarters.

Citation:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/485928/State_of_the_nation_2015__foreword_and_summary.pdf https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/532793/Main_text_SFR22_2016.pdf

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-mobility-index>

<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may>

Belgium

Score 6

According to the OECD, Belgian workers benefit from advantageous working conditions in terms of wages, but at the price of a long-term unemployment rate that stands almost twice as high as the OECD average. Social policy was extremely generous and broad until the financial crisis, but the last two governments have tightened social spending substantially. As a consequence, the number of beneficiaries of unemployment benefits has dropped substantially, much more so than unemployment itself.

More significantly, the refugee crisis (with massive inflows of migrants, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan) may induce Belgium to tighten its immigration policy and reduce the generosity of its poverty assistance beyond what would be desirable for the general population.

Citation:

OECD Economic Surveys: Belgium, February 2015:
http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Overview_Belgium_2015_Eng.pdf

OECD better life initiative 2016: <http://www.oecd.org/belgium/Better-Life-Initiative-country-note-Belgium.pdf>

Czech Republic

Score 6

Due to a favorable employment picture and a still rather redistributive social policy, income inequality and poverty in the Czech Republic remain among the lowest in the OECD and the European Union. However, there are substantial differences between

regions and ethnic groups. Since 2006, the number of areas of social exclusion (defined as those where more than 20% of inhabitants live in inadequate conditions) has doubled to about 600, now covering more than 100,000 people. In more than half of these areas, Roma form a majority. In these areas, about 75% of the inhabitants are low-skilled and the average unemployment rate is between 80% and 85%. A further problem is inadequacy of municipal and social housing. In 2016, for many people living in disadvantaged localities, the private rental accommodation at market prices is not financially inaccessible. In 2016, the government started drafting a law on social housing. Though it has faced criticism from municipal governments, which see it as an attack on their powers.

Citation:

Čada, K. (ed.): Analysis of the Socially Excluded Localities in the Czech Republic. Prague: GAC.

Estonia

Score 6

In general terms, the Estonian welfare system resembles the liberal welfare model. The country's poverty and inequality levels are rather high and have remained static, or even increased in the period under review.

Since labor-related income experienced the most growth, it was mostly the poverty of wage employees that was reduced. Social transfers did not follow step with the rapid wage increases, resulting in increased relative poverty levels for the retired, the unemployed and families dependent on social benefits. In the non-working population, poverty is highest among the elderly, but most severe in the case of children. There are also gender disparities in poverty indicators. The risk of falling into poverty is higher for women (23.3% for women and 19.6% for men), but poverty among men is deeper (the relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap was 16.9% for women, and 28,3% for men).

Government policies have addressed some material deprivation issues. In January 2016, universal child allowance was increased and new monthly benefits for families with three or more children were introduced. However, these measures have so far failed to curb high levels of child poverty. The second government initiative on income tax reimbursements for low-wage workers will take effect in 2017. Yet, as the poverty trends indicate, the problem of working poor has been relieved by wage increases.

Income levels are much lower in rural and remote regions than in the capital area, reflecting great regional disparities. The absence of effective regional policy measures has accelerated the outflow of the working-age population from these areas. This in turn puts an additional burden on families, and makes the formulation of sound social policy all the more difficult.

Subjective perceptions of poverty and inequality levels are also critical. The majority of Estonians feel that income disparities are too high and that job incomes do not

correspond to their personal contribution. Furthermore, life satisfaction is lower than in comparable countries.

Despite the election of Kersti Kaljulaid as the country's first female president in 2016, low levels of female representation remain a problem. At the end of 2016, women accounted for only 27% of members of parliament and only four out of 14 cabinet ministers.

Citation:

Statistics Estonia (2016). Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2016. <http://www.stat.ee/277639> (accessed 03.11.2016)

Japan

Score 6

Japan, once a model of social inclusion, has developed considerable problems with respect to income inequality and poverty during the course of the past decade. Gender equality also remains a serious issue. In terms of the poverty rate, the distribution of income, measured through the Gini coefficient, and in terms of life satisfaction Japan now ranks in the lower half of its OECD peers, according to the SGI database. In a shame culture like Japan, official statistics for poverty may actually hide even more serious “invisible” hardships, e.g., child poverty.

The LDP-led government, in power since late 2012, at first opted to focus its attention on its growth agenda. Only social inclusion measures fitting this agenda (for example, increasing child care options for working mothers) played a somewhat prominent role. More recently, the government is taking social inclusion concerns more seriously. The Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens, adopted by the cabinet in June 2016, shortly before the Upper House elections of July 2016, includes more wide-ranging target groups including people with disabilities or the elderly. Labor market measures like the concept of “equal pay for equal work” have been mentioned elsewhere in this report.

Citation:

Abe, Aya, Child Poverty, the Grim Legacy of Denial, Nippon.com Portal, 12 February 2016, <http://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00341/>

Cabinet (Japan), The Japan's Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens, 2 June 2016

Lithuania

Score 6

The issue of social exclusion is a key challenge for Lithuania's social policy. In 2014, 27.3% of the Lithuanian population was at risk of poverty and social exclusion, higher than the EU average of 24.4%. Families with many children, people living in rural areas, youth and disabled people, unemployed people, and elderly people are the demographic groups with the highest poverty risk.

The Lithuanian authorities have set a goal of reducing the size of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion to 814,000 individuals by 2020 (from 1,109,000 in 2010). The number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion fell to 804,000 in 2014 due to the economic recovery and some policy measures, but remained above the pre-crisis level. Lithuania remains one of the most unequal countries in the European Union. The 2012 to 2016 government increased the monthly minimum wage and the non-taxable threshold of the income tax to reduce poverty.

A mix of government interventions (general improvements to the business environment, active labor-market measures, adequate education and training, cash social assistance, and social services targeted at the most vulnerable groups) is needed in order to ameliorate Lithuania's remaining problems of poverty and social exclusion. The Lithuanian authorities have adopted a social-cohesion action plan for the 2014 to 2020 period. Several relevant measures were approved as part of the new "social model," although their implementation will depend on the newly formed coalition government.

Citation:

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, country report Lithuania 2016: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_lithuania_en.pdf

Malta

Score 6

Malta has a consolidated social benefits system that supports those with low incomes; in addition, health care and education for everyone is available free of charge. However, the high risk of poverty among the unemployed and the elderly suggest that welfare benefits and pensions have not been consistently adequate. This was partially addressed in the 2015 and 2016 budgets when lower pension bands were raised and incentives to help people return to work introduced. Social security expenditure amounted to €23.2 million during the first half of 2016, 3.8% higher than the expenditure for the same period in 2015. In 2015, the at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion rate was 22.4%, with the at-risk-of-poverty threshold increasing by 5.5% over the previous year. The 2016 Commission Staff Working Document indicated that Malta is still lagging behind in terms of its Europe 2020 poverty target. The at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion for particular groups in Malta remains exceedingly high, including 24.1% for children and 16.9% for the elderly (compared to the EU average of 13.8%). Moreover, Eurostat data for 2015 indicates that 43.4% of Maltese children whose parents had a low level of educational attainment were at risk of poverty. However Eurostat data also shows that for children exposed to the triple burden (ARP) risk of poverty, severe material deprivation and low work intensity, there are encouraging signs. There was a huge decrease of single parents with dependent children (from 30.3% in 2012 to 17.1% in 2015), indicating that family friendly measures put in place are having positive results.

Disabled persons remain relatively marginalized. In the second quarter of 2015, there were 20,000 disabled persons of working age in Malta, but only 1,450 were in

employment. A number of measures aimed at mitigating this situation have already generated positive results with 24 disabled persons finding employment each month as opposed to the previous figure of 100 annually. These measures include an obligatory contribution from employers who do not employ disabled individuals, and tax credits and incentives for employers who employ disabled individuals. Disabled individuals who are in employment are entitled to receive full benefits irrespective of their salary.

Several measures have been introduced over the last few years to address social problems. These include supplementary benefits for children, the provision of breakfast at school, greater support for low-income working parents through the creation of after-school clubs for their children, fiscal incentives for people to invest in pensions programs and an annual bonus for senior citizens over the age of 75. These social measures are being consolidated further in the 2017 budget with the launch of a €50 million social housing project and the establishment of a fund for disadvantaged students. Raising the minimum wage over a three-year period has been recommended by certain groups but remains controversial – some fear that it would undermine Malta’s competitive edge.

Citation:

National Statistics Office (NSO) News Release 120/2016

National Statistics Office (NSO) News Release 152/2016

Commission Staff Working Document Country Report Malta 2016 COM (2016) 338 final p.27

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_li60&lang=en

Malta Independent 02/06/15 95% of persons with disability unemployed, employers will have to start paying contributions.

Budget 2016 Speech (English) p. 31

Budget 2015 Speech (English) p. 49

Malta Independent 13/10/2015 Budget 2016: What’s in it for you – point by point, how the budget will affect you.

Budget 2017 Speech (Maltese) p. 134, p. 138

A Minimum essential budget for a decent living. Caritas Malta 2016

Times of Malta 24/11/2016 Child poverty is expensive

South Korea

Score 6

While still smaller than the OECD average, the gap between rich and poor has widened significantly in the past 15 years, and continued to do so during the assessment period. Criticism of the government’s lack of action on this issue is growing in strength. The South Korean tax and welfare system is not designed to reduce inequality, while its capacity to prevent poverty is very limited given the extremely low level of social transfer payments. These small payments force unemployed individuals to accept any job offer, even if wages are much lower than in their previous employment. This explains why South Korea has the highest share of working poor in the OECD. The welfare system also depends on family-based security, in which parents are willing to support their children even after completion of a university degree. Young people in particular still suffer from social exclusion. Gender equality is also still far below the OECD average.

In South Korea's increasingly money- and consumption-oriented society, poverty is becoming a source of shame, which might partly explain the low levels of life satisfaction. Relative poverty, particularly among the elderly, remains a serious problem, and suicide rates particularly for the 60-plus generation are among the highest in the world. Although the Park Geun-hye government promised to improve the welfare system particularly for the elderly, it experienced difficulties in implementing her ambitious goals, and was forced to backtrack on a key election promise of introducing a general monthly pension of KRW 200,000 (6) for citizens over 65 regardless of income level.

The recent massive influx of North Korean defectors has raised potentially troublesome issues of integration into South Korea's workforce. Available data on the work integration of North Korean defectors reveals this group's marginalization within the primary labor market, with other indicators also showing poor labor-force integration. There has been some improvement in terms of embracing multicultural families and illegal-immigrant workers, but South Korea has a long way to go before becoming a genuinely inclusive society.

Citation:

Bidet, Eric, 2009: Social Capital and Work Integration of Migrants: The Case of North Korean Defectors in South Korea, *Asian Perspective* 33(2), 2009

OECD, *Society at a Glance 2011*, <http://www.oecd.org/korea/societyataglance-asiapacifiedition2011.htm>

OECD, *Pension at a Glance 2013*, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/pensions-at-a-glance-2013_pension_glance-2013-en

United States

Score 6

The United States has long had high levels of economic inequality, and these levels have been increasing. In recent years, there has been persistent poverty along with exceptionally large income gains for the top 1% and especially the top 0.1% of the income scale. The United States ranks in the top (i.e., worst) five among the 41 OECD countries with regard to the proportion of the population (17.3%) that receives less than 50% of the median income.

A number of Obama-administration initiatives benefit low-income families. The Affordable Care Act expands health coverage to an enlarged share of the low-income population. Many elements of the 2009 stimulus package tried to address the hardship caused by the recession. In general, Obama's major social policy initiatives have been implemented on a temporary basis. His administration's social policy approach has relied heavily on tax-policy instruments that benefit working-poor households and help the non-working poor to a lesser degree.

Deficit politics and Republican resistance to social spending led to cuts in the food-stamp program as a part of the 2014 farm bill. In 2016, up to one million individuals were expected to lose food stamp assistance as temporary suspension of work requirements expired. About two-dozen Republican-led states have declined to

expand Medicaid health care for the poor as provided for under Obama's health care reform. On the other hand, Obama supported increasing the federal minimum wage, while several states and cities increased their local minimum wage. Nevertheless, the number of children living in poverty has risen, with 1.3 million children homeless. In 2015, the administration initiated a \$200 million pilot program to improve employment prospects among food-stamp recipients. But for the most part, divided party control of government has continued to prevent significant action on social inclusion.

Australia

Score 5

Australia continues to have a mixed record of social inclusion. While successive governments have made considerable efforts to promote social policies that reduce social exclusion, the comparatively flexible labor market has probably been the most effective instrument with regard to ensuring social inclusion.

However, promoting social inclusion did not become an explicit policy goal at the federal level until the election of the Labor government in 2007. At that time, the government created a Social Inclusion Unit (SIU) within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC), which reported to the deputy prime minister. Shortly after coming to office in 2013, the Abbott government abolished the SIU and removed all references to social inclusion from policy documents. However, Prime Minister Abbott did take personal responsibility for indigenous affairs by shifting the portfolio to the PMC and becoming the responsible minister, thereby signaling the policy importance of improving indigenous outcomes. The latest proposal, which streamlines the existing 150 programs into a single Indigenous Advancement Strategy, may potentially improve the lives of indigenous Australians. However, considering the failure of virtually all past initiatives, this would be a surprise. The dire situation of the indigenous population continues to be one of Australia's biggest social issues. Life expectancy of indigenous Australians is about ten years below the Australian average.

In December 2013, the Minister for Social Services commissioned a review of the welfare system with the goal of identifying possible improvements and ensuring the system was sustainable, effective and coherent, and encouraged people to work. The final report of the Reference Group, released in February 2015, advocated streamlining payments into five primary benefits for the working-age population, reducing effective marginal tax rates on welfare recipients in order to encourage employment participation, and adopting an "investment approach" within Australia's social-support system, which in turn would ideally reduce long-term reliance on welfare through targeted investments in benefit recipients. The government broadly accepted the recommendations, but as of the end of the review period, few had been implemented.

Citation:

Australian Institute of Health and Welfare: Mortality and life expectancy of Indigenous Australians 2008 to 2012, <http://www.aihw.gov.au/publication-detail/?id=60129548470&tab=2>.

Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 'A New System for Better Employment and Social Outcomes', Australian Government, February 2015: <https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/review-of-australias-welfare-system/a-new-system-for-better-employment-and-social-outcomes-full-version-of-the-final-report>.

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Table_1_Youth_unemployment,_2014Q4_%28%25%29.png

<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Health-Performance-Framework-2014/tier-1-health-status-and-outcomes/120-infant-and-child-mortality.html>

<https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/indigenous/Health-Performance-Framework-2014/tier-1-health-status-and-outcomes/119-life-expectancy-birth.html>

Chile

Score 5

In terms of possibilities for upward mobility, Chile still fails to overcome a long lasting and broadening social gap. There still is, for example, much exclusion along ethnic lines and a considerable gap between poor parts of the population and the middle class. There is also little upward mobility within higher income groups. The middle class in general and especially the lower middle class can be considered highly vulnerable given the lack of support for those suffering unemployment or health problems. Middle-class wealth tends to be based on a high level of long-term indebtedness and its share in the national income is low even by Latin American standards. The income distribution is highly unequal; although GDP (2015) is about \$240 billion and GDP per capita (2015) about \$14,100, 70% of the population earns a monthly income less than \$640 (CLP 426,000). About 53.5% of the population earns less than \$440 (CLP 300,000) per month. Furthermore, poverty rates among the elderly people are disturbingly high.

The public-education system provides a comparatively low-quality education to those who lack adequate financial resources, while the approach to social policy promoted and supported by the Chilean elite maintains this very unequal social structure. Although some social programs seeking to improve the situation of society's poorest people have been established and extended, the economic system (characterized by oligopolistic and concentrated structures in almost all domains) does not allow the integration of considerable portions of society into the country's middle class. Moreover, the lower-middle class in particular can be regarded more as a statistical category than a realistic characterization of people's quality of life, given that the majority of the Chilean middle class runs a perpetual risk of falling (material) living standards, as their consumer spending is mainly financed by credit and individual debt. If a household's primary income earner loses his or her job, or a family member has serious health troubles, families tend to face rapid impoverishment.

Reforms planned by Bachelet's government (in the realms of taxation, education and labor) are expected to have substantial pro-inclusionary effects. Some of these have already been introduced, while others are on the way or still under discussion.

Citation:

<http://www.fundacionso.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Verdaderos-Salarios-2015.pdf>

<http://www.elmostrador.cl/mercados/2015/10/14/desigualdad-historica-este-2015-el-1-mas-rico-de-la-poblacion-alcanzo-el-mismo-patrimonio-que-el-99-restante-del-mundo/>

<http://data.iadb.org>

<http://datos.bancomundial.org/pais/chile>

Italy

Score 5

The impact of the crisis on the incomes of a significant percentage of households and the increasing levels of unemployment – particularly among young people – have had important negative effects on social inclusion. The gap between the more protected sectors of the population and the less protected ones has increased. The traditional instruments of social protection (such as those guaranteeing unemployment benefits for workers with permanent labor contracts) do not cover a large part of the newly impoverished population, while new policies are only slowly being implemented.

In general, allowances for families with children are rather small, and do not compensate for the costs of raising a large family. The problem of poverty is thus particularly serious for young families, especially where only one adult is employed. Some of the pensions of the elderly are also extremely low.

The progressive tax system and a series of deductions and benefits for low-income individuals – which should have accomplished redistributive functions – have largely ceased to work in this direction. The system's redistributive efforts have been curtailed by the rise in tax rates and the erosion of benefits and deductions, as well as the large tax evasion among certain parts of the population. Moreover, the system's redistributive effects fail to reach that part of the population, which earns less than the minimum taxable income. An effective poverty reduction policy would require larger and more effective instruments.

The ongoing economic crisis has exposed the weaknesses of Italy's social policy. The main social policy instrument used to mitigate and reduce social exclusion is pensions. Other instruments are not very effective and Italian national standards are not very good. On average, local social programs in the north of the country can deliver benefits three times higher than in the south. Italian family networks still constitute the most important though informal instrument of social welfare. The high percentage of home ownership helps protect many Italians from absolute poverty. Housing problems, which would be insurmountable for many young people, are to some extent mitigated by family rather than public support.

The current government has begun to address these problems with a variety of instruments. The €80 monthly tax credit for low income earners, the “Bonus bebé” (an allowance paid to families for each new baby), the NASPI (a new unemployment allowance) and increases for low level pensions indicate the willingness of the government to respond to this emergency. Overall, the impact of these policies is still insufficient.

The government must also address the large proportion of young people not in education, employment or training, particularly in the south of Italy. Otherwise, a generation of young people will be marginalized, unable to participate in the economy. The high rate of youth unemployment is also threatening the pension system and future tax revenues. The government will need to develop special social policies.

Latvia

Score 5

While economic growth and stabilization is evidenced by some economic and social indicators (such as poverty rates), the depth of the 2008 – 2010 economic crisis and persistence of high unemployment rates have until very recently had a lasting impact on citizens’ welfare and quality of life. Latvia has one of the highest levels of income disparity among EU member states, with a Gini index of 35.4 in 2015, still one of the largest in the European Union. This situation has been exacerbated by policy decisions that favored rapid economic recovery at the cost of social-security provision for at-risk population groups.

Between 2011 and 2015, income-tax rates have been reduced from 26% to 23%, the threshold at which tax would be levied on income was increased, and social taxes have been reduced slightly. These are all measures expected to reduce the risk of poverty for low-income wage earners.

European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) indicate that the size of the at-risk population in Latvia decreased from 2011 to 2012 by an impressive 3.9% to 36.2% in 2012 and further decreased to 30.9% in 2015.

Latvia’s economic-recovery package included policies to address poverty and unemployment. The social safety net includes a guaranteed minimum income (GMI) program addressing the needs of unemployed people and at-risk population groups. The minimum GMI benefit has since been increased, but responsibility for financing the program has been transferred from central to local government. This has undermined the program’s financial sustainability, and as the economy has recovered, a gradual phase-out is being considered. However, the GMI benefit remains in place for 2016.

The high emigration rate serves as a major indicator of marginalization and the lack of opportunity. A total of 254,557 people left Latvia between 2006 and 2015.

Moreover, recent research shows that the emigrants are on average better educated than those who have stayed. The annual emigration rate is falling, however. This massive emigration, coupled with a high mortality rate and low birth rate, has led to a 12% decline in population over the past 10 years, the second-largest decline in the European Union. In 2012, a governmental working group was charged with devising policies to encourage emigrants to return to Latvia. The working group's report, *Proposals for Measures to Support Re-emigration*, was approved by parliament on 29 January 2013. The report recommended: the provision of relevant information to potential returnees using a single one-stop website, including labor market information; a focus on attracting a highly skilled workforce; the provision of Latvian language training when necessary; engaging in active cooperation with the diaspora (especially regarding development of business relationships); and the provision of support for students and school-aged children returning to the country. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed an ambassador-at-large to support and promote these initiatives. A 2016 review of the implementation of this plan concluded that it has only been partially implemented due to severe underfunding. For example, in 2016 only €07,800 were dedicated to all re-emigration activities, significantly below the planned €1.2 million.

Citation:

1. European Commission, Unemployment Statistics, Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rate,_2001-2012_%28%25%29.png&filetimestamp=20130417141135, Last Assessed: 20.05.2013.
2. State Employment Agency (2013), Unemployment Statistics Report, Available at: <http://www.nva.lv/index.php?cid=6#bezdarbs>, Last assessed: 20.05.2013.
3. Central Statistical Bureau, Database, Available at: <http://data.csb.gov.lv>
4. Ministry of Economy (2013), Re-emigration Plan, Report and Supporting Documents, Available at: <http://www.em.gov.lv/em/2nd/?cat=30791>, Last assessed: 20.05.2013
5. Inta Mierina (2015), *Latvijas Emigrantu Kopienas: Cerību Diaspora*. LU: Riga. Available at: http://fsi.lu.lv/userfiles/image/ESF%20Latvijas%20emigrantu%20kopienas/FSI_Ceribu_diaspora_pub.pdf

Portugal

Score 5

Government social policies seeking to limit socioeconomic disparities do exist, but they are poorly funded and are not very effective in preventing poverty. Between 2010 and 2014, taxes were first imposed and then increased on pensions, which are now taxed like ordinary income. In view of the need to reduce the government's social costs, there was also substantial pressure to reduce contributions to poverty-reduction programs, including pensions.

This led to an increase in the risk of poverty after social transfers, from a level of 17.9% in 2010 to 19.5% in 2014. The risk of poverty after social transfers has stabilized since 2014, with the level for 2015 remaining at 19.6%.

The Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 to 2019 heavily emphasizes programs for tackling social inclusion, such as increasing the minimum wage and reversing austerity measures imposed on pension and welfare payments. Due to the critical economic situation and high public debt, equivalent to 4.4% of GDP, further social inclusion policies have been postponed.

Citation:

Expresso

Eurostat (2015), “At-risk-of-poverty thresholds - EU-SILC survey”, Available online at: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_li01&lang=en

Slovakia

Score 5

The Slovak social-protection system covers standard social risks. Due to the country’s relatively uniform income distribution, the risk of poverty is relatively low. In 2015 about 18.4% of Slovakia’s inhabitants were in danger of poverty. By comparison, the EU average was almost 6 percentage points higher. While Roma and children from disadvantaged families have become the most endangered group, the share of seniors (65 and older) at risk of poverty fell from 21.9% in 2007 to 12.8% in 2015. Access to the labor market, especially for women and people living in the east and north, has remained a challenge. Despite some progress in closing the gap, unemployment in Bratislava has been substantially lower than in eastern Slovakia. The main reasons for this phenomenon are the combination of low growth and job creation in the country’s central and eastern regions, as well as an insufficient regional labor mobility to job-rich areas. The Roma face the highest poverty risk within the Slovak population.

Spain

Score 5

Societal exclusion remains a perennial problem for Spain: 22.3% of Spaniards live at risk of poverty. Those at a higher risk of marginalization include immigrants, unemployed youth and elderly people with minimal pensions. Particularly serious is the child-poverty rate of nearly 30%, according to different reports published by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights or the Spanish statistical authority (INE). Women (in particular those in precarious employment and heading a single-parent family) are more vulnerable than men. Finally, the share of employed people living under the poverty threshold is also very high, one of the worst cases in the EU. Two back-to-back recessions (2008 – 2009 and 2010 – 2013) further impoverished vulnerable households and broadened the gap between the poorest and wealthiest sectors of the population. Spain’s Gini coefficient (0.35) places the country as more unequal than Germany, France, Italy or the United Kingdom. While it performs better than the United States and Japan on this issue, it is more unequal than most European states. The combined impact of economic difficulties (rising

unemployment rates along with cuts in salaries and benefits) and austerity measures (affecting health care, education, social services and disabled-person support programs) have exacerbated marginalization. The National Action Plan on Social Inclusion for the 2013 – 2016 period has clearly proved insufficient, and privately run social organizations have been unable to fill the service-provision gap. Nonetheless, Spain is on par with the OECD average in terms of welfare spending on pension, family, health and integration policies as a share of GDP.

The situation is better with regard to areas of discrimination not associated with poverty, particularly regarding gender equality within institutions and the rights accorded to homosexuals (see “Non-discrimination”).

Citation:

Mayo 2016, INE: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
<http://www.ine.es/prensa/np969.pdf>

Junio 2016, El País: “Most Spaniards see a lot more inequality as a result of the crisis, survey shows”
http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/03/inenglish/1464940697_566789.html

EU Social Justice Index 2016

http://www.social-inclusion-monitor.eu/uploads/tx_itao_download/Social_Justice_Index_2016.pdf

Turkey

Score 5

Despite an improved Gini coefficient – falling from 42.2 in 2003 to 39.1 in 2014 – income distribution in Turkey continues to be among the OECD’s most unequal. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, the highest income group (20% of population) receives 45.9% of income in the economy, while the lowest 20% of population receives only 6.2%. According to the World Bank (2016) poverty decreased from 44% in 2002 to 22% in 2012. Poverty in Turkey is particularly prevalent among the less educated, workers in the informal market, unpaid family workers, the rural population and the elderly.

The government has developed an integrated social-assistance system geared toward helping welfare recipients get out of poverty. Social-assistance spending has increased rapidly in recent years, amounting to 1.26% of GDP in 2013. But there is still room to increase the generosity of benefits, as only about 10% of beneficiary household consumption is covered by social-assistance transfers. Since 2011 responsibility for all central government social-assistance benefits has been combined under the new Ministry of Family and Social Policies. This ministry has worked to strengthen social inclusion. The government has been implementing an Integrated Social Assistance Information System, using a single proxy means test to target benefits more effectively. Links between the social-assistance system and active labor market policies implemented by ISKUR are being strengthened.

The vast refugee crisis created an extra burden on the government’s efforts to improve the quality of social inclusion. Local governments and several civil society organizations share this burden on ad hoc manner.

Citation:

World Bank (2016) 'World Bank Group - Turkey Partnership: Country Program Snapshot', Washington D.C.
Wendy Zeldin, "Refugee Law and Policy: Turkey," March 2016, Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/turkey.php> (accessed 1 November 2016).

Bulgaria

Score 4

Compared to other EU countries, Bulgaria achieves poor results in preventing exclusion and decoupling from society. Bulgaria also suffers from a relatively high (compared to other EU countries) and rising level of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. There is a general level of dissatisfaction with the state of society, which can be explained by the loss of subjective security during the transition to a market economy, the inability of state social policies to replace social networks disrupted by the transition, and the unfavorable international comparison in terms of material deprivation and poverty rates.

In general, Bulgaria's social policy is unsuccessful in including and integrating people with lower-than-secondary education, minorities and foreigners (mainly refugees or immigrants). As a recent analysis of upward income mobility of the people in the lowest quintile for the 2010-2013 period indicates (Institute for Market Economics 2016), the major determinant of the lack of mobility is employment, and education and labor-market flexibility are among the major determinants of employment. The lack of regional differentiation in the level of the minimum wage and in social security thresholds, the prevailing limits to free business entry and exit, and poor judicial performance in the business sphere prevent people in the lowest quintile and in disadvantaged groups from being employed or starting a business. Additionally, there are no policies sufficiently tailored to the integration needs of specific groups such as minorities and immigrants. Another contributing factor to weak social inclusion is the fact that some political actors have a vested interest in keeping certain voter cohorts in a position of dependence.

The European refugee crisis of the last several years, of which Bulgaria has experienced a small part, has demonstrated two things. First, xenophobia and xenophobic parties are on the rise. Second, government policies in accommodating and integrating refugees have generally failed, while civic organizations have proven to be very active and, in fact, indispensable to helping address refugees' basic needs.

Citation:

Institute for Market Economics (2016): Dynamics of poverty. Analysis of socio-economic mobility and persistent poverty in Bulgaria. Sofia (http://ime.bg/var/images/Poverty_IME_pril16.pdf).

Croatia

Score 4

Poverty and social exclusion are major problems in Croatia. Whereas the income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) and the Gini coefficient broadly match the EU-28 average, 29.1% of the Croatian population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, a figure five percentage points higher than the EU-28 average. In addition, a substantially greater proportion of the population (14%) lives in conditions of severe material deprivation (compared to 8.1% across the EU-28). Almost one-tenth of people live in a dwelling with a leaking roof, damp walls, floors or foundations or rot in windows frames or floor space. About 42% of the population lives in overcrowded accommodation compared to just 16% across the EU-28. The problems of social exclusion and poverty have been exacerbated primarily by the under-performing labor market, and a significant portion of the active population is trapped in long-term unemployment. Labor-market policy and policies dealing with social exclusion are weakly institutionalized, often prone to changes, lacking in strategic objectives and focus, and are almost never evaluated on the basis of efficiency. Social transfers suffer from extreme fragmentation, have low replacement rates and are not structured in such a way that they can have any significant impact on social exclusion. Education still constitutes the best route out of social exclusion. However, vulnerable segments of the population are transferred into the vocational stream of secondary education, which mostly does not allow access to higher education. An additional problem is that regional-development policy has failed to address the geographic distribution of poverty and exclusion. As a consequence, regional disparities have deepened since Croatia became an independent country. This problem of regional inequality and poverty is especially severe in the war-affected areas of Eastern Slavonia, which still have not recovered economically from the effects of the war in the 1990s. Under the Orešković government, no specific plans for addressing these problems were proposed.

Citation:

Bicanic, I., V. Pribicevic (2013): A NUTS2 view of regional inequality in Croatia, in: W. Bartlett, S. Malekovic, V. Monastiriotis (eds.), *Decentralization and Local Development in South East Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 231-251.

Greece

Score 4

Even though Greece is not ranked among the worst-performing OECD countries with regard to poverty and income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, it does present a disappointing image regarding the social exclusion of its younger generation. The rate of youth unemployment remains more than twice the national unemployment rate. The share of NEET persons in the age group 20-24 is over 25%.

An obvious source of social inclusion problems is the economic crisis which continues seven years after its onset in 2010. A deeper source is the long-term

exclusion of youth from the labor market, to which they traditionally remain outsiders. A third source of the problem is the permanent tendency of Greek governments to cater to the social needs of old-age pensioners much more than to the needs of any other category of welfare state beneficiaries.

This policy priority did not change after the government turnover of January 2015, as in this policy sector the government coalition of the radical left and far right followed the path taken by all previous governments.

Essentially, the policy of social inclusion, then and now, entails: distributing ad hoc social assistance benefits to selected categories of the population, hiring the poor and/or the unemployed in the public sector on short, usually five-month long contracts and, above all, counting on the wider Greek family to fill in the gaps of a still inchoate social policy. In short, older family members, particularly if they are already retired, are expected to use their pension or other source of income to live on and to offer food and shelter to relatives who are socially excluded.

If such an arrangement is not possible and a collective household is socially excluded, then it can count on welfare state cash transfers. Since the spring of 2015, the Syriza-ANEL government has fortunately added subsidies to cover the cost of electricity and rent, as well as an allowance for food for the poorest households. In 2016, the government announced the introduction of a new, more comprehensive Social Allowance of Solidarity, which would include the aforementioned separate allowances. In mid-2016, Syriza-ANEL government renewed efforts to introduce a social inclusion net, establishing a pilot project in 30 Greek cities.

Owing to the difficult economic situation, the financing of the new schemes is not solidified, even though in the period under review authorities started to implement the above scheme provisionally in 30 cities. All in all, successive governments have never had a realistic plan to fight poverty and social exclusion, but in the period under review, there was a more intensive effort to prevent the deterioration of existing problems.

Citation:

Data on the poverty rate, the GNI coefficient and the NEET share in the age group 20-24 is provided by the SGI data set.

Hungary

Score 4

The basic social message of the third Orbán government is that it would fight for upward mobility of “hard working people” in Hungarian society, representing the interests of both the middle class and low-income earners. In fact, however, despite the economic recovery since 2013, both the impoverishment of people in the lower income deciles and the fragmentation and weakening of the middle classes have continued. With about 40% of the population in poverty “vertically” and with big

islands of poverty in Eastern Hungary “horizontally,” social inclusion has been low. The segregation of the Roma population further increased in the last years. The main reason is the segregated school system. 80% of the Roma population only have a basic education level (first eight years), whereas it is 20% for the rest of the Hungarian population. As a result, most Roma are low skilled and 42% of the “employed” Roma are stuck in the public work system. Only one-third of the Hungarian society can achieve a way of life similar to that in the developed EU countries. Ranking 36 out of 38, Hungary trails behind in the OECD’s Life Satisfaction Index. The Hungarian government has sought to keep the problem hidden. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) has presented different concepts, definitions and statistics to domestic and international audiences.

Citation:

TÁRKI (2016): Social Report 2016. Budapest.

OECD, Better Life Index (<http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/life-satisfaction/>).

Mexico

Score 4

Mexico is a socially hierarchical society along a number of dimensions: educational, racial and financial. While democratization has somewhat reduced the most flagrant social divisions, Mexican governments have not been capable or willing to bring substantial change. Moreover, the Mexican state is too weak to carry out major social reforms and there is strong resistance against wealth redistribution.

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that public policy has improved the distribution of income in Mexico during the last decade. The Gini coefficient has come down slightly. In addition, social and political processes have become more open. In 2016, the current government faced several challenges, including streamlining social programs, rolling out the new Prospera program, implementing unemployment insurance and improving health care provision.

Romania

Score 4

Poverty and income inequality have been among the highest in the EU. Moreover, social inclusion has suffered from strong rural-urban disparities and the discrimination of the Roma population. As a result of the high share of unremunerated family workers in rural areas, in-work poverty is two times the EU average. The share of people who live in very poor quality housing and spend over 40% of their incomes on housing is one of the highest in the EU. The Ciolos government sought to foster social inclusion by adopting a comprehensive anti-poverty package in April 2016 focused on providing integrated social services to impoverished and excluded communities through integrated EU and national funds. By setting up an anti-poverty coalition committee in charge of developing and

monitoring measures, Ciolos hoped to involve various public institutions, civil society and academia in allocating over 572 million euro allotted by the European Regional Development Fund for 2014-2020. The effective, timely, and transparent implementation of this integrated approach will be a big test for Romanian society.

Citation:

European Commission (2017): Country report Romania 2017. SWD(2017) 88 final, Brussels, 22-23 15-16 (<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-european-semester-country-report-romania-en.pdf>).

Pop, L. (2016): The “Integrated Package to fight poverty” of social services in Romania: a possible road to institutional effectiveness. European Social Policy Network, Flash Report 2016/28.

Israel

Score 3

After showing disturbing trends in recent years, including a rise in inequality and exclusion, the National Insurance Institute (NII) published findings indicating slight improvement in poverty rates based on data from 2014. However, inequality levels in Israel are still among the OECD’s highest; measured by the Gini coefficient, Israel ranks fourth most unequal of 32 countries surveyed. It also has the second highest relative income poverty rate in the OECD countries (18.8%).

Israel’s social spending and tax policies create a dissonance between overall moderate growth rates, on the one hand, and ongoing social polarization, on the other. This polarization is reflected in several dimensions: a persistent gender gap in pay, significant average wage differences between the Jewish and Arab population as well as between the Ashkenazi (Jews of Eastern European and Western origin) and Mizrahi (Jews of Middle Eastern and African origin) communities, and significant inequality within the elderly population relative to their state before retirement. Overall, gender and ethnic disparities are somewhat narrowing but persist.

Based on this persistent polarization, it is difficult to identify significant social-policy successes in Israel in recent years. According to the NII the slight improvement in social indicators is due to improved participation rates in the workforce, although higher participation rates did not translate into reduced poverty in the ultra-Orthodox and Arab populations. This is aggravated by policies such as reducing the social transfers for children and offering a low guaranteed minimum income; Israel currently has one of the lowest spending rates on social issues among OECD countries (15.8% of GDP compared to the 21.9% OECD average, 2014). In December 2015, the government launched a five-year comprehensive program of economic and structural development in the Arab sector. However, the original budget allocation of NIS 15.5 billion has been reduced to 9.7 billion, excluding the education department.

Citation:

Dattel, L. & D. Maor, “Income inequality in Israel among highest in OECD”, Haaretz, 22.5.2015: <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.657611>

Endeweld, M., Heller, O., Barkali, N. and Gottlieb, D., “Poverty and Social Gaps Report - Poverty and Social Gaps

in 2014, annual report”, National Insurance Institute (NII), Jerusalem, January 2016:

https://www.btl.gov.il/English%20Homepage/Publications/Poverty_Report/Documents/oni2014-e.pdf

Swirsky, S., E. Konor-Atias and R. Zelinger, “Social status report 2015”, December 2015. (Hebrew)

<http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/social-2015-1.pdf>

Ben Solomon, Ariel, “Israeli government reaches historic budget deal for Arab sector after tough negotiations”, Jerusalem Post Online, 30/12/2015, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israeli-government-reaches-historic-budget-deal-for-Arab-sector-after-tough-negotiations-438889>

Ilan, Shazar, “The Five Year Plan To The Arab Sector: You Cannot do anything with a List of Confessions” Calcalist, 16.10.2016, <http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3699823,00.html>

Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Daniel Schraad-Tischler
Phone +49 5241 81-81240
daniel.schraad-tischler@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christian Kroll
Phone +49 5241 81-81471
christian.kroll@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Christof Schiller
Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini
Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.sgi-network.org