France Report

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Sustainable Governance Indicators 2020
Executive Summary

France enjoys solid institutions of governance, and under the Fifth Republic has benefited from the most stable, consensual and efficient period of the past 200 years. Yet the country has struggled to effectively address the challenges associated with Europeanization and globalization. The helplessness of the previous conservative and socialist governments faced with the deep economic crisis has contributed to the rise of radical populist parties on the left (La France Insoumise) and the right (National Rally), and a deep distrust between large segments of the population and the political class. The 2017 presidential election failed to remedy this situation, as the upsurge of the Yellow Vest movement (Gilets jaunes) showed particularly between November 2018 and June 2019. The social tensions are still acute and ready to unfold.

Politically, aside from the unexpected landslide victory of a candidate who had no party support, one of the most striking consequences of the 2017 election has been the dramatic fragmentation of the traditional parties of government. The Socialist party of former President François Hollande is in pieces, lacking either a viable program or viable leadership. In October 2018, the left wing seceded, and the leaders of each the various factions have either been defeated or have retired. After the collapse of their candidate in the presidential election, the Conservatives (Les Républicains) chose a young new leader (Laurent Wauquiez) who was later forced to resign in June 2019 after the failure of his strategy at the European elections. The leftist opposition is represented by La France Insoumise, an unreliable party built around and for its leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. The extreme-right party, now renamed the National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), has been weakened by Marine Le Pen’s defeat in the presidential elections. Key members have seceded, and the group is facing a fraud scandal, but remains the main opposition party in spite of its minimal parliamentary representation. The RN emerged as the frontrunner in the 2019 European elections, nosing ahead of Macron’s movement with a 1% vote. La République en Marche (REM) holds an overwhelming majority in parliament, but remains a creature of the president, with no real program; moreover, it has so far proven unable to transform itself into a real party of government (i.e., a party that could mediate between the president and the electorate). The whole party system is in deep crisis, and is unable to channel either support for or opposition to the government. This failure has been highlighted by the emergence of the Yellow Vest movement,
an uprising expressing the fears, distrust and rebellion of the lower middle class. Once again, unregulated protest and violence has been the preferred mode of action rather than use of institutionalized instruments of mediation such as trade unions or political parties. The movement had no leader, no program, no organization and has failed due to exhaustion; however, the rebellion remains alive and difficult to tame, as there are no clear claims beyond rejection of the “system.”

In terms of policy, Macron and his majority in theory have a free hand to implement the president’s ambitious program, proposed in 2017. Macron has taken full advantage of the Fifth Republic’s institutions. He has proceeded forcefully and actively, and has begun to realize reforms on all fronts, including labor law, company law, school and university systems, fiscal policies, healthcare, anti-poverty programs and transportation. However, executive efficiency and parliamentary submission have proven unable to win broader support within the population, or to bypass social opposition. The foreseen constitutional reform has been indefinitely postponed. The proposed reform of the pension system, which by merging all 42 present regimes into one would be the system’s most radical reform ever, has yet to be discussed, negotiated and passed in parliament. It remains to be seen if Macron will succeed in these areas. The political opposition is too weak to present any real obstacle to the president’s policy agenda, and Macron has to date been able to overcome mass mobilization against his policies by the trade unions, which have traditionally been effective in blocking unpopular reforms. He has taken advantage of his determination and legitimacy to foster change, while also exploiting the deep crisis in the trade unions, which are divided and out of touch with the real world. However, the diffuse hostility of public opinion is proving a more difficult obstacle to overcome. Even the government’s successes on many fronts (for instance in terms of growth, unemployment and sectoral reforms) have failed to improve the public’s pessimistic and skeptical mood.

Ironically, Macron is beginning to suffer from the reverse side of the phenomenon which helped to put him in power. The lack, or the extreme weakness, of intermediary bodies capable of mediating and securing agreements is a preoccupying factor. The political landscape is fragmented and the only real opposition is embodied by two irresponsible political parties. Meanwhile, organized interest groups and trade unions are currently incapable of channeling protest. Consequently, the extreme centralization of power in the Fifth Republic, boosted by Macron’s “vertical” top-down method of governance, and his contempt for parties and organized interests is blatant. The president has had to face unorganized but violent popular riots with the Yellow Vest movement starting in November 2018, which has proved to be
the first serious challenge to his governance approach (attacked as being arrogant, elitist and dismissive of ordinary people) and policies (portrayed as taking from the poor to give to the rich). He answered with a classic public-expenditure program (€17 billion) boosting incomes within the lower and middle popular classes, as well as a more original “National Debate” initiative involving two million citizens in local public debates and online conversations. To some extent, this seemed to signal a change in Macron’s governing methods. However, it remains to be seen whether this will really lead to a more deliberative practice of policymaking, or prove no more than a mechanism designed to bleed off political pressure.

While this kind of protest is not entirely new in France, it is a powerful indicator of the inability of the country to find a stable and cohesive direction, and to combine assertiveness and dialogue. The difficulties are further exacerbated by a challenging environment. The Brexit issue, U.S. President Trump’s opposition to multilateralism, and the weakness of the German government are impediments to the ambitious pro-European and multilateral set of proposals put forward by Macron. His disruptive style and aggressive approach to domestic and international issues has had positive outcomes, but has increasingly encountered resistance from other European member states.

**Key Challenges**

The challenges that France has to face are not new but the collapse of the party system following the 2017 presidential election and the political earthquake triggered by Macron’s election has opened radically new perspectives. The challenges now are not so much “What to do?” but rather “Will the president and his majority be capable of fulfilling the promises they have made?”

Macron knows that only a strong and successful French reform agenda will give him the credibility to convince his EU partners and to recover influence on the global scene. The president enjoys a strong majority in the National Assembly and the institutions of the Fifth Republic offer effective instruments for achieving deep reform. The problems lie elsewhere: how to convince a reluctant and volatile public that the new government will make the right policy choices? Given the absence of a strong political opposition, social protest is the main obstacle that the government is likely to face over the coming years. Social mobilization led by trade unions or political parties in protest to the new government has been rather feeble, but could resurge in opposition to the pension reform. Moreover, the widespread and violent
Yellow Vest riots provoked by unorganized protesters serve as a harbinger of possible future scenarios. Macron has to modify his method of reform, foster more real social dialogue and include willing social partners in his decision-making processes. The pension reform, originally scheduled for 2019, but delayed until 2020, might be the crucial test.

Looking ahead, France has to tackle five major challenges.

The first is political. The entire party system has to be reconstructed after the 2017 political earthquake. While this destructive phase has permitted Macron to sweep away the old political forces to the advantage of his new movement, it has also contributed to the weakening of the traditional mediatory institutions, which will have to be rebuilt. This is also true for the president’s movement, La République en Marche, which will have to transform itself into a party capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. The time horizon is short. The renewal of political forces has to be achieved before the next presidential election in 2022, and there is no indication in sight that change is under way. For the time being, all factors are pointing toward polarization between Macron and Le Pen’s respective movements. The other parties are still in a state of limbo.

The second challenge is financial, budgetary and economic. The diagnosis is well-known: public deficits and debt must be drastically reduced, fiscal pressure lowered and unemployment addressed with drastic policy changes. The task is daunting, and no real progress has yet been achieved outside the area of employment. The structural deficit has barely decreased, and budget deficits over the next four years will be higher, driven by increased public expenditure (in part due to the social measures taken in response to the Yellow Vest protests) and lower economic growth. Public debt levels have increased further following the government’s decision to take over the huge debt of the public railway company and its decision to cut taxes. These decisions, among others, have pushed total debt to 100% of GDP. However, Macron remains committed to an ambitious reform agenda. The key issue will be the government’s capacity to pursue its courageous policy choices in the years to come. The disconnection between the (short-term) political agenda and the (medium- to long-term) economic agenda is a crucial component of the equation. Indeed, little more in the way of savings can be expected if structural reforms are not adopted and implemented. Education, professional training and industrial reconstruction are some of the many sectors currently being restructured in order to achieve more substantial benefits, but the time factor is crucial. Some reforms are already in place, but the perceived lack of results by the public might fuel discontent and skepticism.
The third challenge is related to the overall structure of the bureaucracy and public sector. The past approach to addressing unemployment by increasing public sector jobs (in particular at the local level) has failed, and has considerably lowered the effectiveness and efficiency of public service provision. The introduction of a more competitive framework for public transportation, which had repeatedly been postponed, has finally been adopted after nearly four months of strikes in the national railway company. Trimming redundant or inefficient administrations, revising policies that benefit vested interests, and simplifying the complex multilayered territorial system (“millefeuille”) are necessary reforms. However, these reforms have encountered fierce resistance from local authorities, which have not fully accepted the reduction of their resources through various means (e.g., the reduction of a local tax on landlords and tenants). On the one hand, local administrative systems are too costly, too complex and need ambitious reforms whose effects might be felt only in the long term. On the other hand, the central administration needs the support of local governments, which are responsible for two-thirds of public investment. After the Yellow Vest uprising, most ambitions in this area were put aside, and the modest objective set during the campaign (a cut of 150,000 positions in the public sector) has been reduced to a mere 15,000.

A fourth major challenge concerns the intertwined issues of security, immigration and integration. The traditional French model, based on an open policy toward immigrants acquiring French nationality and on the principle of equality of all citizens regardless of ethnic origin or religion, has lost its integrative power over the last 30 years. The established instruments of the integration process (education, work, religion, political parties and trade unions) are no longer effective and have been negatively affected by recent terrorist attacks. This challenge requires multifaceted policy solutions in areas including security, urban development, education and job training, with a primary focus on employment opportunities for the most marginalized citizens. The first measures taken by the government in 2017 emphasized the issues of education and employability, focusing less on financial measures that might mitigate poverty. However, the government failed to pursue this new policy fully, and to give a clear perspective for urban development in the socially marginalized zones. What is at stake is the country’s political and social cohesion, along with common national values and rules. The present situation is characterized by an identity crisis, an ethnic divide, the exclusion of migrants and political frustrations, a mix that has benefited extremist political candidates and parties.

A fifth challenge has also come to the fore in the form of climate change. The situation in this area is paradoxical; on the one hand there is growing pressure
in favor of drastic public action addressing climate change, while on the other, the primary governmental measure used to address the issue (the increase of taxes on fossil-fuel-based energy in order to limit consumption) triggered the Yellow Vest revolt. Seen as socially discriminatory, this measure was quickly put aside, exacerbating the budget deficit and depriving the government of the most efficient policy instrument for meeting the climate change challenge.

France needs courageous policies that include clear (even if unpopular) choices, frankness when explaining the challenges, more social dialogue, and a more streamlined and coordinated style of governance. The good news is that Macron as president is fully and explicitly committed to this reform agenda. The bad news is that his top-down method, together with his more or less open contempt for political parties, trade unions and business organizations, has proved a key obstacle in generating the necessary public support.

Party Polarization

The French party system has a long tradition of polarization. From the French revolution on, the divide between left and right has been a constant feature of French politics, and has been fueled and accentuated by the major political and social events of the past two centuries. Revolutions, revolts, social movements, wars, the relationship between state and church, and tensions between the center and periphery have contributed to the rather polarized and antagonistic political and social structure of the country. Attempts to develop centripetal forces that collaborate rather than fight one another have sometimes succeeded, but on the whole consensual collaboration has been the exception rather than the rule. Consensus-building has occurred in some particular circumstances (e.g., during wars) or on rare occasions, although even in these instances, behind the scenes, more collaboration could often have taken place. The Fifth Republic has further accentuated the phenomenon since the institutions, the electoral system and the rules of the game were designed with the aim of accentuating polarization. This polarization has been a major obstacle to policymaking, as no political trans-partisan “reform coalition” or consensus concerning structural reforms could be formed.

Things have changed following the last presidential election, since the new president has managed to form a coalition with elements from the center-right and center-left, pushing the remaining parties to the extremes of the political spectrum. It remains to be seen if this is a short-term accident or the beginning of a new cycle based on a different set of cleavages (e.g., “people vs. elites,” or “European openness vs. national regression”). For the time being, the
president’s movement, La République en Marche (REM), built upon the idea of overcoming the sterile left-right polarization for the benefit of more consensual progressive policymaking, has not (yet) proven that it has the capacity to change the game.

Macron’s strategy has increased polarization between his movement and Le Pen’s movement, marginalizing all other parties and forcing moderates to rally around his flag. This might help to win the next presidential election, but risks increasing the representativeness gap between the political class in power and the population. (Score: 7)
Policy Performance

I. Economic Policies

Economy

France’s economic outlook is improving. Since President Macron’s election in May 2017, he and his administration have launched an ambitious reform agenda. Over the past two years, an impressive set of reforms (probably comparable in magnitude only to the 1958 – 1959 reforms undertaken at the beginning of the Fifth Republic) have been adopted or launched. However, the Yellow Vest protests lasting from November 2018 through spring 2019 served to slow some reforms slightly, and forced the government to postpone green taxes on oil, abolish taxes and social contributions levied on overtime hours, and increase transfers to single parents and workers with low salaries or pensions. The overall costs of these measures, due both to lower fiscal receipts and higher expenses, has been estimated at €17 billion.

The 2020 draft budget proposes additional changes, such as a decrease in company taxes, an elimination of the local residence taxes (taxe d’habitation) for 80% of taxpayers (with a complete elimination by 2022), a substantial cut in social-system contributions paid by employees, and a total €5 billion decrease in the income taxes paid by low-income families. The overall objectives are to increase the net incomes of low-income employees and workers, prevent capital flight and increase incentives for investors. The crucial feature is the consistency of the overall package, which favors the creation of jobs, erases some defects of the current unemployment-benefit system, and bolsters company competitiveness while slightly increasing workers’ incomes due to the reduction in social-system levies or contributions.

In the short run, the economic situation has remained relatively positive, although economic growth rates forecast for 2019 and 2020 have respectively been reduced to 1.4% and 1.3%. Business investment has been boosted by Macron’s business-tax cuts, favorable financing conditions and increases in
labor-market flexibility. Meanwhile, lower labor taxes and improved job training opportunities have helped boost job creation, although the high unemployment rate is declining slowly. The public deficit remains at its past level (98.8% of GNP), and is expected to decline by only 1% over the 2017 – 2022 period. While reductions in the overall budget deficit were originally planned, this will be actually higher (3.1% of GNP) in 2019 than in 2018, and the public deficit target set for 2020 (2.2%) may not be met. The deficit forecast for 2021 has been increased from 1.2% to 1.5%. The Social Security budget, which was supposed to be positively balanced in 2019, will in fact see a €4 billion deficit that is expected to be erased only by 2023. The financial consequences of Macron’s social measures, announced on 10 December 2018 in order to calm the social unrest, have had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, growth has been sustained due to the stimulus effect of spending measures; on the other, this has compromised efforts to balance the budget and reduce the public debt. However, given the situation at the time, there was probably no other politically acceptable alternative.

Citation:
OECD Economic Surveys, France, April 2019

**Labor Markets**

Between 2012 and 2016, absolute unemployment figures increased by 500,000 people. Since that time, the unemployment rate has decreased slowly, from 9.9% in the first quarter of 2016 to 9.1% in the second quarter of 2018, and further down to 8.5% during the second quarter of 2019. The employment rate of workers over 55 years of age is still among the OECD’s lowest. France also has a notoriously high youth-unemployment rate. According to a report released in 2017 by the National Accounting Office, the labor-market policy measures put in place to support young people were costly (€10.5 billion annually), inefficient (most young people do not find a job at the end of their publicly funded training program) and incoherent (there are too many unattractive and poorly managed programs). Most young people were hired on short-time contracts, with two-thirds of the contracts holding a duration of less than one month. The Macron government has decided to eliminate cosmetic measures adopted in order to lower unemployment rates artificially, such as subsidized jobs for young people, and instead place a special focus on training and employability. Paradoxically, there are numerous unfilled job vacancies across various sectors of the economy. More and more unskilled jobs, particularly in the construction and agricultural sectors, are being filled by non-EU migrants or workers from Eastern and Central Europe recruited on temporary contracts.
During his presidential campaign, Macron announced an intention to substantially reform the labor-law code by using ordinances (drafted and adopted by the executive alone). The ordinances are characterized by multiple adjustments rather than the adoption of a brand new grand design. They introduce more flexibility, simplify rules, merge diverse internal bodies involving social partners at the company level, and give greater space to regulations at the company level compared to the sectoral level in order to allow more flexibility especially for small- and medium-sized companies. These highly controversial measures, fiercely opposed by some trade unions, are already producing positive effects by lowering the number of legal cases related to the firing of employees (the law has fixed standard rates of financial compensation), although some courts are resisting application of the reform by invoking international treaties. The government has also launched immediate measures to improve the job qualifications of long-term unemployed and young people who left school without a diploma, a program involving €15 billion over five years. Furthermore, a reform of the job training system was adopted in 2018, which will upgrade apprenticeship schemes which suffer from a poor reputation. The number of apprentice contracts substantially increased in 2018 – 2019.

During the summer of 2018, negotiations began on a reform of the unemployment insurance scheme, with plans to adopt the reform in 2019. In May 2019, however, the government rejected the solutions negotiated between trade unions and business organizations. Instead, it introduced a set of more sweeping measures aimed at restricting unemployment benefits and reducing the program’s huge deficit. A system of bonuses and penalties has also been introduced with the aim of reducing the number of very short-term contracts (which allows employers and employees to exploit insurance-system loopholes).

Taxes

Taxes and social contributions are in sum higher in France than almost anywhere else in the OECD (45.2% of GDP in 2017, 44.3% expected in 2020). This is a consequence of extraordinarily generous political and budgetary commitments that have led to a continuous rise in taxes. Nonetheless, tax revenues do not cover expenses, as public spending is exceptionally high by Western standards. The Macron administration has started to reverse the trend, but the process has been rather slow. Public expenditure has dropped from 55% of GDP in 2017 to an expected 53.8% in 2019, and is forecast to be 53.4% in 2020.
Whereas the lowering or elimination of many charges and taxes has improved companies’ competitiveness, the overall tax ratio has remained at a high level similar to that of previous years. The effect on economic growth was felt during the first half of 2018, with a decline in consumption (a major factor driving economic growth in France) prompting the inclusion of further consumption and corporate-investment incentives in the draft 2019 budget (e.g., an elimination of social-welfare contributions on any hours worked beyond 35 per week). However, the tax burden is viewed as penalizing the lower-middle working classes, which led to the Yellow Vest movement in November 2018.

The tax policy initiated by Macron has sought to exert better control of the main drivers of public spending. One tactic, for example, was to sign “contracts” with key local government authorities aimed at slowing the expansion of local expenses, reducing tax exemptions (which have a total estimated cost of €100 billion per year, according to the Ministry of Finance), cutting social expenses and streamlining funding for social housing. This overall policy attracted fierce criticism from opposition parties and the media, and Macron was depicted as favoring the wealthy at the expense of the poor. The low flat tax rate for income on capital and particularly the partial abolition of the wealth tax were perceived as symbolic of Macron’s role as a “president of the rich.” In fact, the criticism proved off base, as the new taxation system will increase public revenue due to a better evaluation of taxable wealth. However, in order to calm the social revolt, Macron’s government was forced to substantially revise its tax policy, reducing taxes and social-system contributions for lower income groups.

The ecological sustainability of taxation also has to be rethought, since the tax increases on fossil-fuel-based energy served as the trigger of the uprising in November 2018. These taxes have been put on hold, with no substitute in sight as of the end of the review period.

**Budgets**

France’s budgetary situation is still unsatisfactory with regard to European commitments and long-term sustainability. Over recent years, many new commitments (public servants’ salary increases, security and military expenses, disputable rescue operations) have further increased public spending in spite of public declarations. For example, the number of civil servants was supposed to be decreased by 150,000 during the five-year presidential term; however, the total number has barely shifted, with only 50 civil service posts due to be eliminated in 2020.
After his election, Macron and his government decided to stick to EU budgetary-consolidation obligations, and make sure that France respected its commitments in 2017 and the following years. The president’s aim was not only to return to a position of sound public finances and regain financial maneuvering room, but also to recover lost credibility in Europe, a precondition for any ambitious proposal to reform the European Union or to influence the European Union’s policy agenda.

However, Macron’s hopes that economic growth would support his strategy have been disappointed. The economic growth forecast had to be lowered further in 2019 and in the 2020 draft budget (to 1.3%). Furthermore, the cost of the “urgency measures” announced on 10 December 2018 in response to the Yellow Vests’ social protests created still another impediment to a balanced budget. Given that very few sustainable economies have been realized and the reform of the administration is stagnating, the structural budgetary deficit will see little diminution, and the budget deficit will exceed the 3% limit of the European Stability and Growth Pact (with a deficit 3.1% forecast).

Research, Innovation and Infrastructure

Having improved since 2007, France performs well in research and development policy. According to the EU Innovation Scoreboard 2019, France is ranked 11 out of 28 EU member states with respect to innovation capacity. In the report’s global innovation index, France performs slightly above the EU average and is ranked in the group of “strong innovators,” behind the group of “innovation leaders.” Overall spending on research and development constitutes 2.19% of GDP (2017), a slight decline since 2015 after a period of increase. R&I spending is still below the OECD average, and far from the EU target of 3%. Whereas public spending is comparable to the best-performing countries, private spending remains less strong. France’s main relative weaknesses are its low private investment, and limited broadband penetration, intellectual assets and employment in fast-growing enterprises.

On the positive side, the measures taken by the Hollande administration have encouraged the creation of new technology-based start-up firms. President Macron declared that he would “make France a start-up nation,” and his government has adopted further legal and fiscal policy measures intended to facilitate the creation and growth of startups. For example, he created a €5 billion development fund earmarked for startups that had passed through initial stages of growth. The government’s objective is boost the capitalization of these new companies, thus avoiding the twin risks of expatriation or absorption by more powerful foreign companies. The government has also resisted the suggestion of reducing the tax exemption offered to companies
that improve their research capacities in spite of its increasingly high costs to the state budget. Presently, France has become Europe’s second-largest tech market by dollar funding, outpacing Germany and falling just behind the United Kingdom.

However, barriers to innovation still exist. Cooperation between academic institutions and businesses is still restricted by cultural traditions, such as a lack of investment by small and medium-sized companies and the reluctance of researchers to invest in policy-relevant or applied research. Productivity levels and public research could also be improved. However, the development of public-private initiatives as well as the launching of incubators by private investors are improving the quantity and quality of initiatives and investments, in particular in new technologies.

Citation:
European Innovation Scoreboard 2019
(https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en)

Global Financial System

French governments of either political complexion have generally been in favor of regulation and control of the global financial system. They have been active internationally and at the EU level in supporting better international banking regulations. They have been strongly supportive of all initiatives contributing to the re-capitalization of banks, to the better control of speculative funds and to the fight against fiscal evasion and tax havens. They also have been active, together with 10 other EU member governments, in proposing to impose a levy on financial transactions (the so-called Tobin tax). They have also pushed for the creation of a banking supervision mechanism at the EU level. The Hollande and Macron governments have been or are committed to improving fiscal cooperation on information exchange, the fight against tax havens and tax evasion. In 2016, the French parliament adopted a better system of controls and penalization to tackle corruption at the international level (“Loi Sapin 2”), and Macron has actively pushed at the EU level for higher and fairer taxation of multinational companies working in the information technology sector (the so-called GAFA tax, named after Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon). Following the failure of this initiative, the French parliament adopted its own levy applicable to the large companies, which in turn triggered a fierce response from the Trump administration. During the Biarritz G-7 summit, France said it would abolish this tax once an agreement had been reached at the OECD level.
II. Social Policies

Education

The French education system can in many aspects be characterized as rather successful, but in contrast to the past, it fails to integrate and promote the weakest segments of society. In the 2018 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study, the country’s results did not improve, but remained slightly above the OECD average, with France ranked 20th out of 70 countries. Overall spending on educational institutions amounted to 5.2% of GDP in 2016, slightly above the OECD average. Spending at the preschool level is exemplary. A law adopted in 2019 makes preschool attendance mandatory for all children three years old (écoles maternelles). France now falls slightly below the OECD average public expenditure at the primary level. However, one alarming finding of the PISA assessment is that, more than in any other OECD country, individual success depends on the student’s socioeconomic background. Secondary education is rather good but uneven, excessively costly and, in recent years, has fallen behind other OECD countries. Higher education is dual, with a broad range of excellent elite institutions (prestigious lycées and grandes écoles) and a large mass university system, which is poorly funded and poorly managed, and does not prepare its students well for a successful entry to the labor market. Spending on universities lies below the OECD average. More importantly, drop-out rates are dramatic: only 40% of registered students obtain a university degree.

One major problem concerns professional training. The transition from education to professional training is poor. Organized by state schools, the system offers only a few alternative training courses in cooperation with businesses and diplomas are often not accepted by companies. This is a major reason for the high rates of youth unemployment in France.

The Macron government is approaching these issues in a more open and pragmatic way by distancing itself from the powerful teaching lobby, which has traditionally co-managed the system with the government (to the main benefit of professors). Many significant measures have been taken and immediately implemented. First, these measures placed greater emphasis on training young people from less affluent backgrounds. In areas with significant social problems, the government has decided to cut the number of students per elementary school class by half immediately, reducing the maximum number of students to 12 per class. Second, most of the disputed reforms put in place
by the Hollande-Valls government are being dismantled (for instance the “bi-langues” classes have been reintroduced in secondary schools and more emphasis is put on the fundamentals). Third, international evaluations and rankings (such as the PISA report) have been taken into account and will likely form the basis for further changes. Finally, an immediate action program has been launched, mobilizing €15 billion for job training measures (targeting the long-term unemployed and young people leaving school without diploma), and a far-reaching renewal of the professional training system was passed in 2018. In spite of the hostility of the trade unions, the minister for education has declared that the evaluation of schools and teachers will become normal practice. The government has also succeeded in tackling two “sacred cows” of the education system, which every minister over the past 20 years had failed to reform: the degree obtained at the end of upper secondary education (baccalauréat) will become more manageable, integrating a series of successive checks and a final exam; and a new process for registering students at universities has been set up, based on both students’ requests and evaluations by the universities themselves. This system worked well in 2019, and pushes parents, students and professors to develop strategies and make choices well before the final year of secondary school.

Another important development took place in September 2019, following an attempt by the government to increase tuition fees for foreign students. The Constitutional Court declared that this measure was unconstitutional, and affirmed that education should be offered for free at all levels; however, it did state that a “modest” registration fee would be allowable. As of the time of writing, the level of this fee had not been set.

Citation:
OECD: Education at a glance 2019, Country Note France

Social Inclusion

By international and European standards, the French welfare state is generous and covers all possible dimensions affecting collective and individual welfare, not only of citizens but also of foreign residents. Poverty remains at a comparatively low level. Therefore, programs providing minimum incomes, health protection, and support to the poor and to families are satisfactory, effectively supporting social inclusion. The challenges for France at a time of economic decline and unemployment are, first, to provide sufficient funding for the costly system without undermining competitiveness with too-high levels of social contributions (which demands an overhaul of the tax and contribution system as a whole); and second, to recalibrate the balance of solidarity and individual responsibility, for instance by introducing more
incentives for the jobless to search for employment, and by reducing social contributions on low wages (beginning in September 2019, employers no longer pay contributions up to the point of the minimum salary fixed by the state)

The performance of the welfare state is less convincing when it comes to equal opportunities. The percentage of young people in neither education nor employment is persistently high, pointing to the difficulties in transitioning between the education system and the labor market. Furthermore, some groups or territorial units are discriminated against and marginalized. So-called second-generation immigrants, especially those living in the suburbs, as well as less vocal groups in declining rural regions, feel excluded from broader French society. These populations often experience poor education and training, and high unemployment and poverty rates. In addition to the measures targeting elementary schools in socially disadvantaged areas, the Macron administration has developed a strategy emphasizing training and work placement rather than financial support – that is, focusing on capabilities rather than assistance. The number of young students opting for an apprenticeship training has shown an encouraging increase.

Health

France has a high-quality health system, which is generous and largely inclusive. Since its inception, it has remained a public system based on a compulsory, uniform insurance for all French citizens, with employers’ and employees’ contributions calculated according to wage levels. Together with widespread complementary insurances, they cover most individual costs. About 10% of GDP is spent on healthcare, one of the highest ratios in Europe. The health system includes all residents, and also offers services for illegal immigrants and foreigners (to the point that some asylum-seekers from countries such as Georgia have come primarily with the aim of receiving free medical care).

The problem is cost efficiency and the containment of deficits, which have been constant in recent years. Savings have improved recently, but the high level of medication consumption still needs to be tackled with more decisive measures. The lack of doctors in rural areas and in some poor neighborhoods is a growing issue. The unsatisfactory distribution of doctors among regions and medical disciplines would be unbearable without the high contribution of practitioners from foreign countries (Africa, Middle East, Romania). New policies are expected in order to remedy first the deficits and second the “medical desertification.” More generous reimbursements of expenses for glasses and dental care (a traditionally weak point of the system) were
promised by Macron and implemented in 2018. An ambitious plan to reform the healthcare system was announced in September 2018, but has yet to be implemented. The plan proposes to develop an intermediary level between hospitals and individual doctors, which would involve establishing structures that enable the various medical professions to provide collective and improved services in particular in rural areas. The aim is to alleviate the excessive burden on hospitals by derouting the care for basic treatments toward these healthcare centers (Maisons de santé). The plan also proposes to recruit several thousand medical assistants (to deal with the bureaucratic component of the profession) and eliminate the numerus clausus for university admissions. The social security budget, which was originally forecast to reach a positive balance in 2019 for the first time since 2012, will in fact be in deficit at least through 2023 as a consequence of the measures implemented in the wake of the Yellow Vest protests.

Families

There is a long and consensual tradition of support for families, going back to the 1930s. The comprehensive policy mix which has developed since then has been successful in providing childcare, financial support, parental leave and generous fiscal policies (income is not taxed individually but in each family unit, dividing up the total income by the number of people in a family). Beginning in 2019, nursery schooling has been mandatory from the age of three, a policy that will strengthen the inclusion of immigrant children. In addition, families using the childcare support at home are given rebates on their social contributions. These policies have been effective. Not only is the birth rate in France one of the highest in Europe (despite a slight fall from an average of 2.0 births per woman between 2006 and 2014 to 1.92 births per woman in 2018), but the percentage of women integrated in the labor market also compares favorably to the European leaders (Scandinavian countries) in this domain. However, faced with the need to reduce the budget deficit, the Hollande government scuttled the French welfare state’s “principle of universality” (i.e., social benefits for all, related to the number of children per family, without consideration of income and wealth), reducing the child allowance for families over an income ceiling. This highly contested measure has introduced a more realistic approach to policymaking, beyond the legalistic and formalistic principles which have prevailed since the Second World War. The fact that income taxes are calculated by family unit and not individually is also very favorable to families, since spouses and children lower the amount of taxable income per head.
Pensions

The French pension system is relatively generous, and largely prevents poverty of the elderly. But it is also complex, which is a problem for equity: First, the so-called general regime applies to all private employees and is complemented by additional voluntary systems, in particular in large companies. Second, some professions are affiliated to “special regimes” which are characterized by shorter periods of contribution and higher generosity in pension payments. These systems usually cover employees working in public companies or groups highly subsidized by the public budget (coal mines, public transport, sailors and fishermen, for example). Finally, public servants usually benefit from higher payments as their pension payments are based on their final salary (last six months), and not on an average (e.g., best 25 years). Early retirement remains a common practice. However, the raising of the retirement age to 62 has led to a constant increase in the effective average age of entry into a pension since 2010, calculated as 60.5 years by the OECD for 2017 (compared to 63.3 years for the EU-28 average). The OECD estimates that the age of retirement will further increase following the gradual implementation of the pension reform. An international survey shows that France offers the most generous pensions worldwide, and that given the high life expectancy in the country, these pensions are paid for a longer period than in most other nations.

In order to assure the sustainability of the pension system, French governments continuously introduced reform measures over the last decade: pension contributions have been increased, the number of years of contribution needed to receive a full pension has been increased to 43 years, and the peculiarities or privileges granted to some professional groups (“special regimes”) have been reduced. Macron has deliberately chosen to reduce the advantages enjoyed by the pensioners in order to increase the income of people in work. This has been done by increasing a universal tax paid, the Universal Social Contribution (Cotisation sociale généralisée, CSG), and by eliminating a social contribution paid only by salaried people. The government had also decided that in 2019, pensions would be increased by only 0.3%, but after the eruption of the Yellow Vest protests, it accepted an increase reflecting the inflation rate for the most modest pensions.

In the meantime, the first positive effects of the Sarkozy reforms of 2010 have been felt. In 2015, for the first time, the pension branch of the social security system showed a positive balance, although this lasted only two years. An agreement between three trade unions and the employers’ association added further adaptations concerning the supplementary pension. The payment of supplementary pensions (which are run jointly by the social partners) will be
postponed until the age of 64 for most beneficiaries. The main novelty of this rather complex agreement is that it introduces flexibility in fixing the pension age and actually allows its postponement for most employees in the private sector to the age of 64. Macron has indicated that he will not introduce new reforms concerning the retirement age and the number of years of contribution during his term. Instead, he has suggested changing the method of calculation for pensions by creating a system of credit points accumulated by employees, which will be monetarized at the moment of their retirement. He further declared that he would drastically simplify the current system, merging the current 42 different social regimes into one. This is a daunting task, as the reforms foreseen would constitute a frontal attack on the privileges accumulated over time by a number of groups and professions. After a set of intensive consultations, the reform originally due to be adopted in 2019 was postponed to 2020. Despite intense discussions and negotiations, the project has met fierce opposition and triggered mass mobilization. It remains to be seen whether Macron will succeed in bringing through this reform, regarded as being crucial in order to give him greater financial maneuvering room in the second half of his mandate.

Citation:
OECD: Pensions at a Glance 2019. OECD and G20 Indicators

Integration

Traditionally, France has an open policy toward immigrants. Every person born in France is considered French, or eligible to obtain French citizenship. Integration policies, in terms of long-term residence permits, access to citizenship and family reunification are open and generous. Presently, most new legal immigrants are coming due to family reunification. This partially explains the difficulty of integrating new immigrants, who often have no skills, no education and do not speak French. Processes of integration have to start from scratch. However, the problem is often the same for immigrants moving to France more generally; most are unskilled, and as such, subject to vagaries of economic booms and busts, for instance in the construction sector.

The integration of the so-called second (in fact, often the third) generation of immigrants, especially coming from Maghreb countries, is difficult for many reasons: education system failures; community concentration in urban/suburban ghettos; high unemployment; cultural identity issues, practices of job discrimination and so on. Immigration from Eastern Europe, the southern Balkans and, more recently, from the Middle East has become a very
sensitive subject exploited by the National Rally. The reluctance of the French socialist government to put in place a serious migration policy was challenged by German Chancellor Merkel’s sudden decision in August 2015 to open the doors to migrants from Syria, forcing the French government to revise its veiled but deliberate policy of restricting entry (low level of asylum admissions, cumbersome and discouraging bureaucratic processes).

President Macron has declared his intention to review France’s immigration policy, combining acceptance and integration policies for immigrants and refugees with accelerated asylum-application procedures and stronger efforts to send back people whose applications are rejected. The process of screening requests has improved, but there has also been a deliberate policy to restrict entry. During the summer of 2019, Macron declared that he would increase controls on illegal migration; however, as of the time of writing, no specific measures had been announced.

Citation:

Safe Living

Although the police maintain a reputation for being efficient (sometimes too efficient, as the institution is granted significant powers and discretion vis-à-vis the citizenry), concerns over internal security are high. Attention has focused on repeated outbreaks of urban violence in the suburbs or other areas. Following a rising level of petty crime and several terrorist attacks on French territory and abroad, citizens have been more and more vocal about the need to be better protected by enforcing “law and order” measures. There is a clear relationship between the economic and social crisis and this increasing sense of insecurity. This situation has also had a decisive impact on protest votes in favor of the extreme-right party, the National Rally.

The terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 elevated the topic of security to the top of the political agenda, triggering real concerns as well as political polemics driven by the populist and extreme right. The government has reacted to this with new security measures, giving more powers to the executive and police to prevent terrorist acts. The Macron administration terminated the emergency legislation in November 2017, but this came at the price of bringing the controversial rules into the flow of “normal” law with the introduction of an anti-terrorism law in October 2017. A side consequence of the focus on terrorism has been a distraction from the fight against petty crimes, particularly in large cities, a fact that has contributed to some citizen
dissatisfaction. Moreover, local police forces have grown, and all police officers are now entitled to use a firearm, in contrast to past practices. The Yellow Vest uprising and its repression, stretching from November 2018 to June 2019, also served to modify the relationship between police and citizens. Faced with protests exhibiting rarely seen levels of violence (exacerbated by black bloc activists), the government reacted strongly to the social mobilization, triggering accusations of overreaction by parties and groups of the left. Once again, the French tradition of preferring protest and violence to participation and compromise was seen at work here.

Global Inequalities

France has a long tradition of offering support to poor countries both in terms of financial support and promotion of policies in their favor. However, this should be qualified. First, France is reluctant to consider that free trade is one of the most effective instruments of support. As a consequence, France is often an obstacle to the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers, for instance in agriculture. Second, French aid is concentrated on African countries, where its economic interests have been traditionally strong. The temptation to link aid to imports from the donor country is quite common. Within the framework of international organizations, France is active but for the above mentioned reasons, its policy preferences are deeply influenced by path dependency, such as colonization and the global network of French-speaking countries. On a different front, France has tried to impose a tax on air travel in order to finance the fight against AIDS in poor countries, but has convinced only a few counties to follow suit.

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

In its 2016 environmental report, the OECD stated that France had significantly improved its environmental performance over the last 10 years. However, its performance record with respect to environmental targets is not optimal. According to OECD indicators, France is ranked in the lower-middle group in most areas. Too often, environmental policies continue to be subordinated to sectoral policies or weakened by protest movements. While being extremely active at the international level (e.g., Cop 21 and related forums), France has been unable to reach its own targets in most of areas. This
is due to lobby groups’ resistance to the full implementation of environmental policies. A government report in October 2019 noted that the country has been unable to make progress over the past four years, particularly with regard to meeting its own commitments to fight climate change.

France’s good performance with regard to carbon emissions (sixth place for CO2 emissions per GDP unit within the OECD in 2017) can be credited to the country’s nuclear sector. A July 2015 energy transition bill set several objectives, including a reduction of nuclear power’s share in total energy production from 75% to 50% by 2025, and an increase in the share contributed by renewable energy sources to 40% from what was then a 12.5% share. However, these goals are unlikely to be met, given the complex authorization processes for renewable energies. The Macron government has passed laws prohibiting oil exploration on French territory (including overseas territories), ordering a closure of coal mines by 2022, and closing the Fessenheim nuclear plant beginning in 2020.

Until the recent Volkswagen scandal, the government refused to deviate from incentives for diesel cars, as French companies have a marked preference for diesel engines. Following public pressure, the government decided in October 2016 to end the tax privileges it provided to diesel fuel. The decision to raise taxes on petrol and diesel from 2019 provoked the Yellow Vest riots in November and December of 2018, leading the government to withdraw this decision. This was reminiscent of a similar government retraction in 2014, when President Hollande was forced to cancel the so-called eco-tax on trucks. On 24 October 2019, France was condemned by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for being unwilling or unable to reduce NO2 levels to meet EU targets in place since 2009. In April 2019, Macron announced a new initiative, launching a “Citizen Convention for the Climate,” which assembled 100 citizens representative of the French population to address the question: “How can greenhouse-gas emissions be reduced by 40% by 2030 in a spirit of justice and equity?” The proposals from that group in January 2020 will be submitted to the parliament or to the people by referendum. Some pesticides (e.g., Glysophate) will be banned in the future, but the government rejected an opposition request to advance the deadline, set by the European Union, in France.

In the field of renewable water resources, France has long experience dating to the 1960s, and has set up water agencies to monitor the use and protection of its resources. However, the objectives set out in the Ecophyto plan (2009) to enhance water quality have not been met by 2015. French authorities have been unable to resist the agriculture lobby, which is the largest consumer of water. The use of pesticides has increased by 29% (2008 – 2014). The attitude
of the government is split between a desire to reduce pesticides and a need to respond to pressure from farmers, who are reluctant to abandon pesticides before substitutes become available.

The municipal composting, waste management and recycling sectors trail far behind counterparts in northern European countries. The situation is better with biodiversity and forests, the latter of which are experiencing a growth in surface area. A new law on biodiversity was adopted in August 2016. However, the protection of biodiversity has met resistance in metropolitan France due to many countervailing interests (agriculture, construction and transportation), and protection levels have actually been reduced according to official reports.

To summarize, France has set ambitious environmental-policy goals, but implementation of governmental decisions has often turned out to be incomplete, producing only limited impact. This has been due to interference by conflicting interests, lobbies and government departments, which have been able to weaken environmental targets. Moreover, there is no systematic sustainability check reviewing the environmental effect of policies.

Citation:

**Global Environmental Protection**

All French governments in recent decades have been committed to advancing environmental policies at the global level. Under former President Sarkozy, France was among the leading group of countries trying to secure an agreement on climate change mitigation at the 2009 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. In this tradition, French diplomats were particularly active in preparation for the U.N. Climate Change Conference chaired by France in December 2015. The global agreement reached at this conference is a success for French diplomacy. This commitment is supported by the entire political class and Macron has fully endorsed the policy choices made by Hollande. For instance, Macron has tried to convince U.S. President Donald Trump to remain committed to the pledge of the previous U.S. administration, and announced at the United Nations in September 2018 that France would not sign any international agreements with countries that are not
part of the COP 21 agreement. It remains to be seen whether this commitment will prove to be anything more than a symbolic gesture. Generally, openness to drastic internationally approved protective policies reaches a limit when French interests are at stake. For instance, any policy threatening to reduce the nuclear energy industry’s growth capacity has been frowned upon by France, despite the unresolved issue of nuclear waste dumps.
Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

The electoral process is fair at all levels, and controls by ad hoc commissions or the judiciary ensure the smooth running of elections. There are some restrictions to assure that only serious candidates stand in presidential contests. These include a requirement that each potential candidate has to obtain 500 signatures of support from elected persons, such as mayors or senators, from a third of French départements, or counties, to prove his or her political relevance. In addition, candidates must pay a deposit of €15,000. But these restrictions do not limit the number or variety of political backgrounds of candidates. Further restrictions to limit abuses were implemented in 2017. Spending is capped and now includes expenses for the primaries. In most local and national elections, many candidates decide to run as they often can benefit from advantages that help facilitate the variety of candidates, such as the free provision of electoral materials or a partial reimbursement of expenses for candidates who win more than 5% of the vote. Electoral fraud is exceptional but financial cheating is frequent as evidenced by the condemnation of Nicolas Sarkozy for the hidden costs of his 2012 campaign. Some limitations are imposed on anti-constitutional parties. These restrictions, however, are exceptional.

According to French laws regulating electoral campaigns, all candidates must receive equal treatment in terms of access to public radio and television. Media time allocation is supervised by an ad hoc commission during the official campaign. Granted incumbents may be tempted to use their position to maximize their media visibility before the official start. Private media outlets are not obliged to follow these rules, but except for media outlets that expressly support certain party positions, newspapers and private media tend to fairly allocate media time to candidates, with the exception of marginal candidates who often run with the purpose of obtaining free media access. The
paradox of this rule for equal time is that the presidential candidates who are likely to make it to the second round receive the same amount of media time as candidates who represent extremely marginal ideas or interests.

The right to participate in elections as a candidate or as a voter is fully guaranteed. There is no evidence of restrictions or obstruction in the application of the law. Every citizen enjoys rights that are provided by the constitution. No progress has been made to extend the right to vote to foreign residents, except in the case of EU citizens. Voter registration is easy and, in particular in small local communities, it is quasi-automatic as the local bureaucracy often proceeds with the registration process even without a specific request from the individual. Elsewhere, potential voters have to register. It is usually estimated that some 10% of the electorate is not registered.

Lacking a sufficient legal framework, party financing has long been a source of recurrent scandals. Nearly all political parties used to finance their activities by charging private companies working for local public entities, or by taxing commercial enterprises requesting building permits. Former President Jacques Chirac’s sentencing once he lost his presidential immunity provided a spectacular illustration both of the illegal practices and the changing attitudes vis-à-vis illegal financing. The first reasonably robust regulatory framework was established only in 1990. Since then, much progress has been made in discouraging fraud and other illegal activities. Nonetheless, not all party financing problems have been solved. Current legislation outlines public funding for both political parties and electoral campaigns, and establishes a spending ceiling for each candidate or party. The spending limits cover all election campaigns; however, only parliamentary and presidential elections enjoy public funding. Individual or company donations to political campaigns are also regulated and capped, and all donations must be made by check, except for minor donations that are collected, for instance, during political meetings. Donations are tax-deductible up to certain limits. Within two months after an election, a candidate has to forward the campaign’s accounts, certified by an auditor, to the provincial prefecture, which conducts an initial check and then passes the information on to a special national supervisory body (Commission Nationale des Comptes de Campagne et des Financements Politiques). In presidential elections, this review is made by the Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel).

These controls have made election financing more transparent and more equal. Yet loopholes remain, as evidenced by the Constitutional Council statement identifying irregularities in the financing of former President Sarkozy’s
campaign in 2012. Presently, the National Rally and its leader, Marine Le Pen, are being prosecuted for violating financing regulations. The tradition of cheating persists in many areas. Another example concerns the practice by some parties (including the National Rally and the MODEM centrist party) of using assistants paid by the European Parliament for purely partisan purposes. Finally, the Fillon scandal (in which Fillon used public money earmarked for parliamentary assistants to hire his wife and children – a practice that in itself was not forbidden – without any documented work being undertaken) led to a new piece of legislation in June 2017. Immediately after the presidential election, Macron introduced a new law to deal with the “moralization” of political life. The new law addressed several legal loopholes that allowed for morally ambiguous political behavior. For example, the new law prohibited members of parliament from hiring family members. Conflicts of interest are more strictly controlled and all ministers are subjected before appointment to a screening by an independent authority on financial transparency. When these rules are violated, three types of disciplinary action can be taken: financial (expenditures reimbursed), criminal (fines or jail) and electoral (ineligibility for electoral contests for one year, except in the case of presidential elections).

The Fifth Republic (since 1958) reintroduced the referendum, not only for the ratification of the constitution but as an instrument of government. President Charles de Gaulle used referendums to seek support for decolonization and to revise the constitution, and in doing so, bypassed parliamentary opposition. In 1969, de Gaulle himself became a victim of the referendum process, as he had declared that he would resign should a referendum on regionalization fail. Since then, the referendum has been used less frequently. The use of referendums at the request and for the benefit of the executive is a risky enterprise. All referendums after those of 1962 have been characterized either by indifference and high levels of abstentions or by outright rejection, as in 2005 on the European Constitutional Treaty. Only once, on the vote over the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was the executive able to secure a small, albeit fragile, majority.

Initially, the president was the only figure entitled to call a referendum. Therefore, the practice was perceived as being an instrument of the executive rather than a genuine democratic tool, since popular initiatives are not possible under the referendum system. Since 2015, 20% of the members of parliament, if supported by 10% of the electorate, have been able to call a national referendum. However, the rules and procedures are very restrictive. This 20% threshold was met for the first time in June 2019, when a group of opponents to the privatization of Aéroports de Paris decided to resist the decision by the parliamentary majority. However, after three months of political canvassing, only 800,000 signatures had been collected out of the 4.7 million needed by
March 2020 to allow the organization of a referendum. This cumbersome procedure has been criticized by the Yellow Vest movement, which has advocated (without success) amending the constitution to allow for genuinely popular initiatives enabling popular decision-making on a broad range of subjects.

Local referendums can be organized when municipalities are scheduled to be merged, or for local issues at a mayor’s initiative. However, very few have taken place, and participation rates have been very low. In general, direct public involvement in policymaking is rare, and functions poorly due to public authorities’ reluctance to accept such influence, as well as the lack of an effective culture of public participation. The Notre-Dame des Landes airport saga is a case in point. After more than 30 years of high-conflict deliberations, protests and a positive (but only consultative) referendum in 2016, the government finally decided to withdraw the project in January 2018.

**Access to Information**

In principle, media independence is guaranteed by a complete set of constitutional, legislative and administrative rules. There is not much more that can be done to improve the legal status of the press. This being said, media independence is multifaceted. One must distinguish between public and private media, as well as between legal independence and financial dependence or influence. Public authorities have in principle no direct capacity to intervene in public media decision-making as the power of control and supervision is delegated to an independent media authority. However, the situation is not clear-cut for many reasons. Public media are mostly dependent upon a special tax paid by every television owner, while their access to the advertising market was strongly curtailed by the former Sarkozy government. Most funding is now under government control.

In the private sector, public influence can be felt through the generous subsidies paid to all daily and weekly newspapers. However, it is paid as a kind of entitlement based on general rules and principles, and as such does not provide any real political leverage to the government. Much more serious is the porous nature of the barrier between the media and political worlds, as well as the fact that most daily and weekly newspapers are owned by large business interests. As an exception, the daily Le Monde newspaper was in September 2019 able to agree with its main stakeholders that the publication’s journalists’ organization would wield veto power if a single investor were to attempt to take a majority share in the company.
Media pluralism is reasonably guaranteed in France. Yet nearly all newspapers, daily or weekly, local or national, are under the control of rich business people, companies or banks. Among the few exceptions are a regional newspaper in the western part of France and the daily newspaper La Croix. Whereas on the national level there is a wide range of newspapers expressing political pluralism, the local and regional situation is normally characterized by a monopoly or quasi-monopoly position of one paper in a given geographical area. The print circulation of the country’s daily newspapers is low by Western standards, and has been negatively affected by free newspapers distributed in the streets, as well as by online publications. Indeed, the print market is largely in decline, and is suffering financially. The situation is further aggravated by an obsolete, inefficient, corporatist and costly system of distribution that is controlled by the unions. Many newspapers are being put in jeopardy due to the costs and general dysfunctionality of the distribution system. Faced with online competition, rising costs and a shrinking readership, print media have had to rely more and more on the benevolence of wealthy entrepreneurs or on the state. Given the multiple ties between political and business elites in France, this is not a particularly favorable situation for the maintenance of a vibrant culture of print media pluralism. This being said, the proliferation of online news media and online offerings provided either print media or “pure players” (like Mediapart, Rue89, Slate and Atlantico) should be taken into account. They contribute to media pluralism, whereas social-media networks – which are gaining more and more influence – tend to focus on scandals, and disseminate partial information or fake news. While social-media networks may play an important role in facilitating whistle blowers, they are unable to offer in-depth analysis and well-grounded information.

The right of access to information is solidly assured since it was strengthened in 1978 through the establishment of an independent agency, CADA (Commission d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs). This body guarantees that any private or public entity is entitled to be given any document requested from a public administration or service, regardless of the legal status of the organization (private or public) if the institution operates a public service. However, some restrictions have been established, mainly in relation with issues regarding the private sphere or the protection of intellectual property or business information in order to safeguard competition between companies. The main and more controversial issue is the refusal to issue documents by citing security or defense concerns, a concept which can be applied broadly and with a limited capacity for challenging in court. The administration in question must deliver the requested document within a month. After that deadline, inaction is considered as a rejection which can be challenged in court. In some cases, the adopted solutions reflect the inability of the political elites to adopt clear-cut policies: for instance, it is possible to check the
declaration of revenues and property of members of parliament but divulging the information is considered a criminal offense. This is a telling illustration of the reluctance to set up a full transparency policy. In general, a large range of governmental (or public bodies’) information, including official drafts, reports and audits, are freely accessible via the internet. Beyond the legal rules, two media outlets in particular (Canard enchaîné and Mediapart) have specialized in leaking information that public authorities would prefer to keep secret. This has become an important part of the transparency process, but has had the disadvantage of creating an atmosphere of permanent scandal, with petty or quasi-ridiculous issues sometimes becoming the main concern of social networks or tabloids.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

In France, even though there is an established tradition of the rule of law and the recognition and protection of civil and fundamental rights, there is also a long history of infringements of those rights. The two main reasons for this are related to the distrust, and often contempt, of government toward the judiciary. This behavior dates back to the French Revolution and has been further exacerbated by the country’s fraught political history; violations have continued to occur up until the 1980s.

The situation has improved considerably in recent history for several reasons. France’s judicial system now acts in the shadow of international courts which prosecutes national violations of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union play an incremental but decisive role in this progress.

With the proclamation of a state of emergency by the government following the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 and its extension until 1 November 2017 by the parliament, the question of possible infringements of civil rights has become an important issue. The Council of Europe has been informed about this measure, which implies a possible breach of human rights, according to article 15 of the European Human Rights Convention. Up to now, infringements have been rather limited, and the administrative courts have exerted control of the individual or collective measures adopted by the government in spite of pressures from right-wing political parties and the police to further restrict the rights of persons suspected of supporting terrorist activities. Numerous observers have argued that the repression of the Yellow Vest protests entailed a disproportionate use of force. However, the use of violence by protesters also reached a level rather rare even by French standards.
Political liberties are presently well-protected in France. This situation can be explained by several factors. The fact that these liberties are considered to be the legacy of the French Revolution sets them in a quasi-sacred position. The protections were granted and solidified by the highest administrative court during the Third and Fourth Republics. Recently, the Constitutional Council has played an increasingly active role in striking down laws that could jeopardize these liberties. The expansion of the court’s powers stemmed from its 1971 decision to protect the right of association from governmental intervention. However, history has shown that the status of such liberties could be diminished in times of crisis or military conflict.

A controversial and still not fully resolved issue is related to the interpretation of the separation of religious and public life (laicité). The ban on religious signs and symbols in all places of public administration and institutions is, in theory, applicable to all religious affiliations but concerns mainly the Islamic community. There is a growing uneasiness among the population about the public display of “differences,” issues which right-wing and extreme-right parties are particularly vocal about. Indeed, an increasingly illiberal attitude has been evident in public opinion, manifesting in the rejection of differences based particularly on religious beliefs (e.g., Halāl food, public religious demonstrations and wearing burkinis on public beaches).

In principle, any discrimination based on factors such as gender, race, ethnic origin or religion is banned by the constitution and by many specific laws. Beyond the recognition of the right of non-discrimination, however, institutional monitoring, judicial support and policy measures to ensure such rights are less than adequate.

France’s legal basis for non-discrimination is solid. The controversial recognition of “marriage for all,” or recognizing the right of gays and lesbians to legally marry, is a point in case. Courts tend not only to apply but also to extend these rights. Many policy measures, particularly financial incentives or subsidies, attempt to compensate for different instances of discrimination, in particular gender, age or migration background. However, the situation is often contradictory in many cases. For instance, while immigrants face challenges in getting residence permits, illegal immigrants have free access to healthcare and their children can be legally registered at school. A key contention concerns the integration of so-called second-generation immigrants. Despite many policy measures, a large number of these young French citizens feel like foreigners in their country, and are often considered as such by the population at large. The failure to provide quality schooling and, later, a proper job is one of the most dramatic dimensions of what is called invisible discrimination. Empirical studies have confirmed the discriminatory practices
experienced by Muslim job-seekers (cf. France Stratégie). One serious handicap in dealing with this situation is enshrined in the French republican tradition, which emphasizes strict equality and excludes in principle any sort of discrimination, even positive discrimination (such as gathering statistics based on ethnicity to determine social service allocation).

Institutionally, a recent development is the creation of a new body named the Defender of Rights, which replaces several specialized agencies. In addition to national organizations, many regional or sectoral ad hoc institutions that address discrimination cases have been established.

Citation:
France Stratégie: Lignes de faille, Paris, October 2016
(http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/rapport-lignes-de-faille-ok.pdf)

Rule of Law

French authorities usually act according to legal rules and obligations set forth from national and supranational legislation. However, the legal system suffers still from a number of problems. Attitudes toward implementing rules and laws are rather lax. Frequent is the delay or even the unlimited postponement of implementation measures, which may reflect a political tactic for inaction or sometimes because pressure groups successfully impede the adoption of implementation measures. In addition, prosecutors enjoy the discretionary power to prosecute or not, if in their opinion the plaintiff’s complaint is minor and not worth taking to the court (e.g., a person complaining about a neighbor’s dog barking at night or, more seriously, some cases of marital violence). About one-third of all complaints do not trigger action from the public prosecutor’s office.

In addition, a considerable discretion is left to the bureaucracy in interpreting existing regulations. In some cases, the administrative official circular, which is supposed to facilitate implementation of a law, actually restricts the impact or the meaning of existing legislation. In other cases, the correct interpretation of an applicable law results from a written or verbal reply by a minister in parliament. This is particularly true in the field of fiscal law.

Finally, the most criticized issue of legal uncertainty derives from multiple and frequent legislative changes, particularly fiscal legislation. The business community has repeatedly voiced concerns over the instability of rules, impeding any rational long-term perspective or planning. These changes usually are legally solid, but economically debatable. It is not unusual that a fiscal measure adopted on the occasion of the vote of the annual budget is
repealed or substantially modified one year later. A costly example is provided by the tax on dividends imposed in 2012 by the Hollande administration despite the strong reservations of legal advisers. The measure was later struck down both by the European Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court in October 2017. The courts’ decisions imposed an unexpected expense of €10 billion, which the government had to pay back to the companies. This forced the government to set up an exceptional tax on those companies amounted to half of the reimbursement due.

Executive decisions are reviewed by courts that are charged with overseeing executive norms and decisions. The process of challenging decisions is rather simple. Administrative courts are organized on three levels (administrative tribunals, courts of appeal and the Council of State, or Conseil d’Etat). The courts’ independence is fully recognized, despite the fact that the Council of State also serves as legal adviser to the government for most administrative decrees and all government bills.

This independence has been strengthened by the Constitutional Council, as far such independence has been considered a general constitutional principle, despite the lack of a precise reference in the constitution itself. In addition, administrative courts can provide financial compensation and make public bodies financially accountable for errors or mistakes. The Constitutional Council has gradually become a full-fleshed court, the role of which was dramatically increased through the constitutional reform of March 2008. Since that time, any citizen has been able to raise an issue of unconstitutionality before any lower court. The request is examined by the Supreme Court of Appeals or the Council of State, and can be passed to the Constitutional Council if legally sound. The Council’s case load has increased from around 25 cases to about 70 cases per year (with a peak of more than 100 cases in 2011), allowing for a thorough review of past legislation. This a posteriori control complements the a priori control of constitutionality that can be exerted by the Council before the promulgation of a law, provided that three authorities (the president of the republic and the presidents of the two assemblies) or 60 parliamentarians (typically from the opposition) make such a request.

Appointments to the Constitutional Council, France’s constitutional court, have been highly politicized and controversial. The Council’s nine members serve nine-year terms. Three are nominated by the French president, who also chooses the Council’s president, and three each by the presidents of the Senate and of the National Assembly. Former presidents (at the time of writing, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande) are de jure members of the council but do not usually attend meetings. Up to the Sarkozy administration, there were no checks over council appointments made by these three highest political authorities. Now respective committees of the two
parliamentary chambers organize hearings to check the qualifications and capacity of proposed council appointments. From this point of view, the French procedure is now closer to the process by which Supreme Court justices are appointed in the United States than to usual European practices. Contrary to U.S. practice, however, the French parliament has not yet exerted thorough control over these appointments, instead pursuing a rather hands-off approach, particularly when appointees are former politicians. In 2017, a Senate president’s nominee for the council (a senator and former minister of justice) was forced to withdraw after he had passed all the necessary parliamentary checks. This was prompted by a newspaper report that he had recruited (and paid with public money) his children as personal assistants. While not forbidden by law, the public disapproval following Fillon scandal proved to be a sufficient deterrent. The case underlined the leniency of parliamentary control vis-à-vis former politicians.

Other top courts (penal, civil and administrative courts) are comprised of professional judges, and the government has more limited influence on their composition. In these cases, the government is empowered only to appoint a presiding judge (président), selecting this individual from the senior members of the judiciary.

Up to the 1990s, corruption plagued French politics. Much of the problem was linked to secret party financing, as political parties often sought out alternative methods of funding when member fees and/or public subsidies lacked. Judicial investigations revealed extraordinary scandals, which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of industrial and political leaders. These cases were a key factor for the growing awareness of the prevalence of corruption in France, leading to substantive action to establish stricter rules, both over party financing and transparency in public purchases and concessions.

However, there are still too many opportunities and loopholes available to cheat, bypass or evade these rules. Various scandals have provoked further legislation. After a former minister of finance was accused of tax fraud and money laundering in March 2013, a new rule obliged government ministers to make their personal finances public. Similarly, parliamentarians are also obliged to make their personal finances public, but their declarations are not made public, and the media are forbidden to publish them. Only individual citizens can consult these disclosures, and only within the constituency in which the member of parliament was elected. The legal anti-corruption framework was strengthened again by the Sapin law adopted at the end of 2016, which complements existing legislation on various fronts (conflict of interests, protection of whistleblowers).
Immediately after the 2017 elections, President Macron decided, as a symbol, to introduce a bill dealing with the “moralization of public affairs.” The new law contains many additional restrictions, such as a prohibition on parliamentarians employing members of their family, and the suppression of “loose money” that members of parliament had previously been able to distribute and use without constraint or control. The new legislation constitutes a major contribution with regard to reducing conflicts of interest, and may help to clean the Augean stables. As a consequence of the new rules, as well as the activism of the press on these issues, the appointment of ministers is kept secret for a few days before being officially announced. This allows an independent authority time to check and clear the legal, fiscal and financial backgrounds of potential nominees.

This persistent strengthening of the rules has been justified by recurrent corruption scandals relating to the funding of political campaigns by African states, the irregularities in the accounts of Sarkozy’s 2012 electoral campaign, and the misuse of funds provided by the European Parliament discovered in 2017, to cite a few examples. On 1 October 2019, the country’s highest court (Cour de Cassation) confirmed that former President Sarkozy should be prosecuted before a penal Court (Tribunal correctionnel).
Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

French governments commonly refer to ad hoc committees tasked with providing information on crucial issues. In some cases, a report is requested from a single person. Committee members are mainly high-level civil servants, former or active politicians and academics, and often are chosen on the basis of their sympathy to the government in office at the time. Some reports are made public but others remain unpublished, in particular when the report’s proposals appear too provocative to be accepted by social partners. This situation raises the concern that opportunism may prevail over real strategic planning.

Each minister is entitled to recruit 10 so-called cabinet members, usually young political appointees who are tasked with providing policy advice. However, short-term considerations are usually more important than strategic planning in this regard. In addition, some portfolios have high levels of ministerial turnover of ministers, making long-term planning impossible outside of senior civil servants’ ability to carry through their own bureaucratic agendas.

The only bodies that take a long-term view in terms of strategic planning are bureaucratic departments, such as those in the finance, transport, environment and foreign affairs ministries. The committee of economic advisers attached to the prime minister’s office produces reports on its own initiative or at the office’s request. Its impact on actual policymaking is limited, however. The Court of Accounts, whose reports often serve as the starting point of reforms, is taking on a growing importance with regard to long-term policymaking. Its annual and special reports are attracting increasing attention from public authorities and the media.
France Stratégie, an interesting think tank attached to the prime minister, has recently developed into a body of strategic planning and policy evaluation, although its impact on governmental policy is uncertain for the time being. OECD reports are not part of national strategic planning, but they are rather influential as they compare countries’ performances and capacities to adjust to future challenges.

In contrast to some other European countries, the French government does not rely heavily on academic advice, even though the President’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office frequently consult economists, and outstanding non-governmental academics may be chosen to sit on national reflection councils covering various policy fields (e.g., integration and education). But the influence of academics is not comparable to what can be found in many other political settings. High-level civil servants tend to consider themselves self-sufficient. Once the government has chosen a policy strategy, it tends to stick to it without significant discussion over the appropriateness or effectiveness of choices made. There is nothing comparable in France to the economic institutes in Germany, for example, the opinions of which serve to guide the government and offer a platform for public debates. One telling example of this indifference to experts was the decision (in reaction to the modest ranking of French universities in international rankings) to merge the universities within individual cities and regions, under the assumption that larger universities would produce better results. This decision was taken in spite of the opposition of the academic community, and against the evidence provided by, for instance, the American and British university systems. Predictably, the results have been rather disappointing, while several bureaucratic monsters have been born.

By contrast, the reform of the pension system currently being debated has been heavily influenced by experts and economists, to such an extent that its radical U-turn in relation to the past is creating political turmoil.

**Interministerial Coordination**

There are three main loci of policy coordination once a policy proposal has been forwarded to the prime minister. The first is the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the second is the President’s Office, and the third, in cases of legislation or regulation, the Council of State. This hierarchical organization gives the prime minister the option of modifying ministers’ draft bills. For important issues, this steering function is shared with the President’s Office, and entails strong cooperation and collaboration between the two secretaries-general at the Élysée and Matignon. Both the president and the prime minister appoint civil servants from all ministries as sectoral policy advisers. All ministerial domains are covered in this regard. Several hundred people are
involved in government steering, monitoring, oversight and advising
functions.

However, it would probably be overstated to consider these various checks a
method of evaluation. The PMO mainly coordinates and arbitrates between
ministries, takes into consideration opinions and criticisms from involved
interests and from the majority coalition, and balances political benefits and
risks. The President’s Office does more or less the same in coordination with
the PMO. President Macron pays particular care and attention to the fit
between proposals and political commitments made during his electoral
campaign. More than offering a thorough policy evaluation, these two
institutions serve as a place where the ultimate arbitrations between
bureaucrats, party activists and vested interests are made.

Line ministers have to inform the prime minister of all their projects. Strong
discipline is imposed even at the level of public communication level, and this
rule is reinforced by the attitude of the media, which tend to cover any slight
policy difference as the expression of political tension or party divergence. Not
only the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) oversees the policy process but also
his cabinet assistants, in each area, supervise, liaise and coordinate with their
counterparts in line ministries about the content, timing and political
sequences of a project. The secretary-general of the PMO (as well as his
counterpart at the Élysée) operates in the shadow, but he is one of the most
powerful actors within that machinery. He can step in if the coordination or
control process at that level has failed to stem the expression of differences
within the government. Traditionally the secretary-general is a member of the
Conseil d’État and – in spite of the fact that he could be fired at any time for
any reason – there is a tradition of continuity and stability beyond the
fluctuation and vagaries of political life. It has to be added that given the
presidential character of the Fifth Republic, the same type of control is exerted
by the President’s Office in coordination with the PMO. In practice, the two
general secretaries are the most powerful civil servants whose opinions might
prevail on ministry choices.

Coordination is strong across the French government, and is in the hands of
the PMO and the President’s Office, which liaise constantly and make
decisions on every issue. Coordination takes place at several levels. First at the
level of specialized civil servants who work as political appointees in the PMO
(members of the cabinet, that is political appointees belonging to the staff of
the prime minister), then in meetings chaired by the secretary-general and
finally by the prime minister himself, in case of permanent conflicts between
ministers or over important issues. In many instances, conflicts place the
powerful budget minister or minister of finance in opposition to other
ministries. Appeals to the prime minister require either a powerful convincing
argument or that the appealing party is a key member of the government
coalition, as it is understood that the prime minister should not be bothered by anything but the highest-level issues. A powerful instrument in the hands of the prime minister is his capacity to decide which texts will be presented to the parliament with priority. Given the frequent bottlenecks in the process, ministerial bills can end up indefinitely postponed.

The council of ministers takes place once a week. There are also a large number of interministerial committees chaired by the prime minister or the president. Most of these committees meet upon request. While plenty of them hold meetings every week, these are usually attended by the ministers dealing with the topics discussed, and include only the ministers and secretaries of state involved. In some cases, these meetings might be chaired by the secretary-general of either the President’s Office or the Prime Minister’s Office, two prestigious and powerful high civil servants who respectively serve as the voices of the president and prime minister.

In 2017, the new government introduced the practice of government seminars with the aim of improving cohesion and harmonization. The team spirit seems to have improved considerably in comparison with the past, given that many ministers are not professional politicians.

If a ministry wishes to get its proposals accepted or passed, it must liaise and coordinate with other ministries or agencies involved. For instance, the Macron Law on the economy (2015) had to be co-signed by 13 ministers. In case this consultation has not taken place, objections expressed by other ministers or by the Council of State might deliver a fatal blow to a proposal. All ministries are equal, but some are more equal than others: for example, the finance minister is a crucial, omnipresent and indispensable actor. Usually the coordination and consultation process is placed under the responsibility of a “rapporteur,” usually a lawyer from the ministry bureaucracy (who is also in charge of arguing and defending the draft bill before the Council of State, whose intervention is crucial even beyond the purely legal point of view). The dossier is always followed by a member of the minister’s staff who communicates with his/her counterparts and tries to smooth the process as much as possible. In the most difficult cases (when ministers back up strongly the positions of their respective civil servants), the prime minister has to step in and settle the matter. In contrast to Germany, for instance, sectoral ministers have a limited margin of maneuver.

A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” of former students from the “grandes écoles” (École nationale d’administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech, etc.) or membership in the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection générale des Finances, Diplomatie, Conseil d’État and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as
marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by an informal solidarity. These high civil servants (especially “énarques” from ENA) also work in the PMO or the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is both efficient and not transparent, from a procedural point of view. It is striking, for instance, how much former President Hollande relied on people who were trained with him at ENA, and to whom he offered key positions in the political administration – ranging from ministerial positions or the chair of the central bank to many other high offices. President Macron has maintained these informal links.

In 2011, an interministerial Directorate for State Information Systems and Communication was established. In 2014, in order to strengthen its capacity to steer and influence the sectoral administrations, the directorate was placed under the authority of the prime minister. A further impulse has been given to the directorate by the Macron administration’s emphasis on the dimensions of the technological revolution. A secretariat of state was created in May 2018 (Secrétariat d’État au Numérique) tasked with boosting initiatives and development in the private and public sector and setting up a 100% state digital platform by 2022. Similarly, the president’s economic adviser was asked to present proposals on how to spend the €55 billion Investments of the Future fund. The president’s adviser suggested allocating nearly €10 billion to the digitalization of public services (with half of this sum for the healthcare system). In parallel, a report of the Court of Accounts, in support of past actions, recommended a major effort to improve investment and personnel training. The new secretariat is building on these actions with the view of providing users with a single number that would provide access to all public services. Several experiences have already been quite successful. For example, the digitalization of tax declarations, processes and payments has been so successful that for most taxpayers the use of printed documents is no longer possible. Various efforts to improve coordination between administrations have been implemented. For instance, public procurement processes, which involve several administrations, have been streamlined, and private companies can access the system using their registration number. While there is a lack of systematic international comparisons, it seems that France currently has less invested than the United Kingdom and Germany in digitalization, and the process in some sectors (e.g., the management of Defense Ministry staff) has suffered major failings in past years.

**Evidence-based Instruments**

The practice of compiling regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) has been followed since 1995, notably under the supervision of the PMO. However, there is still no systematic RIA process with comparable rules and
methodologies; this is just one reason why there is an excess of legislation with an insufficient analysis of regulatory impact. There are partial substitutes, however. The finance and budget ministries try to systematically evaluate the fiscal impact of any new measure. This evaluation might be biased, however, as considerations may be exclusively motivated by financial and budgetary concerns. In some ministries (such as industry, agriculture and social affairs) there is also a tradition of analyzing the impact of planned policies. In other sectors, the law might impose these assessments (such as with the environmental and industry ministries, for instance). A legal assessment is systematically practiced by the Conseil d’Etat before the adoption of a regulation or governmental bill. Parliamentary committees also often do an excellent job of regulatory assessment.

More recently, the government think tank France Stratégie has been charged with evaluating the impact of public policies (i.e., the impact of the Macron law, innovation policy or business subsidies). The think tank has published methodological guidelines for the evaluation of public policies. However, last-minute amendments to parliamentary bills tend not to be subject to this type of evaluation. This necessitates frequent post facto modifications to legislation, as unexpected or collateral effects have not been properly anticipated.

What is lacking is a systematic examination involving all the main stakeholders. Former President Sarkozy, seeking to reduce bureaucratic costs, instituted the so-called RGPP (Revue Générale des Politiques Publiques). This allowed around 100,000 positions to be cut, but the process was strongly criticized by the opposition and by the unions. President Hollande decided to move to another type of review (Modernisation de l’Action Publique), but changed little in the administrative apparatus aside reducing the number of regions from 22 to 13 (a measure that generated costs rather than the expected savings). For his part, President Macron launched the CAP22 program, asking an independent expert committee to submit proposals for comprehensive state reform. However, the committee’s report has not been published, and the government has failed to follow its main recommendations for fear of trade-union mobilization and strikes in the public sector.

Studies analyzing the impact of RIA have stated that although administrative bodies’ have overcome their initial skepticism toward RIA, the content of assessments has been too general, and has often tended to justify the need for action rather than attempting a critical, well-grounded assessment. In addition, there are few international comparisons when examining possible alternatives. The assessments are conducted by stakeholders that are typically fighting for or against a given policy measure. Thus, such assessments in general have
little to recommend them. It remains to be seen whether the recommendations for conducting independent assessment by the think tank France Stratégie will be followed. A more thorough analysis ("étude d’impact") is done in case of large public investments (rail lines, highways, airports etc.), and the final decision as well as the process is subject to judicial oversight. Too often the experts in charge of evaluating are chosen ad personam and in a discretionary fashion. The hidden purpose and expectations are that their assessment will be in line with the preferences of the politicians in charge. A comparative study of RIA practices over the last 20 years confirms France’s rather poor ranking, and suggests that this is attributable to the lack of an RIA culture, insufficient training for administrative elites, a lack of political will and the feeble role of parliament in RIA matters.

Citation:
(http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/evaluer-limpact-politiques-publiques)

There is no real systematic sustainability strategy except in those cases where EU regulations require such an examination. In most instances, political jockeying tends to prevail over policy analysis. In many instances, decisions are mainly based on political arguments regardless of social, financial or environmental costs. The sustainability argument is mainly used by opponents of a policy or envisaged equipment (the Nantes airport is a clear example of this). Given that every government attempts to pass as many measures in as short a period of time as possible, any preliminary evaluation tends to be regarded as a loss of time, since the crucial variable is the ability to respond swiftly to the pressure of public opinion. This strategy often appears to be misguided. Indeed, since opponents are unable to make their voice heard, they tend to rely either on judicial remedies (potentially delaying projects for many years) or on violent protest. Radical environmental activists, for instance, have become a major impediment to many public and private projects.

There is no practice of systematic evaluation, except for policies or laws in which the respective constitutive act stipulates the need for an evaluation. However, over the past 25 years, the Court of Accounts, which previously exerted a legalistic type of oversight, has transformed its mission and adapted its methods so as to evaluate public policies from a political, social, economic and financial point of view. The Court’s reports have become reference documents not only for the political authorities (government and parliament), but also for the opposition, the media and the broader public. The reports are usually characterized by rich analysis and accurate criticisms, and the
recommendations are usually well received. The parliament and the
government rarely challenge the courts’ conclusions and recommendations,
which often become the basis for new legislation. Since Sarkozy’s time in
office, the nominee for president of the court has always been a former
politician from the opposition (at the time of appointment). This pattern has
strengthened the legitimacy of the court, and allowed for the adoption of more
policy-oriented evaluations. This dimension is not negatively perceived, as the
Court is not seen as biased in its conclusions; indeed, its pragmatic suggestions
are seen as useful in the preparation of new legislation.

Societal Consultation

The traditional distrust regarding “lobbyists,” which not seen as legitimate
political actors, as well as difficult social relations that hinder effective social
dialogue, have limited the governments’ ability to find effective avenues of
negotiation and cooperation. There are thousands of official or semi-official
commissions that are supposed to give opinions on a given issue or area;
however, governments tend to prefer negotiations with selected partners,
excluding some considered as not being “representative.” Consultations are
often rather formal, and interested parties very often have little willingness to
seek compromise. For these reasons, the temptation to govern in a top-down
manner has always been strong. However, this in turn has in many cases
provoked severe, persistent conflicts and protest movements that have
ultimately forced the government to abandon its plans. Indeed, the French
political culture is rooted more deeply in protest than in pragmatic
cooperation.

In recent years, governments have sought the consultation of interest groups
more systematically, and these practices have partly been adopted as legal
obligations. Moreover, the rules of social negotiations have been modernized
to encourage social contracts between employers and trade unions. Notably,
the Larcher Law of 2007 invited the government to present plans for
legislation in social and labor matters to the social partners, and to give the
social partners an opportunity to negotiate and agree on possible solutions that
could then be transformed into law. Nonetheless, given persistent distrust
between the social actors, especially on the part of some unions, progress has
been slow. There have been some positive cases, such as the 2013 labor-
market reform bill. This measure codified an agreement between three (out of
five) trade unions and the employers’ organization. But there have been
setbacks, too. The Macron government rejected an agreement between the
social partners on reforming the unemployment-insurance system, arguing that
did not sufficiently address the program’s financial problems. The
organizations protested, but in fact were pleased to avoid the blame for the difficult and unpopular measures.

Thus far, President Macron’s strategy has been to engage in intensive consultations while ensuring that the government and parliament have the final say, and leaving little room for change once a government proposal is drafted. This method was applied to the process of drafting the labor-law reform in 2017. Though intense consultations with the social partners took place in July and August 2017, the ordinances (while taking into account some trade union grievances) were presented to the social partners as non-negotiable once drafted in September 2017. The process of reforming the national railway company followed a similar course. The government presented and passed a bill through parliament, declaring that the core measures were non-negotiable, but offered negotiations for the implementation of the new law. In the end, in spite of four months of protests and strikes, and stalemate between the government and trade unions, the reform was adopted. This situation has left the social partners bitter and frustrated – even those who were willing to accept the reforms, but wanted to be incorporated in the decision-making process (e.g., the largest trade union, CDFT). Based on these and other examples, the president has been accused of sticking to a top-down method, leaving no place for the social partners to argue and obtain amendments. More generally, Macron has been criticized for his solitary approach to decision-making, as well as his contempt for the country’s traditional economic and social actors. Faced with the magnitude of these negative reactions and the impact of the Yellow Vest riots, the government is now proceeding with more care, and has signaled a willingness to be more attentive to popular opinions and demands. The national debate launched by Macron was a first step; however, it remains to be seen whether the president will really engage in more meaningful negotiations with societal organizations. The negotiations over the reform of the pension system, which are due to be concluded in 2020, will be a first test.

**Policy Communication**

Government policy communication is usually subject to centralized control by the executive branch. One of the preoccupations of the executive branch is to avoid disagreement or contradiction within the ministerial team, even when coalition governments are in power. There have been situations in which ministers expressing divergent views in the media have been forced to resign.

Hollande’s government communication was poor and messy. In contrast, Macron has defined a new strategy: precise indications about his program during the presidential campaign, a commitment to implement these policy
measures fully and speedily, and strict control over communication by the Élysée staff. This has conferred a significantly higher degree of coherence on governmental communication. However, due to a lack of coordination between ministers, the presidential services and the political movement which supports Macron (the REM), this communication policy has displayed flaws in practice, triggering changes in the organization of the Élysée communication unit. The Macron’s distrust of the media has not helped, and the relationship between the media and the President’s Office is far from optimal. The price has been a highly critical press, which tends to compete with social networks, and which has prioritized form and style over substance. As communication is highly centralized and technocratic ministers often neglect the art of communication, the capacity of the executive to communicate with the public has been rather poor. In addition, the public’s overall distrust of political elites makes official communication extremely difficult. The problem is further aggravated by the proliferation of fake news on social networks.

**Implementation**

The government is efficient in implementing its programs, as it can rely on a relatively disciplined cabinet, an obedient majority and a competent bureaucracy. Resistance, if any, comes from social actors. The question of whether government policies are effective is another matter. One of the major issues that the Hollande government faced was a lack of credibility concerning its commitments to economic growth, unemployment and the reduction of the public deficit. Optimistic forecasts have been disappointed by poor results on all fronts. Most international organizations (the IMF, OECD and the European Union), think tanks or even national organizations (the French central bank, the statistical institute and the Court of Auditors) have pointed out the impossibility of reaching set targets based on overoptimistic data or forecasts. The election of President Macron represented a radical change at the top. The main improvement has come with the Macron government’s ability to combine its policy commitments with intense stakeholder concertation before finalizing legislative proposals. During the first 18 months of his term, this method of policymaking was quite successful. The new administration was very active in adopting and implementing its ambitious and encompassing policy reform agenda. The first positive results in terms of economic policy, growth and unemployment are already being felt. In spite of the Yellow Vest uprising, which forced the government to slow its forward charge somewhat, Macron has continued to pursue his reform agenda, even on very sensitive issues such as reform of the pension system.
Ministerial Compliance Score: 9

Compliance by ministers, when compared internationally, is good, as a minister can be dismissed at any time and without explanation. In the French majority system and in the absence of real coalition governments, the ministers, who are nominated by the president, are largely loyal to him. Together with the effective hierarchical steering of governmental action, ministers have strong incentives to implement the government’s program, following guidelines set up by the president and prime minister. This statement remains true but is highly dependent on the leadership capacities of the president and prime minister. Unlike his predecessor, Macron has made clear that strict compliance is expected from ministers, and there is no doubt that his leadership and policy choices will be supported by ministers who, for most, are not professional politicians.

Monitoring Ministries Score: 9

Line ministry activities are generally well monitored, but several factors influence the impact of oversight, including: the strength of the prime minister; the relationship of the minister with the president; the political position of the minister within the majority or as a local notable; media attention; and political pressure. This traditional pattern under the Fifth Republic failed to work during the first 30 months of the Hollande presidency due to the president’s weakness and reluctance to arbitrate between ministers and divergent preferences. It was only after the September 2014 crisis and the forced resignation of dissident ministers that Prime Minister Manuel Valls was able to exercise improved oversight of the ministries. The monitoring of ministers by Macron and his prime minister is tighter than it has ever previously been under the Fifth Republic. A special software application has been developed that gives Macron the full information about decisions taken by each minister, allowing him to step in as deemed necessary.

Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies Score: 7

In a highly centralized system like France’s, the central machinery is unable to monitor the implementation of government policies fully and constantly. Thus, huge sectoral and geographical variations exist. In some areas, decisions are not implemented or instead are badly implemented or flexibly interpreted. For instance, education is one of the most centralized policy fields in France, but implementation varies so starkly that parents have adopted strategies (such as the crucial choice of where to live) to register their children in the “best” schools. Implementing centrally designed policies requires local or regional adaptation of rigid rules that are applicable to all. Even the prefects, supposedly the arm of central government, refer to this practice, as may be witnessed for instance in the absent, or insufficient, implementation of water directives in some regions. Thus, bureaucratic rules are rendered somewhat less rigid by a certain political flexibility.
Over the past 30 to 40 years, the powers of communes, provinces (départements) and regions, delegated by central authorities or de facto taken over by local entities, have increased considerably. Normally a delegation of powers was accompanied by corresponding funding. However, as formerly centralized policies were notably badly managed or insufficiently funded, local units had to face huge expenditure increases that were not fully covered by the central government. Thus, more than two-thirds of non-military public monies are spent by local/regional actors, a figure comparable to the situation in federal political systems. While local authorities in theory act as agents of the central government in some areas, they in fact have substantial autonomy. The recent regional reform reducing the number of regions from 22 to 13 has had quite an important consequence: the new regions will benefit from a fraction of the VAT. Previously, they did not receive their own tax revenues, depending instead on transfers from the central government. The goal of the merger was to generate efficiencies and thus save on resources. However, a recent Court of Accounts report shows that the new consolidated regions in aggregate spend more than those which were not combined.

On the other hand, piecemeal and ad hoc local taxation reforms, such as the elimination of the local business tax (taxe professionnelle) and its compensation by national state allocations in 2009, have not improved the situation. Growing tension between the central government and local authorities has been fueled by President Macron’s decision to exempt all local taxpayers from paying (by 2022) the “taxe d’habitation” (a rather unfair tax paid by all local residents, owners and tenants). The local tax will be replaced by property-tax revenues that currently go to the provinces, while the provinces will benefit from a new tax or transfer, the details of which were still to be decided as of the time of writing. The various levels of local government fear that they will lose resources, with the uncertainty contributing to discontent and protest. Moreover, local authorities fear that the state subsidies or new taxes will not evolve over time according to needs. Finally, further cuts have been imposed, forcing local authorities to consolidate budgetary policies. The government has passed a law obliging local authorities to apply the 35-hour working week regulation, as many local governments had offered even further reductions of weekly working times in concession to the unions. The expected savings from this change are said to correspond to 30,000 jobs (though this is probably an overoptimistic estimate).

Some instances of recentralization have occurred through fiscal or administrative means, but despite the usual stereotypes about French hyper-centralization, it is fair to say that subnational government enjoys much freedom of maneuver. Legally, subnational government is subordinate. Politically, the influence of local elites in parliament and in particular in the
Senate has been decisive. However, this is less true in the National Assembly due to the fact that the majority of the new deputies elected in 2017 have no local experience or responsibility. The most efficient but contested instruments of control derive from the legal, technical or economic standards imposed by the Brussels and Paris bureaucracies. Violating such standards can involve high political, monetary and legal/judicial costs for local politicians. As local taxes and spending have grown beyond control over the past 30 years, and the myriad of local units make the steering of policymaking difficult, the central government has failed to find any tools more effective than cutting central government funding in order to force local authorities to reduce their spending. “Contracts” determining spending were signed with most of the large local units in 2018.

Policymakers in France share a common interest in ensuring national cohesion. This is the basis for a large number of national standards and rules that frame local and regional policies. National standards are determined by national regulations and constitutional and administrative courts serve as arbiters in disputes over whether these standards are met. The application of national standards is facilitated by the fact that most public utilities are provided by large private or semi-public companies with a vested interest in having the same rules and standards across the country. Services such as energy supply, water distribution or garbage collection are run by many different companies, most of which belong to two or three holding companies. Following protests by businesses and local politicians against a flood of norms and standards, the government has started a review and implemented a number of “simplification” measures, in particular for small communes. However, no significant results have as yet been observed, with the exception of the construction sector, where norms have been simplified after the initial imposition of extremely cumbersome rules and standards. But the French state is as yet unable to control the full implementation of these standards effectively.

The French government’s efforts to adopt rules and regulations applicable across the country encounters resistance due to the diversity of local situations and the relative strength of vested interests. The difficult exercise of balancing conflicting goals has characterized France since the time of the monarchy. During the Fifth Republic, there have been limited cases of political bias or clientelistic behavior within the central administrative apparatus. This is less evident at the local level, where mayors can be more lenient vis-à-vis individuals or groups, for instance in the field of urban planning or in the management of procurement contracts (favoring local providers). The main distortions in policy implementation derive from a well-rooted tradition of ignoring the incomplete implementation or non-application of excessive regulations. Governments often lack the courage to enforce regulations when they fear substantial protests. Successive governments have either failed to
regulate or withdrawn planned regulations when protests have proved powerful and won widespread public support. Macron’s insistence on the need to fully implement policy decisions helped trigger a social revolt during the winter of 2018 – 2019. Like his predecessors, he too has been forced to withdraw or postpone some of his unpopular decisions.

Adaptability

The French government has a good track record in adapting national institutions to European and international challenges. This can be attributed to the bureaucratic elite’s awareness of international issues. This contrasts vividly with the government parties’ weakened ability to adapt national policies to the challenges stemming from the globalization of the economy, as there is often fierce resistance from trade unions, most political parties and public opinion at large. The collapse of the fragile party-government system in 2017 has radically transformed the political landscape. New parliamentarians, mostly selected from outside the traditional political party framework, fully support Macron’s new vision. Macron’s declared European and global approach is a radical departure from the past orientations of either the right or the left. However, this French U-turn coincides with a crisis in European and global multilateral institutions, which are being challenged by populist governments and movements around the world. To date, few innovative initiatives have been successful, and in many cases their content has been watered down.

France plays an active role in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. The country contributes to the provision of global public goods. It has a long tradition of acting on an international level to take part in security/military missions, combat climate change (e.g., hosting the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP 21)), provide humanitarian and development aid, and promote health, education programs and fiscal cooperation.

Concerning the European Monetary Union, French proposals contribute to defining EU policies and often serve as a basis for compromise. However, the credibility of these initiatives was damaged by the French government’s inability to respect common rules France had signed, such as the stability rules of the European Monetary Union (EMU). This considerably limited the government’s success in steering or influencing decision-making at the European level, with France lacking credibility and political support.

President Macron has adopted a fundamentally different method. Having led an openly pro-European presidential campaign, he has declared his full commitment to EU rules, as well as his willingness to reduce the government’s budget deficits and realize structural reforms. In doing so, he has sought not
only to enhance the country’s competitiveness but also to regain lost confidence and credibility in Europe, which is seen as a prerequisite for France’s EU partners to seriously consider his ambitious ideas on European renewal and further integration. Under Macron, France has shown a new willingness and capacity to contribute to the European Union. However, this impulse has produced few concrete results given the current crisis in European and national governance systems. On crucial matters, France finds it difficult to gain sufficient support for its proposals. For example, Macron’s ambitious EMU reform plans have met strong opposition from eight northern and northeastern EMU countries, and the Yellow Vest crisis has forced him to postpone or scale back his financial and budgetary ambitions.

Organizational Reform

Numerous reports on the reform of rules, procedures and structures are prepared at the request of governmental authorities. The Court of Accounts plays a very active and stimulating role in this regard. However, few of these recommendations are implemented. Resistance by the ministries or agencies affected is usually fierce, and is often supported by opposition parties or even by part of the majority coalition. The issue is complicated by the fact that ministerial structures can be set up and changed by the government in charge. The local government administrations have proven to be among the systems least adaptable to structural change. This system is multilayered, complex and no longer in line with the challenges of the modern economy and society. Most serious attempts at reform have failed. However, some elements of the 2015 territorial reorganization may trigger more change (new powers to metropolitan areas, organized cooperation/fusion of the numerous and often too small municipalities). The initial measures taken by President Macron seem to indicate that he has chosen the indirect but powerful instrument of state subsidies to force local governments to make changes. However, the government’s ambitious changes concerning the metropolitan areas and Paris are still on hold, as they face (as usual) fierce resistance from the powerful local-government lobby. From de Gaulle to Macron, all governments have had to limit themselves to partial and ad hoc reforms, making the overall system complex and costly.

French governments are usually reactive to the need to adapt and adjust to new challenges and pressures. These adaptations are not always based on a thorough evaluation of the benefits and drawbacks of the foreseen changes, however. A case in point is the reluctance of most governments to take seriously into consideration the recommendations of international organizations, if they do not fit with the views and short-term interests of the governing coalition. Resistance from vested interests also limits the quality and depth of reforms. Too often the changes, even if initially ambitious,
become merely cosmetic or messy adjustments (when not dropped altogether). This triggers hostility to change, while in fact very little has been done. The new Macron administration is reminiscent of the Gaullist period at the beginning of the Fifth Republic, with its strong commitment to radical reforms (“heroic” rather than “incremental” style). The initial months of the presidency have already attained considerable achievements, but one has to be aware of French society’s deep-rooted reluctance to change. For example, the violent Yellow Vest protest movement starting in November 2018 put a brake on this “bonapartist” storm. After two years of the current government, it is evident that the weak capacity of organized opposition to the Macron administration’s reforms (e.g., by the trade unions, social organizations and vested interests) has given rise to spontaneous and violent grass-roots protests. Protesters have criticized the president’s top-down methods and policies, and the popularity of the president and prime minister has declined. This situation has forced the government to adopt a more cautious approach. If improvements are not felt within the next 12 to 18 months, the effective capacity of the government to achieve real change could be called seriously into question. The planned constitutional reform is on hold for the time being, as the agreement of a reluctant Senate is required.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Citizens’ interest in politics and their participation in the political process have been on the decline in recent decades. Obtaining their information primarily from television, most citizens are poorly informed. Television stations devote little time to any political topic and tend to prefer talk shows where people express their views, rather than using prime-time hours for political information. Information follows mobilization, rather than the other way around, evidenced by the protest movements against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Information is often provided on a certain topic once a group of citizens or political activists have succeeded in attracting media attention. Unfortunately, social networks tend to have substituted for traditional media in this information process. This contributes to the diffusion of unverified and fake news to such a point that, as in many other countries, the overall information issue becomes a problem for the proper functioning of democracy. There is also a strong bias in favor of petty news to the detriment of more complex informative pieces concerning, for example, healthcare policy or the fight against poverty.
One of the problems with government information is that politicians tend to hide the truth or minimize harsh realities. Ever since the Socialist government’s economic policy U-turn in 1983, governments have tried to hide necessary measures or reforms behind a veil of euphemistic language. This kind of action “by stealth” may initially be successful, but it does not enhance political awareness among citizens, and fuels populist feelings at both ends of the political spectrum. During his electoral campaign and in his first months in office, President Macron has introduced a new approach of “speaking truth to people.” In practice, this triggered harsh criticism, and was perceived by many as a manifestation of technocratic arrogance and indifference to the situation of the poor. In January 2019, in reaction to the Yellow Vest riots, Macron launched a vast operation organizing 10,000 local citizen debates paired with other (e.g., online) possibilities for citizens to express themselves (Grand débat national). Nearly 2 million citizens contributed to this debate. This pedagogic exercise seems to have worked, since the executive has been able to end the riots and recover a modicum of popular consensus. It remains to be seen whether this exercise might represent a way of transforming governmental methods and fostering greater citizen participation over the long term.

The bureaucratic and political structure of the country overall provides satisfactory information. It is possible to get full access to information directly or through specialized citizens groups, and several media outlets provide critical analyses of governmental action. However, the political system, both at the local or national level, offers few instruments to help citizens monitor and oversee their administrative and political authorities. The main issue remains the incapacity of individuals to deal with the massive flows of information provided by public bodies. At the local level, the “information” provided by the ruling party or coalition tends to be mere window-dressing or propaganda in support of the adopted or proposed policy.

**Legislative Actors’ Resources**

French legislators have fewer resources at their disposal than, for instance, their American colleagues, but they are reasonably equipped should they wish to make use of all facilities offered. In addition to two assistants, whom parliamentarians can freely choose, they receive a fixed amount of funds for any expenditure. There is a good library at their disposal, and a large and competent staff available to help individuals and committees. These committees can also request the support of the Court of Accounts or sectoral bureaucracies, which are obliged to provide all information requested. There
are still problems, centered on the long tradition of parliamentarians holding several political mandates. Until 2017, three-quarters of the members of parliament were also elected local officials, and many of them dedicated more time to local affairs than to parliamentary activities. A new piece of legislation, in force since June 2018, forbids parliamentarians to hold executive positions in local or regional councils, forcing them to choose between local and national mandates. This is a true revolution. Since absenteeism was one of the major problems of the French parliament both in the plenary sessions and within the specialized committees, one might hope that the control and evaluation functions of parliament will improve in the future. Macron’s proposed constitutional revision, slated for debate in 2020, will provoke a discussion over reducing the number of members of parliament by one-third, while maintaining the overall level of parliamentary resources. According to the president, this would strengthen the resources of the remaining representatives. However, the opposition has argued that the quality and intensity of representation would be further weakened in a system in which parliament is already subordinated to the executive. Given most senators’ fierce opposition to the proposal, it appears unlikely to obtain the required majority.

Committees have free access to all requested documents. However, areas such as national security, the secret service or military issues are more sensitive. The government might be reluctant to pass on information but, worse, could be tempted to use information limitations to cover up potential malpractices. For instance, in the past the PMO had at its disposal substantial amounts of cash that could partially be used for electoral activities of the party in power. No information was available about where the money actually went. In the same vein, it is only since the Sarkozy presidency that the president’s office budget has become transparent and accessible to parliamentary inquiry.

Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences.

Parliamentary committees can summon as many experts as they wish as often as they need in all matters, and they often make use of this right. The recent Benalla affair, involving a close ally of the president, has shown that committees enjoy considerable power in that matter. One serious problem is that members of parliament are often absent, even in cases of very important issues such as Brexit.

There is no congruence between the structures of ministries and those of parliamentary committees. The number of parliamentary committees is limited to eight (up from six in 2008) while there are 25 to 30 ministries or state secretaries. This rule set up in 1958 was meant as, and resulted in, a limitation
of deputies’ power to follow and control each ministry’s activities closely and precisely. The 2007 to 2008 constitutional reform permitted a slight increase in the number of committees, and allowed the establishment of committees dealing with European affairs.

Media

Mass media, notably morning (radio) and evening programs, offer quality information concerning government decisions. As for print media, the crucial issue is the division between local and national media. A few quality daily papers and weekly papers provide in-depth information, but their circulation is low and on the decline. In many instances, the depth and magnitude of information is dependent upon the level of polarization of the government policy. Instead, in local newspapers, information is often superficial and inadequate. The same division applies to private and public audiovisual channels (some private channels offer only limited, superficial and polemical information), and to the emerging online media (only some of which offer quality information and analysis). On the whole, economic information is rather poor. Use of social-media networks is increasingly substituting for consumption of traditional media, but this usually offers a very poor alternative. Mobilization is becoming more important at the expense of providing fair and accurate information. This tough competition has contributed to a deterioration in the quality of traditional media. Rather than providing neutral information about an issue, media outlets tend to illustrate their points by relying on “man/woman on the street” interviews, generally selecting someone expressing dissatisfaction or a fear of future consequences. Rather than taking a neutral stance and trying to weigh the pros and cons of proposed reforms, media tend to take partisan stances – not in the sense of being leftist or rightist, but in objecting to change. Two recent examples may illustrate this point. The press (and even more so the social media networks) predicted catastrophe from a change in the way income taxes were paid (shifting from an annual payment by individuals to the state to a direct transfer from the employer to the state) and a change in the system of registering for university (a shift from a previously disastrous system). In both cases, the transformation went very smoothly. The same phenomenon can be observed with regard to the pension reform, in which the press has mainly served to express the voices of vested interests.

Parties and Interest Associations

Parties are usually both centralized and organized hierarchically. There are few registered fee-paying political activists. These are all serious limitations to the inclusiveness of citizens. Many politicians are not selected by a party; they
are individuals who have made their breakthrough locally and impose themselves on the party apparatus. In the case of the Macron movement, the change is even more radical: candidates were selected from a pool of volunteers with most candidates lacking any prior political experience. In contrast, national politicians normally have a concrete and ground-based knowledge of people’s aspirations and claims based on local experience. Another factor is the popular election of the president. Candidates’ programs are inclusive; no policy sector is forgotten in their long to-do list. A third factor lies in recent changes in the selection of candidates for presidential elections. Primaries have taken place, first within the Socialist Party, then in the neo-Gaullist conservative Union for Popular Movement (UMP). In those cases, both registered activists and voters sympathetic to the party are eligible to participate. Actually, this “opening” of the process contributes to a further weakening of the parties which are already very feeble organizations. The strong participation in the primaries (up to 4.4 million in the case of the conservatives, a multiple of the number of registered members) is a form of citizen participation in a crucial political party decision, which can be seen as a positive sign for open and democratic legitimation of the party’s choice. However, in spite of this apparent success, the primaries in France have confirmed the American experience: they are the most efficient instruments for weakening and destroying political parties. The socialist and conservative primaries have been profitable to the most radical candidates in both cases, deserting the moderate political space and thus permitting the landslide success of the centrist Macron. As a result, the traditional parties of government are deeply divided and weakened. It may well take five years or longer for these parties to reconstruct themselves. As for the movement of the new president, La République en Marche, it remains purely a product of and for Macron. It has not yet been able to transform itself into a political party capable of playing a proper role in decision-making and mediation between citizens and government in spite of being the largest political movement at present with 400,000 supporters (although most supporters are followers rather than activists).

Business associations, mainly the largest employer’s union (Mouvement des Entreprises de France, MEDEF) but also agricultural associations, are able to formulate policy proposals and contribute to agenda setting. They have their own research capabilities, and can successfully lobby government and parliamentarians. Weaker organizations such as the association of small and medium-sized companies complain that their specific interests are marginalized by larger international groups and by the government. Trade unions are usually more reactive in spite or because of their relatively small membership numbers, with trade-union members accounting for less than 8% of the workforce (the lowest percentage within the OECD) and split into several rival organizations. The strategy of the unions is to compensate for
their weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, and by organizing mass protests in the streets. In areas where interest groups are united and strong, as in agriculture and education, they may have substantial influence, effectively making decisions jointly with the government. In other areas, the weakness of organized interests results in marginal involvement in decision-making, which may lead to friction during implementation. President Hollande’s attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue produced limited results. A major problem is the political split within the trade union movement. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions (CGT and FO), have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have long relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, but their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Meanwhile, two other trade unions (CFDT and UNSA) have adopted more moderate positions, and tried to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms. The government’s rejection of the agreement between the social partners on the issue of unemployment insurance marks a recent failure of social concertation. The government contended that the agreement did not go far enough in tackling the costs and loopholes in a system that provided overgenerous benefits and too few incentives to accept available jobs.

The number of, and membership in, non-business associations has been increasing. If the phenomenon of dependency on the financial support of public authorities exists, especially at the local level, there are noneconomic associations that are combining pluralistic approaches, long-term perspectives and a public perspective. This can be seen in fields such as urban policy (where national programs and local public actors rely on the expertise and commitment of associations dealing with local issues), environmental policy or social policy (aid to people with different social problems or handicaps). This said, only a few associations have the capacity to make relevant and credible proposals. Some groups (such as environmental groups and social workers) have a real proactive strategy; however, most associations are reactive and prefer to object rather than make their own proposals.

**Independent Supervisory Bodies**

Parliament does not have its own audit office, except for a special body called the Office Parlementaire d’Évaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques, which is responsible for analyzing and evaluating the impact of technology. In practice, its role has been rather limited.

Instead, the Court of Accounts is now at the disposal of any parliamentary request and can act both as auditor and adviser. While much progress could be made to fully exploit this opportunity, it is noticeable that collaboration
between the two institutions has improved since the Court’s presidency was offered to two prestigious former politicians, the last one from the opposition to the governing party. The role of the Court has dramatically changed, from merely overseeing the government accounts to making a full evaluation of public policies. In fact, the body’s criticisms of past policies and forward-looking proposals are often a blessing for reformers. They can rely on these objective and usually tough evaluations when promoting their own agendas, and can point to the evaluations as a means of persuading the public.

Parliament has no ombuds office but plays a key role in the functioning of the (former) Ombudsman office. Until 2011, the médiateur (ombudsman) could intervene in cases of procedural faults and administrative problems at the request of individuals but only through the mediation of a parliamentarian. The purpose was to try to solve as many problems as possible through the intervention of elected representatives, and to ask the ombudsman to step in only if the issue could not be addressed or solved in a satisfactory way. In 2011, the office was merged with other independent authorities to form a new body (Le Défenseur des Droits). This new agency is active and respected having demonstrated its independence vis-à-vis the administration and government. However, it has not affected the role of parliamentarians in the process and they continue to channel citizens’ requests.

Data protection in France has a rather long history. The extremely active CNIL (Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés) dates back to 1978. Its board of 17 members is appointed by the two chambers of the parliament. The board then elects its president. The CNIL enjoys the status of an Independent Regulatory Agency. It has five main functions, namely to: inform the public on personal data protection; support any person in relation to personal data protection; advise the legislator; control the use of personal data by private companies and public services; plan and prepare for the impact of technological developments on personal data. The CNIL has a relatively modest staff (215 persons), with a budget of €17 million, and received 8,360 complaints in 2017. The body has been very effective over the past 40 years, and its role is widely supported by the public and political elites. Since May 2018, a European regulation states that every company or public body dealing with personal data has to appoint a “data protection adviser.” As of the date of writing, no information was available regarding fulfillment of this obligation.