Executive Summary

Germany remains a country with a far-reaching democratic consensus and state institutions firmly grounded in the rule of law and democratic principles. It is now looking back at a decade of stable GDP growth, very strong employment growth and a significant increase in disposable incomes both among the active workforce and among pensioners. This economic success also had a positive effect on social inclusion, with the number of recipients of basic income support (Hartz IV) declining continuously over the period. Between 2017 and 2019, for example, the number of recipients fell from 4.4 million to 3.9 million. This decline is all the more remarkable given that numerous refugees who entered Germany since 2015 have newly entered the Hartz transfer system. At the same time, the tax and transfer system has continued to act as a strong corrective to highly unequal market incomes, producing much less unequal disposable incomes.

The period under review saw a cyclical downturn. While an outright recession was avoided by the close of the period, the annual GDP growth rate fell significantly to around 0.5%. Germany’s export industry was seriously undercut by the international trade conflict and the lost momentum within the international trading system. However, strong levels of private consumption, government spending and construction were able to compensate for the export-sector downturn, successfully stabilizing the economy. Labor-market statistics for October 2019 still showed increasing employment despite the falling levels of GDP growth. Unemployment rates reached their lowest level since German unification, decreasing to 4.8% (national definition) in October 2019 compared to 5.1% in 2018. Current indicators also confirm that the country has dealt well with the influx of high numbers of refugees in 2015 – 2016, whose labor-market integration has proceeded better than many expected.

Although the prominence of the migration debate has subsided with the falling numbers of refugees, the 2015 – 2016 refugee crisis seems to have had a permanent impact on the German party system. In the period under review, the right-wing and anti-migration party Alternative for Germany (AfD) was further able to establish itself as a long-term political power within the newly emerging German party spectrum. In 2019, Germany had three state elections; each of these illustrated that the two major parties now governing at the federal level, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), are dramatically losing support, with consequent gains for the Greens, the AfD and the Left. Current federal-level opinion polls signal that the SPD could tumble from being one of the two main parties to becoming one of the smaller parties in the party system. At the same time, the Greens could be on their way to catching up with the CDU. Although coalition formation has become more complicated, numerous coalition variants exist at the state level, all of which form functioning and stable governments. This indicates that the rise of the multiparty system has not thus far damaged the ability to engage in effective policymaking. The only outsider with regard to coalition formation is the AfD, which all other parties have to date excluded from any coalition.

The declining levels of voter support for the traditional large parties (“Volksparteien”) aligned in the grand-coalition government is remarkable given the excellent economic performance, and the high effectiveness of decision-making and realization of election promises. Both the government’s own stocktaking and independent reviews confirm that by November 2019, the government had already executed a high number of the envisaged policies laid down in the coalition agreement of March 2018. Hence, it is difficult to explain the growing voter alienation through any reference to a deteriorating effectiveness of policymaking and implementation.

However, the year 2019 also saw a striking change in the political issues deemed most pressing by the country’s electorate. In short, climate change has replaced migration as the dominant policy issue, a fact that also helps explain the new rise of the Greens in opinion polls. As a consequence of the frequent and massive demonstrations led by the younger generation (e.g., the Fridays for Future movement), the issue has replaced migration as the top concern for large groups of the population. The government has sought to be responsive, and has given up its previous complacency regarding its failure to reach emissions-reduction targets. Two climate-policy milestones were set in 2019. First, the Coal Commission presented its comprehensive roadmap for the phase-out of coal-fired power generation in Germany by 2038. Second, the government initiated legislation for its Climate Package, which provides for the introduction of CO2 pricing even for traffic and housing, sectors that do not currently form a part of the EU’s Emission Trading System. It remains to be seen whether the new CO2 price is sufficiently high to speed up emissions reductions. However, these measures have brought Germany back into the group of countries that are demonstrating their climate ambitions by imposing politically costly new taxes on car drivers, home owners and tenants.
Key Challenges

Policy effectiveness with increasing party fragmentation

The transformation of the German party system has put the traditional large parties (“Volksparteien”), the CDU/CSU and the SPD, under particular stress. These parties have to redefine their role within a more fragmented and polarized party system. So far, experiences at the level of the states, with their growing variety of coalition combinations, seem to signal that this change has not damaged the ability to engage in effective policymaking. Whether this also holds for the federal level remains to be seen. The long duration and complications of the coalition negotiations following the 2017 federal election could foreshadow emerging problems and instabilities. All parties that are firmly grounded in the constitutional order and which share the same basic values of a free and open society should avoid ruling out any coalition options with one another, even if they differ significantly in their political programs.

Concerns about a cyclical downswing that could be structural

As of the close of the review period, the German economy had coped reasonably well with the consequences of the global trade conflict and its dampening effects on world trade. However, it is to some extent uncertain whether Germany was experiencing a normal cyclical downturn or feeling the effects of a more fundamental change in the economic environment. Concern about a potentially major threat to the country’s long-standing competitive advantage is particularly relevant within the car industry. This industry is currently dealing with both the digital revolution and the transition to electric drives now strongly supported by national and European regulation. The car industry and its suppliers are of significant macroeconomic importance for Germany, and particularly crucial in the regions that have served as the country’s economic powerhouses.

The long path to a CO2-neutral economy

The country’s new ambitions in climate policy, coming as a reaction to voters’ concerns about climate change, have led to the important decision to implement a comprehensive CO2 price applicable even the areas of traffic and housing. But the passage of new and seemingly ambitious climate-protection
legislation does not yet guarantee successful implantation. The energy- and climate-policy decisions made in recent years have left many questions unanswered. It is still far from clear whether plans to shut down all nuclear-power plants by 2022, and a quick subsequent phase-out of fossil-fuel-based power generation, are consistent with the continued ability to guarantee a reliable electricity supply. New conflicts are emerging with regard to the required expansion of windmill construction, which will be indispensable for the necessary renewable-energy capacity increase. “Not in my backyard” is a strong reflex even for ecologically minded German voters who in theory support an ambitious climate policy. These inconsistencies in voter reactions imply political risks: Even if voters are in favor of climate protection in general, they may punish politicians who actually implement prices felt by car drivers or heating-fuel users through the new CO2 tax. Careful communication will be required in the coming years, and opposition parties will have to act responsibly to avoid discrediting the country’s energy transformation strategy.

Demographic trends pose increasing danger

The current and preceding governments have acted shortsightedly with regard to pension policies. The grand-coalition governments have increased the generosity of pension systems generally, while providing additionally higher pensions for mothers, low-income earners and workers who have been in the labor force for exceptionally long periods. However, no solution was developed for adapting the system to increases in longevity and the increases in dependency ratios that will pick up speed in the 2020s. A pension commission was established that was slated to produce a report by March 2020 on how stabilize both pensions levels and contribution rates. The political process must allow for an open debate on possible options, without taboo topics (e.g., on the potential of linking retirement age automatically to life expectancies). The health system faces equally serious challenges with regard to financial sustainability.

Digitalization and infrastructure

Preparing Germany for the digital age is a comprehensive task that requires adjustment across numerous fields, including secondary and tertiary education, public administration, and innovation and infrastructure policy. Critics are increasingly pointing to the insufficiency of digital networks, as well as rising problems in the rail- and road-transport networks. Government budgets must try to rebalance spending toward these avenues of value creation at the expense of current spending. However, equal attention should be given to
improving the conditions for private investment in digital infrastructure.

Voter competency and political involvement in the digital age

All of the key challenges mentioned thus far involve complicated trade-offs. Governments can only communicate successfully if they transmit their messages to voters who are capable of receiving nuanced information. A crucial problem in this regard, as for all other democracies in the digital age, is the changing information-gathering behavior of the new generations. Within Germany, surveys indicate a low level of interest in politics and low levels of political knowledge among younger cohorts. Media use is intense within the younger age groups, but has shifted away from information toward mere entertainment. Badly informed citizens may either abstain from voting or be susceptible to the misinformation and manipulative campaigns of populist movements and parties. Parents, schools, media, the civil society and politicians must work hard to reach out to the younger generation in order to ensure that the electorate remains interested and informed, an indispensable precondition for a functioning democracy.

Party Polarization

Since the general election on 24 September 2017, the German party system has not only changed but also become more polarized. The party system now appears to be a typical multiparty system with six parties in the federal parliament, including the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP, the Greens, the Left (die Linke) and the AfD. The same tendency exists for the Länder parliaments, where the anti-immigration and anti-EU AfD has gained seats in all states, with particularly high shares in some of the states of the former East Germany. This has been exacerbated by the fact that the vote shares accrued by the traditional major parties, the CDU and the SPD, have fallen dramatically, which means they are no longer dominant forces at either the federal or the Länder level.

Because both the left and right poles of the political spectrum are represented in the Länder parliaments and the Bundestag, and indeed have been increasing their vote shares in most of these bodies, the German party system can now be classified as fragmented and polarized. Although this fragmentation and polarization is much weaker today than it was during the Weimar Republic in the inter-war years, it is much stronger than in most periods of the post-war era. The political positions of the traditional parties of government (i.e., the
SPD and CDU/CSU) have substantially converged over the years, opening up a political space for more extreme competitors. In the state parliaments, numerous variants of coalitions exist, which all form functioning and stable governments, indicating that the rise of the multiparty system has so far not damaged effective policymaking. The only exception in coalition formation refers to the anti-immigration right-wing party, the AfD, which all other parties have hitherto excluded from any coalition. However, evidence for the 2013 – 2017 period indicates that the AfD was and still is able to exert a considerable influence over migration policy. Moreover, in many instances, coalition partners have a difficult time reaching a compromise and have adopted policies that have failed to satisfy supporters on either side, which tends to lead to a further decline in opinion poll ratings for the governing parties, particularly the SPD. (Score: 7)

Citation:
Policy Performance

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Germany’s economy avoided an outright recession, in 2019 but experienced a marked decline in its growth rate. In November, like many other institutions, the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat 2019) reduced its growth forecast, predicting that GDP would grow by 0.5% in 2019 and 0.9% in 2020 (after growth rates of above 1% in the preceding years). The weakening of international trade flows due to the trade dispute between the United States and China, and to other European and global uncertainties including the threat of a no-deal Brexit, has hit German export industries hard. Structural issues have further exacerbated these short-run cyclical factors. As of today, it is hard to predict how the country’s vital car industry will cope with the technological transition to electromobility. Overall, the period’s economic developments were split between the recessionary trends in the export industry and strength in the domestic economy driven by a continuation of the construction boom and high levels of private and government consumption.

Economic policy has continued to be rather passive. The crucial reforms still shaping labor-market institutions, unemployment benefits, the pension system, corporate taxation, the constitutional debt brake and liberalized labor migration from outside the EU are now a decade or more old. Although these reform packages of the 2000s improved Germany’s competitiveness and increased its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, some of these advantages are gradually eroding. Within the field of corporate taxation, for instance, numerous tax reforms in important competing countries like the United States and France have left Germany as a relative high-tax location in comparison. What is also missing are convincing answers to the questions raised by demographic change and its consequences for the availability of skilled labor. The buoyant labor market has led to an increase in wages and a
slight increase in unit labor costs, although this is not yet generally considered to be a threat to competitiveness.

There has been some activity aimed at improving the country’s ability to meet the challenges of the digital transformation. In late 2018, the federal government adopted an Artificial Intelligence Strategy, with the goal of becoming a European or global leader in the development and practical use of AI technologies. This AI Strategy is intended to enhance research into artificial intelligence technologies, along with the subsequent development and implementation, thus strengthening the country’s economic development and social cohesion and sustaining its high level of economic well-being.

Citation:

**Labor Markets**

Germany’s success in reducing structural unemployment since the mid-2000s has been impressive. Most recent statistics show that Germany’s employment rate is still increasing despite the falling levels of GDP growth, with 45.3 million people employed by the end of the review period (+0.33 million compared to October 2018). Unemployment rates are at their lowest level since German unification, again decreasing to 4.8% (under the national definition) in October 2019 as compared to 5.1% in 2018. However, due to the deteriorating situation in the export-oriented industries, unemployment rates may be at a turning point, and may increase in the coming years. While there is still a shortage of skilled workers and the number of job vacancies remains high, this number decreased in autumn 2019 for the first time since 2010. There are also other indications that the number of vacancies may have seen its peak.

The extent to which the share of atypical employment contracts – such as temporary employment programs (Leiharbeit), part-time and agency work – should be seen as a downside of the employment boom remains a debated question. This share grew in the 1990s and early 2000s. But with the onset of the employment boom after 2009, it declined from 22.6% in 2007 to 20.1% in 2018 (Destatis 2019, Specht 2019). The largest portion of atypical employment is part-time work among women, particularly in Western Germany. On the one hand, atypical employment also reflects an increase in industrial flexibility, and may to a considerable extent also be in line with workers’ leisure preferences. On the other hand, atypical employment
contracts may have detrimental consequences for the social security system due to revenue losses, and can increase social risks such as that of old-age poverty.

A national minimum wage has been in effect since January 2015. There are exemptions in particular for adolescents and the long-term unemployed. The minimum wage increased from an initial level of €8.50 to €9.19 in 2019, and €9.35 from January 2020 onward. The minimum wage has elevated the earnings of 1.4 million employees, or about 11% of the employed. In some sectors, minimum wages are higher as a result of collective-bargaining processes. The German Council of Economic Experts has not reported any detrimental macroeconomic effects, though it is difficult to assess the long-term consequences of the national minimum wage, especially in times when the labor market is less dynamic.

Germany has a comprehensive toolbox of active labor-market programs, which includes financial support for vocational training programs, support for self-employed individuals, provision of workfare programs and the subsidized employment of long-term unemployed individuals. Traditional instruments such as job creation and training programs are now seen as combinable. Tailored to individual needs, these instruments are designed to facilitate the reintegration of long-term unemployed individuals into the labor market. Moreover, the subsidies for short-time working schemes (“Kurzarbeit”) have proven to provide an effective protection against dismissals in a cyclical downturn.

The enormous increase in the number of refugees claiming asylum in Germany since 2015 still poses a critical challenge for labor-market policymaking. Reducing barriers to labor-market access, especially to the regular labor market, and providing support for training and education will be crucial for the successful integration of refugees. Germany has already gone a long way toward integrating these newcomer, as illustrated by the constantly decreasing unemployment rate among refugees. In addition, given the looming shortage of labor, further training and – hopefully – further integration into the labor market must be one of the main tasks of present and future labor-market policies.

Citation:
https://www.arbeitsagentur.de/news-arbeitsmarktzahlen-2019
Taxes

German tax policy has lost steam in recent years. This was driven by macroeconomic as well as political factors. On the one hand, sovereign-debt crises in other European countries favored Germany as a business location, signaling that there was no need to overhaul the tax system for competitive reasons. Moreover, zero or even negative interest rates on new government bonds and buoyant tax revenues indicated that there was no need to raise tax revenues further. This complacency with regard to tax policy complacency has led to a situation in which the German tax system provides a mixed impression across the four primary dimensions of performance, as noted below.

Provision of sufficient resources: Clearly, the system has been highly successful in recent years with regard to financing dynamic growth in government expenditure while simultaneously balancing budgets across all federal layers. According to the Ministry of Finance, between 2010 and 2019, total tax revenues have risen by more than 25%, from €531 billion to €793.7 billion (Bundesfinanzministerium 2019).

Consideration of equity aspects: Germany is among the OECD countries in which the tax and transfer system is particularly effective in correcting unequal market incomes so as to achieve a more equal post-tax situation.

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Consideration of equity aspects: Germany is among the OECD countries in which the tax and transfer system is particularly effective in correcting unequal market incomes so as to achieve a more equal post-tax situation. Whereas the Gini coefficient is 0.49 for pre-tax market incomes, it is reduced to 0.29 for disposable incomes by all the redistributive tax and transfer instruments (Sachverständigenrat 2019). Hence, the tax and transfer system performs quite well in terms of redistributive objectives.

Competitiveness: Clearly, the passivity of German tax policy has had a negative impact both on work incentives and the country’s competitiveness as an investment location. The top marginal personal-income-tax rate (47.5%) is comparable to the OECD average (47.8%), but the average marginal rate continues to be a key challenge for Germany’s competitiveness, as it is 15 percentage points higher than the OECD average. The OECD report concludes that this is particularly harmful with regard to the integration of single parents into the labor market (OECD 2019), while also creating substantial work disincentives for households’ potential second earners. Furthermore, the complexity of the German tax system imposes high compliance costs on households and firms. A major further weakness of the German tax system is the eroding competitiveness of corporate taxation. After a decade of passivity, the position of Germany with regard to effective corporate-tax-rate comparisons has continuously declined. The U.S. tax reform of 2018 marks an
important further step, as the United States, a former high-tax location, cut corporate-tax rates to well below the German level. The consequence is that there are today very few industrial countries left that impose a higher tax burden on their companies. Germany has thus lost considerable appeal as a destination for foreign direct investment (Heinemann et al. 2018).

Ecological sustainability: Since the ecological tax reforms of the red-green government in 1999, the German tax system has been equipped with “green” taxes designed to internalize the ecological damage produced by certain polluting activities. The most important instruments here are the energy and electricity taxes that increase the price of fuel, heating oil and gas, and electricity consumption. Moreover, the Renewable Energy Act established massive subsidies for investment into renewable energy, which is financed through a surcharge on electricity consumption. Finally, the German industry is subject to the European emissions-trading system with its market-based pricing of CO2 emissions. Together, these tax instruments have significantly increased the prices of (nonrenewable) energy consumption. However, the revenues from ecological taxes total only 1.8% of GDP as compared to the EU average of 2.4% (Umweltbundesamt 2019). The year 2019 saw one important step that could have a long-run impact on the ecological orientation of Germany’s tax policy. In the context of the climate package, policymakers elected to integrate traffic and heating into the CO2 pricing system. Although the initially envisaged level for the CO2 price was criticized as too timid (and was substantially increased in the legislative process), this institutional innovation can be seen as a milestone with regard to a more comprehensive and consistent pricing of CO2 emissions.

Several further uncertainties and deficiencies within the German tax system should also be mentioned. For example, Germany’s municipal tax system will be confronted with a reform of the housing property tax which must be fully implemented by 2024 so that valuation of property wealth better reflects actual market values. Although there are huge discrepancies in the budgetary performance of German municipalities, they have in aggregate produced budget surpluses over the past couple of years. Despite perennial discussions about the problems of bracket creep, there has been no effective solution to the problem. Finally, the German Council of Economic Experts has criticized the fiscal equalization scheme between states as inefficient and harmful to growth (Sachverständigenrat 2017: 293).

Citation:
Bundesfinanzministerium (2019):
Budgets

For Germany, the 2009 global recession and its aftermath implied higher budget deficits and gross public debt following revenue shortfalls, anti-crisis spending packages and bank bailout costs. Since then, however, Germany’s budgetary outlook has considerably improved. Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to decrease from 80.1% in 2010, and was expected to fall below the Maastricht limit of 60% at the end of 2019 (Sachverständigenrat 2019). This decrease has resulted from surpluses in general government balances since 2010 as a consequence of dynamic employment growth, a stable GDP increase and historically low government-bond interest rates. In addition to this favorable environment, a constitutional debt limit is in place (Schuldenbremse) that restricts the federal government’s cyclically adjusted budget deficit to a maximum of 0.35% of GDP, and will require German states to maintain balanced cyclically adjusted budgets from the year 2020 onwards. The year 2019 also showed a strong positive balance, with the full surplus projected at €49.2 billion (1.4% of GDP) by the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat 2019). Although surpluses are now forecasted to decline, the short-run perspective remains favorable. This has even led to some debate over whether the constitutional debt brake is still appropriate, should be loosened or even given up. Arguments in favor of debt-brake reform relate to the low interest rates that are expected to stay at a low level for the foreseeable future, along with the perceived lack of public investment.

As the review period closed, the short-run budgetary outlook thus remained good despite the cyclical downturn of the economy. However, the medium- and long-run challenges resulting from demographic change are substantial. According to calculations based on the generational accounting methodology developed by Bernd Raffelhüschen and his coauthors (Bahnsen et al., 2019), Germany’s “implicit debt” (i.e., the government’s spending promises not
covered by future tax revenues) are on an increasing path, and have reached 160% of GDP in 2019. This deterioration of long-run solvency is driven both by less optimistic revenue expectations and numerous political decisions that have increased spending within the social security system on a permanent basis without offering compensating revenue measures.

Citation:

**Research, Innovation and Infrastructure**

Germany’s performance in the area of research and development remains positive. According to the World Economic Forum, Germany’s capacity for innovation is ranked best among the world’s top performers. In the Global Competitiveness Report 2019, Germany retained its top rank. Furthermore, Germany ranked fifth out of 141 countries with regard to patent applications per inhabitant. The quality of scientific research institutions is ranked at fourth place, a strong improvement relative to 2017, when Germany was ranked only 11th out of 140 countries (Global Competitiveness Report 2019: 241).

Regarding funding, the German government continues to raise budgets for research and development. Overall spending levels remain above the European average. The budget of the Ministry of Education and Research was increased to €14.0 billion in 2014, €15.3 billion in 2015, €16.4 billion in 2016 and €17.6 billion in 2017, setting a new record. In 2018, this level was kept at the same amount, but increased in 2019 to €18.3 billion (Bundesregierung 2019).

Unlike numerous other European countries, Germany has not previously offered general R&D tax incentives, instead focusing on the provision of targeted funding of specific programs. In this respect, 2019 saw a substantive turning point with the Research Allowance Act (Forschungszulagengesetz), which introduced a R&D tax incentive that will become effective starting with the year 2020. Spending on R&D staff will benefit from a 25% tax allowance that will be paid out if the entity makes a loss. The tax subsidy is capped at €500,000 per company per year.

Companies’ expenditures on R&D are significant, but public-private partnerships and collaborations between universities and industry leave room for improvement. The federal government and states have agreed to continue the Joint Initiative for Research and Innovation, and intend to increase the program’s budget by 3% every year between 2021 and 2030.
Over the past years, as Germany has increased its research and education budget and pursued its excellence initiative within the tertiary education sector, the quality of its scientific research institutions has improved slightly. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019, Germany performs well in the areas of higher education and training. However, the country was at only 21st place with regard to digital skills among the population (Global Competitive Report 2019: 240).

Citation:
Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung – BMBF (2019):

Global Financial System

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, policy initiatives in the field of financial market governance underwent a strategic realignment from private self-regulation toward public regulation, with the aim of in the future avoiding costly public bailouts of private banks. Germany has assumed a leading role in the fight against the sovereign-debt crisis in Europe. Its maximum financial guarantee for the European Stability Mechanism amounts to €190 billion. The country is also exposed to risks through the ECB’s TARGET payment system.

Germany was been an early advocate of the European Banking Union, integrating several elements into national law (e.g., rules for bank restructuring in a crisis) before EU standards emerged. Internationally, Germany argued vigorously in favor of coordinated, international steps to reform the global financial system and to eliminate tax and regulatory havens. In addition, Germany was one of the driving forces that helped to develop the G-20 summit into a first-class forum for international cooperation. Despite these efforts, however, Germany has also clearly defended the interests of its domestic banking system, particularly with respect to the special deposit-insurance programs operated by state-owned savings banks (Sparkassen). The government remains concerned that pooling Europe’s deposit-insurance systems through the envisaged European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) too early could result in the collectivization of southern European banks’ risky loan portfolios and excessive sovereign-debt exposure. However, during the period under review, the German government agreed to start negotiations on EDIS, which was generally welcomed as signaling a willingness to search for a compromise.

Although skeptical at first, the German government ultimately revised its position regarding the implementation of an EU-level financial-transaction tax
(FTT). In 2019, Germany’s Finance Minister Olaf Scholz proposed draft legislation that would introduce a FTT on stock transactions as a joint initiative of 10 EU member states.

II. Social Policies

Education

The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) is still an important indicator regarding the quality of a country’s educational system. Since the first PISA study in 2000, the OECD has often repeated its criticism that access to education in Germany is stratified and educational attainment is dependent on pupils’ social backgrounds. Educational opportunities are particularly constrained for children from low-income families and for immigrants. PISA results from 2012, however, had shown significant improvements, reflecting possibly a catalytic effect of the “PISA shock” in the early 2000s. Germany ranked above the OECD average in mathematics, reading and science, and the importance of students’ socioeconomic background had lessened. While in 2000, the level of social equity in German education was among the lowest in the OECD, the overall quality of the country’s primary and higher education systems showed consistent improvement through 2019. With regard to workforce skills levels, Germany now ranks fifth out of 137 countries (Global Competitive Report 2019: 238).

In contrast to other countries, the proportion of individuals with tertiary education has remained astonishingly low for several decades. The proportion of young people with tertiary education in 2019 still lags behind the OECD average. In 2018, 32% of young adults (aged 25-34) held a tertiary degree, compared to 24% in 2008. Despite this progression, tertiary attainment in Germany remains below the OECD average of 44%, mostly as a result of the country’s strong vocational-education system, which offers another reliable path into skilled employment. The share of people with upper-secondary or post-secondary education is high compared to the OECD average (58% as compared to 44%). However, this figure has fallen persistently in the past decades.

A total of 33% of German university graduates hold a degree in one of the science, technology, engineering or mathematics fields that are of particular importance for a country’s technological and innovation capacities, compared to a 25% average across the OECD countries.
Participation rates in high-quality early-childhood education are high; in 2018, more than one-third (37%) of children under the age of three were enrolled in such programs.

In general, Germany’s education system is strong in terms of vocational training, providing skilled workers with good job and income prospects. The rate of post-secondary vocational education and training is about 20%, much higher than the OECD average. All in all, the German education system excels in offering competencies relevant for labor market success, resulting in a very low level of youth unemployment (rank 2 among OECD countries). Thus, defining educational achievement primarily on the criterion of university degrees (as the OECD does) might not do justice to the merits of the segmented German dual education system.

Ensuring that the refugees who arrived in 2015, and to a lesser extent from 2016 to 2019, are sufficiently included in the education system and the labor market will be one of the most challenging tasks in integrating this population successfully. However, this process has proved remarkably successful to date.

Citation:
Global Competitive Report (2019):

Social Inclusion

Germany has a mature and highly developed welfare state that guarantees a subsistence level of income to all citizens. The German social security system is historically based on the insurance model, supplemented by a need-oriented minimum income. There are a variety of minimum-income benefit schemes, including income support for unemployed (“Hartz IV”) and disabled people, an old-age minimum income, and assistance for asylum-seekers. The number of Hartz IV recipients is declining, having decreased from 4.362 million in 2017 to 4.141 in 2018 and 3.924 in 2019; thus, during the period under review, this figure fell below the 4 million mark for the first time in many years. This decline is all the more remarkable given the fact that many of the refugees who entered Germany since 2015 have newly entered the Hartz transfer system.

On 5 November 2019, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment concerning Hartz IV recipients. Under the current system, people who fail to fulfill certain conditions (e.g., proof of active job search) are subject to penalties. This principle follows the Hartz reforms’ principle of “assist and demand” (“fördern und fordern”). In extreme cases, recipients could lose up to 60% of their benefits, and repeat offenders could lose all their benefits for a maximum
period of three months if they failed to attend a job interview, turned down employment or missed training opportunities. The ruling indicated that cutbacks of 60% or even 100% are unconstitutional. The judges emphasized that such reductions are unreasonable given that “the burden it entails seriously encroaches upon the minimum standard of living guaranteed by the fundamental rights.” Thus, a reduction of only 30% was deemed to be acceptable, and even this allowable only under strict conditions. The judgment thus reinforced benefit recipients’ social inclusion without abandoning the possibility of penalties completely.

Since 2015, Germany has had a national statutory minimum wage designed to increase and stabilize market incomes within the low-wage segment of the population. The minimum wage was raised to to €9.19 in 2019, and will be further increased to €9.35 in 2020. No massive job losses have as yet been noticeable.

In November 2019 the government decided to introduce a basic state pension. It aims at reducing poverty in old age, giving benefit recipients a better legal status as citizen and to increase the basic pension to an appropriate level (for details see P11).

The massive increase in the influx of asylum-seekers and refugees since 2015 has constituted an additional challenge to successful social inclusion. In recent years, however, public agencies, supported by civil society organizations, have been largely effective in managing these issues, and in promoting the social and labor-market integration of asylum-seekers. Integration of refugees into the German labor market has progressed better than expected, with about 40% already in employment by the autumn of 2019 (Tagesschau 2019).

Statistisches Bundesamt (2019):
Tagesschau (2019):
https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/migration-arbeitsmarkt-101.html
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2019/11/ls20191105_1bvl000716.html

Health

The German healthcare system is inclusive and of high quality, and provides healthcare for almost all citizens. Most people in regular employment are insured through the public health insurance systems, whereas civil servants, self-employed people, people with high incomes and some other groups tend to be privately insured. However, the system faces challenges in the form of
increasing costs. Recently, the system’s short-term financial stability has been better than expected due to buoyant contributions resulting from the employment boom. However, long-term financial stability will be challenged by the aging population and increasing costs within the healthcare system. Healthcare spending as a proportion of GDP in Germany is among the three highest such levels in the OECD world, and is considerably higher than the OECD average (11.2% of GDP compared to an OECD average of 8.8%). In per capita terms, health spending in Germany is nearly $6,000 per year. This is the fourth-highest position and is again significantly higher than the OECD average of about $4,000 (OECD 2019).

In its coalition agreement, the grand coalition negotiated a variety of reform measures to increase the quality of healthcare, redefine some financial details, reorganize the registration of physicians in private practice, and adjust the distribution of practicing doctors and hospitals. All measures have been formulated rather vaguely and no important details have yet been determined. But a minimum range of medical-service opening hours for outpatient care of 25 hours per week was adopted, and the ministry will promote the introduction of electronic patient records in the medical practices and the health insurance institutions.

Contribution rates have been largely stable over recent years, consisting of a general rate of 14.6% of gross wages plus an insurer-specific contribution rate that averaged 0.9% in 2019. The insurer-specific contribution, previously paid solely by the employee, is now shared equally between employer and employee, like the general rate. The resulting average combined contribution rate is 15.5% which has to be paid on income up to (an annually increasing upper) ceiling. Effectively, this formula implies that absolute contribution levels will grow dynamically in pace with the overall increase in wage levels. The federal subsidy for the national health fund was raised in 2017 by €0.5 billion to a total of €14.5 billion and was kept constant in 2019.

On 10 October 2018, the cabinet decided to increase the contribution rate for long-term care insurance by 0.5 percentage points. As of 1 January 1 2019, it was 3.05%, with single contributors required to pay a rate of 3.30%. Thus, a total of more than €5 billion will additionally be available for improvements in long-term care. A part of the additional revenue will be placed in a precautionary fund intended to stabilize future contribution rates. In addition, families that wish to provide care at home will be given greater support.

Finally, the coalition agreement has sought to increase the number of medical student places, and to improve the training given to midwives by making this a graduate-level profession.
While the government has been ambitious in fostering a high-quality health system, it has not acted sufficiently to limit spending pressure. In particular, it has been hesitant to open the system to more competition (e.g., with respect to pharmacies).

Citation:
OECD 2019:

Families

For decades, a broad consensus among political parties and major societal actors aligned the German system paradigmatically toward the male breadwinner model. Universal family benefits, incentives tailored to the needs of married couples and single-earner families, and a shortage of public childcare contributed to women’s low rate of participation in the labor market.

Today, this traditional approach has been substantially corrected. Parental leave, previously short and lacking adequate compensation, has been extended. Paternity leave has been introduced and promoted. Today, a parent’s net income while on leave is on average just 25% less than their net income prior to leave. Additionally, the number of public childcare places has increased. A legal right to childcare beginning at age one came into effect in August 2013. In early 2019, a total of 33.6% of the country’s children aged under three, or 790,000 individuals, had access to a childcare institution (BMFSFJ 2019). In June 2017, the German Bundestag voted to increase the number of daycare places by 110,000 by 2020, allocating €1.13 billion to this purpose. Moreover, new legislation was introduce to improve the quality of daycare services (Gute KiTa-Gesetz).

In summary, these measures, in combination with an increasing shortage of skilled labor, have led to a considerable increase in labor-market participation rates among women. While in 2005, only 59.6% of women between 15 and 64 years of age were employed, this figure had risen to about 74.3% by 2019. However, 37% of women are working part-time, which is well above the OECD average of about 25% (OECD 2019).

Citation:
Deutscher Bundestag (2018): Bericht über die Auswirkungen der Regelungen zum Elterngeld Plus
https://www.bmfsfj.de/blob/121264/6b1fe7d78f9a48f9b19ddbeb73e4b6daef/bericht-elterngeldplus-data.pdf
Pensions

Germany has engaged in a significant number of pension reforms in recent decades. In particular, the far-reaching 2004 reform aimed to make the pension system more sustainable by increasing the retirement age and establishing a link between pension increases and demographic change.

Since 2014, the grand-coalition governments have reversed the previous pension reform agenda and gradually increased the generosity of the system. Critics have argued that these measures would undermine the system’s long-term sustainability. First, the government reduced the retirement age by two years for workers who have contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years. Second, it provided a “catch up” payment for housewives with children born before 1992. The calculation will now include two additional years of (fictive) contributions, allowing this group greater parity with counterparts whose children were born after 1992. Finally, pensions for people with disabilities were increased. The total cost of these reforms is expected to reach €160 billion by 2030.

In 2017 and 2018, several additional reforms were undertaken: Company pension plans have been encouraged as an addition to the statutory pension insurance system, pension calculations for people with long-lasting illnesses were adjusted, and the current difference in pension payments and pension levels in the federal states of the former East and West Germany states was set to sunset by 2025.

In November 2019, the government decided to introduce a basic state pension (Grundrente). This is intended to reduce old-age poverty. As long as they have paid into the old-age pension system for more than 35 years, including periods of child raising periods and care, the pensions provided to low-income earners will be increased. They will be treated as if they had paid contributions for 35 years on the basis of 80% of the average wage. The basic pension will then be deemed fully paid up to a monthly maximum taxable income of €1,250 for single individuals and €1,950 for couples (including income from pensions and capital in the means test). The government expects that the additional costs associated with this provision will be about €1.1 billion to €1.5 billion annually. In addition, the government implemented several measures aimed at improving private and occupational pension provisions (BMAS 2019).
Public subsidies for the pension fund have increased routinely over time. In 2017, subsidies totaled €67.8 billion, and with an increase to €98 billion expected by 2019. In August 2018, the government introduced a “double stop line,” which means that contribution rates should not exceed more than 20% of income by 2025, and that pension levels should not fall below 48% of income by the same year. This will only be financially possible with a substantial further increase in the federal subsidy.

The contribution rate has been lowered from 18.9% to 18.6% since January 2015. Meanwhile, pensions have been increasing quickly in recent years due to the high levels of employment growth and the rising average wage of the active population. On 1 July 2019, pensions again increased by 3.18% compared to 1.9% in 2017 and 3.22% in 2018. However, increasing healthcare contributions and long-term care insurance costs have somewhat reduced the level of net pension increases.

Integration

According to new data, about 25% of the people living in Germany have a migrant background. This translates into 20.8 million persons, and represents an annual increase of 2.5% from 2017 to 2018. This increase is consistent with the trend seen over the last decade (apart from the exceptionally high numbers in 2015 – 2016 in the context of the refugee crisis) (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019).

According to the OECD (2013), reforms passed in the early 2010s “put Germany among the OECD countries with the fewest restrictions on labor migration for highly skilled occupations.” In 2014, the government introduced the right to dual citizenship. This reform abolished the requirement for most children born in Germany to non-German parents to decide between the citizenship of their birth and the citizenship of their parents.

The number of asylum applications has strongly decreased after 2016’s peak of 745,545, falling to an estimated 114,165 in 2019 (Statista 2019). Despite this normalization, migration remains one of the country’s top political issues,
with a lasting impact on German politics. Since the refugee crisis of 2015 – 2016, the xenophobic AfD has gained seats in all state parliaments, and even became the third-strongest party in the 2017 Bundestag election. Moreover, the party was able to increase its vote shares in the subsequent Länder elections in 2018 and 2019.

Governments at the federal and state levels, with additional strong involvement by the municipalities and civil society, have responded to the challenges posed by the high number of refugee arrivals since 2015 in an impressive way. The federal government’s financial strength allowed it to substantially increase financial support for states and municipalities, while also providing early integration and language courses. These policies were followed by attempts to restrict and regulate the influx of refugees both through national and EU initiatives, including the refugee pact with Turkey in which the EU agreed to provide financial support to host Syrian refugees in Turkey, while the Turkish authorities in exchange agreed to prevent refugees from entering EU territory.

While Germany has thus handled the short-run challenges remarkably well, the long-term challenge of integration remains a crucial concern, including the successful integration of the refugees and asylum-seekers into both the education system and labor market. However, recent data confirm that the 2015 refugees have been integrated into the German labor market more easily than many expected (Tagesschau 2019). In autumn 2019, about 40% of refugees from the main countries of origin (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran) were already in employment, mostly in regular employment with full social security coverage. However, labor-market integration has been much slower for women refugees than for their male counterparts. The OECD recently praised the effectiveness of Germany’s dual vocational training system as having been successful in providing migrants with professional qualifications and bringing them into skilled employment (Handelsblatt 2019).

Much will ultimately depend on whether the process of broader cultural integration will succeed. So far, German civil society remains generally in favor of a society open to migrants. However, there is a danger of strengthening xenophobia if problems of cultural alienation and safety concerns grow. A further stress factor for integration as resulted from political developments in Turkey, where the weakening of democratic institutions and civil liberties under the Erdogan government have served to polarize Turkish communities in Germany. This has resulted in divergent perceptions of the importance of free media, the rule of law and the separation of powers (values enshrined in the German constitution), raising concerns about an absence of common values.
The German Islam Conference, established in 2016, is a key platform for dialogue with Muslim organizations in Germany. The German coalition government shifted its approach toward the Islam Conference at the end of November 2018, and is currently focusing on a new program called Mosques for Integration (Moscheen für Integration), as well as the education of Muslim theologians in German universities (Deutsche Islamkonferenz 2018).

Citation:

Safe Living

In general, residents of Germany are well protected against security risks such as crime or terrorism. After a rise between 2013 and 2015, the total number of recorded crimes has fallen again since 2016. According to the most recent police statistics, the total number of crimes decreased by 3.4% in 2018, reaching a level of 5.6 million total cases, the lowest such number since 1992 (Bundesministerium des Innern 2019b). In 2018, particularly strong declines in sexual offenses and burglaries were evident.

The influx of nearly 900,000 refugees in 2015 and the years to follow fostered a heated discussion about a potential rise in crime. Crime rates differ significantly across migrant communities (Bundeskriminalamt 2019). The share of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq among crime suspects is far below these countries’ shares in the total refugee population. Conversely, refugees from the Maghreb and other African countries, as well as from Serbia, have disproportionate shares among criminal suspects. In general, the higher crime rates among refugees compared with the native-born population can be explained by the much higher share of young men with low levels of education and who are without employment, a group that tends to exhibit higher crime rates in general.
Several terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists took place over the course of 2016 to 2019, although the majority of allegedly planned attacks were prevented by the police. The most severe attack took place in December 2016, when Anis Amri killed 11 people and injured 55 by driving a truck into a Christmas market in Berlin. The year 2019 saw a terrorist attack from a right-wing extremist who targeted a synagogue in Halle.

Politically motivated crimes, which increased in number in 2015 – 2016, have been on the decline since then. The total number decreased in 2018 by 8.7% (Bundesministerium des Innern 2019a). Politically motivated violent crimes are slightly more frequent from the left (1,340 in 2018) than from the right (1,156 in 2018). For all political crimes, including non-violent incidents, the numbers are much higher for the right (20,431 in 2018) than for the left (7,961 in 2018). Political crimes related to foreign ideologies are on the rise, but remain relatively infrequent overall (2,478 in 2018).

Citation:
Bundesministerium des Inneren (2019b): Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2018, Ausgewählte Zahlen im Überblick,
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/kriminalitaet-rechtsextremismus-101.html

Global Inequalities

In absolute terms, Germany ranks third among donor countries with respect to the provision of official development assistance. Over recent years, it has increased its ratio of official development assistance (ODA) to GNI substantially, and has reached a level almost at the ODA target of 0.7% of GNI, and is thus among the top 20% of OECD donors.

The country’s trading system is necessarily aligned with that of its European partners. In trade negotiations within the European Union, Germany tends to defend open-market principals and liberalization. This position is in line with the country’s economic self-interest as a successful global exporter. For agricultural products in particular, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) still partially shields European farmers from international competition, thus limiting the ability of developing countries to export their agricultural products to Europe. However, Germany has been more willing than peers such as France to consider a more liberal and open CAP that would provide greater benefits to developing countries and emerging markets.
In October 2018, the Merkel government started an initiative to strengthen economic developments in Africa. It invited 12 African governments to Berlin and announced the creation of an investment fund comprising about €1 billion. It is intended to foster economic development and encourage private investment in the participating countries. The dramatic increase in the number of refugees arriving in Germany since 2015 seems to have increased the German government’s awareness of the importance of stable social, economic and political conditions in developing countries. This understanding has had a lasting budgetary impact; for example, the 2018 federal budget provides for an increase in the resources allocated to the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development by €0.8 billion. In 2019, for the first time, the ministry’s budget will exceed €10 billion, with a particular focus on fighting the causes of flight in North Africa and helping Syria and neighboring countries (BMZ 2018).

Citation:

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

In the latest Environmental Performance Index, Germany ranks only among the second tier of “strong performers,” behind its European peers. After ranking sixth worldwide in 2014, Germany dropped to 30th place in 2016, but has since recovered to rank 13 in 2018 (EPI 2018). However, its score has continuously decreased over this time, from 84.26 in 2014 to 78.37 in 2018 (Environmental Performance Index 2018). Behind this overall picture, the country’s performance varies substantially across the various dimensions, as noted below.

Resource use (land, water, materials, energy): Germany uses about one-third of its land for agricultural production. Intensity of production and the negative impact on biodiversity are problematic issues. The country is rich in forests, which cover about 30% of the land.

Environmental pollution (water, air, soil): The degree to which Germany’s population is exposed to fine particulate matter is clearly a problem. Wastewater treatment fulfills the highest standards, and the quality of water
has continuously improved over recent years and decades. Nitrogen pollution of the soil by the agricultural sector is heavily debated, but Germany achieves a relatively good rank 14 in the Environment Performance Index in this area. The country performs best with regard to the population’s minimal levels of heavy-metal exposure.

Climate: Although the German economy’s CO2 intensity has declined, it is still high by international comparison, in part as a consequence of the still relatively high share of GDP contributed by industrial production. The energy sector still depends to a large degree on fossil-fuel-based electricity production.

Biodiversity protection: Despite the controversy regarding the effect of agricultural production on biodiversity, Germany is ranked third worldwide in the Environmental Performance Index for the issue of biodiversity and habitat.

Climate protection became a leading topic in the German public in 2019 as a partial consequence of the younger generation’s frequent and massive demonstrations on the issue (e.g., the “Fridays for Future” movement). The climate issue has replaced the migration issue as the public’s top policy concern. The government has reacted to this mounting pressure in part by abandoning its complacency over the threatened failure to reach its own emissions-reduction targets. Two events in 2019 illustrated this change of course toward a much more ambitious climate policy.

First, in January, the Coal Commission presented its comprehensive roadmap for the phase-out of coal-fired power generation in Germany by 2038, which includes generous financial compensation for the coal-mining regions affected. The government has declared its intention to follow the commission’s recommendations.

Second, both parliamentary chambers, after intense discussions and the adoption of significant amendments, accepted the government’s climate package, originally presented in a draft version in September. The package includes one crucial innovation: the introduction of a CO2 price for traffic and housing, and hence for sectors that do not currently take part in the EU’s Emission Trading System and its pricing mechanism for CO2 emissions. From 2021 onward, CO2 emissions associated with traffic and house heating will carry a price tag. As part of the agreement, the initially proposed starting CO2 price of €10 per ton was raised to €25. That price is envisaged to rise even further to €55 by 2025. The climate package includes a variety of further measures, such as a VAT reduction for railroad services, financial support for a faster buildup of electric-automobile infrastructure, and subsidies for more
environmentally friendly heating systems. Under its new climate-protection act, Germany is now obliged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 as compared to 1990 levels. An independent expert commission will annually review the reduction path. Federal ministries are responsible for ensuring that emissions within their portfolio areas are in line with the legal provisions.

Nevertheless, substantial challenges remain. It is not certain whether the phase-out of fossil-fuel-based energy production in combination with the shutdown of the last nuclear-power plants by 2022 is in fact consistent with ensuring a safe and uninterrupted power supply. Germany has seen a consistent increase in the share of power produced from renewable energy sources. Whereas in 2015, only 33% of energy production originated from renewable energy sources, this share had risen to 38.6% in 2017, about 41% in August 2018 and 47.7% by the middle of 2019 (Fraunhofer Institut 2018). As a key component of the energy policy, the government committed in its coalition agreement to increase the share of renewable energy in electricity consumption to at least 65% by 2035. However, given substantial local resistance to windmill construction and a decline in new investment, it is questionable whether these targets are in reach.

Despite these open questions, Germany has demonstrated a new ambition in climate policy, and has set a course toward the implementation of a far-reaching CO2 price mechanism with a significant starting price in 2021. Through this approach, Germany has once again joined the club of countries with ambitious climate plans.

Global Environmental Protection

Germany is a driving force in international climate policy, in the development of renewable energies, and in efforts to improve energy and resource efficiency. The German government actively promotes strategies fostering environment- and climate-friendly development.

The G7 summit held in June 2015 achieved remarkable progress toward an international agreement for global climate protection. Germany, using its
The presidency of the G7, was able to ensure that climate policy had the highest priority during the summit, setting the stage for the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement committed to a maximum rise in average global temperatures of “well below 2 degrees.” The agreement is a breakthrough because, for the first time, nations have to define their contributions to fighting climate change (Germany: 2.56%). The Paris Agreement was formally ratified by the EU on 5 October 2016 and came into force on 4 November 2016 (European Commission 2016). Germany also ratified the Paris Agreement. The Bundesrat agreed to do so in September 2016, after the Bundestag gave its unanimous approval. However, detailed measures for the implementation of the ambitious climate objectives were not part of the Paris Agreement.

In November 2017, the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 23) was hosted in Bonn, Germany. This was shortly after the German general elections on 24 September 2017, and the new government had not yet taken office. As a consequence, the new government was not able to present a detailed environmental policy. Surprisingly, Chancellor Angela Merkel subsequently opposed the new EU climate objectives that were announced in August 2018 by EU Commissioner for Climate Change Miguel Arias Canete. In the November 2018 Climate Change Conference in Katowice, Poland, Germany made a €70 million contribution to the Adaptation Fund. Smaller pledges made by France, Sweden, Italy and the EU raised the total to $129 million – an annual record for the fund. In addition, Germany contributed €1.5 billion to the Green Climate Fund – double its 2014 contribution (UN 2019).

With increasing signs that Germany would not fulfill its own emissions-reduction targets, the country’s credibility in climate negotiations has suffered in recent years. The turn toward a more ambitious climate policy in 2019, with the legislated implementation of a CO2 price that includes traffic and housing, as well as a legal obligation to fulfill the reduction commitment (for details see “Environment”), has now strengthened Germany’s position as a credible negotiation partner.

Citation:
United Nations (UN) 2019:
Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, (7– 8 June 2015):
https://www.g7germany.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen/G8_G20/2015-06-08-g7-abschluss- eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=6
Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

On 24 September 2017, elections were held to constitute the new German Bundestag. A total of 42 parties and 111 independent candidates contested the elections. Germany’s constitution ensures that members of the Bundestag, the country’s lower parliamentary house, are elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections for a legislative period of four years (Basic Law, Arts. 38, 39). Parties that defy the constitution can be prohibited by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). On January 2017, following a complaint by the Länder governments about the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD), the Federal Constitutional Court decided that while the party is without any doubt unconstitutional in its program and actions, there are no indications that the party will succeed in achieving its anti-constitutional aims. Therefore the suit to ban the NPD failed.

The Political Parties Act (Parteiengesetz, PPA) sets general criteria for the management of political parties and candidates. While independent candidates have to fulfill a signature gathering prerequisite (modest by international standards) in order to qualify for the ballot, parties must meet strict organizational requirements (PPA Section II). If parties have continuously held at least five seats in the Bundestag or a state parliamentary body (Landtag) during the last legislative period, they are allowed run in the election without any initial approval from the Federal Election Committee (Bundeswahlausschuss, FEC).

Political campaigning is largely unregulated by federal legislation, a fact modestly criticized by the latest OSCE election report (OSCE 2018). Article 5 of the Political Parties Act (Parteiengesetz, PPA) requires that “where a public authority provides facilities or other public services for use by one party, equal treatment must be accorded to all parties.” During electoral campaigns, this general criterion applies to all parties that have submitted election applications (Art. 5 sec. 2). The extent of public services parties are able to use depends on their relative importance, which is based on each parties’ results in the last general election (Art. 5 sec. 3). This is called the “principle of gradual
equality,” and constitutes the basis for parties’ access to media in conjunction with the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag). The gradual equality principle is also applied to television airtime, although in this case the time granted to large parliamentary parties is not allowed to exceed twice the amount offered to smaller parliamentary parties, which in turn receive no more than double the amount of airtime provided to parties currently unrepresented in parliament. While public media networks provide campaigns with airtime free of charge, private media are not allowed to charge airtime fees of more than 35% of what they demand for commercial advertising. Despite these rules, there is a persistent debate as to whether the media’s tendency to generally focus coverage on the six largest parties and, in particular, on government parties is too strong.

Citation:
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/germany/358936?download=true

German citizens (Basic Law, Art. 116 sec. 1) aged 18 or older are eligible to vote and run for election to the Bundestag, provided that they have resided in Germany for at least three months (Federal Electoral Act, sections 12.1, 15). By judicial order, the right to vote can be denied to criminals, persons lacking legal capacity and convicts residing in a psychiatric hospital (Federal Electoral Act, sec.13). Prior to an election, every registered citizen receives a notification containing information on how to cast a vote as well as an application form for postal voting. Today, postal voting is widely used, largely without issue. According to the Federal Returning Officer, 28.6% of registered voters cast their ballot in this manner in the 2017 federal election, an increase of 4.3% compared to the 2013 election. Citizens not included in the civil registry (e.g., homeless people) are eligible to vote, but have to apply to authorities in order to be registered.

After the Federal Constitutional Court declared some provisions regarding the voting rights of Germans living abroad to be unconstitutional, a new amendment on the issue was drafted and passed in May 2013. Today, Germans living abroad have the right to vote (Federal Electoral Act, sec. 12) if they have lived at least three months in Germany after their fifteenth birthday and have not lived more than 25 years abroad without interruption. Those who do not fulfill these requirements are still eligible to cast their vote if they can verify that they are both familiar with and affected by German political conditions. Germans living abroad have to register to vote with the authorities of their last domestic residence at least 21 days before the election. They can then cast their vote by mail (cf. Federal Elections Act sections 36, 39 and Federal Electoral Regulations).
During the period under review, there were three state elections, in Brandenburg and Saxony on 1 September 2019 and in Thuringia on 27 October 27. As in all previous elections, no major irregularities or complaints about voter registration, voter lists or postal voting were reported.

Citation:
Federal Elections Act (BWG) Sections 36, 39

On 26 June 2017, mustering the required two-thirds majority, the German Bundestag changed Art. 21 (3) and (4) of the Basic Law, which regulates the financing of the political parties. The Constitutional Court had refused to ban the National Democratic Party (NPD), a right-wing extremist party, on constitutional grounds. In response, the government and other political parties wanted to exclude the NPD and other extremist parties from state-based party financing. As a result of the changes, parties that oppose the free democratic order or the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany by abusing the basic freedoms may no longer benefit from tax advantages for donations or state grants.

In general, Germany’s political parties finance their activities under the terms of the Political Parties Act (PPA) through state funding, membership fees, donations and sponsorships. In order to be eligible for state funding, parties must win at least 0.5% of the national vote in federal or EU elections, or 1% in state elections. A party’s first 4 million votes qualify it for funding of €1 per vote per year; for every vote thereafter, parties receive €0.83. In addition, individual donations of up to €3,300 are provided with matching funds of €0.45 per €1 collected. State funding of political parties has an upper limit, which in 2017 was €165 million. Since 2013, this cap has been annually adjusted for inflation. However, public financing must be matched by private funding. Thus, parties with little revenue from membership fees or donations receive less from the state than they would be entitled to based on vote counts alone.

Following the September 2017 elections, the German Bundestag decided to increase the upper limit for party financing by about €25 million to its current level of €190 million. Before this time, increases had been based jointly on the inflation rate and price increases; in 2017 this calculation produced an increase of 2.5%, whereas the new regulation provided an increase of 15%. The CDU/CSU and SPD, the two governing parties, sought to justify this rise by pointing to steep party cost increases driven by digitalization, intensified
communication and higher costs for internet security (Deutscher Bundestag 2018). This change proved highly controversial within the public and between the parties; moreover, the decision was made a day after the beginning of the Soccer World Cup, prompting further criticism of the timing.

Critics continue to argue that party finances are insufficiently transparent. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has identified some progress with respect to transparency, but continues to point out shortcomings in the German system. In its 2019 report, GRECO concludes that “Germany had implemented satisfactorily or dealt with in a satisfactory manner nine of the 20 recommendations, 10 recommendations had been partly implemented and one remained not implemented.” (Greco 2019: 2). In addition, in a recent assessment based on the accounting reports of all major parties, the nonprofit LobbyControl organization found that three-quarters of all donations to parties lack transparency. All donations less than €10,000 and revenues deriving from party sponsorship arrangements remain opaque. By law, the names and addresses of campaign donors must be made public only if donations from that source exceed €10,000 per year (LobbyControl 2019).

Citation:

In Germany, referendums are of importance on the municipal and state levels. At the federal level, referendums are exclusively reserved for constitutional (Basic Law, Art. 146) and territorial issues. On the municipal and state levels, voter initiatives have grown in use since German unification, with their increasing frequency bolstered by legal changes and growing voter awareness. However, discussions about introducing referendums on the federal level are ongoing and intensifying.

From 1946 to 2019, 351 direct democratic procedures took place. In some states (e.g., Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate), the government or parliament can, under certain conditions, call a referendum with the power to confirm or overturn a decision by the legislature. The main themes had been education/culture (about 25%) and democracy, state organization, and domestic politics (about 25%). Bavaria (57), Hamburg (50) and Brandenburg (49) used direct democratic procedures most frequently. There is an interesting imbalance between the German Länder. Whereas in the Länder of the former West Germany, direct
democratic processes are relatively common (especially in Bavaria, Hamburg and Berlin), the number of such procedures in the Länder of the former East Germany remains extremely low; indeed, no plebiscite has yet been initiated from below, by the population, in these federal states.

These activities proved particularly intense in 2018 proved particularly intense with regard to. A total of 17 new referendums were initiated in the country, considerably more than in the previous years, along with 31 ongoing procedures, mainly driven by civil society. In addition, 15 mandatory constitutional referendums were held in Hesse (Mehr Demokratie 2019: 40). Since 1949, a total of 351 referendums in the country have been initiated by the public or civil society groups rather than legislative bodies.

In some states (e.g., Baden-Wuerttemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate), citizens can, under certain conditions, call a referendum with the power to confirm or overturn a decision by the legislature. Since 2014, no such referendums have occurred.

Citation:
Mehr Demokratie (2019)
https://www.mehr-demokratie.de/volksbegehrensbericht/

**Access to Information**

Germany’s Basic Law guarantees freedom of expression, press and broadcasting (Art. 5 sec. 1) and prohibits censorship, with exceptions delineated by the standards of mutual respect, personal dignity and the protection of young people. Strong constitutional guarantees and an independent judiciary provide for strong media freedom. A new anti-whistleblower provision penalizes the handling of leaked data without ensuring adequate protection for investigative journalists as well as their sources. Since 2016, the law governing the work of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency (BND) has allowed the surveillance of foreign journalists, thus legalizing potential infringements of media freedom rather than preventing them. A constitutional complaint against this regulation was still pending at the Federal Constitutional Court during the period of observation.

Print media, which are largely self-regulated, are broadly independent of political interference. The German Press Council is tasked with protecting press freedom. However, the latent economic crisis of newspapers and publishing houses may slowly but steadily undermine media pluralism. In the World Press Freedom Index published in 2019, Germany was ranked 13th out
of 180 countries, a slight improvement from previous years, but representing a slight decline since its best ranking of 12th place in 2015.

The Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) provides a general nationwide framework for the operation of public and private broadcast media. In the private broadcasting sector, governmental influence is limited to the general provisions, regulations and guidelines stated in the interstate treaty that ban discrimination or other abuses. While the relationship between public authorities and private media can be seen as unproblematic, one can observe dependencies between authorities and the public media organizations (ARD and ZDF) that are at least questionable.

Citation:

In Germany, the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag, RfStV) defines a threshold of average annual viewership share of 30%, over which a broadcaster is considered to have an inadmissible dominance over public opinion (RfStV, Sec. III, Subsection 2). The Federal Cartel Office regulates most questions of oligopoly and monopoly in Germany, and has blocked several potential mergers in both print and electronic media markets.

Two main public television broadcasters operate at the national level in Germany: the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten Deutschlands (ARD), a conglomerate composed of various regional TV channels, and the Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF). According to the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Fernsehforschung (AGF), a broadcast media research group, public broadcasters hold a market share of 44.3%, slightly more than in previous years. In the private sector, the RTL Group holds a 24.3% market share, while the ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG accounts for 18.8% of the total television market. TV is the most commonly used media (80%), followed by radio (65%) and the internet (63%). Daily media use has increased marginally as compared to previous years, with German residents’ average media-consumption time now slightly exceeding five hours per day.

The nationwide print media market is dominated by five leading daily newspapers: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, Handelsblatt and the tabloid Bild. Bild has by far the biggest circulation in Germany. Additional agenda-setters are a number of weeklies, in particular Der Spiegel, Focus, Die Zeit and Stern. However, the latent economic crisis being experienced by newspapers and publishing houses may slowly but steadily undermine media pluralism.
With newspaper circulations continuously falling, the internet has become an increasingly important medium for citizens to gather information. This has forced print media to engage in significant cost cutting measures, including reducing the size of editorial staff. In summary, Germany has a comparatively plural and diversified media ownership structure and modestly decentralized television and radio markets.

Citation:
https://www.agf.de/daten/tvdaten/marktanteile/ vom 01.11.2019

The Freedom of Information Act took effect in 2006. The act defines what government information is publicly available. In 2018, the new Europe-wide General Data Protection Regulation came into force, necessitating some adjustments within the German law. In his 27th Activity Report, covering the period 2017 to 2018, Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI) Ulrich Kelber stated that this process had been successful, and that nearly all German states had adopted or adjusted their own freedom of information laws, or were in the process of developing such legislation (BfDI 2019a).

Even so, citizens remain largely unaware of the federal Freedom of Information Act. Although many federal agencies strive for transparency, some public authorities have interpreted the act in a very restrictive manner. Some have sought to introduce delays in the process of providing information, while others have refused to provide access to documents altogether, arguing that the contents were of vital importance to ongoing government activities and thus confidential. In an overall assessment in 2019, Kelber concluded that citizens are increasingly making use of their rights and that federal authorities no longer regard citizens’ right to information as a nuisance, but as a significant element of a healthy civil society. The number of page views via the internet of the website of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection strongly increased, to about 28 million in 2018 compared to just under 16 million in 2017. The number of citizens directly contacting the BfDI with complaints or questions has also strongly increased (BfDI 2019a).

Over the past several years, beginning in May 2016, the main activity of the BfDI and government in this area has been to adjust the national laws to the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation. However, the changes did not strengthen the role of the BfDI and its federal commissioner, which was expected to be one of the main outcomes in translating the EU directive into national law.
Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil Rights
Score: 9

In general, all state institutions respect individual freedoms and protect civil rights. Civil rights are guaranteed by the Basic Law and their modification is possible only by a two-thirds legislative majority. Some provisions concerning basic human rights are not alterable at all. The court system works independently and effectively protects individuals against encroachments by the executive and legislature. According to the Freedom House (2019) civil liberties index, Germany is ranked as free.

Citation:
Freedom House (2019):

Political Liberties
Score: 9

Due to Germany’s historical experience with National Socialism, political liberties are highly protected by the country’s constitution and the Constitutional Court. Freedom of expression is protected by the constitution (Art. 5), although there are exceptions for hate speech and Nazi propaganda, such as Holocaust denial. With the exception of cases where individuals are deemed to be actively seeking to overturn the democratic order, the right to assemble peacefully is guaranteed (Basic Law, Art. 8) and is not infringed upon. All exceptions are applied very restrictively. For example, even extreme parties such as the far-right National Democratic Party (NDP) currently have full freedom to operate. The Bundesrat appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court seeking to prohibit the NDP but the court did not ban the NPD in his judgment from January 17, 2017.

The freedoms to associate and organize (Basic Law, Art. 9), as well as academic freedom, are generally respected. Non-governmental organizations operate freely. Every person has the right to address requests and complaints to the competent authorities and to the legislature (Basic Law, Art. 17). Freedom of belief is protected by the constitution (Basic Law, Art. 4).

Non-discrimination
Score: 8

Germany’s Basic Law (Art. 3 sec.3) states that every person, irrespective of parentage, sex, race, language, ethnic origin, disability, faith, religious belief or political conviction is equally important and has the same rights. The
General Equal Treatment Act of 2006 added age and sexual orientation to that enumeration of protected categories. The Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency monitors compliance with legal anti-discrimination norms and principles, supports persons who have experienced discrimination, mediates settlements, informs the public about infringements and commissions research on the subject of discrimination.

Nevertheless, discrimination remains a problem in various spheres of society. For example, there is widespread agreement that women should be better represented in the business sector’s upper-management levels. In 2015, the government adopted legislation to increase the number of women on corporate supervisory boards. The law stipulates a 30% share of women on the boards of large companies.

The Federal Constitutional Court decided in June 2013 that treating same-sex and opposite-sex marriages differently from a taxation perspective was unconstitutional. Regulatory changes reflecting this ruling were adopted within weeks by the parliament. In January 2015, the court ruled that a bill banning headscarves for teachers at public schools must adhere to federal-state laws (Ländergesetze). In its ruling, the court indicated that generally prohibiting teachers in state schools from expressing their religious beliefs through their outer appearance was not compatible with the freedom of faith and the freedom to profess a belief (Art. 4 secs. 1 and 2 of the Basic Law). However, in a dissenting opinion, two of the judges opposed the majority’s reasoning, signaling that non-discrimination on religious grounds is a contested issue in society and in constitutional law. In November 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the government must recognize a third gender category in order to avoid discrimination against intersexual persons.

Citation:
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemeldungen/EN/2015/bvg15-014.html
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemeldungen/DE/2017/bvg17-095.html

Rule of Law

Germany’s Basic Law (Art. 20 sec. 3) states that “the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.” In reality, German authorities do live up to this high standard. In comparative perspective, the country generally scores very highly on the issue of rule of law in indices whose primary focus is placed on formal constitutional criteria.

In substantive terms, German citizens and foreigners appreciate the predictability and impartiality of the German legal system, regard Germany’s
system of contract enforcement and property rights as being of high quality, and put considerable trust in the police forces and courts. Germany’s high courts have significant institutional power and a high degree of independence from political influence. The Federal Constitutional Court’s final say on the interpretation of the Basic Law provides for a high degree of legal certainty. In the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index 2019, Germany was ranked sixth out of 128 countries; this was an improvement of two ranks compared to the 2015 – 2016 report, but was the same rank achieved in the 2017 – 2018 report.

Citation:

Germany’s judiciary works independently and effectively protects individuals against encroachments by the executive and legislature. The judiciary inarguably has a strong position in reviewing the legality of administrative acts. The Federal Constitutional Court ensures that all state institutions obey the constitution. The court acts only when an appeal is made, but holds the right to declare laws unconstitutional and has exercised this power a number of times. In case of conflicting opinions, the decisions made by the Federal Constitutional Court are final; all other governmental and legislative institutions are bound to comply with its verdicts (Basic Law, Art. 93).

Under the terms of the Basic Law (Art. 95 sec. 1), there are five supreme federal courts in Germany, including the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Federal Court of Justice (the highest court for civil and criminal affairs, Bundesgerichtshof), Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Federal Finance Court (Bundesfinanzhof), Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) and Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht). This division of tasks guarantees highly specialized independent courts with manageable workloads.

Germany’s courts in general, and the Federal Constitutional Court in particular, enjoy a high reputation for independence both domestically and internationally. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2019, Germany’s relative performance on judicial independence has declined in recent years, with Germany now ranked 31th out of 138 countries after ranking 25th in 2018 and 17th in the previous years. However, the World Justice Report’s Rule of Law Index 2019, which includes judicial review as one topic, assigned Germany sixth place out of 128 countries.

Citation:
https://www.weforum.org/reports
Federal judges are jointly appointed by the minister overseeing the issue area and the Committee for the Election of Judges, which consists of state ministers responsible for the sector and an equal number of members of the Bundestag. Federal Constitutional Court judges are elected in accordance with the principle of federative equality (föderativer Parität), with half chosen by the Bundestag and half by the Bundesrat (the upper house of parliament). The Federal Constitutional Court consists of sixteen judges, who exercise their duties in two senates of eight members each. While the Bundesrat elects judges directly and openly, the Bundestag used to delegate its decision to a committee in which the election took place indirectly, secretly andopaquely. In May 2015, the Bundestag unanimously decided to change this procedure. As a result, the Bundestag now elects judges directly following a proposal from its electoral committee (Wahlausschuss). Decisions in both houses require a two-thirds majority.

In summary, judges in Germany are elected by several independent bodies. The election procedure is representative, because the two bodies involved do not interfere in each other’s decisions. The required majority in each chamber is a qualified two-thirds majority. By requiring a qualified majority, the political opposition is ensured a voice in the selection of judges regardless of current majorities. In November 2018, Stephan Harbarth, previously a member of the German Bundestag, was elected as a new vice-president of the Federal Constitutional Court. This election received substantial press coverage, with discussions as to whether a former member of parliament who worked as a lawyer has the right profile for this position. This example seems to indicate that the new and open procedure has had a positive effect on public awareness.

Despite several corruption scandals over the past decade, Germany performs better than most of its peers in controlling corruption. According to the World Bank’s 2017 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Germany is in the top category in this area, outperforming countries including France, Japan and the United States, but falls behind Scandinavian countries, Singapore and New Zealand. Germany’s overall performance has also improved relative to other nations, with the country ranked at 7th place out of 215 countries in 2019 (World Bank 2019).

The country’s Federal Court of Audit (Bundesrechnungshof) provides for independent auditing of national spending under the terms of the Basic Law (Art. 114 sec. 2). According to various reports, the revenues and expenditures of the federal authorities were in general properly documented.
Financial transparency for office holders is another core issue in terms of corruption prevention. Until 2013, provisions concerning the income declarations required of members of parliament were comparatively loose. For example, various NGOs had criticized the extra-income documentation requirements, which merely stipulated that lawmakers identify which of the three tax rate intervals they fall under. This procedure provided no clarity with respect to potential external influences associated with politicians’ financial interests. However, beginning with the 2013 – 2017 parliamentary term, members of the German Bundestag have had to provide additional details about their ancillary income in a 10-step income list.

A total of 202 members of parliament out of 709, or 28.5%, declared additional income in the term that ended in July 2019. Within the FDP parliamentary party, half of the lawmakers had additional income, while CDU politicians showed the highest incomes overall. The Green parliamentary party has the lowest share of members reporting additional income, at only 15%. In the AfD parliamentary party, 21% of the parliamentarians have additional income, a share is higher than that of the SPD, the Left and the Greens.

Critics argue that the current system incentivizes the declaration of auxiliary income in slices of comparatively low amounts, and remains insufficient with regard to ensuring transparency or preventing corruption or conflicts of interest in a reliable way.

Citation:
https://www.abgeordnetenwatch.de/blog/nebeneinkunfte-2019
Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Since September 2017, the government has been led by Germany’s two most important political parties: the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The former CDU/CSU and SPD government showed comparatively little interest in improving the strategic planning of the Chancellery or federal government. However, the new government rearranged the organizational structure of the Chancellery, and introduced a new section (“Abteilung 6”) for political planning, innovation and digital politics, thus expanding the total number of sections from six to seven. The head of the new section is Eva Christiansen, who is also Chancellor Merkel’s media adviser.

Head of the Chancellery Helge Braun was previously coordinator for relations between the central government and the Länder. His current role has the status of a minister without portfolio, strengthening his position vis-à-vis the minister-presidents of the federal states and the heads of the federal ministries. The Chancellery is constantly expanding, and currently has more than 600 staff members. Despite the new planning section in the Chancellery, planning is neither well developed nor a well-integrated part of the politics and policies of the new government; indeed, it is not accorded a high priority by the federal government overall.

One handicap with regard to developing a strategic policy approach is that the government is strongly influenced by party considerations, with all major political decisions determined in negotiations between the heads of the governing parties. Consequently, most governmental decisions are negotiated between the heads of the three parties that make up the current government (the CDU, CSU and SPD) rather than between members of the government. This practice results in a “party politicization” of the government that undermines strategic planning. In addition, Chancellor Merkel’s leadership...
style can be described as time-oriented reactivity, which precludes goal- and future-oriented planning.

At the end of the review period, conflicts between the coalition partners had increased in intensity, and the parties’ strategies for the next elections were becoming increasingly important. In addition, internal party conflicts are becoming stronger, impeding attempts to improve strategic planning. However, at the beginning of November 2019, the governing parties negotiated a detailed midterm review concerning the implementation of their coalition agreement.

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kabinett-bestandsaufnahme-1688928

In some policy fields, expert commissions advise policymakers on a regular basis. Most of their members are appointed by the government or by individual ministries. In addition, ad hoc commissions are created to provide scientific advice regarding major reforms that involve complex issues, with the aim of coming to a consensus. A number of other established expert advisory bodies provide the government with expertise and advice, including the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der Gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) and the German Advisory Council on the Environment (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen), which produce regular reports on current policy problems (the former at least once a year, the latter every four years).

Most ministries maintain external, academic or legal advisory bodies. However, the impact of experts often has little visibility, and policymaking is heavily influenced by party positions. Nevertheless, while advisory reports do not have an immediate impact, they do have some influence on political debates within the government, the parliament and among the general public, because they are made publicly accessible.

In addition to these forms of academic advice, the federal ministries are increasingly turning to private consultancies. Between 2014 and 2018, the federal government as a whole spent more than €716 million for external advice (Handelsblatt), with the annual spending rate shown substantial annual increases. By far the largest growth in consultancy spending has come within the Ministry of Defense, followed by the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of the Interior. In sum, costs for external advice amounted to €248 million for 2017, while estimates for 2018 show spending of nearly €300 million. These increasing consultancy budgets have been the subject of debate, with critics questioning whether these contracts are justified and transparently commissioned, and whether they may signal undue influence by consultants within the public administration.
Summing up, scholarly advice is widely available, but day-to-day policies are decided mostly on the basis of internal expertise. Moreover, party politicization of the policymaking process often dominates executive decision-making. In addition, the engagement of expert commissions or other sources of advice is often used as a means of postponing decisions rather than as a true decision-making aid.

Citation:

**Interministerial Coordination**

The Chancellery, and particularly its head, sets the agenda for cabinet meetings. However, real political power lies elsewhere. The cabinet’s agenda is negotiated in advance between the top politicians of coalition partners, and the cabinet mostly gives official approval to matters already decided by the heads of the political parties. Thus, the Chancellery will only in exceptional cases refuse items envisaged for the cabinet meetings on the basis of its own policy considerations. Generally, the heads of political parties, rather than the Chancellery, act as gatekeepers. In the current government, the degree of interministerial coordination is comparatively low.

The preparation of bills is mainly the prerogative of the line ministries (Ressortprinzip). Over the course of regular policy processes, the Chancellery is generally well informed, but is not strongly involved in ministerial initiatives. Most disputes between ministries and the Chancellery are discussed and resolved in the often-weekly meetings between the state secretaries and the Chancellery’s staff. Because of the rapidly decreasing electoral support of the three governing parties, the CDU, CSU and SPD, the line ministries and their respective policies have become increasingly independent, following the preferences of the political party that heads each ministry. Each party today works to push through its own policy conception even if this may contradict that of the other coalition parties. Negotiating a commonly developed government policy is a highly contested and extraordinarily difficult process. From the perspective of the middle of the current government period, it is evident that all ministries are used to further the party politics of the individual coalition partners with an eye to the declining voter support in opinion polls.

As a rule of thumb, the cabinet functions as an institution that formally ratifies policy decisions that have been made elsewhere. In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies within their own jurisdiction. Therefore, they have
a strong leeway to pursue their own or their party’s interests, though each ministry must to some extent involve other ministries while drafting bills. Formal cabinet committees do not play an important role in policymaking and are rarely involved in the review or coordination of proposals. One particularly interesting innovation in the area of early coordination occurred during the review period: In March 2019, the government created a Cabinet Committee for Climate Protection (“Klimakabinett”). This consists of the ministries for Economic Affairs (Peter Altmeier), for Environment (Svenja Schulze), for Transport (Andreas Scheuer), for the Interior (Horst Seehofer) and of Agriculture (Julia Glöckner). In addition, Chancellery Head Helge Braun is involved, and the body is led by Chancellor Merkel and Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD).

Ex ante coordination between the line ministries’ leading civil servants has not been particularly strong under past German coalition governments. In addition, an entrenched political practice ensures that no ministry makes any proposal that might be postponed or blocked by other ministries. The federal Ministry of Finance must be involved when budgetary resources are concerned, while complicated legal or constitutional issues necessitate the involvement of the federal Ministry of Justice. But generally, every ministry is fully responsible for its own proposed bills. All controversial issues are already settled before being discussed by the cabinet. The dominant mechanism for conflict resolution is the coalition committee, which is composed of the heads of the governing parties, sometimes supplemented by higher bureaucrats and/or party politicians. It is the most important and informal decision-making body, with comprehensive competences in the governing process.

There are a number of informal mechanisms by which government policy is coordinated. The most important of these is the coalition committee, which comprises the most important actors (the chancellor, the vice chancellor, the chairpersons of the parliamentary groups and the party chairpersons) within the coalition parties. According to the recent coalition agreement from 2017, the coalition committee is expected to meet regularly, or can be convened at the request of any of the coalition partners. The coalition committee deals with the most controversial issues, typically yielding decisions based on the lowest common denominator.

In general, Germany has been slow to adopt e-governance mechanisms. There is as yet no special digital strategy for interministerial coordination. However, some Länder governments, such as Baden-Wuerttemberg and Brandenburg, have independently begun to digitalize their processes of interministerial coordination.
Evidence-based Instruments

In 2000, revised rules of procedure for the federal ministries (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien, GGO) came into effect, requiring an impact assessment (Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung, GFA) for every draft law. Thus, regulatory impact assessments are institutionally anchored in Germany. The GFA process analyzes both intended and unintended effects of draft laws and potential alternatives. In addition, on behalf of the government, non-governmental organizations developed guidelines for sustainability assessments. In October 2016, Chancellor Merkel (re)appointed the German Council for Sustainable Development (RNE). While its recommendations have no binding powers, it did create a Sustainable Financial Strategy for the government to improve its strategic orientation.

The government’s 2006 Bureaucracy Reduction and Better Regulation program created a number of new policies relevant to the assessment process. It established the National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) as an independent watchdog and advisory body tasked with assessing new legislation. It adopted the Standard Cost Model as a tool for measuring bureaucratic costs. Finally, it institutionalized the bureaucracy reduction process by creating a coordination unit within the cabinet office and setting up a committee at the ministerial undersecretary level. However, the NKR only concentrates on potential bureaucratic costs, and not on impacts of laws foreseen through the evaluation process. In addition, about 30% of laws – specifically, those which are initiated by parliament – are not reviewed under the NKR. In its 2019 annual report, the NKR strongly criticized the increasing costs of implementation. These were about €831 million in the year ending 2019, whereas the previous year they had been significantly lower.

Citation:
https://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/nkr-de
https://www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/mediathek/?type=22

The National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) works with a large number of different actors on various levels of the administration. Its cooperation with German states and local authorities has also intensified, in particular through the development of methodological standards for assessing compliance costs.

In its 2018 annual report, the NKR stated that the comprehensive measure of compliance costs had peaked in 2017, with costs declining by €880 million in 2018. In 2019, this tendency reversed, and compliance costs increased again by €831 million. This increase was mainly caused by the implementation of
new legislation against illegal employment and misuse of welfare benefits (Normenkontrollrat 2019).

The NKR has stated critically that digitalization processes in Germany’s public administrations lag significantly behind those in other European countries, and that valuable opportunities for further cost reduction are thus being squandered.

The new “one-in one-out” rule, introduced in 2015, is intended to reduce the financial burdens imposed on enterprises. This rule means that all new costs for enterprises and state bureaucracy (the “ins”) have to be compensated for by additional regulations reducing costs by at least the same amount (the “outs”). In 2017, this rule reduced aggregate costs for enterprises by about €302 million; in 2018, between March and December, enterprises were released from additional net costs of €129 million (Bundesregierung 2019).

Summing up, the NKR’s monitoring and quantification exercises have significantly increased awareness of the bureaucratic burdens associated with legislation for companies, private households and the public administration itself.


In October 2016, Chancellor Merkel appointed six new members to the German Council for Sustainable Development (RNE), and reappointed the remaining nine members. This body is tasked with contributing to the implementation of the National Sustainability Strategy by identifying areas for action, developing specific project proposals and increasing awareness of the importance of sustainability issues. The RNE independently chooses its array of topics and actions.

In addition, the parliamentary Council for Sustainable Development (Parlamentarische Beirat für nachhaltige Entwicklung, PBnE) supervises the government’s sustainability strategy. Its political influence appears moderate, and its primary task is to act as an advocate for long-term responsibility in the business of government. The PBnE was established in 2004 and must be reconstituted after every parliamentary election. On the whole, neither the RNE nor the PBnE are well integrated into the RIA framework.

In 2019 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index, which was jointly developed by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Sustainable Development
Solutions Network (SDSN), Germany is well positioned at sixth place out of 157 countries. Its ranking declined by one position compared to 2018.

In general, government ministries are solely responsible for policy results and, as a consequence, evaluate the effectiveness of policies within their domain. Evaluations are often part of a ministry’s daily procedures.

Traditionally, evaluation of legislation in Germany has an ex ante character. Ex post evaluations are not yet universally undertaken. These study the causal impacts of policies based on credible experimental methods, for example, through comparisons of a treatment group with a control group. Today, thorough ex post analyses are used in the fields of labor market, education and family policies. A milestone for ex post labor-market research was the introduction of a legal obligation to evaluate the impact of active labor-market policies in 1998. Since then, important legislation such as labor-market and social security reforms (Hartz reforms), and later the introduction of minimum wages have undergone far-reaching ex post evaluations.

In December 2018, the government agreed on a program for better lawmaking and bureaucracy reduction (“Bessere Rechtsetzung und Bürokratieabbau”). Application of this program is still in the early stages. Thus, while some standards for high-quality ex post evaluation have been set for some important policy areas, use of these methods has yet to be implemented across the broader policy field.

In general, government representatives meet with societal stakeholders as part of their daily routine. Nevertheless, neither the last nor the current CDU/CSU-SPD government made use of social pacts or other direct bargaining.
Mechanisms. As under previous governments, ministries and parliamentary committees relied heavily on information provided by interest groups, and took their proposals or demands into account when developing legislation. The impact of civil society actors in general depends on their power, resources and organizational status. Since interests are sometimes mediated through institutionalized corporatist structures, employers’ associations and unions play a privileged role. Experts and interest groups regularly take part in parliamentary committee hearings in the course of the legislative process.

With regard to noneconomic societal actors, the German Islam Conference has been tasked to assist in the development of an intercultural dialogue between government officials and Muslim civil society organizations. The institution celebrated its 10-year anniversary in 2016, but since then little progress in this area has been made. On the contrary, conflicts between its members have increased, particularly between the government and the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DiTib), and its future seems uncertain. A German Islam Conference event was scheduled for November 2019.

Citation:
Deutsche Islamkonferenz (DIK) 2019:

Policy Communication

In a formal sense, the federal government’s Press and Information Office is the focal point for communication, serving as the conduit for information originating from individual ministries, each of which organizes their own communication processes and strategies. However, this does not guarantee a coherent communication policy, which is a difficult goal for any coalition government. There is a persistent tendency of coalition partners to raise their own profile versus that of the other government parties. This tendency has increased mainly because of the governing parties’ declining electoral support, the pressure of the elections upcoming in October 2021 and the increasing success of the right-wing populist AfD party and the Greens.

However, on the issue of climate change, which has risen to the top of the policy agenda, the government’s communication of its new climate-related measures (the climate package) appeared more coherent. While the package was criticized by opposition parties, it was jointly defended by the government parties. In addition, new welfare-state-related policies such as the basic pension (“Grundrente”) were – after tough negotiations – jointly communicated. Hence, there seems to have been a slight improvement
compared to the dramatic controversies marking the years of the migration crisis.

Implementation

The current government agreed on its coalition contract on 7 February 2018. The coalition contract comprised 175 pages and touched upon nearly all possible policy topics.

The coalition contract notes that after two years, the government is to take stock and examine the progress made to that point. Thus, in November 2019, the government came up with a positive balance sheet. A month previously, government policies were validated by a study conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) that also gave the government a positive assessment. The study stressed that the government had implemented or substantially initiated more than two-thirds of the promises laid down in its coalition contract. Both parties were able to translate slightly more than 50% of their electoral promises. However, opinion polls make clear that the public is not cognizant of this high implementation rate.

Citation:

In principle, line ministers are responsible for policies that fall under their jurisdiction. Therefore, individual ministers have some leeway to pursue their own or their party’s interests. This leeway is substantial in international comparison. Ministers sometimes pursue interests that therefore clash with the chancellor’s preferences or with coalition agreements. However, the coalition agreement bears considerable political weight and has often proved effective in guiding ministry activities. In terms of budgetary matters, Minister of Finance Olaf Scholz is particularly powerful and able – when he has the chancellor’s support – to reject financial requests by other ministries.

The new coalition agreement provides for some rules regarding when the coalition committee is to meet and who is to attend the meetings. As in previous coalitions, the committee consists of the chancellor and the vice chancellor, the leaders of parliamentary groups and party leaders (insofar as they are not the persons mentioned above). The coalition committee is informally the most important institution in resolving political disagreements within the government. Confronted with a harsh electoral decline in the 2019 state elections, the governing parties have increasingly sought to pursue their own interests through the ministries under their control, strongly undermining
interministerial coordination. In some cases, ministries do not respect the coalition agreement, and have sought to push through policies that are beyond the coalition agreement. The most prominent example was the basic pension legislation proposed by Minister of Finance Scholz. His policy was explicitly not covered by the coalition agreement, but was of high political importance for the SPD. In November 2019, the coalition committee reached an agreement on that issue.

As part of the climate package, ministries are to be made responsible for climate reduction targets in the sectors under their responsibility. This is an important example in which the ministries are tasked with fulfilling the government’s overall objectives.

According to the Basic Law, ministers are fully responsible for governing their own divisions. However, they are bound to the general government guidelines drawn up by the chancellor or the coalition agreement. Concerning topics of general political interest, the cabinet makes decisions collectively. The internal rules of procedure require line ministers to inform the chancellor’s office about all important issues. However, in some cases, the Chancellery lacks the sectoral expertise to monitor line ministries’ policy proposals effectively.

Executive agencies’ competences and responsibilities are explicitly detailed in law, edicts, statutes and other regulations. Their activities are not only subject to legal, but also to functional supervision, meaning that agencies’ decisions and administrative instructions will be reviewed. However, the ministries have not always made appropriate use of their oversight mechanism. A number of independent agencies, including the Federal Employment Office, the Federal Network Agency, the Bundesbank and others have deliberately been placed beyond the effective control of the federal government. It is important that monitoring agencies maintain organizational independence, so that they may monitor government effectiveness and financial impacts. The National Regulatory Control Council has tried to increase its powers over legislative and bureaucratic processes at federal and state levels.

The delegation of tasks from the national to the subnational level without commensurate funding has been a sore point of German fiscal federalism. For instance, municipalities suffer under the weight of increasing costs of welfare programs. However, a number of adjustments over the last years have substantially rejuvenated municipalities and states. For example, in July 2016, the federal government increased the flat-rate payment for the integration of migrants by about €8 billion until 2018, which was an exceptional improvement.

With respect to the future of the fiscal equalization system, an important compromise on the new system (in effect from 2020 onward) was achieved in October 2016. In this compromise, the Länder receive higher shares of VAT
revenues and a system of exclusively vertical equalization payments (from the federal to the state level) is replacing the current horizontal system (where richer states pay to poorer states).

In March 2019, a digitalization pact (Digitalpakt) was adopted. Under this policy, the federal government will invest about €5 billion in upgrading the digital infrastructure of schools – an area that has previously been the exclusive domain of the Länder. The Länder will invest an additional €500 million into the program.

Citation:

The allocation of tasks and responsibilities between the federal and state governments is defined in the Basic Law. Thus, police functions, cultural tasks, and education, including both schools and universities, are the responsibility of the states. This distribution of tasks is largely respected by the federal government. A far-reaching equalization system and an ongoing shift of tax revenues from the federal to the state level has also been improving the financial capabilities of states to fulfill these tasks (see Task Funding). Moreover, the Basic Law also grants local self-government to the almost 12,000 local governments in Germany. Local governments enjoy autonomy in organizing and carrying out their own affairs.

German federalism impedes the application of national standards because both states and local governments enjoy considerable autonomy. Public services are provided by various levels of government: the federal administration, the administrations of federal states, municipalities, indirect public administrations (institutions subject to public law with specific tasks, particularly in the area of social security), nonpublic and nonprofit institutions (e.g., kindergartens or youth centers), and finally judicial administrations. While some standards have a national character and thus have to be respected at all levels, this is not the case in areas such as education. A certain harmonization of implementation and enforcement is achieved through a process of tight coordination between federal and state governments and particularly among the individual state governments.

Laws and other regulations are usually enforced in an effective and unbiased way. However, law enforcement against vested interest depends on the structure of the respective acts. Detailed and strict laws are difficult to thwart, and administrators and courts are able to enforce them. By contrast, vague and lax laws may be more easily circumvented by vested interests. In general, government and courts are willing and able to enforce their respective regulations, and prevail against vested interests.
A current example concerns the enforcement of air quality protection regulation. This is a highly contested issue with vested interests on both sides of the debate (on the one hand, the powerful automotive industry and, on the other hand, influential environmental pressure groups). The fact that driving limits for diesel cars have been enforced in a rigorous way (also compared to other EU member states with identical air quality standards) indicates a largely unbiased implementation process.

**Adaptability**

As in other EU member states, EU regulations have a significant impact on German legislation. The country’s legal system is heavily influenced by EU law, but the federal government does not have a central policy unit specifically coordinating and managing EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters within its sectoral purview related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission. Today all federal ministries have specific EU units; thus, some adaptation is taking place, but these adaptations tend to be separately implemented within individual ministries rather than through government-wide reform.

Federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany has not made serious attempts to adapt government structures to the changing national, international and transnational environment.

The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the EU and other transnational and international organizations. During the years of the euro area debt crisis, the German government played a leading role in organizing and creating stabilization mechanisms. The government cooperated closely with European partners (particularly France), other countries such as the United States, and international organizations in addressing the Crimea crisis and the civil war in eastern Ukraine.

Moreover, Germany played a significant role in achieving a consensus at the Paris Climate Summit in November 2015. At the International Climate Conference in December 2018 in Katowice, Poland, however, Germany was not able to play an important role in fostering climate protection. Environmental Minister Svenja Schulze, together with some industrial and developing countries, called for greater ambition in the attendees’ climate policies. However, Germany’s credibility was impaired by the fact that it was not compliant with its own emissions-reduction targets. However, Germany took action during the current review period to reestablish itself as a climate-policy leader: Through its new climate-protection act, Germany has initiated various measures including a comprehensive CO2 price intended to reduce
emissions. This policy will strengthen the country’s credibility in future international negotiations.

In the area of asylum policy, Germany is today one of the strong supporters of a joint EU approach based on solidarity and equal sharing. Clearly, the dramatic years with record numbers of refugees reaching Germany in 2015 – 2016 demonstrated to Germany that the task of refugee reception may go beyond the capabilities of a single country, even one as large and economically well-performing as Germany.

Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize global and European public goods.

Citation:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 2018

Organizational Reform

There is neither a particular institution nor a commission that independently and impartially operates as an oversight body with respect to governmental activities. In addition, institutional self-monitoring capacities are still low. However, the creation of the Better Regulation Unit in the Chancellery and the extension of the competences of the National Regulatory Control Council (Normenkontrollrat, NKR) – an independent advisory body – have strengthened self-monitoring capacities. The NKR published its last report in October 2019, in which it requested greater effort to improve laws and reduce administrative burdens (NRK 2019). Moreover, the NKR has also sought changes and better monitoring of the organizational set-up for digitalization.

Citation:
Nationaler Normenkontrollrat (NRK) (2019):
https://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/nkr-de/stellungnahmen

In general, institutional reforms intended to improve the government’s management capacities are extremely rare. As in other countries, strategic capacities and reform efforts are heavily influenced by constitutional and public-governance structures and traditions. The federal system assigns considerable independent authority to the states. In turn, the states have a crucial role in implementing federal legislation. This creates a complex environment with many institutional veto players across different levels. Institutional and organizational inertia spells for low levels of strategic...
capacity. German federalism reforms, which constitute some of the more far-reaching institutional changes of recent years, have started to have an impact on the adaptability of the federal politics. In July 2017 and March 2019, further far-reaching reforms relating to the financial relations between the federal level and the states were adopted.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Recent empirical analyses indicate a dramatic decline in public interest in politics and parliamentary debates in Germany. Younger cohorts in particular were unable to mention any parliamentary debate they had followed with interest. Media use is intense in the younger age groups, but has shifted away from information toward entertainment consumption, with the result that an increasing share of people is almost completely cut off from any information on politics. In addition, policy knowledge correlates strongly with family social status and the socioeconomic environment (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018). Recent studies make clear that populist sentiments within the citizenry have increased over the years, while at the same time indicating a decline in political knowledge and interest in political details (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018). Schools have been unable to compensate for those deficiencies (Bundestag 2017). Nonetheless, comparative research indicates that policy knowledge in Germany remains at a level comparable to that in Scandinavian countries (Jensen and Zohlnhöfer 2020).

Citation:
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) Populismus-Studie
Open government is a relatively new topic in German politics and policymaking. In 2003, the European Parliament and the European Council issued Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information. The directive’s objective is to make public sector information more readily available to the public and private information providers with minimal bureaucracy. The directive has been changed several times, and was adjusted in 2015. On 13 December 2006, the German Bundestag passed a bill provided for by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (“Informationsweiterverwendungsgesetz”). The bill converted the first EU directive into national law. As the European directive was revised, a newer version of the law was adopted by the Bundestag in May 2015. Overall, the legislation requires that public sector information on social, economic, geographic, climate, tourism, business, patent and education issues be made available to private information suppliers and the general public. It has not been changed substantially since 2015. The federal government published a second National Action Plan on Open Data in September 2019 (following the first in 2014), and is currently working on an open data strategy.

Besides this legal obligation, the statistical offices of the federal and state governments are important sources of information for citizens. These offices provide a wealth of high-quality indicators across a large variety of fields that help citizens to assess the country’s performance. Statistical offices publish data not only through thorough detailed expert reports but also through readable and concise press releases, which are frequently cited by the media. Statistical offices in Germany enjoy a high degree of independence from politics, and have a reputation for providing undistorted data.

Citation:

Legislative Actors’ Resources

The German Bundestag has adequate personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activity. Members of parliament can conduct their own research or obtain information from independent experts. The parliamentary library and the parliamentary research unit respectively have staffs of 175 and 450 individuals. Every member of parliament receives a
monthly income of €10,083 (since July 2019), as well as an additional budget of more than €20,000, allowing him or her to maintain two offices and employ, on average, two experts. The German Bundestag has a staff of around 6,000. Parliamentary groups also have resources to commission independent research studies. Compared to the United States, German members of parliament are equipped with modest structural and personnel resources.

The German Bundestag is a “working parliament” – that is, parliamentary committees are of great importance in preparing and discussing legislative initiatives. Outside their law preparation activities, they also serve in an oversight role with respect to government ministries. Nonetheless, the government sometimes tries to withhold information. But most documents are made public and can be accessed. In an important ruling on 12 September 2012, the Federal Constitutional Court’s Second Senate strengthened the information rights of German parliamentary representatives regarding the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM).

In a ruling from 7 November 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court again strengthened the information rights of the Bundestag vis-à-vis the government, requiring the government to provide comprehensive and publicly available information. In addition, in a recent ruling from February 2019, the Federal Court (“Bundesgerichtshof”) bolstered the rights of parliamentary investigation committees to access governmental records.

Citation:
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/bvg16-084.html
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/auskunftsrecht-verfassungsgericht-staerkt-kontrollrechte-des-bundestags-1.3738737
BGH 3 ARs 10/18 – Beschluss vom 6. Februar 2019

Parliamentary committees’ right to summon ministers is established by the Basic Law. Ministers (or their state secretaries) typically attend meetings to which they have been invited. The Basic Law also gives members of the federal government or the Bundesrat the right to be heard in front of the plenum or any committee.

Parliamentary committees are able to hold public hearings at any time, and can summon experts to attend them. This mechanism is regularly used. Rule 70 Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag states that “for the purpose of obtaining information on a subject under debate, a committee may hold public hearings of experts, representatives of interest groups and other persons who can furnish information.” Experts are often able to
influence parliamentary discussions or ministerial drafts and bring about changes in the draft laws. The number of public hearings is increasing.

In general, the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries coincide. However, this is not always the case since the Basic Law provides for the establishment of several committees that do not have a ministerial counterpart (including the Committee on the European Union; the Petitions Committee; the Parliamentary Control Panel). Furthermore, several committees sometimes deal with matters that are within the responsibility of a single ministry (e.g., the Committee on Internal Affairs and the Sports Committee both monitor activities performed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior), and a single committee sometimes deals with matters that are not clearly assigned to a single ministry. Nonetheless, parliamentary committees’ most important policy areas fully coincide with those of the ministries, enabling effective monitoring.

Media

Public TV and radio broadcasters generally offer in-depth reports on political processes. Competition between the two main public television broadcasters, ARD and ZDF, has forced them to copy the private channels’ successful infotainment and politainment formats. Nevertheless, by international standards, ARD and ZDF in particular offer citizens the opportunity to obtain a relatively deep knowledge of political decision-making, and their market shares have stabilized in recent years. The plurality of the country’s television broadcast market is enhanced by the availability of programming from international broadcasters such as CNN, BBC World, CNBC Europe and Al-Jazeera. Recent opinion polls demonstrate that public trust in the media is decreasing. A total of 65% of Germans trust the public sector television, compared to 72% in 2017, with 66% trusting daily newspapers, and only 17% trusting private TV broadcasters (down from 29% in 2017). A quite small share of just 11% trusts the internet (Jackob et.al. 2019). Trust in the media is thus placed mainly in the public television and radio broadcast services. Nonetheless, according to another recent study, there are differences in the degree of trust accorded to public television depending on respondents’ political orientation: People on the left and the center of the political spectrum trust ARD and ZDF significantly more than do people on the right of the political spectrum (FAZ 2019).

Overall, confidence in the media’s truthfulness is increasing increases. In 2018, only 13% believed that the media were lying, compared to 20% the previous year (Spiegel Online 2018). However, the quantity of digital disinformation is increasing, creating a growing problem in this modern and digitalized media society.
Parties and Interest Associations

Generally, party leaders of the coalition government were reelected without any serious opposition. Party members do not directly participate in making important policy decisions. The parties retain traditional hierarchical decision-making processes and candidate-election procedures. However, at the end of October 2018, Chancellor Merkel announced that she would not run for reelection as party chairwoman of the CDU. Breaking with traditional procedures, a number of candidates stood for the office, with three candidates ultimately competing openly for the party leadership. In an open and nationwide campaign, they tried to attract the votes of the party members. In December 2018, a party convention elected Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as the new party chairwoman. Typically, the party leader runs for the chancellorship in the next national elections. For its part, the SPD adopted a highly sophisticated procedure to elect its new leadership. Only a duo proved acceptable, and a highly complicated procedure was employed. Party members have a strong influence in these debates.

Economic interest associations like trade unions or employers’ associations in Germany are well-functioning organizations endowed with rich analytical and lobbying resources. They are definitely able to develop policy strategies and proposals and to present alternatives to current politics. Both trade unions and employers’ association have their own economic think tanks supporting their policy proposals through substantive research on costs and benefits of different options. Furthermore, these organizations also invest substantial resources in lobbying for their positions among the general public and do so successfully. For example, the decision to introduce a general statutory minimum wage had been preceded by trade unions’ extensive public lobbying.

As of May 2019, the government’s official list contained 2,337 registered associations (Bundestag 2019), which again represented a moderate increase. One-third of those can be considered noneconomic interest associations. Within the process of policy formulation, interest-group expertise plays a key role in providing ministerial officials with in-depth information necessary to make decisions. Citizen groups, social movements and grassroots lobbying organizations are increasingly influential actors, particularly at the local level.
Policy proposals produced by noneconomic interest groups can be described as reasonable, but their suggestions often appear unrealistic.

Citation:
https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/lobbyliste

**Independent Supervisory Bodies**

The Federal Court of Audit (FCA) is a supreme federal authority and an independent public body. FCA members enjoy the same degree of independence as the members of the judiciary. Its task is to monitor the budget and the efficiency of state’s financial practices. It submits its annual report directly to the Bundestag, the government and the Bundesrat. The Bundestag and Bundesrat jointly elect the FCA’s president and vice-president, with candidates nominated by the federal government. According to the FCA’s website, around 1,300 court employees “audit the (state) account and determine whether public finances have been properly and efficiently administered,” while the FCA’s “authorized officers shall have access to any information they require” (Federal Budget Act Section 95 Para. 2). The reports receive considerable media attention. In its report from 22 October 2019, the FCA strongly criticized the expenditures of the Ministry of Defense.

Citation:
https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de

The standing parliamentary petitions committee is provided for by the Basic Law. As the “seismograph of sentiment” (annotation 2 Blickpunkt Bundestag 2010: 19; own translation), the committee deals with requests and complaints addressed to the Bundestag based on every person’s “right to address written requests or complaints to competent authorities and to the legislature” (Basic Law Art. 17). It is able to make recommendations as to whether the Bundestag should take action on particular matters. Nonetheless, its importance is limited and largely symbolic. However, the committee at least offers a parliamentary point of contact with citizens. According to its 2019 report, some 13,189 petitions were submitted, an increase of about 15% compared to the year before. Two additional parliamentary ombudsmen are concerned with the special requests and complaints made by patients and soldiers.

Citation:
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw20-de-petitionsbericht-641584
The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit, BfDI) has a long history, dating back to the end of the 1970s. Since January 2016, this institution has been an independent federal authority subject only to parliamentary and judicial control, no longer under the authority of the minister of the interior. The independence of the authority’s head is highly protected. A dismissal is possible only with good reason, with standards similar to those that apply to the dismissal of a judge with lifetime tenure. The authority’s budget and staff numbers have increased over time. Since 2016, its staff has increased from 90 to nearly 200 positions, with further increase expected. The authority’s task is to oversee federal institutions’ compliance with national and European data-protection rules.

Citation:
https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/Infothek/Pressemitteilungen/2019/16_27_TB.html
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