



Iceland Report

Gretar Þór Eyþórsson, Thorvaldur Gylfason,
Detlef Jahn (Coordinator)

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2020

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Executive Summary

The cabinet coalition formed after the October 2017 elections between the Left-Green Movement, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party is still in office. The prime minister is Katrín Jakobsdóttir, leader of the Left-Green Movement. Following a period of considerable political turbulence, which included three parliamentary elections in four years (2013, 2016 and 2017), things have stabilized.

After limited strikes in early spring 2019, Efling, the Store and Office Workers' Union (VR), and the Federation of General and Special Workers (SGS) signed a collective agreement with the Confederation of Icelandic Enterprise (SA) in April 2019. The agreement will expire on 1 November 2022. Members of the Efling and VR trade unions, and members of trade unions belonging to SGS approved the collective agreements. The contract applies to more than 100,000 members of 30 different unions. At the time of writing, excluding another agreement signed in mid-October 2019 between five unions and the Icelandic Confederation of University Graduates (BHM), no other unions have signed contracts.

In March 2019, one of the two largest Icelandic airlines, WOW air, declared bankruptcy and ceased operations. This led to 1,500 people immediately losing their jobs. Six months later, 300 to 400 of them are still without jobs. Though the overall impact of this bankruptcy has not been as large as initially feared. In response, the other Icelandic airline, Icelandair, has increased its passenger capacity. At the same time, Icelandair has encountered difficulties connected with the need to ground several Boeing MAX 737 jets until 2020.

Also in March 2019, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Iceland had violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is meant to ensure individuals' right to a fair and public hearing, in the appointment of judges to the recently established Court of Appeals. This led to the resignation of the minister of justice, Sigríður Andersen. In April 2019, the Icelandic government requested that the court review its ruling. Whether a revised ruling will be issued remains to be seen.

Having failed to adequately comply with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) concerning measures to tackle money

laundering and the financing of terrorism, Iceland has been added to the FATF's grey list, along with Mongolia and Zimbabwe. At the same time, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Ethiopia were removed from the list.

Other indicators suggest that a reasonably successful economic recovery from a financial crash, while essential, is not enough. Freedom House no longer categorizes Iceland as a full-fledged democracy. Iceland's democracy score was 100 between 2004 and 2009, but dropped to 99 between 2010 and 2012, before returning to 100 in 2013, 2014 and 2016. In 2017 and 2018, Iceland's democracy score dropped to 95, with the country ranked 19 overall. Iceland's deteriorating score can be attributed to several factors – not only the inadequate treatment of immigrants, which is often the sole reason why OECD countries fail to achieve a score of 100 in Freedom House's ranking.

In November 2019, as described by Sigmundsdóttir (2019), Iceland was shaken by the revelation of 30,000 documents, which were exposed by WikiLeaks, and initially reported on by Al Jazeera, Icelandic State TV (RÚV) and the Stundin newspaper. The documents suggest that Samherji, Iceland's largest fishing firm, had paid huge bribes to Namibian ministers, among others, to secure fishing quotas. The scandal resulted in the immediate arrest of the Namibian minister of fisheries and marine resources, and the former Namibian minister of justice plus four other Namibian individuals. Further, in early December 2019, Reuters (2019) reported that Angolan authorities have opened a criminal case against a former fisheries minister for alleged involvement in the bribery scandal.

Citation:

Al Jazeera, Officials in Namibia corruption scheme to remain in custody, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/officials-namibia-corruption-scheme-remain-custody-191202140206392.html>. Accessed 11 December 2019.

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Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), "Ten Years After: Iceland's Unfinished Business," forthcoming in Robert Z. Aliber and Gylfi Zoega (eds.), *The 2008 Global Financial Crisis in Retrospect*, Palgrave. Also available as CESifo Working Paper No. 7318, November 2018.

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Al Jazeera, Officials in Namibia corruption scheme to remain in custody, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/officials-namibia-corruption-scheme-remain-custody-191202140206392.html>. Accessed 11 December 2012.

Alda Sigmundsdóttir, Of political corruption and misdeeds in Iceland and Namibia, 22 November 2019. <https://www.aldasigmunds.com/of-political-corruption-and-misdeeds-in-iceland-and->

namibia/?fbclid=IwAR2I451ydOyXuSTdyLH5Y7Ramgz0bEqN6qfMmi_LJ7qVfcF6hPIEzUSrp5w. Accessed 11 December 2019.

Reuters (2019), Angola opens case against ex-minister over Namibia fishing bribe scandal, <https://www.reuters.com/article/namibia-iceland-angola/angola-opens-case-against-ex-minister-over-namibia-fishing-bribe-scandal-idUSL8N28L4L5?src=ilaw>. Accessed 11 December 2019.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) (2019), Rotten Fish: A Guide on Addressing Corruption in the Fisheries Sector, Vienna, <https://navig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Rotten-Fish.pdf>. Accessed 16 December 2019.

Key Challenges

Despite fears of labor unrest fueled by dissatisfaction with the recent, substantial wage hikes for business and political elites, three large labor unions nevertheless negotiated moderate wage agreements for their members in April 2019. Some public sector unions signed further agreements in late 2019 along similar lines but others have not yet reached agreement. The danger that labor market discord could result in debilitating strikes or excessive wage increases followed by a bout of increased unemployment, inflation or both seems to have abated.

The growth in tourism has slowed down following a fivefold expansion between 2010 and 2018 from 0.5 million foreign tourist arrivals to 2.35 million. This slowdown notwithstanding, tourism will still make a significant contribution to the national economy. In recent years, tourism has generated more foreign exchange earnings than fish and aluminum combined, and may well continue to occupy first place as the country's main foreign exchange earner in the years ahead. Even if the long-term consequences remain unclear, it appears that the bankruptcy of WOW air in the spring of 2019 may not dent the national economy as seriously as many feared. At the same time, Icelandair has encountered difficulties due to the need to ground its four Boeing 737 MAX-8 jets until 2020. The long-run impact of this on Icelandair, one of Iceland's largest companies, remains to be seen.

Iceland's largest hospital, Landsspítalinn (LHS), has for many years faced serious economic difficulties. These financial problems have resulted in repeated cuts to staff numbers and service provision in ways that many perceive as an existential threat to the healthcare system and some even see as a deliberate effort to pave the way toward increased privatization of healthcare, a controversial issue.

The current cabinet – which is led by Katrín Jakobsdóttir, the chairman of the Left-Green Movement, and which has held office since late 2017 – has launched a plan for a limited, partial revision of the Icelandic constitution. By so doing, the government is rejecting the result of the consultative referendum in 2012 in which 67% voted for the proposed constitution drafted by the Constitutional Council in 2011 – a level of public support that remains undiminished according to recent opinion polling (MMR, 2019). Support for the proposed constitution, which includes a provision for national ownership of Iceland’s natural resources that was supported by 83% of voters in the 2012 national referendum, seems likely to increase in the wake of recent scandals involving Samherji. Recent revelations suggest that Samherji, Iceland’s largest fishing firm, paid huge bribes to African politicians to gain access to valuable fishing quotas. Meanwhile, Samherji is also under investigation in Norway and elsewhere for money laundering.

After having failed to adequately comply with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), concerning measures to tackle money laundering and the financing of terrorism, Iceland was added to the FATF’s grey list.

Another concern is whether the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) will revise its ruling from March 2019. The ECHR had determined that Iceland had violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is meant to ensure individuals’ right to a fair and public hearing, in the appointment of judges to the recently established Court of Appeals.

Citation:

Ferðamálastofa (Icelandic Tourist Board), <https://www.ferdamalastofa.is/is/tolur-og-utgafur/fjoldi-ferdamanna/heildarfjoldi-erlendra-ferdamanna>. Accessed 27 October 2019.

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Iceland Federalist Papers (2017). https://escholarship.org/uc/igs_ifp. Accessed 21 December 2018.

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Party Polarization

Iceland has performed above the OECD average for “ideological polarization in party systems” since 2013. Since 2016, however, Iceland has shown signs of greater polarization. The economic collapse of 2008 has led to a period of substantial turbulence in Icelandic politics, which has been further exacerbated by the resignation of Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson in 2016 due to his implication in the Panama Papers scandal. There have been two parliamentary elections in Iceland since 2016: one in October 2016 triggered by the Panama Papers scandal and one in October 2017 triggered by a pedophilia scandal. The number of parties in parliament has increased over the last decade. In the 2007 and 2009 elections, five parties won seats in parliament. After the 2013 election, six parties were represented in parliament, which increased to seven parties in 2016 and eight parties in 2017. Whether this stems from increased polarization in the political arena is not clear. The new parties now represented in the parliament (Althingi), such as Regeneration (Viðreisn) and the Center Party (Miðflokkurinn), were not established on the basis of any significant ideological polarization. Regeneration is essentially a liberal, pro-EU splinter group from the right-wing Independence Party. Meanwhile, the Center Party, a splinter group from the centrist Progressive Party, was formed by Gunnlaugsson. The Pirate Party and the People’s Party are more ideological. The Pirate Party emphasizes freedom of speech, free information, direct democracy, and transparency in politics and public administration. Meanwhile, the People’s Party focuses on the interests of the lowest-paid workers and vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and disabled.

Crypto-fascist tendencies increasingly in evidence elsewhere in Europe are not clearly visible in Icelandic politics. Nevertheless, latent sympathy with real or imagined foreign strongmen (e.g., President Putin and President Trump) and their methods can be discerned in the political discourse of some representatives of the Independence Party, including its main organ (Morgunblaðið), and the Center Party. For example, the constant criticism of RÚV, the public broadcasting corporation, by right-wing politicians is considered unfounded and unfair by most objective observers.

The pre-crash government (2007 – 2009) was a coalition of the Social Democrats and the Independence Party, and spanned the left-right ideological spectrum. However, two subsequent coalition governments (the left-wing 2009 – 2013 and the center-right 2013 – 2016 coalition governments) followed more traditional patterns of allegiance, with polarization more clearly evident

then than it is today. Under the present coalition government (a coalition of the Independence Party, the Left-Green Movement and the Progressive Party, formed in 2017), the Left-Green Movement and the Progressive Party have historically been considered the main opponents of the Independence Party. Until then, it was considered highly unlikely (if not unthinkable) that the Independence Party and the Left-Green Movement would join forces in government, but that is exactly what happened after the 2017 election. During its first two years in office, the current coalition government has not encountered any significant internal disputes concerning policy objectives, despite significant left-right ideological differences between the coalition partners. Some observers have not been surprised by the lack of internal conflict. The three current parties of government and the Social Democrats have long been referred to as the “Gang of Four” (Fjórflokkurinn) – an alliance of political parties perceived to behave like political interest organizations. (Score: 8)

Citation:

Eva H. Önnudóttir and Ólafur Th. Hardarson: “Iceland 2017: A new government from left to right.” <https://whogoverns.eu/iceland-2017-a-new-government-from-left-to-right/>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

Policy Performance

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Economic Policy
Score: 7

The economy has still not recovered fully from the harsh fiscal adjustment to the 2008 financial crash, which imposed a retrenchment equivalent to about 10% of GDP between 2010 and 2017. Public services, especially healthcare and education, have suffered a serious shortage of funds. Having run a small fiscal surplus in recent years, the central government now forecasts a deficit in 2019 due to lower tax revenue. Meanwhile, the central bank has lowered interest rates to counter a slowdown in economic activity due, among other things, to fewer tourist arrivals.

At 3%, inflation exceeded the official target of 2.5% in 2019 and may rise further as labor unions, under new leadership, continue to demand wage increases against the background of large wage hikes granted earlier by the Wage Council to members of parliament, senior public officials (and the president of Iceland who donated the salary increase awarded to him to charity). The salaries of members of parliament increased by 111% between 2011 and 2018. The Wage Council has since been disbanded. The council did not keep minutes of its meetings. Under these circumstances, and in view of ever higher CEO compensation, concerns about distributive justice in the labor market loom large.

The future of the banking sector remains uncertain. The government, which still owns two-thirds of banking sector assets in Iceland, has not yet presented any concrete plans for restructuring the banks. Iceland is one of very few countries in the world without any foreign competition in its domestic banking sector.

Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009. The preceding government had signaled its intention to abide by EU standards and to strengthen Iceland's

institutional environment, including its regulatory policy. Due to disagreements between the government's coalition partners at that time, the application process was put on hold in January 2013. In 2013, a new government expressed its intention to unilaterally retract Iceland's membership application. A formal withdrawal was announced in the spring 2015. However, the European Union and the Icelandic government seem to disagree on whether this means that Iceland has fully withdrawn from the process. Specifically, the European Union has questioned the authority of Iceland's foreign minister to unilaterally withdraw an application approved by parliament. This question is most likely going to remain unanswered for some time.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2015), "Iceland: How Could This Happen?," in *Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries*, eds. Torben M. Andersen, Michael Bergman, and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, Oxford University Press.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), "Ten Years After: Iceland's Unfinished Business," forthcoming in Robert Z. Aliber and Gylfi Zoega (eds.), *The 2008 Global Financial Crisis in Retrospect*, Palgrave.

International Monetary Fund (2018), *Iceland: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission*, September 25, 2018.

Labor Markets

Labor Market
Policy
Score: 6

For a long time, labor market policy and labor market mobility within Iceland kept unemployment low in general. Just before the collapse in 2008 the unemployment rate was below 1%, reflecting an overheated economy. However, this changed following the collapse, but less than might have been expected. In 2010, the unemployment rate peaked at just under 8%. Thereafter, joblessness gradually declined to below 3% in 2018 before rising to 4%, still a low rate compared with other European countries. However, the bankruptcy of WOW air, an Icelandic airline, in late March 2019 has changed things. The collapse of WOW air led to 1,500 people losing their jobs, with a large proportion of these people still unemployed at the time of writing. The unemployment rate rose from 3.2% in March 2019 to 3.7% in April 2019 due to the bankruptcy (Vinnumálastofnun, April 2019).

Iceland's labor market legislation has essentially remained unchanged since 1938 with wage contracts negotiated by the leadership of labor unions and employers' associations, granting both partners significant market power. Many wage contracts were renegotiated between 2018 and 2019. In April 2019, two of the largest trade unions – VR (the Store and Office Workers' Union) and Efling (a union covering workers across all sectors except commerce and trade) – reached a moderate collective agreement with the Confederation of Icelandic Enterprise (SA). Though, at the time of writing,

several wage negotiations have not reached agreement, including negotiations covering almost the entire public sector.

Several decisions by the Wage Council in 2017 – including granting double-digit, retroactive wage increases to members of parliament, senior public officials, and the president of Iceland – have caused resentment among ordinary wage earners, as have rising differentials between CEO compensation and average wages. For this reason, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over future wage developments.

Wage rivalry between labor unions remains a prominent feature of Iceland's labor market, a phenomenon that helps to explain Iceland's high inflation in the past and current fears that inflation may rebound despite favorable external conditions for price stability.

Citation:

<https://vinnumalastofnun.is/media/2271/april-2019-skyrsla-lok.pdf> (Icelandic Directorate of Labour).

Statistics Iceland, <https://hagstofa.is/talnaefni/samfelag/vinumarkadur/vinumarkadsrannsokn/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur, and Assar Lindbeck (1984), "Union rivalry and wages: An oligopolistic approach," *Economica*, May.

Taxes

Tax Policy
Score: 6

Current tax revenues are insufficient for the government to fulfill its goals of revenue generation, equity, growth promotion and ecological sustainability. Education, healthcare, welfare provisions and environmental protection all remain underfunded. The tax system should be more progressive and the tax authorities should do more to tax wealth hidden in foreign tax havens, especially given the information exposed in, for example, the Panama Papers. Fishing fees remain far below potential as only 10% of the common property resource rent from fisheries accrues to the taxpayer while 90% accrues to the owners of fishing vessels. In late 2018, parliament decided to significantly lower fishing fees, while disadvantaged social groups (e.g., disabled people and pensioners) complain bitterly about being left behind.

Frequent changes of government since 2013 have not had a significant affect on tax policy. Tax revenue was stable at 42% of GDP between 2017 and 2018, but is projected to fall below this level in 2019. New labor market agreements could change this if the government, as the single largest employer, uses tax policy as a bargaining chip or if large wage increases trigger a change in tax policy.

Citation:

International Monetary Fund, 2018 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 18/318, November 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/11/14/Iceland-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-Staff-Statement-and-46357>. Accessed 18 December 2018.

Indriði H. Thorláksson, “Veidigjöld 2015. Annar hluti” (Fishing Fees 2015. Part Two), <http://herdubreid.is/veidigjold-2015-annar-hluti/>. Accessed 18 December 2018.

Budgets

Budgetary Policy
Score: 7

The 2008 economic collapse dramatically increased the country’s foreign debt burden. General government gross debt rose from 29% of GDP at the end of 2006 to 95% in 2011. Thereafter, it gradually decreased to 34% of GDP at the end of 2019 and is projected to decline to 24% by 2023. Reflecting a reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, which stems in part from a fairly rapid expansion in output since 2011, interest payments on the public debt have declined from 4.5% of GDP in recent years to 3% in 2019. According to the IMF, Iceland’s foreign debt burden should remain sustainable. Nonetheless, fiscal sustainability remains a serious concern for the government given the dire financial situation of several key public institutions, such as the State University Hospital.

Three comments are in order. First, Iceland’s public debt burden is understated in official statistics because unfunded public pension obligations are not included, which is rare in OECD country data. Second, while the left-wing 2009 – 2013 government increased fishing fees significantly and budgeted for further increases, the center-right 2013 – 2016 government reversed course and reduced fishing fees against IMF advice, a policy continued by the center-right 2016 – 2017 government and the left-right government formed in late 2017. This reversal reflects a change in public expenditure and tax policy from a progressive to a regressive stance. Third, many public institutions remain in a dire financial situation, including the State University Hospital, schools and universities, and the State Broadcasting Corporation (RÚV). Fiscal balance is not on a firm foundation when vital public institutions and infrastructure continue to suffer from long-standing financial neglect.

Citation:

International Monetary Fund, 2018 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 18/318, November 2018, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/11/14/Iceland-2018-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-Staff-Statement-and-46357>. Accessed 18 December 2018.

Research, Innovation and Infrastructure

R&I Policy
Score: 6

Combined public and private research and development (R&D) expenditure in Iceland totaled 3% of GDP in 2006, one of the highest levels among OECD members. About 40% of this expenditure was provided by the government.

This high level of R&D investment reflects the ongoing transformation from an economic focus on agriculture and fisheries toward manufacturing and services. In particular, this has led to the creation of new private firms in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-tech manufacturing sectors. Such export-oriented firms were helped by the depreciation of the króna (which lost a third of its value in real terms following the 2008 crash), but were then hurt by the króna's gradual recovery, before once again benefiting from the depreciation of the króna during 2018. The economic collapse in 2008 led to a cut in R&D expenditure to 1.8% of GDP in 2013. According to the most recent available data, R&D expenditure was 2.1% of GDP in 2017, still well below the 2006 level. This is evidence of the long-lasting damage caused by the 2008 collapse, which compelled public authorities to drastically cut public expenditure and then change the composition of public spending following the country's recovery – changes that would have been difficult to implement during normal times.

Citation:

Statistics Iceland, <https://hagstofa.is/talnaefni/atvinnuvegir/visindi-og-taekni/rannsoknir-og-throun/> Accessed 16 September 2019.

Rannis (The Icelandic Centre for Research), <https://www.rannis.is/starfsemi/arsskyrslur/>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

Global Financial System

Stabilizing
Global Financial
System
Score: 4

In part because of its small size, Iceland has never sought to make a substantial contribution to the improvement of the international financial architecture. However, the government has taken significant steps to address the extreme instability of the domestic financial system, including steps that have attracted international attention and have been held out as an example for other countries.

The post-crash 2009 – 2013 government significantly strengthened the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) and established a Special Prosecutor's Office charged with investigating legal violations related to the financial crash. By late 2018, the Supreme Court had sentenced 36 individuals (30 bankers, three executives, two auditors and a cabinet secretary in the finance ministry) to a total of 88 years in prison for crash-related offenses, with an average jail term of 2.5 years. The 88 years of total prison time have not been evenly divided among the banks, however: Kaupthing got 32 years, Glitnir got 19, Landsbanki got 11 years, Savings and Loans got 12 years, and others 14 years. The uneven distribution of sentences across the three main banks (even if they were very much alike) may create concerns about unequal justice. At the end of 2015, the Special Prosecutor's Office was merged with the District Prosecutor's Office under the directorship of the former Special Prosecutor.

Under new management following the crash, the FME sought to impose tougher standards. For example, prior to the crash, the owners of the banks were their largest borrowers. This is no longer the case. Further, banks commonly provided loans without collateral, but this practice has since been discontinued. Before, it was common practice to extend loans to well-connected customers to purchase equities, with the equities themselves as sole collateral. Presumably, this is no longer being done. However, other practices have not ceased. For example, banks continue to be accused of acting in a discriminatory and nontransparent manner with some privileged customers allowed to write off large debts, while others are not, without appropriate justification for discriminating among customers. A number of Iceland's most prominent business figures avoided bankruptcy following the crash because banks annulled their losses. Due to bank secrecy, such debt write-offs are impossible to ascertain. Under new management, since the proactive director of the FME appointed in 2009 was replaced in 2012, the FME lacks strong and clear leadership. The FME has once again adopted a passive, non-intrusive strategic approach. According to a February 2019 Gallup poll, banks are among the least trusted institutions in Iceland. Only 20% of respondents expressed confidence in the banks, compared with 18% confidence in the parliament and 27% confidence in the FME. The government decided in late 2018 to incorporate the FME into the central bank, marking a return to the arrangement that produced weak bank supervision in the past. This decision has now been implemented. Tellingly, in October 2018, Iceland was added to the Financial Action Task Force's grey list of countries – a list of countries that have not introduced sufficient measures to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

The government has yet to propose a plan for the reorganization of the banking system. This means that the future ownership structure of the banks remains uncertain, particularly the division between private and public ownership as well as between foreign and domestic ownership. Foreign competition in the banking sector remains absent, offering huge monopoly rents to bank owners, a unique feature of Icelandic banking, which helps explain why bank ownership is so coveted among Iceland's clan-based business elite.

Citation:

Jensdóttir, Jenný S. (2017), "Ákærur og dómur vegna hrunmála" (Indictments and Verdicts in Crash-related Cases), *Gagnsæi* (Transparency), *Samtök gegn spillingu* (Alliance against Corruption), <http://www.gagnsaei.is/2017/12/29/domar1/>. Accessed 18 December 2018.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), "Ten Years After: Iceland's Unfinished Business," forthcoming in Robert Z. Aliber and Gyfi Zoega (eds.), *The 2008 Global Financial Crisis in Retrospect*, Palgrave.

<https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/>. Accessed 16 September 2019.

Iceland Review (2019), "Iceland Grey Listed for Inadequate Money Laundering Policies," <https://www.icelandreview.com/news/iceland-grey-listed-for-inadequate-money-laundering-policies/>.

II. Social Policies

Education

Education Policy
Score: 6

Public expenditure on education was curtailed after 2008. In 2016, public expenditure on high schools, colleges and universities was almost 12% lower than in 2008 and has remained at this level since then.

Municipalities are responsible for primary schools. After the 2008 collapse, considerable cutbacks and rationalization measures were introduced, including a shortening of the school year. Upper secondary schools and public universities are the responsibility of the central government. The government in office between 2013 and 2016 managed to shorten the duration of upper secondary matriculation from four years to three. This means that students now enter university at the age of 19 rather than 20.

Iceland's universities have been seriously underfunded for a long time. However, the government that came to office in late 2017 revised the state budget and raised funding for universities by 3%. In the state budget for 2019, universities received a 5% raise compared with the year before, but no further increase is budgeted for 2020. In 2019, Iceland's music schools, once the pride of Iceland's education system due to their unique model of private and public funding, continued to fight for their survival, with no end to the struggle in sight.

The OECD, among other institutions, has long highlighted the relatively low proportion of Iceland's labor force with secondary or tertiary level qualifications – a key factor in explaining Iceland's low productivity, long working hours and high rates of labor force participation. Statistics Iceland recently published new figures that purport to show that Icelanders do not work longer hours than workers in neighboring countries, but these new figures have been met with skepticism.

Iceland's low PISA scores, which have declined since 2000 and are now well below average in the OECD region, remain a source of concern.

Citation:

Statistics Iceland, www.hagstofa.is. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Frumvarp til fjárlaga fyrir árið 2018. (Lagt fyrir Alþingi á 148. löggjafarþingi 2017–2018.) (State budget 2018).

OECD: Education at a Glance 2019, Paris.

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2019_f8d7880d-en.

Social Inclusion

Social Inclusion
Policy
Score: 7

From the mid-1990s to 2008, income inequality in Icelandic society increased dramatically. This development was driven by a regressive tax policy, which in real terms reduced the income threshold at which households are exempt from paying income tax, and a rapid increase in capital income. High inflation further increased the tax burden of low-income wage earners, although the rate of inflation fell to around 2% in early 2014 and is now around 3%. The left-wing cabinet of 2009 – 2013 made the tax system more progressive by imposing the smallest tax increases on the lowest income groups. Consequently, according to Statistics Iceland (which failed to publish any information on income distribution until after the crash of 2008), the Gini coefficient for Iceland, excluding capital gains, rose from 24 in 2004 to 30 in 2009, before falling back to 25 in 2015 and 24 in 2016. Including capital gains, however, the Gini index for total disposable income in Iceland rose by one point a year from the mid-1990s onward until the crash of 2008, an unprecedented development (Gylfason, 2015, based on data from Internal Revenue Directorate; Ólafsson and Kristjánsson, 2013). Little is still known about the distribution of wealth and whether it became more skewed after the 2008 crash. The huge amount of hidden household financial wealth in tax havens, equivalent to 10% of world GDP in 2008 according to Zucman (2015), casts doubt on official estimates of income and wealth inequality.

The Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið) has argued for years that their members are being left behind as the economy recovers and wages rise. Significant cuts in public expenditure followed the 2008 economic collapse. For example, pensions and social reimbursements were cut, and have not yet been fully restored to their former level. In October 2016, just before the elections, the government announced an increase in pensions to the same level as minimum wages in 2018. In their September 2017 budget proposition, the government announced a further increase in pensions and social reimbursements. The result was a modest increase, far below recent wage increases. In the state budget for 2020, presented in autumn 2019, pensions and social reimbursements continue to lag behind wages.

After the crash, many families were dependent on food aid offered by volunteer organizations, a phenomenon not seen in Iceland for decades. Even so, Iceland performs quite well in international poverty comparisons, suggesting that social policies after the economic crisis were reasonably successful. For some households, however, the economic situation remains difficult but is gradually improving. In the past, young Icelanders could take housing for granted. However, house prices have become unaffordable for many because residential construction in the Reykjavík area has not kept up with demand and the tremendous influx of tourists has led to a substantial increase in rents as well as to the conversion of family dwellings to rental units for tourists. An ongoing effort by the city authorities in Reykjavík to build more housing is intended to remedy this situation by lowering house prices and rent costs over the coming years.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2015), "Social Capital, Inequality, and Economic Crisis," Challenge, July.

Internal Revenue Directorate (2016), <http://www.rsk.is/>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

OECD website, <http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/income-distribution-database.htm>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

Ólafsson, Stefán, and Arnaldur Sölvi Kristjánsson (2013), "Income Inequality in Boom and Bust: A Tale from Iceland's Bubble Economy," in Gornick, Janet C., and Markus Jäntti (eds.), *Income Inequality Economic Disparities and the Middle Class in Affluent Countries*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 416-438.

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Zucman, Gabriel (2015), *The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens*. Chicago and London, England: University of Chicago Press.

Health

Health Policy
Score: 6

On average, the healthcare system in Iceland is efficient and of a high quality. However, there is considerable variation across regions. For example, healthcare services in Reykjavík and its surroundings as well as the northern city of Akureyri are much better than in more peripheral areas where patients have to travel long distances to access specialized services. After the 2008 economic collapse, substantial cutbacks for a number of regional hospitals were introduced, and various departments and centralized specialized care facilities were closed. In addition, smaller regional hospitals and healthcare centers have consistently faced serious problems in recruiting doctors.

The University Hospital in Reykjavík (Landspítalinn Háskólasjúkrahús), by far the largest hospital in Iceland, has for several years been in a difficult

financial situation. The 2013 – 2016 government did not provide adequate additional public funds nor did it allow the hospital to independently raise funds through, for example, patient service fees. The resulting shortage of nursing and other medical staff increased the work pressures on existing staff, including their hours of work. One of the issues in the 2013 election campaign was the question of how to finance a redevelopment of the University Hospital in Reykjavík and the healthcare system in general. In the 2016 election campaign, this question appeared to be the most important issue for both political parties and voters. This has already led to a modest increase in public healthcare expenditure. A considerable amount of money has also been granted to renovating old buildings around Reykjavík University Hospital over the last decade.

Opinions remain sharply divided among political parties as to whether partial privatization of hospital services would be desirable.

Life expectancy in 2017 was 82 years, the 20th highest in the world, up from 73 years in 1960 when life expectancy in Iceland was second only to that of Norway (World Bank, 2016). Even so, life expectancy was about the same in 2017 as in 2011, a six-year stagnation that has never been recorded previously in Iceland. Twice before, a four-year stagnation had followed an economic shock: in 1967 – 1971, following the collapse of herring fishing; and, in 1984 – 1988, following a government clampdown on double-digit inflation with the restoration of positive real interest rates through the introduction of financial indexation.

Citation:

Government budget (Fjárlagafrumvarp), <https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/fjarmalaraduneyti-media/media/frettatengt2016/Fjarlagafrumvarp2017.pdf>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

World Bank (2019), World Development Indicators, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.FE.IN>.

Families

Family Policy
Score: 9

Family policy has long supported female participation in the labor force. Iceland's rate of female participation in the labor force, between 75% and 80% since 1991, has long been among the highest in the world. Family policy has also encouraged a more equitable distribution of the burden of child rearing between genders. For example, in 2005, almost 90% of eligible fathers utilized their right to take parental leave of three months.

However, as a consequence of the economic collapse, maximum state payments during parental leave were reduced from ISK 535,000 in 2008 to

ISK 300,000 in 2010 per month and, despite increasing to ISK 370,000 in 2014 and 2015. In January 2018, the amount was almost restored in nominal terms (ISK 520,000) but not in real terms as prices rose significantly after the 2008 economic collapse. This amount is still the same at the time of writing. Furthermore, average wages for men are higher than for women. This discourages men from taking parental leave, especially since the 2008 economic collapse. Due to the raise in 2018, however, this may be changing.

Citation:

Gender Equality in Iceland 2017. The Center for Gender Equality (Jafnréttisstofa).

http://faedingarorlof.is/files/Upph%C3%A6%C3%B0ir%20f%C3%A6%C3%B0ingarorlofs%20og%20f%C3%A6%C3%B0ingarstyrks%202018_826789392.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Pensions

Pension Policy
Score: 7

Iceland's pension system is a fully funded one rather than pay-as-you-go. Pension policy is based on a tax-financed, means-tested social security program supported by tax incentives to encourage participation in occupational pension funds and voluntary savings schemes. The pension funds, which are based on employee contributions of 4% of total wages and employer contributions of 8%, are designed to provide a pension equivalent to 56% of an individual's average working-life wage. In addition, employees can opt to pay a further 4%, with a further employer contribution of 2%, into a voluntary savings program. There is a large number of pension funds, currently 27, down from 50 in 1997. Pension funds' average annual returns on investments range from 1.2% to 6.2% in real terms (i.e., adjusted for inflation). Under the period of capital controls 2009 – 2017, pension funds, which before the 2008 crash had gradually increased their foreign holdings, were confined to domestic placements.

In the past, Iceland's pension policy appeared both conducive to poverty prevention and fiscally sustainable. However, Iceland's pension funds experienced heavy losses as their investments in, among others, equities in Iceland's banks depreciated substantially following the collapse of the banking system in 2008. These losses, which totaled about a third of GDP, caused most pension funds to reduce their payments to members and further reduced the living standards of pensioners. The pension funds have recovered since 2008 and once more have an overall assets-to-GDP ratio that is among the highest in the OECD region.

Two main issues confront the pension system. First, the Pension Fund of State Employees, the largest pension fund, has a huge funding gap that will have to be financed through future tax revenue. Second, given that pension funds have

previously been used to fund social programs, as if supporting the government is more important than safeguarding the interests of retirees, there is a persistent danger that the government will seek to claim access to the funds to support its aims in a time of need.

In 2017, two major changes were made to the system. In March 2017, as part of the relaxation of capital controls, the central bank swept away restrictions on pension funds' investments in foreign markets, which had been imposed following the 2008 financial collapse. The 2016 – 2017 government reached an agreement with the trade unions of state employees on their pension rights. The rights of those employees in the A-section of the Pension Fund of State Employees were changed from equal to age-related. At the same time, the state pension age was increased from 65 to 67 years.

Citation:

Ísleifsson, Ólafur (2012), "Vulnerability of pension fund balances," *Stjórnámál og stjórnsýsla*, Vol. 8, No 2., 543-564.

Lifeyrismal.is Upplýsingavefur um lífeyrismál. <https://www.lifeyrismal.is/is/frettir/breytingar-a-lifeyrissjodakerfi-opinberra-starfsmanna-taka-gildi-i-dag>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

OECD Data. Pension funds assets 2015. <https://data.oecd.org/pension/pension-funds-assets.htm>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Integration

Integration Policy
Score: 6

Civil rights legislation for immigrants is largely influenced by the Danish and Norwegian models, which also reflects Iceland's obligations under the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. Separate legislation for immigrants from EEA/EU countries and non-EEA/EU countries makes it difficult for citizens outside the EEA to move to Iceland. Legislation for non-EEA/EU countries focuses on the need for foreign labor and restricts non-EEA/EU migrants to temporary work permits. Authorities provide instruction in the Icelandic language for foreign nationals. Nationals from other Nordic countries with three years' consecutive residency in Iceland are eligible to vote in local elections, while for other foreign national's eligibility follows five years of consecutive residency. The right to vote in parliamentary elections presupposes Icelandic citizenship.

The center Alþjóðasetur in Reykjavík provides interpretation and translation services to immigrants. The Directorate of Immigration (Útlendingastofnun) – a division within the Ministry of Interior whose mandate includes processing residence permits, visas and citizenship applications – has repeatedly been criticized for expelling foreign nationals on weak grounds. The Directorate of Labor (Vinnumálastofnun) reaches out to foreigners by, for example,

providing important information in English on its website. The Directorate of Labor is also responsible for running the European Employment Services office in Iceland.

In 2015, Iceland received and accepted 82 refugees. The government contributed further grants to the support of refugees in 2016. The number of refugees in Iceland increased from 111 in 2016 to 135 in 2017 and up to 160 in 2018. Although the absolute number of refugees in Iceland is not large, the number of refugees nevertheless increased by 95% between 2015 and 2018.

In 2016 and even 2017, as earlier, the Directorate of Immigration repeatedly came under heavy media criticism for its insensitive handling of immigrants and refugees, especially for refusing to grant extensions to individuals who would face grave consequences if sent back to their home countries.

Citation:

Lög um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5, 1998 (Law on local government elections no. 5 1998).

Tölfræði hælismála 2015 http://utl.is/files/Tlfri_yfirlit_2015.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Tölfræði hælismála 2016 http://utl.is/files/Tlfri_hlismala_2016.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2018.

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https://www.utl.is/images/t%C3%B6lfr%C3%A6%C3%B0i%202017/Allt_2017/T%C3%B6lfr%C3%A6%C3%B0i_%C3%A1rsins_2017.pdf. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Tölfræði hælismála.
https://www.utl.is/images/2018/H%C3%A6list%C3%B6lfr%C3%A6%C3%B0i/Allt_%C3%A1ri%C3%B0/T%C3%B6lfr%C3%A6%C3%B0i_%C3%A1rsins_2018.pdf. Accessed 16 October 2019.

Wojtynska, A., Skaptadóttir, U. D., and Ólafsson, H. (2011), The participation of immigrants in civil society and labor market in the economic recession, University of Iceland, Faculty of Social and Human Sciences.

Safe Living

Internal Security
 Policy
 Score: 8

Iceland has always been a secure place to live, with relatively few assaults, burglaries, or other crimes. However, some changes have occurred since the 2008 economic collapse. The 2007 – 2009 government was undermined by a series of protests, which – though largely peaceful – did lead to clashes between protesters and riot police in early 2009. While these events led only to minor injuries and some 20 arrests, they were the first serious riots since the protests against a parliamentary decision to enroll Iceland in NATO in 1949. The main policing priority has been Iceland's internal security. The police force has for a long time suffered from a manpower shortage, exacerbated by low pay.

Drug smuggling has been on the rise for several years. This trend reflects a related increase in the prevalence of violent attacks by individuals under the

influence of alcohol or other drugs, especially on weekends. Organized foreign gangs are considered responsible for the repeated waves of burglaries.

During 2017, four murders were committed in Iceland. Accordingly, the country had a rate of 1.2 murders per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017 – the same rate as in Sweden, lower than in Finland (1.6), but higher than in Denmark (1.0) and Norway (0.6). In 2018, the number went down to two – a low rate compared to other Nordic countries.

Citation:

Interview with Helgi Gunnlaugsson in visir.is 6th January 2018. <https://www.visir.is/g/2018180109266>

Global Inequalities

Global Social
Policy
Score: 5

Iceland joined the United Nations in 1946.

The Icelandic International Development Agency (Þróunarsamvinnustofnun Íslands, IIDA) is a public institution associated with the Foreign Ministry, established in 1981. Its mandate is to cooperate with and assist developing countries. Recently, IIDA reduced the number of countries in which it ran projects (bilateral cooperation) from six to three: Malawi, Mozambique, and Uganda. Additionally, the IIDA is involved in a regional project on geothermal power in East-Africa. In late 2015, the Gunnlaugsson cabinet decided to merge the IIDA with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Among the earlier six recipient countries was Namibia, where Icelandic experts provided valuable help with the development of the Namibian fishing sector until 2010. In 2019, Wikileaks revelations indicates that Samherji, Iceland's largest fishing firm, paid huge bribes to Namibian ministers, among others, to secure fishing quotas. The scandal led to the immediate arrest of two Namibian ministers and four other Namibian individuals, and has left Iceland's reputation among ordinary Namibians in tatters. The case is still under investigation.

In 2009, Iceland's contribution to development aid amounted to 0.3% of GDP, well below the U.N. target of 0.7%, and remained virtually unchanged at 0.28% in 2018. The government has set a goal of 0.35% of GDP for 2022. In 2013, parliament resolved to meet the U.N. target, but has so far failed to implement this resolution. In 2013, Iceland joined the OECD's Development Cooperation Directorate.

Apart from its rather limited development assistance, Iceland has not undertaken any specific initiatives to promote social inclusion in the context of global frameworks or international trade.

Citation:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation (Próunarsamvinna).
<https://www.stjornarradid.is/verkefni/utanrikismal/throunarsamvinna/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

Environmental
Policy
Score: 7

Environmental policy has historically not been a high priority on Iceland's political agenda. The Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources (Umhverfis – og auðlindaráðuneytið) was established, comparatively late, in 1990. The ministry was a single-issue ministry until 2013 when it was merged with the former Ministry for Fisheries and Agricultural Affairs. However, a new minister for environment and natural resources was appointed at the end of 2014, separating the two ministerial positions. At the time of writing, this arrangement remains.

The country is rich in onshore energy and freshwater resources, and has substantial offshore fisheries. However, apart from the fisheries management system in operation since the mid-1980s, there has been little discussion about how to preserve these resources, reflecting a popular assumption that these resources are, in effect, unlimited.

In April 2019, the Jakobsdóttir cabinet resolved to reduce the government's carbon footprint by instructing public employees to:

1. Reduce both domestic and international air travel, and use digital technology instead;
2. Use the most environment-friendly option possible to get to and from work;
3. Use electric rental cars where possible.

In September 2018, the Icelandic government announced a new climate strategy, intended to boost efforts to cut net greenhouse gas emissions. The new measures aim to help Iceland meet its Paris Agreement targets for 2030 and reach the government's ambitious goal to make Iceland carbon neutral before 2040. The main emphasis of the new plan is on two measures: to phase out fossil fuels in transport; and to increase carbon sequestration through afforestation, revegetation, and restoration of wetlands. Climate mitigation measures will receive a substantial increase in funding, almost ISK 7 billion, between 2019 and 2023. A general carbon tax, already in place, will be gradually increased.

So, even though environmental policy has historically not been a high priority on Iceland's political agenda, it seems to be gaining ground.

Citation:

Althingi. Retrieved 17th May 2013 from the link http://www.Althingi.is/pdf/Althing2011_enska.pdf

Law on nature protection (Lög um náttúruvernd) 2013 nr. 60 10. apríl.

Vernd og orkunýting landsvæða (rammaáætlun) 89. mál þingsályktunartillaga Þál. 13/141 141. löggjafarþingi 2012 – 2013.

Government Offices of Iceland: <https://www.government.is/news/article/2018/09/10/Iceland-launches-new-Climate-Strategy-boosting-efforts-to-reach-Paris-goals/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Global Environmental Protection

Global
Environmental
Policy
Score: 7

The Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources is responsible for the country's involvement in international environmental affairs. Iceland participates in the United Nations Environment Programme and is active under the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 in areas of sustainable development. Iceland is also one of the eight member states of the Arctic Council, a cooperation forum directed primarily toward environmental affairs and sustainable development, which includes five working groups. Two of these working groups – the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna and Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment – are located in Akureyri, in the north of Iceland. In early 2016 it was decided to move the secretariat of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) from Potsdam, Germany to Akureyri. The mission of IASC is to encourage and facilitate cooperation in all aspects of Arctic research, among all countries engaged in Arctic research and in all areas of the Arctic region.

Whaling remains a controversial economic activity in Iceland. On 15 September 2014, all 28 EU member states as well as the United States, Australia, Brazil, Israel, Mexico, and New Zealand formally protested the continued practice of whaling in Iceland. The government of Iceland has not yet reacted to this protest and whaling continues, even though it is increasingly difficult to find markets for whale meat.

Iceland is still engaged in a dispute with the European Union over quotas for mackerel fishing. In 2014, an agreement was reached between the European Union, Norway, and the Faroe Islands. However, the agreement did not include Iceland. Mackerel migrates in huge numbers from international to Icelandic waters, and Iceland has been accused of overfishing mackerel.

Iceland was fully engaged at the Paris conference on climate change in late 2015 and on 22 April 2016 the minister of environment and natural resources signed the Paris agreement. New measures included in a new climate strategy (September 2018) are meant to help Iceland meet its Paris Agreement targets for 2030 and reach the government's ambitious goal to make Iceland carbon neutral before 2040.

Citation:

Fiskistofa. <http://www.fiskistofa.is/veidar/aflastada/afliiimakril/>

Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

Candidacy
Procedures
Score: 9

Most Icelandic citizens aged 18 years or over can run for parliament. Exceptions include Supreme Court justices and adult individuals convicted of a serious felony or sentenced to four months or more in custody. For local elections, with the exception of the minimum age limit, these restrictions do not apply. Citizens of other Nordic countries with three years' consecutive residence in Iceland can stand as candidates in local elections. The registration process for candidates and parties is transparent and fair.

The minimum 5% share of the national vote required to get so-called leveling seats (jöfnunarpingsæti) in parliament was set in 2000. In addition to this 5% threshold, parties can win a seat by securing a majority of the vote within a constituency. This minimum threshold is the same as in Germany, but higher than in the other Nordic countries (Sweden and Norway 4%, Denmark 2%).

A consequence of this system is that many votes fail to directly influence the results. As many as 12% of the votes in 2013 won no parliamentary representation, as they went to candidates or parties that failed to win a constituency seat or polled less than 5% of the national vote. This was the largest share of unrepresented votes in Iceland's modern history. A result that was due mainly to a record 15 parties running for parliament in 2013. Since 2013, this rate has declined. In the 2016 elections, parties that did not reach the 5% threshold received a combined 5.7% of the total vote. This rate further declined to only 1.6% of the total vote in the 2017 elections.

Citation:

Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K. M., Harðarson, Ó. T., Narud, H. M. and Oscarsson, H. (2014), *The Nordic Voter. Myths of exceptionalism*. Essex. ECPR Press.

Lög um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 (Law on parliamentary elections nr. 24/2000).

Lög um breytingar á lögum um kosningum til Alþingis nr. 16/2009 (Law on changes in law on parliamentary elections nr. 24/2000).

Lög um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5/1998 (Law on local elections nr. 5/1998).

Media Access
Score: 7

Formally, all parties or candidates have equal access to media. There are no restrictions based on race, gender, language, or other such demographic factors. However, parties already represented in the national parliament or in local councils have an electoral advantage over new parties or candidates. Furthermore, in the 2013 parliamentary election campaign, several media organizations systematically discriminated against small or new parties, which opinion polls had indicated were unlikely to surpass the 5% minimum vote threshold. However, the state-run media cover all major parties. During the election campaign in the autumn 2017 elections, two small parties complained about not being allowed to participate in the party leader debate on the state-run TV the night before the election day. However, both parties were seen to have very low support and neither fielded candidates in every constituency.

Voting and
Registration
Rights
Score: 10

Iceland's voting procedure is unrestricted. If an individual is registered as a voter within a constituency, he or she only has to present personal identification to cast a vote. Every person 18 years or older has the right to vote.

Party Financing
Score: 5

The 2006 law regulating the financing of political parties provides three types of public grants. First, an annual grant, proportional to the national vote share in the previous election, is awarded to any party or independent group with at least one member of parliament or attained at least 2.5% of the national vote in the last election. Second, an annual grant, proportional to the number of seats in parliament, is awarded to all parliamentary parties or independent groups. Third, a grant is awarded to any party or independent group, in a municipality of 500 inhabitants or more, with at least one member in the local council or attained at least 5% of the vote in the last municipal election. The law also regulates private contributions to political activity. For example, parties are not allowed to accept more than ISK 400,000 (€2,900) from any private actor, company, or individual.

The National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) monitors party and candidate finances, and publishes annual summaries that include total expenditure and income. Income must be classified by origin, identifying companies or other entities contributing to party finances before and during election periods.

Before the 2007 election campaign, political parties reached an agreement that a maximum of ISK 28 million could be spent on TV, radio, and newspaper advertisements. Moreover, there is legal limit on electoral spending. Since 2009, regulation on party finances has been under review, but no final agreement has been reached.

The law on party financing was originally drafted by a committee comprising party representatives, including the chief financial officers of the main political parties. This followed the disclosure by the National Audit Office

that, among other things, fishing firms gave 10 times as much money to the Independence Party and the Progressive Party between 2008 and 2011 as to all other parties combined. The Independence Party and the Progressive Party have been and remain particularly generous toward the fishing industry. Similarly, the Special Investigation Committee disclosed that huge loans and contributions were provided by the Icelandic banks to political parties and politicians between 2006 and 2008, on a per capita scale significantly greater than in the United States.

The extent to which the rules are circumvented is not well known. Even so, a new method of circumvention came to light in 2018 when it was disclosed that some members of parliament received considerable sums of money from parliament to pay for travel costs, including travel to visit voters before elections.

Citation:

Lög um fjármál stjórnmalasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra, nr. 162/2006 (Law on the finances of political organizations and candidates and about their information duties nr. 162/2006).

Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 162/2006, um fjármál stjórnmalasamtaka og frambjóðenda og um upplýsingaskyldu þeirra nr. 119 21. september 2010.

Kristinsson, G. H. (2007), Íslenska stjórnmálakerfið. 2. útgáfa. Reykjavík, Háskóli Íslands. (The Icelandic political system. Second edition)

Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), report delivered to Althing, the Icelandic Parliament, on 12 April. See <http://www.rna.is/eldri-nefndir/addragandi-og-orsakir-falls-islensku-bankanna-2008/skyrsla-nefndarinnar/english/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Popular Decision-Making
Score: 5

Since 1944, the constitutional provision granting the president of Iceland the right to veto legislation has been invoked three times and has twice led to a national referendum.

In 2012, an advisory national referendum on a new constitution was called by parliament. In the referendum, 73% voted in favor of a provision enabling 10% of the electorate to demand a national referendum. This reform would mean that referring legislation passed by parliament to a national referendum would no longer remain the prerogative of the president alone. However, parliament has yet to ratify the constitution bill or use it as a basis for a new one, even though 67% voted in favor of the bill. Proposals for further referendums (e.g., on EU membership negotiations) ring hollow when parliament has yet to respect the outcome of the constitutional referendum of 2012. In 2018, the cabinet of Jakobsdóttir – claiming that the authority for changing the constitution lies in the parliament, not the people – announced a three-year process for reviewing limited aspects of the constitution, as though the 2012 national referendum on a new constitution had not taken place. The review is supposed to cover the transfer of state powers, national referendums,

natural resources and environmental protections. The outcome of this review remains to be seen.

A law on local government affairs was passed by parliament in September 2011. This law contained a new chapter called Consultancy with Citizens (Samráð við íbúa), which includes paragraphs on local referendums and citizen initiatives. Under its terms, if at least 20% of the population eligible to vote in a municipality demand a referendum, the local authorities are obliged to hold a referendum within a year. However, local councils can decide to increase this threshold to 33% of eligible voters. At the local level, therefore, significant steps have been taken to improve the opportunity for citizen impact between elections.

Citation:

Carrillo, David A. (ed.) (2018), *The Icelandic Federalist Papers*, Berkeley Public Policy Press 2018.

The New Icelandic Constitution: How Did It Come About? Where Is It?, Iðunn, Reykjavík, 2018.

Constitution of the Republic of Iceland No. 33, 17 June 1944.

Forsætisráðuneytið. Endurskoðun stjórnarskrár 2018-2021. <https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=e6329b3e-1a68-11e9-942f-005056bc4d74> Retrieved 16th October 2019.

National Referendum (Þjóðaratkvæði). <http://thjodaratkvaedi.is/2010>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

The Constitutional Council. <http://stjornlagarad.is/english/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Eythórsson, Grétar Thór & Arnarson, Sveinn (2012), *Íslensk sveitarstjórnarmál í brennidepli. Staða sveitarstjórnarstigsins, verkefni, skipan, íbúalýðræði og áhrif efnahagshrunsins*. Akureyri. Háskólinn á Akureyri.

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Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2013), "From collapse to constitution: The case of Iceland," in *Public Debt, Global Governance and Economic Dynamism*, ed. Luigi Paganetto, Springer.

Access to Information

Media Freedom
Score: 7

Until privatization in 1986, the state had a monopoly over radio and TV broadcasting. Private stations now have a significant role in the media market.

Owners of private media sometimes try to exercise influence over news coverage. The largest daily newspaper has faced accusations that its owners, a former business magnate and his wife, have unduly influenced content. They sold the paper in 2019. Meanwhile, Iceland's second largest daily newspaper is partly owned by fishing magnates. Its chief editor is a former Icelandic prime minister and discredited governor of Iceland's central bank. The newspaper regularly publishes content critical of fisheries policy reforms as

well as Iceland's application for EU membership. Some politicians in government have repeatedly accused state-run radio and TV (RÚV) of bias against the government in their news reporting, partly because RÚV played an important role in exposing political scandals. Despite criticism that Iceland lacks a strong, independent media, the position of those seeking to dominate the media has been considerably weakened by the advent of online social media platforms.

Citation:

Karlsson, Ragnar (2010): Íslenskur fjölmiðlamarkaður. Framboð, fjölbreytni, samkeppni og samþjöppun. (The Icelandic Media Market. Supply, diversity, competition and concern). An overview prepared for the Ministry of Education and Culture.

Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa Íslands) www.statice.is

Media Pluralism
Score: 6

Media ownership in Iceland can be divided into three blocs, two private ones and one public.

There is one state-owned TV station (RÚV – Sjónvarp) and two state-owned radio channels (RÚV – Rás1 and RÚV – Rás2). There are also four private national TV channels (Stöð2, Sjónvarp Símans, Hringbraut, and N4) and two national private radio channels, separately owned. Until March 2017, the private 365 Media Corporation (365 Miðlar) owned a TV station (Stöð 2), Bylgjan radio station, and Fréttablaðið, the larger of the country's two daily newspapers. 365 Media Corporation was the largest media actor in Iceland, and had clear connections to a business magnate and former bank owner, who sold his media holdings to another magnate in 2019.

Morgunblaðið, the second largest newspaper, has long been considered the voice of the Independence Party and is owned primarily by several fishing vessel owners. Since 2009, its chief editor has been the former prime minister and Independence Party leader. Other newspapers include DV, Stundin and Kjarninn.

Given the somewhat broader ownership of TV and radio media combined with several smaller TV broadcasters, radio stations and newspapers, media ownership in Iceland can be considered fairly pluralistic.

Access to
Government
Information
Score: 6

The 1997 Information Act (Upplýsingalög), revised in 2012, aims to guarantee the right of access to official information. Memoranda, working documents, and materials related to the Council of the State (Ríkisráð), cabinet, and ministerial meetings were originally exempted. In 2011, a revision to the Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) mandated that the agenda of cabinet meetings be presented to the media and published on the government's website after each meeting. Paragraph nine states that the prime minister can decide, with cabinet approval, to create ministerial committees on

an issue-specific basis. Following a 2015 revision, two permanent ministerial committees were established to oversee state finances and economic affairs.

Sensitive financial and personal information, as laid out in the Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data (No. 77/2000), is not accessible unless permission is obtained from the person involved. Access to restricted information is available once the measures associated with the information are complete, after a period of 30 years for general information or 80 years for personal information (as per the National Archives Act, No. 66/1985). Information regarding the security or defense of the state, or international commercial activities, is also exempted from the act. Decisions denying access to information can be appealed to the Information Committee, whose members are appointed by the prime minister. No other government or judicial body can overrule the decisions of the Information Committee.

Despite these provisions, public access to information can be restricted. For example, the central bank refused a parliamentary committee's request to see a transcript or hear an audio recording of a fateful telephone conversation between the prime minister and the central bank governor shortly before the 2008 economic collapse.

Governments have proved to be quite secretive about potentially compromising information. For example, an official report on Icelanders whose names appear in the Panama Papers was ready well before the October 2016 parliamentary election but was not disclosed to the public until after the election in which all three ministers whose names appeared in the Panama Papers were re-elected to their seats in parliament. There have been several other recent scandals involving information withheld from the public. One such scandal led to the collapse of the coalition government of Benediktsson in 2017. Another example is that of the opposition member of parliament who, for the last two years, has tried in vain to obtain an answer from the government to the question of who bought a large number of apartments from which the House Financing Fund had evicted the former owners between 2009 and 2019.

During 2018, an opposition member of parliament from the Pirate Party managed to compel the parliament to disclose information regarding parliament's reimbursement of members of parliament's expense claims (e.g., travel costs). Parliament's failure to ratify the constitution bill, approved in the 2012 national referendum, can be viewed in the light of the bill's provisions on transparency, freedom of information and protection of whistleblowers, reforms that many politicians continue to resist.

Citation:

The National Archives Act no. 66/1985. (Lög um Þjóðskjalasafn Íslands no. 66/1985).

Information Act (Upplýsingalög). Act no. 50/1996.

Act on Processing and Protection of Personal Data. (Lög um persónuvernd og meðferð persónuupplýsinga) Act no. 77/2000.

Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) nr. 115 23. september 2011.

Change of Act on the Government of Iceland (Lög um Stjórnarráð Íslands) nr. 115 23. september 2011. (Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 115/2011, um Stjórnarráð Íslands (skrifleg framlagning mála á ríkisstjórnarfundum)).

Lög um breytingu á lögum um Stjórnarráð Íslands, nr. 115/2011, með síðari breytingum (skipulag ráðuneyta og stofnana o.fl.) nr. 82 13. júlí 2015.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil Rights
Score: 7

The Icelandic state fully respects and protects civil rights, and courts effectively protect citizens. Where there is evidence of disregard for civil rights, courts generally rule against the government.

However, there are specific exceptions to this rule. Most importantly, in 2007, the United Nations Committee on Human Rights (UNCHR) issued a de facto (if not de jure) binding opinion stating that, because of its discriminatory nature, the management system of Iceland's fisheries constituted a violation of human rights. Furthermore, the UNCHR instructed the government to change the system and to pay damages to those whose rights had been violated. The government responded by promising to pass a new constitution with a provision declaring the country's natural resources to be the property of the nation. The UNCHR later dropped the case, saying that Iceland's promise of a new constitution was partly sufficient. However, the parliament has not ratified the new constitution, which was approved by 67% of the voters in the 2012 national referendum. The current prime minister, Katrín Jakobsdóttir (who took office in November 2017), has stated that steps should be taken during the current mandate period to revise the constitution. However, this would require the parliament to overrule the national referendum from 2012. What happens next remains to be seen. Two of the political parties most opposed to the constitution bill are part of the current cabinet.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has heard several petitions by Icelandic citizens recently that their civil rights have been violated. In almost all of these cases, the ECHR has ruled in favor of the petitioners, casting doubt on the ability of Icelandic courts to protect civil rights effectively. Most recently, for example, journalists who had been found guilty of libel in Iceland

were declared innocent by the ECHR. Following a number of similar ECHR rulings in recent years, Icelandic courts have demonstrated an increased tendency to acquit defendants in politically motivated libel cases. Nevertheless, defendants in several recent libel cases have had to bear the cost of their legal defense, despite being acquitted. Recently, the ECHR has also ruled against Iceland in connection with controversial judicial appointments.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2016), "Constitution on Ice," in *Iceland's Financial Crisis: The Politics of Blame, Protest, and Reconstruction*, eds. Valur Ingimundarson, Philippe Urfalino, and Irma Erlingsdóttir, Routledge, London.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2018), "Chain of legitimacy: Constitution making in Iceland," in Elster, J., R. Gargarella, V. Naresh, and B. E. Rasch (eds.), *Constituent Assemblies*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2018.

Political Liberties
Score: 9

The 1944 constitution contains provisions protecting the freedom of the press as well as freedoms of organization and assembly. In the October 2017 parliamentary election campaign, five parties declared support for ratifying the constitutional bill proposed by the Constitutional Council in 2011, namely the Social Democrats, the Pirate Party, the Left-Green Movement, Regeneration and Bright Future. The strongest opponent of the constitutional change has been the Independence Party, which – together with the Progressive Party, another party that is reluctant to accept the change – is part of the current cabinet coalition led by the Left-Green Movement. The future of the constitution remains uncertain.

Citation:

David A. Carrillo (ed.) (2018), *The Icelandic Federalist Papers*, Ch. 20, Right to Information and Freedom of Expression, Berkeley Public Policy Press.

Non-
discrimination
Score: 6

Iceland's constitution states that every person should enjoy equal human rights regardless of gender, religion, opinion, national origin, race, color, property, birth or other respect. More specific provisions are to be found in the Penal Code, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Equality Act. The Supreme Court has ruled based on those acts and the constitution. The Equality Act states that genders should be accorded equal rights in all areas of society, and that discrimination in terms of work and pay is against the law. The Center for Gender Equality monitors adherence to this law and is obliged to refer all major cases to the courts.

Although equal rights are guaranteed by law, the reality is that discrimination occasionally occurs in Iceland, especially against women, disabled persons, and migrants. In the 2012 presidential elections, blind and physically disabled voters were denied the right to have an assistant of their own choice to help them vote at polling stations. Instead, they had to vote with help from public

officials working at the polling stations. Following complaints from the Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), the electoral laws were adjusted to allow blind or otherwise physically disabled individuals to independently nominate their own assistant who would be sworn to secrecy. This change applied to the 2013 parliamentary elections.

The government's non-compliance with the binding opinion of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which ruled in 2007 that the management system of Iceland's fisheries was discriminatory, signals a less-than-full commitment to non-discrimination.

The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was signed on behalf of the Icelandic government in March 2007. It was not until September 2016 that the Icelandic parliament, Althingi, passed a resolution to enable the government to ratify the convention. At the time of writing in late 2019, this remains to be done.

Citation:

The Penal Code (Almenn hegningarlög no. 19/1940).

The Administrative Procedure Act (Stjórnsýslulög no. 40/1993).

The Gender Equality Act (Lög um jafna stöðu og jafnan rétt kvenna og karla no. 10/2008).

Act on changes on the Act on Parliamentary Elections (Lög um breytingu á lögum um kosningar til Alþingis nr. 24/2000 og lögum um kosningar til sveitarstjórna nr. 5/1998 (aðstoð við kosningu). Lög nr. 111 16. október 2012.

Þingsályktun um fullgildingu samnings Sameinuðu þjóðanna um réttindi fatlaðs fólks. <http://www.althingi.is/altext/145/s/1693.html>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Rule of Law

Legal Certainty
Score: 8

Icelandic state authorities and administration respect the rule of law, and their actions are generally predictable. However, there have been cases in which verdicts by Icelandic courts and government actions have been overruled on appeal by the European Court of Human Rights. There have also been examples of Supreme Court verdicts that have been overruled by the European Court of Justice. Some of these cases have dealt with journalists' free speech rights.

A relatively recent case of a different kind has a bearing on legal certainty. The Supreme Court ruled, first in June 2010 and more recently in April 2013, that bank loans indexed to foreign currencies were in violation of a 2001 law. As such, the asset portfolios of Icelandic banks contained invalid loans. These examples demonstrate that the banks acted contrary to the law. Neither the government nor any government institution, including the central bank and the

Financial Supervisory Authority, paid sufficient attention to this violation. A governor of the central bank was even among those who had drafted the 2001 legislation. Even after the Supreme Court ruled that these loans were null and void, the banks were slow to recalculate the thousands of affected loans. Individual customers have had to sue the banks in an attempt to force them to follow the law.

Alleged violations of the law by public officials are less likely to be prosecuted than allegations involving private individuals. Several recent cases involve the decisions of central bank officials during and after the 2008 financial collapse, which were not investigated or prosecuted at the time. In particular, the authorities never investigated the dubious circumstances surrounding a €500 million loan, which was lent by the central bank to Kaupthing at the height of the financial crash. The dubious nature of the loan came to light following a leaked transcript of a telephone conversation between the central bank governor and the prime minister, which was kept secret until 2017. The statute of limitations for this alleged violation took effect in early October 2018.

In late 2019, huge bribes to Namibian ministers and others paid by Iceland's largest fishing firm, Samherji, to secure fishing rights in Namibian waters were exposed by Wikileaks. This revelation led to the immediate arrest of two ministers and four other individuals in Namibia. In contrast, the reaction of political and judicial authorities in Iceland to this scandal has been more muted than in Namibia. However, the case is still under investigation. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether the Wikileaks accusations are correct.

Citation:

Lög um vexti og verðtryggingu (Law on interest and indexation) no. 38 2001.

European Court of Justice Verdict Against Iceland (Dómur MDE í máli Erlu Hlynsdóttur gegn Íslandi), <https://www.innanrikisraduneyti.is/raduneyti/starfssvid/mannrettindi/mannrettindadomstoll-evropu/nr/29388>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Judicial Review
Score: 6

Iceland's courts are not generally subject to pressure by either the government or powerful groups and individuals. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to rule on whether the government and administration have conformed to the law is beyond question. According to opinion polls, confidence in the judicial system ranged between 50% and 60% before 2008. After falling to about 30% in 2011, it recovered to 39% in 2013, remained around 40% in 2014 and 2015, and climbed to 43% in 2017. Having then fallen to 36% in 2018, the rate peaked in 2019 when Gallup reported it to be 47%.

Many observers consider the courts biased, as almost all judges attended the same law school and few have attended universities abroad. Two political

parties, the Independence Party and the Progressive Party, maintained control over the Ministry of Justice for 81 out of the 90 years between 1927 and 2008 – dictating judicial appointments and sowing distrust.

In 2017, a sitting Supreme Court justice sued a former justice for libel in a case that awaits a verdict by the Supreme Court. Then, in 2019, the former justice sued another sitting justice over a private land dispute. Disputes among justices do not inspire confidence and trust, least of all when they trade accusations of illegal behavior.

Citation:

<https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/>. Accessed 16 October 2019.

Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar, *Með lognið í fangið – um afglöp Hæstaréttar eftir hrún (With the Stream – On the Blunders of the Supreme Court After the Crash)*, BP útgáfa, Reykjavík, 2017.

Appointment of
Justices
Score: 3

To date, all Supreme Court and district court judges have been appointed by the minister of the interior, without any involvement from or oversight by parliament or any other public agency. However, all vacancies on the Supreme Court were advertised and the appointment procedure was at least formally transparent. As part of the appointment process, a five-person evaluation committee was appointed and tasked with recommending a single applicant. A 2010 change to the Act on Courts restricted the minister's ability to appoint any person not found to be sufficiently qualified by the committee unless such an appointment is approved by the parliament. This was meant to restrain the minister's authority by introducing external oversight.

A new Act on Courts was passed by parliament in June 2016, authorizing the minister to ask parliament to authorize the appointment of judges other than those recommended by the evaluation committee. The act was criticized, among other things, for taking inadequate steps concerning the minister of the interior's ability to make judicial appointments subject to significantly weaker restraints than those stipulated in the constitutional bill approved in the 2012 referendum.

In 2009, the European Union expressed concern over the recruitment procedures for judges. The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has also criticized the process for appointing judges in Iceland. The 2011/2012 constitutional bill proposes that judicial appointments should be approved by the president or a parliamentary majority of two-thirds.

Many appointments to the courts continue to be controversial. In many cases, the scrutiny of Supreme Court candidates seems superficial. A retired Supreme Court justice, whose own appointment was controversial, published a book in 2014 criticizing his former court colleagues for their alleged opposition to his

appointment as well as for some of their verdicts that he deemed misguided. He has since directed further attacks at his former colleagues for violating rules regarding conflict of interest, among other things.

In 2017, the minister of justice appointed 15 new judges to a new intermediary court between the district court level and the Supreme Court, including four judges deemed less qualified than other available applicants according to the review committee's assessment of the applications. Two of the applicants who were bypassed sued and were awarded damages by the Supreme Court. A third applicant has announced that he will also sue for substantial damages. The Supreme Court has ruled that the minister of justice broke the law when she bypassed the recommendations of the review committee. In March 2019, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the Icelandic state was guilty of breaking the law when 15 judges were appointed to the Landsréttur (a new intermediary court).

For all but 10 years between 1927 and 2017, control of the Ministry of Justice and the authority to appoint judges alternated between the Independence Party and the Progressive Party.

:
 Act on Courts. (Lög um dómstóla nr. 15 25 March 1998, revised 7 June 2017).
 Change of the Act on Courts. (Lög um breyting á lögum um dómstóla nr. 15 1998 með síðari breytingum (skipun dómara) nr. 45 26. maí 2010).
 Gunnlaugsson, Jón Steinar (2014), Í krafti sannfæringar, Forlagið, Reykjavík.
 GRECO (2013), Report on Iceland, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/ReportsRound4_en.asp. Accessed 22 December 2018.
 GRECO (2015), Report on Iceland, [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/RC4/GrecoRC4\(2015\)3_Iceland_EN.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round4/RC4/GrecoRC4(2015)3_Iceland_EN.pdf). Accessed 22 December 2018.

Corruption
 Prevention
 Score: 4

Rightly or wrongly, financial corruption in politics is not viewed as a serious problem in Iceland, but in-kind corruption – such as granting favors and paying for personal goods with public funds – does clearly occur. Regulatory amendments in 2006, which introduced requirements to disclose sources of political party financing, should reduce such corruption in the future.

In very rare cases, politicians are put on trial for corruption. Iceland has no policy framework specifically addressing corruption because historically corruption has been considered a peripheral subject. However, the appointment of unqualified persons to public office, a form of in-kind corruption, even nepotism, remains a serious concern. Other, subtle forms of in-kind corruption, which are hard to quantify, also exist. Erlingsson and Kristinsson (2016) write that “corruption is rare but still clearly discernible. Less serious types of corruption, such as favoritism in public appointments and failure to disclose information, are more common than more serious forms,

such as extortion, bribes and embezzlement. Nonetheless, it should be noted that a sizable minority of experts still believe corruption is common, especially in the case of favoritism and fraud.”

The collapse of the Icelandic banks in 2008 and the subsequent investigation by the Special Investigation Committee (SIC), among other bodies, highlighted the weak attitude of government and public agencies toward the banks, including weak restraints and lax supervision before 2008. Moreover, three of the four main political parties, as well as individual politicians, accepted large donations from the banks and affiliated interests. When the banks crashed, 10 out of the 63 members of parliament owed the banks the equivalent of more than €1 million each. Indeed, these personal debts ranged from €1 million to €40 million, with the average debt of the 10 members of parliament standing at €9 million. Two out of the 10 members of parliament in question still sit in parliament and the cabinet, one is the current finance minister, without having divulged whether they have settled their debts or not. Write-offs of bank debt are not made public information in Iceland. The SIC did not report on legislators that owed the banks lesser sums (e.g., €500,000). GRECO has repeatedly highlighted the need for Icelandic members of parliament to disclose all their debts beyond standard mortgage loans. In 2015, GRECO formally complained that Iceland had not responded to any of its recommendations in its 2013 report on Iceland.

In November 2011, parliament passed a law that obliges members of parliament to declare their financial interests, including salaries, means of financial support, assets, and jobs outside parliament. This information is publicly available on the parliament’s website.

According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, which measures business corruption, Iceland scored 76 out of 100, where a score of 100 means absolutely no corruption. Iceland is well behind the other Nordic countries with scores between 84 and 88. In an assessment of political corruption in 2012, Gallup reported that 67% of Icelandic respondents view corruption as being widespread in government compared with 14% to 15% in Sweden and Denmark. A 2018 poll from the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Iceland shows that 65% of respondents view many or nearly all Icelandic politicians as corrupt.

New information, including emails leaked from one of the failed banks, about corruption surrounding the crash of 2008 and involving a prime minister, has come to light. This information led to a gag order being imposed on the newspaper Stundin shortly before the election. The gag order was lifted in late 2018.

Citation:

Erlingsson, Gissur Ó., and Kristinsson, Gunnar H (2016), "Measuring corruption: whose perceptions should we rely on? Evidence from Iceland," *Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration*, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 215-236. <http://www.irpa.is/article/view/a.2016.12.2.2/pdf>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Erlingsson, Gissur Ó. (2014), *CORRUPTION IN LOW CORRUPT COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SWEDEN*. Open lecture given at the University of Akureyri, Iceland 19 September 2014.

Félagsvísindastofnun Háskóla Íslands (Social Science Research Institute, University of Iceland), 2018. http://fel.hi.is/stjornmalamenn_spilling_2018. Accessed 20 December 2018.

Hagsmunaskrá Alþingismanna: <https://www.althingi.is/altext/cv/is/hagsmunaskra/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), report delivered to parliament 12 April.

Rules on registration of parliamentarians financial interests. (Reglur um skráningu á fjárhagslegum hagsmunum alþingismanna og trúnaðarstörfum utan þings. Samþykkt í forsætisnefnd Alþingis 28 nóvember 2011.).

Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results> and <http://www.libertadciudadana.org/archivos/IPC2017/CPI%202017%20Global%20Report%20English.pdf>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Gallup (2013), Government Corruption Viewed as Pervasive Worldwide, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/165476/government-corruption-viewed-pervasive-worldwide.aspx>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2015), "Social Capital, Inequality, and Economic Crisis," *Challenge* 58, No. 4, July, 326-342.

Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Strategic
Planning
Score: 3

Long-term strategic planning in Iceland is often vague, with comparatively weak execution, supervision, and revision of plans. When specific objectives are established in the policy-planning phase, a lack of sufficient incentives or institutional mechanisms typically limits their realization. As a result, the government can delay or change strategic plans. For example, parliament approves a strategic regional policy every four years (Stefnumótandi byggðaaáætlun), but – as this plan has the status of a parliamentary resolution and not legal status – the government has no binding obligation to implement the plan. Consequently, only certain aspects of these four-year plans have ever been implemented.

Policymaking is monitored by cabinet ministers who rely on their respective ministerial staff for advice and assistance.

Citation:

Special Investigation Committee (SIC) (2010), Report of the Special Investigation Commission (SIC), report delivered to parliament 12 April.

Parliamentary resolution on a strategic regional plan for the period 2018 – 2024.

<https://www.stjornarradid.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=3b970dc2-f19a-11e8-942f-005056bc4d74>

Accessed 17th October 2019.

Expert Advice
Score: 6

Governments occasionally consult academic experts. Typically, these experts are trained lawyers who provide advice on the preparation of specific laws or public administration practices, but economic and engineering experts have also been consulted. Moreover, these experts are quite often affiliated with the political party of the minister seeking their advice. Meanwhile, independent experts involved in the policy process have complained that their views were ignored. Thus, impartial, non-governmental experts should not be considered to have had a strong influence on decision-making.

However, the 2008 economic collapse changed this pattern. The need for scholarly advice on judicial, financial, and economic issues, as well as on questions of public administration, increased markedly. This was particularly the case with the April 2010 parliamentary Special Investigation Committee (SIC, Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis), which investigated the causes of the economic collapse. A number of experts in various fields – including law, economics, banking, finance, media, psychology, philosophy, political science and sociology – contributed to the SIC report. While no data exist on the broader use of expert advice in governmental decision-making, the SIC experience may have expanded the role of experts overall.

Foreign experts are occasionally called upon. In 2017, four teams of foreign economists were asked to evaluate Iceland's monetary policies and prospects.

Academic experts called upon to advise the government are commonly viewed as being politically partisan. This has reduced public confidence in academic expertise in Iceland. According to Gallup, public confidence in the University of Iceland dropped from 90% in early 2008 to below 80% after the 2008 economic collapse and has since remained around 75% in the Gallup polls (74% in 2018 and 2019).

Citation:

Gallup, <https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/>. Accessed 17th October 2019.

Interministerial Coordination

GO Expertise
Score: 6

The Prime Minister's Office has the fewest staff members of any of the country's ministries and a limited capacity for independently assessing draft bills. The left-wing cabinet 2009 – 2013 merged a number of ministries, reducing the total number of ministries from 12 to eight. A primary justification was that some ministries lacked broad-based expertise and the merger would make this expertise more widely accessible, which has in some cases been achieved. The Gunnlaugsson center-right cabinet 2013 – 2016 partially reversed this reform in 2013 by appointing separate ministers to head the Ministry of Welfare's subdivisions of Social Affairs and Housing and Health Affairs. Furthermore, a separate minister of environment and resources was appointed at the end of 2014. These changes increased the number of ministers from eight to 10. After the 2016 elections a cabinet comprising three parties was established – the Benediktsson cabinet coalition. This led to an increase in ministerial posts from 10 to 11 – a symbol of politicians' disdain for the proposed constitutional change, which was approved by 67% of voters in 2012 and would cap the number of ministers at 10. The Ministry of Interior

Line Ministries
Score: 8

was split in two, separating justice from communications and local government affairs. This has remained the same under the Jakobsdóttir cabinet, which has held office since late 2017.

Due to a strong tradition of ministerial independence, ministries have considerable flexibility in drafting their own policy proposals without consulting the Prime Minister's Office. Yet, where a minister and prime minister belong to the same party, there is usually some Prime Minister's Office involvement. However, where the minister and prime minister belong to separate coalition parties the Prime Minister's Office has little or no involvement in policy development. After the publication of the Special Investigation Committee report in 2010, a committee was formed to evaluate and suggest necessary steps toward the improvement of public administration. To improve working conditions within the executive branch, the committee proposed introducing legislation to clarify the prime minister's role and responsibilities. In March 2016, new regulations on governmental procedures were approved (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar), requiring ministers to present all bills they intend to present in parliament first to the cabinet as a whole.

Citation:

Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016 18. mars 2016.

Skýrsla starfshóps forsætisráðuneytisins (2010): Viðbrögð stjórnarsýslunnar við skýrslu rannsóknarnefndar Alþingis. Reykjavík, Forsætisráðuneytið.

Cabinet
Committees
Score: 6

Cabinet committees rarely prepare cabinet meetings, although the Budget Committee and some ad hoc committees are exceptions. However, the majority of items on cabinet meeting agendas are prepared by ministers often with two or more ministers coordinating the cabinet meeting. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 economic collapse, cooperation between ministers increased, particularly between the prime minister, the minister of finance, and the minister of commerce. However, this change was temporary and intended only to facilitate the cabinet's immediate reactions to the 2008 economic collapse. In February 2013, new regulations were introduced permitting the prime minister to create single-issue ministerial committees to facilitate coordination between ministers where an issue overlaps their authority areas.

Records must be kept of all ministerial committee meetings, but these are not made public.

The number of ministerial committees to coordinate overlapping policy issues was reduced from seven to three in 2016, but has since been increased to five. These committees included the Ministerial Committee on Public Finances (Ráðherranefnd um ríkisfjármál), with four ministers, and the Ministerial

Committee on National Economy (Ráðherranefnd um efnahagsmál), with four ministers. The newly established Ministerial Committee on Coordination of Issues that concern more than one ministry (Ráðherranefnd um samræmingu mála er varða fleiri en eitt ráðuneyti) encompasses the former ministerial committees on equality, solutions for household debt, arctic affairs and public health affairs. In 2018, the number of committees was increased to four following the re-establishment of the special Ministerial Committee on Equality (Ráðherranefnd um jafnréttismál) and, in 2019, to five when the Ministerial Committee on Food Policy (Ráðherranefnd um matvælastefnu) was introduced.

Citation:

Rules on procedures in ministerial committee meetings. (REGLUR um starfshætti ráðherranefnda. Nr. 166/2013 22. febrúar 2013).

Cabinet committees (Ráðherranefndir), <https://www.stjornarradid.is/rikisstjorn/radherranefndir/> Accessed 17th October 2019.

Ministerial
Bureaucracy
Score: 7

Ministry officials and civil servants play an important role in preparing cabinet meetings. Even so, no cooperation between ministries is presumed in cases where the ministers themselves are not involved. As a consequence of the strong tradition of ministerial power and independence, the involvement of too many ministries and ministers has been found to be a barrier to policymaking. Currently, coordination between ministries is irregular. The prime minister has the power to create coordination committees, but the number of active committees is currently low.

Informal
Coordination
Score: 7

There is evidence that informal cooperation between ministers outside of formal cabinet meetings is increasing. These cooperative ministerial clusters were referred to in the Special Investigation Committee's 2010 report as "super-ministerial groups." The SIC report pointed out that examples of such cooperation immediately after the 2008 economic collapse demonstrated a need for clear rules on reporting what is discussed and decided in such informal meetings.

The SIC report also identified a tendency to move big decisions and important cooperative discussions into informal meetings between the chairmen of the ruling coalition parties. In March 2016, revised regulations on the procedures for cabinets were introduced but this only addresses formal cabinet meetings and not informal ministerial meetings. Therefore, we can conclude that the SIC report's call for clearer regulation has been addressed in part. However, informal meetings continue without proper reporting.

Citation:

The SIC report from 2010. Chapter 7. (Aðdragandi og orsakir falls Íslensku bankanna 2008 og tengdir atburðir (7). Reykjavík. Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis).

Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016. 18. mars 2016. (Rules on procedures in cabinets).

Digitalization for
Interministerial
Coordination
Score: 2

No digital technologies are used to support policy coordination across or within government ministries. In the Prime Minister's Office, there is a department called Office of Policy Matters (Skrifstofa stefnumála), which to some extent coordinates key issues between ministries. This office also coordinates national economic and monetary policy, manages labor market communications, and monitors cabinet policy, future developments and the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

Citation:

Organization (Skipulag), <https://www.stjornarradid.is/raduneyti/forsaetisraduneytid/skipulag/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Evidence-based Instruments

RIA Application
Score: 7

Iceland had no history of conducting regulatory impact assessments until March 2016 when new regulations on cabinet procedures were enacted (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar). Paragraph 13 concerns impact assessment of cabinet bills. Every minister should evaluate the impact, including financial impact, of every bill their ministry intends to submit to the parliament. The impact assessment should be a part of the explanatory statement, submitted to parliament with the bill. The methodology of these impact assessments was approved by the cabinet of Bjarni Benediktsson in March 2017.

Citation:

Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016 18. mars 2016.

SAMÞYKKT RÍKISSTJÓRNARINNAR um undirbúning og frágang stjórnarfrumvarpa og stjórnartillagna, sbr. 9. gr. reglna um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. 10 mars 2017.

<https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/forsaetisraduneyti-media/media/frettir2/Samthykkt-rikisstjornar-um-stjornarskjol-10-mars-2017.pdf>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Quality of RIA
Process
Score: 5

The regulations on cabinet procedures (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar) from 2016, including paragraph 13 about impact assessments of cabinet bills, partly ensure participation. The methodology for these impact assessments was approved by the cabinet of Benediktsson in March 2017. Stakeholders, other ministries, and the public shall be informed during the process, which is an important step toward transparency.

Citation:

Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016 18. mars 2016.

SAMÞYKKT RÍKISSTJÓRNARINNAR um undirbúning og frágang stjórnarfrumvarpa og stjórnartillagna, sbr. 9. gr. reglna um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. 10 mars 2017.

<https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/forsaetisraduneyti-media/media/frettir2/Samthykkt-rikisstjornar-um-stjornarskjol-10-mars-2017.pdf>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Sustainability
Check
Score: 2

The new regulations on cabinet procedures, enacted in March 2016, do not include anything about sustainability checks as parts of the impact assessment. However, financial impact is mentioned.

Citation:

Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016 18. mars 2016.

Quality of Ex
Post Evaluation
Score: 2

No regular ex post evaluations of the effectiveness or efficiency of public policies appear to be conducted by any government ministry. However, that does not mean that no such evaluations take place.

Societal Consultation

Public
Consultation
Score: 6

Iceland has a long tradition of formal and informal consultation between government and labor market associations. The 2008 economic collapse led to closer consultation. In February 2009, the government, the municipalities, and the major labor market associations signed the so-called Stability Pact (Stöðugleikasáttmáli). Repeated disputes finally led to a withdrawal from the pact by the main employers' association.

Another example of public consultation was the process of revising the 1944 constitution. This process involved the convention in 2010 of a national assembly, comprising 950 individuals selected at random from the national register. In addition, a further 25 constituent assembly representatives were nationally elected in late 2010 from a list of 522 candidates. The constituent assembly, later called the Constitutional Council, unanimously passed in mid-2011 a constitutional bill in close accord with the conclusions of the national assembly in 2010. However, parliament has not yet ratified the bill, even though the bill received support from 67% of the voters in a national referendum in October 2012. Parliament's disregard for the result of the constitutional referendum raises questions about the nature and efficacy of Iceland's democracy. In the 2017 election campaign, five parties declared, to varying degrees, support for the new constitution, namely the Social Democrats, the Pirate Party, the Left-Green Movement, Regeneration and Bright Future. The support for these parties totaled 46% of the votes and 28 out of 63 seats. The only firm opponent of the new constitution, the Independence Party, won 25% of the vote and 16 seats. Since December 2017, the Independence Party has been a member of the coalition cabinet, along with the Left-Green Movement and the Progressive Party. No steps toward a total revision of the constitution have so far been announced by the Jakobsdóttir cabinet, although a limited, partial revision has been announced for the period 2018 – 2021.

Citation:

National referendum (Þjóðaratkvæði) (2012), <http://www.thjodaratkvaedi.is/2012/en/proposals.html>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Euractiv.com, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/icelanders-back-first-crowdsourced-constitution/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2016), "Consitution on ice," in Erlingsdóttir, Irma, Valur Ingimundarson, and Philippe Urfalino (eds.), *The Politics of the Icelandic Crisis*. Also available as CESifo Working Paper No. 5056, November 2014.

Policy Communication

Coherent
Communication
Score: 6

The government of Iceland generally speaks with one voice. However, in the so-called West Nordic administrative tradition, where ministers are responsible for institutions subordinate to their ministries, every minister has the power to make decisions without consulting other ministers. Nevertheless, ministers rarely contradict one another and generally try to make decisions through consensus.

However, the 2009 – 2013 left-wing cabinet proved to be an exception to this tradition since three Left-Green Movement parliamentary members withdrew from the governing party coalition. Despite this internal dissent, the cabinet coalition held together to the end of its mandated term. Under the 2013 – 2016 center-right cabinet comprising the Progressive Party and the Independence Party, the situation reverted to the traditional Nordic practice. The leaders of the two coalition parties sometimes issued conflicting statements, but this did not result in any open conflict.

In April 2016, events took a dramatic turn following the publication of the Panama Papers. The papers, which included 11.5 million documents that detailed financial and attorney-client information concerning more than 200,000 offshore entities, exposed the methods by which wealthy individuals and public officials used offshore bank accounts and shell companies to conceal wealth and avoid tax. Among those exposed was Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson (Progressive Party). While initially denying involvement and without the knowledge of the leader of the Independence Party (who was also exposed in the Panama Papers), Gunnlaugsson tried to convince the president (whose wife was also exposed in the Panama Papers) to dissolve parliament and declare new elections. The president refused. Gunnlaugsson resigned as prime minister, but continued as chairman of his party whose vice-chairman took over as prime minister. New parliamentary elections were announced for autumn 2016. At the next party congress, Gunnlaugsson lost the position of party chair. Thousands of protesters took to the streets in Reykjavík as in 2008, forcing the government to advance the

upcoming parliamentary election by six months, from April 2017 to October 2016. These events constitute the clearest example of open conflict in an Icelandic cabinet in recent years.

Shortly thereafter, an alleged breach of trust led to the breakup of the Benediktsson cabinet (January – September 2017). After only eight months in power, the center-right three-party coalition collapsed when Bright Future announced that they were ending their coalition with the Independence Party due to a serious breakdown of trust within the government in connection with the prime minister's father's recommendation letter of "restored honor" for a man convicted of pedophilia. Benediktsson, despite having been informed about this by the minister of justice, kept this matter to himself until a parliamentary committee compelled the ministry to release this information to the press. This affair reflects the pervasive culture of secrecy that permeates Icelandic politics.

The first two years of the current Jakobsdóttir cabinet (November 2017 to date) have passed without any notable public disputes.

Implementation

Government
Effectiveness
Score: 6

As a rule, the strength of the executive branch vis-à-vis the legislative branch ensures that bills proposed by the government are rarely rejected by parliament. Thus, governments are usually able to achieve all of their policy objectives.

However, legislative proposals by the 2009 – 2013 left-wing cabinet were twice overturned by the public in national referendums, in 2009 and 2011. On both occasions, the referendums concerned the introduction of government guarantees for losses experienced by Icelandic bank account holders based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (ICESAVE). In both cases, exercising his constitutional right of veto, the president refused to sign into effect the government's legislative proposal, referring the proposed legislation to a national referendum.

Other examples of executive weakness include the failure of the 2009 – 2013 cabinet to deliver on three important elements of its platform: a new constitution, a reform of the system managing Iceland's fisheries, and a deal on Iceland's accession to the European Union that could be put to a national referendum. These failures were due to internal disagreements between the coalition parties (Social Democrats and Left-Green Movement) and the obstructive tactics of the opposition, including extensive, unprecedented filibustering.

The two cabinets between 2013 and 2016, which both commanded a parliamentary majority of 38 to 25, had no problems in implementing their policy proposals, even though some ministerial initiatives were thwarted. The three-party coalition cabinet (January – September 2017) had a much smaller majority of 32 to 31. However, this small margin never led to any government bills being overturned during the coalition’s brief tenure. The current coalition cabinet, which has held office since 2017, holds a majority of 35 to 28 and has so far not had any problems of this kind – even though two Left-Green Movement members of parliament declared during the cabinet formation negotiations that they would not support the coalition.

Ministerial
Compliance
Score: 9

Ministers usually follow party lines, but individual ministers have considerable authority to make independent decisions. Even so, non-collective decisions are rare.

Under the 2009 – 2013 cabinet, dissent among ministers occurred, but it had little to do with specific ministerial actions. Subsequent cabinets have experienced no such ministerial discord – except the aforementioned episode involving former Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson in the wake of the Panama Papers scandal in 2016.

Monitoring
Ministries
Score: 10

In March 2016, revised regulations regarding the monitoring and oversight of ministries were introduced, replacing those from 2013. Under these regulations, the Prime Minister’s Office must review bills from all ministries, with the exception of the national budget bill. Accordingly, all bills need to be sent to the Prime Minister’s Office no later than one week before the respective cabinet meeting. Before the bill can be discussed by the cabinet, a statement from the Prime Minister’s Office needs to be processed (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar, No. 292/2016). This regulatory change is a step toward stronger, formal monitoring of ministerial bills.

Citation:

Regulations on government procedures. (Reglur um starfshætti ríkisstjórnar. Nr. 292/2016 18. mars 2016).

Monitoring
Agencies,
Bureaucracies
Score: 3

The monitoring of public agencies by ministries is weak. Public agencies and government ministries have often spent more money than allotted to them in the government budget. This problem has been exacerbated by the limited capacity of the National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) to monitor the activities of those agencies within its jurisdiction. From 2000 to 2007, the National Audit Office audited only 44 out of 993, or 4.4%, of the agencies within its jurisdiction. In 2009, almost half of the National Audit Office’s efforts (43%) were diverted to financial auditing related in some way to the financial crash and its consequences. Moreover, National Audit Office’s resources have been cut. Between 2011 and 2012, the number of personnel

was reduced from 47 to 42. Although, by the end of 2016, the number had increased to 45 and, in 2017, returned to 47. So, the situation seems to be recovering and the National Audit Office is again being strengthened.

Citation:

National Audit Office Annual Report 2012. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2012. APRÍL 2013).

National Audit Office Annual Report 2013. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2013. APRÍL 2014).

National Audit Office Annual Report 2014. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2014. APRÍL 2015).

National Audit Office Annual Report 2015. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2015. MARS 2016).

National Audit Office Annual Report 2016. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2016. JÚNÍ 2017).

National Audit Office Annual Report 2016. (ÁRSSKÝRSLA RÍKISENDURSKOÐUNAR 2017. MAÍ 2018).

Task Funding
Score: 8

The issue of grant-based funding has been a constant source of conflict between the local and central government levels. Meanwhile, the division of responsibilities between the central government and local governments has changed, but not radically. In 1996, full responsibility for primary education was transferred from the central government to local governments. In general, this transfer of responsibilities has been achieved without imposing a heavy financial burden on local governments. However, some of the smallest municipalities have experienced fiscal difficulties as a result of these transfers, and have either been forced to amalgamate or cooperate on service provision with neighboring municipalities. Full responsibility for services for disabled individuals was transferred to local governments in 2010 and took effect in January 2011, without conflicts concerning funding arrangements arising between the central government and local governments. Further transfers of responsibility have been planned – though without any dates set, including responsibility for elderly care. Negotiations on the transfer of elderly care have been repeatedly postponed due to disagreements over funding arrangements between central and local governments. The negotiating and preparation committee with representatives from state and local levels has in fact had no formal meeting since August 2013 (www.velferdarraduneyti.is/yfirfaerslan/).

Citation:

Eythórsson, Grétar Thór (2017), “Bigger and stronger together. How Icelandic municipalities solve their lack of capacity and scale economy,” in Teles, Filipe and Swianiewicz, Pawel (Eds.), *Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Europe Institutions and Governance*. Palgrave MacMillan. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-62819-6.

Eythórsson, Grétar Thór (2012), “Efling íslenska sveitarstjórnarstigsins: Áherslur, hugmyndir og aðgerðir,”

in *Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration*, Vol. 8, No. 2. http://www.irpa.is/article/view/a.2012.8.2.12/pdf_278. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Constitutional
Discretion
Score: 10

Local government in Iceland has no constitutional status, beyond a paragraph in the 1944 constitution that states that municipal affairs shall be decided by law. The Local Government Act (Sveitarstjórnarlög) states that local governments shall manage and take responsibility for their own affairs. The parliament or the responsible ministry – the Ministry of the Interior – have the power to make decisions that affect local government. However, beyond these decisions, local governments are free to engage in any governing activities that are not forbidden by law.

Citation:

Eythórssón, Grétar (1999), “The Iceland National Report,” in Jacob, Linder, Nabholz and Heierli (eds.), *Democracy and Local Governance. Nine Empirical Studies*. Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Switzerland, 62-88.

Local Government Act. (Sveitarstjórnarlög nr. 128/2011).

National
Standards
Score: 8

A diverse set of special laws set national minimum standards for the provision of local government services. These laws relate particularly to primary education, child protection, and standards of social services. Nevertheless, central government monitors compliance with some standards, and has even raised certain standards to an unattainable level in view of the financial support available to local governments.

Effective
Regulatory
Enforcement
Score: 6

Government agencies enforce regulations and are accountable to a corresponding ministry. Government agencies include the Directorate of Health, Icelandic Medicines Agency, Icelandic Competition Authority, Financial Supervisory Authority and Directorate of Fisheries. Evidence of the extent to which these authorities are able to function in an effective and unbiased way is hard to find. The Financial Supervisory Authority was heavily criticized for failing to do its job prior to the financial collapse in 2008. A 2015 master’s thesis on the Directorate of Fisheries concluded that the directorate had operated according to OECD standards. However, as state television (RÚV) has reported, fishermen have over many years complained about the significant quantities of fish illegally discarded at sea, despite the directorate’s denials.

In October 2018, the government announced a plan to merge the central bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME). The planned merger would enhance trust, transparency and efficiency in financial administration, according to the Prime Minister’s Office. In the past, the FME was less effective as a department within the central bank than as an independent institution. The merger will take effect on 1 January 2020.

Citation:

Margrét Kristín Helgadóttir (2015), Eftirlitsstofnanir á Íslandi. Fiskistofa. MPA thesis from the University of Iceland.

RÚV (2017), Brottkast, ís-svindl og uppgjöf Fiskistofu (Discarding, ice-fraud, and the capitulation of the Directorate of Fisheries), <http://www.ruv.is/frett/brottkast-is-svindl-og-uppgjof-fiskistofu>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

Adaptability

Domestic
Adaptability
Score: 7

While not a member of the European Union, Iceland has since 1994 been a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), and has integrated and adapted EU structures into domestic law to a considerable extent. Under the EEA agreement, Iceland is obliged to adopt around 80% of EU law. Iceland is also responsive to comments made by the Council of Europe, countries belonging to the Schengen Agreement, and U.N. institutions. As one of the five full members, Iceland is bound by every unanimous decision of the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the council deals only with issues connected to Nordic cooperation. The structure and organization of Iceland's government accords well with international practice, and seems to be under constant review. The 2009 – 2013 government attempted to streamline and rationalize the ministry structure in order to weaken the long-standing links between special-interest organizations and the ministries. Through a process of mergers, the number of ministries was reduced from 12 to eight. The Gunnlaugsson cabinet (2013 – 2016) partially reversed some of these mergers and increased the number of ministers to 10. Further, the Benediktsson cabinet (January 2017 – September 2017) increased the number of ministers by one by splitting the Ministry of Interior in two in January 2017. Currently, there are still 11 ministries.

International
Coordination
Score: 5

Iceland is an active participant in international forums, but seldom initiates measures. Iceland was not a founding member of the United Nations, but joined in 1946. Iceland was a founding member the IMF, the World Bank and NATO. In 2008, Iceland sought a U.N. Security Council seat, but eventually lost out to Austria and Turkey. Largely, Iceland has worked cooperatively within international frameworks, but has not led any significant process of international coordination. Iceland did participate in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq and modestly participates in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2009, Iceland applied for EU membership. Those negotiations were postponed at the beginning of 2013 due to dissent between the coalition parties. The 2013 – 2016 cabinet did not renew negotiations and finally withdrew Iceland's application for membership in 2015. As a result, the European Union no longer includes Iceland on its official list of applicant countries. Even so, the European Union may continue to view Iceland as an applicant country on the grounds that the minister of foreign affairs was not,

without parliament's approval, authorized to withdraw an application approved by parliament.

This question remains unsettled. It remains to be seen if a national referendum will be held on whether Iceland should resume its membership negotiations with the European Union. The cabinet of 2013 – 2016 rejected that option, contributing to a split within the Independence Party and leading to the establishment of a splinter party, Regeneration. Yet, when the Independence Party formed a cabinet coalition with the breakout party, Regeneration, and Bright Future in January 2017, the coalition agreement included only a vaguely worded intention to have a national referendum on the issue. Following the breakup of that coalition in September 2017, which led to a new election in late October 2017, the question remains unresolved. All three coalition parties in the Jakobsdóttir cabinet (2017 – present) publicly oppose EU membership.

Organizational Reform

Self-monitoring
Score: 5

Iceland has no formal political or administrative system of self-monitoring organizational reform. Monitoring of institutional arrangements is irregular. Institutional arrangements are occasionally reviewed. For example, the 2009 – 2013 cabinet reshuffled several ministerial portfolios to strengthen policy coordination and administrative capacity. The 2013 – 2016 cabinet immediately reversed some of these mergers, increasing the number of cabinet ministers from eight to 10 and the 2017 cabinet further increased the number to 11.

Institutional
Reform
Score: 8

Iceland's recent governments have sought to improve the central government's strategic capacity by reviewing ministerial structures. The 2007 – 2009 cabinet of Haarde initiated this process, while the 2009 – 2013 cabinet of Sigurðardóttir continued this process by reducing the number of ministries from 12 to eight and reshuffling ministerial responsibilities. Some of the ministries were administratively weak because of their small size. The capacity of these small ministries to cope with complex policy issues, such as international negotiations, was inefficient and ineffective. Further, the informality of small ministries was a disadvantage. The three cabinets since 2013, however, have more or less reversed these reforms by again increasing the number of ministers by three.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens' Participatory Competence

Political
Knowledge
Score: 8

Iceland's citizens are generally well informed about government policy. In local surveys, most citizens demonstrate familiarity with public policies, especially with respect to policies that either interest them or directly affect them. This is truer of domestic policies than of international politics, because the complexity of Iceland's political landscape is comparatively low. By international standards, it is relatively easy to develop a comprehensive overview of the politics, parties, and policy issues in Iceland. Extensive interpersonal networks between citizens and Iceland's distance from other countries contribute to the domestic preoccupation of Icelandic politics.

The immediate response of some voters to the 2008 economic collapse demonstrates an ability on the part of some to quickly adapt to changed circumstances. In voter surveys connected to the 2007 and 2009 parliamentary elections, the percentage of voters agreeing with the statement that Iceland was mainly governed in accordance with the popular will, declined from 64% in 2007 to 31% in 2009. Furthermore, the four traditional national parties lost a substantial number of votes in the 2010 local government elections, following a dramatic decline in public trust in politicians and political institutions. In two of the biggest municipalities, Reykjavík and Akureyri, non-traditional parties were elected to power. This trend was accentuated by the publication of the scathing Special Investigation Committee report six weeks before the elections. Even so, in the 2013 parliamentary elections, the Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) made the largest proportionate gains, increasing its vote share from 14.8% to 24.4%. This increase was due to the party's election pledge to write off up to 20% of homeowners' mortgage debts at foreign expense. In the same election, the previous governing coalition lost more than half of their combined seats. The cabinet that came to power in 2013 was led by the Progressive Party.

Public debate surrounding two national referendums, in 2009 and 2011, concerning the so-called Icesave dispute, suggests strong public interest in the issue. Similarly, the 2012 national referendum on a new constitution secured a turnout of 49% of the electorate, despite the negative attitude of some of Iceland's traditional political parties. Declining levels of public trust in politicians and the associated increase in political apathy coincide with a noticeable deterioration in how well-informed citizens are about national and

international affairs. At 79%, voter turnout in the parliamentary election of 2016 was the lowest recorded since the beginning of the 20th century. Turnout among people aged 18 to 25 years old is especially low, as is the case in many Western democracies. Most current electoral research indicates that a significant proportion of young people do not vote due to a lack of interest.

Citation:

Önnudóttir, E.H., and Hardarson, Ó. Th. (2009), “Óánægðir lýðræðissinnar: Afstaða Íslendinga til lýðræðis,” (Dissatisfied democrats: The Icelanders’ attitudes toward democracy), in Gudmundsson, H.S., and Ómarsdóttir, S. B. (2009), *Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum X*. Reykjavík, Háskólaútgáfan.

Eythórsson, G., and Kowalczyk, M. (2013), “Explaining the low voter turnout in Iceland’s 2010 local government elections,” *Samtíð*. An Icelandic journal of society and culture, Vol. 1.

Eythórsson, G. T., Önnudóttir, E. H., Hardarson, Ó. T., Valgardsson, V. O., Jónsdóttir, G. A., Björnsdóttir, A. E., and Birgisson, H. E. (2014), “Sveitarstjórnarkosningarnar 2014: Hverjar eru ástæður dræmrar kjörsóknar?” (What are the main reasons for the low voter turnout in the Local Government elections in 2014?).

Eythórsson, G. T., and Önnudóttir, E. H. (2017), “Abstainers reasoning for not voting in the Icelandic Local Government Election 2014,” *Íslenska þjóðfélagið*, Vol. 8, No. 1. <http://thjodfelagid.is/index.php/Th/article/view/86>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

Open
Government
Score: 4

The government does not systematically or regularly publish data or information that could strengthen the ability of citizens to evaluate or monitor the government. On the contrary, the government is widely seen as seeking to hide information that is readily available to citizens in neighboring countries. For example, the Pension Fund for State Employees has refused to publish the names of those pensioners who receive the largest payments from the fund and the amounts they receive.

Furthermore, the Wage Council, which was tasked with deciding the salaries of members of parliament and senior public officials, granted substantial wage hikes in recent years. The wage increases were so substantial that both the Icelandic Confederation of Labor (ASÍ) and the Confederation of Icelandic Enterprise (SA) publicly complained that the increases threatened to undermine the labor market by triggering corresponding wage claims across the board. The government responded by disbanding the Wage Council. The Wage Council appears to have kept no minutes of its meetings.

The governing board of the central bank, appointed by parliament, does not publish the minutes of its meetings. This makes it impossible to ascertain whether the board has fulfilled its legal obligations to ensure that the central bank follows the law and investigate allegations of legal violations by central bank officials. In October 2008, the central bank lent the private bank Kaupthing €500 million, just as Kaupthing was about to fail. The loan was not made in accordance with the bank’s rules and may have violated the law. It is a matter of record that one-third of the loan amount was deposited

immediately in an offshore tax haven. Even so, as no minutes of meetings were kept, there is no way to determine whether the governing board of the bank fulfilled its legal obligations, let alone took appropriate measures.

These examples notwithstanding, the government has for some time run an open consultation web portal (Samráðsgátt, samradsgatt.island.is/um-samradsgatt/) to increase transparency, and opportunities for public and stakeholder participation in policymaking. One can find and access drafts of bills, rules and policy documents via the portal. Everyone can send in comments and suggestions. The extent to which such contributions can affect the actions or intentions of the government is, however, unclear.

Citation:

Samráðsgátt stjórnvalda. <https://samradsgatt.island.is/oll-mal/?FilterDate=LatestChanged>

Legislative Actors' Resources

Parliamentary
Resources
Score: 3

Parliamentarians have access to experts employed by parliament. While the 28-person Committee Department (Nefndasvið) is tasked with assisting the parliament's standing committees, individual members can also turn to this department for assistance. However, the limited capacity of the Committee Department, combined with its primary mandate to assist the parliament's standing committees, restricts its ability to effectively assist more than 50 of the 63 members of parliament. Ministers also have access to resources in their ministries. The 2007 – 2009 government enabled members of parliament whose constituencies are located outside of the capital area to hire half-time personal assistants. The aim of this was to improve members of parliament's access to information and expertise. However, this policy was withdrawn after the 2008 economic collapse due to budget cuts and is still to be reintroduced. In late 2018, parliament passed a new budget for 2019, stipulating a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary assistants. At the time of writing, the number of staff is not higher than 29.

Citation:

Parliament (Althingi). <https://www.althingi.is/um-althingi/skrifstofa-althingis/skipurit-og-hlutverk/nefndasvid/> Accessed 19. October 2019.

Obtaining
Documents
Score: 6

The Information Act from 2012 (Upplýsingalög, No. 140/2012) grants standing parliamentary committees the right to request government documents relating to their work, with the exception of classified documents. Exempted documents include minutes, memos, and other documents from cabinet meetings; letters between the government and experts for use in court cases; and working documents marked for government use only, excluding those

containing a final decision about a case or information that cannot be gathered elsewhere. The government can restrict access to documents if it can make a case that there is an exceptional public security risk, such as national security, international relations, or business agreements. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has a special legal status, which allows it to request government documents that would enable it to fulfill its legal obligations. The chair of the committee and the foreign minister can decide to keep the discussions and decisions of the committee confidential. The Budget Committee can also request the government documents it needs to fulfill its legal obligations.

In a case relating to the most infamous telephone call in Icelandic history, the central bank refused to comply with a parliamentary committee request to release the recording or transcript of a telephone conversation, which took place shortly before the 2008 economic collapse, between the prime minister and the central bank governor. This dispute remains unresolved demonstrating that the right of parliamentary committees to request access to information does not amount to the right to obtain information.

An internet newspaper, Kjarninn, sued the central bank in 2017 in an attempt to gain access to the coveted recording of the telephone conversation. Then, all of a sudden, a transcript of the recording was published in Morgunblaðið, which is edited by the former central bank governor and who, according to the transcript of the telephone conversation, declares to the prime minister that the €500 million loan to Kaupthing Bank just before the financial crash will not be recovered.

Citation:
The Information Act (Upplýsingalög nr. 142/2012)

Summoning
Ministers
Score: 9

Parliamentary committees can legally summon ministers for hearings, but seldom do so. The foreign minister is summoned and usually attends meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The relative representation of each party across and within parliamentary committees reflects the relative representation of each party in parliament.

The Special Investigation Committee, appointed by the parliament in December 2008 to investigate the processes that led to the collapse of Iceland's three main banks, summoned several ministers and ex-ministers during 2009 and 2010.

The most notable example of a prominent politician being held accountable was the 2010 indictment of Prime Minister Geir Haarde by parliament, which led to a trial in 2012 before the High Court of Impeachment. Haarde was found guilty on one count of negligence relating to his tenure as prime

minister before the 2008 economic collapse. He was found guilty of neglecting to hold cabinet meetings, during the first months of 2008, on important issues relating to the economic collapse. This obligation is stated in paragraph 17 of the constitution. As a first-time offender, Haarde was not given a custodial sentence. He was Iceland's ambassador to the United States until 2019, when he was appointed executive director representing Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden to the World Bank Group, a role in which he sits on the group's board of executive directors.

Citation:

World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/g/geir-hilmar-haarde>

Summoning
Experts
Score: 10

Independent experts are frequently asked to appear before standing parliamentary committees. Following the 2008 economic collapse, committees have more frequently summoned experts, particularly lawyers, economists, and finance and banking experts. Furthermore, political scientists and other experts were asked to give advice relating to the drafting of a new constitution. However, no substantive minutes are recorded of expert testimonies before parliamentary meetings. There have been examples documented of experts making outlandish statements in their testimonies.

In November 2018, the constitutional and supervisory committee of parliament summoned several members of parliament to a hearing following a scandal in which six members of parliament were taped in a public bar by an offended bystander using foul and misogynistic language, several of the members of parliament were intoxicated at the time of the incident. With one exception, the summoned members of parliament did not attend the hearing and the hearing was postponed indefinitely.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2014), "Tvöfalt líf – Allir segjast vera saklausir" samtal við Þráin Bertelsson (Double Life – Everyone proclaims innocence ..., a conversation with Þráinn Bertelsson), *Tímarit Máls og menningar*, 4. hefti.

Task Area
Congruence
Score: 5

Between 2013 and 2016, only four of the eight standing parliamentary committees fully coincided with ministry responsibilities: the Economic Affairs and Trade Committee (Efnahags – og viðskiptanefnd) coincides with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (Fjármála – og efnahagsráðuneytið); the Industrial Affairs Committee (Atvinnuveganefnd) coincides with the Ministry of Industries and Innovation (Atvinnuvega – og nýsköpunarráðuneytið); the Foreign Affairs Committee (Utanríkismálanefnd) coincides with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utanríkisráðuneytið); and the Welfare Committee (Velferðarnefnd) coincides with the Ministry of Welfare (Velferðarráðuneytið). Others do not coincide. The Ministry of Welfare was then split between two ministers in 2013 and later the Ministry of Interior was

split between two ministers in 2017. In autumn 2018, two separate ministries – the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Affairs – were established following the abolition of the Ministry of Welfare.

Two of the standing parliamentary committees have a special role vis-à-vis the government. The committee responsible for financial issues and budget preparation has the authority to request information from institutions and companies that ask for budgetary funding. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has advisory status vis-à-vis the government regarding all major international policies and the government is obliged to discuss all major decisions concerning international affairs with the committee.

Parliamentary committees rarely oppose the ministries, as party affiliation of committee members reflects the parliamentary power of the governing parties. Thus, even if the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries nearly coincide, that does not guarantee effective monitoring. Minority members from the opposition can, however, use the committees as a venue to voice their opinions.

Media

Media Reporting
Score: 6

Iceland's main TV and radio stations provide fairly substantive in-depth information on government decisions. Radio analysis typically tends to be deeper than that found on television since the small size of the market limits the financial resources of TV stations. However, in-depth analysis on TV increased significantly when the private TV station Hringbraut increased such analyses in their program in 2016. In 2018, the TV station was struggling financially and aired sponsored programs. In late 2019, a merger between Hringbraut and the newspaper Fréttablaðið was announced. Further, Fréttablaðið then purchased DV, a smaller newspaper. That will probably strengthen the ability of all three media outlets to undertake in-depth analyses as well as their economic position. Critical analysis of government policies by independent observers, experts, and journalists is a fairly recent phenomenon in Iceland.

The Special Investigation Committee report had a separate chapter on the media before and during the 2008 economic collapse. The report criticizes the media for not having been critical enough in their coverage of the Icelandic banks and other financial institutions before the 2008 economic collapse. The report argues, on the basis of content analyses of media coverage of the banks, that the media was too biased toward the banks as was the case, for example, in the United States during the 1920s.

Parties and Interest Associations

Intra-party
Decision-Making
Score: 8

In the 2013 parliamentary elections, four out of 15 parties gained more than 10% of the votes. These four parties all hold their national conventions, which are the supreme decision-making forums for the parties, every second year. The conventions issue resolutions on major public policy issues, which oblige the members of parliament of the respective party to abide by these directives. Representatives from the regional and local party units of all parties have the right to participate in party conventions. The number of representatives attending is proportional to the number of party members in each unit. The nomination processes vary slightly among parties. Most parties have a tradition of primary elections in which only party members or declared supporters have the right to vote. The Progressive Party has different rules, under which most constituencies have a constituency board (Kjördæmisráð) that selects candidates to a constituency congress (Kjördæmisþing). The number of representatives of each local party unit is equal to the proportion of each unit's membership to the total membership of all units. At these congresses, candidates are elected one by one. The recently established party Bright Future (Björt Framtíð), which won six seats in 2013, four in 2016 and zero in 2017, did not nominate candidates by primary elections before the 2016 election, but thereafter developed its procedures for internal decision-making. Regeneration (Viðreisn), a liberal party founded in 2016, also does not hold primary elections. The Pirate Party (Píratapartíið), which won three seats in 2013, 10 in 2016 and seven in 2017, held electronic primary elections in every constituency in the autumn 2016 elections. Further, the Pirate Party uses internet platforms to conduct open debates on many policy issues. Due to the limited time for election campaigning in 2016, the traditional parties skipped primary elections in some constituencies and used alternative nomination methods within the party organization. The time factor was even more important in the very sudden parliamentary elections held in October 2017. Therefore, all parties except the Pirate Party used the most effective nomination method – to just propose lists and put the decisions in the hands of the constituency congresses. The People's Party (Flokkur fólksins) and the Centre Party (Miðflokkurinn), two parties that gained parliamentary seats for the first time in October 2017, did not have any open selection procedures either. Meanwhile, the Pirate Party held electronic pre-elections countrywide.

Association
Competence
(Employers &
Unions)
Score: 8

The main interest organizations in Iceland continue to have considerable influence on public policymaking and engagement with political parties.

The Confederation of Icelandic Employers (Samtök atvinnulífsins, SA), referred to as the employers' association, has close, informal ties to the right-wing Independence Party. Likewise, the Icelandic Confederation of Labor

(Alþýðusamband Íslands, ASÍ) has close links to the parties on the left, although its formal ties to the Social Democratic Party were severed in 1942. Until its breakup in the 1990s, the cooperative movement, with its strong ties to the agricultural sector, was closely linked to the Progressive Party (Framsókn), which has its origins in the farmers' movement.

Closely associated with the Confederation of Icelandic Employers is the Iceland Chamber of Commerce, which – despite stating that all was well just before the 2008 collapse – continues to provide advice to the government.

All major interest organizations have a staff of skilled employees who create research-based policy proposals that are usually well grounded, coherent, and in line with the organizations' goals.

After the 2008 economic collapse, the employers' association, the employees' union, the government, and the Federation of Municipalities signed an agreement intended to promote economic stability (Stöðugleikasáttmáli). The agreement proposed a restructuring of the economy through wage and price freezes, among other issues. This effort failed. In 2015, the representatives of the government, employers, and labor unions signed the so-called SALEK agreement, a framework for collective agreements in the labor market. This agreement applies now to approximately 70% of employees. Some public sector unions have so far refused to agree on SALEK.

Between 2009 and 2013, the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners resisted government plans to change the regulation of fishing quotas. While the federation was unable to resist a considerable increase in fishing fees paid by vessel owners to the government, it was able to help prevent a broader overhaul of the system.

The 2013 – 2016 cabinet lowered the fees in 2013, against IMF advice. In 2018, the minister of fisheries and agriculture announced a further substantial reduction in fishing fees, which was approved by parliament before the end of 2018.

Citation:
Gunnarsson, Styrmir (2009), *Umsátrid (The Siege)*, Veröld, Reykjavík.

Association
Competence
(Others)
Score: 9

Iceland has many active, noneconomic interest organizations in various fields. Although many have a reasonable level of prominence, only a few have the capacity and competence to exert significant influence on public policy. The largest are the Organization of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), with 43 associated organizations and a staff of 18, and the Consumers' Association of Iceland (Neytendasamtökin), had a staff of five and 7,300 members in 2018

(information was not accessible in October 2019). The Nature and Wildlife Conservation Organization (Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands), which had 1,400 members and one member of staff in 2018, is also influential. This group has managed to feature prominently in public debates about hydro and geothermal power plants, and expressed reservations about further construction of aluminum smelters around the country. Landvernd, the Icelandic Environmental Association with 5,000 members and eight employees, also has influence.

Citation:

Landvernd, <http://landvernd.is/en>. Accessed 20th October 2019.

Consumers' Association of Iceland (Neytendasamtökin), <https://ns.is/>. Accessed 22 December 2018.

The Organisation of Disabled in Iceland (Öryrkjabandalagið), <https://www.obl.is/is/english> Accessed 20th October 2019.

Independent Supervisory Bodies

Audit Office
Score: 10

Iceland's National Audit Office (Ríkisendurskoðun) is fully accountable to parliament. Considering its substantial human and financial resource constraints, the National Audit Office performs its functions quite effectively. These constraints, however, mean that a vast majority of the agencies under its jurisdiction have never been audited. No significant strengthening of the office's financial resources occurred for several years, as its staff numbers were reduced from 49 in 2009 to 41 in 2015, a total of 16%. The number of staff was 46 at the end of 2017.

Citation:

Ársskýrsla Ríkisendurskoðunar 2017. (Maí 2018). https://rikisendurskodun.is/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Arsskyrsla_RE_2017.pdf Accessed 20th October 2019.

Ombuds Office
Score: 10

The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Umboðsmaður Alþingis), established in 1997, investigates cases both on its own initiative and at the request of citizens and firms. It is independent, efficient, and generally well regarded. The office has 19 staff members, including 10 lawyers. In February 2019, Gallup reported that 55% of respondents expressed confidence in the Parliamentary Ombudsman compared with 18% confidence in parliament.

Citation:

The Parliamentary Ombudsman (Umboðsmaður Alþingis), <http://www.umbodsmaduralthingis.is/category.aspx?catID=30>. Accessed 21 December 2018.

Gallup, <https://www.gallup.is/nidurstodur/thjodarpuls/traust-til-stofnana/>. Accessed 20th October 2019.

Data Protection
Authority
Score: 10

The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (Persónuvernd) is a state-run authority, which monitors the processing of data to which the Act on Data

Protection and the Processing of Personal Data No. 90/2018 apply. The authority deals with specific cases requested by public authorities or private individuals, or on its own initiative.

Citation:

The Icelandic Data Protection Authority (Persónuvernd), <https://www.personuvernd.is/information-in-english/greinar/nr/437>. Accessed 20th October 2019.

Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Christof Schiller

Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Thorsten Hellmann

Phone +49 5241 81-81236
thorsten.hellmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini

Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.sgi-network.org