Adaptability Report
Domestic Adaptability, International Cooperation

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2020
Domestic Adaptability

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

10-9 = The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8-6 = In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5-3 = In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2-1 = The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.

Sweden

Score 10

Following Sweden’s EU membership, which came into force in the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained effort to adapt government, policy and regulation to EU standards. The bulk of this adaptation relates to changes in domestic regulatory frameworks and policies, a development that does not impact the structure of government.

Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU member states. However, Sweden is today among the forerunners in the EU with respect to its adoption of EU directives and decisions. Most of the adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative level (e.g., by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies).

Citation:
Zannakis, M. (2010), Climate Policy as a Window of Opportunity: Sweden and Global Climate Change (Gothenburg: Department of Political Science).

Denmark

Score 9

Being a small and open economy, Denmark has a long tradition of participating in international cooperation. The most wide-ranging form of international/supranational cooperation is Denmark’s membership of the European Union. Since joining in 1973, an elaborate system of coordination within government administration has developed. It involves all affected ministries and agencies, and often also interest
organizations. In parallel, the European Affairs Committee in the parliament (Folketinget) has become an efficient democratic control of Danish-EU policy. Denmark speaks with one voice in Brussels.

Citation:

**Estonia**

Score 9

The most important supranational organization affecting domestic policies is the European Union. After consultations with the parliament and advocacy groups, the government has typically adopted a framing-policy document (e.g., Estonian EU Policy 2015 – 2019). Generally, the formation and implementation of national EU policy is the responsibility of the government. An interministerial Coordination Council for EU Affairs is tasked with facilitating coordination of these national efforts. The Coordination Council plans and monitors the initiation and implementation of all EU-related policy activities. Each ministry bears the responsibility for developing draft legislation and enforcing government priorities in its domain.

The Secretariat for EU Affairs within the GO provides administrative and legal support in preparing EU-related activities. The secretariat advises the prime minister on EU matters (including preparations for European Council meetings), manages EU affairs across all government bodies, and offers guidelines for permanent representations. The parliament’s European Union Affairs Committee issues political positions on draft EU legislation, provides political opinions and oversees the activities of the government as it implements EU policies.

Even though these structures are well-developed, due to the small size of the country, Estonia cannot avoid being a rule-taker in areas of more marginal national relevance.

Cooperation with international organizations (e.g., WTO, OECD and NATO) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Finland**

Score 9

Most important adaptations have resulted from Finland’s EU membership. Finland was among the first EU member states to adopt the euro and government structures have in several instances been adapted to EU norms. The Parliamentary Grand Committee is tasked with preparing and adopting EU legislation. Furthermore,
oversight of the EU secretariat, responsible for the coordination of EU affairs, has been transferred from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister’s Office. A coordination system exists to ensure that Finland maintains positions in line with its overall EU policy. This system involves relevant ministries, a cabinet committee on EU affairs and various EU subcommittees. These subcommittees are sector-specific governmental organs and constitute the foundation for the promotion of EU affairs within the state’s structures. The National Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2022 was adopted in 2014, introducing measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change. The implementation of the plan is coordinated by a national monitoring group. The National Climate Change Act, which lays down provisions on the planning system for climate change policy and monitoring of the implementation of climate objectives, has been in force since June 2015. A medium-term climate change policy plan under the act was adopted by the parliament in March 2018.

Citation:

Ireland

Score 9

The key influence in this area is Ireland’s membership in the European Union and, in the financial area, of the euro zone. Over the 46 years since Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community, the country has adapted institutions at all levels of government to allow effective functioning in Europe. Having successfully implemented the 2010 bailout agreement with the Troika, Ireland is now committed to adhering to the EU rules of economic governance contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and the fiscal procedures contained in the European Semester. The unexpectedly strong economic performance since 2013 has greatly facilitated compliance with these obligations.

Citation:
For a discussion of the framework of Ireland’s economic governance see http://www.iea.com/publications/reforming-european-economic-governance?gclid=CKC1zsatveECFQRj2wodjzA9w#sthash.I8sWbHq.dpufin return for

Latvia

Score 9

Latvia has adapted domestic government structures to fulfill the requirements of EU membership, revising policy-planning and decision-making processes. During the 2013 – 2015 period, Latvia adapted its domestic structures to comply with the demands of the 2015 EU presidency. Beginning in 2014, Latvia began adapting to the requirements associated with OECD membership. In 2016, Latvia joined the OECD.
In order to ensure efficient decision-making and meet the obligations of IMF and EU loan agreements, Latvia created a reform-management group for coordination on major policy reforms. In 2012, this included changes to the biofuels support system, reforms in the civil service’s human-resources management, tax-policy changes and reforms in the management of state enterprises. The group proved to be a useful forum for the consolidation of support across sectors for major policy changes and structural reforms. The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the group serves to facilitate support for upcoming policy changes. Although the reform management group was considered successful, at the time of writing it had not met since 2013.

Citation:
Cabinet of Ministers, Minutes of the Reform-management group (in Latvian), Available at: http://tap.mk.gov.lv/mp/vaditas-padomes/Reformu-vadibas-grupa/sedes/, Last assessed: 05.11.2019

Lithuania

Score 9

Lithuania’s policymakers have over time significantly adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. A network of semi-independent regulatory agencies was developed during the pre-accession period. After the completion of EU accession negotiations, Lithuania’s system of coordinating EU affairs was gradually moved from the core government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in the case of specific sectoral matters, decentralized to line ministries.

Lithuania has managed to maintain a rather good record of transposition and implementation of EU law, as illustrated by the low transposition deficit and relatively small number of infringement cases initiated against the country. Lithuania absorbs EU investments relatively quickly. As much as 40% of EU payments were disbursed by 3 October 2019, compared to the EU-28 average of 35%. Although the management of EU funds and control systems is functioning well and in compliance with EU requirements, it is challenging for the Lithuanian authorities to ensure the result-orientation of EU funds while maintaining a high rate of absorption during the programming period from 2014 to 2020. The adoption of EU policy has largely taken place on a formal basis, rather than indicating substantial policy learning. The central bank’s capacities were strengthened as a result of preparations for the introduction of the euro in 2015, while the adoption of economic-governance rules for the euro area resulted in an expansion in the role and capacities of the National Audit Office. Accession to the OECD in 2018 was expected to strengthen the quality of regulation and the efficacy of state-owned enterprises, but the autumn 2019 decision by a newly appointed minister of transport and communications to dismiss the board members of the state-owned Lithuanian Post indicated that there is some risk that these reforms will be reversed.
Canada

Score 8
Organizational change is constantly taking place within the federal government and some of this change reflects international developments. However, unlike countries in the European Union, Canada is not a member of a supranational organization that might necessitate adjustments in organizational structures and reporting relationships. One area that has seen changes over time is international affairs, which includes the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).

France

Score 8
The French government has a good track record in adapting national institutions to European and international challenges. This can be attributed to the bureaucratic elite’s awareness of international issues. This contrasts vividly with the government parties’ weakened ability to adapt national policies to the challenges stemming from the globalization of the economy, as there is often fierce resistance from trade unions, most political parties and public opinion at large. The collapse of the fragile party-government system in 2017 has radically transformed the political landscape. New parliamentarians, mostly selected from outside the traditional political party framework, fully support Macron’s new vision. Macron’s declared European and global approach is a radical departure from the past orientations of either the right or the left. However, this French U-turn coincides with a crisis in European and global multilateral institutions, which are being challenged by populist governments and movements around the world. To date, few innovative initiatives have been successful, and in many cases their content has been watered down.

New Zealand

Score 8
New Zealand follows the Westminster model of democracy, which is characterized by a low number of institutional veto players and centralizes political decision-making power in the executive. New Zealand’s political system thus gives the government – at least in principle – the ability to respond to international challenges promptly and effectively. Probably best known is New Zealand’s response to global economic headwinds in the 1980s, when – triggered by oil shocks in the 1970s and Britain shifting its trade to Europe – successive governments carried out radical neoliberal reforms that turned the country into a poster child of free-market globalization.

With the implementation of a mixed-member electoral system in 1996, the institutional capacity to meet new international demands has somewhat declined – not least because single-party majority governments (which used to be the typical outcome under the old first-past-the-post system) have been replaced by multiparty
coalition and minority governments. Still, the political system has again and again proven its ability to innovate and adapt in response to international challenges. Of particular note are reforms implemented in the wake of the 2008/09 global financial crisis, which prompted the government to tighten expenditures and reconsider how to deliver improved citizen-centered services at reduced cost. The 2014 “Better Local Government” reforms were designed to (1) clarify the core responsibilities of local councils, (2) set clear fiscal responsibility requirements, and (3) give councils more tools to better manage costs. The 2015 amendment to the Government ICT Strategy aims at rationalizing public service delivery by strengthening coordination across different government agencies and by establishing a digital platform for federated services.

Citation:

Norway

Government structures have remained fairly stable over time. Norway is not a member of the European Union but is a member of the European Economic Area and has signed numerous additional agreements with the European Union. EU policies are therefore routinely transposed into law and implemented in Norway. EU regulations and legislation affect Norwegian ministries and public administration in much the same way as EU member states are affected.

There are ongoing efforts to improve the institutional framework and further strengthen e-governance, although not primarily in response to international developments.

It is common for new governments to reallocate tasks across ministries. Examples of adaptation include the country’s early establishment of an Environment Ministry, the strengthening of the political leadership devoted to development cooperation, and the recent establishment of a Directorate of Integration and Diversity separate from the body dealing with immigration issues. In general, interdepartmental coordination has increased as a result of international activity, particularly so in relation to the handling of European affairs.

South Korea

International and supranational developments that affect South Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, South Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role in the South Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the
IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The government has also declared its intention to increase its provision of official development assistance (ODA) in order to meet global standards in the near future. For example, it was the first Asian donor to join the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an initiative for enhancing aid transparency. However, the country’s degree of adaptability largely depends upon compatibility with domestic political goals. Korea seems to be falling behind particularly with regard to the transition to greater environmental sustainability. On a positive note, Korea has notified the United Nations that it will ratify four key International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions on the freedom of association and the prohibition of forced labor, although this ratification was still pending as of the time of writing.

Citation:
“South Korea set to ratify four key ILO conventions,” Hankyoreh, Nov.21,2017

Spain

Score 8

The government has largely adapted its domestic structures to agreements made at international and supranational level, although this adaptation has not always been implemented effectively. The government’s coordination with and adaptation to the European Union is mainly the task of the Secretariat of State for the European Union and the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels (both units within the Foreign Ministry). The Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry for Economy, and the Ministry for Finance also have important responsibilities in terms of coordinating cooperation between ministries on EU matters and structural reforms connected to European economic governance. More generally, all line ministries have to some extent Europeanized their organizations, although most ministries lack units dealing specifically with the European Union, and interministerial coordination is weak. Cooperation between central government and the autonomous communities on EU affairs has been managed by the so-called Conferences on Matters Related to the European Union.

The creation of a High Commissioner for the 2030 Agenda with interministerial responsibilities was the most important development (despite operating under the restricted powers of Spain’s caretaker government since 2019) with regard to adapting domestic structures to meet the objectives decided at the international level such as the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

Citation:
Real Decreto 595/2018
Bulgaria

Score 7

EU and NATO membership imposes a clear necessity on the Bulgarian government to be able to respond to and adopt changes based on international and supranational developments. Beyond changes in recent years related to this, the primary governmental structures and their methods of operation have remained largely unchanged. One area in which organizational changes related to supranational developments seem to be leading to improvement is the implementation of EU-funded programs and mechanisms; this is particularly evident in spheres such as transportation and environmental-protection infrastructure, while less so with regard to agricultural subsidies and judicial reform. In 2017, the government adapted to its upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union by creating a Ministry of the Bulgarian Presidency. Its operation was deemed successful, and at the end of 2018 the ministry was disbanded, indicating that the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances remained. A next challenge will be the adaptation of government structures to upcoming changes in the EU funding framework.

Iceland

Score 7

While not a member of the European Union, Iceland has since 1994 been a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), and has integrated and adapted EU structures into domestic law to a considerable extent. Under the EEA agreement, Iceland is obliged to adopt around 80% of EU law. Iceland is also responsive to comments made by the Council of Europe, countries belonging to the Schengen Agreement, and U.N. institutions. As one of the five full members, Iceland is bound by every unanimous decision of the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the council deals only with issues connected to Nordic cooperation. The structure and organization of Iceland’s government accords well with international practice, and seems to be under constant review. The 2009 – 2013 government attempted to streamline and rationalize the ministry structure in order to weaken the long-standing links between special-interest organizations and the ministries. Through a process of mergers, the number of ministries was reduced from 12 to eight. The Gunnlaugsson cabinet (2013 – 2016) partially reversed some of these mergers and increased the number of ministers to 10. Further, the Benediktsson cabinet (January 2017 – September 2017) increased the number of ministers by one by splitting the Ministry of Interior in two in January 2017. Currently, there are still 11 ministries.

Israel

Score 7

Following OECD and academic recommendations, the Israeli government advances various administrative reforms regarding regulatory burdens, decision-making and long-term planning. Periodic progress reports show gradual improvement in the dissemination of information as well as in decision-making. The government
continues to adapt its domestic structures to international and supranational developments in an ongoing and constructive process. The Ministry of Economy and Industry produces an annual report that reviews progress with regard to implementation of the OECD’s recommendations. For example, in 2015 the report presented the progress made in the ability to regulate the imposition of labor laws. Moreover, in 2015, Israel signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in tax matters of the OECD and ratified it in 2016. Many other agreements, such as the enforcement of the anti-bribery convention, have been signed, with policies adapted in Israel in accordance with OECD standards.

Citation:


“OECD economic surveys: Israel,” OECD publication (December 2013).

OECD, “OECD Studies on SMEs and Entrepreneurship SME and Entrepreneurship Policy in Israel 2016,”

“Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies,” Ministry of industry, trade and labor official report (June 2012)


“There are currently more than 200 ongoing investigations of corruption and bribery around the world,” Globes, 18.7.2017, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?id=1001197649


Luxembourg

Luxembourg has made progress in implementing European legislation. In terms of the transposition of EU directives, Luxembourg’s performance is moderate, yet it has improved in recent years. Given the size of the country, there is limited scope for improving the government administration’s human resources. A single civil servant is typically responsible for a number of tasks that would be assigned to an entire team in other EU member states. For example, European Social Fund (ESF) activities fall under the responsibility of only four civil servants who have other responsibilities in addition to European programs. Despite a lack of personnel, work expected by European and supranational institutions is completed.

Luxembourg often responds to international requests by launching an ad hoc group. The country has also done well in conforming national law to EU directives,
sometimes transposing laws verbatim. However, this does not guarantee that the law will be followed verbatim; differences between de jure and de facto interpretations have emerged.

Citation:


Malta

The capacity of government structures to adapt to change improved during the period of EU accession and since membership. Malta’s preparations for assuming the EU presidency required further adaption to changing scenarios, especially at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels as well as ambassadorial and consulate levels. It also required the expansion and international training of personnel. Consequently, there is greater awareness of the need to respond to international developments. Better coordination among the bureaucracy has also contributed to improvements. Malta is presently updating certain structures with the aim of improving its regulatory and enforcement capabilities, particularly in the areas of finance and environmental protection.

Departments are required to submit a strategic plan that is linked to their policy objectives, and which makes a contribution to wider national and corporate programs. On this basis, they are then required to submit a business plan specifying the necessary human and budgetary resources (typically in a two-year rolling plan format). These plans are approved and translated into the organizational leadership-performance plan. These are revised and updated every six months to ensure that they remain relevant and suitable to current conditions.

In this way, organizations and their mandates are allowed to evolve gradually so as to remain “fit for purpose.” In addition, the government of Malta uses a number of structured review processes, including spending reviews (led by the Ministry for Finance), and strategic/operational/capacity reviews carried out either by the in-house consultancy firm (the Management Efficiency Unit, or MEU) or external consultants. Similarly, there is a structured internal audit program led by the Internal Audit and Investigations Department (IAID). These latter interventions aim to stimulate significant organization change as needed, and generally focus on specific issue areas.

Parliament has also demonstrated a greater willingness to engage with international forums. This has increased the government’s capacity to address international issues.
such as climate change, international financial institutions, security policy and humanitarian crises. The recent decision to provide the parliament with greater autonomy and resources is expected to enhance improvements made over these past four years. Furthermore, a debate has finally begun on whether parliament should become a full-time institution. Indeed, the most sophisticated and complex committee in parliament (with the most subcommittees) is the committee dedicated to foreign policy and European affairs.

Portugal

Score 7

The European Union is vital to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal, organizational, security and reporting frameworks. While the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and regulations, it is steadily adopting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has had to adapt its structures accordingly. In terms of organizational adaptation, this is reflected in the creation of positions such as the secretary of state for European affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General-Directorate for European Affairs. In addition, almost all ministries have structures designed to interact with the EU level.

United Kingdom

Score 7

The organization of ministries in the United Kingdom is a prerogative of the prime minister, and traditionally the precise division of tasks between ministries apart from the classic portfolios of foreign policy, defense, the Treasury, and the Home Office has been subject to considerable change. There is some evidence for international and supranational developments playing an important role in these decisions on UK government structures, a clear example being the creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change, with an explicit remit to engage in international action to mitigate climate change, although was subsequently subsumed within new ministries following the change in prime minister in 2016. New cabinet committees have been set up (and subsequently terminated), such as a committee on Syrian refugees in 2015. There have also been developments leading to new cross-departmental structures. The establishment of the National Security Council was a response to security-related issues, while the creation of a cross-governmental joint energy unit was motivated by the Ukraine crisis.

The United Kingdom has in some areas been an early, and sometimes enthusiastic, proponent of norms and practices that have been championed by international bodies, including those overseeing financial stability and transparency in
government. The Open Data Charter and the Open Government Partnership (in which the United Kingdom plays an active role) were agreed under the United Kingdom’s G8 presidency. The United Kingdom is an acknowledged leader in open government and ranked 1 out of 115 countries in the 2016 Open Data Barometer.

Perhaps reflecting the prevailing UK attitude to “Brussels” before the decision to leave the European Union, there has been some resistance to policy recommendations from the European Commission, including the country specific recommendations associated with EU semester process, unless they accord with government priorities like tax avoidance and establishing trade links. There is less resistance to recommendations from, for example, the IMF, even when the recommendations of the IMF and European Union are similar.

In addition to the obvious reactions to Brexit, such as reconfiguring ministries and cabinet committees, efforts are being made to develop trade policy capability, in order to respond to the expanding UK role in trade internationally. For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has worked with the Department for International Trade (DIT) and others to develop a cross-Whitehall Trade Policy and Negotiations Faculty in the FCO’s Diplomatic Academy.

Austria

The Austrian government has adapted domestic structures to international developments, but with reservations. While the EU political agenda is generally accepted, the government has proved reluctant to implement specific policies, for example by defending the principle of bank secrecy. Contributing to this hesitancy is the fact that the government is often internally divided, for reasons both constitutional and political: First, the cabinet consists of autonomous ministers who cannot be forced to accept a general agenda. The position of the chancellor as first among equals means there is no clearly defined leadership by a head of government. Second, governments since 1983 have been coalitions. Coalition parties tend to work on a specific party agenda, and have limited interest in the agenda of the government as such.

In many cases, one governing party tends to favor implementation of international and especially supranational (EU) policies more than the other. Alternately, some parties seek to mobilize populist sentiments against the international or supranational level, identifying their own party as the defender of Austrian interests against foreign encroachment. It is especially the Freedom Party (FPÖ) – allied on the EU-level with parties like the French Front National – which plays the patriotic card against what the party identifies as “Brussels.” As the FPÖ is now a member of the government, the reluctance to adapt to European standards will increase, even as the FPÖ (in contrast to the Front National) does not favor an Austrian exit from the European Union.
Austria’s hesitancy in participating in an all-European policy regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict reflects a lack of adaptability. Austrian political actors tend to use the country’s neutrality status as a pretext for staying aloof. And Austria’s permanent neutrality, enshrined in the constitution, creates problems for Austria’s willingness to cooperate in a tighter common European defense policy.

In 2018, the government shifted its overall international outlook away from following general EU policies (as established by the principle of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy) to a more diverse attitude – siding in some cases (e.g., concerning the U.N. migration agreement) with the four Visegrád EU member states rather than with the EU mainstream. This reflects the euroskeptic attitude of the FPÖ. During Austria’s rotating presidency of the European Council, this created a specific ambivalence between the Austrian government’s responsibility for the European Union at large and the government’s tendency to align with the dissident positions of the Visegrád group. This became visible in the government’s hesitant approach to re-establishing the travel freedom in the Schengen area.

The euroskeptic tendency of the former government may change with the formation of a new coalition. If the most euroskeptic Austrian party is not a partner in the new coalition, the pro-EU tendencies of the other parties may change the overall Austrian attitude in the direction of deeper pro-European policies.

Belgium

Score 6

Belgium is one of the founding states of the European Union and is an active member of many international agreements. In some instances, Belgium has even played a leading role in international agreements (such as banning the production of land mines).

However, Belgium is today regularly criticized for not fully complying with rules agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations or NATO. For instance, critics have taken aim at Belgium’s slower-than-average progress in abiding by EU environmental norms.

Citation:
https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/fcnm-factsheet

Greece

Score 6

No other country surveyed by the SGI has been subject to such intense or extensive scrutiny as Greece has under the Troika and the EU Task Force, which since 2015 has been replaced by the European Union’s Structural Reform Support Service (SRSS). Loan conditionality has obliged the country to respond to an externally
imposed agenda.

Greece exited the Third Economic Adjustment Program (2015 – 2018) in August 2018. During the period under review, the government attempted to implement legislation that had been previously passed in accordance with the requirements of successive economic adjustment programs (the so-called Memoranda). Implementation had been delayed, as some of the measures contradicted the electoral program of the two coalition partners (Syriza and ANEL) that had held power since January 2015. For example, it was only in late autumn 2017 that the Ministry of Administrative Reconstruction adopted new measures for a performance-based review of Greek civil servants; such a review had never before taken place, and Syriza had persistently fought against it between 2010 and 2014. A second round of the same review started in the spring of 2019. The new center-right government, which assumed power in July 2019, has started a series of structural reforms. These include major administrative changes, along with changes to investment, labor-relations, migration and education policy intended to help Greece converge with the EU mainstream in these areas. It also announced cuts in the very high tax levels imposed by the previous government. However, the quality of implementation of these reforms remains to be seen.

**Italy**

In the medium term, the most significant impact that international, and particularly supranational (EU-related) developments have had upon the structure and working of the government concerns the role of the minister of finance and of the treasury. Because of budgetary requirements deriving from European integration and participation in the euro zone, the minister of finance has acquired increasing weight in the governmental decision-making process, exercising an effective gatekeeping role with respect to the proposals of line ministries. Another example of this development is the strict internal stability pact, designed to meet the European Union’s stability and growth pact obligations across all administrative levels. Consequently, the prime minister and finance minister gained a more central role in the implementation of the government program, guiding the most important decisions, while other ministers assumed a secondary role.

Under the first Conte government, this trend appeared to be reversing itself. The political influence of the prime minister and finance minister was reduced to accommodate the policy initiatives of the two coalition-party leaders, Di Maio and Salvini, who made little effort to respect Italy’s international and European obligations. However, the second Conte government has backed somewhat away from this mode of operation.
Japan

Score 6

Japan’s reform processes are usually driven by domestic developments and interests, but international models or perceived best practices do play a role at times. Actors interested in reform have frequently appealed to international standards and trends to support their position. However, it is often doubtful whether substantial reform is truly enacted or whether Japan follows international standards in only a formal sense, with underlying informal institutional mechanisms changing much more slowly.

Mexico

Score 6

The Mexican governing elite have traditionally been very interested in adopting international standards and had a high degree of contact with international organizations and policy institutes. The major motivation for this is that multilateralism has always provided a strategic avenue for counterbalancing the country’s dependence on its northern neighbor. Moreover, many members of the policy elite have studied and/or worked abroad, mostly in English-speaking countries and sometimes in those international organizations that promote international norms. Mexico’s presidential system, with its directing authority at the center of the administration, also allows the country to make swift changes. However, while adaptability of the Mexican government is comparatively high in formal terms, implementation of new approaches and policies is much weaker, particularly when it involves subnational entities, heavily unionized sectors or counters economic interests in society. In this regard, one of the most challenging tasks for the Mexican government is currently to transfer the ambitious U.N. Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) agenda into domestic policies, adapting them to national priorities. Progress, thus far, seems to be slow. While formulating action plans and monitoring strategies at the national level faces little or no capacity barriers, the implementation and mainstreaming of policies at the local and regional level will be the major challenge. In addition, while Mexico has signaled commitment to human rights in international arenas, within the country the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law remain low. The current government, despite a tradition of paying attention to international initiatives, is rather inward looking because of increasing domestic challenges.

Romania

Score 6

On 30 June, 2019, Romania completed its six-month term hosting the EU Council Presidency, with the last summit hosted in President Iohannis’ hometown of Sibiu. The presidency went better than expected, producing 90 pieces of legislation addressing banking, workforce, future migrant crisis situations, the gas market, and
low-emission vehicles. The informal meeting at Sibiu saw the adoption of the Sibiu Declaration, which details a commitment to one Europe “united through thick and thin.” Furthermore, the event was an opportunity for EU leaders to emphasize the rule of law, a topic that the EU has often warned Romania about. The better-than-expected functioning of Romania’s presidency shows that Romania was able to adapt its government structures and processes so as to successfully meet its obligations as EU Council president. At the same time, little progress was made in terms of improving the absorption of EU funds.

**Slovenia**

**Score 6**

Upon EU accession, Slovenia developed a complex system for coordinating European affairs, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central coordinator. The Cerar and Šarec governments left this system largely unchanged. In order to increase the absorption of EU funds, the Cerar government created a new ministry without portfolio with responsibility for development, strategic projects and cohesion and changed procedures. The Šarec government has kept the ministry, but replaced its minister twice due to the ministry’s poor performance.

**Switzerland**

**Score 6**

Switzerland directly implements international treaties which today account for about half of the federal legislation. Whenever Switzerland agrees to cooperate with other countries or international organizations, it attempts to meet all the requirements of the agreement, including implementation of the necessary administrative reforms.

With regard to the European Union, however, the adaptation is idiosyncratic. On the one hand, the government cannot develop institutional mechanisms with Brussels, as most Swiss do not want to join the EU and have expressed in several referendums their skepticism toward the EU. On the other hand, adaptations to EU law reach beyond these treaties and comprise also large parts of (domestic) economic law. The strategy of bilateral treaties has been placed in jeopardy following the passage of the popular initiative capping mass immigration. The parliament solved the problem by paying lip-service to the constitutional amendment while drafting an implementation law that does not correspond to the wording and the spirit of the popular decision (“implementation light”). Moreover, there are serious concerns as to whether the “strategy of bilaterals” is sufficient or sustainable. Conflicts between the EU and Switzerland have escalated since 2008, with the EU demanding that institutional solutions be developed to address the bilateral system’s weaknesses. Specifically, the EU has called for self-executing rules enabling bilateral treaties to be updated as well as independent institutions for the settlement of conflicts arising from the bilateral treaties. Switzerland has opposed these proposals. There is strong domestic
opposition against any such institutional framework agreement, while the EU is not willing to continue the previous case-by-case updating of bilateral agreements nor the unanimous adjudication of conflicts by a joint committee of the EU and Switzerland. Switzerland has tried to wait out the decision, but the EU has threatened and then executed sanctions if no solution is in place by the end of 2018. Given the long list of unresolved issues touching the interests of diverse groups such as trade unions and right-wing populist politicians, the Swiss political system has been unable to adapt to these external challenges. Instead, the executive and most political parties procrastinated and muddled their way through. Decisions on these issues can be made by early summer 2020 at the earliest and only after the popular referendum on the free movement of EU citizens into Switzerland has been held. At the time of writing, there are two major oppositions against the draft of an institutional agreement: The left, and in particular the trade unions, fear becoming victims of the liberalizing negative integration which is spurred by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. The right-wing populist party takes an oppositional approach as a matter of principle. It seems unlikely that a popular vote will produce a stable for the institutional agreement as long as the train union movement is not on board with the issue.

United States

Score 6

The United States has developed institutional structures that are able to respond to its international obligations. Climate-change negotiations, for example, have been firmly institutionalized in the Office of Global Affairs in the State Department. Similarly, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a domestic structural response to the challenges of international terrorism. Whether the policies of these units and agencies have been successful or have facilitated multilateral cooperation has depended on the policy choices of each administration and the disposition of Congress.

Australia

Score 5

Most government structures are essentially driven by domestic imperatives and are largely insensitive to international and supranational developments. The key government structures of Australia have not changed since the federation of the colonies. Indeed, only a few international events have persuaded Australian governments in recent times to adapt domestic structures. The major exception is in relation to the treaties and conventions to which Australia is a signatory, particularly in the areas of human rights, anti-discrimination and transnational crime, where Australia has been a regional leader. Australian society has been reluctant to support a change in political structures and has resisted doing so when asked in referendums, for example with regard to proposed constitutional changes.
Australian society has demonstrated a willingness to ignore international pressure, such as international criticism of its humanitarian migration policy or high levels of carbon emissions.

The establishment of the Department of Home Affairs in December 2017, which was intended to bring together all of the government’s national-security, border-control and law-enforcement agencies, marked one recent example when the government felt the need to adapt its structures to international developments. The new agency took over responsibility for national security, the law-enforcement and emergency-management functions previously held by the Attorney-General’s Department, the transport-security functions previously held by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the counterterrorism and cybersecurity functions of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the multicultural-affairs functions of the Department of Social Services, and the entirety of the responsibilities held by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Citation:

Chile

Score 5

The modernization of the Chilean state is still underway in some areas, but national institutions have already become quite solid over the last decade. In general terms, the reform of domestic governing structures tends to be driven by national fiscal-policy concerns, which implies that any innovations implying financial changes (such as a budget augmentation for a certain ministry or for a department within a ministry) are very difficult or even impossible to realize. Changes concerning topics that might be of future interest and do not directly affect current political challenges – for example, the expansion of a department’s staff or the creation of a new unit dedicated to topics of possible future interest – are driven more by fiscal or political reasons and political cycles than by international or supranational developments. However, Law No. 20,600 of 2012 established environmental tribunals (Tribunales Ambientales) in three regions of the country (north, central and south), and the creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation and the reconfiguration of some supervisory boards can be seen as a domestic adaptation responding to international and supranational developments.

Citation:
Environmental Tribunals:
http://www.tribunalambiental.cl/2ta/informacion-institucional/sobre-el-tribunal-ambiental/historia/
http://www.mma.gob.cl/1304/w3-article-53480.html
Croatia

Score 5

Croatia’s accession to the European Union and NATO has been accompanied by substantial changes in domestic government structures, ranging from the reintroduction of RIA to the passage of the Societal Consultation Codex and the strengthening of capacities for policy coordination. However, the ability of the Croatian administration to absorb the newly available EU funds has remained limited, and the Plenković government has done little to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In 2019, some cosmetic changes were made to the governance structure. State administration offices in 21 Croatian counties were revoked and some of their competencies transferred to counties. Unfortunately, this reform will not significantly decrease the out-sized public administration apparatus. The reform only entails the reshuffling of competencies and personnel, and will not alter structures or processes.

Citation:

Cyprus

Score 5

Numerous studies aiming to reform the administration have been conducted in the last decade. Their general goal was to offer prescriptions for overcoming the difficulties caused by the rigid structures of the 1960 constitution as well as fight the dominating lack of innovative spirit. Notwithstanding, there has thus far been little progress, despite the EU and IMF repeatedly urging reforms.

Some changes were brought about by EU accession: the creation of new institutions and adoption of new practices. However, as a single region under the EU’s “cohesion policy,” Cyprus has not been significantly affected by relevant EU policies.

The 2013 Memorandum of Understanding with creditors aimed at more radical reforms, including tackling governmental structures and entrenched mentalities. Growing strategic-planning capacity and promoting administrative reforms will require additional critical targets for success, such as changing administrative practices and culture, and promoting meritocracy.

In fall 2019, the government appeared willing to renew reform efforts. Meetings with the leadership of the parties aimed to promote some reform proposals previously rejected by the parliament. The renewed effort for reforms may be negatively affected by the absence of a centralized coordinating body following the dissolution in 2018 of the Unit for Administrative Reform.
Czechia

Score 5
Since the mid-1990s, government activities have adapted to, and are strongly influenced by, the EU’s legislative framework. The main structures of government and methods of functioning have improved over time. The disjuncture between domestic structures and EU provisions and requirements was demonstrated by recurrent issues accompanying the use of EU structural funds on the national and regional level, but this has significantly improved over the last several years. In general, control over the use of EU funds further improved under the Sobotka and Babiš governments. However, the sustainability of EU-funded infrastructures and measures will remain a crucial issue, especially after 2020, when the current funding period concludes. In some areas, such as R&D, the government has a medium-term strategy for financial sustainability, in other areas, such as environmental protection and regional development, such a strategy is not yet in place.

Germany

Score 5
As in other EU member states, EU regulations have a significant impact on German legislation. The country’s legal system is heavily influenced by EU law, but the federal government does not have a central policy unit specifically coordinating and managing EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters within its sectoral purview related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission. Today all federal ministries have specific EU units; thus, some adaptation is taking place, but these adaptations tend to be separately implemented within individual ministries rather than through government-wide reform.

Federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany has not made serious attempts to adapt government structures to the changing national, international and transnational environment.

Netherlands

Score 5
Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years. In this time there has been no substantial reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. A brief experiment with consultative referendums was
nipped in the bud early in the Rutte III cabinet rule. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II government largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of local and municipal governments. Given the Dutch citizens’ relatively high level of trust in national institutions, it could be argued there was no need for reforms.

The most recent episode in this saga of institutional stability (or inertia) was a report by the Remkes Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing the demands of democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 recommendations, the report advocated for the direct election of politicians tasked with forming new cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective referendum process, the establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with assessing the constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that would give voters greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The commission also called for a new political culture that would accept less detailed government coalition agreements, and would be more willing to consider the possibility of minority governments.

Information about EU policies and decisions reach the Dutch parliament through a large number of special channels. Although the number of civil servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of “Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness (beyond what has already been achieved) to adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly EU, trends and developments.

Citation:
Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27 October 2014)
NOS, De haat-liefde verhouding van premier Rutte met de EU, 13 June 2018
Trouw, Dat het voorlopig gedaan is met referendums is niet meer dan terecht, 28 February 2018
Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel (die. Remkes), December 2018. Lage drempels, hoge dijken.Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans, Amsterdam: Boom
Eurofound, 2018. Societal change in change in institutions, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg (esp. Table 3)

Poland

Government structures in Poland have been adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably because of NATO and EU membership. Before the PiS government came to power, Poland enjoyed a good reputation within the European Union, and its growing influence showed that adaptation had been successful. The PiS government has been more inward-looking, and has not only been much more reluctant to adapt domestic government structures to international
requirements (and EU requirements in particular), but even argues that adaptation is unnecessary.

**Hungary**

Score 4

The Orbán governments have paid little attention to the adaptation of domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In public, Orbán has stressed Hungarian independence, and has argued that his government is waging a freedom fight for national sovereignty against the European Union. Major institutional reforms have even reduced the fit of domestic government structures with international and supranational developments. The radical reduction in the number of ministries in the third Orbán government, for instance, has created huge problems with regard to EU affairs, as the ministries’ organization no longer matched that of other EU member states or the structure of the European Union’s Council of Ministers. However, these problems have been moderated by the expansion of ministries and staffing. Moreover, as Hungary has become more active at the European level, with Orbán seen by many as the “leader” of a nationalistic, traditional, authoritarian group in the European Union, the government has started to adapt its domestic government structures.

**Slovakia**

Score 4

In the past, Slovakia’s ability to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments, most notably at the EU level, has been weak and its performance ambiguous and confusing. Despite several attempts at reform, the rate of absorption of EU funds has remained low, as the absorption of EU funds has been hindered by dysfunctional planning procedures, poor project design and selection, and the failure to comply with the requirements of environmental impact assessments. Recommendations by European Union or international organizations like the OECD, Council of Europe or U.N. divisions have been considered selectively. Due to various scandals in the education sector and the misuse of EU funds, Slovakia’s access to financial support from the European Union has tightened. Overall, Slovakia continues to perform poorly in drawing EU funds. As the European Commission states the lack of capacities, and strategic planning and administrative inefficiencies hamper the use of EU funds. Distribution of funds to final beneficiaries remains low. As a result, Slovakia lost €120 million in funding for R&I and regional development in the period under review.

Citation:
Instead of following international recommendations and complying with global currency market conditions during the latest economic and lira crisis in 2018, the government refused to consult with the IMF to counter the currency crisis effectively. It acted on its own and in collision with previously independent regulatory boards, which a commentator assessed as being “afraid to take necessary steps without instructions from above,” that is, the presidency. Given examples are the Treasury and Finance Ministry which had barred banks from calling in loans to companies under duress due to exchange rates, thereby bypassing the country’s banking watchdog, the BDDK, altogether. The banks panicked, leading to further drops in the value of the lira. Three hours later the ministry announced it was merely a suggestion rather than a policy change. Another example is the Capital Markets Board (SPK), a regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the securities markets in Turkey whose announcement that insider trading would not be punished was overturned by decree. According to the commentator, “the confusion and disorganization in economic management, the lack of coordination between agencies, the miscalculated regulations have exposed the political influence over independent regulatory institutions, and elevated worries of a possible institutional collapse.”

On another topic, the state authorities are in ongoing operational consultation with UN and EU bodies to handle the refugee crisis. Institutional and procedural reforms, regulations and project set ups are continuously undertaken in accordance with international norms. However, Turkey’s military intervention in Syria and northern Iraq are largely considered to undermine regional security and the country’s own efforts to re-stabilize the region and promote the resettlement of refugees. Moreover, Turkey has not responded to EU demands to revise anti-terror legislation or visa policies as part of the EU refugee agreement, nor does it meet various Copenhagen standards in certain policy fields that are required for EU accession. Finally, despite its regular consultation with European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Turkey still ranks second after Russia in failing to execute ECHR rulings.

Turkey still has not ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and has not established a National Coordination Council that would be necessary to integrate environmental policies into its domestic agenda and reach policy coherence. It has set extremely limited carbon reduction targets, pledging only a 21% decrease in projected levels by 2030 (as compared with 1990 levels), which is significantly lower than the 40% sufficiency threshold discussed at the COP21 conference in Paris.

Citation:

Indicator

International Coordination

Question

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-9</td>
<td>The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-6</td>
<td>The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Denmark

Score 9

Despite being a small country, Denmark prioritizes the provision of and contributions to global public goods, and Danish politicians are proud to promote Danish values internationally.

Climate change and development aid are high on the domestic agenda, and the government tries to play an active international role in these areas. Denmark also has a long tradition of working to strengthen the United Nations. Denmark is among the countries that contribute the highest percentage of GDP to development aid.

As an EU member state, Denmark’s possibilities increasingly depend on the European Union. Since the European Union in recent years has adopted a relatively “progressive” environmental policy and has tried to exercise international leadership, there is no conflict in this area.

There is a long tradition for Nordic cooperation within various policy areas. The Nordic Council of Ministers is the official inter-governmental body for cooperation in the Nordic region. The council takes various initiatives and there are regular council meetings were representatives of the Nordic governments meet to draft Nordic conventions and other agreements.

Citation:
Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, eds., Adaptation and Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967-
Score 9

Germany

The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the EU and other transnational and international organizations. During the years of the euro area debt crisis, the German government played a leading role in organizing and creating stabilization mechanisms. The government cooperated closely with European partners (particularly France), other countries such as the United States, and international organizations in addressing the Crimea crisis and the civil war in eastern Ukraine.

Moreover, Germany played a significant role in achieving a consensus at the Paris Climate Summit in November 2015. At the International Climate Conference in December 2018 in Katowice, Poland, however, Germany was not able to play an important role in fostering climate protection. Environmental Minister Svenja Schulze, together with some industrial and developing countries, called for greater ambition in the attendees’ climate policies. However, Germany’s credibility was impaired by the fact that it was not compliant with its own emissions-reduction targets. However, Germany took action during the current review period to reestablish itself as a climate-policy leader: Through its new climate-protection act, Germany has initiated various measures including a comprehensive CO2 price intended to reduce emissions. This policy will strengthen the country’s credibility in future international negotiations.

In the area of asylum policy, Germany is today one of the strong supporters of a joint EU approach based on solidarity and equal sharing. Clearly, the dramatic years with record numbers of refugees reaching Germany in 2015 – 2016 demonstrated to Germany that the task of refugee reception may go beyond the capabilities of a single country, even one as large and economically well-performing as Germany.

Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize global and European public goods.

Citation:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 2018
Sweden

Score 9

Sweden has maintained a rather high international profile on a number of issues requiring international collective action. These issues have traditionally included disarmament, human rights, international solidarity and more recently, climate change and a feminist approach to international relations and peacekeeping.

Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator, though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden, together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international influence through “soft power.”

Citation:


Finland

Score 8

Typically, global public goods are best addressed collectively, on a multilateral basis, with cooperation in the form of international laws, agreements and protocols. Finland is a partner to several such modes of cooperation and contributes actively to the implementation of several global frameworks. In its climate policy, Finland is committed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement and EU legislation. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for coordinating climate negotiations, and specifically, within the framework of the European Union, Finland is committed to bringing down its national annual average carbon emissions. Finland held the chair of the Arctic Council between 2017 and 2019, the presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2016, and the presidency of the Nordic Council in 2017. These and other commitments notwithstanding, Finland cannot be regarded a dominant actor with regard to protecting global public goals. Given its relatively high level of knowledge, strong research capacities, and the existence of frameworks for policy coordination and monitoring, Finland does have the institutional capacities to participate in global governance. However, the capacities are not utilized to their fullest extent. The Rinne government’s program underlined the importance of climate protection and ecological sustainability, and aimed at solidifying Finland’s pioneering role in this area worldwide, but it remains to be seen how these goals will be realized.

Citation:
www.motiva.fi/en/energy_in_finland/national_climate_and_energy_strategy
France

Score 8

France plays an active role in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. The country contributes to the provision of global public goods. It has a long tradition of acting on an international level to take part in security/military missions, combat climate change (e.g., hosting the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP 21)), provide humanitarian and development aid, and promote health, education programs and fiscal cooperation.

Concerning the European Monetary Union, French proposals contribute to defining EU policies and often serve as a basis for compromise. However, the credibility of these initiatives was damaged by the French government’s inability to respect common rules France had signed, such as the stability rules of the European Monetary Union (EMU). This considerably limited the government’s success in steering or influencing decision-making at the European level, with France lacking credibility and political support.

President Macron has adopted a fundamentally different method. Having led an openly pro-European presidential campaign, he has declared his full commitment to EU rules, as well as his willingness to reduce the government’s budget deficits and realize structural reforms. In doing so, he has sought not only to enhance the country’s competitiveness but also to regain lost confidence and credibility in Europe, which is seen as a prerequisite for France’s EU partners to seriously consider his ambitious ideas on European renewal and further integration. Under Macron, France has shown a new willingness and capacity to contribute to the European Union. However, this impulse has produced few concrete results given the current crisis in European and national governance systems. On crucial matters, France finds it difficult to gain sufficient support for its proposals. For example, Macron’s ambitious EMU reform plans have met strong opposition from eight northern and northeastern EMU countries, and the Yellow Vest crisis has forced him to postpone or scale back his financial and budgetary ambitions.

Japan

Score 8

Japan is actively involved in G-7 and G-20 mechanisms. While the country has a lower profile in international and global settings than might be expected in view of its global economic standing, the growing linkages between international economic and political issues have helped the Abe-led government to raise its profile, for instance by chairing the 2019 G-20 summit. Japan established an “Osaka Track” framework for free and secure cross-border data flows, created an initiative to tackle
marine plastic litter, and has been a prime mover for the G-20 Action Agenda on Adaptation and Resilient Infrastructure relating to global ecological calamities.

The Japanese constitution makes it difficult for Japan to engage in international missions that include the use of force, although it can contribute funds. As a result of Japan’s five-year participation in a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (which ended in 2017), the government has flexibly expanded various procedures stopping just short of active military engagement, such as providing ammunition to endangered military units from partner countries. In 2015, despite considerable public opposition, new security laws were passed that allow military intervention overseas in defense of (somewhat vaguely defined) allies.

Japan has actively supported and contributed to regional initiatives. In recent years, China has emerged as an increasingly influential actor shaping regional initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative. Partly in response, Japan has started to promote its own (smaller-scale) initiatives, such as the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in 2015 – 2016; the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy of 2016, which also includes Australia, India and the United States; and an invigoration of its development cooperation with Africa, particularly in the context of the 2019 meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).

Citation:

Luxembourg

Score 8

Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in cooperation with the European Union. The legal framework for the launch of the European Citizens’ Initiative was passed by the parliament in 2012.

Luxembourg ranks highly within the European Union for the inclusiveness of its welfare benefits, as its programs are both generous and wide-ranging. However, with a normalized Gini index value of 31 in 2016 (2015: 28.5), Luxembourg is only a middling performer within the EU-28 (which has an average Gini index value of 30.8). The generous social transfers (47% of public expenditure in 2017) and the high share of social transfers in relation to total income not only reduce poverty risks, but also sustainably strengthen social cohesion.
However, Luxembourg also retains a number of labor-market protection measures and unsustainable pension policies; both provide incentives to leave the labor market early and opt instead for replacement revenues. Attitudes of the insured – mainly residents and nationals – are partly still those of consumers of welfare provisions. The system’s main weakness is the “early exit” attitude which is expressed by many residents.

Citation:

New Zealand

In general, New Zealand’s political system stands out for its capacity to coordinate among different government agencies and enforcing policies effectively. However, when it comes to tackling global challenges and implementing multilateral frameworks, the picture is mixed. This suggests that, in some policy areas, it is political will – rather than institutional capacity – that poses the main obstacle. For example, New Zealand performs relatively well in terms of working toward inclusive economic development at the global level. The country is a signatory to a number of multilateral free-trade agreements with developing countries, and – crucially – these agreements have been transposed into domestic law and their implementation is effectively coordinated across different ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry for Primary Industries. In November 2019, the country passed the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act. However, the success of its implementation remains to be seen.

Citation:
Climate Action Tracker, New Zealand (https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/new-zealand/)

Norway

Norway is a small state dependent on a stable and predictable international order. Over time, Norway has invested significantly in the development of a fair international framework. Norway is active in several international cooperation arrangements, including the United Nations and OECD, and cooperates closely with the European Union. Norway is very diligent in adopting EU legislation. The country is not an EU member state, but still participates in most forms of EU policy coordination as a member of the European Economic Area, with certain exceptions in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. In addition, Norway has numerous agreements with the European Union in the field of internal and external security. However, while the agreements with the European Union are seen as important, they do not give Norway a role in EU decision-making or policy formulation. There is
also a strong tradition for Nordic cooperation and coordination on a range of policy fields.

Norway has been an active participant in and promoter of various international conventions, forums and activities. Areas of particular interest have been human rights, development and peace. Relative to its size, Norway is a founding member of NATO, and an active member of several international organizations, such as the IMF, the United Nations and the World Bank. The country participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Initiative on so-called blood diamonds. Norway actively encourages developing countries to join the EITI and is one of four contributors to the World Bank Special Trust Fund tasked with assisting with the fund’s implementation. Norway also supports the initiative on climate risk financial disclosure.

Current geopolitical tensions and increased pressure on international institutions and norms represent a challenge for Norwegian foreign policy. In an age of increased power politics, it is to be expected that smaller states will play a less influential role in shaping global developments.

Portugal

Score 8

Although Portugal is small, relatively poor and not very influential as a nation, it is a member of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), among other groups. It works actively with other nations through these organizations to develop policies. Given the country’s size and importance, it collaborates quite effectively in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods.

Portugal “punches well above its weight” in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission (José Manuel Durão Barroso) and the current secretary-general of the United Nations, António Guterres, are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country.

The Costa government sought to increase the country’s influence in terms of shaping the European Union’s future. The nomination of Minister of Finance Centeno to the presidency of the Eurogroup was a reflection of this. In addition, António Costa was ranked ninth in the Politico “28 Class of 2018,” which listed “the 28 people who are shaping, shaking and stirring Europe.”

Citation:
Spain

Score 8

The years 2018 and 2019 were important with regard to Spain’s efforts to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The country continued to participate in these efforts as one of the leading EU member states and as a permanent guest at the G-20 summits. In 2019, as a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council (2018 – 2020), the government supported, among other things, resolutions addressing violence and discrimination against women and girls in the workplace, an initiative on equal pay, and the declaration on the 40th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

The government also contributed to international forums and actions responding to challenges including climate change (through the COP), energy supply, financial stability, illegal migration (as a signatory to the Global Compact and several bilateral agreements), terrorism, and peacekeeping (troops deployed in U.N., NATO and EU missions). In November 2019, the government decided to host the United Nations’ climate change summit after the Chilean government pulled out from holding the event.

During the period under review, the PSOE government tried to find a common European answer to dealing with the migration challenge. Spain had previously played a very small role in addressing the refugee crisis, while concentrating on domestic problems. However, the political instability of the government and the lack of support for the 2019 budget again focused attention on domestic issues.

Moreover, Spain also played an important role in the negotiation of a budgetary instrument to promote convergence and competitiveness in the euro zone.

Citation:


Belgium

Score 7

Belgium hosts various supranational institutions, including the majority of the offices of the European Union. The country has always displayed enthusiasm toward joint-reform initiatives. This can be illustrated by the large number of Belgian politicians involved in the highest levels of such organizations (e.g., Herman Van Rompuy, a
former president of the European Council; Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament). Moreover, the country’s small size makes it heavily dependent on international coordination. It therefore supports international reform efforts in areas such as tax systems, carbon-dioxide regulation, and as of 2015, on the European equivalent of the American Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. However, with regard to implementation, Belgium does not always fulfill its commitments.

Canada

Score 7

Canada’s government has the capacity to provide global public goods in coordination with other actors. Indeed, it has done so throughout its history. Prime Minister Trudeau has repeatedly sought to carve out an active role for Canada in international bodies such as the United Nations. The government has reaffirmed its commitment to be a strong voice on the international stage, and has submitted Canada’s candidacy to serve on the UN Security Council in 2021 – 2022, a seat not held since 2000.

Canada has deployed a 250-person Air Task Force as peacekeepers with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Climate change is also among Prime Minister Trudeau’s declared priorities, as demonstrated in the development of recent climate policies designed to meet the country’s Paris targets. In 2018, Canada resettled more Syrian refugees than any other country, according to government statistics gathered by UNHCR.

Citation:

Chile

Score 7

The government is endowed with the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. This is underlined by the fact that Chile represents one of the most active countries in Latin America with regard to international policymaking initiatives. However, the impacts of national policies on these global challenges are not always systematically assessed and then incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.
Ireland

Score 7

The country contributes to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods primarily through its active participation in European policymaking institutions. Irish government structures have been progressively altered to support this capacity.

Ireland has continued to maintain a relatively high level of overseas development assistance since the onset of the economic crisis. It also continues to play an active part in the development of the European response to climate change. The Irish and Kenyan ambassadors co-facilitated the final intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the UN’s Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) in 2015.

Citation:
For an account of Ireland’s role in negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals see https://www.irishaid.ie/what-we-do/post-2015-negotiations/ireland’s-special-role/

Lithuania

Score 7

Lithuania actively engages in international policy cooperation on behalf of democracy and market-economic systems, in particular by providing reform support to its eastern neighbors (the Eastern Partnership countries), by providing technical and financial assistance, and by serving as an advocate for their interests within the EU institutional framework. Lithuania has been part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2005. The country’s policymakers have managed to coordinate their involvement in these international fields quite effectively. In 2012, Lithuania joined the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes as well as completed a first compliance assessment. In 2015, Lithuania was invited to start its accession process to the OECD. In the second half of 2013, Lithuania took over the rotating presidency of the European Council and was afterward assessed by other EU institutions and member states as performing effective work. Furthermore, Lithuania became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2014 to 2015 term. The interparty agreement, which includes a commitment to progressively increase defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2018, is further evidence of a willingness to support NATO. Lithuanian authorities have actively pushed the United Nations and other international organizations to refrain from recognizing Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.

However, the government has been less willing or able to contribute to such global challenges as climate change or trade liberalization (except in the context of its presidency of the European Council presidency). In 2017, the European Commission fined Lithuanian Railways (Lietuvos geležinkeliai) €27.9 million for breaching EU antitrust rules by removing a rail track connecting Lithuania and Latvia, which
hindered competition in the rail freight market. Lithuanian authorities have also experienced problems in trying to convince regional partners to agree on the preferred option for synchronizing electricity systems with the Central European grid and a common position on the safety risks posed by the new nuclear-power plant being constructed in Astravyets, Belarus.

Citation:

Netherlands

The Netherlands has been a protagonist in all forms of international cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) before being transposed into Dutch law. The present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid; the shift in the government’s attitude toward being a net contributor to EU finances; and the rejection of the EU referendum and the rejection of the EU treaty with Ukraine in a non-binding referendum.

The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. However, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU level. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led to reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, with heavy support from the minister of finance. The Dutch and the Germans routinely put the brakes on further unification of EU policies in the policy domain of banking and finance; moreover, the Dutch have resisted efforts to dismantle tax and financial rules that have turned the Netherlands into a tax haven for American and Russian capital. The vice-president of the European Commission, Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. In the close race to succeed Juncker as president of the European Commission, he was the lead candidate for the Socialists in the European Parliament, but ultimately lost. The Dutch minister for Development Aid and Trade plays an important role in fostering better cooperation between governments, international companies and international aid organizations through transnational treaties on production and supply chains. The Netherlands will be part of the UN Security Council for the next year.
South Korea

As a member of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the G-20, South Korea helps to shape global rules and foster global public goods, but it rarely plays a leading role in international cooperation. The Moon administration has further shifted the attention from multilateral institutions to bilateral negotiations, with a particular focus on North Korea. Nevertheless, Korea does play a role in international organizations; for example, it is currently contributing 627 individuals to UN peacekeeping missions. Korea does engage in development cooperation, and joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, although initial goals of spending 0.25% of GNI for the purposes of development cooperation have not yet been met. Korea is committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and has signed the Paris Agreement on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. However, Korea can hardly be seen as a leader in these fields, as national sustainability and emissions-reduction goals are underwhelming. For example, while the European Union has promised to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels, Korea has only pledged to reduce emissions to 37% below business-as-usual projections, which would represent an increase of 81% compared to 1990.

Estonia

Engagement in international development has traditionally been the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An interministerial coordination group of cabinet ministers coordinates foreign policy issues.

Besides this basic structure, some line ministries increasingly emphasize international coordination, depending on the changing global security and migration
situation. The Ministry of Interior, responsible for migration and asylum affairs, participates in EU efforts to reduce illegal migration across the Mediterranean Sea. Domestically, the Ministry of Interior increasingly cooperates with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Tax and Custom Board to tackle illegal (immigrant) labor issues. This domestic cooperation is legally framed by the amendments of the Act on Aliens (2018) and the National Action Plan on Prevention of Illegal Labor.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CDCE) was established on the initiative of Estonia. The CDCE is a multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyber-defense expertise, which promotes cyber-defense education and R&D, as well as best practices and consultation. Currently, 28 countries participate in the CDCE, which is based in Tallinn.

At the end of 2019, the government declared its support for the European Commission’s long-term goal to make Europe climate neutral by 2050 (after initially opposing the goal with three other central and eastern European countries). To coordinate and advance activities in this area, an interministerial commission on climate and energy has been established by the Government Office.

Latvia

Latvia largely contributes to international actions through engaging in the development of EU policy positions.

Institutional arrangements for the formulation of Latvia’s positions on issues before the European Union are formalized. The system is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with particular sectoral ministries developing the substance of Latvia’s various positions. The process requires that NGOs be consulted during the early policy-development phase. In practice, ministries implement this requirement to varying degrees. NGOs themselves often lack the capacity (human resources, financial resources, time) to engage substantively with the ministries on an accelerated calendar.

Draft positions are coordinated across ministries and approved in some cases by the sectoral minister, and in other cases by the Council of Ministers. Issues deemed to have a significant impact on Latvia’s national interests are presented to the parliament’s European Affairs Committee, whose decision is binding. The committee considers approximately 500 national positions per year.

During the first six months of 2015, Latvia held the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Latvia’s first experience with the presidency was considered a success, with the country providing appropriate leadership both on expected challenges, such as returning Europe to economic growth, and unexpected challenges, such as the rapidly escalating refugee crisis and terrorist activity in Europe.
**Slovakia**

Score 6

Because of its size, Slovakia’s capacity to shape strategic global frameworks is limited. For a long time, the country was eager to be seen as a reliable and trustworthy partner within NATO and European Union. However, Slovakia’s reputation and standing in the European Union has suffered from Slovakia aligning with the position of other Visegrád countries in the EU refugee crisis and from Speaker of Parliament Andrej Danko’s ongoing “flirtation” with Russia. The Pellegrini government has sought to reposition Slovakia among the core group of EU member states, and has been keen to distance Slovakia from some of the positions taken by Hungary and Poland. In 2018, Slovakia has also been actively involved in two major international initiatives. It participated in the voluntary national review of the SDGs and elevated them to a national priority. Moreover, as acting UN General Assembly president from September 2017 to September 2018, the Slovak foreign minister Miroslav Lajčák, was intensively involved in the formulation of the UN’s Global Migration Compact. Eventually, however, the SNS, one of the junior coalition partners, prevented the Slovak signing of the Global Migration Compact. The resulting loss of credibility complicated Slovakia’s OSCE chairmanship in 2019.

**United Kingdom**

Score 6

The United Kingdom has long played a leading role in coordinating international initiatives and the country’s imperial legacy has contributed to its active stance on international commitments. It has led global responses in recent years, for example, in efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, coordinate the EU response to the Ebola outbreak, promote reform in the financial sector, and combat climate change and corruption.

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is very active in the United Nations in security matters and also plays a prominent role in NATO. Government structures, such as the National Security Council, ensure consistency. It led the way in supporting the Rohingya in October 2017.

However, following the decision to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom will have to rethink its role in the world, especially among its European neighbors. There is a risk that the demands on governance capacity of dealing with the various levels of negotiation will distract attention from wider global concerns. To this extent, domestic politics have already inhibited international coordination with the United Kingdom’s European partners and may inhibit coordination with other countries in the future.
Australia

Score 5

Australia’s comparatively small population and economy, isolated geographic location and status as a South Pacific regional power has tended to work against the country’s ability to influence global reform efforts. Nonetheless, there is a governmental culture of seeking to participate in international forums or organizations, including those focused on reform. Primary emphasis tends to be on the Asia-Pacific region, although Australia is also a strong advocate of reducing trade barriers for agricultural products worldwide.

Australia’s international reputation has suffered considerably in the last two decades. Previously, Australia had been a very active player in international forums, for instance in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, the Howard and Abbott governments failed to make constructive contributions to international forums. For example, the Abbott government permitted the G-20 summit in November 2014 to become an anti-Putin event. By contrast, Labor governments such as Kevin Rudd’s have been overly ambitious. Rudd’s plans for an Asia-Pacific Community were hastily developed and criticized by his own government’s adviser. Prime Minister Turnbull steered a much more cooperative course over his term in office, but Scott Morrison has reverted to a stance that emphasizes Australia’s narrowly defined economic and political interests.

Citation:
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2018/jun/19/are-trumps-shenanigans-turning-us-off-international-relations

Austria

Score 5

Within the European Union, the government is obliged to collaborate with EU institutions. This collaboration is rarely controversial. In other matters (e.g., within the framework of the WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the United Nations), the Austrian government tends to play a rather low-key role, usually trying to follow a general EU policy if such a policy exists. In some fields (e.g., environmental protection), the government tends to promise more on the international level than it is willing or able to implement at home. During the debate about CETA, some members of the Austrian government (from the Social Democratic Party) attempted to improve some details even after the European Commission and the Canadian government had reached an agreement. In the end, the Austrian government, represented by the social democratic chancellor, signed CETA.
Between 2017 and 2019, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition created an unusual mixture of different responsibilities in the field of Austria’s European and international policies. The EU agenda is strictly controlled by the ÖVP: The chancellor represents Austria in the European Council, and the (ÖVP-nominated) minister for European affairs is Austria’s voice in the Council of General Affairs. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has lost its EU agenda, is led by a minister, nominated by the FPÖ. This has created already some frictions (e.g., regarding the FPÖ-favored policy to allow members from the Italian province of Bolzano – Südtirol – to gain Austrian citizenship while retaining their Italian citizenship). This idea has not only raised eyebrows in Italy but also within the ÖVP – although this has not led to an open dispute.

As the incoming government will differ in structure from the old one, the new government might adopt a more integrated and EU-friendly attitude. However, there will always be a temptation to use the complexities of the EU decision-making process to use the European Union as a “scapegoat” for easy domestic political gains.

**Croatia**

Score 5

Croatia has supported major global reform initiatives, especially in environmental affairs. However, the Plenković governments have not paid much attention to improving the country’s capacity to engage in global affairs or to assessing the global repercussions of national policies. Unlike her predecessor, President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović has not been very active in improving cooperation with the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia.

**Iceland**

Score 5

Iceland is an active participant in international forums, but seldom initiates measures. Iceland was not a founding member of the United Nations, but joined in 1946. Iceland was a founding member the IMF, the World Bank and NATO. In 2008, Iceland sought a U.N. Security Council seat, but eventually lost out to Austria and Turkey. Largely, Iceland has worked cooperatively within international frameworks, but has not led any significant process of international coordination. Iceland did participate in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq and modestly participates in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2009, Iceland applied for EU membership. Those negotiations were postponed at the beginning of 2013 due to dissent between the coalition parties. The 2013 – 2016 cabinet did not renew negotiations and finally withdrew Iceland’s application for membership in 2015. As a result, the European Union no longer includes Iceland on its official list of applicant countries. Even so, the European Union may continue to view Iceland as an
applicant country on the grounds that the minister of foreign affairs was not, without parliament’s approval, authorized to withdraw an application approved by parliament.

This question remains unsettled. It remains to be seen if a national referendum will be held on whether Iceland should resume its membership negotiations with the European Union. The cabinet of 2013 – 2016 rejected that option, contributing to a split within the Independence Party and leading to the establishment of a splinter party, Regeneration. Yet, when the Independence Party formed a cabinet coalition with the breakout party, Regeneration, and Bright Future in January 2017, the coalition agreement included only a vaguely worded intention to have a national referendum on the issue. Following the breakup of that coalition in September 2017, which led to a new election in late October 2017, the question remains unresolved. All three coalition parties in the Jakobsdóttir cabinet (2017 – present) publicly oppose EU membership.

Poland

Score 5

With the PiS government, Poland’s international orientation has changed. Steps leading toward deeper integration have been contested and PiS has been more critical than its predecessors of Germany’s role in the European Union. Because of this intransigence, Poland’s reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. While Prime Minister Morawiecki and Foreign Minister Czaputowicz have been more urbane than their predecessors, the government’s basic approach toward the European Union has not changed much so far. Poland wants to play an active role within NATO and has tried to establish a closer bilateral relationship with the United States, which has also been perceived as a form of side-diplomacy outside the usual channels. Within the Visegrád group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) collaboration is closer and more collective – a tendency that also stretches to other countries in the region – although differing attitudes toward Russia is a source of division between these countries. Unlike the other Visegrád countries, Poland has strongly supported the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union.

Regarding climate change measures and energy policy, the government also stresses national interests, which follow the interests of the coal industry and not the interests of future generations, and is less eager to foster global public goods in Poland and abroad. In this respect, Poland was eager to block any progress at the European Council summit in June 2019. Together with Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic, Poland blocked the EU decision on becoming CO2 neutral by 2050, which led to extensive public discussions, among others, with the French president, Emmanuel Macron.

Citation:
Romania

Score 5  
Romanian governments have supported international efforts to provide global public goods. The country has been actively involved in various U.N. peacekeeping missions, has contributed to global action against climate change and has participated constructively in the allocation of refugees within the EU. In April 2018, it also became a member in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. The country’s international ambitions are evident in its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council from 2020-2021. However, Romania’s international standing has suffered from the democratic backsliding.

Slovenia

Score 5  
Like its predecessors, the Šarec government has been preoccupied with domestic political and economic issues and has paid little attention to improving institutional capacity for shaping and implementing global initiatives. The country’s main international focus has been on shaping the European Union’s policy toward the western Balkans, where Slovenia sees its strategic interests. In the period under review, the 25-year long territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Gulf of Piran and part of the land border continued. While Slovenia accepted the arbitration decision of June 2017 and amended its legislation in December 2017, Croatia has refused to do so, prompting Slovenia to pursue legal action in the European Court of Justice in July 2018. The first court hearing took place in July 2019.

Switzerland

Score 5  
Switzerland is a fairly active member of the United Nations, the IMF, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and most of the other important international organizations. Swiss foreign economic policy works actively to defend the interests of its export-oriented economy, as for instance in the context of the WTO.

The policy of neutrality and the objective of safeguarding national autonomy set clear limits to the country’s international engagement in the past, however, and direct democracy further reduced the scope of action in international affairs. During the
growing polarization witnessed in Swiss politics over the past 20 years, together with
the associated decline in consociational patterns of behavior, right-wing politicians
have emphasized the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state
surviving on the basis of smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large
portions of the population support these ideas. Popular skepticism toward European
integration has mounted over the course of the last years.

The country concentrates its efforts in areas where it can realistically have some
influence, such as economic matters or technical organizations dealing with issues
such as transport, ecology or development. This said, there is a clear gap between
the government’s stated goals in terms of international cooperation and the resources –
institutional or otherwise – that it has at its disposal for these tasks.

Bulgaria

Score 4

Bulgarian government bodies do possess the capacity to correspond with, coordinate
with and participate in international processes and initiatives. Yet Bulgaria is still
primarily reactive in terms of international efforts to foster the provision of global
public goods and its level of commitment to such causes remains relatively low.
Factors contributing to this situation include a lack of capacity, political cautiousness
with regard to international commitments, and recently an increase in xenophobia as
represented by portions of the governing coalition.

More often than not, Bulgaria tends to take part in international efforts but wait for
the international community to formulate policies, set goals and benchmarks. It then
does its best to implement those domestically. Inasmuch as there is coordination and
assessment going on, it is for these reactive purposes.

Cyprus

Score 4

The proclaimed role of Cyprus as a bridge between three continents draws on its
geographical location. However, a focus and preoccupation with domestic challenges
has prevented the country from seizing opportunities offered through its membership
in the EU, UN and other intergovernmental organizations. A clear strategy for
international coordination appears to be missing, and contributions to global and
regional politics and public welfare has been limited. Government activities are in
recent years focusing on bi- and tri-lateral relations as well as initiatives aiming to
coordinate the exploiting of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean with
neighboring countries. 2019 showed that, given existing conflicts in the region
(which are partly fueled by hydrocarbon explorations), forged alliances do not seem
to help secure a better environment for the region. Also, the Cyprus conflict
decisively absorbs authorities’ activities.

1. EEZ: Cyprus has the right, Turkey has the might, Cyprus Mail, 06 October 2019, https://cyprus-
mail.com/2019/10/06/eez-cyprus-has-the-right-turkey-has-the-might/
Czechia

Score 4

For a long time, the Czech government acted not as a leader but as a reliable partner to the international community. Vis-à-vis the European Union, this changed over the refugee crisis. However, the Czech position, while opposing EU quotas for relocation of refugees, was not as firm as that of Hungary and Poland, and the government has sought to achieve some acceptance at the European level. It has aligned instead with the Italian Prime Minister Conte on the refugee issue than with Hungary and Poland. Czechia (unlike Poland and Hungary) continues to accept some refugees and contributes funding to humanitarian aid outside Europe (Turkey, Syria). There is no political will to implement the euro or to engage in debates over the reforms of the EU reform and its further development.

Greece

Score 4

As a euro area member and participant in EU summits and ministerial meetings, Greece has engaged in international efforts to foster the provision of public goods. For instance, Greece has actively participated in international forums on environmental and cultural issues; it has also been vocal at the European level in pressing for a coordinated response to migration challenges, emphasizing that migration from the developing world into Europe is not solely a Greek problem arising from its geographical position between Europe and Asia. However, given its own severe economic crisis in the 2010 – 2018 period, Greece was often on the receiving end of coordination rather than being a policy-setter. It has been unable to develop institutional capacities for fostering the provision of global public goods beyond its role as an EU member state. Given the scale and urgency of problems of the Greek economy, Greek governments have not been able to devote considerable effort or resources to ensuring that the country’s own national policies are in line with international norms and agreements.

Israel

Score 4

Israel takes part in several international efforts to foster global public goods. Israel joined the OECD in 2010. Since its accession to the OECD, Israel is largely involved and engaged in shaping and implementing the OECD recommendation in several fields.

Israel has several ministerial committees in general, but very few, if at all, have specific responsibility for the implementation of OECD recommendations. An exception is the ministerial committee on regulatory affairs, which was launched in
2015 and has promoted many imitations (for more information, see G3.1-G3.4) Another fresh example of Israel’s intention to be part of international collaboration to foster public goods is its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. This forum, which will transform to a regional organization, convenes the Energy Ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate and maintain dialogue regarding gas resources in the region. Beyond its stated purpose, the forum is also conceived as an influential strategic gathering for Eastern Mediterranean countries.

Citation:
rapporteur of the U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. It continues to support good-governance efforts in Libya and Tunisia and co-operates closely on refugee and migration issues with neighboring countries. Malta accepts more asylum-seekers per capita than almost all other countries and was one of the few EU countries to honor in full the EU relocation program by taking in its full quota. In 2018 and 2019, with the assistance of the EU Commission, Malta coordinated the redistribution of a number of migrants stranded in Mediterranean ports to other EU states, while also taking up part of the relocation quota on its own. During the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting hosted in Malta in 2015, the country contributed toward the setting up of a fund to assist small Commonwealth island countries in adapting to climate change and in the fight to eradicate polio. Preliminary discussions also took place in preparation for the climate change summit in Paris. In October 2015, Malta hosted an EU-Africa migration conference, the Valletta Summit on Migration. It has pressed for the implementation of agreements reached at the summit. In December 2015, it facilitated talks between Libya’s rival factions in support of a U.N. peace plan. Malta’s progress in this sphere has also been demonstrated by its success during the EU presidency. Malta has also contributed to the creation of a strong international regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies. As a net importer of labor, Malta is presently working with governments in the Middle East and North Africa region, focusing initially on Tunisia with the aim of providing employment to skilled Tunisians. In 2019, Malta also increased the financial contribution it makes to support global issues. In June 2020, Malta will officially launch its bid for a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for the 2023 – 2024 term.

Citation:
Galustain, R., Libya Mediation via Malta, Times of Malta 01/11/16
Malta representative in Palestine visits PLO dignitaries in Ramallah foreignaffairs.gov.mt
Trade between Malta and Tunisia still below potential Times of Malta 05/01/19

Turkey

Score 4

Despite the many controversial steps Turkey has taken in foreign and security policy, Turkish state authorities play an active role in numerous fields and levels of international affairs (e.g., the United Nations, G-20, OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe, EU, the Regional Cooperation Council in the Balkans, the OIC in the Islamic world, the Turkic Council in Central Asia and MIKTA). Yet, apart from its G-20 presidency in 2015 or the international summits it hosts (where the government has been able to actively promote global common goods), Turkey usually takes and is increasingly taking a more assertive approach that is clearly driven by its national interests. As a result, the country has increasingly confronted partners (NATO) and undermined joint undertakings and common interests in EU-Turkey relations (e.g., regarding stability in the Eastern Mediterranean).

Turkey continues to cooperate with 22 EU member states, having signed 47 cooperation agreements involving information-sharing and joint operations in the
fight against terrorism and crime. Overall, Turkey has 172 security cooperation agreements with 103 countries. Its counterterrorism dialogue with the EU continued throughout the period under review and is among the key areas of joint interest. Since, 2014, Turkey has cooperated with EU member states on detecting foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) looking to cross Turkey to reach – or return from – Syria or Iraq and acted assertively when sending FTFs back to their countries of origin. At the same time, state authorities at times instrumentalize the refugee issue to push national interests against Greece and EU states instead of seeking joint understanding and sustainable solutions.

The Ministry of National Defense takes part in joint peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Qatar. Some 17,470 military personnel from a total of 100 countries have participated in the courses provided by the Turkish Armed Forces at the Partnership for Peace Training Center (BİÖE). However, citing the need to fight terrorism, Turkey defied international calls not to enter into Syria in 2019. And its search for gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is carried out with the protection of military ships, is viewed by the EU as a destabilizing move within a fragile region.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has offered projects in education, health, infrastructure, energy, communication and human resources development since 1991 in the Middle East and Africa, the Balkans and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, East Asia, South Asia, the Pacific and Latin America. In 2018 alone, TİKA spent about TRY 350 million (€55 million) on various projects abroad. Similarly, the Directorate for Religious Affairs has been active in religious affairs, education and social affairs in other countries, promoting interreligious dialogue. Both agencies are involved in protecting cultural heritage and promoting intercultural understanding. However, some have criticized Turkey for a lack of transparency regarding its objectives and for prioritizing Muslim or Turkish nationals’ interests.

Turkey has yet to ratify the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. On the other hand, it will host in 2021 COP22, an international convention on the protection of the Mediterranean marine environment and coastline.

Citation:
United States

Score 4

The United States has often led international efforts to pursue collective goods. Its institutional structures and political traditions – especially the role of presidential leadership – accommodate all of these approaches. But the United States often cannot act effectively unless a national consensus or single-party control of the government enables the president and Congress to agree on a strategy.

U.S. performance in this area is not significantly constrained by deficiencies of institutional capability. However, the Trump administration, with its avowed “America First” orientation, has reduced its engagement in international forums and agreements. This has included lecturing NATO members on their allegedly insufficient contributions, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement and declining to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. In 2019, among other examples, he has opposed efforts to enhance European security capability, worked to undermine the World Trade Organization, and, in conduct that led to his impeachment, withheld military aid from Ukraine to coerce its cooperation with his personal electoral interests.

Hungary

Score 3

Since the beginning of the EU refugee crisis, Prime Minister Orbán has looked for an international role for himself and has increasingly been elevated to one of Europe’s “strong men” in the Fidesz press. He has intensified cooperation within the Visegrád group, especially on migration policy and has boasted about his good relationship with Putin and China. However, all these activities have further undermined his standing with other European leaders.

The conflict of the Orbán government with the European Union further deepened in the refugee crisis and by the “Stop Brussels campaign.” It reached a new high in September 2018 when the European Parliament, with a two-thirds majority, passed the Sargentini Report criticizing the Hungarian government in detail for its violation of European rules and values. Orbán actively seeks to build alliances in Brussels against all projects that are not in line with the new nationalist-populist ideology he follows.

Mexico

Score 3

The Mexican government has almost completely lost its international reputation. In his first year in office, AMLO has not left Mexico. He refused to participate in G20 meetings or U.N. assemblies. In an attempt to demonstrate to the Mexican population his commitment to domestic issues, this has undermined Mexico’s position in the world.
Mexico has traditionally been supportive of international initiatives, and played an active role in the United Nations, OECD and other intergovernmental organizations. It also was an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Numerous policy and organizational recommendations made by international bodies have been adopted in the Mexican policymaking process. Thus, it had a supportive role in many international attempts oriented toward the provision of global public goods. Whether this engagement will be revived again has to be seen.
Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Christof Schiller
Phone +49 5241 81-81470
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Thorsten Hellmann
Phone +49 5241 81-81236
thorsten.hellmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini
Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.sgi-network.org