



Adaptability Report

Domestic Adaptability, International Cooperation

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022

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Indicator Domestic Adaptability

Question To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
- 8-6 = In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
- 5-3 = In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
- 2-1 = The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.

Sweden

Score 10 Following Sweden's EU membership, which came into effect in the mid-1990s, there has been a sustained effort to adapt government, policy and regulation to EU standards. The bulk of this adaptation relates to changes in domestic regulatory frameworks and policies, a development that does not impact the structure of government (Jacobsson and Sundström, 2006).

Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU member states. However, Sweden is today among the forerunners in the EU with respect to its adoption of EU directives and decisions. Most of the adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative level (e.g., by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies). At the same time, Eriksson (2021) reports that Sweden has had a considerable influence on EU policymaking in many policy sectors.

Citation:

Eriksson, Jonas. (ed.) 2021. "Sverige 25 år i EU. Sammanfattningar av åtta forskningsrapporter." SIEPS: Rapport 20p. https://sieps.se/globalassets/publikationer/2021/sieps-2021_2op-webb.pdf

Jacobsson Bengt and Göran Sundström. 2006. "Från Hemvävd till Invävd: Europeiseringen av Svensk Förvaltning och Politik." Malmö: Liber.

Denmark

Score 9 Being a small and open economy, Denmark has a long tradition of participating in international cooperation. The most wide-ranging form of international/supranational cooperation is Denmark's membership of the European Union. Since joining in

1973, an elaborate system of coordination within government administration has developed. It involves all affected ministries and agencies, and often also interest organizations. In parallel, the European Affairs Committee in the parliament (Folketinget) has become an efficient democratic control of Danish-EU policy. Denmark speaks with one voice in Brussels.

Citation:

Finn Laursen, "Denmark: in pursuit of influence and legitimacy," in Wolfgang Wessels, Andreas Maurer and Jürgen Mittag (eds.), *Fifteen into one? The European Union and its member states*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 92-114.

Rasmus Brun Pedersen et al., "Dansk europapolitik og det danske EU-koordinationssystem." in Jørgen Grønnegård and Jørgen Elklit (eds.), *Det demokratiske system*. 4. ed., Reitzels, 2016, pp. 248-284.

Estonia

Score 9

The most important supranational organization affecting domestic policies is the European Union. After consultations with the parliament and advocacy groups, the government has typically adopted a framing-policy document (e.g., *Priorities of Estonian EU Policy 2022 – 2023*). Generally, the formation and implementation of national EU policy is the responsibility of the government. An interministerial Coordination Council for EU Affairs is tasked with facilitating coordination of these national efforts. The Coordination Council plans and monitors the initiation and implementation of all EU-related policy activities. Each ministry bears the responsibility for developing draft legislation and enforcing government priorities in its domain.

The Secretariat for EU Affairs within the GO provides administrative and legal support in preparing EU-related activities. The secretariat advises the prime minister on EU matters (including preparations for European Council meetings), manages EU affairs across all government bodies, and offers guidelines for permanent representations. The parliament's European Union Affairs Committee issues political positions on draft EU legislation, provides political opinions and oversees the activities of the government as it implements EU policies. Cooperation with international organizations (e.g., WTO, OECD and NATO) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even though these structures are well-developed, due to the small size of the country, Estonia cannot avoid being a rule-taker in areas of more marginal national relevance.

Finland

Score 9

Most important adaptations have resulted from Finland's EU membership. Finland was among the first EU member states to adopt the euro and government structures have in several instances been adapted to EU norms. The Parliamentary Grand Committee is tasked with preparing and adopting EU legislation. Furthermore,

oversight of the EU secretariat, responsible for the coordination of EU affairs, has been transferred from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister's Office. A coordination system exists to ensure that Finland maintains positions in line with its overall EU policy. This system involves relevant ministries, a cabinet committee on EU affairs and various EU subcommittees. These subcommittees are sector-specific governmental organs and constitute the foundation for the promotion of EU affairs within the state's structures. The National Climate Change Adaptation Plan 2022 was adopted in 2014, introducing measures to mitigate the adverse consequences of climate change. The implementation of the plan is coordinated by a national monitoring group. The National Climate Change Act, which lays down provisions on the planning system for climate change policy and monitoring of the implementation of climate objectives, has been in force since June 2015. A medium-term climate change policy plan under the act was adopted by the parliament in March 2018.

In 2021, Finland was still very much in crisis mode. The pandemic was far from over, and public authorities' main focus was to continue containing the negative effects of the COVID-19 crisis. As of the time of writing, it was not known whether the government had evaluated its crisis management system or initiated reforms to enhance preparedness. However, a number of expert groups have discussed these topics in their reports. As early as April 2020, the Prime Minister's Office appointed a working group tasked with planning Finland's exit from the COVID-19 crisis and determining what measures would be implemented to deal with its aftermath.

The Prime Minister's Office also appointed a 13-member multidisciplinary scientific panel to support the working group. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Finance appointed a working group of four economists to prepare an expert assessment of the impact of the coronavirus crisis and recommend measures that could be used to limit the damage to the Finnish economy. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment appointed a high-profile group to propose measures to enhance well-being and equality in the aftermath of the coronavirus epidemic. The aim was to produce proposals to prevent the emergence of lasting problems, social exclusion and an increase in inequality following the lifting of the restrictive measures used to tackle the epidemic (OECD 2020).

Citation:

Ministry of the Environment, "National climate change policy," http://www.ymp.fi/en-US/The_environment/Climate_and_air/Mitigation_of_climate_change/National_climate_policy

OECD, 2020. OECD Survey on the STI Policy Response to Covid-19. Accessed 28.12. 2020. https://stiplab.github.io/Covid19/F_inland.html

Ireland

Score 9

The key influence in this area is Ireland's membership in the European Union and, in the financial area, of the euro zone. In the almost 50 years since Ireland became a member of the European Economic Community in 1973, the country has adapted institutions at all levels of government to allow the country to function effectively within the European Union. The Europeanization of both institutions and the policymaking process has changed the country profoundly. Having successfully implemented the 2010 bailout agreement with the Troika, Ireland has remained committed to adhering to the EU rules of economic governance contained in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance and the fiscal procedures contained in the European Semester. The unexpectedly strong economic performance since 2013 has greatly facilitated compliance with these obligations. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Ireland has walked in step with its EU peers when introducing emergency measures, and limiting economic and social activity. Ireland participated fully in the European Union's vaccine strategy with the rest of the European Union, and data and information from the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has featured prominently in public discourse and in policymaking.

Citation:

For a discussion of the framework of Ireland's economic governance see Tutty, M. (2014) Reforming European Economic Governance, IIEA papers, available at: <https://historyiiea.com/product/reforming-european-economic-governance/>

Latvia

Score 9

Latvia has adapted domestic government structures to fulfill the requirements of EU membership, revising policy-planning and decision-making processes. During the 2013 – 2015 period, Latvia revised its domestic structures to comply with the demands of the 2015 EU presidency. Beginning in 2014, Latvia began adapting to the requirements associated with OECD membership. In 2016, Latvia joined the OECD.

In order to ensure efficient decision-making and meet the obligations of IMF and EU loan agreements, Latvia created a reform-management group for coordination on major policy reforms. In 2012, this included changes to the biofuels support system, reforms in the civil service's human-resources management, tax-policy changes, and reforms in the management of state enterprises. The group proved to be a useful forum for the consolidation of support across sectors for major policy changes and structural reforms. The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the group serves to facilitate support for upcoming policy changes.

Lithuania

Score 9

Lithuania's policymakers have over time significantly adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. A network of semi-independent regulatory agencies was developed during the pre-accession period. After the completion of EU accession negotiations, Lithuania's system of coordinating EU affairs was gradually moved from the core government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in the case of specific sectoral matters, decentralized to line ministries.

Lithuania has managed to maintain a rather good record of transposition and implementation of EU law, as illustrated by the low transposition deficit and relatively small number of infringement cases initiated against the country. Lithuania absorbs EU investments relatively quickly. As much as 40% of EU payments were disbursed by 3 October 2019, compared to the EU-28 average of 35%. Although the management of EU funds and control systems is functioning well and in compliance with EU requirements, it is challenging for the Lithuanian authorities to ensure the result-orientation of EU funds while maintaining a high rate of absorption during the programming period from 2014 to 2020. The adoption of EU policy has largely taken place on a formal basis, rather than indicating substantial policy learning. The central bank's capacities were strengthened as a result of preparations for the introduction of the euro in 2015, while the adoption of economic-governance rules for the euro area resulted in an expansion in the role and capacities of the National Audit Office. Accession to the OECD in 2018 was expected to strengthen the quality of regulation and the efficacy of state-owned enterprises, but the autumn 2019 decision by a newly appointed minister of transport and communications to dismiss the board members of the state-owned Lithuanian Post indicated that there is some risk that these reforms will be reversed.

The COVID-19 pandemic presented Lithuanian authorities with numerous challenges. Although the initial reaction by the authorities was swift and largely appropriate given the circumstances, later responses – especially those that required more complex decision-making and analysis – often lagged behind the developments. Moreover, policymakers did not internalize lessons sufficiently to enable them to prepare for successive pandemic waves. The management of the illegal migration crisis and the more general geopolitical tensions originating from the increasingly aggressive behavior of authoritarian regimes in Russia, Belarus and China drove the government to draft a new National Security strategy in 2021, and prompted a review of the country's crisis management system. Russia's war against Ukraine and Belarus' military dependency on Russia are likely to result in significant mobilization of national and allied resources for security purposes.

Canada

Score 8 Organizational change is constantly taking place within the federal government and some of this change reflects international developments. However, unlike countries in the European Union, Canada is not a member of a supranational organization that might necessitate adjustments in organizational structures and reporting relationships. One area that has seen change is international affairs. There is now Global Affairs Canada which has three ministers: 1) Foreign Affairs, 2) International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development and 3) International Development. This new structure (integrated yet differentiated) allows for distinct but coordinated treatments of diplomacy, international trade, and aid/cooperation.

France

Score 8 The French government has a good track record in adapting national institutions to European and international challenges. This can be attributed to the bureaucratic elite's awareness of international issues. This contrasts vividly with the government parties' weakened ability to adapt national policies to the challenges stemming from the globalization of the economy, as there is often fierce resistance from trade unions, most political parties and public opinion at large. The collapse of the fragile party-government system in 2017 has radically transformed the political landscape. New parliamentarians, mostly selected from outside the traditional political party framework, fully support Macron's new vision. Macron's declared European and global approach is a radical departure from the past orientations of either the right or the left. However, this French U-turn coincides with a crisis in European and global multilateral institutions, which are being challenged by populist governments and movements around the world. To date, few innovative initiatives have been successful, and in many cases their content has been watered down.

Italy

Score 8 In the medium term, the most significant impact that international, and particularly supranational (EU-related) developments have had upon the structure and working of the government concerns the role of the minister of finance and of the treasury. Because of budgetary requirements deriving from European integration and participation in the euro area, the minister of finance has acquired increasing weight in the governmental decision-making process, exercising an effective gatekeeping role with respect to the proposals of line ministries. Consequently, the prime minister and the finance minister gained a more central role in the implementation of the government program, guiding the most important decisions, while other ministers assumed a secondary role.

Under the first Conte government (2018–2019), this trend appeared to be reversing itself. The political influence of the prime minister and finance minister was reduced to accommodate the policy initiatives of the two party leaders of the coalition, who made little effort to respect Italy’s international and European obligations. However, the second Conte government has backed somewhat away from this mode of operation and, with the increasing need to obtain European support during the pandemic crisis, the role of the finance minister has gained new weight. This trend has been significantly reinforced by the Draghi government, and the large funds attributed to Italy by the European Commission and the Next Generation EU program. The role of the prime minister and of the finance minister have become crucial in steering the implementation of this program.

New Zealand

Score 8

New Zealand follows the Westminster model of democracy, which is characterized by a low number of institutional veto players and centralizes political decision-making power in the executive. New Zealand’s political system thus gives the government – at least in principle – the ability to respond to international challenges promptly and effectively.

With the implementation of a mixed-member electoral system in 1996, the institutional capacity to meet new international demands has somewhat declined – not least because single-party majority governments (which used to be the typical outcome under the old first-past-the-post system) have been replaced by multiparty coalition and minority governments. Still, the political system has again and again proven its ability to innovate and adapt in response to international challenges. Of particular note are reforms implemented in the wake of the 2008/09 global financial crisis, which prompted the government to tighten expenditures and reconsider how to deliver improved citizen-centered services at reduced cost. The 2014 “Better Local Government” reforms were designed to (1) clarify the core responsibilities of local councils, (2) set clear fiscal responsibility requirements, and (3) give councils more tools to better manage costs. The 2015 amendment to the Government ICT Strategy aims at rationalizing public service delivery by strengthening coordination across different government agencies and by establishing a digital platform for federated services.

The centralized nature of the New Zealand political system (local government remains comparatively weak) does allow the government of the day to respond rapidly to crises if required. It is also not uncommon for the government to use “urgency” measures to pass legislation through the parliament when the coalition partners support the particular policy, although this process has been subject to criticism (Walters, 2021).

Citation:

Department of Internal Affairs (2015) ICT Strategy 2015. (<https://snapshot.ict.govt.nz/resources/digital-ict->

archive/static/localhost_8000/strategy-and-action-plan/strategy/index.html)

Department of Internal Affairs (2014) Better Local Government. (<https://www.dia.govt.nz/Better-Local-Government>)

Walters, L. (2021). 'What's the rush? Lawmaking in a Hurry' <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/whats-the-rush-lawmaking-in-a-hurry>

Norway

Score 8

Government structures have remained fairly stable over time. Norway is not a member of the European Union but is a member of the European Economic Area and has signed numerous additional agreements with the European Union. EU policies are therefore routinely transposed into law and implemented in Norway. EU regulations and legislation affect Norwegian ministries and public administration in much the same way as EU member states are affected. A recent scandal in the welfare sector has exposed weaknesses in the capacity to correctly apply EU policies, indicating room for improvement in this area.

There are ongoing efforts to improve the institutional framework for e-governance and to strengthen it, although not primarily in response to international developments.

It is common for new governments to reallocate tasks across ministries. Examples of adaptation include the country's early establishment of an Environment Ministry, the strengthening of the political leadership devoted to development cooperation, and the recent establishment of a Directorate of Integration and Diversity separate from the body dealing with immigration issues. In general, interdepartmental coordination has increased as a result of international activity, particularly so in relation to the handling of European affairs.

South Korea

Score 8

The government's ability to engage in policy learning is generally high, but institutional learning is far more limited. Non-governmental academic experts have considerable influence on government decision-making. In addition to their participation on the presidential advisory committee, scholars are often nominated for top government positions, although their tenure seems to be relatively short. The process of appointing experts remains highly politicized, and in the past experts have often been chosen because of their political inclination rather than their academic expertise. The Moon government did not give sufficient attention to criticisms of policy failures stemming from experts with a different political perspective, which makes the process of policy consultation less effective. The short-lived tenures of two ministers of justice (Cho Kuk and Choo Mi ae) and their contentious relationships with the Prosecutor's Office illustrate the limitations of the echo-chamber approach.

International and supranational developments that affect South Korea directly can trigger rapid and far-reaching change. For example, South Korea has reacted to the global financial and economic crisis with decisive action and massive government intervention. Global standards play a crucial role in the South Korean government. Reports and criticism issued by international organizations such as the OECD or the IMF, or by partners such as the United States or the European Union, are taken very seriously. The government has also declared its intention to increase its provision of official development assistance (ODA) in order to meet global standards in the near future. For example, it was the first Asian donor to join the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), an initiative for enhancing aid transparency. However, the country's degree of adaptability largely depends upon compatibility with domestic political goals. For example, given its large manufacturing sector, Korea was slow to transition to greater environmental sustainability. However, with its shift to a green and digital economy, environmental standards have also been raised in recent years.

Pandemic management is one area in which the government has demonstrated its capacity for institutional learning and innovation. The government learned from its failures in handling MERS by updating and/or adopting various policies and mechanisms. Measures such as strengthening the role of the Korea Centers for Disease Control, fast-tracking approval for emergency medical supplies, and enhancing communication and the transparency of information helped Korea to respond far more effectively to COVID-19 than it did to the MERS outbreak. Thus, at the beginning of the pandemic, the learning curve was less steep for the Korean government than for other governments. Later, however, the government failed to secure the timely delivery of vaccines. In fact, for some time, the government was a bit too self-confident in its ability to contain the pandemic, and believed that Korea would not need an early vaccination campaign.

Citation:

Asian Development Bank. "The Republic of Korea's Coronavirus Disease Pandemic Response and Health System Preparedness," October 4, 2021. <https://www.adb.org/publications/republic-korea-coronavirus-disease-pandemic-response>.

Kim, Jiyeon, and Neil Richards. "South Korea's COVID Success Stems from Earlier Lessons in Managing Mers." *The Wire Science*, February 27, 2021. <https://science.thewire.in/health/south-koreas-covid-success-stems-from-earlier-lessons-in-managing-mers/>.

Brookings Doha Center. "Policy & Institutional Responses to COVID-19: South Korea," June 2021. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/MENA-Covid-19-Survey-South-Korea-Dyer-June-14-2021.pdf>.

Spain

Score 8

The government has largely adapted its domestic structures to agreements made at international and supranational level, although this adaptation has not always been implemented effectively. The government's coordination with and adaptation to the European Union is mainly the task of the Secretariat of State for the European Union and the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels (both units within the Foreign

Ministry). The Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry for Economy, and the Ministry for Finance also have important responsibilities in terms of coordinating cooperation between ministries on EU matters and structural reforms connected to European economic governance. More generally, all line ministries have to some extent Europeanized their organizations, although most ministries lack units dealing specifically with the European Union, and interministerial coordination is weak. Cooperation between central government and the autonomous communities on EU affairs has been managed by the so-called Conferences on Matters Related to the European Union.

A Ministry of Social Rights and Agenda 2030 was created in 2021 with executive powers, and tasked with coordinating domestic actions to promote fulfilment of the SDGs. In addition, a specific governance system has been created: the government commission for the 2030 Agenda will strengthen dialogue and interministerial coordination, while the Sectoral Conference for the 2030 Agenda will facilitate coordination with subnational levels of government. However, the government reacts most frequently to changes in the international developments through further executive centralization around the PMO, as reflected in the management of the Plan for Recovery, Transformation and Resilience.

Citation:

Real Decreto 507/2021, de 10 de julio, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 2/2020, de 12 de enero, por el que se reestructuran los departamentos ministeriales.

Iceland

Score 7

While not a member of the European Union, Iceland has since 1994 been a member of the European Economic Area (EEA), and has integrated and adapted EU structures into domestic law to a considerable extent. Under the EEA agreement, Iceland is obliged to adopt around 80% of EU law. Iceland is also responsive to comments made by the Council of Europe, countries belonging to the Schengen Agreement, and UN institutions. As one of the five full members, Iceland is bound by every unanimous decision of the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the council deals only with issues connected to Nordic cooperation. The structure and organization of Iceland's government accords well with international practice, and seems to be under constant review. The 2009 – 2013 government attempted to streamline and rationalize the ministry structure in order to weaken the long-standing links between special-interest organizations and the ministries, reducing the number of ministries from 12 to eight. By 2021, the number had been restored to 12.

Israel

Score 7

Following OECD and academic recommendations, the Israeli government advances various administrative reforms regarding regulatory burdens, decision-making and long-term planning. Periodic progress reports show gradual improvement in the

dissemination of information as well as in decision-making. The government continues to adapt its domestic structures to international and supranational developments in an ongoing and constructive process. The Ministry of Economy and Industry produces an annual report that reviews progress with regard to implementation of the OECD's recommendations. For example, in 2015 the report presented the progress made in the ability to regulate the imposition of labor laws. Moreover, in 2015, Israel signed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in tax matters of the OECD and ratified it in 2016. Many other agreements, such as the enforcement of the anti-bribery convention, have been signed, with policies adapted in Israel in accordance with OECD standards.

Citation:

Arlozorov, Merav. 2020. "Netanyahu's failing management forces Israel to crawl down to Pfizer". TheMarker. Retrieved from <https://www.themarker.com/coronavirus/premium-1.9303019>

Linder, Roni. 2020. "Israel is burning, said Sigal Sadetzki. Is it happening again, and how did we reach another lockdown." TheMarker. Retrieved from <https://www.themarker.com/news/health/premium-1.9356648>

Israel's State Comptroller. 2020a. Israel's handling of the Corona crisis – Special Interim report. Office of the State Comptroller.

Israel's State Comptroller. 2020b. Health system management in the outbreak of new diseases. Office of the State Comptroller.

Luxembourg

Score 7

Luxembourg has made progress in implementing European legislation. In terms of the transposition of EU directives, Luxembourg's performance is moderate, yet it has improved in recent years. Given the size of the country, there is limited scope for improving the government administration's human resources. A single civil servant is typically responsible for a number of tasks that would be assigned to an entire team in other EU member states. For example, European Social Fund (ESF) activities fall under the responsibility of only four civil servants who have other responsibilities in addition to European programs. Despite a lack of personnel, work expected by European and supranational institutions is completed.

On 21 March 2020, the Chamber of Deputies approved a law implementing the 6th Directive 2011/16/EU on Administrative Cooperation ("DAC6"), which introduced an automatic exchange of information in relation to cross-border financial arrangements. The law of 10 July implemented a register of fiduciaries and trusts, transposing Article 31 of Directive (EU) 2015/849 as amended by the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5). However, in December 2021, the European Commission called on Luxembourg to amend its legislation to correctly transpose the non-deductibility of interest payments rule set by the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive.

Luxembourg often responds to international requests by launching an ad hoc group. The country has also done well in conforming national law to EU directives,

sometimes transposing laws verbatim. However, this does not guarantee that the law will be followed verbatim; differences between de jure and de facto interpretations have emerged.

Malta

Score 7

The capacity of government structures to adapt to change improved during the period of EU accession and since membership. Malta's preparations for assuming the EU presidency required further adaptation to changing scenarios, especially at the ministerial and bureaucratic levels as well as ambassadorial and consulate levels. It also required the expansion and international training of personnel. Malta is also seeking election to the UN Security Council for 2023/24. Consequently, there is greater awareness of the need to respond to international developments. Better coordination among the bureaucracy has also contributed to improvements. Departments are required to submit a strategic plan that is linked to their policy objectives, and which makes a contribution to wider national and corporate programs. On this basis, they are then required to submit a business plan specifying the necessary human and budgetary resources (typically in a two-year rolling plan format). These plans are approved and translated into the organizational leadership-performance plan. These are revised and updated every six months to ensure that they remain relevant and suitable to current conditions. In this way, organizations and their mandates are allowed to evolve gradually so as to remain "fit for purpose." In addition, the government of Malta uses a number of structured review processes, including spending reviews (led by the Ministry for Finance), and strategic/operational/capacity reviews carried out in-house consultancy firm (the Management Efficiency Unit, or MEU) or external consultants. Similarly, there is a structured internal audit program led by the Internal Audit and Investigations Department (IAID). These latter interventions aim to stimulate significant organization change as needed, and generally focus on specific issue areas.

Malta is presently under substantial pressure to update and improve its regulatory and enforcement capabilities, particularly in the area of finance. Malta's grey listing by the FATF is one example of this pressure, and expertise and funding has been allocated to ensure this. This is supported by recent credit agency reports. Environmental protection also requires strengthening. However, success in this field has been marginal.

Parliament has also demonstrated a greater willingness to engage with international forums. This has increased the government's capacity to address international issues such as climate change, international financial institutions, security policy and humanitarian crises. However, the fact that parliament remains a part-time institution slows down the process, leaving the task to the public service.

Citation:

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.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/107615/moodys_give_malta_positive_governance_rating_1#.YbxWomCZOa4
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/102995/fiau_flagged_61_cases_of_suspected_money_launders_to_the_police#.YbxXY2DP23A

Mexico

Score 7

The Mexican governing elite have traditionally been very interested in adopting international standards and had a high degree of contact with international organizations and policy institutes. The major motivation for this is that multilateralism has always provided a strategic avenue for counterbalancing the country's dependence on its northern neighbor. Moreover, many members of the policy elite have studied and/or worked abroad, mostly in English-speaking countries and sometimes in those international organizations that promote international norms. Mexico's presidential system, with its directing authority at the center of the administration, also allows the country to make swift changes. However, while adaptability of the Mexican government is comparatively high in formal terms, implementation of new approaches and policies is much weaker, particularly when it involves subnational entities, heavily unionized sectors or counters economic interests in society. In this regard, one of the most challenging tasks for the Mexican government is currently to transfer the ambitious U.N. Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) agenda into domestic policies, adapting them to national priorities. Progress, thus far, seems to be slow. While formulating action plans and monitoring strategies at the national level faces little or no capacity barriers, the implementation and mainstreaming of policies at the local and regional level will be the major challenge. In addition, while Mexico has signaled commitment to human rights in international arenas, within the country the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law remain low. The current government, despite a tradition of paying attention to international initiatives, has been rather inward looking due to increasing domestic challenges. However, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexico has become more active diplomatically, seeking to revitalize South-South cooperation, especially the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

Portugal

Score 7

The European Union is vital to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal, organizational, security and reporting frameworks. While the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and regulations, it is steadily adopting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has had to adapt its structures accordingly.

In terms of organizational adaptation, this is reflected in the creation of positions such as the secretary of state for European affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the General-Directorate for European Affairs. In addition, almost all ministries have structures designed to interact with the EU level.

Slovenia

Score 7 Upon EU accession, Slovenia developed a complex system for coordinating European affairs, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central coordinator. The Cerar, Šarec and current Janša governments left this system largely unchanged. In order to increase the absorption of EU funds, the Cerar government created a new ministry without portfolio with responsibility for development, strategic projects and cohesion and changed procedures. The Šarec government has kept the ministry, but replaced its minister twice due to the ministry's poor performance. In addition, the Janša government has kept the ministry, but notably increased the efficacy of cohesion funds absorption capacity. Slovenia was well prepared to take over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time in the second half of 2021.

United Kingdom

Score 7 The organization of ministries in the United Kingdom is a prerogative of the prime minister, and traditionally the precise division of tasks between ministries apart from the classic portfolios of foreign policy, defense, the Treasury, and the Home Office has been subject to considerable change. There is some evidence for international and supranational developments playing an important role in these decisions on UK government structures, a clear example being the creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change, with an explicit remit to engage in international action to mitigate climate change, although was subsequently subsumed within new ministries following the change in prime minister in 2016. New cabinet committees have been set up (and subsequently terminated), such as a committee on Syrian refugees in 2015 and more recently on dealing with Afghanistan after the 2021 takeover by the Taliban. There have also been developments leading to new cross-departmental structures. The establishment of the National Security Council was a response to security-related issues, while the creation of a cross-governmental joint energy unit was motivated by the Ukraine crisis.

The United Kingdom has in some areas been an early, and sometimes enthusiastic, proponent of norms and practices that have been championed by international bodies, including those overseeing financial stability and transparency in government. The Open Data Charter and the Open Government Partnership (in which the United Kingdom plays an active role) were agreed under the United

Kingdom's G7 presidency. The United Kingdom is an acknowledged leader in open government and ranked first out of 115 countries in the 2016 Open Data Barometer. Considerable effort was put into the preparation of COP26, held in Glasgow in 2021, with the effort headed by a cabinet minister.

Prior to Brexit, ministries and cabinet committees were reconfigured and efforts made to develop trade policy capability, because government had to respond to the expanding UK role in international trade. The revived Ministry for International Trade was one such reconfiguration. On the other hand, the Johnson government is eager to distance itself from many of the United Kingdom's previous relationships with the European Union to emphasize its independence.

United States

Score 7

The United States has developed institutional structures that are able to respond to its international obligations. Climate-change negotiations, for example, have been firmly institutionalized in the Office of Global Affairs in the State Department. Similarly, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a domestic structural response to the challenges of international terrorism. Whether the policies of these units and agencies have been successful or have facilitated multilateral cooperation has depended on the policy choices of each administration and the disposition of Congress.

Austria

Score 6

The Austrian government has adapted domestic structures to international developments, but with reservations. While the EU political agenda is generally accepted (including EU-related structures and units within the governing machine), the government has proved reluctant to implement specific policies (e.g., by defending the principle of bank secrecy). This hesitancy reflects the fact that the government is often internally divided for constitutional and political reasons. First, the cabinet consists of autonomous ministers who cannot be forced to accept a general agenda. The position of the chancellor as first among equals means there is no clearly defined leadership by a head of government. Second, governments since 1983 have been coalitions. Coalition parties tend to work on a specific party agenda, and have a limited interest in the agenda of the government. In many cases, one governing party tends to favor implementing international and especially supranational (EU) policies more than the other. This issue was particularly pronounced when the FPÖ was part of the governing coalition between 2017 and 2019.

Recently, the government shifted its overall international outlook away from following general EU policies (as established by the principle of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy) to a more diverse attitude – siding in some cases (e.g., concerning the UN migration agreement) with the four Visegrád

EU member states rather than with the EU mainstream. In 2020, Austria was part of a small coalition of countries (alongside Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) that prominently blocked suggestions for an EU coronavirus aid program.

A key challenge Austria faces regards the structural reform of its federal division of power between the federal state, and the regions and (to a lesser extent) municipalities. Despite its rather small country size, Austria disposes of a strong federal system with a lot of powers residing with the regions, although some powers are inefficiently divided between the state and the regions (e.g., regarding healthcare). This system leads to a lot of inefficiencies regarding the implementation of effective policies and consumes a lot of resources, which would be invested better elsewhere.

Citation:

<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-corona-oesterreich-niederlande-1.4916086>

Belgium

Score 6

Belgium is one of the founding states of the European Union and is an active member of many international agreements. In some instances, Belgium has even played a leading role in international agreements (such as banning the production of land mines).

However, Belgium is today regularly criticized for not fully complying with rules agreed upon at the European Union, United Nations or NATO. For instance, critics have taken aim at Belgium's slower-than-average progress in abiding by EU environmental norms. According to the European Commission, this is mainly because "the country's environmental governance has been shaped by EU environmental law and policy (top-down process)," while "the regions' powers in environmental matters have been increasing since the 1980s (reinforcing the bottom-up nature of environmental governance in Belgium)." The commission further stresses that "[t]he lack of a hierarchy of legislative acts reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental policymaking in Belgium."

Citation:

http://www2.derand.be/livingintranslation/en/Minorities_Convention.php

<https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/fcnm-factsheet>

European Commission, DG Environment (2019) "The EU Environmental Implementation Review 2019 Country Report – BELGIUM"

Bulgaria

Score 6

The year 2021 is likely to mark some progress in domestic coordination, and in the coordination of the country's policy stance vis-a-vis North Macedonia's and Albania's accession to the European Union – a stance that remains difficult for EU outsiders to understand.

The diversity of opinions within the government regarding Russia complicates matters, as does the president's obvious intent to play a central role in international and NATO affairs.

EU and NATO membership imposes a clear necessity on the Bulgarian government to be able to respond to and adopt changes based on international and supranational developments. Beyond changes in recent years related to this, the primary governmental structures and their methods of operation have remained largely unchanged.

One area in which organizational changes related to supranational developments seem to be leading to improvement is the implementation of EU-funded programs and mechanisms; this is particularly evident in areas such as transportation and environmental-protection infrastructure, and less so with regard to agricultural subsidies and judicial reform.

In 2017, the government adapted to its upcoming presidency of the Council of the European Union by creating a Ministry of the Bulgarian Presidency. Its operation was deemed successful and by all standards it was a success, and at the end of 2018 the ministry was dissolved, indicating that the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances remained.

A next challenge will be the adaptation of government structures to upcoming changes in the EU funding framework, both in terms of EU earmarked revenues and post-COVID-19 recovery transfers.

Greece

Score 6

After Greece exited the third Economic Adjustment Program (2015–2018) in August 2018, it remained under an enhanced European Commission surveillance system. Surveillance reports on Greece are issued every three months, with the latest one issued in November 2021. During the period under review, the government adapted its domestic structures to international and supranational developments.

Following the change in government in 2019, the Prime Minister's Office was renamed the Presidency of Government. It acquired more authority to steer government and public administration in a post-crisis path toward economic development. New administrative units and additional skilled staff were assigned to the Presidency of Government.

After the COVID-19 crisis hit, the government put together two expert committees, consisting of epidemiologists and medical school professors, one on monitoring the evolution of the pandemic and the other on vaccinations. The government consulted with the committees before announcing public health measures.

On the other hand, there was inertia on the part of the government with regard to international trends, such as attaining the United Nation's 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). After the Prime Minister's Office had issued the first National Voluntary Report for Greece on the SDGs in 2018, there was no structural adaptation in any government unit to follow-up on sustainable development in 2020–2021.

To sum up, in the period under review, government structures have adapted to manage issues from previous crises (the euro zone crisis) or new crises (the COVID-19 pandemic), while there was structural inertia regarding longer-term targets (sustainable development).

Greece first "National Voluntary Report" on the 17 SDGs is available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/19378Greece_VNR_Greece_2018_pdf_FINAL_140618.pdf

Japan

Score 6 Japan's reform processes are usually driven by domestic developments and interests, but international models or perceived best practices do play a role at times. Actors interested in reform have frequently appealed to international standards and trends to support their position. Some of the recent reforms adopted in response to international standards are digitalization and regulatory impact assessment process.

Romania

Score 6 On 30 June 2019, Romania completed its six-month term hosting the EU Council Presidency, with the last summit hosted in President Iohannis' hometown of Sibiu. The presidency went better than expected, producing 90 pieces of legislation addressing banking, workforce, future migrant crisis situations, the gas market, and low-emission vehicles. The better-than-expected functioning of Romania's presidency shows that Romania was able to adapt its government structures and processes so as to successfully meet its obligations as EU council president. At the same time, little progress was made in terms of improving the absorption of EU funds. Since the end of its EU presidency, Romania has not demonstrated any notable developments in its capacity to adapt government structures to respond to new challenges.

Switzerland

Score 6 Switzerland directly implements international treaties which today account for about half of the federal legislation. Whenever Switzerland agrees to cooperate with other countries or international organizations, it attempts to meet all the requirements of the agreement, including implementation of the necessary administrative reforms.

With regard to the European Union, however, the adaptation is idiosyncratic. On the one hand, the government cannot in a self-executing way update domestic legislation to EU rules, as most Swiss do not want to join the European Union and have expressed in several referendums their skepticism toward the European Union. On the other hand, adaptations to EU law reach beyond these treaties and comprise also large parts of (domestic) economic law. The strategy of bilateral treaties has been placed in jeopardy following the passage of the popular initiative capping mass immigration. The parliament solved the problem by paying lip-service to the constitutional amendment while drafting an implementation law that does not correspond to the wording and the spirit of the popular decision (“implementation light”). Moreover, there are serious concerns as to whether the “strategy of bilaterals” is sufficient or sustainable. Conflicts between the European Union and Switzerland have escalated since 2008, with the European Union demanding that institutional solutions be developed to address the bilateral system’s weaknesses. Specifically, the European Union has called for self-executing rules enabling bilateral treaties to be updated as well as independent institutions for the settlement of conflicts arising from the bilateral treaties. Switzerland has opposed these proposals. There is strong domestic opposition against any such institutional framework agreement, while the European Union is not willing to continue the previous case-by-case updating of bilateral agreements nor the unanimous adjudication of conflicts by a joint committee of the European Union and Switzerland. Switzerland has tried to wait out the decision, but the European Union has threatened and then executed sanctions. Given the long list of unresolved issues touching the interests of diverse groups such as trade unions and right-wing populist politicians, the Swiss political system has been unable to adapt to these external challenges. Instead, the executive and most political parties procrastinated and muddled their way through. Finally, in spring 2021, the government terminated any development of an institutional agreement with the European Union having failed to find consensus within the government or win over a clear majority of voters and interest groups for the draft agreement that had been hammered out over the previous years. The left, and in particular the trade unions, feared becoming victims of the liberalizing negative integration which is spurred by the rulings of the European Court of Justice. The right-wing populist party took an oppositional approach as a matter of principle.

Hence, relations between the European Union and Switzerland have stalled at the time of writing. In principle, the European Union has made any update to and extension of its bilateral treaties with Switzerland conditional on a sufficient institutional agreement that defines the dynamic updating of the bilateral treaties and dispute settlement, and a central role for the European Court of Justice. Some Swiss actors, on the other hand, believe that in the end the European Union will agree to a gradual process of updating of the treaties because of Switzerland’s importance to the European Union. This is the position of the party with the largest vote share in Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party. Other major parties see the need to respond to

the EU demand for an institutional arrangement, but are far from finding consensus on what such an arrangement might look like.

Over recent decades, the Swiss government adapted its government structures to increasing European integration. There is a desk on European integration (which has had various names and various ministry assignments) in the federal government. There is a leading federal officer for European Affairs (who has sometimes even been granted the competencies of a state secretary, which is just below the level of a federal minister). Meanwhile, with respect to European politics, power has shifted somewhat from interest associations and a pre-parliamentary commission to the national parliament and particularly the federal government. Finally, cantons have far-reaching powers and participate accordingly in the formulation of Switzerland's European policy when their interests are affected. The cantons determine their positions in the Conference of Cantonal Governments (KdK), which is represented at the Swiss Mission to the European Union.

Citation:

Armingeon, Klaus/Lutz, Philipp (2020): Muddling between responsiveness and responsibility: the Swiss case of a non-implementation of a constitutional rule, in: *Comparative European Politics* 18, 256-280. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00185-2>

Armingeon, Klaus and Philipp Lutz 2022: Citizens' response to a non-responsive government: The Case of the Swiss Initiative on Mass Immigration, unpublished manuscript

DARDANELLI, Paolo and Oscar Mazzoleni eds 2021: *Switzerland-EU Relations. Lessons for the UK after Brexit?*, London: Routledge.

Lauener, Lukas/Emmenegger, Patrick/Häusermann, Silja, et al. 2021: Torn Between International Cooperation and National Sovereignty: Voter Attitudes in Trade-off Situations in Switzerland, in: *Swiss Political Science Review*. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12484>

Wasserfallen, Fabio 2021: Die Europäische Union und die Schweiz, in Bernauer, T. et al.: *Schweizer Aussenpolitik*, Zürich: NZZ-Verlag.

Australia

Score 5

Most government structures are essentially driven by domestic imperatives and are largely insensitive to international and supranational developments. The key government structures of Australia have not changed since the federation of the colonies. Indeed, only a few international events have persuaded Australian governments in recent times to adapt domestic structures. The major exception is in relation to the treaties and conventions to which Australia is a signatory, particularly in the areas of human rights, anti-discrimination and transnational crime, where Australia has been a regional leader. Australian society has been reluctant to support a change in political structures and has resisted doing so when asked in referendums, for example with regard to proposed constitutional changes.

Australian society has demonstrated a willingness to ignore international pressure, such as international criticism of its humanitarian migration policy or high levels of carbon emissions.

The establishment of the Department of Home Affairs in December 2017, which was intended to bring together all of the government's national-security, border-control and law-enforcement agencies, marked one recent example when the government felt the need to adapt its structures to international developments. The new agency took over responsibility for national security, the law-enforcement and emergency-management functions previously held by the Attorney-General's Department, the transport-security functions previously held by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the counterterrorism and cybersecurity functions of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the multicultural-affairs functions of the Department of Social Services, and the entirety of the responsibilities held by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Citation:

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1718/Quick_Guides/HomeAffairs

http://www.aec.gov.au/elections/referendums/Referendum_Dates_and_Results.htm

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/un-human-rights-review-slams-australias-asylum-seeker-policies/news-story/29a4c5e8b0ecf94a327f7fe822dfec07?nk=7466221ea84d656a7525406f82e23bf2-1481452755>

Chile

Score 5

In general terms, the reform of domestic governing structures tends to be driven by national fiscal policy concerns, which means that any innovation implying financial changes (such as a budget augmentation for a certain ministry or for a department within a ministry) is very difficult or even impossible to realize. Changes concerning topics that might be of future interest and do not directly affect current political challenges – for example, the expansion of a department's staff or the creation of a new unit dedicated to topics of possible future interest – are driven more by fiscal or political reasons and political cycles than by international or supranational developments. However, Law No. 20,600 of 2012 established environmental tribunals (Tribunales Ambientales) in three regions of the country (north, central and south). The creation of the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, MICITEC) in 2018, as well as the reconfiguration of some supervisory boards, can be seen as a domestic adaptation responding to international and supranational developments. The planned creation of the Agency for Personal Data Protection (Agencia de Protección de Datos Personales) represents another step in line with international and supranational developments.

Citation:

On the Environmental Tribunals, <https://tribunalambiental.cl>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

On the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation (Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, MICITEC), <https://www.minciencia.gob.cl>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

Croatia

Score 5 Croatia's accession to the European Union and NATO has been accompanied by substantial changes in domestic government structures, ranging from the reintroduction of RIA to the passage of the Societal Consultation Codex and the strengthening of capacities for policy coordination. However, the ability of the Croatian administration to absorb the newly available EU funds has remained limited, and the Plenković government has done little to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In 2019, some cosmetic changes were made to the governance structure. State administration offices in 21 Croatian counties were revoked and some of their competencies transferred to counties. Unfortunately, this reform will not significantly decrease the out-sized public administration apparatus. The reform only entails the reshuffling of competencies and personnel, and will not alter structures or processes. The long-awaited reform of the territorial organization of the country is effectively being shelved. The excessive fragmentation thus remains, with a total of 556 municipalities and towns.

Citation:

Puljiz, J., Maleković, S., Keser, I. (2018): Cohesion Policy in Croatia: What Have We Accomplished so Far? in: Z. Petak, K. Kotarski (eds.), *Policy-Making at the European Periphery: The Case of Croatia*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 285-302.

Cyprus

Score 5 Numerous studies have been conducted in the last decade, which to support reform. Some included proposals to overcome the limitations imposed by the rigid structures of the 1960 constitution, while others aimed at introducing innovative changes. There has been little progress, despite the European Union and IMF repeatedly urging for reform.

Changes brought about by EU accession, with the introduction of new institutions and practices, have not been fully productive. In addition, as a single region under the European Union's "cohesion policy," Cyprus has not benefited significantly from relevant EU policies.

Reforms suggested since 2013, including tackling governmental structures and entrenched mentalities, have shown little progress. Attempts to increase strategic planning capacity, promote administrative reforms that will change administrative practices and culture, and promote meritocracy have started to produce results.

The renewal of government efforts to reform local authorities and the judiciary in the fall of 2019 have made progress, though the results are not conclusive yet. The

dissolution in 2018 of the Unit for Administrative Reform points to the need for a centralized coordinating body, which may be the DGC (formerly DGEPD) for some issues.

Citation:

1. Another 85 million by February if Cyprus meets deadline of key reforms, KnewsKathimerini, 22 September 2021, <https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/cyprus-must-meet-deadline-of-key-reforms-to-receive-the-next-85-million-from-the-eu>

Czechia

Score 5

Since the mid-1990s, government activities have adapted to, and are strongly influenced by, the European Union's legislative framework. The main structures of government and methods of functioning have improved over time. The disjuncture between domestic structures and EU provisions and requirements was demonstrated by recurrent issues accompanying the use of EU structural funds on the national and regional level, but this has significantly improved over the last several years. In general, control over the use of EU funds further improved under the Sobotka and Babiš governments. However, the sustainability of EU-funded infrastructures and measures will remain a crucial issue, especially after 2020, when the current funding period concludes. In some areas, such as R&D, the government has a medium-term strategy for financial sustainability, in other areas, such as environmental protection and regional development, such a strategy is not yet in place. The European Union's Recovery and Resilience Fund, offering the equivalent of 3.1% of 2020 GDP in grants largely for green transition and digitalization investments, required the formulation of a Czech national recovery plan. The plan, which was approved in September 2021, will be administered primarily by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Existing structures are evidently considered adequately adaptable.

Germany

Score 5

As in other EU member states, EU regulations have a significant impact on German legislation. The country's legal system is heavily influenced by EU law, but the federal government does not have a central policy unit specifically coordinating and managing EU affairs. Each federal ministry is responsible for all matters within its sectoral purview related to the adoption, implementation and coordination of proposals by the European Commission. All federal ministries have specific EU units, and there are a variety of mechanisms and bodies for interministerial coordination on EU issues (Große Hüttmann 2007). In contrast to the federal government, all federal states have a ministry with explicit responsibility for EU issues. The Länder even determine Germany's European policy in some areas that are the sole responsibility of the states (Article 23 of the Basic Law). The states consult with each other in a regular conference of ministers of European affairs, which is also attended by federal government and EU Commission representatives.

Thus, some coordination and adaptation is taking place, but federal structures present specific problems in terms of policy learning and adaptability to international and supranational developments. In general, Germany has not made serious attempts in the last years to rigorously adapt government structures to the changing national, international and transnational environment.

Citation:

This is not my field of expertise, maybe the second reviewer has a closer look, I think this old answer would benefit from some more substance.

Große Hüttmann, Martin (2007): Die Koordination der deutschen Europapolitik, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 10/2007, p. 39-45, <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/30626/die-koordination-der-deutschen-europapolitik/> (accessed 13 February 2022).

Netherlands

Score 5

Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years, but there has been no substantial reform of the original government structure, which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” The Council of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part of the executive, not the judiciary. A brief experiment with consultative referendums was nipped in the bud early in the Rutte III cabinet rule. The Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II government largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of local and municipal governments. Given the Dutch citizens’ relatively high level of trust in national institutions, it could be argued there was no need for reforms. But in 2021, as a response to the child benefit scandal and many other signs of policy failure, the general public’s levels of trust in politics and politicians suddenly dropped dramatically.

For years there had been a negative political mood, manifesting in typical expressions of unease like “I am OK, but the country is going down the drain,” by “angry” or “worried” citizens who feel they are not being “listened to,” are “not visible,” or are “forgotten,” “orphaned,” no longer “at home” and “threatened in their identity.” Some analysts framed this as the emergence of a psychological-populist political culture, exploited by both right-wing populist (PVV, FvD, JA91) and identitarian parties (Bij1, DENK) and human interest and lifestyle-based media. Dozens of political opinion leaders, scientists and even high-level civil servants stepped forward with analyses of how and why the political system structurally fails to be responsive, is averse to learning from failure, avoids deep political conflicts and, generally, lacks sufficient learning capacity. In these analyses two major points stand out. First, parliament has lost its capacity and interest in careful co-legislation; and in its role of holding the executive to account it lacks information about policy impacts on the life world of citizens. Second, in the executive, control over implementation has shifted to experts in process management, financial control and performance measurement. In other words, the bureaucracy’s ethos is no longer

anchored in the concept of “public value and service for citizens” but rather in “correct rule compliance” and “cost-efficiency in the service delivery process.”

The first signs of trouble in this area came in a 2018 report by the Remkes Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing the demands of democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 recommendations, the report advocated for the direct election of politicians tasked with forming new cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective referendum process, the establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with assessing the constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that would give voters greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The commission also called for a new political culture that would accept less detailed government coalition agreements, and would be more willing to consider the possibility of minority governments or governing through shifting majorities. In the 2021 coalition agreement, finally, in a first section entitled “strengthening of democracy and the rule of law” (versterking van de democratische rechtsorde), many of these recommendations are embraced as to-be-elaborated intentions and promises by the Rutte IV cabinet.

Citation:

Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27 October 2014)

Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel (die. Remkes), December 2018. Lage drempels, hoge dijken. Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans, Amsterdam: Boom

De Groen Amsterdammer, van der Hoeven, March 10, 2021. Is de publieke zaak nog in goede handen? ‘We moeten zaken simpeler willen huden.’

R. Bekker, March 2020. Dat had niet zo moeten. Fouten en vallen van de overheid onder het vergrootglas. Boombestuurkunde

J. Bussemaker, 2021. Ministerie van verbeelding. Idealen en de politieke praktijk, Uitgeverij Balans

NRC, de Witt Wijnen, January 15, 2021. Meer transparantie, altertere ambtenaren

Montesquieu Instituut, van den Berg en Kok, August 30, 2021. Onbehagen bestrijden? Meer rechtsstaat, minder emotiecultuur.

NRC, 22 November, 2021. Wantrouwen gaat niet over samenleving maar over politiek.

Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naar elkaar, en vooruitkijken naar de toekomst’

Hungary

Score 4

Save for ensuring the absorption of EU funds, the Orbán governments have paid little attention to the adaptation of domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. In public, Orbán has stressed Hungarian independence, and has argued that his government is waging a freedom fight for national sovereignty against the European Union. Major institutional reforms have even reduced the fit of domestic government structures with international and supranational developments. The radical reduction in the number of ministries in the

third Orbán government, for instance, has created huge problems with regard to EU affairs, as the ministries' organization no longer matched that of other EU member states or the structure of the European Union's Council of Ministers. In general, the centralized and erratic policymaking typical of the Orbán governments has been at odds with the more sectoral policymaking at the EU level and in most EU member states.

Poland

Score 4

Poland's government structures have been adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably because of NATO and EU membership. Before the PiS government came to power, Poland enjoyed a good reputation within the European Union, and its growing influence showed that adaptation had been successful. The PiS government has been more inward-looking, and has not only been much more reluctant to adopt domestic government structures to international requirements (and EU requirements in particular), but states that adaptation is unnecessary. It even opposes further EU harmonization and argues that more national independence is favorable in recent years.

Slovakia

Score 4

In the past, Slovakia's ability to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments, most notably at the EU level, has been weak and its performance ambiguous and confusing. Despite several attempts at reform, the rate of absorption of EU funds has remained low, as the absorption of EU funds has been hindered by dysfunctional planning procedures, poor project design and selection, and the failure to comply with the requirements of environmental impact assessments. Recommendations by European Union or international organizations like the OECD, Council of Europe or UN divisions have been considered selectively. Due to various scandals in the education sector and the misuse of EU funds, Slovakia's access to financial support from the European Union has tightened. Overall, Slovakia continues to perform poorly in drawing EU funds. During the programming period from 2014 to 2020, the country drew less than a third of the available funds, one of the lowest shares in the EU. Given the opportunities associated with the EU's new Recovery and Resilience Funds, the new center-right government has launched some reforms to increase absorptive capacity. However, its effects have yet to be seen.

Turkey

Score 3

The international environment does not much affect the administrative structure of the Turkish state. The new presidential system has been presented as a unique system in the world that maximizes efficiency in decision-making and implementation.

Instead of following international recommendations and complying with global currency-market conditions during the latest economic and lira crisis in 2018, the government refused to consult with the IMF to counter the currency crisis effectively. Another example is the Capital Markets Board (SPK), a regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of securities markets in Turkey whose announcement that insider trading would not be punished was overturned by decree.

On another topic, the state authorities are in ongoing operational consultation with UN and EU bodies to handle the ongoing refugee crisis. Institutional and procedural reforms, regulations and new projects are continuously undertaken in accordance with international norms. However, Turkey's military interventions in Syria and northern Iraq are largely considered to have undermined regional security and the country's own efforts to restabilize the region and promote the resettlement of refugees. Moreover, Turkey has not responded to EU demands to revise anti-terror legislation or visa policies as part of the EU refugee agreement, nor does it meet various Copenhagen standards in certain policy fields that are required for EU accession. Finally, despite its regular consultation with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Turkey still ranks second after Russia in failing to execute ECHR rulings, especially concerning the political trials of Selahattin Demirtaş and Osman Kavala.

Citation:

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı. 2021 Yılı Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yıllık Programı. https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/2021_Yili_Cumhurbaskanligi_Yillik_Programi.pdf

European Commission. "Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document." October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en

Indicator

International Coordination

Question

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
- 8-6 = The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
- 5-3 = The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
- 2-1 = The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.

Denmark

Score 9

Despite being a small country, Denmark prioritizes the provision of and contributions to global public goods, and Danish politicians are proud to promote Danish values internationally.

Climate change and development aid are high on the domestic agenda, and the government tries to play an active international role in these areas. Denmark also has a long tradition of working to strengthen the United Nations. Denmark is among the countries that contribute the highest percentage of GDP to development aid.

As an EU member state, Denmark's possibilities increasingly depend on the European Union. Since the European Union in recent years has adopted a relatively "progressive" environmental policy and has tried to exercise international leadership, there is no conflict in this area.

There is a long tradition for Nordic cooperation within various policy areas. The Nordic Council of Ministers is the official inter-governmental body for cooperation in the Nordic region. The council takes various initiatives and there are regular council meetings where representatives of the Nordic governments meet to draft Nordic conventions and other agreements.

Citation:

Carsten Due-Nielsen and Nikolaj Petersen, eds., *Adaptation and Activism: The Foreign Policy of Denmark 1967-*

1993. Copenhagen, DJØF Publishing, 1995.

Martin Marcussen, *Den danske model og globaliseringen*. Frederiksberg: Samfundslitteratur, 2010.

Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen (eds.) *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017*. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017.

Germany

Score 9

The German government actively collaborates in various reform efforts promoted by the EU and other transnational and international organizations. During the years of the euro area debt crisis, the German government played a leading role in organizing and creating stabilization mechanisms. During the period under review, the government cooperated closely with European partners (particularly France), other countries such as the United States, and international organizations in addressing the Crimea crisis and the civil war in eastern Ukraine. Some critics expect Germany to take on a more active role militarily, but this has always been rejected by German politicians with reference to German history. Moreover, Germany has played a significant role in international climate negotiations (see “Global Environmental Policy”). The turn toward a more ambitious climate policy with the coalition agreement of 2021 is not only a reaction to domestic voter preferences, it also mirrors the aim of joining once again the club of the global climate policy forerunners and regain credibility as a promoter of a crucial global public good.

During the pandemic, Germany has been heavily involved with maintaining a global perspective on the crisis and has increased its support to developing countries. The country is a member of and a major donor to the international COVAX vaccination campaign. The German government’s involvement with the EU coronavirus response package “Next Generation EU” also demonstrated its ability to overcome national resistance to the shift toward greater European solidarity.

Generally, Germany is a constructive partner in international reform initiatives and is ready to accept substantial costs and risks in order to realize European and global public goods.

Sweden

Score 9

Sweden has maintained a rather high international profile on a number of issues requiring international collective action. These issues have traditionally included disarmament, human rights, international solidarity and more recently, climate change and a feminist approach to international relations and peacekeeping (Aggestam and Towns, 2018; Ingebritsen 2006). The country has traditionally been (and still is) a generous contributor to international development work and humanitarian aid (Regeringskansliet, 2021).

Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator, though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden, together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international influence through “soft power” (Petridou et al., 2020; Pierre, 2016). However, in seeking to address the pandemic crisis, Sweden largely did not engage in international coordination.

Citation:

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Ingebritsen, Christine. 2006. “Scandinavia in World Politics.” Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Pierre, Jon (ed.) 2016. “Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics.” Oxford University Press.

Petridou, Evangelia, Jörgen Sparf, and Kari Pihl. (2020). Resilience Work in Swedish Local Governance: Evidence From the Areas of Climate Change Adaptation, Migration, and Violent Extremism.” In Pedro Pinto Santos, Ksenia Chmutina, Jason von Meding, Emmanuel Raju (eds.) “Understanding Disaster Risk: A Multidimensional Approach.” Amsterdam: Elsevier, 225-238.

Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden). 2021. Internationellt Unvecklingssamarbete.” <https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/internationellt-utvecklingssamarbete/>

Finland

Score 8

Typically, global public goods are best addressed collectively, on a multilateral basis, with cooperation in the form of international laws, agreements and protocols. Finland is a partner to several such modes of cooperation and contributes actively to the implementation of several global frameworks. In its climate policy, Finland is committed to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement and EU legislation. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for coordinating climate negotiations, and specifically, within the framework of the European Union, Finland is committed to bringing down its national annual average carbon emissions. Finland held the chair of the Arctic Council between 2017 and 2019, the presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2021, and the presidency of the Nordic Council in 2022. These and other commitments notwithstanding, Finland cannot be regarded a dominant actor with regard to protecting global public goals. Given its relatively high level of knowledge, strong research capacities, and the existence of frameworks for policy coordination and monitoring, Finland does have the institutional capacities to participate in global governance. However, the capacities are not utilized to their fullest extent. The Rinne/Marin government’s program underlined the importance of climate protection and ecological sustainability, and aimed at solidifying Finland’s pioneering role in this area worldwide, but it remains to be seen how these goals will be realized.

Given the global characteristic of the pandemic, the Finnish government made remarkably little effort to promote international coordination. On the contrary, it has focused strongly on national efforts to contain the spread of the virus, centered on virological and epidemiological concerns. However, experts from the Ministry of

Social Affairs and Health have attended meetings of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).

In addition, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Finnish Institute of Health and Welfare have liaised with the ECDC and WHO. This collaboration has ensured that the impact of national policies on these global challenges have been assessed, and then incorporated into the government's formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies. The Finnish Institute of Health and Welfare has established connections with similar agencies in other Nordic countries. These contacts have been used to exchange information and experiences on a weekly basis. However, decisions regarding the closure of borders between nation states have been taken at the national level, a practice that has created tensions between the Nordic countries.

The country's national responses have demonstrated little solidarity with regard to the situation beyond Finland's borders. However, the Finnish R&I sector has worked with its European and global counterparts to find ways to respond to the COVID-19 epidemic by using and leveraging existing collaborations, partnerships and projects (OECD 2020).

Institutions such as the Nordic Council could have provided a platform for coordination within the Nordic region. However, it seems that the Finnish government has been unwilling to engage effectively in regional cooperation. Finland has appropriate interministerial coordination groups in place, led by figures from the center of government, but their activities have focused almost exclusively on domestic matters. This indicates that the impact of national policies on global challenges has not been systematically assessed and incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.

Citation:

OECD, 2020. OECD Survey on the STI Policy Response to Covid-19. Accessed 28.12. 2020.
<https://stiplab.github.io/Covid19/Finland.html>

www.motiva.fi/en/energy_in_finland/national_climate_and_energy_strategy
http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1427398/Ratkaisujen+Suomi_EN_YHDISTETTY_netti.pdf/8d2e1a66-e24a-4073-8303-ee3127fbfcac

France

Score 8

France plays an active role in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. The country contributes to the provision of global public goods. It has a long tradition of acting on an international level to take part in security/military missions, combat climate change (e.g., hosting the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP 21)), provide humanitarian and development aid, and promote health, education programs and fiscal cooperation.

However, the credibility of French initiatives in the field of monetary or economic affairs have historically been impaired by the government's inability to respect

common rules signed by France, such as the stability pact of the European Monetary Union (EMU).

President Macron adopted a fundamentally different method. Having led an openly pro-European presidential campaign, he declared his full commitment to EU rules, as well as his willingness to reduce the government's budget deficits and realize structural reforms. In doing so, he has sought not only to enhance the country's competitiveness but also to regain lost confidence and credibility in Europe, which is seen as a prerequisite for France's EU partners to seriously consider his ambitious ideas on European renewal and further integration. Under Macron, France has shown a new willingness and capacity to contribute to the European Union. However, this impulse has produced few concrete results given the ongoing crises in European and national governance systems. On crucial matters, France found it difficult to gain sufficient support for its proposals. For example, Macron's ambitious EMU reform plans met with strong opposition. Paradoxically, the pandemic and the subsequent suspension of EU rules in the field of state aid, budgetary deficit and debt have offered the French government some breathing space, and created an opportunity to promote new rules and policies. Thus, France, along with Germany and the European Commission, was a driving force in launching the NextGenerationEU recovery fund, which is based on public European-level borrowing. Macron also saw the French EU presidency in the first half of 2022 as an opportunity to influence the EU agenda further in this direction.

Luxembourg

Score 8

Luxembourg is mainly involved in international reform initiatives in the framework of the European Union, as well as in the multilateral environment (OECD, ONU, UNESCO), including participation in cooperation for development across the world.

The Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations' 2030 Agenda (adopted at the 2015 U.N. Summit), have been integrated into the 2021 Grand Duchy's National Reform Program for the first time. The government is working to update its strategic approach with reference to the revised International Climate Finance Strategy (defined by the United Nations Climate Change Conference and the Paris Agreement), the Aichi Biodiversity targets, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which sets standards and goals for climate action and environmental and social protection. The Grand Duchy signed a new strategic framework agreement (2020-2023) that will enable the World Health Organization (WHO) to implement the Thirteenth General Program of Work flexibly and effectively. All this should also contribute to making society more resilient.

According to Luxembourg's development cooperation strategy, entitled "On the road to 2030," the country provided international and multilateral organizations with €19.7 million in 2019 and €24.6 million in 2020. Luxembourg has been an

essential supporter of the Global Fund since its inception. With contributions totaling more than €7.85 million to date, the country is one of the most generous donors among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Citation:

“National Plan for a Green, Digital and Inclusive Transition. National Reform Programme of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg under the European semester 2021.” The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/2021-european-semester-national-reform-programme-luxembourg_en.pdf. Accessed 03 Jan.2022.

“Economic forecast for Luxembourg 2020-2023. European Commission.” https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-performance-and-forecasts/economic-performance-country/luxembourg/economic-forecast-luxembourg_en. Accessed 03 Jan.2022.

“How Countries are Performing on the Road to Recovery.” World Economic Forum. Special edition 2020. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2020.pdf. Accessed 03 Jan.2022.

The Global Fund. <https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

New Zealand

Score 8

In general, New Zealand’s political system stands out for its capacity to coordinate among different government agencies and enforcing policies effectively. However, when it comes to tackling global challenges and implementing multilateral frameworks, the picture is mixed. This suggests that, in some policy areas, it is political will – rather than institutional capacity – that poses the main obstacle. For example, New Zealand performs relatively well in terms of working toward inclusive economic development at the global level. The country is a signatory to a number of multilateral free trade agreements with developing countries, and – crucially – these agreements have been transposed into domestic law and their implementation is effectively coordinated across different ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry for Primary Industries. In November 2019, the country passed the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, which specifies mechanisms for meeting New Zealand’s commitments under the Paris Agreement. However, the success of its implementation remains to be seen.

Citation:

Climate Action Tracker, New Zealand (<https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/new-zealand/>)

New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, Market access: International agreements and non-tariff barriers (<https://www.nzte.govt.nz/common/market-access-international-agreements>)

Norway

Score 8

Norway is a small state dependent on a stable and predictable international order. Over time, Norway has invested significantly in the development of a fair international framework. Norway is active in several international cooperation arrangements, including the United Nations and OECD, and cooperates closely with

the European Union. Norway is very diligent in adopting EU legislation. The country is not an EU member state, but still participates in most forms of EU policy coordination as a member of the European Economic Area, with certain exceptions in the areas of agriculture and fisheries. In addition, Norway has numerous agreements with the European Union in the field of internal and external security. However, while the agreements with the European Union are seen as important, they do not give Norway a role in EU decision-making or policy formulation. There is also a strong tradition for Nordic cooperation and coordination on a range of policy fields.

Norway has been an active participant in and promoter of various international conventions, forums and activities. Areas of particular interest have been human rights, development and peace. In spite of its small size, Norway is a founding member of NATO, and an active member of several international organizations, such as the IMF, the United Nations and the World Bank. The country participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Kimberley Initiative on so-called blood diamonds. Norway actively encourages developing countries to join the EITI and is one of four contributors to the World Bank Special Trust Fund tasked with assisting with the fund's implementation. Norway also supports the initiative on climate risk financial disclosure.

Current geopolitical tensions and increased pressure on international institutions and norms represent a challenge for Norwegian foreign policy. In an age of increased power politics, it is to be expected that smaller states will play a less influential role in shaping global developments.

Portugal

Score 8

Although Portugal is small, relatively poor and not very influential as a nation, it is a member of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), among other groups. It works actively with other nations through these organizations to develop policies. Given the country's size and importance, it collaborates quite effectively in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods.

Portugal "punches well above its weight" in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission (José Manuel Durão Barroso) and the current secretary-general of the United Nations, António Guterres, are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country. The latter figure was reelected as UN secretary-general in June 2021. The former was appointed chair of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) – an international partnership

involving the World Health Organization, UNICEF, the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, among others, which seeks to increase access to vaccines in poorer countries – beginning in January 2021.

During the review period, Portugal played a central role in terms of international coordination during its presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first semester of 2021, and through its participation in the presidency's trio from July 2020 till the end of 2021. The Portuguese presidency was deemed very successful by the European Commission, as a number of important dossiers were advanced.

Politico (2021), "The Portuguese presidency's policy efforts, marked," available online at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-portuguese-presidencys-policy-efforts-marked/>

Eco (2021), "Von der Leyen: Portuguese presidency 'incredibly successful' despite pandemic," available online at: <https://econews.pt/2021/07/05/von-der-leyen-portuguese-presidency-incredibly-successful-despite-pandemic/>

Spain

Score 8

The years 2020 and 2021 were important with regard to Spain's efforts to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The country continued to participate in these efforts as one of the leading EU member states and as a permanent guest at the G-20 summits. The country's foreign development agencies increased the budget for foreign aid in 2020 and 2021, announcing that they would prioritize global health and epidemic prevention in the country's development cooperation policy.

In 2020, as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the government supported a number of resolutions including those addressing violence and discrimination against women and girls in the workplace, an initiative on equal pay, and the declaration on the 40th anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.

The government also contributed to international forums and actions responding to various challenges including climate change (through the COP26), energy supply, financial stability and illegal migration (as a signatory to the Global Compact and several bilateral agreements). At the 26th edition of the United Nations Climate Change Conference, the government announced that Spain would increase its financial aid to less developed countries by 50%, to help them make a sustainable and just energy transition.

Opportunities for contributing to collective governance at the European level have expanded since the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the EU. For example, Spain played an important role in the negotiation of the NextGenerationEU program. Spain's "non-paper on a European recovery strategy" included the suggestion that a top priority should be given to the ecological and digital transition of the economy, and to boosting the European Union's long-term industrial and technological autonomy.

The government has advocated finding a common European answer to dealing with the energy crisis. However, member states decided to respect the current market rules and avoid any long-term reforms or market interventions.

Citation:

Government of Spain (2020), non-paper on a European recovery strategy April 19, 2020, <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Spain-.pdf>

United States

Score 8

The United States has often led international efforts to pursue collective goods. Its institutional structures and political traditions – especially the role of presidential leadership – accommodate all of these approaches. But the United States often cannot act effectively unless a national consensus or single-party control of the government enables the president and Congress to agree on a strategy.

U.S. performance in this area is not significantly constrained by deficiencies of institutional capability. However, the Trump administration reduced its engagement in international forums and agreements. This included lecturing NATO members on their allegedly insufficient contributions, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, declining to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and opting out of the World Health Organization in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, here the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction of its predecessor, notably by cancelling some of its isolationist decisions. For instance, the Democratic president returned the United States to the Paris Climate Agreement while rejoining the World Health Organization.

Belgium

Score 7

Belgium hosts various supranational institutions, including the majority of the offices of the European Union. The country has always displayed enthusiasm toward joint-reform initiatives. This can be illustrated by the large number of Belgian politicians involved in the highest levels of such organizations (e.g., Herman Van Rompuy, a former president of the European Council; Charles Michel, current president of the European Council; Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the liberal group in the European Parliament). Moreover, the country's small size makes it heavily dependent on international coordination. It therefore supports international reform efforts in areas such as tax systems, carbon-dioxide regulation, and as of 2015, on the European equivalent of the American Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. However, with regard to implementation, Belgium does not always fulfill its commitments.

Canada

Score 7 Canada's government has the capacity to provide global public goods in coordination with other actors. Indeed, it has done so throughout its history. Prime Minister Trudeau has repeatedly sought to carve out an active role for Canada in international bodies such as the United Nations. The government has reaffirmed its commitment to be a strong voice on the international stage. While the government did submit Canada's candidacy to serve on the UN Security Council in 2021-2022, that did not prove to be successful.

With respect to the Afghan crisis and the return of the Taliban, Canada has committed to settling 40,000 Afghans in Canada and has been working with international partners toward that end. To date, however, progress on that front has been minimal, with just over 4000 Afghans having been settled in the country and with substantial criticism that the process for application to Canada was slow in the face of the enormity of the crisis.

Citation:

Government of Canada, "First charter flight of privately sponsored Afghan refugees arrives in Canada, 2 December 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2021/12/first-charter-flight-of-privately-sponsored-afghan-refugees-arrives-in-canada.html>.

Government of Canada, "Supporting Afghan nationals: About the special programs," 12 December 2020, <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/afghanistan/special-measures.html>.

Chile

Score 7 The government is endowed with the institutional capacity to contribute actively to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods. The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives. This is underlined by the fact that Chile represents one of the most active countries in Latin America with regard to international policymaking initiatives. However, the impacts of national policies on these global challenges are not always systematically assessed and then incorporated into the formulation, coordination and monitoring of policies across government.

Ireland

Score 7 The country contributes to international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods primarily through its active participation in European policymaking institutions. Irish government structures have been progressively altered to support this capacity. In 2020, Ireland secured a seat on the U.N. Security Council for the 2021–2022 term.

In this role, Ireland has sought to assume leadership roles in relation to women, peace and security, climate and security, Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Somalia, among other areas. These roles reflect Ireland's existing foreign policy priorities and strengths (DFA, 2021).

Ireland has continued to maintain a relatively high level of overseas development assistance since the onset of the economic crisis more than a decade ago (0.42% of GNI in 2021). It also continues to play an active part in the development of the European response to climate change. The Irish and Kenyan ambassadors co-facilitated the final intergovernmental negotiations that led to the adoption of the United Nation's Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) in 2015, for example, and the Irish government participated fully in the COP26 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Glasgow in October–November 2021 (see “Global Environmental Policy”).

Citation:

DFA (2021) Ireland's Priorities for the UN Security Council, 2021-2022, Department of Foreign Affairs, 22 January, available at: <https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/speeches/speeches-archive/2021/january/irelands-priorities-for-the-un-security-council-2021-2022.php>

For an account of Ireland's role in negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals see <https://www.irishaid.ie/what-we-do/post-2015-negotiations/ireland's-special-role>

Italy

Score 7

The ability of Italian governments to take a leading role in international efforts is generally limited. This is in part due to the country's size, but also to the fact that Italian politics tends to focus on internal matters. Moreover, frequent changes in political leadership have made it difficult to provide a strong and clear position in international efforts. There have been occasional exceptions when the government has been more active on a specific issue (e.g., the abolition of death penalty, or in the promotion of peace talks in the Middle East). With regard to the immigration crisis, Italian governments have tried to promote a sharing of responsibility among EU member states.

The first Conte government adopted a rather confrontational attitude toward the European Union and the main EU member states, which undermined its international actions. In contrast, the second Conte government increasingly adopted a more cooperative approach toward the European Union. Furthermore, the current Draghi government has significantly strengthened this cooperative attitude toward the European Union and at the same time with the new Biden administration. Thanks to the international prestige of the prime minister, Italy has played a more active role in various international forums, such as the G20 and COP26, and the current government has deliberately given the international arena much greater attention compared to previous governments.

Japan

Score 7

Japan is actively involved in G-7 and G-20 mechanisms. While the country has a lower profile in international and global settings than might be expected in view of its global economic standing, the growing linkages between international economic and political issues have helped the LDP-led government to raise its profile, for instance by chairing the G-20 in 2019, with various initiatives getting underway. Like various other nations, Japan committed in 2020 to reaching carbon-neutrality by 2050. It remains to be seen, though, how implementation will pan out. The Climate Action Tracker, run by an international scientific consortium, rates Japan's current efforts as insufficient.

The Japanese constitution makes it difficult for Japan to engage in international missions that include the use of force, although it can contribute funds. As a result of Japan's five-year participation in a UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (which ended in 2017), the government has flexibly expanded various procedures stopping just short of active military engagement, such as providing ammunition to endangered military units from partner countries. In 2015, despite considerable public opposition, new security laws were passed that allow military intervention overseas in defense of (somewhat vaguely defined) allies.

Japan has actively supported and contributed to regional initiatives and organizations like the Asian Development Bank. Also in response to Chinese-led institutions and signature initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, Japan has successfully promoted its own geostrategic initiatives such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, which aligns with, or has fed into, related designs of Australia, India and the United States. There has also been an invigoration of development cooperation with Africa, also in the context of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).

Citation:

Japan's Roadmap to "Beyond-Zero" Carbon, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 11 November 2020, https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/global_warming/roadmap/report/20201111.html

Climate Action Tracker, Japan country site, <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/> (accessed 17 February 2022)

Mitsuru Obe, Japan Parliament Approves Overseas Military Expansion, *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 September 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-parliament-approves-abe-security-bills-1442596867>

Werner Pascha, The political economy of new multilateral initiatives in Pacific Asia, in: Carmen Mendes (ed.): *China's New Silk Road. An Emerging World Order*, Routledge: London and New York, 2019, pp. 69-86

Michael Bosack, What did Japan Learn in South Sudan?, *The Diplomat*, 10 June 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/>

Paul Goldstein, Japan's growing geostrategic role, *The Japan Times*, 23 June 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/06/23/commentary/japan-commentary/japans-growing-geostrategic-role/>

Lithuania

Score 7 Lithuania actively engages in international policy cooperation on behalf of democracy and market-economic systems, in particular by providing reform support to its eastern neighbors (the Eastern Partnership countries), by providing technical and financial assistance, and by serving as an advocate for their interests within the EU institutional framework. Lithuania has been part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2005. The country's policymakers have managed to coordinate their involvement in these international fields quite effectively. In 2012, Lithuania joined the OECD's Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes as well as completed a first compliance assessment. In 2015, Lithuania was invited to start its accession process to the OECD. In the second half of 2013, Lithuania took over the rotating presidency of the European Council and was afterward assessed by other EU institutions and member states as performing effective work. Furthermore, Lithuania became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for the 2014 to 2015 term. For several years now, Lithuania has honored its pledge to allocate 2% of GDP for defense, which is further evidence of a willingness to support NATO. Lithuanian authorities have actively pushed the United Nations and other international organizations to refrain from recognizing Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol.

However, the government has been less willing or able to contribute to such global challenges as climate-change or trade liberalization (except in the context of its presidency of the European Council presidency). In 2017, the European Commission fined Lithuanian Railways (Lietuvos geležinkeliai) €27.9 million for breaching EU antitrust rules by removing a rail track connecting Lithuania and Latvia, which hindered competition in the rail freight market. Lithuanian authorities have also experienced problems in trying to convince regional partners to agree on the preferred option for synchronizing electricity systems with the Central European grid and a common position on the safety risks posed by the new nuclear power plant being constructed in Astravyets, Belarus. In addition, Lithuanian diplomats have not coordinated sufficiently with the country's EU partners with respect to planned decisions vis-a-vis Taiwan and China.

Citation:

Vilpišauskas, R. "Lithuania's EU Council Presidency: Negotiating Finances, Dealing with Geopolitics," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 52, Annual Review, August 2014, pp. 99-108.

Netherlands

Score 7 The Netherlands has been a long-time protagonist in all forms of international cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by years) before being transposed into Dutch law. Although popular support for the EU never fell

below 60% in Eurobarometer studies, the present-day popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-government-spending-norm for development aid; the government's continued message that the country is an "unfairly" treated net contributor to EU finances; and the rejection of the EU referendum and the rejection of the EU treaty with Ukraine in a non-binding referendum.

The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since 2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality – that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. Although the number of civil servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of "Dutch interests first" translates into a political attitude of unwillingness to adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly EU, trends and developments (beyond what has already been achieved). Nevertheless, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of financial policies at the EU level. The present vice-president of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. Indeed, it is only since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led to some reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, with heavy support from the minister of finance. In tandem, they put the brakes on the Stability and Growth pact for a coordinated European approach to economic reforms and mitigation of the economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis. At the time of writing, the Dutch were the only country to have not yet filed a national plan for reforms as a condition for gaining access to SGP funds.

But regarding the EU, there is change in the air. The December 2021 coalition agreement states that from now on, the Dutch government intends to play a leading role in making the EU more ready for decisive action, and in making it economically stronger, greener and more secure. This implies more willingness to implement EU directives swiftly and to cooperate on issues like climate, migration, security, trade and tax evasion. Tellingly, the Dutch government is considerably increasing its national defense budget, and supports EU military cooperation and a potential European security council. To date, information about EU policies and decisions have typically reached citizens not through governmental information services, but only through the media and the Dutch parliament through a large number of

fragmented channels. As part of a new Europe Law, the government intends to structurally inform citizens and parliament more transparently about EU decision-making and the impacts and value-added associated with EU policies.

Globally, the Netherlands, ranking 11th out of 165 countries, is doing fairly well in achieving its own Sustainable Development Goals. The bad news is that its spillover score ranks 159th out of 165, meaning that it hardly has any positive spillover effects on other countries or parts of the world on dimensions like environmental and social impacts embodied in trade, economy, finance and security. Especially in the areas of the economy and finance, the country contributes to corporate tax evasion, financial secrecy and profit shifting; it also plays a small but substantial role in weapons exports.

Citation:

R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, *Governance and Politics of The Netherlands* (2014). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 220-228 regarding coordination viz-a-viz the EU and 251-272 for Foreign Policy in general.

Instituut Clingendaal, Europa NU, 22 december 2021. Europese Commissie wil brievenbusfirma's aanpakken, Nederland onder de loep

Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. 'Omzien naae elkaar, vooruitkijken naar de toekomst.

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South Korea

Score 7

As a member of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and the G-20, South Korea helps to shape global rules and foster global public goods, but it rarely plays a leading role in international cooperation. The Moon administration has further shifted the attention from multilateral institutions to bilateral negotiations, with a particular focus on North Korea. Nevertheless, Korea does play a role in international organizations; for example, it is currently contributing 627 individuals to UN peacekeeping missions. Korea does engage in development cooperation, and joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2009, although initial goals of spending 0.25% of GNI for the purposes of development cooperation have not yet been met. Korea is committed to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and has signed the Paris Agreement on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, Korea can hardly be seen as a leader in these fields, as national sustainability and emissions-reduction goals are underwhelming. For example, while the European Union has promised to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 40% below 1990 levels, Korea has only pledged to reduce emissions to 40% below business-as-usual projections, which would represent an increase of 81% compared to 1990.

Following the adoption of its Digital, Green, and Human New Deals in 2020, Korea seems ready to take more of a proactive role in international cooperation. At a summit in 2021, President Moon and President Biden agreed on a U.S.- Korea technology partnership. In 2020, Korea pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by

2050; and at COP26 in 2021, it scaled up its NDC target. In line with President Moon's inclusive, human-centered vision for Korean society, the administration finally pushed through three key ILO conventions for which labor rights activists have been advocating for decades. Moreover, it pledged to contribute significantly increased amounts to global health initiatives such as GAVI and the Global Fund.

Citation:

The government of Korea. 2016 National Voluntary Review Year One of Implementing the SDGs in the Republic of Korea: From a Model of Development Success to a Vision for Sustainable Development. [https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10632National%20Voluntary%20Review%20Report%20\(rev_final\).pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/10632National%20Voluntary%20Review%20Report%20(rev_final).pdf)

Climate Action Tracker. South Korea Profile. <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/southkorea.html>

United Kingdom

Score 7

The United Kingdom has long played a leading role in coordinating international initiatives and the country's imperial legacy has contributed to its active stance on international commitments. It has led global responses in recent years, for example, in efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, coordinate the EU response to the Ebola outbreak, promote reform in the financial sector, and combat climate change and corruption.

As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United Kingdom is very active in the United Nations in security matters and also plays a prominent role in NATO. Government structures, such as the National Security Council, ensure consistency. It led the way in supporting the Rohingya in October 2017. It also supported initiatives to raise the lending capacity of the IMF, enabling it to boost support for low-income members badly affected by the pandemic

Following the decision to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom had to rethink its role in the world, especially among its European neighbors. While the Johnson government has emphasized its independence vis-a-vis its European partner countries by treating them somewhat robustly, it has played up its "Global Britain" profile by putting resources into COP26, the COVAX initiative and increasing funding for the WHO during the pandemic. Prime Minister Johnson hosted the Gavi donor conference (which secured pledges for vaccine funding for poorer countries) held in London in June 2020. Following the Carbis Bay G7 meeting chaired by the United Kingdom in July 2021, the United Kingdom undertook to donate 100 million vaccine doses by the summer of 2022.

Citation:

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-begins-donating-millions-of-covid-19-vaccines-overseas>

Estonia

Score 6 Engagement in international development has traditionally been the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An interministerial coordination group of cabinet ministers coordinates foreign policy issues.

Besides this basic structure, some line ministries increasingly emphasize international coordination, depending on the changing global security and migration situation. The Ministry of Interior, responsible for migration and asylum affairs, participates in EU efforts to reduce illegal migration across the Mediterranean Sea. Domestically, the Ministry of Interior increasingly cooperates with the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Tax and Custom Board to tackle illegal (immigrant) labor issues. This domestic cooperation is legally framed by the amendments of the Act on Aliens (2018) and the National Action Plan on Prevention of Illegal Labor.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CDCE) was established on the initiative of Estonia. The CDCE is a multinational and interdisciplinary hub of cyber-defense expertise, which promotes cyber-defense education and R&D, as well as best practices and consultation. Currently, 28 countries participate in the CDCE, which is based in Tallinn.

At the end of 2019, the government declared its support for the European Commission's long-term goal to make Europe climate neutral by 2050 (after initially opposing the goal with three other central and eastern European countries). To coordinate and advance activities in this area, an interministerial commission on climate and energy has been established by the Government Office.

In 2021, Estonia's participation in the OECD's global minimum tax initiative became a sensitive topic for the government. The government had strong reservations and joined only in very final stage of the process. As of the end of 2021, the government is attempting to secure exemption from the relevant EU directive.

Latvia

Score 6 Latvia largely contributes to international actions by participating in the development of EU policy positions and by integrating Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into its own policies.

Institutional arrangements for formulating Latvia's positions on issues before the European Union are formalized. The system is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with particular sectoral ministries developing the substance of Latvia's various positions. The process requires that NGOs be consulted during the early policy-development phase. In practice, ministries implement this requirement to

varying degrees. NGOs themselves often lack the capacity (human resources, financial resources, time) to engage substantively with the ministries on an accelerated calendar, although this could to some extent be addressed by improving communication and by sharing the positions in a timelier manner.

Draft positions are coordinated across ministries, and approved in some cases by the sectoral minister, and in other cases by the Council of Ministers. Issues deemed to have a significant impact on Latvia's national interests are presented to the parliament's European Affairs Committee, whose decision is binding. The committee considers approximately 500 national positions per year.

Latvia also contributes to the global Agenda 2030 by integrating the SDGs into the national development planning system. Policy documents drawn up in 2017 made reference to the SDGs, but the new National Development Plan 2021 – 2027 does not include any detailed references. Moreover, the National Development Council had its the last meeting in February 2020; thus, there is currently no institutional system at the highest level engaging in ongoing review of the country's contribution to global development. Nevertheless, in 2022, Latvia plans to submit its National Voluntary Review on the implementation of the SDG to the U.N. High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), and an ad hoc open process is going to be established. Overall, the weak institutional and policy framework with regard to SDG accountability translates into low policy coherence in the area of global development, at least in comparison to EU coordination, which is rather well established.

Slovakia

Score 6

Because of its size, Slovakia's capacity to shape strategic global frameworks is limited. For a long time, the country was eager to be seen as a reliable and trustworthy partner within NATO and the European Union (Gould/ Malová 2020). However, Slovakia's reputation and standing in the EU has suffered from Slovakia aligning with the position of other Visegrád countries in the EU refugee crisis and the increasingly pro-Russian stance of some political parties (SNS, Smer-SD, ĽSNS). The new center-right government is comprised of pro-European parties (OLANO and Za Ľudi) as well as euroskeptical parties (SaS, Sme-Rodina). This makes it difficult to align in a clear way with EU policies. This was demonstrated by the controversies over the purchase of the Russian vaccine, which contributed to the coalition crisis and government reshuffle in spring 2021.

Citation:

Gould, J., D. Malová (2019): Toxic Ordoliberalism on the EU's Periphery: Slovakia, the Euro and the Migrant Crisis, in: J. Bátor, J.E. Fossum (eds.), *Towards a Segmented European Political Order: The European Union's Post-Crisis Conundrum*. London/ New York: Routledge, 112-131.

Australia

Score 5

Australia's comparatively small population and economy, isolated geographic location and status as a South Pacific regional power has tended to work against the country's ability to influence global reform efforts. Nonetheless, there is a governmental culture of seeking to participate in international forums or organizations, including those focused on reform. Primary emphasis tends to be on the Asia-Pacific region, although Australia is also a strong advocate of reducing trade barriers for agricultural products worldwide.

Australia's international reputation has suffered considerably in the last two decades. Previously, Australia had been a very active player in international forums, for instance in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, the Howard and Abbott governments failed to make constructive contributions to international forums. For example, the Abbott government permitted the G-20 summit in November 2014 to become an anti-Putin event. By contrast, Labor governments such as Kevin Rudd's have been overly ambitious. Rudd's plans for an Asia-Pacific Community were hastily developed and criticized by his own government's adviser. Prime Minister Turnbull steered a much more cooperative course over his term in office, but Scott Morrison has reverted to a stance that emphasizes Australia's narrowly defined economic and political interests. Geopolitical conflicts have further reduced the range of options available to Australia's middle power diplomacy.

Citation:

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/13/tony-abbott-says-he-will-shirtfront-vladimir-putin-over-downing-of-mh17>

<http://www.smh.com.au/national/rudds-man-criticized-hasty-asiapacific-community-plan-20101223-196ln.html>

<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/commentisfree/2018/jun/19/are-trumps-shenanigans-turning-us-off-international-relations>

<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-12-04/scott-morrison-defends-australias-climate-change-action/11549260>

Austria

Score 5

Within the European Union, the government is obliged to collaborate with EU institutions. This collaboration is rarely controversial. In other matters (e.g., within the framework of the WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the United Nations), the Austrian government tends to play a rather low-key role, usually trying to follow a general EU policy if such a policy exists. In some fields (e.g., environmental protection), the government tends to promise more on the international level than it is willing or able to implement at home.

Austria has enjoyed a long-standing reputation as a "bridge-building actor" at the international level, though the main contribution to this has been hosting

international meetings in the federal capital, Vienna. At the same time, Austria has tried to avoid any clear-cut positioning, which in many cases could be justified by the country's constitutional commitment to neutrality. This tradition has continued under the ÖVP-Green government. For example, in late 2021, international talks over the Iran nuclear deal resumed in Vienna, where the first major deal had been struck back in 2015. In December 2021, Chancellor Nehammer also suggested that Austria should act as a “bridgebuilder” in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, though it remained largely unclear what exactly this would involve.

Citation:

<https://www.sn.at/politik/weltpolitik/wiener-atomgespraeche-mit-dem-iran-unter-zeitdruck-113732803>

<https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/bundeskanzleramt/nachrichten-der-bundesregierung/2021/12/bundeskanzler-nehammer-oesterreich-als-brueckenbauer-im-konflikt-zwischen-der-ukraine-und-russland.html>

Croatia

Score 5

Croatia has supported major global reform initiatives, especially in environmental affairs. However, the Plenković governments have not paid much attention to improving the country's capacity to engage in global affairs or to assessing the global repercussions of national policies. Unlike her predecessor, President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović was not very active in improving cooperation with the other successor states of the former Yugoslavia. President Milanović has not as yet changed that direction, leaving relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia strained.

Greece

Score 5

As a euro area member, and participant in EU summits and ministerial meetings, Greece has engaged in international efforts to foster the provision of public goods.

For instance, Greece has actively participated in international forums on environmental and cultural issues; it has also been vocal at the European level in pressuring for a coordinated response to migration challenges, emphasizing that migration from the developing world into Europe is not solely a Greek problem arising from its geographical position between Europe and Asia.

Moreover, in contrast to the pre-2019 period, Greece has been more active in EU forums. For instance, in January 2021, the Greek government officially submitted a proposal to EU authorities to establish a EU-wide vaccination certificate for people vaccinated against COVID-19.

In May 2021, Greece submitted a candidacy for non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2025-6).

Over time, however, Greece has been unable to develop institutional capacities for fostering the provision of global public goods beyond its role as an EU member state.

Citation:

Greece's official proposal for a EU-wide vaccination certificate is available at: <https://primeminister.gr/en/2021/01/12/25597>

Iceland

Score 5

Iceland is an active participant in international forums, but seldom initiates measures. Iceland was not a founding member of the United Nations, but joined in 1946. Largely, Iceland has worked cooperatively within international frameworks, but has not led any significant process of international coordination. Iceland did participate in peacekeeping efforts in Iraq and modestly participates in the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In 2009, Iceland applied for EU membership. Those negotiations were postponed at the beginning of 2013 due to dissent between the coalition parties. The 2013 – 2016 cabinet did not renew negotiations and finally withdrew Iceland's application for membership in 2015. As a result, the European Union no longer includes Iceland on its official list of applicant countries. Even so, the European Union may continue to view Iceland as an applicant country on the grounds that the minister of foreign affairs was not, without parliament's approval, authorized to withdraw an application approved by parliament.

This question remains unsettled. The 2013 – 2016 cabinet rejected demands for a national referendum on whether Iceland should resume its membership negotiations with the European Union. This contributed to a split within the Independence Party, which produced a splinter party, Regeneration. Yet, when the Independence Party formed a cabinet coalition with Regeneration and Bright Future in early 2017, the coalition agreement included only a vaguely worded intention to hold a national referendum on the issue. Following the breakup of that coalition, which led to a new election in late 2017, the question remains unresolved. All three coalition parties in the right-center-left cabinet, which has been in office since 2017, publicly oppose EU membership.

Iceland's small size constrains its effective contributions in international forums. The government says all the right things about global warming and peace, but its global contribution in this regard can only be minuscule. Concerning poverty reduction, Iceland's development assistance remains small, far below UN goals, and has been scaled back.

Israel

Score 5 Israel takes part in several international efforts to foster global public goods. Israel joined the OECD in 2010. Since its accession to the OECD, Israel is largely involved and engaged in shaping and implementing the OECD recommendation in several fields.

However, most ministerial committees do not have specific responsibility for the implementation of OECD recommendations. The exception is the ministerial committee on regulatory affairs. Another example of Israel's intention to be part of international collaboration to foster public goods is its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which convenes the Energy Ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate and maintain dialogue regarding gas resources in the region.

"Israel in the OECD," Minister of Treasury formal report (2010) (Hebrew).

"The Second Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies," Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2015) (Hebrew): <https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/publication/second-progress-report-implementation-oecd-recommendations-labour-market-social-policies-israel/>

"Progress report on the implementation of the OECD recommendations: Labor market and social policies," Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute (2012) (Hebrew):

<https://brookdale.jdc.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/OECD-Progress-report-HEB-Sep-2012.pdf>

"Beyond Energy: The Significance of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum," INSS report (February 2019): <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/beyond-energy-significance-eastern-mediterranean-gas-forum/>

Malta

Score 5 Malta does not have the institutional capacity to actively shape a wide range of international efforts. However, Malta has sought to do this within its immediate Mediterranean region and increasingly within the European Union. Since 1975, Malta has been a rapporteur of the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. It continues to support good-governance efforts in Libya and Tunisia and co-operates closely on refugee and migration issues with neighboring countries. Malta accepts more asylum-seekers per capital than almost all other countries and was one of the few EU member states to honor in full the EU relocation program by taking in its full quota. Since 2020, Malta has sought to extend its actions in sub-Saharan Africa and has provided COVID-19 vaccines to a number of African countries, among other supports. It is now providing scholarships to young diplomats from the Mediterranean and a number of African states. Indeed, over the last four years, Malta has done as much as it could on several international issues. One such issue concerns Libya, as Malta continues to seek ways to assist the country's peace process and aid humanitarian efforts. In 2019, Malta also increased the financial contribution it makes to support global issues. In June 2020, Malta will officially launch its bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2023 – 2024 term.

Citation:

https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/111958/watch_malta_lays_out_red_carpet_for_libyan_national_unity_pm_dbeibah#.Ybxdq2Azqko

https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/106441/927_million_in_goods_breaching_libya_sanctions_seized_by_malta_customs#.YbxeZ2AVxBc

<https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/17391/malta-releases-libya-s-frozen-assets-holds-on-to-gaddafi-s-money-20120411#.Ybxei2DJa3A>

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs website.

https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/112657/covid19_malta_to_send_135000_astrazeneca_vaccines_to_rwanda#.Ybxe-2BTZBc

Mexico

Score 5

The Mexican government has almost completely lost its international reputation. In his first year in office, AMLO has not left Mexico. He refused to participate in G-20 meetings or U.N. assemblies. In an attempt to demonstrate to the Mexican population his commitment to domestic issues, this has undermined Mexico's position in the world.

Mexico has traditionally been supportive of international initiatives, and played an active role in the United Nations, OECD and other intergovernmental organizations. It also was an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Numerous policy and organizational recommendations made by international bodies have been adopted in the Mexican policymaking process. Thus, it had a supportive role in many international attempts oriented toward the provision of global public goods. Whether this engagement will be revived again has to be seen.

President López Obrador and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard have revitalized CELAC in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic, using the pro tempore CELAC presidency to lead the demand for equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies. Additionally, Mexico has started domestic vaccine production and has distributed the results across Latin America. The weak standing of the United States and the absence of Brazil as a regional actor has opened space for a Mexican diplomatic comeback.

Poland

Score 5

With the PiS government, Poland's international orientation has changed. Steps leading toward deeper integration have been contested and PiS has been more critical than its predecessors of Germany's role in the European Union. Because of this intransigence, Poland's reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. While Prime Minister Morawiecki has been more urbane than his predecessors, the government's basic approach toward the European Union has not

changed. Poland wants to play an active role within NATO and has tried to establish a closer bilateral relationship with the United States, which has also been perceived as a form of side-diplomacy outside the usual channels. This has received only half-hearted responses from both the Trump and Biden administrations. Within the Visegrád group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) collaboration is closer and more collective – a tendency that also stretches to other countries in the region – although differing attitudes toward Russia are a source of division between these countries. Regarding climate change measures and energy policy, the government also stresses national interests, which follow the coal industry's interests, but slowly seems to be making a policy shift. While Poland blocked any progress at the European Council summit in June 2019 on the issue of becoming CO2 neutral by 2050, the government is now adapting its course to become more environmentally friendly. However, Poland did not coordinate its actions with other EU member states or EU agencies such as Frontex during the COVID-19 pandemic or during the Belarus border crisis in autumn and winter 2021/22.

Citation:

Bayer, L., Z. Wanat (2020): Hungary and Poland block EU coronavirus recovery package, in: Politico, November 16 (<https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-and-poland-block-progress-on-e1-8-trillionpackage/>).

Romania

Score 5

Romanian governments have supported international efforts to provide global public goods. The country has been actively involved in various UN peacekeeping missions, has contributed to global action against climate change and has participated constructively in the allocation of refugees within the European Union. In April 2018, it also became a member in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee. The country's international ambitions are evident in its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council from 2020–2021; an initiative that was ultimately unsuccessful as members opted to award the seat to Estonia instead. Romania remains committed to joining the Schengen Area as soon as possible, an ambition regularly reiterated in meetings with the European Council. However, Romania's international standing has suffered from the democratic backsliding.

Slovenia

Score 5

Like their predecessors, the Šarec and partially also the Janša governments have been preoccupied with domestic political and economic issues and have paid little attention to improving institutional capacity for shaping and implementing global initiatives. The country's main international focus has been on shaping the European Union's policy toward the western Balkans, where Slovenia sees its strategic interests. In the period under review, the 25-year long territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Gulf of Piran and part of the land border continued.

While Slovenia accepted the arbitration decision of June 2017 and amended its legislation in December 2017, Croatia has refused to do so, prompting Slovenia to pursue legal action in the European Court of Justice in July 2018. In a judicial setback to Slovenia in its long dispute with Croatia over their maritime border, the Court of Justice said in January 2020 it has no jurisdiction to rule on the dispute and merely urged both sides to resolve their differences. In addition, during the period under review, Slovenia took over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second time in the second half of 2021.

Switzerland

Score 5 Switzerland is a fairly active member of the United Nations, the IMF, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and most of the other important international organizations. Swiss foreign economic policy works actively to defend the interests of its export-oriented economy, as for instance in the context of the WTO.

However, the policy of neutrality and the objective of safeguarding national autonomy set clear limits to the country's international engagement in the past, and direct democracy further reduced the scope of action in international affairs. During the growing polarization witnessed in Swiss politics over the past 20 years, together with the associated decline in consociational patterns of behavior, right-wing politicians have emphasized the notion of a small, neutral and independent nation-state surviving on the basis of smart strategies in a potentially hostile environment. Large portions of the population support these ideas. Popular skepticism toward European integration has mounted over the course of the last years.

The country concentrates its efforts in areas where it can realistically have some influence, such as economic matters or technical organizations dealing with issues such as transport, ecology or development. This said, there is a clear gap between the government's stated goals in terms of international cooperation and the resources – institutional or otherwise – that it has at its disposal for these tasks

Bulgaria

Score 4 Government bodies in Bulgaria have the capacity to correspond and coordinate with international institutions, and to participate in international processes and initiatives. Yet Bulgaria is still primarily reactive in terms of international efforts to foster the provision of global public goods and its level of commitment to such causes remains relatively low. Factors contributing to this situation include insufficient capacity, political cautiousness with regard to international commitments and, recently, an increase in xenophobia as represented by portions of the governing coalition.

More often than not, Bulgaria tends to take part in international efforts but waits for the international community to formulate policies, set goals and benchmarks. It then does its best to implement those domestically. Inasmuch as there is coordination and assessment going on, it is for these reactive purposes.

In 2021, Bulgaria's position vis-à-vis North Macedonia resulted in an unintended form of self-isolation.

Cyprus

Score 4

The proclaimed role of Cyprus as a bridge between three continents draws on its geographical location. However, the almost exclusive focus on and preoccupation with domestic issues has prevented initiatives to broaden the country's role. Opportunities offered through membership in the European Union, United Nations and other organizations could assist Cyprus to be a valuable contributor to both regional and global politics, benefiting public welfare. In recent years, particular focus on bi- and trilateral relations have aimed to coordinate the exploitation of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean. More recently, cooperation with neighboring countries has focused on issues of climate change.

Existing conflicts in the region are partly fueled or affected by hydrocarbon exploration, which makes it difficult to secure a better environment for all. The Cyprus conflict occupies a central role in existing problems.

Citation:

1. Turkey slams Cyprus over exploration license for Exxon, Qatar Petroleum in Mediterranean, 2 December 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/turkey-slams-cyprus-over-exploration-license-exxon-qatar-petroleum-mediterranean-2021-12-02/>

Czechia

Score 4

Policymaking in Czechia continues to be inward-looking. Successive governments have confined themselves to being a trusted and reliable international partner, but have not aimed to become a leader in international affairs. Since 2015, however, Czechia has become more active on the EU stage, building alliances within and beyond the CEE region in order to shape EU policies. It has opposed EU quotas for the relocation of refugees and has tried to water down the environmental goals of the European Union. In 2021/22, Czechia allied with other countries to lobby for the inclusion of nuclear power within the definition of green recovery. Like its predecessors, the Babiš government has invested little in improving the institutional capacities for greater international coordination.

Turkey

Score 4

Despite the many controversial steps Turkey has taken in foreign and security policy, Turkish state authorities play an active role in numerous fields and levels of

international affairs (e.g., the United Nations, G-20, OSCE, NATO, the Council of Europe, EU, the Regional Cooperation Council in the Balkans, the OIC in the Islamic world, the Turkic Council in Central Asia and MIKTA). Yet, apart from its G-20 presidency in 2015 or the international summits it hosts (where the government has been able to actively promote global common goods), Turkey usually takes and is increasingly taking a more assertive approach that is driven by its national interests. As a result, the country has increasingly confronted partners (NATO) and undermined joint undertakings and common interests in EU-Turkey relations (e.g., regarding stability in the Eastern Mediterranean).

Since, 2014, Turkey has cooperated with EU member states in seeking to identify foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) looking to cross Turkey to reach – or return from – Syria or Iraq. It has acted assertively in sending FTFs back to their countries of origin. At the same time, state authorities at times instrumentalize the refugee issue to advance national interests against Greece and other EU states instead of seeking joint understanding and sustainable solutions. In addition, the Ministry of National Defense takes part in joint peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Qatar. Turkey has made some public efforts to support the 2030 Agenda associated with the Sustainable Development Goals.

However, problems persist on several fronts, for instance regarding the armament of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey's search for natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean has caused severe tension with the major players in the region. U.S.-Turkey relations severely deteriorated during the review period. Turkey's purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia led to the enforcement of the U.S. Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), with sanctions taking effect in April 2021. The Halkbank case, Fethullah Gülen's possible extradition, and the U.S. support for Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces are also stressing the already fragile relationship. Nevertheless, both parties have found some common ground for cooperation in Afghanistan.

In recent years, Turkey increased its investment in Africa, especially in Somalia, despite the humanitarian costs due to several deadly attacks against Turks. Relations with Israel have improved considerably. In Syria, Turkey actively worked through the Astana Process, a tripartite committee that also involves Iran and Russia. In jihadist-controlled Idlib, military observation posts have been established. Additionally, Turkey has become a close ally of Russia, and has extended its cooperation in the fields of defense, energy and tourism. Efforts have also been made to align Turkey's Middle Corridor infrastructure strategy with China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Citation:

European Commission. "Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document." October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en

<https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/sayfa/FAAL%C4%B0YET%20RAPORU%202020/TIKAFaaliyet2020Web.pdf>

Hungary

Score 3

Since the beginning of the EU refugee crisis, Prime Minister Orbán has looked for an international role for himself and has increasingly been elevated to one of Europe's "strong men" in the Fidesz press. He has intensified cooperation within the Visegrád group, especially on migration policy and has boasted about his good relationship with Putin and China (Mészáros 2021). However, all these activities have further undermined his standing with other European leaders and have contributed to a "self-peripheralization" (Hegedüs 2021) of Hungary in the European Union. The Orbán government has sometimes been able to block or to delay agreements, but has lacked the capacity to set the agenda.

Citation:

Hegedüs, D. (2021): Ungarns Selbstperipherisierung in der Europäischen Union: Hintergründe und Aussichten, in: Ellen Bos, Astrid Lorenz (Hrsg.), Das politische System Ungarns: Nationale Demokratieentwicklung, Orbán und die EU. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, S. 191-208.

Mészáros, T. (2021): As Hungary lauds its 'Eastern Opening' policy, statistics fail to show benefits, in: Euractiv, May 12 (<https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/as-hungary-lauds-its-eastern-opening-policy-statistics-fail-to-show-benefits/>).

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