



Legislative Actors' Resources Report

Parliamentary Resources, Obtaining Documents, Summoning Ministers, Summoning Experts, Task Area Congruence

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022

©vege - stock.adobe.com

Indicator

Parliamentary Resources

Question

Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
- 8-6 = The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government's major activities.
- 5-3 = The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
- 2-1 = The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.

United States

Score 10

The staff resources of the U.S. Congress substantially surpass those of any other national legislature. First, there are three large congressional agencies that perform research and analysis: the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service and Government Accountability Office. The CBO, a non-partisan body, is the most credible source of budget analysis in the government. Secondly, each congressional committee has a sizable staff, divided between the majority and the minority parties. In addition, each member of Congress has personal staff, ranging from about 14 personnel, including at least one or two legislative specialists, for a member of the House, to more than 50, with several legislative specialists, for a senator from a large state.

Importantly, Congress cut staff personnel significantly in recent years. This reflects an increasing reliance on ideologically oriented think tanks for policy advice and centralization of control in the party leadership. The role of individual members and committees in policymaking has been diminished. Nevertheless, Congress's staff levels remain unmatched globally.

Australia

Score 9

Members of parliament have considerable resources at their disposal for monitoring government activity and obtaining relevant information to advance policymaking. The parliamentary library is well-resourced with many skilled researchers and is able to respond to requests rapidly, producing reports on policy issues at the request of members. In addition, each senator or member may hire employees in four full-time

electorate officer positions. Members who have a second electorate office at federal expense may hire employees in an additional full-time electorate officer position. However, individual members of parliament do not receive allowances to fund independent research.

Belgium

Score 9 Belgium is a parliamentary democracy. Thanks to Belgium's strong party system, information flows well between the government and parliament. As party presidents are central figures in any political agreement, they can coordinate action at each level. Individual members of parliament as well as party parliamentary groups are also well-supported by state-funded expert staff and by parliamentary assistants – their overall level of resources is thus high, even though there is often a high level of party discipline in the federal parliament.

In addition, parliament can summon any person, even ministers, to request information. It can initiate special investigations through ad hoc committees, and the Audit Office (Cour des Comptes/Rekenhof), which monitors all Belgian institutions, is a collateral institution of the federal parliament and operates on a nonpartisan basis.

Czechia

Score 9 In Czechia, members of parliament can draw on a set of resources for monitoring government activity. In addition to their basic salary, members of parliament receive additional pay for their membership in parliamentary committees, commissions and other duties. They also have a budget for assistance and expertise. Parliamentary committees have an office staff of two to three persons and a secretary, and both a parliamentary library and a Parliamentary Institute are available to members. The latter serves as a research center providing information and training for members of both chambers. The research is provided on demand (to deputies and senators) and the institute also publishes regular reports on subjects of interest to the body.

Finland

Score 9 Parliamentarians' resources for obtaining information were greatly improved in the 1990s through the creation of a parliamentary assistant system. Currently, some 130 assistants work in a parliament of 200 sitting legislators. However, critics have argued that this system has become too comprehensive and expensive. The assistants perform a variety of tasks, some of which relate closely to the procurement of information and general expertise. Members of parliament are also assisted by the Parliamentary Office, whose task it is to establish the necessary conditions for the

parliament to carry out its duties. Employing a staff of 440, the office is also responsible for providing personal assistants. Furthermore, members of parliament are assisted by the Information and Communication Department, which includes the Library of Parliament, the Research Service and the Parliament Information Office. The Library of Parliament has about 40 employees and maintains a number of service entities. A Committee Secretariat provides secretarial services for the parliamentary committees and handles the preparation of matters brought before the committees. Additionally, the Research Service supplies information, documents, publications and other materials that are required by members of parliament and other actors involved in parliamentary work. As legislators each serve on an average of two parliamentary committees, they also benefit from the information and knowledge provided by the various experts regularly consulted in committee hearings.

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the parliamentary oversight process came under pressure in Finland. As outlined in an OECD report, the operations of the legislature were threatened by health and safety concerns, and the government asked the legislature to accommodate swift policy action, either through faster budget procedures or by improvising new ones (OECD 2020). The government cabinet, jointly with the president of the republic, declared that Finland was in a double emergency: a health emergency and an economic emergency. The emergency declaration itself was not reviewed by parliament, but when the cabinet issued a decree to use specific powers under the Emergency Powers Act (EPA) the decree was subject to legislative oversight (Scheinin 2020). As outlined in Finnish legislation, the Constitutional Law Committee (CLC) of the parliament carefully reviewed the special legislation and government decrees to determine whether they were compatible with the constitution. Among legal scholars there is a “consensus that the principles of democratic decision-making have been respected in the handling of the pandemic, as parliamentary oversight functions well, and the parliament still wields the highest legislative power in Finland” (Kimmel and Ballardini, 2020).

Citation:

<http://lib.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/library/organization/people.htm>

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoeduskunnasta/Organisaatio/eduskunta-tyonantajana/Sivut/default.aspx>

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoeduskunnasta/kirjasto/tietoakirjastosta/tekijat/Sivut/default.aspx>

Kimmel, Kaisa-Maria and Ballardini, Rosa Maria, 2020. Restrictions in the Name of Health During COVID-19 in Finland. Harvard Law Blog. Accessed 11.1. 2021.

<https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/14/finland-global-responses-covid19/>

OECD, 2020. Policy Responses to Corona. Accessed, 28.12 2020.

<https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policyresponses/>

[legislative-budget-oversight-of-emergency-responses-experiences-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-ba4f2ab5/](https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policyresponses/legislative-budget-oversight-of-emergency-responses-experiences-during-the-coronavirus-covid-19-pandemic-ba4f2ab5/)

Scheinin, Martin, 2020: The COVID-19 Emergency in Finland: Best Practice and Problems, VerfBlog,

2020/4/16. Accessed 18.12. 2020. <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-covid-19-emergency-in-finland-bestpractice-and-problems/>, DOI: 10.17176/20200416-092101-0.

Germany

Score 9 The German Bundestag has adequate personnel and the structural resources needed to effectively monitor government activity. Members of parliament can conduct their own research or obtain information from independent experts. The parliamentary library and the parliamentary research unit have staffs of 175 and 450, respectively. Every member of parliament receives a monthly income of €10,013 (since July 2021), as well as an additional budget of €22,800 (April 2021) for staff and further budgets for offices and equipment. The German Bundestag has a staff of more than 6,000. Parliamentary groups also have resources to commission independent research studies. Compared to the United States, German members of parliament are equipped with modest structural and personnel resources.

Citation:

https://www.bundestag.de/abgeordnete/mdb_diaeten

Lithuania

Score 9 Members of parliament as a group have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activities in an effective way. They have resources including personal staff; personnel assigned to parliamentary committees, commissions and other structures; and access to the Parliamentary Research Unit. Expenses incurred by calling experts for testimony or consultation can be reimbursed, although members of parliament are usually unwilling to allocate adequate sums to commission external impact assessment studies, as they fear being seen by the media as wasting taxpayer money. Thus, despite the presence of resources, political incentives frequently prevent them from engaging in effective parliamentary oversight. For instance, during its 2012 to 2016 term, the parliament passed more than 2,500 legislative acts. During the spring 2017 session, the parliament adopted 421 legal acts (i.e., about seven legal acts per every sitting), a record for a parliamentary session. The large number of laws adopted undermines the quality of these laws. After President Nausėda vetoed two bills during his first two weeks in office, the president's team criticized the quality of laws adopted by the parliament. One positive development noted by OECD has been a significant decline in the use of the urgency procedure to pass legislation, following several decisions by the Constitutional Court in 2020-2021.

Parties that form a part of governing coalitions are often unwilling to engage in self-monitoring, while opposition parties are frequently incapable of constructive external oversight. Although the parliament does not often commission independent research, it can produce internal conclusions or reports, or invite experts to various parliamentary meetings. In addition, the parliament utilizes the results of audit reports produced by the National Audit Office. It is also often the case that members

of parliament employ their party colleagues as advisers or assistants on the basis of trust rather than because these individuals have a particular expertise.

Citation:

STRATA/OECD, Mobilising Evidence at the Centre of Government in Lithuania : Strengthening Decision-Making and Policy Evaluation for Long-term Development, <https://www.oecd.org/regreform/mobilising-evidence-at-the-centre-of-government-in-lithuania-323e3500-en.htm>

OECD, Mobilising Evidence at the Centre of Government in Lithuania. Strengthening decision-making and policy evaluation for long-term development, Paris: OECD, 2021.

Slovenia

Score 9 Slovenian members of parliament command sufficient resources to perform their jobs effectively and to monitor government activity. Each member of parliament has a personal budget for education and literature acquisition as well as access to research and data services provided by the Research and Documentation Section. Additional resources are available to parliamentary party groups for organizational and administrative support, and for hiring expert staff. Parliamentary groups must have a minimum of three members of parliament. During the 2014-2018 parliamentary term, only three members of parliament did not belong to a parliamentary group. During the current 2018–2022, term all members of parliament are part of a parliamentary group.

Sweden

Score 9 Members of the parliament can collectively monitor all aspects of government activities. They can find some support for these and other activities from the parliament's (Riksdag) administrative support (Riksdagens Utredningstjänst, RUT). RUT conducts inquiries requested by groups of members of parliament. Individual members of parliament in Sweden receive rather little administrative support; instead, support is given to the political party organizations within parliament. The RUT's reports are not public record, unless the member of parliament who ordered them refers to them on a public occasion, for example when talking to the media (Sveriges Riksdag, 2022).

Citation:

Sveriges Riksdag. (The Parliament of Sweden). 2022. "Riksdagens Utredningstjänst." <https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/sa-funkar-riksdagen/riksdagsforvaltningen/verksamhet/#8db16bfd46d08fb5c137e8fccade98f2>

Denmark

Score 8 Parliamentary committees have staff, as do political parties. The parliament also has its own library and recently opened a (small) unit offering consultation on economic issues. In 2020, the total number of parliamentary staff was about 480 (full-time equivalent), which is not huge. More than a quarter of staff are secretaries, a little less than a quarter are academic staff, followed by security personnel and IT staff. In

general, the members of parliament depend a lot on the government for information and expertise. To gather information, they ask written and oral questions of ministers, and use hearings, independent sources as well as contacts within interest organizations and think tanks. There is, however, no tradition in Denmark for major independent investigations initiated by the parliament. This can weaken its power vis-à-vis the government. Party discipline is also a strong factor in Danish politics, which can weaken individual members' possibilities.

Citation:

Anders Henriksen, "Folketinget er for svagt i forhold til regeringen," *Politiken*. 24 August 2010. <http://politiken.dk/debat/kroniken/article1042660.ece> (accessed 26 April 2013).

Året der gik i Folketinget: Beretning om Folketingsåret 2015-2016. http://www.ft.dk/~media/sites/ft/pdf/publikationer/aarsberetning/aaret-der-gik-i-folketinget-2015_16.ashx (Accessed 19 October 2017).

Året der gik i Folketinget: Beretning om Folketingsåret 2016-2017. https://www.ft.dk/~media/sites/ft/pdf/publikationer/aarsberetning/aaret-der-gik-i-folketinget-2016_17.ashx?la=da (Accessed 7 October 2018).

Folketingets administration, http://www.ft.dk/Folketinget/Folketingets_administration.aspx (Accessed 1 December 2016).

Jørgen Grønnegård Christensen and Jørgen Elklit (eds.), *Det demokratiske System*. 4. udg. Chapter 4. Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2016.

Estonia

Score 8

Compared to many other countries, the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu) has a rather modest support structure. All administrative staff are employed by the Chancellery of parliament and can be divided into three categories. The first category includes analysts working in the research department who provide expert advice and produce information sheets and study reports. Because of budget and personnel limitations (10 advisers in total), their studies are typically very limited. There is also the small (six-person), parliamentary Foresight Center, which carries out various ex ante public policy studies. In the course of the latest budget cuts (affecting the 2022 budget), the risk that the Foresight Center will be disbanded has increased. The second category includes standing committee support staff. A standing committee typically has three to five advisers. The third group is made up of the advisers of party groups. In total, there are 31 people working for the six parliamentary party groups. Legislators can use a reading room in the parliamentary building and the National Library, which also serves as a parliamentary library, is located nearby. Members of parliament also benefit from allowances that they can use to order expert analyses, studies or information overviews. Though there is little evidence that the allowances are extensively used for such purposes.

Israel

Score 8

Two major Knesset departments, the Knesset research center, and the Knesset's legal advisory department serve as structural resources for acquiring information. The role of the research center is to equip Knesset members, committees and departments with information and research to meet the requirements of their parliamentary work, including reports on government activities. The research center is a massive document producer: it receives on average 500 research requests and produces 300 documents annually.

The Knesset's Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit (KATEF) has published several papers, which are available on its website and mostly comprise pamphlets. While the papers lack uniformity, a general direction is slowly and steadily emerging. One example of this is the series of pamphlets called Gate to the government, which provide advice on how to access government information. However, the unit is still very new and recent instability in the political system has not contributed to its path-finding processes.

Citation:

A Pamphlet Explaining About the Katef Unit's Vision, Fields of Operation, and Its Short History of Establishment, Undated. Available Online Through the Katef Unit's "About" Webpage (see link below). (Hebrew)

Alon, Gideon. "The fa is on the Shoulder [also Katef]." In: Israel Today website. July 23rd, 2017. (Hebrew): <https://www.israelhayom.co.il/article/492397>

Arlozorov, Meirav. "How the Knesset Broke the World Record in Proposing Private Bills." In Themarker. May 16th, 2017 (Hebrew): <https://www.themarker.com/news/politics/1.4091536>

Azulay, Moran. "Exposure: On the Way to a Revolution in Legislation and Oversight of the Knesset over the Government." In Ynet. February 2nd, 2017. (Hebrew): <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4917549,00.html>.

Ben-David, Lior, "A comparative survey on the status, function and employment conditions of parliamentary assistants," Knesset research institute 4.11.2004 (Hebrew)

Blander, Dana. "Opinion as to the corrections to Base Law: the Knesset, Base Law: the Government and the Knesset Act Regarding the Authorities of Parliamentary Committees of Public Inquiry." The Israeli Democracy Institute. July 4th, 2017. (Hebrew)

"Correction: Debate on 'Hok Ha-Hesderim 2013,'" Open Knesset website (Hebrew)

"Is Bagatz mocking the petition against the treasury?," Globes website 18.6.2014: <http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000947260> (Hebrew).

Israel. The Knesset. Katef – the Knesset Parliamentary Oversight Coordination Unit. Oversight Process of the Implementation of the Committee for the War on Poverty's Report. Second Report. June 2018. Retrieved from <https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightSupervisoryProducts.aspx> (Hebrew)

Friedberg, Chen. How to Improve the Knesset as a Legislative and Oversight Body: Key Recommendations. Updated Edition. Israel: the Israel Democracy Institute, 2018. (Hebrew)

Galnoor, Itzhak, and Dana Blander. The Political System of Israel: Formative Years; Institutional Structure; Political Behaviour; Unsolved Problems; Democracy in Israel. Tel Aviv: Am Oved Publishers Ltd., 2013, two volumes. (Hebrew) "Information and research in the Knesset," Knesset website (Hebrew)

"In the Knesset corridors," IDI website (September 2010) (Hebrew)

"Katef Unit – About." In the Katef unit's website.
<https://main.knesset.gov.il/Activity/Oversight/Pages/OversightAbout.aspx>

Knesset Research Center Summary of 2016 <https://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m03933.pdf> (Hebrew)

Public Inquiry Commissions Act, 1968 (Hebrew)

Shapira, Asaf, "A decade to the Knesset's research and information center," IDI website (September 2010) (Hebrew)

Lis, Johnathan. "Rivlin in the Knesset's Inauguration: There are Times in Which the President is Compelled to Intervene," Ha'aretz, October 4th, 2019, p. 6. (Hebrew)

The Knesset's Rules of Procedure, up to date as of June 14th, 2018. (specifically article 135, "the Authorities of a Parliamentary Committee of Public Inquiry and the Presentation of a Report to the Knesset," clause A; also article 127, "Failure of Arrival [to a committee] and Failure of Presenting of Information"). (Hebrew)

Zerahia, Zvi, "The treasury is deliberately holding out information from MPs so we can't supervise it," The Marker 7.1.2014: <http://www.themarket.com/news/1.2210843> (Hebrew)

Italy

Score 8

Members of parliament can draw on significant resources of highly qualified personnel to monitor the activities of the government. The permanent staff of both chambers is quite large and is selected through highly competitive mechanisms. Most staff members possess highly qualified legal expertise. The parliamentary staff regularly produces studies on issues and reforms under discussion. A special office of the parliament (the Ufficio Parlamentare di Bilancio, Upb), created in 2015 following the Fiscal Compact Treaty and successive decisions of the European Council, is now responsible for providing parliamentarians with a detailed evaluation of the government's fiscal proposals. The two chambers have quite extensive libraries. Members of parliament also have at their disposal resources for hiring personal parliamentary assistants. The selection of these assistants is much less merit-based and their quality highly variable. Whether in general members of parliament are really interested in using systematically the available resources for monitoring the government is another matter. Probably only a minority fully utilizes these resources.

Citation:

<http://www.upbilancio.it/pubblicato-il-rapporto-sulla-politica-di-bilancio-2022/> (accessed 20 December 2021)

Luxembourg

Score 8

The members of Luxembourg's Chamber of Deputies must balance a heavy workload with dual mandates and other professional activities, including municipal councils and/or professional employment. According to the regulations of Luxembourg's unicameral parliament, members can employ a personal assistant and recuperate some costs within the limits of eligible expenses. In practice, the

parliamentary groups instead employ a pool of assistants who work for all the members of parliament of their group, rather than each member of parliament having his or her own assistant. Members of parliament can consult with external experts as part of the functioning of parliamentary commissions. In addition, they have access to a central state computer system to review databases, surveys, reports, agendas and other important information.

Citation:

“Règlement de la Chambre des Députés.” Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (16 décembre 2021). <https://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/dadc958b-a532-4acb-ae85-5f7b20ed05a2/Rglement+CHD16122021.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&ContentCache=NONE&CACHE=NONE&CVID=nUw4CwA>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

Bossaert, Danielle (2019): How size matters. In: forum, Kleinstaat Luxemburg, 2019, no. 394, pp. 39-43.

Norway

Score 8

Members of parliament do not have personal staff but can draw on support from general staff allocated to each party and paid for by parliament. The number of general staff members is related to party size. As such, the system creates a slight bias toward political parties rather than to the parliament and individual parliamentarians.

Legislators, all of whom serve on standing committees, are also supported by committee staff; most of the legislative work is in fact done in standing committees. The parliamentary library is well-regarded by representatives for its ability to provide support in research and documentation. Support resources are not lavish, but neither do they represent an impediment to the effective functioning of parliament or its individual members. The parliament has a limited capacity to independently collect and analyze information, but members of parliament routinely asks the government to answer questions and to provide additional information. The parliament has increasingly exercised its right to hold hearings.

Austria

Score 7

The two-chambered Austrian parliament, in which the National Council (Nationalrat) or lower house holds more power than the Federal Council (Bundesrat), is divided along two main cleavages. First, the strength of political party groups in parliament reflects the results of direct national elections (in the National Council) as well as indirect provincial elections (in the Federal Council). Second, the formation of coalitions creates a government and a parliamentary opposition.

All party groups that have at least five members in the National Council can use the infrastructure (office space, personnel) paid by public funds and provided by parliament. All party groups are represented on all committees, in proportion to their

respective strength. In plenary sessions, speaking time is divided by special agreements among the parties, typically according to the strength of the various parliamentary party groups. Since 2014, the creation of a parliamentary investigation committee has been a minority right.

Individual members' ability to use resources independently of their respective parliamentary party groups has improved in recent years. Members of parliament can now hire a small number of persons for a personal staff that is funded by parliament and not by the party, which has increased members' independence. More recently, the Austrian Parliamentary Administration developed the EULE Media Monitor / 360°Topic-Monitoring system, which aims to help parliamentarians stay up to date by delivering information in an easy-to-access web-based form. However, this newly won independence is still circumscribed by the strong culture of party discipline, which is not defined by explicit rules but rather by the party leadership's power to nominate committee members and electoral candidates.

Citation:

<https://www.ipu.org/innovation-tracker/story/austria-uses-ai-keep-mps-informed>

Canada

Score 7

All members of parliament from the House of Commons have a "Member's Office Budget" that offers a basic amount to hire staff, commission research, or support events. MPs typically have a staff of 4-5 people. Typically, members of parliament split their staff between the House of Commons and constituency offices. Members of parliament can receive supplementary funding based on some features of their ridings, for example, a higher than average population (so-called elector supplement) or a large territory (so-called geographic supplement). Members of parliament and senators also have access to the research staff of the Library of Parliament.

Citation:

House of Commons Canada, "Members' Allowances and Services," Ottawa, 2021. <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/MAS/mas-e.pdf>

France

Score 7

French legislators have fewer resources at their disposal than, for instance, their American colleagues, but they are reasonably equipped should they wish to make use of all facilities offered. In addition to two assistants, whom parliamentarians can freely choose, they receive a fixed amount of funds for any expenditure. There is a good library at their disposal, and a large and competent staff available to help individuals and committees. These committees can also request the support of the Court of Accounts or sectoral bureaucracies, which are obliged to provide all information requested. There are still problems, centered on the long tradition of

parliamentarians holding several political mandates. Until 2017, three-quarters of the members of parliament were also elected local officials, and many of them dedicated more time to local affairs than to parliamentary activities. A new piece of legislation, in force since June 2018, forbids parliamentarians to hold executive positions in local or regional councils, forcing them to choose between local and national mandates (except as mere councilors). This is a true revolution. Since absenteeism was one of the major problems of the French parliament both in the plenary sessions and within the specialized committees, one might have hoped that the control and evaluation functions of parliament would have improved in the future. Macron's proposal to reduce the number of members of parliament by one-third failed due to the fierce opposition of the Senate, and new calls for the reintroduction of the possibility of accumulating electoral mandates (*cumul des mandats*) that would have allowed, for example, acting as mayor of a city and member of parliament simultaneously, have popped up again with the argument that members of parliament without local mandates were lacking concrete experience of "real" life. In fact, absenteeism remains a recurrent factor, and parliamentary oversight is often triggered more by political or partisan bias than by policy concerns.

Greece

Score 7

Members of the Greek parliament are granted full access to the well-resourced library of the parliament. They are also entitled to hire up to two research advisers who are paid out of the parliament's budget, and three other assistants who may be transferred from any ministry or state agency to the parliament. However, many members of parliament hire family members or friends who in effect do administrative and secretarial work rather than conducting research. This practice was continued in the period under review. Nevertheless, each party represented in parliament has its own research support group that is funded by the state budget.

Nowadays, updated academic advice is available also through three other institutions. The first is the Office of the Budget, a policy-oriented committee of university professors with economic expertise who work independently of the government. They have published policy reports on the prospects of the Greek economy which diverge from official government predictions. The second is the Scientific Council of the Parliament, essentially a body of constitutional and administrative law experts. The parliament's speaker may refer a bill of law to the scientific council and consult the council on constitutional matters. The council's opinions, however, are not binding. There is also the more academically oriented Foundation of the Parliament, which focuses on historical issues and constitutional matters.

Parliamentary committees are also quite active in organizing hearings and in discussing a variety of issues. However, the parliament lacks a research unit (e.g., the U.S. Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service or the UK House of

Commons Library's Research Service) that could provide members of parliament with expert opinions on non-legal issues.

Citation:

The competences of the "Scientific Council of the Parliament" are cited in the official site of the parliament: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Dioikitiki-Organosi/Ypiresies/Epistimoniki-Ypiresia/Epistimoniko-Symvoulio>

Japan

Score 7

Parliamentarians have substantial resources at their disposal to independently assess policy proposals. Every member of parliament can employ one policy secretary and two public secretaries paid through an annual fund totaling around JPY 20 million (€153,000 as of February 2022). However, in many cases, these secretaries are primarily used for the purposes of representation at home and in Tokyo. Both houses of parliament have access to a 560-staff-member Research Bureau tasked with supporting committee work and helping in drafting bills. A separate Legislative Bureau for both houses, with around 160 staff members, assists in drafting members' bills and amendments. The National Diet Library is the country's premier library, with parliamentary support among its primary objectives. It has a Research and Legislative Reference Bureau with over 190 staff members whose tasks include research and reference services based on requests by policymakers and on topics of more general interest such as decentralization. For such research projects, the library research staff collaborates with Japanese and foreign scholars.

Notably, the substantial available resources are not used in an optimal way for purposes of policymaking and monitoring. The Japanese Diet tends toward being an arena parliament, with little legislative work taking place at the committee level. Bills are traditionally prepared inside the parties with support from the national bureaucracy. Ruling parties can rely on bureaucrats to provide input and information, while opposition parties can at least obtain policy-relevant information from the national bureaucracy.

Citation:

Jun Makita, A Policy Analysis of the Japanese Diet from the Perspective of 'Legislative Supporting Agencies,' in Yukio Adachi, Sukehiro Hosono and Iio Jun (eds), *Policy Analysis in Japan*, Bristol: Policy Press 2015, pp. 123-138

Junko Hirose, Enhancing our Role as the "Brains of the Legislature": Comprehensive and Interdisciplinary Research at the National Diet Library, Japan, paper for the IFLA Library and Research Services for Parliaments Section Preconference 2014, http://www.ifla.org/files/assets/services-for-parliaments/preconference/2014/hirose_japan_paper.pdf

Netherlands

Score 7

A comprehensive study on the information exchange between the States General and government in the Netherlands over the past 25 years concludes: "In a mature democracy the primacy of information provision to parliament ought to be in the hands of parliament itself; but in the Netherlands in 2010 de jure and de facto this is

hardly the case. ... De facto the information arena in which the cabinet and the parliament operate is largely defined and controlled by the cabinet.” The informal code governing information release to parliament has become known under the label of the Rutte doctrine (see “Access to Government Information”). This reflects the necessity of forming government coalitions supported by the majority of the States General. As an institution, the States General is not necessarily a unified actor. As basically every parliamentary vote can result in the downfall of a government, this creates mutual dependence for political survival: parliamentary groups supporting the government (part of the legislature) and government ministers (the executive) become fused, which threatens the democratic principle of control and accountability.

Moreover, the States General’s institutional resources are modest. Approximately 600 staff assist parliamentarians in developing legislation, knowledge storage and use, and ICT issues. Dutch members of parliament in large parliamentary factions have one staffer each, while members of parliament of smaller factions share just a few staffers. Experienced members of parliament say that a political party needs 15 seats (with staffers) to adequately handle the normal workload of parliamentary business. At present, only four political parties have this size; one of which (populist PVV) has a track record of frequent absence with regard to legislative work. Smaller factions simply lack the time and the manpower to participate seriously in legislative debate, and thus have to choose their battles carefully, taking their visibility in the press and among their electorate into consideration. Since the larger parties are needed to maintain a stable coalition, in-depth legislative debate de facto is the prerogative of the larger parties that support the government.

In October 2019, the cabinet approved a modest budget enlargement for staff assistance to parliament. Legislators belonging to the coalition parties are usually better informed than are opposition members of parliament. Members of parliament do have the right to summon and interrogate ministers, although the quality of the question-and-answer game is typified as: “Posing the right questions is an art; getting correct answers is grace.” The hard, detailed work of legislation, oversight and control occurs out of the spotlight in departmentally organized permanent parliamentary committee meetings. The small Parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure does not produce independent research, but provides assistance to members of parliament.

Policy and program evaluations are conducted by the departments themselves, or by the General Audit Chamber (which has more information-gathering powers than the States General). Another more standardized mechanism is the annual Accountability Day, when the government responds to the Audit Chamber’s annual report on its policy achievements over the last year. Due to restrictive contact rules (oekaze Kok) day-to-day contacts with officials are fuzzy and unsatisfactory. Formal hearings between members of parliament and departmental officials are rare. Members of parliament can ask officials to testify under oath only in the case of formal

parliamentary surveys or investigations. Although this is considered an extraordinarily time-consuming instrument, parliament has voted to use it in three cases of contested issues: regarding gas exploitation and earthquakes in the province of Groningen, the child benefits affair and management of the coronavirus crisis.

Guido Enthoven (2011), *Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement*, Eburon

Wikipedia, *Parlementaire enquête in Nederland* (nl.m.wikipedia.org, accessed 3 November 2018)

Parlement.com, van den Berg, 16 July 2021. *Problemen met wetgeving, oud en nieuw*

Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. *Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?*

Kabinet akkoord met grotere financiële steun Kamerleden en partijen

NRC.next, 27 March 2021. *Al die parlementaire enquêtes een gevaar voor Rutte IV? Dat is voorbarig*

Chile

Score 6

The National Congress is furnished with a multidisciplinary staff of consultants in order to support deputies and senators in their representative, legislative and control functions as well as in the field of congressional diplomacy. Nevertheless, this support tends to be asymmetric in comparison with ministerial analytical and investigatory capacities. The National Congress' oversight function is exerted by the Chamber of Deputies. However, in many cases, this task tends to be triggered in reaction to journalistic complaints or political conflicts rather than functioning as a proactive mechanism for monitoring the government's ongoing activity.

Croatia

Score 6

The members of the Croatian parliament (Sabor) are supported by some parliamentary staff. The Sabor has an Information and Documentation Department that keeps track of the Sabor's legislative activity and responds to queries for information from members of parliament and parliamentary staff about bills in progress and transcripts of plenary sessions. There is also a parliamentary library with various collections in the fields of law, politics, history, economics and sociology. However, the support staff for individual members of parliament is relatively small, as the budget of the Sabor allows for a secretary for every parliamentary group and one additional adviser for every 16 group members. Moreover, the Sabor does not have an office for policy analysis, and formal legalistic thinking is prevalent among Sabor staff.

Poland

Score 6

The members of the Sejm, the Polish parliament, have permanent support staff and can draw on the Sejm's library and the expertise of the Sejm's Bureau of Research

(BAS). In addition to researching legal issues, the BAS publishes a newsletter, discussion papers, and a peer-reviewed quarterly Law Review (*Zeszyty Prawnicze BAS*). Since PiS's victory in the 2015 and 2019 parliamentary elections, however, the BAS has been progressively streamlined so as to reflect the political will of the ruling party. As a result, the quality of its expertise has declined, and it no longer issues critical studies.

Portugal

Score 6

The Assembly of the Republic has a very robust committee structure composed of standing and ad hoc committees, as well as committees to assess implementation of the Plano do Governo and the Orçamento de Estado. Moreover, it can call members of the executive to explain issues and has some degree of autonomy in terms of its budget allocations. However, there remains a substantial lack of expert support staff.

Members of parliament do not generally have their own staff and, in most but not all cases, have little ability to rely on expert support. However, this is not due to a lack of funding for support staff. Legislation provides parliamentary party groups with fairly generous subsidies to hire support staff. In 2020, the most recent year for which data is available, total subsidies granted amounted to €8.8 million, the same as in the year 2018. As subventions are granted based on legislation, the total is relatively stable over time.

Parliamentary groups are free to allocate this funding as they choose and set wages for staff accordingly. The overall number of support staff in 2020 was 250, which exceeds the number of parliamentary members (230) and was very similar to the figures recorded in 2019 (249) and 2018 (250). However, this funding is of limited policy value, because parliamentary party staff funds are frequently used to pay general party staff rather than staff for the parliamentary group specifically. The former head of ECFP (the independent body tasked with monitoring party financing and accounts) recently noted that funding for parliamentary staff has become “a means for financing parties.”

As such, parliament's capacity to monitor government activity is mainly contingent on legislators' own expertise. Under the 22nd constitutional government, a minority Socialist Party government, parliamentarians showed increased interest in government monitoring, and parliamentary negotiation was considerable. However, this energy and interest does not imply that lawmakers in fact have adequate personnel and structural resources for the purposes of monitoring.

Citation:

Assembleia da República, “Relatório da Conta de Gerência da Assembleia da República – 2020,” available online at: <https://www.parlamento.pt/GestaoAR/Documents/oar/RelCGAR2020.pdf>

Davim, Margarida. 2018. “O caso dos assessores-fantasma,” Sábado, September 13.

Romania

Score 6 The Romanian parliament has a Department of Parliamentary Studies and EU Policies, which is divided into two divisions: the Division for Legislative Studies and Documentation and the EU Division. Together, these divisions offer members of both chambers, as well as parliamentary group leaders and committee chairs, useful documentation, studies and research materials, expertise and assistance. In addition, all members have equal access to the parliamentary library which provides references as well as research and bibliographic services. However, members of parliament have relatively limited individual resources. In practice, they tend to rely on assistance from former parliamentarians or political-party staff rather than on the expertise of the Department of Parliamentary Studies and EU Policies or independent experts.

A new set of regulations for the organization and functioning of the departments assisting the Chamber of Deputies was adopted in February 2019. It brought no changes to the Department of Parliamentary Studies and EU Policies and the Divisions for Legislative Studies/Documentation and the European Union. The Senate had adopted similar regulations in 2018.

Slovakia

Score 6 Members of the National Council, the Slovak parliament, can draw on a set of resources for monitoring government activity. Members of parliament have a budget for assistants and expertise and tend to have a support staff of at least two persons. They can draw on the Parliamentary Institute, an information, education and research unit providing expertise for parliamentary committees, commissions and individual legislators. In addition, there is a parliamentary library.

South Korea

Score 6 Members of parliament have a staff of nine, including four policy experts, three administrative staffers and two interns. Given the large quantity of topics covered, this staff is scarcely sufficient, but is enough to cover legislators' main areas of focus. Tight schedules and the record-high number of agencies monitored by the National Assembly have generated skepticism regarding the effectiveness of legislative oversight. Observers familiar with parliamentary affairs have voiced concern that parliamentary audits are inevitably superficial, as lawmakers have little time to study dossiers thoroughly or prepare their questions. Moreover, some lawmakers lack the capacity and willingness to monitor government activities effectively.

United Kingdom

Score 6

Members of parliament have relatively few resources at their disposal in terms of personnel capable of monitoring government activity. Parliamentary parties also relatively poorly funded, relying substantially on donations, and therefore can provide little support. In addition, if a party is in government, a substantial proportion of its members of parliament will be (junior) members of the government and therefore not too keen to monitor themselves.

Parties in opposition are granted some public funds to hire additional researchers to fulfill their duties of controlling the government. But in terms of resources this is still not much compared to those the governing parties can call on through the ministerial bureaucracy. The Library of the House of Commons, however, provides non-partisan support and many members of parliament regularly avail themselves of its services.

The Dame Laura Cox Report 2018 exposed the widespread problem of bullying and harassment of House of Commons staff. In response, the House of Commons Commission announced measures to prevent further bullying, which the House of Commons adopted. The Committee on Standards has been working on it, and the Independent Complaints and Grievance Policy as well as the Behaviour Code set up. A recent high-profile case involving a former minister showed the capacity of the independent Parliamentary Standards Commissioner, Kathryn Stone, to call out transgressions, despite attracting hostility from some members of parliament.

Citation:

European Parliament / Directorate-General for Research 2000: Comparison of organizational and administrative arrangements in EU national parliaments; http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ma/ep/00/budg110_en.pdf

Dame Laura Cox Report: <https://www.parliament.uk/globalassets/documents/conduct-in-parliament/dame-laura-cox-independent-inquiry-report.pdf>

<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmstandards/1726/1726.pdf>

<https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8369/CBP-8369.pdf>

Cyprus

Score 5

The House of Representatives has substantially upgraded its resources. With the recruitment of specialized staff, parliamentary work enjoys expert support, which is not limited to administrative and secretarial services. Research provides the information needed to draft legislation, parliamentary committees comment on and evaluate government draft laws, while legal advice is available to check compliance with the constitution and existing legislation. A European affairs section deals with obligations under EU membership, and an international affairs section assists with relations to other parliaments and international bodies. Communication, technological and archival services complete the spectrum of resources available to the parliament.

The parliament has a rich library, which is open to the public and is in the process of digitizing its assets.

Citation:

1. House of Representatives, The parliament's services and their functions (in Greek), 2021, <http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/assetfile/Odigos.pdf>

Hungary

Score 5

The Hungarian parliament has a good library and even a small research section. The members of parliament are provided some funds for professional advice. However, since these funds are apportioned according to the share of seats in parliament, the democratic opposition parties receive only a small amount of money. This has made it difficult for the opposition to monitor the government's hectic legislative activity. However, the key obstacle to effective monitoring of the government is not the lack of resources but the behavior of the Fidesz majority in parliament and its committees.

Citation:

Nikolenyi, C. (2020): The Decline of the Hungarian Legislature since 2010, in: I. Khmelko, F. Stapenhurst, M. Mezey (eds.), *Strong Executives and Weak Parliaments: Legislative Decline in the 21st Century*. London/ New York: Routledge.

Ireland

Score 5

The Oireachtas Library and Research Service manages the Irish parliamentary library. The service's primary users are the individual members of the Houses of the Oireachtas, committees and staff of both houses. Resources are considered inadequate, relative to peer jurisdictions in the European Union (e.g., Denmark, Finland and Sweden).

Whereas ministers recruit advisers and experts, there is no system of internships that allows members to recruit researchers and no tradition of members or groupings commissioning and publishing evaluations of government activity. The main resource available to members for monitoring government activity is the committee system. This allows members to call expert witnesses and explore the implications of proposed legislation. The resources available to these committees appear adequate for their purpose.

These resources are complemented through the mechanism of parliamentary questions, which can be in oral or written form. Dáil Éireann allocates time during which deputies may ask questions of members of the government relating to their departments or to matters of administration for which they are responsible. Considerable civil service resources are devoted to researching the answers to these questions, of which a total of 50,000 were processed during 2014. This works out at an impressive average of 300 per deputy.

Citation:

A statement of the services available from the Oireachtas Library and Research Services is provided here:

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/housesoftheoireachtas/libraryresearch/others/LRSStatementofServicesapprovedbyCommission2012.pdf>

Gallagher, M. 'The Oireachtas: President and Parliament,' in John Coakley and Michael Gallagher (eds), *Politics in the Republic of Ireland*, 2010.

Malta

Score 5

The passage of a new act in 2016 giving parliament financial autonomy over its internal budget decisions (the Parliamentary Services Act), and an increase in funding in the 2017 and 2018 budgets, has left members of parliament in Malta with more resources than previously. Members of permanent parliamentary committees enjoy support from newly appointed research officers as well as academics and specialists. Greater participation of members of parliament in international conferences has helped bridge the resource gap, but much more is required. These developments have improved the process for evaluating EU legislation and other social issues. Additional resources must be allocated to the parliamentary scrutiny committee dealing with pipeline aquis. Furthermore, despite improvements, legislators have too few resources to support their legislative work. In 2020, the opposition leader made a request for more parliamentary resources. Staff members are too few in number, and fully occupied by their primary duties. Part of the fault lies with the present setup. Members of parliament do not give up their private professional activities, since their role as legislator is a part-time occupation. This results in constraints on the amount of time dedicated to parliamentary business, and may also produce conflicts of interest. Members of parliament can now be fined for not attending sittings. Meeting times have changed to make it easier for female members to participate. However, to date, no child support is provided during parliamentary sessions. Meanwhile, the vested interests of members of parliament, who are also members of a profession, remain an obstacle. The practice of back-bench lawmakers sitting on government boards or working in government departments, and large cabinets that include a majority of government-party parliamentarians, also undermines their ability to monitor the government effectively.

Citation:

Camilleri, I. Parliament is out of touch with Brussels. No feedback to Brussels' documents. *Times of Malta* 14/06/11

Its too early to talk about what is in store for me *Times of Malta* 11/10/2015

MPs express different opinions on pay rise for politicians, full-time parliament proposals. *Malta Today* 6/01/2015

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160111/local/new-law-will-make-parliaments-administration-autonomous-of-the.598431>

Parliamentary service Act Chapter 562 ACTXL11 of 2016

Most PN proposals to improve parliamentary work included in PL manifesto – government *Times of Malta* 19/08/17

The PN has seven suggestions for a better functioning parliament *Times of Malta* 18/08/17

Speaker concerned about incomplete security coverage around parliament. *Times of Malta* 30/11/17

Times of Malta 22/01/2020 Executives dominance of Parliament

Times of Malta 20/01/20 PN requests more parliamentary resources

Malta Employers Association; Parliamentary Reform: Towards a More Productive Parliament Position paper February 2020

Mexico

Score 5 The Mexican presidential system, with its emphasis on the presidential government, and the electoral system have systematically weakened parliament and members of parliament. Formally, Congress is well staffed and sufficiently financed to fulfill its duties. Members of Congress were until recently prohibited from running for re-election. This system was intended to bring legislators closer to civil society, but it had weakened the legislative role and increased the power of party bosses. The most senior members largely control Congress. They tend to control the careers of more junior congressional members because the effect of Mexico's strong no re-election rule prevents members of Congress from using their constituency as a political base. In turn, members tended to lack resources and legislative scrutiny was often perfunctory. Similarly, members have had little incentive to take a deep interest in lawmaking, because their term as incumbents was so short. Moreover, good legislative performance often went unrewarded in local or national politics.

Since 2018, local representatives, city council members and mayors have been able to run for reelection. Senators and federal representatives in Congress will have to wait until 2024 before they are able to run for two consecutive terms in a row; thus, the midterm elections of 2021 were still functioning under the traditional no-reelection condition.

New Zealand

Score 5 While New Zealand members of parliament are not generously equipped with financial or personnel resources to monitor government activity, they do have access to party research budgets, which fund party research units. Each party's research unit follows up on parliamentarians' requests, especially in preparation for parliamentary debates. Other personnel available to individual members of parliament include an executive assistant (in parliament) and electorate staff, with constituency members being more generously funded than those on the party lists. The Clerk's Office provides other research support for members through the independent Parliamentary Research Service and, for members of select committees, via various secretariat. The parliament budget also provides research support for other cross-party groups within parliament including the Commonwealth Women Parliamentarians group. Despite the availability of these resources, the opposition party (usually a major party) may be disadvantaged, depending on its internal party resources. However, it is the smaller parties that are at a more distinct disadvantage relative to the breadth of staff, research and other resources made available to the parties in government. That said, this has not changed over time, and during the pandemic, resources were diverted to support the Epidemic Response Committee designed to hold the government to account, which was chaired by the opposition party.

Citation:

K.-U. Schnapp and P. Harfst, *Parlamentarische Informations- und Kontrollressourcen in 22 westlichen Demokratien*, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 36 (2005), pp. 348–70.

Spain

Score 5

Every parliamentary group is assigned funds to hire personnel, with budget allocations dependent on the party's electoral results. However, individual members of parliament lack even a single exclusive assistant, and the small number of staff members is shared. No real parliamentary research units exist, and committees have few independent administrative resources, but can count on the important legal expertise of clerks. The lack of technical support for deputies and senators, who cannot effectively oversee all dimensions of public policy, has been frequently criticized, but no improvements are in sight.

The scrutiny of EU policymaking illustrates the lack of resources, as the Joint Committee of the Congress and the Senate for European Affairs has at its disposal only two legal clerks, a librarian and three administrative personnel. Despite growing demands for greater parliamentary involvement in EU affairs, budgetary restrictions have prevented any change with regard to human and financial resources.

The parliamentary staff is also involved in the institution's external relations, specifically interparliamentary relations and parliamentary diplomacy. However, the resources available are limited, which makes it difficult for them to offer value-added services.

Citation:

Kölling, M. and I. Molina. 2022, *The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline*, *Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations*. (forthcoming)

Jorge M. Fernandes, Cristina Leston-Bandeiraeds. (2019): *The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*. London: Routledge.

Switzerland

Score 5

The Swiss parliament is not broadly professionalized. Officially, it is still a militia parliament, meaning that legislators serve alongside their regular jobs. However, this is far from reality (Vatter 2018a: 283). Almost 90% of members use more than a third of their working time for their political roles. Legislators' incomes have also been increased over time. On average, the various components of remuneration total more than CHF 100,000 annually (about €85,000). Because of this, fewer and fewer members of parliament have other professional activities beside their political mandate (or external mandates paid or otherwise, but related to their activity as a politician). In other words, an increasing number of members of parliament can be considered "professional politicians." The parliamentary system is, therefore, often described as semi-professional now.

However, legislators do not have personal staffs, and the parliamentary services division offers only very limited research services, though legislators do have access to the parliamentary library. Thus, from a comparative perspective, the resources available to members of parliament are very limited.

Citation:

Bieri, Niklaus. (2018): Das Parlament und die Vernehmlassung. Der Wandel der parlamentarischen Rezeption des Vernehmlassungsverfahrens als Hinweis auf die Erstarkung des Parlaments nach den Parlamentsreformen der frühen 1990er-Jahre. in *Traverse – Zeitschrift für Geschichte / Revue d'histoire* 2018 (3): 33–45. <https://boris.unibe.ch/127608/>.

Bütikofer, Sarah. 2014. *Das Schweizer Parlament. Eine Institution auf dem Pfad der Moderne*, Baden-Baden: Nomos

SRF News (2019): Im neuen Nationalrat sitzen noch mehr Berufspolitiker. <https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-jobs-der-neugewahlten-im-neuen-nationalrat-sitzen-noch-mehr-berufspolitiker>

Vatter, Adrian 2018a; *Das politische System der Schweiz*. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB)

Vatter, Adrian (Hrsg.) 2018b: *Das Parlament in der Schweiz. Macht und Ohnmacht der Volksvertretung*, Zürich: NZZ Libro

Turkey

Score 5

The administrative organization of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) consists of departments that support the Speaker's Office. The conditions of appointment of the administrators and officers are regulated by law (Law 6253, 1 December 2011). The administrative organization (including the research services department and the library and archives services department) is responsible for providing information as well as bureaucratic and technical support to the plenary, the bureau, committees, party groups, and deputies; informing committees about bills and other legislative documents and assisting in the preparation of committee reports; preparing draft bills in accordance with deputy requests; providing information and documents to committees and deputies; coordinating relations and legislative information between the Assembly and the general secretary of the president, and other public institutions; organizing relations with the media and public; and providing documentation, archive, and publishing services (Article 3, Law 6253).

The new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive and significantly undermined the parliament's legislative and oversight functions. Since the 2018 general elections, parliament has been dominated by a bloc consisting of President Erdogan's AKP and its de facto coalition partner, the MHP. Although the budget of the Assembly is part of the annual state budget, it is debated and voted on as a separate spending unit. The Assembly prepares its budget without negotiation or consultation with the government; however, it does follow the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance.

Citation:

Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. "The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity," I. Khmelko et al (eds) *Legislative Decline in the 21st Century* (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.

European Commission. "Turkey Report 2021. Commission Staff Working Document." October 19, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/turkey-report-2021_en

Bulgaria

Score 4

The Bulgarian parliament has a budget that amounts to little more than 0.15% of national public spending. About three-quarters of the budget are used to pay the salaries members of parliament and their administrative staff. As a result, resources available to members of parliament for expert staff and independent research are very limited. This means that the capacity of the National Assembly to effectively assess and monitor the policies and activities of the executive is also limited. This limitation is not structural, since the Bulgarian parliament has full discretion over the central government budget and could secure the resources for enhanced monitoring.

After a period of restricted and to some extent biased dissemination of information to members of parliament, the 2021 election seems to have ushered in some improvements in this regard. In 2017-2020, budget funds were spent to renovate one of the buildings of the parliament, and resources have now been made available to hire more experts and technical staff.

Iceland

Score 3

Parliamentarians have access to experts employed by parliament. While the 21-person Committee Department (Nefndasvið) is tasked with assisting the parliament's standing committees, individual members can also turn to this department for assistance. However, the limited capacity of the Committee Department, combined with its primary mandate to assist the parliament's standing committees, restricts its ability to effectively assist more than 50 of the 63 members of parliament. Ministers also have access to resources in their ministries. The Research and Information Office (Rannsókn- og upplýsingaskrifstofa), which has a staff of seven, collects data and other information for members of parliament.

In December 2018, the parliament passed a new budget for 2019, stipulating a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary assistants. At the time of writing in 2021/2022, there has not been an increase in staff numbers.

Citation:

Parliament (Althingi). Lög um breytingu á lögum nr. 88/1995, um þingfararkaup alþingismanna og þingfararkostnað (starfsmenn þingflokka og aðstoðarmenn formanna stjórnmalaflokka). Lög nr. 135 21. desember 2018.

Parliament (Althingi). <https://www.althingi.is/um-althingi/skrifstofa-althingis/skipurit-og-hlutverk/>. Accessed 10 January 2022.

Latvia

Score 3 Parliament does not have adequate resources to monitor government activity effectively. Some limited expertise is available from the parliamentary committee, legal office, personal administrative support, and parliamentary library staff. However, this has not allowed for substantive policy analysis or the independent production of information. Until 2017, the Latvian parliament was the only legislature in the Baltic Sea region with no institutional research capacity.

In 2017, the parliament created a new parliamentary research unit. As of May 2017, it is in its startup phase, with a director and staff of three. The 2018 budget for the unit is expected to include resources for outsourcing expertise. To date, the unit has produced 19 studies and reports.

Indicator

Obtaining Documents

Question

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
- 8-6 = The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
- 5-3 = The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
- 2-1 = Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.

Czechia

Score 10

As specified in the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Czech parliamentary committees may ask for almost all government documents. Members of parliament are entitled to request all information and documents from government members, heads of administrative authorities and local self-government bodies that are necessary for the performance of their functions. These requests are usually respected and documents are delivered on time.

Estonia

Score 10

Parliamentary committees have the legal right to obtain from the government and other executive agencies the materials and data necessary to draft legal acts and evaluate draft-law proposals made by the government. The commission can also invite civil servants from the ministries to participate in commission meeting in order to provide additional information or explain governmental position.

Finland

Score 10

Reports drafted by committees provide the basis for legislative decisions. Committees prepare government bills, legislative initiatives, government reports and other matters for handling in plenary sessions. Given these tasks and functions, it follows that the government is expected to report in full its motives for proposing legislation and that committees are able to obtain the desired documents from the government upon request.

Greece

- Score 10 Members of parliament may request the supply of government documents and frequently exercise this right. Documents are normally delivered in full, within one month, from the competent ministry to the parliament. Restrictions apply to documents containing sensitive information on diplomatic, military or national security issues, but even in such cases a competent committee can inspect some classified documents in closed-door sessions. Overall, members of parliament are usually very demanding regarding information and they press authorities to obtain it, and government ministers do not refrain from supplying such information.

Citation:

The supply of government documents to the parliament is regulated by article 133 of the Standing Orders of the Parliament.

Latvia

- Score 10 The parliament has the right to obtain documents from the government. No problems have been observed in the exercise of this right.

Sweden

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees (or indeed any persons) have the right to review all public documents in Sweden unless they are classified or part of an ongoing decision-making process.

In this respect, the Swedish system leaves very little to be desired. The problem, instead, has been the execution of these rights. In the annual reviews conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs (KU) during the past several years, the committee has severely criticized the government's central office (Regeringskansliet) for not providing documents, or for being exceedingly slow in doing so. The media, academics, and more recently, members of the Coronavirus Commission have been critical of the government in this respect.

Switzerland

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees, as well as members of parliament, have access to government documents and receive copies of these promptly upon request. Legislators have also electronic access to the majority of government documents.

Australia

- Score 9 The legislature has strong powers, deriving from both Section 49 of the constitution and the Parliamentary Privileges Act, that require the executive arm of government to provide parliament with information. As parliamentary bodies, these powers are vested in parliamentary committees. There are only a very few acceptable reasons for refusal: a minister or other member of the executive who refuses to turn over requested documents can be held in contempt of parliament.

Austria

- Score 9 Currently, all parliamentary committees have the power to ask for any kind of document. However, documents deemed “secret” can only be viewed in a special parliamentary room and cannot be copied.

Significant portions in government documents obtained by newly formed investigative committees were redacted, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting privacy. This resulted in an uproar among members of parliament and demonstrated that committees are entitled to obtain documents, yet the government can create significant limitations in accessing parts of these documents.

The Austrian Constitutional Court has repeatedly strengthened the position of investigative committees relative to the government when it comes to obtaining documents and other data. For example, in early 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that the minister of finance was obliged to provide the investigative committee investigating the “Ibiza affair” (which led to the fall of the ÖVP-FPÖ government in 2019) with access to the emails and other stored data of staff members of the federal Ministry of Finance.

Citation:

https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_03.03.2021_UA_1_2021_Erkenntnis.pdf

Belgium

- Score 9 Parliamentary committees are de facto able to obtain essentially all documents they need, as long as the latter are not deemed highly confidential. The more sensitive areas include domestic and foreign security, in particular regarding the police and intelligence services, for which two special regular parliamentary committees (the so-called P and R committees) have been set up. The members of parliament taking part in these two special committees do have access to classified data and information upon demand, but must follow a very strict code of conduct (which they do in practice). The P committee oversees the law enforcement forces (R stands for

police) and the R committee oversees the intelligence services (R stands for Renseignements, which means intelligence).

The powers of such committees become even stronger when they are set up to initiate a parliamentary investigation. However, this often leads to a strategy of not collecting data on sensitive issues in order to avoid having to disclose sensitive information. In response, Cumuleo, an activist group seeking to improve the regulation and oversight of public offices, has denounced several illegal attempts to restrict access to public documents.

This does of course imply that government policymaking takes place somewhat in the dark or with limited oversight.

Citation:

<https://www.cumuleo.be/presse/cp/02-09-2019.php>

Denmark

Score 9

Parliament is entitled and granted access to most government documents. There are internal ministry documents, however, that are not made available. This is occasionally criticized by some politicians, especially from the opposition. However, ministers and ministries know that it is politically important to heed parliament requests. Documents may be stamped confidential, but, in general, most committee documents are publicly available.

Citation:

Henrik Zahle, Dansk forfatningsret 1: Institutioner og regulering. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers' Forlag, 2005.

Folketinget, Håndbog i Folketingsarbejdet. Oktober 2015.
http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/publikationer/folketinget/haandbog_i_folketingsarbejdet_2011.aspx (accessed 22 October 2014).

France

Score 9

Committees have free access to all requested documents. However, areas such as national security, the secret service or military issues are more sensitive. The government might be reluctant to pass on information but, worse, could be tempted to use information limitations to cover up potential malpractices. For instance, in the past the PMO had at its disposal substantial amounts of cash that could partially be used for electoral activities of the party in power. No information was available about where the money actually went. In the same vein, it is only since the Sarkozy presidency that the president's office budget has become transparent and accessible to parliamentary inquiry.

Germany

Score 9

The German Bundestag is a “working parliament” – that is, parliamentary committees are of great importance in preparing and discussing legislative initiatives. Beyond their activities in preparing legislation, they also have oversight over government ministries, though the government nonetheless tries to withhold information at times. But most documents are made public and can be accessed. An important ruling delivered on 12 September 2012 by the Federal Constitutional Court’s Second Senate strengthened the information rights of German parliamentary representatives regarding the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM).

In its 7 November 2017 ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court (“Bundesverfassungsgericht”) once again strengthened the Bundestag’s right to information vis-à-vis the government, requiring the government to provide comprehensive and publicly available information. In addition, in a recent ruling from February 2019, the Federal Court of Justice (“Bundesgerichtshof”) strengthened parliamentary investigation committees’ right to access governmental records.

Citation:

<https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/bvg16-084.html>

<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/auskunftsrecht-verfassungsgericht-staerkt-kontrollrechte-des-bundestags-1.3738737>

<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/bvg17-094.html>

BGH 3 ARs 10/18 – Beschluss vom 6. Februar 2019

Japan

Score 9

Government documents can be obtained at the discretion of legislative committees. There are typically no problems in obtaining such papers in a timely manner.

Lithuania

Score 9

Members of parliament have the right to obtain information not only from the government itself but also from various government agencies, enterprises and other public sector organizations. When carrying out their oversight function, parliamentary committees can request information and relevant documents from ministries and other state institutions. These are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time-frame. Opposition members also often ask for the government’s position on politically salient policy issues. There are some restrictions concerning the access of information considered to be sensitive for reasons of state security. In addition, information from ongoing pretrial investigations and other investigations cannot be provided if this could harm the investigations.

New Zealand

- Score 9 The Cabinet Manual defines the right of committees to ask for government documents. All documents must be delivered in full and within an appropriate time. There are limitations with regard to classified documents. There is no evidence that these limitations have been misused systematically for political purposes.

Citation:

Cabinet Manual: Providing Information to Select Committees: <http://cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/8.66> (accessed October 24, 2015).

Norway

- Score 9 The parliamentary right of access to information is a very strong norm, which most members of the government are very careful not to violate. They thus work to ensure that the parliament is provided with adequate and timely information. Oral proceedings and consultations are sometimes used to supplement written procedures. There are some limitations to access to information rights, for instance, in cases related to national security or information on a person's private matters. However, even in these cases, parliament has an extended foreign relations committee, which has access to more classified information.

Canada

- Score 8 Parliamentary committees have the right to receive government documents in the course of their deliberations. Parliamentary committee members frequently ask ministers and officials who give testimony to provide further information in writing. These requests are typically not tied to a formal motion, and the information received may be given to the members without forming part of the parliamentary record. Sometimes, the information is requested through a formal motion adopted by the committee. However, documents sometimes arrive incomplete and redacted because of confidentiality considerations.

Chile

- Score 8 Congressional committees and individual deputies can request documents, which must be delivered by the government within legally defined time limits. Those deadlines are generally met, but there are de facto limitations in the exercise of oversight, as the majority party or coalition can block the minority's request. Until recently, obtaining information from state-owned companies or the Ministry of Finance was difficult.

Italy

Score 8 Parliamentary committees are comparatively powerful. They can significantly amend legislation and they have extensive oversight powers. Committees also have the right to ask for documents from the government. Delivery of the documents may not always be prompt, but there is no significant evidence that the government fails to comply.

Luxembourg

Score 8 In general, information flows freely between the government and coalition parties. Following the 2018 legislative elections, the government appointed a minister for relations with parliament (in the person of Marc Hansen), whose job is to foster interinstitutional relations and synergies.

In the cases where such information flows are seen as incomplete, parliamentary questions (questions parlementaires) are a popular and sometimes effective way for members of parliament to obtain information from the government or to gain insight into specific topics. However, many parliamentary questions are answered only partially or inadequately. In Luxembourg, there is no culture that demands inquiries be answered comprehensively. The effect of parliamentary questions on government work is rarely visible. The press is far more effective in creating change, particularly if the national TV broadcaster RTL addresses a political problem.

In the course of the 2019-2020 session, Luxembourg's deputies submitted 1,679 parliamentary questions to the government (compared with 1,297 questions submitted during the 2018-2019 session). During the coronavirus crisis, 425 parliamentary questions were asked, of which 80 were deemed urgent. Lawmakers also asked 190 urgent questions and 33 so-called enlarged questions, which are debated during the plenaries rather than being answered in writing by the relevant minister. The deputies met for 60 plenary sessions and 687 committee meetings, and spent about seven hours on ministerial question time.

Nevertheless, during the state of emergency related to coronavirus crisis (mid-March until mid-June 2020), the government was entitled to adopt measures unilaterally. Afterward, public health legislation related to the pandemic was adopted by the parliament.

Citation:

"Réglement de la Chambre des Députés." Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (16 décembre 2021). <https://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/dadc958b-a532-4acb-ae85-5f7b20ed05a2/Reglement+CHD16122021.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&ContentCache=NONE&CACHE=NONE&CVID=nUw4CwA>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

Etgen, Fernand. "La Chambre «sollicitée comme jamais»." *Chambre des Députés* (12 octobre 2020). https://chd.lu/wps/portal/public/Accueil/Actualite!/lut/p/z1/hY7BCoJAEIafxYNXZ9g1iW4rRhSBoVC211DZVmN1Zd309VvoJBjN7Z__4YBDgXwvpxaWdpW96Vy-c6jR0KSa3YMCab7PEJCL5RIOUHEEG7_AO5q_DEMnc9XEIZxRmKKeEjJKrC4cQIula6-77K-olsJ3linMMIEb-PWjbXDuPPRx3meA6m1VCKodefjmtLo0UKxJGHoCnxt1HRmnvcBbWCQiw!!/?1dmy&page=6_D2DVRI420G7Q402JEJ7USN38D6&urile=wcm%3apath%3a%2Factualite.public.chd.lu%2Fst-www.chd.lu%2Fsa-actualites%2F0d225221-bb2e-40d2-a573-95b1a621c8a4. Accessed 14 January 2022.

"Parliamentary questions asked by members of parliament in 2019-2020." Delano (12 October 2020). https://delano.lu/article/delano_parliamentary-questions-asked-mps-2019-2020. Accessed 14 January 2022.

Slovenia

- Score 8** In Slovenia, parliamentary committees have the right to ask for almost all government documents, and they can discuss any document in sessions either open or closed to the public. However, both the current Janša and former Šarec governments, similar to their predecessors, have sometimes delivered draft bills and other documents at the last minute or with considerable delay, thereby infringing on the work of the committees and obstructing public debate on the proposals.

South Korea

- Score 8** Parliamentary committees are legally able to obtain the documents they request from the government. The government, including governmental agencies and public institutions, is required to deliver these documents within 10 days of a request from a member of the National Assembly. Problems do arise in the process of requesting and obtaining documents. Documents pertaining to commercial information or certain aspects of national security can be withheld from the parliament. Bureaucrats are sometimes reluctant to provide the documents and information requested in an effort to protect their organizational interests. And because of the frequency of requests from parliamentarians, there have been numerous cases reported in which agency officials have had to work overtime to meet the document requests.

Spain

- Score 8** The information and documentation requested from the government must be made available within a period not exceeding 30 days and in the manner most suitable to the applicant. If this is not done, "the legally justified reasons preventing the supply of such information" must be provided. This legal margin allows the government to avoid delivering some important documents (e.g., on the grounds of secrecy), or enables it to deliver the documents incompletely or late. Furthermore, although every member of a committee is in principle entitled to request any information or document, they can only do so with the prior knowledge of their respective

parliamentary group. Access to documents may also vary depending on the ministry. Documents generally arrive on time and in full, but obstacles are occasionally erected.

United Kingdom

Score 8

The Osmotherly Rules, updated in October 2014, define the rights of select committees to obtain government documents. Although published in a Cabinet Office document, like many internal parliamentary rules, they are informal and cannot be legally challenged. However, documents are rarely held back and will thus be made available to committees. Only in very specific, pre-defined circumstances are documents withheld from select committees.

Although the government party normally has the majority on any committee, chairs of committees are shared among the parties, yet explicit party-political motives rarely come into play. Freedom of Information requests can additionally be used to obtain documents, but this does not include documents that affect national security or public interests. The media reinforce parliamentary scrutiny through their strong influence and the keen interest they take in committee findings that challenge the serving government.

Committees' rights are thus not formally limited, but there are occasional disputes between committees and government over the provision of specific information, and committees will then have to order the publication of government documents. Recent high-profile examples include documents assessing the impact of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union and strategy papers describing the government's approach to Brexit. In addition, the Johnson government delayed publication of a dossier from the intelligence and security committee about alleged Russian interference in the Brexit referendum campaign. In nearly all cases, Parliament eventually prevails, with the government likely to suffer reputational damage for resisting.

Citation:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/364600/Osmotherly_Rules_October_2014.pdf

United States

Score 8

The legislature's right to obtain government documents is well established in the U.S. system of government and congressional committees have subpoena power to request documents. This power is sometimes limited by claims of executive privilege – a constitutionally recognized entitlement that protects White House and agency internal communications in limited circumstances.

Although the executive branch often withholds classified information from general release to members of Congress, the members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have top-secret clearance enabling them access to sensitive secrets. In any case, for most issues, the information that Congress needs for policymaking or oversight of administration does not fall under any plausible claim of executive privilege or security restriction.

In a sharp departure from past practice, during the first two years of the Trump presidency, the Republican Congress largely refrained from conducting oversight or investigations into the conduct of the executive branch. After the mid-term elections, the struggle between Democrats in Congress increased the level of oversight and investigation into the administration that continued even after Trump left the White House, in the context of the House committee's investigation into the January 6 attack on the Capitol. In January 2022, the Supreme Court ordered the release of Trump-era presidential documents to the U.S. House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.

During his 2020 presidential campaign Joe Biden pledged to dramatically increase government transparency. After entering the White House in January 2021, he started to take steps to promote greater transparency and document access. Yet, a year later, critics argued that, while significant progress had been made, President Biden had yet to fulfill his ambitious pledge to fully bring transparency back (Diakun, 2022).

Citation:

Diakun, Anna. 2022. "Biden promised transparency. Has he delivered?" CNN, January 21. <https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/21/opinions/biden-first-year-transparency-diakun/index.html>

Bulgaria

Score 7

Under the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Bulgarian parliament, parliamentary committees can obtain any documents from any public or private person in the country. A chairperson of a standing committee is obliged to acquire such documents if one-third of the members of the committee ask for them. In practice, some documents are withheld from parliament with confidentiality or national security being cited as reasons for doing so. While parliamentary committees are entitled to handle classified information and documents, such a demand would require cumbersome formal procedures such as setting up a specific body to investigate the concrete issue, adopting respective rules and procedures, and ensuring confidentiality. The institution of "parliamentary questions" put to the executive also gives individual members of parliament access to the executive branch. Representatives of the executive can delay the execution of these requests, because responsibilities are not clearly specified and sanctions are not defined. There have been numerous instances of such delays. However, parliamentary questions remain an effective and widely used (especially by the opposition) tool for parliamentarians to access government information.

Croatia

Score 7 According to Article 115 of the Standing Order of the Croatian parliament (Sabor), any working bodies of the Sabor may “seek a report and data from ministers of state or officials who administer the operations of other state administrative bodies,” and ministers are obliged “to report on issues and affairs within the authority of the ministries or other state administrative bodies, to submit a report on the execution and implementation of laws and other regulations and the tasks entrusted to them, to submit data at their disposal, or data they are obliged to collect and record within the scope of their duties, as well as records and other documents necessary to the work of parliament or its working body, to respond to posed questions.” However, these rights are seldom exercised in practice. The most commonly used supervisory mechanisms are oral or written questions that are submitted to the government. These questions are mostly answered satisfactorily.

Ireland

Score 7 Parliamentary committees have the power to send for persons, papers and records; to require attendance by ministers in order discuss current policies and proposals for legislation; and to require the attendance of principal officeholders in bodies that are funded by the state. The issue of access to government documents by committees has not been contentious in recent years.

While parliamentary committees were once weak, they have been getting stronger since the 1980s. One comparative ranking of the strength of committee systems in 39 advanced industrial democracies placed Ireland mid-table (Martin 2010).

Citation:

The Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Final Report January, 2016. The scope and structure of the Banking Inquiry are set out here: <http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/Relevant-Proposal-to-the-Committees-on-Procedure-and-Privileges-of-Dáil-Eireann-and-Seanad-Eireann.pdf>

Martin, S. ‘The Committee System,’ in Muiris MacCarthaigh and Maurice Manning (eds, 2010) *The Houses of the Oireachtas*. Dublin: IPA.

Israel

Score 7 According to Israel’s basic laws and the Knesset’s Rules of Procedure, the executive or appointed officials must attend and provide information to Knesset committees upon request, unless information is considered confidential. However, the law contains no specific provisions or sanctions for enforcement in cases of disobedience and lack of compliance or the provision of insufficient or inaccurate information.

Thus, the parliament has only general or disproportionate means of response, such as passing a motion of no confidence or reporting to the Civil Service Commission. These options do not provide a solution to mundane problems, such as receiving unreliable information from the government.

Citation:

Fridberg, Chen, "The Knesset committees from an oversight perspective: Chronicle of a failure foretold?," *Studies in Israel's revival* 20 (2010) 49-79: <http://in.bgu.ac.il/bgi/iyunim/20/a3.pdf> (Hebrew)

Knesset Rules of Procedure, Section H, Chapter 7

Liel, Dafna. "The New Minister of Justice: MK Amir Ohana." In Mako website.. June 5th, 2019. (Hebrew)

Plesner, Yohanan, "There is Still Hope for Knesset Reform," IDI Website, 10/8/17, <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/18582>

Zerahia, Zvi, "The treasury is deliberately holding out information from PMs so we can't supervise it," *TheMarker* 7.1.2014: <http://www.themarker.com/news/1.2210843> (Hebrew)

Roznai, Yaniv, Liana Volach, Law reform in Israel, in "The Theory and Practice of Legislation," 6(2018)2, pp. 291-320: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20508840.2018.1478330>

Mexico

Score 7

The constitution invests Congress with significant powers. However, until recently, the independence of Congress was undermined by legislation that blocked congressional members from being immediately re-elected. This ban made congressional members dependent on a few powerful leaders who controlled access to resources and increased traditional personalistic and clientelist party structures. For this political, rather than legal, reason congressional committees voted largely along party lines and legislative scrutiny was generally perfunctory. For example, congressional members are legally entitled to request and scrutinize government documentation under the Freedom of Information Act. While the ban on being immediately re-elected has been abolished, it is too early to assess the effect of this change on legislative scrutiny.

Portugal

Score 7

The government is obliged to respond within 30 days to requests for information from the Assembly of the Republic. While there is no data on how it responds specifically to requests from parliamentary committees, delivery of information to requests from members of parliament can be untimely or incomplete.

During the first session of the 14th legislature, lasting from 25 September 2019 to 14 September 2020, parliamentarians issued 4,330 questions. Out of this total, 65% (2,826) were answered. This marks an improvement vis-à-vis the results in the previous edition of the SGI.

As noted in previous SGI reports, this response rate does not appear to reflect a deliberate attempt to conceal information from the Assembly. In general, it is likely that committee requests are answered more promptly and fully than those made by individual legislators.

Citation:

Assembleia da República, Balanço da Atividade Parlamentar – 1.ª Sessão Legislativa da XIV Legislatura, available online

at: https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Documents/Estatisticas_Actividade_Parlamentar_XIIIILeg/ActividadeLegislativa_XIII_3.pdf

<https://www.homepagejuridica.pt/.../4235-app-id-gov-pt-aplicacao-oficial-de-acesso-a..>

Romania

Score 7

According to Article 111 of Romania's constitution, "the government and other agencies of public administration shall, within the parliamentary control over their activity, be bound to present any information and documents requested by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate or parliamentary committees through their respective presidents." However, this access is limited in case of documents containing classified information, especially with respect to national security and defense issues. Members of parliament also complain about delays in the provision of documents and information. In 2020 and 2021, these concerns were compounded by the coronavirus pandemic, which slowed access to information across government.

Iceland

Score 6

The Information Act from 2012 (Upplýsingalög, No. 140/2012) grants standing parliamentary committees the right to request government documents relating to their work, with the exception of classified documents. Exempted documents include minutes, memos, and other documents from cabinet meetings; correspondence between the government and experts for use in court cases; and working documents marked for government use only, excluding those containing a final decision about a case or information that cannot be gathered elsewhere. The government can restrict access to documents if it can make a case that there is an exceptional public security risk, such as national security, international relations, or business agreements. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has a special legal status, which allows it to request government documents that would enable it to fulfill its legal obligations. The chair of the committee and the foreign minister can decide to keep the discussions and decisions of the committee confidential. The Budget Committee can also request the government documents it needs to fulfill its legal obligations.

In a case relating to the most infamous telephone call in Icelandic history, the central bank refused to comply with a parliamentary committee request to release the recording or transcript of a telephone conversation, which took place shortly before

the 2008 economic collapse, between the prime minister and the central bank governor. The right of parliamentary committees to request access to information does not secure the right to obtain information.

An internet newspaper, Kjarninn, sued the central bank in 2017 in an attempt to gain access to the coveted recording of the telephone conversation. Then, all of a sudden, a transcript of the recording was published in Morgunblaðið, which is edited by the former central bank governor. According to the transcript of the telephone conversation, the former central bank governor declares to the prime minister that the €500 million loan to Kaupthink Bank just before the financial crash will not be recovered.

In early 2022, the minister of the interior instructed the Directorate of Immigration not to provide parliament with the information that parliament had requested.

Citation:

The Information Act (Upplýsingalög nr. 142/2012)

“Directorate of Immigration ignores parliament at minister’s request” (Útlendingastofnun hunsar Alþingi að beiðni ráðuneytis), RÚV 28 January 2022, <https://www.ruv.is/frett/2022/01/28/utlendingastofnun-hunsar-althingi-ad-beidni-raduneytis>. Accessed 4 February 2022.

Netherlands

Score 6

The government has to provide correct information to the States General (according to Article 68 of the constitution). However, this is often done defensively, in order to protect “ministerial responsibility to parliament” and a “free consultative sphere” with regard to executive communications. According to the Rutted doctrine, providing the States General with internal memos, policy briefs (e.g., on alternative policy options), interdepartmental policy notes or advice from external consultants is viewed as infringing on the policy “intimacy” necessary for open deliberation, as well as the state’s interests. Documents containing such information frequently reach parliament in incomplete form with crucial passages rendered unreadable. As political scientist Hans Daalder noted a long time ago: “In practice, it is the ministers that decide on the provision of information requested.” There are recent examples of cases where the Dutch parliament has not been informed or has been informed incorrectly. These include a childcare allowance scandal and a parliamentary investigation into the legality of (covert) crime investigation techniques used by the police (see Guido Enthoven in de De Groen Amsterdammer, 2021).

Citation:

R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.

Guido Enthoven (2011), *Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie tussen regering en parlement*, Eburon

De Groen Amsterdammer, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. *Het einde van de Rutte-doctrine. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.*

Poland

- Score 6 On paper, parliamentary committees have full access to government documents. Members of parliament may demand information from government officials, either in written or verbal form, at the Sejm plenary or a committee meeting. Since the 2015 change in government, however, it has become increasingly difficult for opposition members of the Sejm to obtain government documents and receive them in good time. The government has also failed to deliver the correct documents in some cases.

Hungary

- Score 5 Traditionally, parliamentary committees in Hungary enjoyed far-reaching access to government documents. However, the new standing orders of the Hungarian parliament, as adopted under the 2012 Act on Parliament, do not regulate the access of parliamentary committees to public documents. The Orbán governments have used their parliamentary majority to restrict access to public documents, even for discussion within parliamentary committees.

Slovakia

- Score 5 Parliamentary committees have the formal right to ask for almost all government documents. The main limits stem from the logic of party competition. Governments do not support opposition members of parliament in their legislative activities. As a result, committees' access to government documents is often not timely. This has not changed under the center-right government.

Turkey

- Score 5 According to the Rules of Procedure (Article 62), the speakership of the TBMM may invite the vice-president, ministers, and deputy ministers, and senior public officials to provide information at the plenary, as described by Article 119 of the constitution (state of emergency). Parliamentary commissions may directly communicate with any ministry and request information from a ministry relevant to the commission's work (Article 41). However, there is no available data for all parliamentary committees on how frequently they request such information – orally or in writing. The major problem lies again in the effectiveness of the legislators in obtaining documents. Since legislators are aware that such inquiries are not an effective way of putting pressure on the government, given that the new presidential system has centralized power in the hands of the executive, the power is not widely used.

Citation:

Ş. İba. 2017. Parlamento Hukuku, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi

Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. "The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity," I. Khmelko et al (eds) *Legislative Decline in the 21st Century* (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.

Cyprus

Score 4

The government and the broader public administration have no constitutional obligation to make documents available to the parliament. In practice, in almost all cases, ministers answer questions, and present information and documents to deputies and parliamentary committees. However, for critical issues, they can refuse to do so.

The Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to Parliamentary Committees grants committees the power to summon officials, but not ministers, and request official information and data. An official who attends a committee hearing is obliged to tell the truth and to provide genuine documents. Hiding information or documents may lead to sanctions.

Critically, when invited, attendance is mandatory under the law, except for ministers. There has never been a case of activating this provision against officials or private persons who have refused to appear. This points to the weakness of the law, which affects the House of Representative's ability to obtain documents; access depends on an official's willingness to attend a hearing and a minister's discretionary power to approve the release of documents. Withholding information is possible without risking sanctions.

Citation:

1. Law on the deposition of data and information to the House of Representatives and parliamentary committees 21(I)/1985 http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html

Malta

Score 4

Parliamentary committees may request documents from the government, though the government is not obliged to comply. For example, the government could refuse to release documents, because the documents could contain commercially sensitive information or it is too soon to make the information public. However, by reference to the NAO or Ombuds Office and reports by the Officer in Responsible for Standards in Public Life, much more information can be obtained and documents consulted. Numerous ombudsman reports have stressed the need for more openness. The speaker of the house has made a number of rulings on the issue of documents being made available to the house. Another route is through the parliamentary question and ministerial statement processes. However, in 2021 (up to October), a

total of 19 government members of parliament failed to answer questions filed by opposition members of parliament.

Citation:

Said Pullicino, J (ed) 2015 The State's Duty to Inform Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman

Annual Report 2020 Parliamentary Ombudsman

Ruling delivered by the speaker following the request for tabling of documents sitting nos 79 6th February 2018/
sitting nos 80 7th February 2018[https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/10588/nao-study-reports-on-success-of-](https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/10588/nao-study-reports-on-success-of-teleworking#.Ybs73oatQoR)

[teleworking#.Ybs73oatQoRhttps://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/103437/damning_report_finds_collusion_between_vitals_and_government_on_hospitals_deal#.Ybs8NIaGMoQ](https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/103437/damning_report_finds_collusion_between_vitals_and_government_on_hospitals_deal#.Ybs8NIaGMoQ)

https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/102476/majority_of_national_audit_office_recommendations_imple mented_annual_report_shows#.Ybs8f4aP_14

Ruling by the Speaker concerning the tabling of documents already in the public domain sitting No 328 Monday 1th
May 2020

The Shift 22/10/2021 19 Government MPs stonewall questions from opposition MPs since reopening of parliament

Indicator

Summoning Ministers

Question

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
- 8-6 = The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
- 5-3 = The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
- 2-1 = Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.

Australia

Score 10

Committees have the legal right to summon ministers to appear before committee inquiries, but in practice compulsion to appear is uncommon. Under the principle of comity, a house of parliament does not seek to compel the attendance of members of that house or another house. It is common, however, for members, including ministers, to appear by invitation or by request before committees, to assist with committee inquiries.

Belgium

Score 10

Ministers are regularly summoned to parliamentary committees. The rights of committees are in practice not restricted. This is reinforced by the fact that most members of parliament (majority and opposition alike) have little chance of seeing their individual proposals pass in parliament. Therefore, they concentrate much of their time on written questions (which must be answered by the minister in charge), which can improve a member's media visibility. However, when the media attention on a topic is intense, one frequently sees prominent ministers replaced by (less prominent) state secretaries (i.e., junior ministers) during questioning.

Parliament also has the ability to establish investigative committee with the power to take all the investigative measures provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These commissions have extensive investigatory powers, including the ability to summon ministers. Such commissions were set up by the federal and regional parliaments to investigate the management of the COVID-19 crisis.

Citation:

<https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0558-le-controle-parlementaire-dans-la-crise-sanitaire>

https://www.rtf.be/info/dossier/epidemie-de-coronavirus/detail_creation-d-une-commission-speciale-coronavirus-a-la-chambre?id=10529914

<https://plus.lesoir.be/301051/article/2020-05-15/coronavirus-vers-une-commission-denquete-pour-evaluer-la-gestion-de-la-crise>

Czechia

Score 10

Ministers and the top personnel of major state institutions are obliged to attend committee meetings and answer questions when asked. According to the rules, ministers are also required to present draft bills to appropriate committees. If the ministers send officials below the rank of deputy minister, committees may, and often do, refuse to discuss a legislative proposal. If the Chamber of Deputies believes that there has been serious misconduct and a minister's explanation is regarded as insufficient, it may establish a parliamentary inquiry committee.

Denmark

Score 10

Committees regularly summon ministers for meetings, called consultations (samråd). These meetings are key elements of how the Danish parliamentary system works. Consultations play an important role in the legislative process for members of parliament. At the same time, the meetings are where the parliament exercises control over the government.

Citation:

Henrik Zahle, Dansk forfatningsret 1: Institutioner og Regulering, 2005.

Henrik Zahle, Dansk forfatningsret 2: Regering, forvaltning og dom, 2004.

Estonia

Score 10

Permanent committees have the right to request participation of ministers in committee meetings in order to obtain information. However, no information on how regularly committees use this ability is available.

In addition, members of parliament can individually forward written questions and interpellations to the ministers. These must be answered publicly at one of the national parliament's plenary sessions within 20 days.

Finland

Score 10

Committees are able to summon ministers to hearings and do so regularly. Committee meetings usually begin with a presentation by a ministry representative. Ministers can take part in committee meetings and debates but cannot be regular members of the committee. Furthermore, when deemed necessary, committees invite

the Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman or their representatives to a formal hearing as experts on questions of legislative drafting.

Citation:

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/valiokunnat/Pages/default.aspx>

Germany

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees' right to summon ministers is established by the Basic Law. Ministers (or their state secretaries) typically attend meetings to which they have been invited. The Basic Law also gives members of the federal government or the Bundesrat the right to be heard in front of the plenum or any committee.

Latvia

- Score 10 Members of parliament have the right to pose questions to ministers and summon them to answer questions before parliament. At least five signatories are required for such a request. Ministers generally comply with parliamentary requests.

Parliamentary committees have the right to request information from ministries as well as to summon ministers to committee meetings.

Norway

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees may summon ministers for appearances. Ministers regularly respond to invitations and answer questions. In addition, there is a weekly session in parliament where legislators can ask questions directly to the ministers. If a minister is found to have misinformed parliament, he or she cannot expect to continue as a minister for long. Parliament is also increasingly exercising its right to call various hearings.

Slovenia

- Score 10 The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in the Rules of Procedure of the Slovenian parliament. Ministers regularly follow invitations; if they are unable to attend in person, they can also authorize state secretaries to represent them. Ministers are also obliged to answer questions from members of parliament, either in oral or written form, and this obligation is largely respected in practice. Moreover, the prime minister must personally answer four questions from members of parliament in every parliamentary session. In 2020, members of parliament submitted a total of 1,857 questions to the government generally or to individual ministers specifically (1,425 more than in 2018 and 251 less than in 2019), with 71.5% of questions submitted by opposition parties. None of the questions remained unanswered.

Citation:

National Assembly (2021): Report on the Work of the National Assembly in 2020. Ljubljana (https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2018%E2%80%932022/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_letu_2020.pdf).

Switzerland

Score 10

Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests, and answer the committees' questions.

Chile

Score 9

In August 2005, a constitutional reform (Law No. 20,050) established the process of ministerial interpellation. Committees in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have the right to summon ministers for questioning about matters concerning their area. The ministers are obliged to attend. This political instrument has been used on various occasions. The effectiveness of this instrument of congressional oversight depends on the quality and quantity of information accessible to the National Congress through other channels.

Greece

Score 9

Ministers are regularly summoned to committees but they are obliged to appear in front of a committee only if two-fifths of the committee members require them to do so. There are a few restrictions with regard to information given to the committees by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former may restrict his or her comments only to armaments supplies, while the latter is not obliged to give information on any ongoing negotiations or talks in which Greece still participates.

Owing to tensions with neighboring countries, ministers are frequently summoned to parliament and engage in intense debates with the opposition. As might be expected in a polarized party system, debates sometimes create a spectacle rather than providing a setting for the exchange rational arguments (especially when they are televised). Sometimes ministers send alternate ministers or deputy ministers to attend parliamentary committee meetings in their place.

Citation:

The summoning of ministers is regulated by article 41A of the Standing Orders of the Greek parliament.

Iceland

Score 9 Parliamentary committees can legally summon ministers for hearings, but seldom do so. The foreign minister is summoned and usually attends meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The relative representation of each party across and within parliamentary committees reflects the relative representation of each party in parliament.

The Special Investigation Committee, appointed by the parliament in December 2008 to investigate the processes that led to the collapse of Iceland's three main banks, summoned several ministers and ex-ministers during 2009 and 2010.

The most notable example of a prominent politician being held accountable was the 2010 indictment of Prime Minister Geir Haarde by parliament, which led to a trial in 2012 before the High Court of Impeachment. Haarde was found guilty on one count of negligence relating to his tenure as prime minister before the 2008 economic collapse. He was found guilty of neglecting to hold cabinet meetings, during the first months of 2008, on important issues relating to the economic collapse. This obligation is stated in paragraph 17 of the constitution. As a first-time offender, Haarde was not given a custodial sentence. He was Iceland's ambassador to the United States until 2019, when he was appointed executive director representing the Nordic and Baltic countries at the World Bank.

Citation:

World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/g/geir-hilmar-haarde>

Italy

Score 9 Article 143 of the Chamber of Deputies' rules of procedure enables parliamentary committees to summon ministers or undersecretaries for hearings. Similar rules apply for the Senate. Summoning ministers and undersecretaries is a regular practice, and they normally comply with such requests. From time to time, however, compliance is delayed.

Japan

Score 9 Committees may request the attendance of the prime minister, ministers and lower – ranking top ministry personnel such as senior vice-ministers. When summoned, these ministers often attend the meetings to answer questions.

Lithuania

Score 9 Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions (with the exception of court judges). Invited people, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, typically answer questions posed by the members of the parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice-ministers or other authorized civil servants can serve as substitutes for ministers. However, rather than being used as a forward-looking mechanism, this instrument of parliamentary control is often restricted to the explanation of government activities on an ex post basis. In addition, during crises (e.g., during management of the pandemic), the frequent practice of vice-ministers substituting for ministers who were busy with crisis-management duties sometimes led to frictions between members of parliament and particular ministers.

Luxembourg

Score 9 Interaction between the government and the Chamber of Deputies is generally straightforward. Any deputy parliament can introduce a parliamentary question (written or oral). Questions are addressed to the parliamentary president. Within one month, the responsible minister(s) must respond and deliver detailed information about relevant policy decisions and departmental activities. Questions and answers are fully published on the Chamber of Deputies' website. On Tuesdays, when the parliament convenes, there may be a lively question and answer session, covering a broad range of relevant issues posted by opposition parties.

In the aftermath of the Court of Auditors report in 2020, the Chamber of Deputies summoned Economy Minister Franz Fayot (LSAP) and Finance Minister Pierre Gramegna (DP) to a hearing in May 2021 concerning the deal between the government and the Greek dairy company Fage. The auditors pointed out irregularities in the sale of the land (negotiations weren't documented). The transaction was realized by former Economy Minister Étienne Schneider (LSAP). The Chamber also requested explanation from Schneider, who could only be invited and not summoned to attend a hearing. This invitation was the second for Schneider since he left government in early 2020. He was previously called to justify the budget of a military Earth observation satellite, which ended up costing €139 million more than foreseen under plans presented by Schneider in his role as defense minister (2018).

"Réglement de la Chambre des Députés." Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (16 décembre 2021). <https://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/dadc958b-a532-4acb-ae85-5f7b20ed05a2/Rglement+CHD16122021.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&ContentCache=NONE&CACHE=NONE&CVID=nUw4CwA>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

"Parliament wants Schneider hearing over failed Fage project." Delano (11 May 2021). <https://delano.lu/article/delano-parliament-wants-schneider-hearing-over-failed-fage-project>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

Schroen, Michael (2008): *Parlament, Regierung und Gesetzgebung*, in: Wolfgang H. Lorig/Mario Hirsch (eds.), *Das politische System Luxemburgs*. Springer VS, Wiesbaden, pp. 106-129.

Mexico

Score 9 Under Article 93 of the constitution, parliamentary committees have the right to summon ministers, which happens quite a lot in practice.

Regarding the resources of legislators to monitor the government, it is worth noting that – through legislative committees – they can (and frequently do) conduct hearings where they summon ministers as well as other public officials, who have an obligation to attend. It is often the case that hearings are held right after Annual Presidential Reports to go over evidence and documents supporting the president's claims on their respective offices (similar to the State of the Union Address in the United States). While these resources are relevant and useful for monitoring, they very rarely have meaningful consequences for public officials (positive or negative). In reality, the majority of MORENA and its allies in Congress support President López Obrador. This has led to a unified government with power concentrated in the executive, which has in turn undermined the legislature's oversight function. In the midterm elections of 2021, the governing coalition lost the supermajority needed to change the constitution, but retained a simple majority in Congress.

Netherlands

Score 9 Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer questions. Usually, such requests are duly obeyed. For example, in 2018 a minister for public health even canceled international commitments in favor of dealing with parliamentary issues concerning the bankruptcy of two local hospitals. Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer questions in a forthright manner. Sometimes ministers avoid public accountability and step down before being summoned to escape a censure or no-confidence motion. Every week, parliamentarians have the opportunity to summon ministers and pose questions.

Citation:

R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.

NOS, Minister Bruins wil vinger in de pap bij keuze overnamekandidaat ziekenhuis Lelystad, 2 November

Parlement.com, Aftredende bewindslieden

Portugal

Score 9 Ministers must be heard at least four times per legislative session in their corresponding committee. Additionally, committees can request ministers to be present for additional hearings. A committee request requires interparty consensus.

However, each parliamentary group may also unilaterally request ministerial hearings. These vary from one to five per session, depending on the size of the parliamentary group. Ministers accede to requests for their attendance at hearings.

Romania

Score 9

According to Article 54(1) of the Chamber of Deputies Regulations, ministers are permitted to attend committee meetings, and “if their attendance has been requested, their presence in the meeting shall be mandatory.” Furthermore, ministers are requested to present a work report and strategy of their ministry before committees once per session. Sometimes ministers send deputies who are not always able to respond to queries raised by parliamentarians. Notably, the frequency with which ministers attend committee meetings is not documented.

South Korea

Score 9

The parliament has the constitutional right to summon ministers to appear before parliamentary hearings, and indeed frequently exercises this right. Regular investigation of government affairs by parliament is an effective means of monitoring ministers. Almost every minister has been summoned to answer parliamentarians' questions in the context of a National Assembly inspection. However, the role of the minister in the South Korean system is relatively weak, with the professional bureaucracy trained to be loyal to the president. In addition, the ruling party and ministers can agree not to invite ministers or to cancel hearings on politically controversial issues. In many cases, opposition parties summon irrelevant ministers simply as a means of furthering political confrontation with the president.

The inability to override witnesses' refusal to answer questions remains an issue that must be addressed. Under current law, the National Assembly can ask prosecutors to charge those who refuse to take the witness stand with contempt of parliament. However, this carries only light penalties, such as fines. The National Assembly should work to reform the hearing system to make it a more effective tool in probing cases of national importance. Under the Moon government, government institutions became more cooperative in response to parliamentary committees' document requests.

Spain

Score 9

According to Article 110 of the constitution, the committees of either the Congress of Deputies or the Senate “may summon members of the government” to ask them questions. At least 70 deputies or one-fifth of the members of a committee need to make the request. The request is subject to a vote in the Bureau of Congress and the Board of Spokespersons. The party supporting the government may try to reject some of the requirements made by the opposition, but after 2016, minority

governments have been in a weak parliamentary position, rendering this veto much more difficult to sustain. If the initiatives are approved, ministers are obliged to answer questions raised in these sessions. Ministers are regularly summoned by the committees overseeing their policy areas (see “Task Area Congruence”) and it is quite common for ministers themselves to request to be allowed to report on matters relating to their respective departments.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on the work of Spain’s parliament. During the coronavirus crisis, both chambers demonstrated a remarkable ability to continue their legislative business thanks to a largely digital working environment that was already in place. However, from 26 February until 25 April 2020, no question-and-answer governmental oversight sessions were held in the Congress’ plenary. However, the minister of public health did appear several times in front of the Congress’s Commission of Public Health.

However, following frequent debates in parliament during the state of alarm, from June 2020 through the end of the review period the president appeared before parliament to provide a briefing only once every two months, and the minister of health once every month. This has reduced the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of government decision-making. In 2021 the parliament recovered its constitutional functions, both regarding the legislative process and in monitoring the actions of the government.

Citation:

García-Escudero Márquez, P. (2020), *Actividad y funcionamiento de las Cortes generales durante el estado de alarma por COVID-19*. Cuadernos Manuel Giménez Abad, Junio.

Sweden

Score 9

Parliamentary committees summon ministers who appear and respond to questions. This is most frequently the case with the annual review conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Matters, but has been used by other committees, too. Except for very few cases, summoned ministers will appear in parliamentary committees. A few years ago, there was extensive media attention on a couple of instances when former cabinet ministers declined to appear before a parliamentary committee.

The hearings occur regularly and are often broadcasted by public service television. The results of the hearings are published and accessible to everyone.

Austria

Score 8

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. When summoned, ministers (or their state secretaries) do attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is in practice limited by the majority that the governing parties have in all

committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is little interest in summoning cabinet members, at least against the minister's will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, the high level of party discipline in Austria is an additional influence.

In a parliament in which three opposition parties, as in the Nationalrat elected in 2019, governments generally tend to face greater criticism regarding their willingness to answer critical questions in parliament as extensively as possible.

The particular political importance of summoning ministers and the chancellor became clear in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz's alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee became the source of a major judicial inquiry, which eventually led to Kurz's resignation.

Canada

Score 8 Ministers are normally expected to appear before parliamentary committees. Ministers may decline a committee invitation, but they have to appear, or send a representative, when receiving a formal summons approved through a committee motion. A deputy minister may appear instead of a minister for questions linked to departmental operations. The parliamentary secretary may stand in for the minister if the matter at hand is legislative in nature.

France

Score 8 Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences.

Ireland

Score 8 The powers and scope of Oireachtas committees of inquiry are set out in the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Act 2013, which was signed into law in July 2013. The act provides for Oireachtas inquiries, consistent with the Supreme Court's judgment on the scope of such inquiries. The scope of legitimate parliamentary inquiries that can now be carried out is broad. The legislation expands the scope of evidence that civil servants may give, thus enabling committees to develop a full narrative of events for the purpose of establishing facts.

Cabinet ministers regularly attend committees and assist them with their work. Oireachtas (parliamentary) committees play an increasingly important role in

parliamentary business. They can receive submissions and hear evidence from interested groups, discuss and draft legislative proposals, publish minutes of evidence and related documents, and demand the attendance of government ministers.

Citation:

For a discussion of how a constitutional provision for cabinet confidentiality might impinge on the work of the Banking Inquiry, see the July 2014 post by Dr. Conor O'Mahony on the Constitution Project @ UCC website: "Cabinet Confidentiality and the Banking Inquiry" <http://constitutionproject.ie/?p=342> However, the committee's work was not unduly hampered by these considerations. For the Supreme Court judgment on the powers of Oireachtas Inquiries see: https://www.google.ie/search?q=abbeylara+case&oq=abbeylara+case&aqs=chrome..69i57.8950j1j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8

New Zealand

Score 8

It is common practice that ministers follow invitations to visit select committee meetings, but occasionally they refuse to do so. This follows a guideline that committees can request, but not require, that a minister appear before them. Only the House of Representatives itself can compel members to attend a committee if they do not do so voluntarily.

Citation:

Officials and Select Committees – Guidelines (Wellington: States Services Commission 2007).

United Kingdom

Score 8

Ministers can be summoned to parliamentary committee hearings, but they cannot be forced to attend, because ministers have to be members of parliament or members of the House of Lords, and members of parliament cannot be forced to attend any meeting. However, the Osmotherly Rules recommend that ministers accept invitations to a hearing as an act of respectful courtesy, and thus ministers will usually accept an invitation to a hearing in a select committee. It would be headline news and damaging to the minister in question if they refused to appear before a committee on anything remotely controversial, although the answers given to committees can be bland. Sessions in the House of Commons can become quite confrontational, whereas those in the House of Lords are usually more restrained. Ministerial questions in plenary sessions of parliament complement the work of committees and can also be quite sharp in tone. The prime minister and key aides traditionally refuse to appear before select committees, but have appeared before the Liaison Committee, which is composed of the chairs of all the other committees.

United States

Score 8

Executive officials do not appear on the House or Senate floor. However, department secretaries and other high-level officials of the executive branch appear with great frequency and regularity, essentially on request, before legislative committees and

subcommittees. In the context of an investigation, committees sometimes subpoena executive branch members to make an appearance. Most appearances are voluntary, however, motivated by the desire to maintain strong relationships with the congressional committee.

As with respect to documents, the Trump administration maintained an unprecedented, blanket refusal to allow executive branch officials to testify before House committees investigating presidential misconduct. Numerous lawsuits were underway, but the House also approved an article of impeachment alleging the obstruction of Congress. President Biden has promised much greater transparency than his predecessor, a pledge illustrated by the testimonies of key officials from his administration in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the aftermath of the fall of Kabul in August 2021.

Bulgaria

Score 7

Legally, parliamentary committees have the power to summon ministers and the prime minister, and under the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Bulgarian parliament, these executive-branch figures are obliged to comply. When a minister or the prime minister is asked a parliamentary question, he or she has to respond in person in the National Assembly in due time. There is no penalty for non-compliance except the possible loss of reputation and political image. Members of the executive most often comply with summons from the parliament, but can afford to ignore such summons indefinitely.

Since the newly elected parliament has amended the rules, ministers are now summoned more often than before.

Croatia

Score 7

Parliamentary committees can and do summon ministers for hearings. However, these hearings are not always taken seriously by ministers. Ministers occasionally refuse to answer questions. Although the work of investigative commissions that summon ministers or former ministers to testify at parliamentary hearings is generally of great public interest, the impact of such initiatives is relatively limited. For that reason, ministers occasionally refuse to answer questions.

Citation:

Staničić, F., Čačija, M. (2016): Kontrola koju provode istražna povjerenstva Hrvatskog sabora – učinkovit oblik kontrole? (The Control Implemented by the Inquiry Commissions of the Croatian Parliament – An effective Form of Control?). *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu/Collected Papers of the Law Faculty of the University of Split*, 53(2): 439-466.

Israel

Score 7

Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers. According to the basic law's provisions on the Knesset, every committee may require a minister to appear before it, and the minister is obliged either to attend the meeting or send a representative to provide the required information. Officials invited by committees generally attend meetings as requested. However, ministers and other public figures do occasionally refuse requests or provide insufficient information, causing conflicts between the Knesset and the government. Committees have no real power to enforce sanctions in these cases. Moreover, they are not authorized to force a minister to provide information at a set date in order to better prepare for a meeting.

One exception to the rule detailed above is the Knesset's State Audit Committee. Since 1990, the audit committee is able to warrant the attendance of officials, and fine officials who failed to show up to the committee or sufficiently justify their lack of compliance (though the size of the fine is not specified).

Citation:

Ataeli, Amichai, "The Evasion and its Punishment," Yedioth Aharonot, 07.07.2016, <http://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4825644,00.html> (Hebrew)

Lis, Jonathan, "Instead of an investigation committee, a decoration committee: In the Knesset they are jealous of American congress," Haaretz 7.9.2014: <http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/premium-1.2426295> (Hebrew)

Plesner, Yohanan, "There is Still Hope for Knesset Reform," IDI Website, 10.8.2017, <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/18582>

"The Legislature's Authority to Inquire Information, and the Obligation to Provide True Information," Knesset Research and Information Center (December 2002). (Hebrew)

Malta

Score 7

A parliamentary committee may call any minister unless precluded from doing so by a vote within the committee. In 2012, the house speaker ruled that committees have the authority to devise their own rules and approved this method. Since 2013, with few exceptions, ministers have freely appeared before various committees to provide explanations or answer questions. In fact, the number of such committee meetings has increased. Konrad Mizzi, a former minister, in 2021, initially refused on a number of occasions to appear before the public accounts committee to testify on electro-gas.

Citation:

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20150824/local/security-committee-to-discuss-visas-scam.581745>

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160919/local/public-accounts-committee-expected-to-examine-state-hospital-contracts.625475>

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160118/local/committee-wrapping-up-long-oil-procurement-debate.599271>

Times of Malta 13/10/2021 Konrad Mizzi refuses to appear in parliament as witness for a second time

Poland

- Score 7** Ministers and heads of the supreme organs of state administration (or their representatives) are obliged to participate in committee meetings whenever issues are discussed that fall within their domain. Groups comprising at least 15 members of parliament and parliamentary party groups have the right to ask for up-to-date information from members of the government. The PiS government has taken the summoning of ministers less seriously than previous governments. Ministers have occasionally refused to follow invitations or to answer questions.

Slovakia

- Score 7** The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in Article 85 of the Slovak constitution. In practice, committees make relatively little use of this right, as the majority of committee members are members of parliament belonging to a government coalition party and often block such proposals.

Cyprus

- Score 5** The constitution (Art. 79) stipulates that the president “may address” or “transmit his views” to the House of Representatives or a committee “through the ministers.” Moreover, ministers “may follow the proceedings, [...] make a statement to, or inform” the House of Representatives or a committee on issues within their sphere of responsibility. Thus, constitutionally, the parliament has no power to summon executive officials. A law passed by the parliament in 1985 makes it mandatory for officials, though not ministers, to attend. Although, generally, ministers respond positively to invitations, there have been cases where ministers and other officials have failed or declined invitation to appear themselves or be represented. No attempt has ever been made to activate the law penalizing failures to appear. Thus, since attendance ultimately lies with the discretion of the executive, ministers feel comfortable ignoring invitations when the subject is related to a contentious matter or for other reasons.

Citation:

1. The Constitution of Cyprus, http://www.parliament.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/download/filename/SYNTAGMA_EN.pdf/foldername/articleFile/minute/pdf/

Hungary

- Score 5** The standing orders of the Hungarian parliament stipulate that ministers have to report personally to the parliamentary committee(s) concerned with their issue area at least once a year. However, they do not guarantee parliamentary committees the right to summon ministers for other hearings as well. Moreover, ministerial hearings

suffer from heavy time restrictions, with individual members of parliament having only two minutes to speak. Overall, the number of interpellations is sinking. In 2013, 267 interpellations took place, while there were 219 in 2017 and only 150 in 2021. The number is sinking both in governmental and opposition-induced cases, which shows that even the opposition is losing trust in the instrument.

Citation:

Országgyűlés Hivatala: Összehasonlító sztatistikai adatok 2013, 2017, 2021 évek, p. 11; <https://www.parlament.hu/documents/10181/56582/%C3%96sszehasonl%C3%ADt%C3%B3+adatok+az+Orsz%C3%A1lgy%C5%B1%C3%A9s+2013.%2C+2017.%2C+2021.+%C3%A9ves+munk%C3%A1j%C3%A1r%C3%B3l.pdf/8a9904c0-8aec-9371-95ed-063e451efed4?t=1640083243221>

Turkey

Score 4

Ministers can attend committee meetings as a representative of the government without invitation and may talk on the subject matter at hand (Rules of Procedure, Article 29, 30, and 31). However, ministers may also delegate a senior civil servant to be his or her representative at a committee meeting. If relevant, the committee may ask a minister to explain a government position, but he or she is not required to comply with this invitation if there is no legal obligation (Article 62). While parliamentary committees are not able to summon ministers for hearings, the responsible minister may voluntarily decide to participate in a meeting. Normally, the committees are briefed by high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats. In the new presidential system, the ministers will always be present at the Planning and Budget Committee when the previous year's final accounts and the following year's draft budget are discussed. They also attend the budgetary debates in the plenary. An inquiry by one of the opposition deputies revealed that written questions are one of the most important elements of the current oversight mechanism, but almost no question was answered within the legal time limit.

During the review period, corruption scandals, mayoral resignations, economic instability, and regional affairs (e.g., Turkey's involvement in the war in Syria, the massive movement of refugees from neighboring countries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments in and outside of Turkey) were highly visible. None of the government's senior executives took responsibility for or allowed for an independent parliamentary investigation into these issues. Instead, the government – including the president as both head of the executive and chairman of the governing party – demonstrated a lack of accountability vis-à-vis parliament.

Citation:

Gazeteduvar. "17 bakana soru: Kimi link verdi, kimi adres gösterdi," October 18, 2021. <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/17-bakana-soru-kimi-link-verdi-kimi-adres-gosterdi-haber-1538759>

Indicator **Summoning Experts**

Question **Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?**

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
- 8-6 = The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
- 5-3 = The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
- 2-1 = Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.

Australia

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees conduct inquiries, to which experts are always invited to give evidence. Experts are also sometimes compelled to appear before committee inquiries.

Austria

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees have no formal limits in terms of summoning experts. Every party, including the opposition (i.e., the committee's minority parties), can nominate or invite experts it deems qualified. Expert hearings are held regularly and frequently. However, this opportunity is not always used in the best-possible way. The twin factors of party discipline and cabinet dominance over the parliament's majority mean that independent expert voices do not ultimately have great influence.

The coronavirus pandemic gave rise to some spectacular incidents concerning experts reporting to the parliament. In 2021, a senior scientific expert was accused of lying about coronavirus-related facts by the FPÖ, which led to the abrupt termination of the hearing.

Citation:

<https://www.diepresse.com/6034876/eklat-bei-expertenhearing-fpoe-bezichtigt-aerzteammer-praesident-der-luege>

Bulgaria

- Score 10 Under the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Bulgarian parliament, parliamentary committees are able to invite experts. This opportunity is available to deputies from the opposition as well. Experts are obliged to provide the committees

with any information and documents that the latter require for their work. While experts cannot be obliged to attend the committee meetings, these invitations carry considerable prestige and an opportunity to have an input in the legislative process, thus providing incentive to respond promptly. Due to budget constraints, committees have to be selective, and cannot invite a broad range of experts; however, they use this opportunity regularly.

Canada

Score 10 Parliamentary committees have the right to summon any expert they choose to provide testimony, and experts are frequent contributors to the work of committees. However, committees cannot compel experts to appear. Parliamentary committees have allowed experts to appear virtually long before the pandemic.

Croatia

Score 10 Croatia is one of the rare countries where experts can be named as outside members of parliamentary committees, and this has become a regular practice. The Committee for International Relations, the Committee for European Integration and the Committee for Internal Affairs and National Security are the only exceptions to this rule.

Czechia

Score 10 In Czechia, parliamentary committees and subcommittees may summon experts, and often do so.

Estonia

Score 10 Parliamentary committees can summon experts for committee meetings. They do this regularly, and to an increasing extent. Each committee determines which experts to call for each particular matter. In addition to ministerial representatives, researchers from universities and think-tank representatives, NGO activists involved in draft-law preparatory work are often invited. The scope of hearings varies depending on the public interest and priority of the issue under investigation.

Finland

Score 10 Parliamentary committees are able to summon experts for committee meetings, which they do regularly and increasingly frequently. A committee starts its work with a recommendation by the committee's own experts on which additional experts to call. This may include ministerial representatives or other individuals who have either assisted in preparatory work or represent specific agencies, organizations or

other interested parties. The scope of hearings varies greatly. In some cases, only one expert may be called, but in major legislative projects a committee may hear dozens of experts. Data from earlier research shows that committees in 1938 consulted advisers in 59% of all cases on which they prepared reports. The corresponding figure for 1960 was 94% and 100% in 1983. The number of experts consulted has likewise been increasing. All expert opinions provided since 2015 can be downloaded from the parliament's homepage.

The only problem with the experts' statements is that they are not made public before a legal proposal is accepted or rejected. Therefore, the public has no opportunity to critique the statements before they have been processed by the parliamentary committee.

Citation:

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/EN/lakiensaaminen/valiokunnat/Pages/default.aspx>

Dag Anckar, "Finland: Dualism and Consensual Rule," in Erik Damgaard, ed.: *Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries*, Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1992, pp. 182-186.

Suutari, Jari. 2018. "Valiokuntien asiantuntijalausuntojen saatavuus,"

<https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/kirjasto/aineistot/eduskunta/valtiopaivaasiakirjat-tietopaketti/Sivut/asiantuntijalausuntojen-saatavuus.aspx>

France

Score 10

Parliamentary committees can summon as many experts as they wish as often as they need in all matters, and they often make use of this right. The recent Benalla affair, involving a close ally of the president, has shown that committees enjoy considerable power in that matter. One serious problem is that members of parliament are often absent, even in cases of very important issues such as Brexit.

Germany

Score 10

Parliamentary committees are able to hold public hearings at any time, and can summon experts to attend them. This mechanism is regularly used. Rule 70 Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Bundestag states that "for the purpose of obtaining information on a subject under debate, a committee may hold public hearings of experts, representatives of interest groups and other persons who can furnish information." Experts are often able to influence parliamentary discussions or ministerial drafts and bring about changes in the draft laws. The number of public hearings is increasing.

Greece

Score 10

Regular committees summon experts from ministries, universities, NGOs and professional associations. Examples include high-ranking EC officials who have briefed the European Affairs Committee and university professors who have briefed the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs on university reforms.

Typically, government and the opposition tend to disagree on everything, even if there is consensus among experts that policy choices are very limited (e.g., the consensus on the obvious unsustainability of the pension system and on the destructive impact of party-led politicization on Greek universities). Political parties may tend to summon experts who in turn support the view of the party that has invited them. Recurrent disagreement in parliamentary committees reflects the long-term polarization in the Greek party system, as well as the broader mistrust and relatively low social capital that characterizes Greek society. In the period under review, parliamentary committees summoned many different experts, including technocrats and academics. In fact, over time there has been increasing interaction between parliamentary committees and experts from many different academic fields and professions.

Citation:

Summoning experts to regular committees is regulated by article 38 of the Standing Orders of the Greek parliament.

Iceland

Score 10

Independent experts are frequently asked to appear before standing parliamentary committees. Following the 2008 economic collapse, committees have more frequently summoned experts, particularly lawyers, economists, and finance and banking experts. Furthermore, political scientists and other experts were asked to give advice relating to the drafting of a new constitution. However, no substantive minutes are recorded of expert testimonies before parliamentary meetings. There have been examples documented of experts making outlandish statements in their testimonies.

In November 2018, the constitutional and supervisory committee of parliament summoned several members of parliament to a hearing following a scandal in which six members of parliament were taped in a public bar by an offended bystander using foul and misogynistic language, several of the members of parliament were intoxicated at the time of the incident. With one exception, the summoned members of parliament did not attend the hearing and the hearing was postponed indefinitely.

Citation:

Gylfason, Thorvaldur (2014), "Tvöfalt líf – Allir segjast vera saklausir ...," samtal við Þráinn Bertelsson (Double Life – Everyone proclaims innocence ..., a conversation with Þráinn Bertelsson), *Tímarit Máls og menningar*, 4. hefti, <https://tmm.forlagid.is/tvofalt-lif/>. Accessed 4 February 2022.

Ireland

Score 10

There are no restrictions on summoning expert witnesses to their meetings. As above (see "Strategic Planning"), the government has in general relied heavily on experts over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic to inform policymaking and to justify decisions (Colfer, 2021).

Citation:

Colfer, B. (2020) Herd-immunity across intangible borders: Public policy responses to COVID-19 in Ireland and the UK, *European Policy Analysis*, 06(02) pp 203-225, <https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1096>;

Norway

- Score 10 Each party represented on a parliamentary committee has the right to invite experts to appear at committee hearings. This kind of invitation is becoming increasingly common, with experts coming from interest organizations, NGOs, businesses and academia to present information and views on various issues and policy proposals. Moreover, the parliament has a group of independent experts who assist legislators by collecting and analyzing information.

Sweden

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees may certainly summon experts. They do not usually do so as part of the regular deliberation of the committees, but rather in the form of a public hearing on some specific issue.

Switzerland

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actually used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council's Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, which were then broadcast live over the internet.

United Kingdom

- Score 10 Parliamentary committees may summon expert witnesses who will usually provide any evidence willingly. Should they decline to do so, committees then have the power to order a witness to attend, though this would be exceptional. Committees also often employ experts as specialist advisers.

Committees may also summon actors involved in an issue that the committee is investigating. Examples include the examination of press barons in the context of the Leveson Inquiry into phone hacking by journalists, of the entrepreneur Philip Green regarding the pension deficit of the BHS department store chain, and of Cambridge

Analytica executives during the Information Commissioner's investigation into the propagation of misinformation during the Brexit referendum campaign. Such hearings invariably attract extensive media coverage. In the last two years, the key advisers to the government on the pandemic (both those holding formal offices, such as the chief scientific officer and the chief medical officer, and independent experts) have appeared a number of times as witnesses.

United States

Score 10

The invitation of outside experts to testify at committee hearings is an established, highly routine practice in the legislative process. Hearing transcripts are published, and testimony from a variety of qualified witnesses is expected in a competent committee process. Although congressional norms call for permitting both parties to select witnesses, some committee chairs in the current era severely limit the minority-party witnesses, resulting in a selection of witnesses strongly biased in favor of the majority-party position.

Belgium

Score 9

Experts are regularly invited and questioned in parliamentary committees. The rights of committees do not appear to be restricted. Experts are often called upon, for instance when committees are addressing so-called ethical laws (involving issues such as euthanasia, adoption rights for same-sex couples, religious-related disputes, and so on) or institutional reforms. There are some de facto restrictions as to the range of experts invited, as the decision in principle to query expert advice must be validated by an absolute majority of committee members. This gives a de facto veto power to the majority parties.

The management of the COVID-19 crisis relied heavily on experts' opinions, and different groups were created to coordinate the inputs. At the onset of the crisis, the government activated the National Security Council (NSC), a structure designed to closely monitor and provide advice in the event of major crises and national emergencies. Most critical in this regard were its Risk Assessment Group (RAG) and Risk Management Group (RMG) components, which collaborated in an emergency "medical cluster." To assess the potential economic impact of the epidemic, another NSC expert group, the Economic Risk Management Group (ERMG), was created. Later on, a fourth expert group was installed, the Group of Experts for the Exit Strategy (GEES), focusing on concrete strategies for exiting the first lockdown. As the idea that the crisis was not temporary became more prevalent, the GEES was replaced by the GEMS, or the Group of Experts in Management Strategy, which continues to advise the government with regular reports on the evolution of the public health situation and suggests possible measures that could be taken.

Citation:

<https://vsse.be/fr/notre-fonctionnement/cadre-legal-et-administratif/le-conseil-national-de-securite>
<https://www.vocabulairepolitique.be/conseil-national-de-securite/>
<https://www.lesoir.be/343730/article/2020-12-15/coronavirus-le-gems-succede-au-gees>
<https://www.lesoir.be/342853/article/2020-12-10/coronavirus-voici-le-casting-du-nouveau-groupe-dexperts-qui-conseillera-le>

Chile

Score 9

Congressional committees may summon any civil servant to interview as a subject-area expert. Private experts can also be invited, but the National Congress lacks the financial funds to pay for the assistance of prominent private experts. However, there is a group of 50 to 60 specialists from a variety of subject areas affiliated with the Library of the National Congress, whose task it is to offer professional support to the members of Congress in their lawmaking, representative, diplomatic and oversight tasks.

Citation:

Library of the National Congress of Chile (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, BCN): <https://www.bcn.cl>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

Denmark

Score 9

Normal committee meetings take place behind closed doors. However, committees can decide to hold open meetings – including ones without the minister present – and invite experts from outside, as well as civil servants and representatives from interest organizations to explore and discuss issues. Such meetings are also open to the press.

Committees may also decide to conduct larger hearings, occasionally in cooperation with other organizations. Such hearings normally take place in the room in which the former second chamber of the Danish parliament, the Landsting, met until it was abolished by the new constitution in 1953. To learn more about the issues they legislate, members of parliament also go on study trips and take part in conferences.

Citation:

Folketinget, Håndbog i Folketingsarbejdet. October 2015.
http://www.ft.dk/Dokumenter/Publikationer/Folketinget/~/_media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publikationer/Folketinget/H%C3%A5ndbog%20i%20folketingsarbejdet_web_7%20MB.pdf.ashx (accessed 24 April 2013).

Israel

Score 9

Parliamentary committees are entitled to invite experts or any interested civilian to meetings. However, these figures are not obligated to attend, unlike civil servants or representatives of the executive. In addition, independent experts are not compelled to answer committee members' questions. Their testimony cannot serve as evidence and has no official status. Despite these issues, citizens who appear before Knesset committees are generally interested in voicing their opinions in order to reinforce their viewpoints in the eyes of decision-makers and the public.

Citation:

Blander, Dana. "Opinion regarding Corrections to Base Law: the Knesset, Base Law: the Government and the Knesset Act concerning the Authorities of Parliamentary Inquiry Committee." The Israeli Democracy Institute. July 4th, 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.idi.org.il/ministerial-committee/16190> (Hebrew).

Freidberg, Chen and Atmor, Nir, "How to improve the Knesset's position as a legislator and a supervisory body?" The Israel Democracy Institute 2013: <http://www.idi.org.il/media/2438022/00321913.pdf> (Hebrew).

Shapira, Asaf, "Citizens in the Parliamentary Committees," The Israel Democracy Institute, (September 2010). (Hebrew).

"The authority of the legislature to inquire information, and the obligation to provide true information," Knesset Research and Information Center (December 2002). (Hebrew).

Kam, Zeev, "Refused to show up in a Knesset committee after summoning? Punishment will follow" NRG 19.4.2016 <http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/770/601.html> (Hebrew)

Italy

Score 9

Parliamentary regulations provide for the right of committees to invite any person able to provide important information (art. 143, 144 Regolamento Camera dei deputati). They can also ask the government to command special studies from the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) (art. 145). The rights of committees are not limited, and committees frequently use this opportunity to summon experts. This also reflects the fact that the Italian committee system plays a more prominent role in the legislative process than do committees in other European parliamentary regimes. Special parliamentary commissions may be established to investigate particular topics. These parliamentary commissions can also summon experts to give evidence. Recently, a joint parliamentary commission of inquiry on the banking system was established and senior officials from the Banca d'Italia were summoned.

Lithuania

Score 9

When considering draft legislation, parliamentary committees can receive and consider comments from experts. Committees can also invite experts to participate in special hearings focusing on draft legislation or engage in a parliamentary oversight function. Committees can establish preparatory working groups whose membership can involve experts or scientists. The extent to which experts are involved in the activities of parliamentary committees varies by specific committee and policy issue. However, the degree to which expert advice is actually integrated into the legislative process remains unclear, as there is no requirement for members of parliament to conduct impact assessments of their legislative proposals. In addition, external expert assessments of particular draft laws are sometimes commissioned as a political instrument intended to delay adoption of those legal norms. Funds allocated for external impact assessment studies are usually inadequate in any case, because members of parliament are concerned that they might be criticized for wasting taxpayer money.

Luxembourg

Score 9

Consultations with experts and representatives of interest groups take place regularly in the course of various ongoing commission work. Domestic and foreign experts, as well as lobbyists and concerned civil society groups, may be invited to participate in commission meetings. Under particular circumstances of public interest, experts are invited to parliament to introduce subjects and to offer professional opinions.

In the case of important policy reform projects, the government usually asks for advice from reputable foreign institutes, being aware of the limited base of knowledge available within the country. For example, German and Swiss institutes were consulted over psychiatry reforms in healthcare. A similar consultation approach was used for reforming environmental legislation. Such policy projects are implemented by a specific parliamentary commission, with a budgetary allowance made available to support outsourced inquiries. Innovation is often driven by foreign expertise and reports, which overcomes domestic resistance.

A transparency register for deputies that the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) had asked for on several occasions will require politicians to disclose meetings with representatives and organizations. Every month, each deputy and parliamentary group will have to publicly identify which lobbyists they met with during that time period. The register is expected to help citizens identify the origin of deputies' policy proposals.

Citation:

"MPs to be obligated to register meetings with lobbyists in transparency register." RTL Today (23 June 2021). <https://today.rtl.lu/news/luxembourg/a/1743451.html>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

"Mémorial A n° 227 de 2014." Journal officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 11 Dec. 2014, legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/memorial/2014/227. Accessed 14 January 2022.

Malta

Score 9

Parliamentary committees may summon experts to make presentations or help committees evaluate policies under discussion or shed light on issues under investigation. While the Parliamentary Accounts Committee has long used this process, it has recently become more widespread, with experts being called more frequently before the Social Affairs Committee, the Economic Policy Committee and to a lesser extent the Environmental Committee. However, problems may arise due to the government's reluctance to reveal commercial information, as in case of the hospital management contract.

Citation:

Let MPs summon Vitals deal stakeholders. PN tells government, Times of Malta 06/01/1

Standing Orders of the House of Representatives Subsidiary Legislation Constit.02 Article 164

Financial scrutiny of Vitals to remain secret: Request to publish due diligence exercise denied by Data Protection Commissioner, Times of Malta 03/10/18

Mexico

- Score 9 Congressional committees frequently summon experts, including international ones, and often take their input seriously. Indeed, there is evidence that experts play a considerable role in the legislative process. This aspect of governance mostly works well, because it provides a source of independent scrutiny.

Netherlands

- Score 9 Parliamentary committees may and do regularly summon experts. For example, during the coronavirus crisis, the Committee for Public Health, Welfare and Sports regularly summoned members of the Outbreak Management Teams for so-called technical briefings. In the past, parliament has summoned experts for special topics like climate change.

Citation:

R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), *Governance and Politics of the Netherlands*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 163-174.

Tweede Kamer, Debat gemist, Update coronavirus

18 augustus 2021 Vaste commissie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport Technische briefing

New Zealand

- Score 9 Select committees may summon experts. The only restriction is with regard to public servants who need the approval of their minister to attend committee meetings. There has been some criticism of alleged politicization in the choice of experts called to testify during the Epidemic Response Committee's period of operation in 2020 (Curtin, 2021), but for the most part committee work is considered to be open and reliable.

Citation:

Curtin, (2021) <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/end-new-zealands-zero-covid-policy>
Officials and Select Committees – Guidelines (Wellington: States Services Commission 2007).

Portugal

- Score 9 Parliamentary committees are both legally and practically free to request the attendance of experts at committee meetings. This right is exercised by committees when they see fit. An example of this was the June 2021 hearing on urban areas of illegal genesis, which featured testimony by academic experts. The frequency of such testimony varies from committee to committee, but there are no legal or practical constraints on such hearings.

Citation:
Audição Parlamentar N° 97-CAEOT-XIV, available online at:
<https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalleAudicao.aspx?BID=127127>

Romania

Score 9 According to Article 55(2) of the Chamber of Deputies Regulations, “committees may invite interested persons, representatives of non-governmental organizations and experts from public authorities or from other specialized institutions to attend their meetings. The representatives of non-governmental organizations and the experts may present their opinions on the matters that are under discussion in the Committee or may hand over documents regarding the matters under discussion to the Committee President.” The frequency with which experts are invited has differed among committees.

Slovenia

Score 9 Parliamentary committees in Slovenia may invite experts or form expert groups in charge of helping to draft legislative proposals. Under the Šarec government, the number of experts invited has decreased as a result primarily of a much smaller volume of legislative proposals being prepared and adopted in 2018–19. However, under the Janša government, when the number of legislative proposals substantially increased, the number of invited experts returned to previous levels. Parliamentary committees have launched several public expert discussions on important pieces of legislation and invited experts to the sessions of investigation committees. On the initiative of the National Council, a large expert group has been involved in preparing legislation for the introduction of regions.

Hungary

Score 8 According to the standing orders of the Hungarian parliament, all parliamentary party groups can invite experts, and the sessions of the committees are open to the public. In practice, however, Fidesz’s overwhelming majority and the hectic pace of legislation have reduced the involvement of experts to a mere formality. While the rights are there and there are few legal obstacles to the summoning of experts, the consultation of experts does not play a major role in the policymaking process.

Slovakia

Score 8 In Slovakia, parliamentary committees may invite experts. However, this is not a very common practice.

South Korea

Score 8 Parliamentary committees are legally able to, and frequently do, summon experts to parliamentary hearings. The National Assembly Act provides that besides expert advisers who are assigned to individual committees, a committee may provide commissions with up to three experts in the relevant matter as assistants in connection with the examination of important matters or matters requiring expert knowledge. In other instances, the National Assembly summons interested parties to be questioned about their own activities. For example, during a 2021 audit, the National Assembly summoned the heads of Kakao, Coupang and Naver to question them about excessive market dominance and abuse of power over small businesses. Refusals to attend or false testimony are subject to punishment based on the 2017 Act on Testimony, Appraisal Before the National Assembly.

Citation:

Act on Testimony, appraisal, etc. before the National Assembly, Act No. 14757, Mar. 21, 2017
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=42837&lang=ENG

Park, Jae-hyuk. "Naver Founder to Be Summoned to National Assembly Audit." *The Korea Times*, September 29, 2021. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/biz/2021/12/602_316201.html.

국회법 (National Assembly Act), Act No. 18367, July 27, 2021,
https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=25732&lang=ENG

Spain

Score 8 The standing orders of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate state that parliamentary committees may request, through their respective speakers, "the attendance of persons competent in the subject-matter for the purposes of reporting to and advising the committee." The rights of parliamentary committees to send invitations to independent experts are not limited by any legal constraint.

Requests to summon experts have increased in number in recent years, particularly at the beginning of the legislative process or in specialized subcommittees. Nevertheless, the limited nature of the parliament's staffing and financial resources have to date prevented any systematic involvement in the lawmaking process by university scholars, think tank analysts or other experts. There has been formal and informal collaboration with other public administrations and the Bank of Spain, although this information cannot be considered autonomous and include political judgment of the executive.

In October 2020, the Joint Congress-Senate Commission was created to assess the causes and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Several experts were invited to appear before the committee.

Citation:

Kölling, M. and I. Molina. (2022), *The Administration of the Spanish Cortes Generales: Organizing Legitimacy, Executive Dominance and Party Discipline*, Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations. (Forthcoming)

Cyprus

Score 7 Under the law, parliamentary committees have the power to summon experts. In practice, committees invite interested parties and stakeholders to present their views, but inviting independent experts or seeking their views is exceptionally rare.

Under the law, a person that attends a parliamentary committee meeting has the obligation to provide genuine data and tell the truth.

Citation:

1. Law on the Deposition of Data and Information to the House of Representatives and to Parliamentary Committees, L.21(I)/1985, http://www.cylaw.org/nomoi/enop/non-ind/1985_1_21/full.html (in Greek)

Japan

Score 7 Under Article 62 of the constitution, the Diet and its committees can summon witnesses, including experts. Summoned witnesses have the duty to appear before parliament. The opposition can also ask for witnesses to be called, and under normal circumstances such requests are granted by the government. However, the use of expert testimony in parliamentary committees is not widespread; experts, academic and otherwise, are relied upon more frequently within the context of government advisory committees, in particular at ministerial level.

Latvia

Score 7 Parliamentary committees are able to invite experts to committee meetings but have no power to make attendance mandatory. The parliament largely relies on the pro bono participation of experts to compensate for its own lack of substantive capacities and resources. However, committee chairs do have some discretion to pay modest honorariums to external experts.

Poland

Score 7 Parliamentary committees have the right to invite experts to give statements on hearings on particular issues or to take part in ordinary committee proceedings. However, suppose bills are introduced by individual members of parliament (as has often been the case under the PiS government). In that case, the summoning of experts must be supported by a majority of members of parliament. The PiS majority in the Sejm has used this procedural rule to limit the invitation of experts close to the parliamentary opposition. Given the maneuvering of the PiS in the Sejm, some experts have refrained from participating in what they consider political manipulation.

Turkey

Score 6

According to the parliamentary rules of procedure, committees are legally able to summon experts from non-governmental organizations, universities, or the bureaucracy to provide testimony without limitation (Rules of Procedure, Article 29 and 30). There is no available data relating to parliamentary committees' summoning of experts since the 2018 legislative elections.

Citation:

Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. "The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity," I. Khmelko et al (eds) *Legislative Decline in the 21st Century* (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.

Indicator Task Area Congruence

Question Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

41 OECD and EU countries are sorted according to their performance on a scale from 10 (best) to 1 (lowest). This scale is tied to four qualitative evaluation levels.

- 10-9 = The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
- 8-6 = The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
- 5-3 = The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
- 2-1 = The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.

Finland

- Score 10 A total of 16 permanent special parliamentary committees along with the Grand Committee (which focuses mainly on EU issues) prepare government bills, legislative initiatives, government reports and other matters for plenary sessions. Reforms of the committee system in the early 1990s aimed to improve parliamentary committees' alignment with ministry responsibilities. These reforms have been highly successful and committees are now thematically bound within the scope of a corresponding ministry. The Grand Committee is in practice a committee for the handling of EU-related matters.

Australia

- Score 9 The number of parliamentary committees exceeds the number of government departments (ministries). This is because there are a number of committees concerned with internal matters of parliament, such as parliamentary privileges, procedure and publications. In general, the task area of each "externally oriented" parliamentary committee is confined to one government department, but some government departments have more than one committee monitoring their activities. The demarcation between task areas of committees that oversee the same department is usually clear, and the split does not lead to incoherent parliamentary action.

Citation:

https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=comm_li st.htm#joint

Austria

- Score 9 Though parliamentary committees outnumber ministries, the task areas of parliamentary committees are more or less identical to the tasks of the ministries with only minor exceptions. The National Council's General Committee enjoys a kind of overall competence, including deciding the government's position within the European Council.

Bulgaria

- Score 9 For the last several parliamentary terms, Bulgaria has maintained standing parliamentary committees that closely follow or effectively repeat the structure of the Council of Ministers.

Canada

- Score 9 As of 2021, there were 24 standing committees of the House of Commons and 18 standing committees of the Senate. The new (2021) Liberal cabinet has 39 members. As such, there are more ministries than committees with some variation in the number of ministries over time. However, since some cabinet positions (e.g., the leader of the government in the House of Commons) have no corresponding ministries and some ministers (e.g., the minister for international development) are heads of agencies under the umbrella of a larger ministry, the number of ministries is very close to the number of House of Commons standing committees (by far the most important of the two houses). Therefore, parliamentary committees are largely capable of monitoring ministries.

Czechia

- Score 9 The Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies do not prescribe a particular distribution of subject areas among committees. The chamber is obliged to establish the Mandate and Immunity Committee, the Committee on Petitions, the Budget Committee, the Control Committee, the Organizing Committee, the Electoral Committee, and the Committee on European Affairs. However, the establishment of additional committees is within its competence. Committee meetings are public, except for the Organizing Committee, and the Mandate and Immunity Committee meetings. In the 2017–2021 term, there were 18 parliamentary committees, 15 of which shadowed government ministries or ministerial agendas. However, there was no exact match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries. For example, the Economic Committee covered the agendas of two ministries, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Transportation. Parliamentary committees can and frequently do establish subcommittees.

Estonia

Score 9

The 11 standing committees of the parliament by and large match the structure of the government, which is composed of 11 ministries. In addition to task areas that correspond to ministries, there is also a European Union Affairs Committee that monitors the country's EU policy. Legal affairs are split between two permanent committees, the Constitutional Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee. Cultural and educational affairs both fall under the purview of the Cultural Affairs Committee. The working schedule of the standing committees is established by the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act, with committee work sessions spread over three days and totaling 12 hours per week.

All members of parliament belong to one standing committee (excluding the EU Affairs Committee), with each committee having about 10 members. At present, no standing committee is chaired by an opposition member of parliament, which represents a challenge to the democratic principle of checks and balances.

In addition to the standing committees, there are currently one investigative committee and three special committees. Considering that the members of these task force committees are also full members of standing committees, the workload of several members of parliament is considerable and concerns have been voiced about unreasonable fragmentation under scarce resources. The influence of special committees on the design of reforms has remained marginal in most cases.

Germany

Score 9

In general, the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries coincide. However, this is not always the case since the Basic Law provides for the establishment of several committees that do not have a ministerial counterpart (including the Committee on the European Union; the Petitions Committee; the Parliamentary Control Panel). Furthermore, several committees sometimes deal with matters that are within the responsibility of a single ministry (e.g., the Committee on Internal Affairs and the Sports Committee both monitor activities performed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior), and a single committee sometimes deals with matters that are not clearly assigned to a single ministry (e.g., the Committee on Digital Affairs). Nonetheless, parliamentary committees' most important policy areas fully coincide with those of the ministries, which facilitates effective monitoring.

Japan

Score 9 The Diet's standing committees (17 in both chambers) closely correspond to the sectoral responsibility of the government's major ministries. The portfolios of the ministers of state cover special task areas and are in some cases mirrored by special committees (e.g., consumer affairs). Special committees can and have been setup to deal with current (or recurring) issues. In the lower house, there are currently nine such committees that deal with issues such as disaster management.

Citation:
The House of Representatives, Japan, Committees, n.d.
https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_english.nsf/html/statics/guide/committee.htm

Netherlands

Score 9 There are 12 (fixed) parliamentary committees (vaste kamercommissies). Only the prime minister's Department of General Affairs lacks an analogous dedicated parliamentary committee. There are also fixed committees for interdepartmental policymaking on aggregate government expenditure, European affairs and foreign trade, and development aid. Parliamentary committees usually have 25 members, representing all political parties with seats in the States General; they specialize in the policy issues of their dedicated departments and inform their peers (i.e., tell them how to vote as part of the party voting-discipline system). Members of parliament in these parliamentary oversight committees usually have close contacts with (deputy) ministers and (far less) high-level civil servants in the departments they oversee. Some observers see this as having contributed to a mutual interweaving of the executive and legislative branch of the government, thereby diminishing the executive's accountability to the legislature. There are approximately 1,700 public and non-public committee meetings per year. By giving the committees the right to introduce, discuss and vote on motions (without a subsequent plenary debate and voting), the pressure on the plenary meetings is reduced, and the oversight role of the committees strengthened.

There has been a debate about the Committee on Security (Commissie Stiekem), which includes all leaders of the political parties, as some lawmakers have expressed concern about a lack of effective parliamentary oversight on crucial security issues. Very little is known about why such criticism was voiced and how members look at their role in the parliamentary committee. Other committees have public sessions (since 1966) that are broadcast, which means that there is more information available on the activities of the various political parties. Smaller political parties, especially ones with between one and three members, simply cannot attend all committee meetings. Over time, the core of parliamentary activity has moved from the plenary sessions to the committees.

Commissies (tweedekamer.nl, consulted 6 November 2014)

S. Otjes, 6 February 2019, *Wie bepaalt de agenda van de Tweede Kamer?* (stukroodvlees.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

G. H. Hagelstein, *De parlementaire commissies* (Nederlands parlamentsrecht, Monografie VI, Dissertatie Groningen 1991; Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1991, xix + 443 blz., ISBN 90 01 36530 2).

Hijzen, Constant. 2013. "More Than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community." *Security and Human Rights* 24; 227-238.

Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. *Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?*

Norway

Score 9

There is considerable overlap between the organization of the parliament into standing committees and the government into ministries. Though this arrangement is not perfect, it is congruent enough to enable parliamentarians to hold ministers to account. Cross-cutting issues regarding EU and European Economic Area concerns have historically posed some challenges.

Portugal

Score 9

The Assembly of the Republic has 12 permanent committees, each with a policy focus.

All ministries are covered by at least one committee, although some committees cover areas of more than one ministry. While these committees by-and-large reflect the portfolios of ministries, there is not an exact correlation, as the number of ministries (19) in the 22nd constitutional government exceeded the number of committees (14).

The 14 permanent committees are:

- Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees
- Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Portuguese Communities
- National Defense Committee
- European Affairs Committee
- Budget and Finance Committee
- Committee on Economics, Innovation, Public Works and Housing
- Committee on Agriculture and the Sea
- Committee on Education, Science, Youth and Sport
- Health Committee
- Committee on Labor and Social Security
- Committee on the Environment, Energy and Territorial Planning
- Committee on Culture and Media
- Committee on Culture and Media
- Committee on Public Administration, Administrative Modernization, Decentralization and Local Government
- Committee on Transparency and the Statute of Members

Each committee can create sub-committees to work on a specific area or project. Creating a sub-committee requires the prior authorization of the president of the Assembly of the Republic, after consultation with the Conference of Parliamentary Committee Presidents. Further, each committee can also create working groups for even more specialized tasks.

In addition, and of greater importance for monitoring government ministries, the Assembly of the Republic can create ad hoc parliamentary committees of inquiry. Their specific purpose is, according to the parliamentary rules of procedure, to “assess compliance with the constitution and the laws and consider the acts of the Government and the Administration.” These ad hoc committees of inquiry have investigative power and judicial authority. During the period under review, two such committees operated. These committees focused on the state’s role in granting support after the 2017 forest fires; and on the losses suffered by the Novo Banco bank and the funding it subsequently received from the Resolution Fund.

Citation:

Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Republic, available online at: http://www.parlamento.pt/sites/EN/Parliament/Documents/Rules_of_Procedure.pdf

Slovakia

Score 9

In the current term, the Slovak National Council has more parliamentary committees than there are ministries (by a ratio of 19 to 14). Two committees (the European Affairs Committee and the Committee for Human Rights and Minorities) have several ministerial counterparts and three committees have special mandates such as supervising intelligence services. However, committees cover all ministerial task areas and thus, the allocation of subject areas among committees does not hamper parliamentary oversight of ministries.

South Korea

Score 9

The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries mostly correspond. As of December 2022, there were 17 standing committees tasked with examining bills and petitions falling under their respective jurisdictions and with performing other duties as prescribed by relevant laws. With the exception of the House Steering Committee and the Legislation and Judiciary Committee, the task areas of these parliamentary committees correspond with the ministries. As a consequence of the strong majoritarian tendency of the political system, committees dominated by the governing parties tend to be softer on the monitoring of ministries, whereas committees led by opposition parliamentarians are more confrontational. However, in general, the legislature is a “committee parliament” and the committees are quite effective and efficient.

Citation:

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, http://korea.na.go.kr/int/org_06.jsp

Croissant, Aurel 2014. Das Politische System Südkoreas, in: Derichs, Claudia/Heberer, Thomas (Hrsg.), Die politischen Systeme in Ostasien, 3., überarbeitete Auflage, Wiesbaden (i.E.).

Spain

Score 9

The task areas of the regular parliamentary committees in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate generally correspond to the functions exercised by government ministries. Since 2020, the 22 ministries have been monitored by 21 standing legislative committees in the Congress, which were even renamed to match the ministerial portfolios. Thus, there is no mismatch, although other structural factors (limited committee resources) are rather more problematic with regard to effective monitoring. In recent years, the delay in forming governments has also interfered with the organization of parliamentary committees.

Citation:

Índice de Comisiones, XIV Legislatura

<https://www.congreso.es/comisiones>

Sweden

Score 9

There is a high degree of congruence between government departments and parliamentary committees, but no perfect overlap. This is of course no coincidence. The configuration of government departments is more flexible than that of parliamentary committees, which has undergone very few changes over the last several decades. Ensuring that the committee system matches the GO's organization in departments is essential to the efficiency of both institutions. Furthermore, the GO and the parliament (Riksdag) staff have regular meetings to ensure that the parliament and individual committees are not overloaded with government bills, but that there is a steady flow of bills across the year.

United States

Score 9

The structure of committees in the House and Senate largely reflects the structure of the executive branch. When deviations occur, the adverse effect on the ability of the House and Senate to monitor executive activities and performance is modest. But there are also effects on the burdens of oversight for the agencies. Agencies will sometimes face hearings and investigations from several committees from both chambers that have jurisdiction over an agency or program. Indeed, committees compete for the publicity that comes with investigating a highly salient topic. Because members of Congress develop large stakes in monitoring and influencing particular programs, the structure of the congressional committee system often is a

serious barrier to reorganization of the executive branch. In financial regulatory reform, for example, committee jurisdiction stood in the way of organizational reform because the proposed abolition of the Office of Thrift Supervision would have resulted in a committee losing its jurisdiction.

Belgium

Score 8 The number of parliamentary committees in the House of Representatives is slightly larger than the number of ministries. There are 11 permanent committees that address key policy areas largely aligned with ministerial portfolios (e.g., defense, justice, budget or external affairs), while 13 special committees focus on specific topics (e.g., committees on COVID-19 or on Belgium's colonial past in Congo) or cross-cutting issues (e.g., constitutional reform). Committees are largely able to monitor ministries, but the effectiveness of this monitoring can be underwhelming, as the recent experience regarding nuclear safety and electricity supply has demonstrated.

Citation:

List and functioning of commissions:

<https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm>

https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_12_02.pdf

Croatia

Score 8 In the current parliamentary term, the number of committees has substantially exceeded the number of ministries. However, this discrepancy stems largely from the existence of committees that deal with internal parliamentary affairs such as the Credentials and Privileges Committee, Interparliamentary Cooperation Committee, and Petitions and Appeals Committee. The task areas of the other parliamentary committees largely match those of the ministries, thus enabling an effective monitoring.

Denmark

Score 8 The committee structure largely corresponds to the structure of ministries. The Ministry of Social Affairs, for instance, corresponds to the social affairs committee in the parliament (Folketinget). The Ministry of Taxation corresponds to the fiscal affairs committee in the assembly. Other committees, for instance, deal with energy, defense, culture, environment, healthcare and education, and have strong ties to the applicable minister.

A few committees do not have a direct parallel, such as the European Affairs Committee. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating EU policy, the European Affairs committee will have consultations (samråd) with all

ministers that take part in European Council meetings, and seek a mandate for upcoming negotiations in the council. This may create internal coordination problems in the parliament, between the European Affairs committee and the committees dealing with the substance of EU legislation (fagudvalg).

Citation:
Folketinget, Håndbog i Folketingsarbejdet. Oktober 2015.
http://www.ft.dk/dokumenter/publikationer/folketinget/haandbog_i_folketingsarbejdet_2011.aspx (Accessed 22 Oktober 2014).

Finn Laursen, "The Role of National Parliamentary Committees in European Scrutiny: Reflections based on the Danish Case," in Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz, eds. *The Europeanisation of Parliamentary Democracy*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006, pp. 110-125.

Italy

Score 8

The tasks of committees and ministries mostly coincide. However, there are a few cases where more than one ministry is overseen by a single committee. For instance, this happens with the Presidency of the Council and the Ministry of the Interior, for the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Ministry Education, and for the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Public Works). Parliamentary committees have instruments at their disposal enabling the effective monitoring of ministries' activities.

Committees meet frequently and their members are assisted by highly qualified technical personnel. However, parliamentarians are not always interested in fully exploiting their monitoring prerogatives. Often, they prefer to concentrate either on issues with high media visibility or of local relevance rather than on the more important administrative processes taking place far from the spotlight.

Lithuania

Score 8

There is extensive congruence between the current structure of 16 parliamentary committees and the primary areas of competence of Lithuania's 14 ministries. The Committee for the Future is the most recent one, established in 2020. However, there are a few mismatches. On the one hand, some ministries (Economy, Transport, and Communications) and other state institutions are monitored by a single Committee on Economics. On the other hand, there are several horizontal parliamentary committees (including committees on Audit, European Affairs and Human Rights). The parliament also has 10 standing commissions, some of which are related to policy areas assigned to the Lithuanian ministries (especially the Commission for Energy and Sustainable Development, the most active of these bodies). Thus, the composition of parliamentary committees allows government policy to be monitored on both a sectoral and horizontal basis.

Committees meet on a regular basis, but the bulk of committee activities are related to the consideration of draft legislation. The workload of individual committees in the legislative process varies substantially, with the committees on Legal Affairs, State Administration and Local Authorities, Social Affairs and Labor, and Budget and Finance accounting for about 55% of the legislative review work delegated to the committees. The amount of attention given to the exercise of the parliamentary oversight function remains insufficient, but the exact amount depends on the particular committee.

Citation:

Alvidas Lukošaitis, "Parlamentinės kontrolės įgyvendinimas Lietuvoje: metodologinės pastabos apie trūkinėjančią "šeiminko-samdinio grandinę"//Politologija. 2007, nr. 2

Luxembourg

Score 8

Parliamentary committees and ministries are well coordinated and parliamentary monitoring is satisfactory. Ministers appear regularly before committees and communication is adequate. Although the number of ministries has grown over the years, reaching 20 ministries and 17 ministers, the number of parliamentarians has still not increased beyond 60 members. There are 29 permanent committees and four subcommittees. Each committee has up to 13 members. As such, their workload has expanded considerably in recent years, which has made running standing committees more challenging. In general, members of parliament are often members of more than one committee.

Citation:

"Réglement de la Chambre des Députés." Chambre des Députés du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (16 décembre 2021). <https://www.chd.lu/wps/wcm/connect/public/dadc958b-a532-4acb-ae85-5f7b20ed05a2/Rglement+CHD16122021.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&ContentCache=NONE&CACHE=NONE&CVID=nUw4CwA>. Accessed 14 January 2022.

"Public administration characteristics and performance in EU28: Luxembourg." European Commission. Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion Support for developing better country knowledge on public administration and institutional capacity-building" (VC/2016/0492) (2018).

Poland

Score 8

The number of Sejm committees exceeds the number of ministries. However, most ministries, including the more important ones, have only a single oversight committee, a so-called branch committee. Thus, the distribution of subject areas among committees does not infringe upon parliament's ability to monitor ministries.

Slovenia

Score 8

The Slovenian parliament has two kinds of working bodies – 13 committees and two subcommittees – that normally cover the work of ministries and eight commissions, some of them standing, which deal with more specific issues such as rules of

procedure, the supervision of intelligence and security services, and issues concerning national minorities. Under both the Šarec and Janša governments, the committee structure has remained largely unchanged, even though the number of ministries has increased. As a result, the number of committees overseeing more than one ministry has grown. However, this has not infringed on the monitoring of ministries.

Citation:

Slovenian National Assembly 2021: Working Bodies. Ljubljana (https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/en/Home/pos/WorkingBodies!/ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8zivSy9Hb283Q0N3I2CTA0CXYyefIMNjA2cfQ31w8EKnPyCTD3BCrycTAWCjf19nYLMgwwNA030o4jRj0cBSL8BDuBooF-QGxoKACLpVWs!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/).

Switzerland

Score 8

The Swiss government has only seven ministries, and all attempts to enlarge this number has failed due to political opposition within parliament. Hence, most of the seven ministries have responsibility for many more issue areas than in other democracies. Both the first and the second parliamentary chambers have nine committees dealing with legislation and two committees with oversight functions (e.g., the Finance Committee, which supervises the confederation's financial management). Four other committees have additional tasks (e.g., the Drafting Committee, which checks the wording of bills and legal texts before final votes). Thus, the task areas of the parliamentary committees do not correspond closely to the task areas of the ministries. Nonetheless, this does not suggest that the committees are not able to monitor the ministries. As the mismatch between ministerial committees and ministries is a function of how the federal government is organized, it does not impair parliament's oversight function. The congruence between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries therefore is largely suited to the monitoring of ministries.

Chile

Score 7

The Chilean legislature's oversight function is exerted primarily by the Chamber of Deputies and its (currently) 27 permanent committees (Comisiones Permanentes) and several ad hoc investigative committees (Comisiones Investigadoras). These permanent committees correlate in part with the 24 ministries. However, there are overlaps and intersections; some single committees, for example, are responsible for an area of responsibility that touches on various ministries' work, while a single ministry's area of responsibility may in some cases be distributed across multiple committees. It should be noted that Chile is not a parliamentary but a presidential system and thus ministers are not directly accountable to the Chilean National Congress. Therefore, the degree of control exercised by the congressional committees is institutionally rather weak.

Citation:

Quantity and name of the permanent parliamentary committees, https://www.camara.cl/legislacion/comisiones/comisiones_permanentes.aspx, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

Ministries and subsidiary public institutions. <https://www.gob.cl/instituciones>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

About interpellations of ministers:

Fundación 2020, “Qué es una interpelación y cuál es su objetivo”, November 2014, <http://www.educacion2020.cl/noticia/que-es-una-interpelacion-y-cual-es-su-objetivo>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

Historical interpellations:

Chamber of Deputies of Chile (Cámara de Diputados), <https://www.camara.cl/fiscalizacion/interpelaciones/interpelaciones.aspx>, last accessed: 13 January 2022.

United Kingdom

Score 7

Every government department is shadowed by a committee in the House of Commons, which looks at three facets of the department's work: spending, policies and administration. The remit and number of committees adapts to reflect changes in the makeup of the government. There are also two select committees – the Public Accounts Committee and the (more recent development) Environmental Audit Committee – which undertake cross-departmental scrutiny. House of Lords select committees focus on broader topics and are less directly matched to departmental task areas, but cover important areas. One example is the Science and Technology Select Committee, which in turn has subcommittees that cover specific topics, such as the implications of autonomous mobility or the possible meaning of the withdrawal from the European Union for universities' staff policies.

However, the capacity of committees to monitor effectively is limited due to a lack of resources and limited continuity in membership (e.g., the House of Lords rules oblige members to be rotated off a committee after four years, although from direct observation of the work of its committees this does not seem to weaken them). Also, the number of reports they issue massively exceeds the time available on the floor of the House to debate them and, despite increased efforts by the committees to publicize them, not all reports achieve much media coverage.

A new Brexit committee, with an above average membership and a careful balance of members to reflect conflicting views, was created after the 2016 referendum. However, this did not prevent the topic from splitting the House of Commons, with large parts of 2019 marked by complete political paralysis. The return of majority government after the 2019 general election solved that problem. During the pandemic, parliamentary committees provided timely scrutiny and criticism of government action.

Greece

Score 6 After the change in government in July 2019, the number of ministries remained 19 (the same as in the pre-2019 period). The number of parliamentary committees also remained the same, with six standing committees. This discrepancy (19 ministries versus six committees) created a task mismatch, but parliamentary scrutiny was jointly carried out in selected committees.

For instance, there is the Standing Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, and the Standing Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs. However, there are also four special standing committees (e.g., on European affairs) and eight special permanent committees (e.g., on armament programs and contracts) with more specific agendas, as well as several subcommittees.

The task of monitoring ministries is undermined by the sometimes decorative participation of members of parliament in committee meetings. Even though competences have been transferred from the plenary of the Greek parliament to the regular committees (which examine new legislation), this has not considerably improved the quality of legislation or of parliamentary control.

Citation:

Information on the number, competences and tasks of regular committees of the Greek parliament in English is available at <http://www.hellenicparliament.gr>

Information on Committees of the Greek parliament is available here: <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/Katigories>

Ireland

Score 6 There is a considerable amount of variance in both the number and task congruence of committees across parliaments.

There are 33 regular committees serving the current Dáil. Of these, 13 can be seen as “core” committees, namely those focusing on agriculture and marine issues; children, disability, equality and integration; education; enterprise, trade and employment; finance; foreign affairs; healthcare; housing, local government and heritage; justice; media, tourism, arts, culture, sport and the gaeltacht; transport; the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement; and the public accounts. Committees shadow the main line ministries for the most part. In addition, there are also other types of committees, such as special committees (i.e., temporary, subject-specific committees rather than standing committees). These have included special committees on the COVID-19 response, the future funding of water resources, the future of healthcare, and housing and homelessness. In July 2016, as part of the process of reforming the Dáil, a new standing committee was established, the Committee on Budgetary Oversight, to help parliament monitor the government’s

economic and financial policy decisions. The current committee has 15 members representing all parliamentary parties. No member of the committee can be a government minister (Oir, 2022).

Malta

Score 6

There are presently 16 standing committees, several of which are fully congruent with ministerial portfolios. These include health, foreign affairs, environment, economic and financial affairs, and social affairs. The main monitoring committee is the Public Accounts Committee, which is chaired by a member of the opposition. Since 2016, committees have become more involved in monitoring ministries, though they also retain an advisory role. Ad hoc committees are also established from time to time. The Standing Committee on Foreign and EU Affairs, for example, scrutinizes pipeline aquis, because of the scale of this task, three subcommittees were created: one acting as a clearinghouse, and the other two dealing with the various policy areas in line with ministerial portfolios. This standing committee also works very closely with the other standing committees. In 2018, a new Standing Committee for Standards in Public Life was inaugurated to assist the new commissioner in this area. This figure was empowered to look into breaches of ethics committed by members of parliament and those appointed within the public service on a position-of-trust basis. A new Petitions Committee has also been created. Additionally, a number of joint committees facilitate policy development and implementation across ministries.

Citation:

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160118/local/committee-wrapping-up-long-oil-procurement-debate.599271>

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20151024/local/zonqor-university-site-selection-to-be-discussed-during-parliament.589443>

<http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20150724/local/committee-to-consider-whether-gay-men-should-donate-blood.577877>

<http://www.parlament.mt/standing-committees?l=1>

The Parliament of Malta web page

Parliament Annual Report 2020

New Zealand

Score 6

The New Zealand House of Representatives is too small to establish as many select committees as would be necessary to fully correspond to the number of ministries and there is no public appetite for increasing the size of parliament. In recent years, efforts have been made to restrict the number of select committees any individual member of parliament may sit on. Select committees are appointed at the start of each parliament following a general election. The number of members on a committee can vary, but normally a committee has between six and 12 members each, with parties broadly represented in proportion to party membership in the

House of Representatives. Areas of ministerial responsibility are reflected in 12 subject-select committees and seven specialist committees (under the Labour-Green government that took office in 2020). These committees have had to scrutinize 68 portfolios and four “other ministerial entities” (as of January 2022), led by 20 cabinet ministers, four ministers outside the cabinet, two “cooperation agreement” ministers and two parliamentary undersecretaries.

Citation:

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (n.d.) Directory of Ministerial portfolios. <https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/ministers-and-their-portfolios/ministerial-portfolios/directory>

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (n.d.) Ministerial list. <https://dpmc.govt.nz/our-business-units/cabinet-office/ministers-and-their-portfolios/ministerial-list>

New Zealand Parliament (n.d.) List of select committees. <https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/sc/scl/>

Romania

Score 6

The number of committees in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies is roughly in line with the number of ministries in the government. However, the legislature’s oversight capacity is reduced by the incomplete match between the task areas of ministries and parliamentary committees. The number and task areas of the ministries changed significantly after the Dăncilă government was replaced by the government of Ludovic Orban, but, these changes did not lead to changes in parliamentary committees.

In the current parliament, the six permanent committees remain and only two standing committees have been struck, though this number should increase as the government stabilizes.

Cyprus

Score 5

In 2020–2021, the House of Representatives comprises 55 deputies, 16 committees and six ad hoc committees. There is one committee for each of the 11 ministries, while five deal with cross-ministerial matters. According to the latest available activity report of the House of Representatives, during the 2020–2021 session, committees held 550 meetings (compared to 613 in 2019). The Defense Committee held 10 and the Committee for Legal Affairs held 54 meetings.

The proper monitoring of the work of the ministries is critically hindered by three factors: the small number of deputies (56), high membership needed in most committees (nine) and very broad scope of each line-ministry’s competences. Each deputy must participate in at least three committees. Insufficient knowledge and deficient study and preparation is sometimes combined with deputies’ readiness to serve interests promoted by lobbyists.

Citation:

House of Representatives, Activity Report 2020 – 2021 (in Greek)

<http://www.parliament.cy/images/media/redirectfile/Apologismos2021-A.pdf>

Iceland

Score 5

The coalition negotiations between the Independence Party, the Progressive Party and the Left-Green Movement, following the September 2021 election, included a reorganization of ministries. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Children became the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Labor Market. Some of the former ministry's responsibilities were assigned to the new Ministry of Education and Children's Affairs, which was also made responsible for primary and secondary education. The Ministry of Education and Culture Affairs was abolished, and cultural policy was assigned to the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Culture. At the same time, responsibility for university education was assigned to the new Ministry of Science, Industry and Innovation. Other ministries remained unchanged, except that the Ministry of Communications and Local Government was renamed the Ministry of Infrastructure. This reshuffle further reduced the policy alignment between standing parliamentary committees and ministry responsibilities.

Two of the standing parliamentary committees have a special role vis-à-vis the government. The committee responsible for financial issues and budget preparation has the authority to request information from institutions and companies that ask for budgetary funding. The Committee on Foreign Affairs has advisory status vis-à-vis the government regarding all major international policies and the government is obliged to discuss all major decisions concerning international affairs with the committee.

Parliamentary committees rarely oppose the ministries, as party affiliation of committee members reflects the parliamentary power of the governing parties. Thus, even if the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries nearly coincide, that does not guarantee effective monitoring. Minority members from the opposition can, however, use the committees as a venue to voice their opinions.

Mexico

Score 5

There are far more committees than members of the cabinet. This is negative from the point of view of effective monitoring. Yet there are more significant obstacles to the effectiveness of congressional committees than their official scope. The most notable limitation has been the one-term limit for legislators, which has now been changed. However, it is too early to assess the effect of this change.

Turkey

Score 5 Under the Turkish presidential system, the number of ministries has been reduced to 16. Although advocates of the new system argued that the system would run more efficiently, the alignment of ministries (or rather the presidency and its new executive structure) and parliamentary committees is likely to create frictions in policymaking.

There are 18 standing committees in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), which are generally established in parallel with the structure of the ministries. The exceptional committees include the Petition Commission and the Human Rights Investigation Commission. Except for committees established by special laws, the jurisdiction of each committee is not expressly defined by the Rules of Procedure. Therefore, some committees have overlapping tasks. Committees examine draft bills and may also supervise ministry activities indirectly.

The State Economic Enterprises Commission does not audit ministries but plays an important role in monitoring developments within their administration. The distribution of the workload of these committees is uneven. The Planning and Budget Commission is the most overloaded group, as every bill possesses some financial aspect.

Citation:

Ö.F. Gençkaya. 2020. "The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity," I. Khmelko et al (eds) *Legislative Decline in the 21st Century* (pp. 82-93). Routledge: New York.

Ş. İba. 2017. *Parlamento Hukuku*, Ankara: Turhan Yayınevi

Hungary

Score 4 Ever since the 2010 reduction in the number of ministries, there has been a strong mismatch between the task areas of ministries and committees. The fact that ministries have been covered by several committees has complicated the monitoring of ministries. Moreover, the real decision-making centers, the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office are not covered by any parliamentary committee at all.

Latvia

Score 4 The task areas of the parliamentary committees poorly match the task areas of the ministries. Only the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Justice have an equivalent parliamentary committee. These committees being the Budget and Finance Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Committee of Justice. While the Ministry of Agriculture reports to only a single committee, this committee oversees three other ministries. In all other cases, ministries report to multiple committees and committees oversee multiple ministries' task areas.

Citation:

1. List of Parliamentary Committees: https://titania.saeima.lv/Personal/Deputati/Saeima13_DepWeb_Public.nsf/structureview?readform&type=3&lang=L
2. Composition of the Cabinet of Ministers: <https://www.mk.gov.lv/en/amatpersonas>

France

Score 3

There is no congruence between the structures of ministries and those of parliamentary committees. The number of parliamentary committees is limited to eight (up from six in 2008) while there are 25 to 30 ministries or state secretaries. This rule introduced in 1958 was meant as, and resulted in, a limitation of deputies' power to follow and control each ministry's activities closely and precisely. The 2007-08 constitutional reform permitted a slight increase in the number of committees, and allowed the establishment of committees dealing with European affairs.

Israel

Score 3

Knesset committees are currently not well structured for efficient government monitoring. The structure of the ministries and the parliament's committees diverges significantly: The Knesset has 12 permanent committees, while the number of ministries shifts according to political agreements, totaling 29 at the time of writing (headed by 22 ministers, excluding the prime minister). Since parliamentary committees are divided by themes and not by ministerial responsibilities, they often struggle to gather and coordinate information. High turnover rates among representatives also makes it difficult to control professional and bureaucratic information. Although the number of committees is average by global standards, the combination of a small number of parliamentarians (120) and the usually broad coalitions results in only two-thirds of all members being available to sit on committees regularly. Some members of the Knesset sit on as many as five or six committees, inevitably impairing their committees' supervisory capabilities. This problem may be somewhat mitigated by the recent adoption of the Norwegian Law, which allows ministers who are members of the Knesset to quit the Knesset and be replaced by other members on their party list.

Citation:

Freidberg, Chen, "Monitoring of the executive by the parliament in Israel – potential and function," Doctoral Dissertation (2008) (Hebrew).

Freidberg, Chen and Atmor, Ronen, "How to improve the Knesset's position as a legislator and a supervisory body?" The Israel Democracy Institute 2013: <http://www.idi.org.il/media/2438022/00321913.pdf> (Hebrew).

Kenig, Ofer, "The new Israeli cabinet: An overview of the 33rd government of Israel," Israel Democracy Institute. (March 2013).

Kenig, Ofer, "Coalition building in Israel: A guide for the perplexed," Israel Democracy Institute. (February 2013).

"Knesset Committees," The Knesset Website: https://www.knesset.gov.il/deSCRIPTION/eng/eng_work_vaada.htm

"Ministries," Prime Minister's Office Website (Hebrew):
<http://www.pmo.gov.il/IsraelGov/Pages/GovMinistries.aspx>

Twentieth Knesset: Government 34 – Current Members,
https://knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByNumber_eng.asp?current=1

Address | Contact

Bertelsmann Stiftung

Carl-Bertelsmann-Straße 256
33311 Gütersloh
Germany
Phone +49 5241 81-0

Dr. Christof Schiller

Phone +49 30 275788-138
christof.schiller@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Dr. Thorsten Hellmann

Phone +49 5241 81-81236
thorsten.hellmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

Pia Paulini

Phone +49 5241 81-81468
pia.paulini@bertelsmann-stiftung.de

www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
www.sgi-network.org