Executive Capacity
#30Key Findings
Despite its strong presidential system, Mexico performs relatively poorly (rank 30) in the area of executive capacity. Its score has fallen by 0.7 points relative to its 2014 level.
Decision-making is strongly centralized in the presidency. Particularly under López Obrador, strategic planning and key policy proposals have come from the presidential office rather than from external units or line ministries. This office is staffed with appointees that have the capacity to assess line ministry proposals, and is responsible for interministerial coordination.
RIAs are common and of generally high quality, with the agency responsible recently having received a broader mandate. However, government interest in evidence-based policy has declined. The president has personally handled most public communication, eliminating contradictions. Public consultation has shifted away from traditional business and trade union groups toward the broader civil society.
The current government has a highly ambitious reform agenda, calling for a so-called fourth transformation. While major social programs have been implemented, key aspects – including anti-corruption policies, demilitarization of the drug war, and effective COVID-19 management – have not been successful. Austerity has made it difficult for subnational governments to complete their tasks.
Decision-making is strongly centralized in the presidency. Particularly under López Obrador, strategic planning and key policy proposals have come from the presidential office rather than from external units or line ministries. This office is staffed with appointees that have the capacity to assess line ministry proposals, and is responsible for interministerial coordination.
RIAs are common and of generally high quality, with the agency responsible recently having received a broader mandate. However, government interest in evidence-based policy has declined. The president has personally handled most public communication, eliminating contradictions. Public consultation has shifted away from traditional business and trade union groups toward the broader civil society.
The current government has a highly ambitious reform agenda, calling for a so-called fourth transformation. While major social programs have been implemented, key aspects – including anti-corruption policies, demilitarization of the drug war, and effective COVID-19 management – have not been successful. Austerity has made it difficult for subnational governments to complete their tasks.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
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1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The Mexican president is required by law to produce a strategic plan in his first year in office. At a lower level, there are quite a few planning units within the Mexican government, though they do not all have decisive input in the policymaking process. Longer-term, Mexico has committed itself to the SDGs and created a specialized technical committee involving 25 federal agencies, which will collect the statistical information required to monitor progress.
President López Obrador has an extraordinarily high level of legitimacy. Elected with the support of more than 53% of the Mexican voting population, with a majority in Congress and high approval rates (65% in November 2021), he has initiated a wide-ranging transformation of Mexico, the so-called fourth transformation. First, he repealed several reforms of the former government, such as the education reform. Second, he stopped infrastructure projects, like the new Mexico City Texcoco Airport. In addition, President López Obrador has created new social programs and plans to revive the Mexican oil industry. He has also pledged to demilitarize the war on drugs, a strategy which has so far failed. Another element of the so-called fourth transformation are state and electoral reforms. Mexico has numerous autonomous bodies and agencies; however, the government plans to limit their autonomy and centralize power, indicating that one goal is to cut government spending, among other arguments. Overall, strategic planning involved in these transformations has been concentrated in the presidency, less in strategic planning units and bodies.
President López Obrador has an extraordinarily high level of legitimacy. Elected with the support of more than 53% of the Mexican voting population, with a majority in Congress and high approval rates (65% in November 2021), he has initiated a wide-ranging transformation of Mexico, the so-called fourth transformation. First, he repealed several reforms of the former government, such as the education reform. Second, he stopped infrastructure projects, like the new Mexico City Texcoco Airport. In addition, President López Obrador has created new social programs and plans to revive the Mexican oil industry. He has also pledged to demilitarize the war on drugs, a strategy which has so far failed. Another element of the so-called fourth transformation are state and electoral reforms. Mexico has numerous autonomous bodies and agencies; however, the government plans to limit their autonomy and centralize power, indicating that one goal is to cut government spending, among other arguments. Overall, strategic planning involved in these transformations has been concentrated in the presidency, less in strategic planning units and bodies.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
In the Mexican political system, barriers between the government and scholars are comparatively low. It is quite common for a cabinet to include recruits from academia, and there are also substantial informal contacts between academics and high-level public officials. By the same token, former government officials often teach at universities.
After assuming office, President López Obrador announced he would strengthen relationships with experts and activists from civil society, rather than with economists and international professionals. In contrast to former governments, consultations with civil society actors and citizens enjoy high priority. However, these announcements have proven to be merely rhetorical. In reality, governmental decision-making is concentrated in the presidency, mainly in the figure of President López Obrador himself in a populist manner. Experts and members of the public are included in pro forma consultations.
After assuming office, President López Obrador announced he would strengthen relationships with experts and activists from civil society, rather than with economists and international professionals. In contrast to former governments, consultations with civil society actors and citizens enjoy high priority. However, these announcements have proven to be merely rhetorical. In reality, governmental decision-making is concentrated in the presidency, mainly in the figure of President López Obrador himself in a populist manner. Experts and members of the public are included in pro forma consultations.
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The presidential office offers positions of high prestige in Mexico. It is involved with the legislative process to a decisive degree. Due to the absence of a high-level career civil service, both the cabinet and the presidential office are staffed with presidential appointments, which generally have the capacity to assess proposals from line ministries. Nevertheless, the independence of figures within the executive is thus questionable since everyone of influence in the presidential office is a political appointee.
Holding a majority in Congress and benefiting from a high degree of public legitimacy, the initiatives of the president and MORENA are highly likely to be implemented. Decision-making is centralized in the presidency. In this regard, however, the midterm elections of 2021 did not strengthen the traditionally weaker position of the president in the second part of the term.
Holding a majority in Congress and benefiting from a high degree of public legitimacy, the initiatives of the president and MORENA are highly likely to be implemented. Decision-making is centralized in the presidency. In this regard, however, the midterm elections of 2021 did not strengthen the traditionally weaker position of the president in the second part of the term.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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9
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Given Mexico’s presidential system, cabinet ministers are respectful of and even deferential to the presidential office. Moreover, cabinet ministers dismissed by the president after disagreements rarely find a way back into high-level politics, which tends to promote loyalty to the president and presidential staff. Accordingly, senior figures in the presidential office are very powerful, because they determine access to the president and can influence ministerial careers. At present, President López Obrador dominates Mexican politics in a personalistic, populist manner. Nevertheless, the partially weakened position of the ruling coalition in Congress could weaken the cohesion of government in the second half of the president’s term.
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Mexico is unusual, because the constitution does not recognize the cabinet as a collective body. Instead, Mexico has four sub cabinets, respectively dealing with economic, social, political and security matters. As a result, Mexico in practice has a system of cabinet committees each of them normally chaired by the president. The full cabinet never or hardly ever meets. Mexico’s cabinet, as a collective, matters less than in most countries. The cabinet is not a supreme executive body as it is in, say, Britain. For one thing, there are a number of heads of executive agencies, with cabinet rank, who are not directly subject to a minister. President López Obrador is trying to reduce the importance and number of independent and autonomous bodies and agencies, as a means of increasing his power. By the end of the review period, many bodies had been staffed with loyal followers of the president. The central political figure has been and is the president.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Traditionally, there has been little real distinction in Mexico between high-ranking civil servants and politicians, though the relationship between them has varied quite a bit over time. The upper levels of the administration consist overwhelmingly of presidential appointments, with only a limited number of career bureaucrats. Two prominent exceptions are the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where bureaucratic expertise has always played a major role. The politicization of the cabinet, which has increased under the three recent administrations, is constraining its ability to coordinate policy proposals due to the centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, the previously mentioned independent agencies are often characterized by higher levels of bureaucratic professionalism. President López Obrador’s cabinet is filled with politicians who are close to the president, and decision-making is centralized in the presidency. Because of this personalization and centralization, policy proposals are effectively controlled by the presidency and ministries.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
A number of informal mechanisms for coordinating policy exist, and given the lack of “formal” coordination capabilities within the Mexican administration, informal coordination often functions as a substitute. This is normal in a presidential system where only a few cabinet secretaries have independent political bases. Ministers retain their positions, for the most part, at the will of the president. It is important to note, however, that some cabinet secretaries are more equal than others. Since his election, President López Obrador has dominated Mexican politics, and has exercised decision-making in a personalistic and populistic manner. Policy coordination thus rests in the hands of the presidency.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The Mexican government has adopted a National Digital Strategy and established a Change Management Plan in order to guide agencies in the development of projects. Furthermore, the Executive Council Interministerial Commission for e-Government Development (Comison Intersecretarial para el Desarrollo del Gobierno Electronico, CIDGE) has ensured the technical and operational coordination necessary to implement the strategy.
However, as for many projects in Mexico, the implementation of digitalization is falling behind schedule, especially on the subnational level and between different regions and/or cities with different financial and personal capacities. This is a reflection if the heterogeneity of digitalization in particular, and of modernization overall within the broader Mexican society.
Citations:
SDG 2018. Mexico’s SDG Portal Brings Functionality to Reporting. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/mexicos-sdg-portal-brings-functionality-to-reporting/
OECD Digital Government Studies Digital Government in Mexico Sustainable and Inclusive Transformation: Sustainable and Inclusive Transformation, OECD 2020.
However, as for many projects in Mexico, the implementation of digitalization is falling behind schedule, especially on the subnational level and between different regions and/or cities with different financial and personal capacities. This is a reflection if the heterogeneity of digitalization in particular, and of modernization overall within the broader Mexican society.
Citations:
SDG 2018. Mexico’s SDG Portal Brings Functionality to Reporting. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/mexicos-sdg-portal-brings-functionality-to-reporting/
OECD Digital Government Studies Digital Government in Mexico Sustainable and Inclusive Transformation: Sustainable and Inclusive Transformation, OECD 2020.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) was introduced in Mexico in 1997. In 2000, RIA was implemented broadly through reform of the Federal Administrative Procedure Law. Thus, RIA in Mexico is established by law, and not by presidential or prime ministerial degree as in some other OECD countries.
In May 2018, the new General Law of Better Regulation was issued. A government agency, the Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement (Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria, COFEMER), is responsible for performing impact assessments on new proposals if they generate compliance costs. With the new law, COFEMER’s mandate was broadened and the agency renamed the Comisión Nacional de Mejora Regulatoria (CONAMER). CONAMER assesses existing regulations. The law requires Mexico’s 32 states to adopt RIAs for subnational regulatory projects and there are efforts to expand this further. Overall, RIA could be strengthened by involving stakeholders early on in the process.
Beyond RIA, evidence-based evaluations of several Mexican public policies in the social sector have gained international recognition and have had significant spillover effects to the international evaluation community. This is especially true for social policies, where rigorous impact assessments based on experimental and quasi-experimental analyses of education, health, and nutrition programs (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, PROGRESA) can be perceived as an international showcase on how to evaluate large-scale social programs. In this area, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) is responsible for carrying out rigorous impact evaluations in large social-sector programs. CONEVAL is an autonomous agency created by the 2007 General Law on Social Development (Ley General de Desarrollo Social).
Citations:
Reyes, R et al (2015). Regulatory Impact Assessment in Mexico: A Story of Interest Groups Pressure. Law and Development Review 8, 1: 99-122.
In May 2018, the new General Law of Better Regulation was issued. A government agency, the Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement (Comisión Federal de Mejora Regulatoria, COFEMER), is responsible for performing impact assessments on new proposals if they generate compliance costs. With the new law, COFEMER’s mandate was broadened and the agency renamed the Comisión Nacional de Mejora Regulatoria (CONAMER). CONAMER assesses existing regulations. The law requires Mexico’s 32 states to adopt RIAs for subnational regulatory projects and there are efforts to expand this further. Overall, RIA could be strengthened by involving stakeholders early on in the process.
Beyond RIA, evidence-based evaluations of several Mexican public policies in the social sector have gained international recognition and have had significant spillover effects to the international evaluation community. This is especially true for social policies, where rigorous impact assessments based on experimental and quasi-experimental analyses of education, health, and nutrition programs (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación, PROGRESA) can be perceived as an international showcase on how to evaluate large-scale social programs. In this area, the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL) is responsible for carrying out rigorous impact evaluations in large social-sector programs. CONEVAL is an autonomous agency created by the 2007 General Law on Social Development (Ley General de Desarrollo Social).
Citations:
Reyes, R et al (2015). Regulatory Impact Assessment in Mexico: A Story of Interest Groups Pressure. Law and Development Review 8, 1: 99-122.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
RIA was introduced in Mexico in 1997 and its usage has spread from the federal government to some state governments. It has established itself as a legitimate part of the policymaking process. The relevant government agency, CONAMER (and its predecessor, COFEMER), is responsible to an interdepartmental committee that ultimately reports to the Ministry of Economy. CONAMER does not have a veto on new proposals, but it must be consulted and can express an opinion. Its position vis-à-vis the ministries was strengthened by the new law on regulation in 2018. It can prevent new regulations from coming into force until the consultation process is complete. CONAMER has also been active in negotiating the streamlining of procedures with individual Mexican states. This is significant, as much regulation is generated at subnational levels. After a quiet start, COFEMER/CONAMER has played a significant role in Mexico’s pro-competitive policy. Its annual reports are publicly available and provide critical assessments on regulatory projects. While input and output are clearly visible, the outcome of the RIA process cannot be assessed so far.
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
So far, RIAs have often highlighted international benchmarking to reinforce their investigations. As one example, in a recent development, the Mexican government signaled its intention to become a world leader in sustainable tourism. Here, sustainability relates to energy efficiency, improved environmental performance and the protection of cultural heritage. The government partnered with the private firm EC3 Global to support the adoption of their trademark EarthCheck science and solutions for tourism operators and companies committed to sustainable practices and to align their performance with global benchmarks, endorsed by the World Tourism Organization. EarthCheck is an internationally recognized environmental management and certification program with more than 1,300 members in 70 countries. The program improves the operational performance of member organizations and reduces costs. However, like in most other OECD countries, RIAs in Mexico have up to now not fully embraced a multidimensional sustainability perspective as is foreseen by the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development. This is a particular challenge against the backdrop of the United Nation’s Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals), which were supported by Mexico and require a multidimensional perspective – including social, economic and ecological dimensions – in public policymaking. However, Mexican government elites at the national level often still appear more likely to be aware of the SDGs than government elites in other OECD countries, which might lead to an improvement in the coming years.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Overall, Mexican policies are supposed to subjected to ex post evaluation and, at least at the national level, a comparatively strong culture of ex post evaluation has grown over the last two decades. This phenomenon is rooted in two different ideological streams. On the one hand, the traditional planning euphoria from a left-leaning, corporatist system has embraced the idea of ex post evaluation as an integral part of a well-mastered policy cycle. On the other hand, market liberal reforms and the influence of international finance organizations have introduced forms of new public management, with rigorous ex post evaluation seen as a crucial way to guarantee the efficiency and effectiveness of public policies.
Since 2012, mandatory guidelines require the use of ex post evaluations. As a consequence, Mexico has established one of the most developed evaluation policies in the field of social policy, which is executed by a constitutionally anchored evaluation agency, CONEVAL. Created in 2014, CONEVAL is established as an autonomous constitutional organization with a very high level of technical and management autonomy. Its task is to coordinate and manage the ex post evaluation of national social policies, and it does so with a very high level of sophistication. It consists of the head of the Ministry of Social Development, six well-known academics chosen by the National Social Development Commission and an executive secretary who is in charge of the council. In the international realm, CONEVAL has been an institutional innovation in poverty measurement and the evaluation of social public policies. So far, the independent provision of scientifically based evaluations has had a substantial impact on technically improving social policy programs in Mexico.
While CONEVAL represented a substantial move forward in the evaluation of social policies, a major setback occurred in mid-2019 when the head of CONEVAL was replaced after having criticized cuts to the agency’s budget. Given his prior critiques on the governments’ austerity policies, the replacement was perceived as a serious blow to the agency’s independence. It remains to be seen whether CONEVAL will continue to act as a critical but constructive evaluation agency in an environment where the central government, at least, has decreased its interest in evidence-based policymaking.
Beyond the field of social policy, however, other policy fields are subjected to less scientific ex post evaluations and, at the subnational level, much more remains to be done. However, the ongoing presence of many organizations of international development cooperation in Mexico as well as promising dynamics at the subnational level is favorable to the development of an evaluation-friendly environment. In this regard, there have been some initiatives focusing on improving evaluations of climate change adaptation, for instance.
Since 2012, mandatory guidelines require the use of ex post evaluations. As a consequence, Mexico has established one of the most developed evaluation policies in the field of social policy, which is executed by a constitutionally anchored evaluation agency, CONEVAL. Created in 2014, CONEVAL is established as an autonomous constitutional organization with a very high level of technical and management autonomy. Its task is to coordinate and manage the ex post evaluation of national social policies, and it does so with a very high level of sophistication. It consists of the head of the Ministry of Social Development, six well-known academics chosen by the National Social Development Commission and an executive secretary who is in charge of the council. In the international realm, CONEVAL has been an institutional innovation in poverty measurement and the evaluation of social public policies. So far, the independent provision of scientifically based evaluations has had a substantial impact on technically improving social policy programs in Mexico.
While CONEVAL represented a substantial move forward in the evaluation of social policies, a major setback occurred in mid-2019 when the head of CONEVAL was replaced after having criticized cuts to the agency’s budget. Given his prior critiques on the governments’ austerity policies, the replacement was perceived as a serious blow to the agency’s independence. It remains to be seen whether CONEVAL will continue to act as a critical but constructive evaluation agency in an environment where the central government, at least, has decreased its interest in evidence-based policymaking.
Beyond the field of social policy, however, other policy fields are subjected to less scientific ex post evaluations and, at the subnational level, much more remains to be done. However, the ongoing presence of many organizations of international development cooperation in Mexico as well as promising dynamics at the subnational level is favorable to the development of an evaluation-friendly environment. In this regard, there have been some initiatives focusing on improving evaluations of climate change adaptation, for instance.
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
With a high degree of legitimacy following the presidential election, President López Obrador announced more possibilities for public consultation. Popular consultation was undertaken for the planned new airport as well as for infrastructure projects in the south. In addition, the president’s daily press conference is intended to “consult” the public. The government is trying to integrate civil society actors and activists, although traditional business and trade union lobby groups remain outside. This is a clear break with the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s tradition of corporatism and clientelism, where participation has flowed mainly through corporatist and clientelist party channels rather than through independent civil society organizations.
Some participatory involvement occurs at the local and state levels, in the form of experiments with participatory budgeting, roundtables with stakeholder consultation and so on. While these types of consultation processes are not as strong as in other Latin American countries, they have become more common in Mexico.
One new element has been the introduction of elements of participatory democracy, such as referendums. In December 2020, the first national referendum took place, on the issue of impunity granted to presidents. A recall referendum on the current president was scheduled for 2022. Although participation in direct democratic mechanisms is to date very limited, and the elements in place have been used by President López Obrador in a top-down populist manner to legitimize himself and his policies, it remains to be seen whether this shift will ultimately produce a significant change in policymaking style in the future.
Some participatory involvement occurs at the local and state levels, in the form of experiments with participatory budgeting, roundtables with stakeholder consultation and so on. While these types of consultation processes are not as strong as in other Latin American countries, they have become more common in Mexico.
One new element has been the introduction of elements of participatory democracy, such as referendums. In December 2020, the first national referendum took place, on the issue of impunity granted to presidents. A recall referendum on the current president was scheduled for 2022. Although participation in direct democratic mechanisms is to date very limited, and the elements in place have been used by President López Obrador in a top-down populist manner to legitimize himself and his policies, it remains to be seen whether this shift will ultimately produce a significant change in policymaking style in the future.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
The communication performance of the current administration is based on the communication skills of the new president. As a populist, AMLO relies heavily on public communication. The daily press conferences at 7 a.m. are not addressed to the press, but are rather a means of directly communicating with the public. So far, no other politician or ministry has engaged in strategic communication, and major contradictions in government communications have not occurred. In some senses, this personalistic style has led to a highly coherent government communication style. At the same time, this seems to be an unsustainable strategy in a complex policy environment where communication ultimately needs to respond to complex issues in ways that go beyond populist rhetoric.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
President López Obrador has announced a highly ambitious reform agenda – the so-called fourth transformation – that is aimed at transforming Mexico socially, economically and politically. New social programs are being implemented and projects targeting the poor south have been announced, including infrastructure projects. President López Obrador has a unified government, with a majority in Congress supporting him. This has enabled him to concentrate power in the presidency. Additionally, he has very high levels of popular support. Hence, structural factors for implementing the agenda are very good. Nevertheless, he has failed to achieve key elements of his agenda, such as tackling corruption and ending the war on drugs. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has severely hit Mexico, producing serious economic challenges and one of the highest death tolls in the world. The government’s reform agenda was and remains too ambitious, and yet has not measured up to the even more demanding challenges of the last several years.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Whatever problems there may be with the Mexican system, it does deal effectively with the so-called agency problem, cabinet secretaries mostly have a strong incentive to avoid incurring presidential displeasure. The presidency is the center of the Mexican government and defines whole-of-government strategic priorities. Especially under President López Obrador, the degree to which power is centralized has increased, and the government is tracking progress on the implementation of policy priorities. At the same time, the second part of the presidential term usually increases the agency problem for the president. Given the results of the midterm elections, one can expect that this will also happen to AMLO’s presidency.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The presidential office can choose who it monitors and how. There are two caveats to this statement, however. First, Mexico is a federal system, and there are thus strong limits to the central government’s power as many competencies fall, at least partially, to the states or even the local level. Second, independent agencies headed by individuals of cabinet rank have taken on an expanding role during the last two decades. Yet where the central authority has power, it uses it. Under President López Obrador, the government has sought to concentrate power in the presidency and limit the autonomy of independent agencies. Hence, the presidency does monitor the rest of the government and the administration. However, in many instances, inadequate implementation is due to structural deficiencies in the systemic capacity of monitoring systems, particular in the areas of health and internal security. In core problem areas such as security and health, the central government’s capacity is rather poor.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
The process of monitoring tends to work better at the national level than at the subnational level, where the general process of accountability is more heterogeneously developed. Monitoring is considerable at particular times and places, but limited otherwise. Moreover, monitoring is selective due to uneven state capacity, which hampers greater coverage. Essentially, the commitment to monitoring depends on political constellations. Ministries can scrutinize bureaucratic agencies if they want to, but there are good reasons why they do not always do so. Decentralized agencies often try to exercise autonomy. President López Obrador has tried to limit the autonomy of independent bodies in order to increase the power of the president. Many such bodies are today headed by loyal allies, and independent bodies such as INE, the national electoral institute, have been attacked by the president. Additionally, political polarization has increased, which has led federal-state governors belonging to opposition parties to oppose the presidency instead of working together. The federal character of Mexico limits the ministries’ ability to engage in effective monitoring.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Mexico has three levels of government – central, state and municipal. In Mexican federalism, state governments are politically and economically more powerful than municipalities. The state governors’ association is a powerful lobby group that bargains effectively with the central government. In general terms, Mexico’s intergovernmental transfer system must reduce vertical imbalances and discretionary federal transfers. The latter are distributed from the center across states with political, rather than policy goals in mind and constitute a substantial share of government spending. Moreover, Mexican states need to increase their own revenues in order to become less dependent on central government transfers.
Due to government austerity, which has been a central theme for President López Obrador, underfunded mandates and insufficient resources have made successful completion of many government tasks challenging, and have undermined the realization of the principle of subsidiarity in Mexico’s fiscal federalism. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, President López Obrador announced a 75% budget cut, which seriously threatens many state activities.
Due to government austerity, which has been a central theme for President López Obrador, underfunded mandates and insufficient resources have made successful completion of many government tasks challenging, and have undermined the realization of the principle of subsidiarity in Mexico’s fiscal federalism. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, President López Obrador announced a 75% budget cut, which seriously threatens many state activities.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
The Mexican constitution gives subnational entities, in particular states, considerable opportunity to influence policy. However, fiscal federalism in Mexico still relies heavily on transfers and thus gives the central government considerable leverage over states. The economic heterogeneity of states is so substantial that there is a need for a solidarity-oriented transfer system. In other words, fiscal federalism in Mexico cannot rely on the principle of market-based federalism with its focus on competition among subnational entities. Additionally, considerable administrative capacity deficits persist at the subnational level. Under President López Obrador, the concentration of power in the presidency has further undermined this fragile equilibrium.
On 7 September 2021, the Mexican Supreme Court unanimously ruled that penalizing abortion was unconstitutional, setting an important precedent across the whole country.
Citations:
Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Fiscal Federalism and Redistribution in Mexico (December 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886703
On 7 September 2021, the Mexican Supreme Court unanimously ruled that penalizing abortion was unconstitutional, setting an important precedent across the whole country.
Citations:
Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Fiscal Federalism and Redistribution in Mexico (December 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2886703
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Insufficient funding, corruption and inefficiency inhibit the effective implementation of nationwide public policy standards in many sectors. While the government has launched several efforts to improve social policies, President López Obrador’s populist policy approach generally undermines public policy standards. Particularly with regard to pandemic-management efforts, it was clear that there are severe limits in the degree to which national standards can be reliably implemented at the regional and local level.
Citations:
Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA (November 2017) “Solving higher education conundrum key to 2018 election success?.”
Citations:
Latin American Regional Report: Mexico & NAFTA (November 2017) “Solving higher education conundrum key to 2018 election success?.”
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Insufficient funding, corruption and inefficiency inhibit effective regulation in many sectors. Additionally, fragmented responsibilities due to deficiencies in the federal Mexican system are prevalent. Vested interests often manage to block reforms or policy implementation. President López Obrador has attacked vested elite interests with his populist approach. The government has said it intended to establish stronger relations with NGOs, but instead of creating new formal standards, it has relied on informal discussions.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The Mexican governing elite have traditionally been very interested in adopting international standards and had a high degree of contact with international organizations and policy institutes. The major motivation for this is that multilateralism has always provided a strategic avenue for counterbalancing the country’s dependence on its northern neighbor. Moreover, many members of the policy elite have studied and/or worked abroad, mostly in English-speaking countries and sometimes in those international organizations that promote international norms. Mexico’s presidential system, with its directing authority at the center of the administration, also allows the country to make swift changes. However, while adaptability of the Mexican government is comparatively high in formal terms, implementation of new approaches and policies is much weaker, particularly when it involves subnational entities, heavily unionized sectors or counters economic interests in society. In this regard, one of the most challenging tasks for the Mexican government is currently to transfer the ambitious U.N. Global Goals (Sustainable Development Goals) agenda into domestic policies, adapting them to national priorities. Progress, thus far, seems to be slow. While formulating action plans and monitoring strategies at the national level faces little or no capacity barriers, the implementation and mainstreaming of policies at the local and regional level will be the major challenge. In addition, while Mexico has signaled commitment to human rights in international arenas, within the country the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law remain low. The current government, despite a tradition of paying attention to international initiatives, has been rather inward looking due to increasing domestic challenges. However, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mexico has become more active diplomatically, seeking to revitalize South-South cooperation, especially the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The Mexican government has almost completely lost its international reputation. In his first year in office, AMLO has not left Mexico. He refused to participate in G-20 meetings or U.N. assemblies. In an attempt to demonstrate to the Mexican population his commitment to domestic issues, this has undermined Mexico’s position in the world.
Mexico has traditionally been supportive of international initiatives, and played an active role in the United Nations, OECD and other intergovernmental organizations. It also was an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Numerous policy and organizational recommendations made by international bodies have been adopted in the Mexican policymaking process. Thus, it had a supportive role in many international attempts oriented toward the provision of global public goods. Whether this engagement will be revived again has to be seen.
President López Obrador and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard have revitalized CELAC in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic, using the pro tempore CELAC presidency to lead the demand for equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies. Additionally, Mexico has started domestic vaccine production and has distributed the results across Latin America. The weak standing of the United States and the absence of Brazil as a regional actor has opened space for a Mexican diplomatic comeback.
Mexico has traditionally been supportive of international initiatives, and played an active role in the United Nations, OECD and other intergovernmental organizations. It also was an enthusiastic participant in multilateral organizations, including international financial organizations such as the World Bank, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank. Numerous policy and organizational recommendations made by international bodies have been adopted in the Mexican policymaking process. Thus, it had a supportive role in many international attempts oriented toward the provision of global public goods. Whether this engagement will be revived again has to be seen.
President López Obrador and Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard have revitalized CELAC in the wake of COVID-19 pandemic, using the pro tempore CELAC presidency to lead the demand for equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and medical supplies. Additionally, Mexico has started domestic vaccine production and has distributed the results across Latin America. The weak standing of the United States and the absence of Brazil as a regional actor has opened space for a Mexican diplomatic comeback.
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
Historically, Mexico has often found ways of dealing with the so-called agency problem in policy implementation, which explains why institutional arrangements need constant monitoring. Traditionally this agency problem was dealt with by a high degree of corporatist authoritarianism, which came at a high cost for controlling agents. In today’s Mexico, democracy – even if sometimes insufficiently implemented – requires new models of overcoming this agency problem in an increasingly diversified and complex state structure. Particularly policymakers at the central level and in the more advanced states are becoming aware that effectively governing complexity requires different principles, including monitoring institutional governance arrangements. In July 2018, Mexico launched an online platform to track progress toward achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Yet, especially at the subnational level, pockets of authoritarianism, weak state capacity and widespread corruption result in uneven capacity for monitoring institutional arrangements and regulatory reforms. At the top of the political pyramid, the quality of self-monitoring still depends much on the personal engagement of the president. Mexican policymakers have tended to engage quite frequently in administrative reorganization, possibly to excess. President Peña Nieto was an ambitious, and perhaps excessive, but largely unsuccessful reformer. President López Obrador is even more ambitious, and is attempting to radically transform Mexico with his so-called fourth transformation agenda. López Obrador’s new social programs and plans to revive the Mexican oil industry are intended to transform Mexico’s socioeconomic structure. However, this socioeconomic transformation has been hindered and interrupted by numerous problems associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Another element of President López Obrador’s reform agenda, the demilitarization of the war on drugs, has failed completely. After the passage of half of López Obrador’s term, his approval ratings remain very high, despite several failures.
Institutional governing arrangements are centralized in the presidency. President López Obrador makes his own decisions on policies, and also determines whether and when governance is to be monitored, which is done sporadically when such activities conform with the president’s plans.
Citations:
SDG 2018. Mexico’s SDG Portal Brings Functionality to Reporting. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/mexicos-sdg-portal-brings-functionality-to-reporting/
Yet, especially at the subnational level, pockets of authoritarianism, weak state capacity and widespread corruption result in uneven capacity for monitoring institutional arrangements and regulatory reforms. At the top of the political pyramid, the quality of self-monitoring still depends much on the personal engagement of the president. Mexican policymakers have tended to engage quite frequently in administrative reorganization, possibly to excess. President Peña Nieto was an ambitious, and perhaps excessive, but largely unsuccessful reformer. President López Obrador is even more ambitious, and is attempting to radically transform Mexico with his so-called fourth transformation agenda. López Obrador’s new social programs and plans to revive the Mexican oil industry are intended to transform Mexico’s socioeconomic structure. However, this socioeconomic transformation has been hindered and interrupted by numerous problems associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Another element of President López Obrador’s reform agenda, the demilitarization of the war on drugs, has failed completely. After the passage of half of López Obrador’s term, his approval ratings remain very high, despite several failures.
Institutional governing arrangements are centralized in the presidency. President López Obrador makes his own decisions on policies, and also determines whether and when governance is to be monitored, which is done sporadically when such activities conform with the president’s plans.
Citations:
SDG 2018. Mexico’s SDG Portal Brings Functionality to Reporting. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/mexicos-sdg-portal-brings-functionality-to-reporting/
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
While Mexican policy elites are often receptive to new ideas and open to administrative reform, many of these reforms remain unimplemented and are abandoned before they can take root. This is especially true with regard to domestic security and law enforcement. Too often, the re-drawing of organizational diagrams has taken precedence over the implementation of desperately needed, but difficult structural reforms to strengthen the rule of law. Moreover, the most important challenge currently consists of improving the effectiveness of existing institutions.
The current Mexican president has an extraordinarily high level of legitimacy. Elected by more than 53% of Mexicans, with a majority in Congress and a high approval rating (65% in November 2021), he has initiated a transformation of Mexico in various policy fields, which he calls the “fourth transformation.” A central element of this shift has been the concentration of power within the presidency. The first half of President López Obrador’s term was characterized not by sustainable institutionalization, but rather by personalization and populist, anti-institutionalist approaches, with the judiciary, media and autonomous bodies coming under particular pressure.
Citations:
agree
The current Mexican president has an extraordinarily high level of legitimacy. Elected by more than 53% of Mexicans, with a majority in Congress and a high approval rating (65% in November 2021), he has initiated a transformation of Mexico in various policy fields, which he calls the “fourth transformation.” A central element of this shift has been the concentration of power within the presidency. The first half of President López Obrador’s term was characterized not by sustainable institutionalization, but rather by personalization and populist, anti-institutionalist approaches, with the judiciary, media and autonomous bodies coming under particular pressure.
Citations:
agree