Executive Accountability
#23Key Findings
Despite strong gains in recent years, France scores in only the lower-middle ranks (rank 23) in terms of executive accountability. Its score on this measure has improved by 1.3 points relative to 2014.
Parliamentarians have considerable resources and adequate powers to monitor the executive. A Macron proposal that would have reduced the number of legislators by one-third failed. The Court of Accounts serves as auditor while also making forward-looking proposals, and the country’s active data-protection authority has been in existence for more than 40 years.
While citizens’ interest in politics has been on the decline, social media has provided a venue for activists to attract media and public interest. However, the information shared in such venues is often of very poor quality. The Yellow Vest movement prompted a citizen-consultation process for climate policy. However, much of the public prefers protest to participatory methods.
The main traditional political parties are largely hierarchically organized, while Macron’s movement remains centered on his own person without having become a mature party. The government consults with economic organizations, but has rejected negotiated solutions on key issues. Many non-business organizations have enhanced the quality of their policy oversight and advice in recent years.
Parliamentarians have considerable resources and adequate powers to monitor the executive. A Macron proposal that would have reduced the number of legislators by one-third failed. The Court of Accounts serves as auditor while also making forward-looking proposals, and the country’s active data-protection authority has been in existence for more than 40 years.
While citizens’ interest in politics has been on the decline, social media has provided a venue for activists to attract media and public interest. However, the information shared in such venues is often of very poor quality. The Yellow Vest movement prompted a citizen-consultation process for climate policy. However, much of the public prefers protest to participatory methods.
The main traditional political parties are largely hierarchically organized, while Macron’s movement remains centered on his own person without having become a mature party. The government consults with economic organizations, but has rejected negotiated solutions on key issues. Many non-business organizations have enhanced the quality of their policy oversight and advice in recent years.
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To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?
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Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
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Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
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Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
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Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Citizens’ interest in politics and their participation in the political process have been on the decline in recent decades. Obtaining their information primarily from television, most citizens are poorly informed. Television stations devote little time to any political topic and tend to prefer talk shows where people express their views, rather than using prime-time hours for political information. Information follows mobilization, rather than the other way around, evidenced by the protest movements against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Information is often provided on a certain topic once a group of citizens or political activists have succeeded in attracting media attention. Unfortunately, social networks tend to have substituted for traditional media in this information process. This contributes to the diffusion of unverified and fake news to such a point that, as in many countries, the overall information issue becomes a problem for the proper functioning of democracy. There is also a strong bias in favor of petty news or scandals to the detriment of more complex informative pieces concerning, for example, healthcare policy or the fight against poverty.
One of the problems with government information is that politicians tend to hide the truth or minimize harsh realities. This kind of action “by stealth” may initially be successful, but it does not enhance political awareness among citizens, and subsequently fuels populist feelings at both ends of the political spectrum as people lose trust in politics. During his electoral campaign and in his first months in office, President Macron introduced a new approach by “speaking truth to people.” In practice, this triggered harsh criticism, and was perceived by many as a manifestation of technocratic arrogance and indifference to the situation of the poor. In January 2019, in reaction to the Yellow Vest riots, Macron launched a vast operation organizing 10,000 local citizen debates paired with other (e.g., online) possibilities for citizens to express themselves (Grand débat national). Nearly 2 million citizens contributed to this debate. This pedagogic exercise worked, since the executive was able to end the riots and recover a modicum of popular consensus. Another initiative was the launch of a Citizen’s Convention on Climate Policy, an assembly of 150 citizens chosen by random and installed in October 2019, tasked with discussing measures that the country might implement to address climate change. However, the government transposed only a part of the 149 propositions presented by the convention in June 2020, and the fundamental question regarding the compatibility of such participatory elements with the principles of representative democracy remains unanswered. Furthermore, the convention might suspected of being another personal strategy by the president enabling him to overcome the Yellow Vest protests. The idea of complementary forms of citizen consultation is interesting and could be explored further, but it should be placed on a more regular basis, and not be seen as a discretionary instrument used at the whim of the government or serving president.
Finally, governmental and bureaucratic methods have changed little, aside from the use of a more pedagogic approach during the pandemic. A traditional feature of French politics has also persisted: much of the public prefers protest to participatory methods.
One of the problems with government information is that politicians tend to hide the truth or minimize harsh realities. This kind of action “by stealth” may initially be successful, but it does not enhance political awareness among citizens, and subsequently fuels populist feelings at both ends of the political spectrum as people lose trust in politics. During his electoral campaign and in his first months in office, President Macron introduced a new approach by “speaking truth to people.” In practice, this triggered harsh criticism, and was perceived by many as a manifestation of technocratic arrogance and indifference to the situation of the poor. In January 2019, in reaction to the Yellow Vest riots, Macron launched a vast operation organizing 10,000 local citizen debates paired with other (e.g., online) possibilities for citizens to express themselves (Grand débat national). Nearly 2 million citizens contributed to this debate. This pedagogic exercise worked, since the executive was able to end the riots and recover a modicum of popular consensus. Another initiative was the launch of a Citizen’s Convention on Climate Policy, an assembly of 150 citizens chosen by random and installed in October 2019, tasked with discussing measures that the country might implement to address climate change. However, the government transposed only a part of the 149 propositions presented by the convention in June 2020, and the fundamental question regarding the compatibility of such participatory elements with the principles of representative democracy remains unanswered. Furthermore, the convention might suspected of being another personal strategy by the president enabling him to overcome the Yellow Vest protests. The idea of complementary forms of citizen consultation is interesting and could be explored further, but it should be placed on a more regular basis, and not be seen as a discretionary instrument used at the whim of the government or serving president.
Finally, governmental and bureaucratic methods have changed little, aside from the use of a more pedagogic approach during the pandemic. A traditional feature of French politics has also persisted: much of the public prefers protest to participatory methods.
Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
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The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
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The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
The bureaucratic and political structure of the country overall provides satisfactory information. It is possible to get full access to information directly or through specialized citizens groups, and several media outlets provide critical analyses of governmental action. Public institutions such as the parliament, the Court of Accounts, and various independent authorities or committees not only facilitate access to information, but also offer a critical analysis of government action.
However, the political system, both at the local or national level, offers few instruments to help citizens monitor and oversee their administrative and political authorities. The main issue remains the incapacity of individuals to deal with the massive flows of information provided by public bodies. At the local level, the “information” provided by the ruling party or coalition tends to be mere window-dressing or propaganda in support of the adopted or proposed policy.
However, the political system, both at the local or national level, offers few instruments to help citizens monitor and oversee their administrative and political authorities. The main issue remains the incapacity of individuals to deal with the massive flows of information provided by public bodies. At the local level, the “information” provided by the ruling party or coalition tends to be mere window-dressing or propaganda in support of the adopted or proposed policy.
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Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
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The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
French legislators have fewer resources at their disposal than, for instance, their American colleagues, but they are reasonably equipped should they wish to make use of all facilities offered. In addition to two assistants, whom parliamentarians can freely choose, they receive a fixed amount of funds for any expenditure. There is a good library at their disposal, and a large and competent staff available to help individuals and committees. These committees can also request the support of the Court of Accounts or sectoral bureaucracies, which are obliged to provide all information requested. There are still problems, centered on the long tradition of parliamentarians holding several political mandates. Until 2017, three-quarters of the members of parliament were also elected local officials, and many of them dedicated more time to local affairs than to parliamentary activities. A new piece of legislation, in force since June 2018, forbids parliamentarians to hold executive positions in local or regional councils, forcing them to choose between local and national mandates (except as mere councilors). This is a true revolution. Since absenteeism was one of the major problems of the French parliament both in the plenary sessions and within the specialized committees, one might have hoped that the control and evaluation functions of parliament would have improved in the future. Macron’s proposal to reduce the number of members of parliament by one-third failed due to the fierce opposition of the Senate, and new calls for the reintroduction of the possibility of accumulating electoral mandates (cumul des mandats) that would have allowed, for example, acting as mayor of a city and member of parliament simultaneously, have popped up again with the argument that members of parliament without local mandates were lacking concrete experience of “real” life. In fact, absenteeism remains a recurrent factor, and parliamentary oversight is often triggered more by political or partisan bias than by policy concerns.
Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?
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Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
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Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Committees have free access to all requested documents. However, areas such as national security, the secret service or military issues are more sensitive. The government might be reluctant to pass on information but, worse, could be tempted to use information limitations to cover up potential malpractices. For instance, in the past the PMO had at its disposal substantial amounts of cash that could partially be used for electoral activities of the party in power. No information was available about where the money actually went. In the same vein, it is only since the Sarkozy presidency that the president’s office budget has become transparent and accessible to parliamentary inquiry.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences.
Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?
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Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
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The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
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Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Parliamentary committees can summon as many experts as they wish as often as they need in all matters, and they often make use of this right. The recent Benalla affair, involving a close ally of the president, has shown that committees enjoy considerable power in that matter. One serious problem is that members of parliament are often absent, even in cases of very important issues such as Brexit.
Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?
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The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
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The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
There is no congruence between the structures of ministries and those of parliamentary committees. The number of parliamentary committees is limited to eight (up from six in 2008) while there are 25 to 30 ministries or state secretaries. This rule introduced in 1958 was meant as, and resulted in, a limitation of deputies’ power to follow and control each ministry’s activities closely and precisely. The 2007-08 constitutional reform permitted a slight increase in the number of committees, and allowed the establishment of committees dealing with European affairs.
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To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?
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A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
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About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
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A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
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All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Mass media, notably morning (radio) and evening programs, offer quality information concerning government decisions. As for print media, the crucial issue is the division between local and national media. A few high-quality daily papers and weekly papers provide in-depth information, but their circulation is low and on the decline. In many instances, the depth and magnitude of information is dependent upon the level of polarization of the government policy. Instead, in local newspapers, information is often superficial and inadequate. The same division applies to private and public audiovisual channels (some private news channels offer only limited, superficial and polemical information), and to the emerging online media (only some of which offer quality information and analysis). On the whole, economic information is rather poor. News channels and social media networks are increasingly substituting for traditional media, but are very poor alternatives. Mobilization is becoming more important at the expense of providing fair and accurate information. This tough competition has contributed to a deterioration in the quality of traditional media. Rather than providing neutral information about an issue, media outlets tend to illustrate their points by relying on “man/woman on the street” interviews.
Rather than taking a neutral stance and trying to weigh the pros and cons of proposed reforms, media tend to take partisan stances – not in the sense of being leftist or rightist, but in objecting to change. Two recent examples may illustrate this point. The press (and even more so the social media networks) predicted that two recent governmental decisions would lead to disaster: first, a change in the way income taxes were paid (shifting from an annual payment by individuals to the state to a direct transfer from the employer to the state); and second, a change in the system of registering for university (a shift from a previously disastrous system). In both cases, the transformation turned out to work very smoothly. The same phenomenon was observable during the pandemic, at least during the initial phase of the vaccination process. Most of the press put the opinions of epidemiologists and of anti-vax gurus more or less on the same footing.
Rather than taking a neutral stance and trying to weigh the pros and cons of proposed reforms, media tend to take partisan stances – not in the sense of being leftist or rightist, but in objecting to change. Two recent examples may illustrate this point. The press (and even more so the social media networks) predicted that two recent governmental decisions would lead to disaster: first, a change in the way income taxes were paid (shifting from an annual payment by individuals to the state to a direct transfer from the employer to the state); and second, a change in the system of registering for university (a shift from a previously disastrous system). In both cases, the transformation turned out to work very smoothly. The same phenomenon was observable during the pandemic, at least during the initial phase of the vaccination process. Most of the press put the opinions of epidemiologists and of anti-vax gurus more or less on the same footing.
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How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?
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The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
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The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
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A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Parties are usually both centralized and organized hierarchically. There are few registered fee-paying political activists. These are all serious limitations to the inclusiveness of citizens. Many politicians are not selected by a party; they are individuals who have made their breakthrough locally and impose themselves on the party apparatus. In the case of the Macron movement, the change is even more radical: candidates were selected from a pool of volunteers with most candidates lacking any prior political experience. In contrast, national politicians normally have a concrete and ground-based knowledge of people’s aspirations and claims based on local experience. Another factor is the popular election of the president. Candidates’ programs are inclusive; no policy sector is forgotten in their long to-do list. A third factor lies in recent changes in the selection of candidates for presidential elections. Primaries have taken place, first within the Socialist Party, then in the neo-Gaullist conservative Union for Popular Movement (UMP, now LR, Les Républicains) before the 2017 election. In these cases, both registered activists and voters sympathetic to the party are eligible to participate. Actually, this “opening” of the process contributed to a further weakening of the parties, which are already very feeble organizations. The strong participation in the 2017 primaries (up to 4.4 million in the case of the conservatives) can be seen as a form of citizen participation in a crucial political party decision. However, in spite of this apparent success, the primaries in France have confirmed the American experience: they are the most efficient instruments for weakening and destroying political parties. The socialist and conservative primaries have been profitable to the most radical candidates in both cases, deserting the moderate political space and thus permitting the landslide success of the centrist Macron. The traditional parties of government were deeply divided and weakened. Given this catastrophic experience, they decided not to do it again. In 2021, Les Républicains reserved the choice to registered activists (triggering an increase from 70,000 to 148,000 fee-paying members within a three-month period), and the declining Socialist Party gave up organization of a primary altogether. As for the president’s movement, La République en Marche, it remains purely a product of and for Macron. It has not been able to transform itself into a political party capable of playing a proper role in decision-making and mediation between citizens and government in spite of being the largest political movement at present with 400,000 supporters (although most supporters are followers rather than activists).
To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Business associations, mainly the largest employer’s union (Mouvement des Entreprises de France, MEDEF) but also agricultural associations, are able to formulate policy proposals and contribute to agenda setting. They have their own research capabilities, and can successfully lobby government and parliamentarians. Weaker organizations such as the association of small and medium-sized companies complain that their specific interests are marginalized by larger national groups and by the government. Trade unions are usually more reactive in spite or because of their relatively small membership numbers, with trade-union members accounting for less than 8% of the workforce (the lowest percentage within the OECD) and split into several rival organizations. The strategy of the unions is to compensate for their weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, and by organizing mass protests in the streets. In areas where interest groups are united and strong, as in agriculture and education, they may have substantial influence, effectively making decisions jointly with the government. In other areas, the weakness of organized interests results in marginal involvement in decision-making, which may lead to friction during implementation. President Hollande’s attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue produced limited results. A major problem is the political split within the trade-union movement. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions (CGT and FO), have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have long relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, but their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Meanwhile, two other trade unions (CFDT and UNSA) have adopted more moderate positions, and tried to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms. However, President Macron did not honor this constructive attitude, and did not try to forge reform alliances that included the unions. On the contrary, the government’s rejection of the agreement between the social partners on the issue of unemployment insurance marks a recent failure of social concertation. The government contended that the agreement did not go far enough in tackling the costs and loopholes in a system that provided overgenerous benefits and too few incentives to accept available jobs. It presented its own reform bill, which passed parliament and has been in force since October 2021.
To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?
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Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
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Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
The number of non-business associations has been increasing in recent years, and member figures have been rising. In many cases, especially at the local level, such organizations are dependent on the financial support of public authorities. Moreover, most associations are reactive, preferring to object rather than make their own proposals. Nonetheless, there are a number of noneconomic associations that combine pluralistic approaches, long-term views and a public perspective. This can be seen in fields such as urban policy (where national programs and local public actors rely on the expertise and commitment of associations dealing with local issues) or social policy (aid to people with different social problems or handicaps). Furthermore, many associations addressing the issues of the environment, climate change and anti-corruption policies have acquired or significantly increased their competencies, and enhanced the quality of their policy oversight and advice. This development has resulted from a combination of political activism and new legal instruments provided to associations, in particular before the courts. A similar evolution can be observed in the field of economic/fiscal policy, thanks to the creation of new think tanks.
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Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Parliament does not have its own audit office, except for a special body called the Office Parlementaire d’Évaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Technologiques, which is responsible for analyzing and evaluating the impact of technology. In practice, its role has been rather limited.
Instead, the Court of Accounts can now respond to any parliamentary request, and can act both as auditor and adviser. While much progress could be made to fully exploit this opportunity, it is noticeable that collaboration between the two institutions has improved since the Court’s presidency was offered to two prestigious former politicians, the last one from the opposition to the governing party and recently to a former minister and EU commissioner. The role of the Court has dramatically changed, from merely overseeing the government accounts to making a full evaluation of public policies. The body’s criticisms of past policies and forward-looking proposals are often a blessing for reformers. They can rely on these objective and usually tough evaluations when promoting their own agendas, and can point to the evaluations as a means of persuading the public. The last president of the Court (appointed in 2020) introduced an innovation: Aside from the traditional and extensive reports that might require several months or years of work, the body can now publish briefs about key issues on the governmental agenda, giving it a more active role in the ongoing reform debate.
Instead, the Court of Accounts can now respond to any parliamentary request, and can act both as auditor and adviser. While much progress could be made to fully exploit this opportunity, it is noticeable that collaboration between the two institutions has improved since the Court’s presidency was offered to two prestigious former politicians, the last one from the opposition to the governing party and recently to a former minister and EU commissioner. The role of the Court has dramatically changed, from merely overseeing the government accounts to making a full evaluation of public policies. The body’s criticisms of past policies and forward-looking proposals are often a blessing for reformers. They can rely on these objective and usually tough evaluations when promoting their own agendas, and can point to the evaluations as a means of persuading the public. The last president of the Court (appointed in 2020) introduced an innovation: Aside from the traditional and extensive reports that might require several months or years of work, the body can now publish briefs about key issues on the governmental agenda, giving it a more active role in the ongoing reform debate.
Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
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There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
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There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
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There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Parliament has no ombuds office, but plays a key role in the functioning of the (former) Office of the Ombudsman office. Until 2011, the médiateur (Ombudsman) could intervene in cases of procedural faults and administrative problems at the request of individuals but only through the mediation of a parliamentarian. The purpose was to try to solve as many problems as possible through the intervention of elected representatives, and to ask the ombudsman to step in only if the issue could not be addressed or solved in a satisfactory way. In 2011, the office was merged with other independent authorities to form a new body, the Defender of Civic Rights (Défenseur des Droits). This new agency is active and respected, having demonstrated its independence vis-à-vis the administration and government. However, it has not affected the role of parliamentarians in the process and they continue to channel citizens’ requests. The number of requests is rising steadily. Between 2014 and 2019, the authority received 780,000 requests from its more than 500 delegates distributed over the national territory; in 2020 alone, nearly 97,000 requests were registered, 10% more than the year before.
Citations:
Le Défenseur des droits: Rapport annuel d’activité 2020, Paris 2021
(https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ddd_rapport-annuel-2020_25-03-2021.pdf)
Citations:
Le Défenseur des droits: Rapport annuel d’activité 2020, Paris 2021
(https://www.defenseurdesdroits.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ddd_rapport-annuel-2020_25-03-2021.pdf)
Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data protection in France has a rather long history. The extremely active CNIL (Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés) dates back to 1978. Its board of 17 members is appointed by the two chambers of the parliament. The board then elects its president. The CNIL enjoys the status of an Independent Regulatory Agency. It has five main functions, namely to: inform the public on personal data protection; support any person in relation to personal data protection; advise the legislator; control the use of personal data by private companies and public services; plan and prepare for the impact of technological developments on personal data. The CNIL has a relatively modest staff (215 persons), with a budget of €17 million, and received 13,585 complaints in 2020 (an increase of more than 60% following the adoption of the EU regulations). The body has been very effective over the past 40 years and in particular during the coronavirus crisis. Its role is widely supported by the public and political elites. A European regulation that went into effect in May 2018 states that every company or public body dealing with personal data has to appoint a “data protection adviser.” In 2020, the authority conducted 247 review processes and imposed 14 penalties entailing financial sums amounting to nearly €140 million.