Hungary

   

Quality of Democracy

#40
Key Findings
Having taken large steps back in recent years, Hungary falls into the bottom ranks (rank 40) with regard to democracy quality. Its score on this measure has declined by 1.5 points since 2014.

Electoral procedures such as voting rights and party registration and funding are arranged to dilute opposition support. More than 90% of traditional media outlets are now controlled by the government or allied oligarchs. The internet has thus become the central forum for public discourse and information, but this does not reach the population as a whole.

Popular initiatives are used as an expression of opposition and dissent, but are typically refused by the government-controlled election board. Asylum-seekers are subject to forced detention. NGOs receiving more than about €24,000 from abroad annually must register as and present themselves as “foreign-funded NGOS.”

Opposition activists are defamed as traitors and foreign agents. Discrimination against minorities, especially Muslims, Roma and refugees, is widespread. The government’s anti-Soros campaign has invoked anti-Semitic stereotypes. Judicial independence has declined substantially, and corruption is pervasive.

Electoral Processes

#40

How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?

10
 9

Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for all elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.
 8
 7
 6


A few restrictions on election procedures discriminate against a small number of candidates and parties.
 5
 4
 3


Some unreasonable restrictions on election procedures exist that discriminate against many candidates and parties.
 2
 1

Discriminating registration procedures for elections are widespread and prevent a large number of potential candidates or parties from participating.
Candidacy Procedures
6
The far-reaching changes to Hungary’s electoral law in the run-up to the April 2014 parliamentary elections included amendments to registration procedures. The combination of decreased registration requirements and generous public funding for candidates and party lists led to a surge in candidacies. A record-high 53 parties took part in the elections, 18 of which were able to form a national list. The governing Fidesz party actively promoted this associated fragmentation with the evident aim of confounding voters and weakening the opposition. The registration process suffered from a lack of transparency. Election commissions at both the central and constituency level largely failed to address cases of alleged signature fraud. Since the 2014 elections, the controversial procedures have been left unchanged. At the same time, the number of registered parties has further grown. In autumn 2017, there were 219 registered parties and 171 parties under registration.

To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?

10
 9

All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.
 8
 7
 6


Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.
 5
 4
 3


Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.
 2
 1

Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communications. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.
Media Access
2
As a result of the Orbán government’s takeover of the media, access to the media has become highly uneven. In the period under review, Fidesz has completed the control of the print media and local radio stations in the countryside. All county-based dailies have been purchased by Fidesz oligarchs. Klubrádió – on air only in Budapest – has remained the one and only independent radio station. Since fall 2016, the “media war” has also turned into a “billboard war” in which the government has sought control over political ads on billboards, which have played an important role in the 2010 and 2014 elections and in the government’s campaigns against refugees, “Brussels” and George Soros. As many billboards have been owned by the former Orbán associate – now political enemy and Jobbik supporter – Lajos Simicska, they have been heavily used by the opposition. In order to weaken the visibility of the opposition, parliament passed a controversial law in June 2017 that has prohibited party advertising outside the official campaign period, while allowing the government to continue its “public interest advertisements.” Although the law, as a regulation on parties, would have required a two-thirds majority in parliament, it was adopted by a simple majority only. Simicska has managed to circumvent the new regulations and has intensified the billboard war pretending that the new ads have been private initiatives. As a reaction to the narrowing media access, about eight opposition parties have established an Agóra (agora) as an open forum for public discussion near the parliament building in early September 2017.

To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?

10
 9

All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be. There are no discriminations observable in the exercise of the right to vote. There are no disincentives to voting.
 8
 7
 6


The procedures for the registration of voters and voting are for the most part effective, impartial and nondiscriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel being discriminated. Disincentives to voting generally do not constitute genuine obstacles.
 5
 4
 3


While the procedures for the registration of voters and voting are de jure non-discriminatory, isolated cases of discrimination occur in practice. For some citizens, disincentives to voting constitute significant obstacles.
 2
 1

The procedures for the registration of voters or voting have systemic discriminatory effects. De facto, a substantial number of adult citizens are excluded from national elections.
Voting and Registration Rights
3
In Hungary, the registration and voting procedures are heavily tilted in favor of the governing Fidesz party. The single most important problem has been the unequal treatment of three groups of eligible voters: (1) Hungarians living in Hungary, (2) Hungarians with dual citizenship in neighboring countries and (3) Hungarian citizens working abroad. While the first group can vote without registration, the others have to register beforehand through a complicated procedure. Hungarians living abroad and in possession of dual citizenship – who usually demonstrate a strong political affinity for Fidesz – can vote by mail. In contrast, Hungarian citizens working abroad, who are often opposed to the Orbán government can vote only at diplomatic missions which are often far away. These biased procedures gave a big advantage to Fidesz in the 2014 elections and contributed to its victory.

To what extent is private and public party financing and electoral campaign financing transparent, effectively monitored and in case of infringement of rules subject to proportionate and dissuasive sanction?

10
 9

The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring to that respect. Effective measures to prevent evasion are effectively in place and infringements subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
 8
 7
 6


The state enforces that donations to political parties are made public and provides for independent monitoring. Although infringements are subject to proportionate sanctions, some, although few, loopholes and options for circumvention still exist.
 5
 4
 3


The state provides that donations to political parties shall be published. Party financing is subject to some degree of independent monitoring but monitoring either proves regularly ineffective or proportionate sanctions in case of infringement do not follow.
 2
 1

The rules for party and campaign financing do not effectively enforce the obligation to make the donations public. Party and campaign financing is neither monitored independently nor, in case of infringements, subject to proportionate sanctions.
Party Financing
3
The Orbán government has kept the public financing of bigger, parliamentary parties low. An amendment of the law on party financing in 2013, shifted funds toward individual candidates and smaller parties, thus contributing to the record-high number of candidates in the 2014 parliamentary elections. While it has become easier for small parties to enter the political arena, the political landscape has got more fragmented, to the detriment of bigger opposition parties. The financial gap between Fidesz and the opposition has been large. With membership declining, the non-governing parties have lost revenues from membership fees and have become dependent on rich donors. While Jobbik has benefited from the support by Simicska, the time of tycoons with leftist leanings has passed. Even more importantly, Fidesz has been able to circumvent the restrictions on campaign spending by involving formally independent civic associations.

Do citizens have the opportunity to take binding political decisions when they want to do so?

10
 9

Citizens have the effective opportunity to actively propose and take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through popular initiatives and referendums. The set of eligible issues is extensive, and includes national, regional, and local issues.
 8
 7
 6


Citizens have the effective opportunity to take binding decisions on issues of importance to them through either popular initiatives or referendums. The set of eligible issues covers at least two levels of government.
 5
 4
 3


Citizens have the effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure. The set of eligible issues is limited to one level of government.
 2
 1

Citizens have no effective opportunity to vote on issues of importance to them through a legally binding measure.
Popular Decision-Making
6
The 2011 constitution has limited the scope for popular decision-making by abolishing popular initiatives, expanding the set of issues exempt from referendums and raising the thresholds for referendum success to a 50% participation threshold. For the weak and fragmented opposition, referendums could have become the most important means of mobilizing support and expressing dissent. A case in point is the successful mobilization for a municipal referendum in Budapest against the 2024 Olympic Summer Games. In January 2017, a group of young activists organized a movement called Momentum and launched a campaign against the unpopular Olympic Games, a prestige project of the Orbán government. All opposition parties joined the NOlimpia campaign and Momentum succeeded in collecting 266.000 signatures in a short period of time, much more than needed to have a referendum. Realizing the resistance of the citizens, the Orbán government withdrew its bid for the games in February 2017. Inspired by this success, proposals for referendums have become a fashionable instrument for the opposition. The opposition parties have tried to organize referendums or at least collecting signatures for pressuring the government on highly unpopular government project such as the deforestation of Budapest City Park (Liget) or the Danube Dam in Northern Buda.
However, almost all initiatives have been refused by the government-controlled National Election Committee (NVB), which enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether the issues are eligible for a referendum or not.

Access to Information

#40

To what extent are the media independent from government?

10
 9

Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and fully respected by the incumbent government.
 8
 7
 6


The incumbent government largely respects the independence of media. However, there are occasional attempts to exert influence.
 5
 4
 3


The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/ market access for private media.
 2
 1

Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation or change them to benefit their interests.
Media Freedom
2
In Hungary, media freedom exists only on paper, since more than 90% of media are controlled by the government, either directly, as in the case of the public media, or indirectly, as in the case of private media owned by Fidesz oligarchs. The second Orbán government pushed through highly controversial media laws in 2010/11. These laws have effectively involved a “media capture” by the state since they have strengthened government control over the media by vesting a Media Council (staffed entirely by Fidesz associates) with media-content oversight powers and the right to grant broadcasting licenses. Since then, media freedom has been further restricted by the takeover of formerly independent media by oligarchs close to Fidesz, supported through the strategic allocation of government advertisements. After the acquisition of the last four remaining independent regional newspapers in July 2017, Fidesz oligarchs now control all regional dailies, which still have a large readership, and almost all local radio stations. While Lajos Simicska, an enigmatic oligarch that fell out with Orbán and and now supports Jobbik, still controls some media and while there are some minor independent print and other media, the internet has become the central forum for public discourse and information. However, the internet does not reach the society as a whole, as public TV and radio did until the government maximized its influence on them. Moreover, society is vulnerable to disinformation campaigns and fake news. In recent years, the Hungarian media has been penetrated by around 100 locally operated, Russia-linked disinformation sites which have supported the Fidesz agenda.

Citations:
Szicherle, P., V. Wessenauer (2017): A Média és a politika új viszonya Magyarországon (The new relationship of media and politics in Hungary). Budapest: Political Capital/ Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (http://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/FES_PC_A_media_es_a_politika_uj_kapcsolata%20_171004.pdf),

Győri, L., P. Krekó, J. Jakub, B. Weidinger (2017): Does Russia interfere in Czech, Austrian and Hungarian elections? Budapest: Political Capital (http://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/western_experiences_eastern_vulnerabilities_20171012.pdf).

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?

10
 9

Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.
 8
 7
 6


Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.
 5
 4
 3


Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.
 2
 1

Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.
Media Pluralism
3
Media pluralism in Hungary has suffered further both from increasing government control over the public media and a process of concentration of private-media ownership in the hands of companies close to Fidesz. Some media pluralism has been maintained, as a result of the rifts within the right-wing camp, by the media outlets owned by Simicska, including Hír TV (TV), Magyar Nemzet (daily), Index (the largest information website) and Heti Válasz (weekly). There are also some independent media, but they work under very difficult financial and political circumstances and reach only 10% of the overall population. Klubrádió, the one and only independent radio station, is on air only in Budapest. Népszava, the only national-wide independent daily, has a small circulation and the role of the former opposition daily Népszabadság, purchased by Fidesz affiliates and shut down in October 2016, cannot be compensated for by the remaining independent weeklies, as those address predominantly highly educated readers.

Citations:
Bayer, J. (2016): Media Pluralism in Hungary, in: P. Bárd, J. Bayer, A comparative analysis of media freedom and pluralism in the EU Member States: Study for the LIBE Committee. Brussels: EU, 120-139 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571376IPOL_STU(2016)571376_EN.pdf).

To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

10
 9

Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.
 8
 7
 6


Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.
 5
 4
 3


Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some poorly justified restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are often ineffective.
 2
 1

Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.
Access to Government Information
4
While existing law provides for far-reaching access to government information, the government has made it difficult for the public and the media to obtain information, especially on issues relating to public procurement by referring to business secrets. Under the third Orbán government there has been a constant fight between the government and the democratic opposition over access to government data and documents, often fought at the courts. Professional NGOs – notably Transparency International Hungary, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) and the “Átlátszó” (Transparent) website – have worked intensively to claim government information through the courts, and independent media organizations (websites such as hvg.hu and index.hu) have regularly published categorized government information. Providing day-to-day information on fake government deals (“mutyi-mondó”) has become a new feature of the opposition online media. As a reaction, the government has tried to raise fees for processing public documents substantially.

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

#39

To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against infringements of their rights?

10
 9

All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights. Infringements present an extreme exception.
 8
 7
 6


The state respects and protects rights, with few infringements. Courts provide protection.
 5
 4
 3


Despite formal protection, frequent infringements of civil rights occur and court protection often proves ineffective.
 2
 1

State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Court protection is not effective.
Civil Rights
4
The Orbán governments have formally respected civil rights. However, the rule of law has suffered from the government’s politicization of the courts, its failure to protect Roma and other minorities from harassment and hate speech and its attempts to criminalize the (former) left-wing elite. The Prosecutor General has acted more and more as a shield protecting Fidesz affiliates and initiating fake legal processes against opposition actors, damaging their economic situation and private life. In the context of the EU refugee crisis, the Orbán government adopted emergency legislation that has raised fears of an emerging police state both inside and outside Hungary. The forced detention for all asylum-seekers introduced in March 2017 has prompted harsh criticism by the international community. So has the government’s new legislation on NGOs adopted in June 2017 which obliges all NGOs receiving more than 7.2 million HUF (around Euro 24.000) annually from abroad to register with the courts and to present themselves to the public as “foreign-funded NGOs.” Like the Russian “foreign agent” legislation, it has especially aimed at stigmatizing those organization and activists which get resources from the international networks to protect civil rights, including Amnesty International or the Red Cross. The leading professional NGOs have declared that they would not abide this law and turned to the Constitutional Court. The European Commission triggered an infringement process against the Hungarian government, which is an ongoing process. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe criticized the law sharply and addressed a letter to the president of Hungary and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the government not to pass the bill.

Citations:
Amnesty International Hungary (2017): We do not register. Budapest (http://www.amnesty.hu/news/2377/nem-regisztralunk-megyunk-a-birosagra).

To what extent does the state concede and protect political liberties?

10
 9

All state institutions concede and effectively protect political liberties.
 8
 7
 6


All state institutions for the most part concede and protect political liberties. There are only few infringements.
 5
 4
 3


State institutions concede political liberties but infringements occur regularly in practice.
 2
 1

Political liberties are unsatisfactory codified and frequently violated.
Political Liberties
4
The Orbán government has shown little respect for political liberties. In Putin style, Orbán and other Fidesz leaders have defamed opposition activists as traitors to the Hungarian nation and as foreign agents paid by George Soros. In September 2017, Antal Rogán, the influential head of the prime minister’s cabinet office accused the democratic opposition of planning to turn to violent actions before the elections. The vice-president of Fidesz, Szilárd Németh, has called Márton Gulyás, Gábor Vágó and Árpád Schelling, three well-known public activists subscribing to peaceful public disobedience, “terrorists.” Moreover, the government has used “soft violence” against demonstrators at public or political events by relying on aggressively acting “private” security services (e.g., Valton Security). The most notorious cases of “baldheaded aggression,” as the behavior of the frequently baldheaded security people has been called in popular parlance, took place during the Putin visit and Orbán’s national holiday speech on October 23. Finally, the new NGO-legislation passed in June 2017 has aimed at further weakening civil society.

How effectively does the state protect against different forms of discrimination?

10
 9

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are extremely rare.
 8
 7
 6


State anti-discrimination protections are moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.
 5
 4
 3


State anti-discrimination efforts show limited success. Many cases of discrimination can be observed.
 2
 1

The state does not offer effective protection against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.
Non-discrimination
4
Hungary has a comprehensive anti-discrimination legal framework in place, but in practice, little is done to enforce it. Fidesz’s traditional family concept corresponds with strong discrimination against women in the areas of employment, career and pay, although there are some steps to reverse this policy. However, there are no female ministers or top-level leaders in Fidesz. The failure is even greater regarding the Roma minority. By trying to create a separate school system, the Orbán government has aggravated segregation. The government has also continued its hate campaign against Muslims and refugees. As a result, xenophobia has grown among Hungarians, with a spillover to all kinds of minorities, including Jews. The government’s campaign against George Soros invoked anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Rule of Law

#40

To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?

10
 9

Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.
 8
 7
 6


Government and administration rarely make unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.
 5
 4
 3


Government and administration sometimes make unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.
 2
 1

Government and administration often make unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.
Legal Certainty
3
As the Orbán government has taken a voluntaristic approach toward lawmaking, legal certainty has strongly suffered from chaotic, rapidly changing legislation. The hasty legislative process has regularly violated the Act on Legislation, which calls for a process of social consultation if the government presents a draft law. The government’s instrumental use of the law is illustrated by the Act on the Protection of Settlements’ Images (Act CIV 2017 on 23 June 2017), since in order to ban the use of billboards by the other parties this act was passed as a simple majority law, even though most experts deemed a two-third majority necessary. As many laws are contradictory, it is increasingly difficult to implement them in the system of deconcentrated state administration and the institutions of municipal self-administration.

To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?

10
 9

Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
 8
 7
 6


Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.
 5
 4
 3


Courts are independent, but often fail to ensure legal compliance.
 2
 1

Courts are biased for or against the incumbent government and lack effective control.
Judicial Review
4
The independence of the Hungarian judiciary has drastically declined under the Orbán governments. While the lower courts still make in most cases independent decisions, the Constitutional Court, the Kúria (Curia, previously the Supreme Court) and the National Office of the Judiciary (OBH) have increasingly come under government control and haven often been criticized for making biased decisions. The same goes for Péter Polt, the Chief Public Prosecutor and a former Fidesz politician, who has persistently refrained from investigating the corrupt practices of prominent Fidesz oligarchs. As the Alliance of Hungarian Judges (Magyar Bírói Egyesület) has repeatedly criticized, OBH President Tünde Handó has no formal power to promote judges to a higher position, but has in fact used her position to influence decisions. As a result of the declining independence and quality of the Hungarian judiciary, more and more court proceedings have ended up at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. Hungary is among the countries generating the most cases, and the Hungarian state often loses these lawsuits.

To what extent does the process of appointing (supreme or constitutional court) justices guarantee the independence of the judiciary?

10
 9

Justices are appointed in a cooperative appointment process with special majority requirements.
 8
 7
 6


Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies with special majority requirements or in a cooperative selection process without special majority requirements.
 5
 4
 3


Justices are exclusively appointed by different bodies without special majority requirements.
 2
 1

All judges are appointed exclusively by a single body irrespective of other institutions.
Appointment of Justices
2
The 2012 constitution left the rules for selecting members of the Constitutional Court untouched. Its justices are still elected by parliament with a two-thirds majority. However, given the strong Fidesz majority in parliament and the government’s lack of self-restraint, this two-thirds threshold until February 2015 failed to limit the government parties’ control over the process. Parallel to the weakening of the remit of the Constitutional Court, the court was staffed with Fidesz loyalists, some of whom are not even specialists in constitutional law. When the loss of its two-thirds majority made it impossible for Fidesz to select justices unilaterally, four court positions remained vacant for some time. In November 2016, Fidesz succeeded in getting the support of the opposition party Politics Can Be Different (LMP) for the nomination of four new justices.

To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

10
 9

Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
 8
 7
 6


Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their positions.
 5
 4
 3


Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
 2
 1

Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption Prevention
3
Widespread corruption has been a systemic feature of the Orbán governments, with benefits and influence growing through Fidesz’s informal political-business networks. Members of the Fidesz elite have been involved in a number of corruption scandals, with many people accumulating substantial wealth in a short period of time. After the conflict with Lajos Simicska, the previous “Czar” of business and media, Orbán has made a radical rearrangement in the camp of the Fidesz-linked oligarchs by pushing out all Simicska-related businessmen from public procurement and promoting new oligarchs, most notably Lőrinc Mészáros, István Garancsi and István Tiborcz (the son in law of Orbán). According to Forbes Hungary, Mészáros, for example, has tripled his fortune in 2017. Corruption has become so pervasive that even some senior Fidesz figures have begun openly criticizing the Fidesz elite’s rapid wealth accumulation. Corruption in Hungary has to be seen through the prism of oligarchic structures and is strongly linked to public procurement, often related to investments based on EU funds and facilitated by the new public procurement law of 2012. A general problem here is that there is comparably little competition in this field, with Poland and Hungary ranking last. Its political power has allowed the Orbán government to keep corruption under the carpet. De-democratization and growing corruption are thus mutually reinforcing processes. As a result, the fight against corruption has largely rested with the political opposition and some independent NGOs. In addition to Transparency International Hungary and Átlátszó (Transparent), Á. Hadházy, the co-president of the opposition party Politics Can Be Different (LMP), has been very active and effective in investigating the corruption by the leading Fidesz politicians and oligarchs.

Citations:
Tóth, I., M. Hajdú (2016): Korrupciós kockázatok, átláthatóság, közbeszerzések. Magyar közbeszerzések 2009–2015 közötti adatainak elemzése, in: T. Kolosi, I.G. Tóth (eds.): Társadalmi szemle 2016, Budapest: Tárki, pp. 33-53.
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