Poland

   

Executive Capacity

#32
Key Findings
Showing significant deterioration during the review period, Poland scores relatively poorly (rank 32) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 2.0 points since 2014.

Policy-making under the PiS government has been guided by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. With staffing based on political loyalty, the Chancellery has lost sectoral expertise and influence on policy development. Ministers’ standing is largely dependent on relationships with Kaczyński. New appointments have secured the government’s dominance over the bureaucracy.

RIAs quality has declined significantly. The PiS often bypasses public consultation and impact-review requirements, and views many social actors as enemies. The swift passage of bills has resulted in very low quality, with many requiring immediate amendment. Information provided by ministries tends to be propagandistic.

With an absolute parliamentary majority, the government been quite effective in implementing policy objectives. Local governments are often viewed as oppositional, and the PiS government has sought to reduce their role. Politicization of the administration has decreased professionalism. The government has closed offices tasked with preparing introduction of the euro.

Strategic Capacity

#33

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
5
Motivated by EU demands and partly by the objective of improving its absorption and use of EU funds, the Tusk government expanded the planning capacities of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, KPRM) and replaced the previously uncoordinated assortment of sectoral plans with a more systematic approach in which a long-term strategy developed by the Chancellery (Poland 2030: The Third Wave of Modernity) established a framework for a limited number of medium-term strategies. The PiS government has relied on this framework and has developed its own long-term strategy. The new Strategy for Responsible Development was presented by Minister of Development Mateusz Morawiecki in February 2016 and has since been refined. Ultimately, however, policymaking under the PiS government has been guided by the grand visions and inspirations of PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński.

Citations:
OECD (2013): Public Governance Review Poland: Implementing Strategic-State Capacity. Paris, Chap. 2.

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decisionmaking?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Scholarly Advice
4
While the PiS government consults with experts, policymaking has become ideologically driven rather than evidence-based. In the case of education reform, for example, expert assessments were almost completely disregarded. The government’s ideological approach has led many experts who once showed some sympathy for PiS to break with the party.

Interministerial Coordination

#32

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

10
 9

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
The policy expertise of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister was strengthened under the Tusk government. Under the PiS government, the quality of the staff has declined as the main principle is political obedience, not expertise or professionalism.

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

10
 9

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
 5
 4
 3


The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
 2
 1

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.
GO Gatekeeping
6
All draft bills are reviewed by the Chancellery’s Council of Ministers Committee Department before their presentation in the Council of Ministers, and the prime minister is formally allowed to return items on policy grounds. However, a number of factors have limited the actual gatekeeping role of Prime Minister Szydło. First, the number of ministries has increased from 17 to 21 under the PiS government. Second, there is a core group of ministers who enjoy a special standing in the government, including Defense Minister Macierewicz, Minister of Justice Ziobro, Minister of Science and Higher Education Gowin and Minister of Development Morawiecki. Finally, PiS party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński serves as the ultimate gatekeeper in the PiS government.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
6
Under the PiS government, the Chancellery has kept its enhanced formal involvement in the preparation of policy proposals by the line ministries. As its gatekeeping role has declined, however, so has its actual influence on the development of policy proposals.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
4
The number and role of cabinet committees under the PiS government have been limited. However, it set up an Innovativeness Council, consisting of five ministers, in February 2016 and an Economic Committee at the end of September 2016. The latter is in charge of coordinating the finalization and implementation of the Strategy of Responsible Development.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
5
Senior ministry officials play a substantial role in interministerial coordination. All meetings of the Council of Ministers, the Polish cabinet, are prepared by the Council of Ministers’ Permanent Committee, which is made up of deputy ministers from the ministries. The Committee for European Affairs, which is in charge of EU coordination, also relies strongly on coordination by top civil servants. In contrast, bureaucratic coordination at lower levels of the hierarchy is still relatively limited, even though the joint administration of EU funds has helped to intensify interministerial exchange. Changes in personnel, especially in the security agencies, have secured the dominance of the government over administration.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
8
Informal mechanisms of coordination have played an important role under the PiS government. PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński has served as the gray eminence behind the scene. He has taken many important decisions himself, and the standing of government ministers has been strongly dependent upon their relationship with him.

Evidence-based Instruments

#39

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
3
From 2001 to 2015, Poland established a relatively comprehensive system of regulatory impact assessment (RIA). The PiS government has left this system largely unchanged in formal terms but has not taken RIA seriously. It has bypassed RIA by strongly relying on “fast-track” legislation or on legislative initiatives by members of parliament, and the quality of RIA has been low.

Citations:
OECD (2013): Public Governance Report Poland: Implementing Strategic-State Capacity. Paris, Chap. 3.

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
The quality of the RIA process has strongly declined under the PiS government. The involvement of stakeholders and the publication and communication of results have become rather selective, and there has been no independent body in charge of checking the quality of individual RIAs.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
2
Article 5 of Poland’s constitution enshrines the principle of sustainable development, according to which the state ensures the protection of the environment, guided by the principle of sustainable development. Sustainability checks are not an integral part of regulatory impact assessments, and the PiS government has been less concerned with issues of sustainability than its predecessors. Rather, the PiS government entered into several quarrels with the European Commission and the European Court of Justice due to infringement procedures because the government did not practice RIA in the case of natural gas drilling or ignored sustainability and environmental protection principles in the case of logging in the Białowieża primeval forest.

Societal Consultation

#34

To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

10
 9

The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.
 8
 7
 6


The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.
 5
 4
 3


The government consults with societal actors.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Negotiating Public Support
4
The Polish government is obliged by law to consult all parties affected by proposed legislation. In addition, there is a Council of Social Dialog whose members are appointed by the president. In October 2015, this council replaced the traditional Tripartite Commission which had ceased operations in June 2013 because of conflicts between trade unions and the government. Consultations both inside and outside the Council have been largely formal. Generally speaking, the government’s clear majority in parliament has reduced the need for winning over social actors, and the government perceives many of them as enemies. Public consultation has been bypassed by introducing legislative initiatives through parliamentarians, since such initiatives do not require the regular consultation mechanisms, and therefore exclude experts and public. Moreover, the quick passage of major laws has reduced the time available for meaningful consultation. However, unlike the employers’ associations and other trade unions, the trade union NSZZ Solidarność enjoys a special relationship with the government. Several of its representatives were given positions in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Affairs, and it has supported reforms such as pension reform.

Policy Communication

#24

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 8
 7
 6


The government coordinates the communication of ministries. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
Coherent Communication
5
Ministerial communication is coordinated by the Government Information Center, a department of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. It regularly reports on government activities and connects to other ministries’ press departments. However, the actual coordination of government communication has been low. Particularly, the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Affairs often put out contradictory statements. The information given by ministries has tended to be selective and highly propagandistic.

Implementation

#16

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Efficiency
7
Favored by its absolute majority in parliament and the internal discipline of PiS, the PiS government has been quite effective in implementing its policy objectives. It has succeeded in realizing its major campaign pledges, such as the increase in the minimum wage and the family allowance, tax relief for small businesses, the lowering of the retirement age or the reversion to a higher age for entering school, and it has realized them rather quickly. Precisely because so many bills have sailed so quickly through parliament, the quality of legislation has often proven to be very poor, requiring immediate amendments. Unlike in the PiS government’s first year in office, street protests are no longer the only effective obstacle to implementing the government’s policy objectives. In winter 2016 – 2017, the Sejm crisis and the occupation of the Sejm building by opposition members of parliament delayed the passing of the budget. In July 2017, President Duda’s unexpected veto of two of the three laws on the reform of the judiciary revealed rifts within the PiS and limits to the government’s power.

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
8
Since the cabinet consists of a group of people who were more or less hand-picked by PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the need for using specific organizational devices for exerting pressure on ministers to stay in line with the government’s program has been limited. Despite some internal debates and power struggles, ministers have largely been committed to implementing the government’s program, one bullet point after another.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
8
Ministries are obliged to keep the Chancellery of the Prime Minister informed about legislative progress on a regular basis. If ministries seek to maintain their autonomy, the prime minister, through the Chancellery or Jarosław Kaczyński, as party leader, can intervene.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies
8
There is a large number of executive agencies in Poland. Agencies report to ministries, and ministries have special units responsible for monitoring the activities of agencies and auditing their finances. Under the PiS government, the leadership of state agencies has become highly politicized. As a consequence of the new civil service act that came into effect in January 2016, all employment contracts of previous directors turned invalid, and the positions were no longer filled by open competition, but by personal appointment. A previous provision was canceled requiring directors of state institutions to have not been members of a political party for five years before assuming a leading position in state administration. Thus, compliance between ministries and administration has become easier, but the administration has also become dependent on the political will of the majority. The increase in oversight has led to a decline in democratic checks and balances, professionalism (since there was a massive personnel exchange in the state bureaucracy), and non-politicized relations between ministries and agencies.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
5
Since 1999, Poland has supported three tiers of subnational governments: municipalities, districts and regions. Since the 2015 elections, the relationship between the central government and the majority of local governments still controlled by parties of the previous government has been strained. As heavily criticized by local offices, the reform of the school system has been associated with a strong shift of costs to the local level. PiS distrust in the politicians running the 50 biggest Polish cities has led to selective support for other localities, thus sending a strong clientelistic signal to the local authorities that funding and support will be distributed not on merit, but on political grounds. In 2017, subnational government fiscal problems increased due to a decrease in available EU funds at the local level.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
4
The process of government decentralization that started in 1998 has been broadly accepted. However, since the PiS government has perceived local governments as a bastion of the opposition, it has tried to restrict their role. Legislation passed in 2017 has reduced the role of subnational governments in the management of inland waterways and regional operational programs involving EU funds. In July 2017, President Duda vetoed an amendment to the auditing of subnational finances, which would have increased the national government’s grip on decisions at the subnational level.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
7
Previous governments have set national standards with the aim of guaranteeing a minimum quality of public services. Institutionally, the regions have a centrally appointed head of regional administration who is responsible for ensuring that national policies are implemented, and that state institutions operating in the region perform their functions properly. This has recently been contested and discussions increased over the competencies of the Voivode (PiS member) ruling the Masovian voivodship and the mayor of Warsaw as the largest city in this region, governed by PO. This debate about the competencies of the regions and larger cities in Poland is again an expression of a political power play. Generally, the PiS receives less votes in large cities than the PO. The politicization of the civil service under the PiS government has put the success of these standards at risk by reducing the professionalism of the administration. Moreover, because of the conflicts between the government and the Constitutional Tribunal, the standards themselves are contested.

Adaptability

#35

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
5
In the past, government structures in Poland have been gradually adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably NATO and EU membership. Poland’s good reputation and its growing influence in the European Union showed that adaptation had been successful, as the relatively high and increasing rate of absorption of EU funds underlines. The PiS government has been more inward-looking and has paid much less attention to the compatibility of domestic government structures with international and EU requirements in particular. In 2017, Poland closed the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Introducing the Euro and the Office of Polish Integration with the Eurozone in the National Bank of Poland, even though Poland is formally required to introduce the euro once the convergence criteria are fulfilled.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
With the new government, Poland’s international orientation has changed. Although Prime Minister Szydło and her cabinet members do not reject cooperation within the European Union per se, they detest all steps toward a deeper integration and are more critical of the German role in the European Union. In 2017, Poland not only closed the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Introducing the Euro and the Office of Polish Integration with the Eurozone in the National Bank of Poland. The government also wants to leave the Eurokorps, a common EU defense unit, since the government sees NATO as the main actor in the field of defense and contests European actions in this area. Because of the PiS government’s intransigence, Poland’s reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. This became clearly visible when, in May 2017, Poland was the only country to vote against Donald Tusk’s re-election as president of the European Council. At the same time, however, Poland wants to play an active role within NATO, and has tried to establish a closer relationship with the United States and within the Visegrad group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). While the four Visegrad countries agree on the refugee issue and climate policy, and Poland and Hungary are the main opponents of Macron’s recent initiative to amend the worker’s directive, they hold different attitudes toward Russia. Unlike the other Visegrad countries, Poland has strongly supported the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union.

Citations:
Fuksiewicz, A., A. Łada (2017): When two Plus Two Doesn’t Equal four. The Visegrad Group on the Future of Europe, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Analyses & Opinions No. 23 /150, Warsaw (http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/analyses/1177980591.pdf).

Łada, A. (2017): Poland in Europe – Regional Leader or outlier? Poland’s European policy in view of the changes on the continent. Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych (http://www.isp.org.pl/uploads/pdf/712883116.pdf).

Organizational Reform

#38

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
4
The PiS government has adopted a number of institutional reforms, but has not monitored the institutional arrangements of government in a systematic and regular way. The goal is not to improve or professionalize institutions but to increase political power and employ personnel that follow the party line.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
4
Upon entering office, the PiS government has changed the institutional arrangements of governing. It has changed the portfolios of ministries several times, set up new cabinet committees, overhauled the Civil Service Act and strengthened the position of central government vis-à-vis subnational governments. However, the strategic capacity of the PiS government has primarily rested on its majority in parliament, the strong party discipline and the uncontested role of party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. No reforms were introduced to improve strategic capacity through an open involvement of, for example, scientific expertise. The main priority of the government is to follow its ideological positions and to secure executive power.
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