

Sustainable Governance Indicators 2009

SGI 2009 Codebook

| Bertelsmann Stiftung

Bertelsmann Stiftung
International Relations Program
Carl Bertelsmann Str. 256
33311 Gütersloh
www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de

C·A·P

Center for Applied Policy Research
Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research
Maria-Theresia-Str. 21
81675 München
www.cap.lmu.de

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Synopsis Texts

Executive Summary

Identifies the key executive and policy changes within the period under review.

Strategic Outlook

Provides concrete suggestions for overcoming reform blockades and improving reform capacity.

Status of democracy

- S1 Electoral process
- S2 Access to information
- S3 Civil rights
- S4 Rule of law

S1.1

Fair electoral process

How fair are procedures for registering candidates and parties?

Everyone has equal opportunity to become a candidate for election. The registration of candidates and parties may be subject to restrictions only when in accordance with law and if deemed reasonably necessary in a democratic society. This includes protecting the interests of national security or public order, public health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others.

Legal regulations provide for a fair registration procedure for elections; candidates and parties are not discriminated against.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The registration procedures for elections are subject to reasonable restrictions, but their application tends to privilege individual candidates over others.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The registration procedures for elections are subject to reasonable restrictions, but their application tends to discriminate against several candidates and parties.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The registration procedures for elections are subject to restrictions that discriminate against candidates or parties.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S1.2

Fair electoral campaign

To what extent do candidates and parties have fair access to the media and other means of communication?

Every candidate for election and every political party has equal opportunity of access to the media and other means of communication, which allows them to present their political views and to communicate with the voters. Access to the media may not be restricted or refused on grounds of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

All candidates and parties have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. All major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties have largely equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets provide a fair and balanced coverage of different political positions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties often do not have equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. While the major media outlets represent a partisan political bias, the media system as a whole provides fair coverage of different political positions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Candidates and parties lack equal opportunities of access to the media and other means of communication. The major media outlets are biased in favor of certain political groups or views and discriminate against others.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent do all citizens have the opportunity to exercise their right of participation in national elections?

To participate in national elections, every adult citizen must have the right to access an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory voter registration procedure. No eligible citizen can be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration as a voter, unless in accordance with objectively verifiable criteria prescribed by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the state's obligations under international law.

Every individual denied the right to vote or to be registered as a voter is entitled to appeal to a jurisdiction competent to review such decisions and to correct errors promptly and effectively. Every voter has the right of equal and effective access to a polling place to exercise her or his right to vote.

All adult citizens can participate in national elections. All eligible voters are registered if they wish to be.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no observable discrimination in exercising the right to vote.	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The procedures for voter registration and voting are effective, impartial and non-discriminatory. Citizens can appeal to courts if they feel they are being discriminated against.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
While the procedures for voter registration and voting are non-discriminatory, cases of discrimination occur in practice.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The procedures for voter registration or voting have discriminatory effects. Groups of adult citizens are de facto excluded from national elections.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S2.1

Media freedom

To what extent are the media independent from government?

This question asks to what extent are the media subject to government influence and the influence of actors associated with the government. The question focuses both on media regulation and government intervention. The rules and practice of supervision should guarantee sufficient independence for publicly owned media. Privately owned media should be subject to licensing and regulatory regimes that ensure independence from government.

Public and private media are independent from government influence; their independence is institutionally protected and respected by the incumbent government.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The incumbent government largely respects the independence of the media, but the regulation of public and/or private media does not provide sufficient protection against potential government influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The incumbent government seeks to ensure its political objectives indirectly by influencing the personnel policies, organizational framework or financial resources of public media, and/or the licensing regime/market access for private media.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Major media outlets are frequently influenced by the incumbent government promoting its partisan political objectives. To ensure pro-government media reporting, governmental actors exert direct political pressure and violate existing rules of media regulation.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S2.2

Media pluralism

To what extent are the media characterized by an ownership structure that ensures a pluralism of opinions?

This question does not assume that the predominance of either private or public ownership guarantees a pluralism of opinions. Rather, the underlying assumption is that a diversified ownership structure is likely to best represent the views and positions existing in society.

Diversified ownership structures characterize both the electronic and print media market, providing a well-balanced pluralism of opinions. Effective anti-monopoly policies and impartial, open public media guarantee a pluralism of opinions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Diversified ownership structures prevail in the electronic and print media market. Public media compensate for deficiencies or biases in private media reporting by representing a wider range of opinions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize either the electronic or the print media market. Important opinions are represented but there are no or only weak institutional guarantees against the predominance of certain opinions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Oligopolistic ownership structures characterize both the electronic and the print media market. Few companies dominate the media, most programs are biased, and there is evidence that certain opinions are not published or are marginalized.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

To what extent can citizens obtain official information?

To assess the accessibility of government information, you should examine:

- (1) whether a freedom of information act exists or equivalent legal regulations exist,
- (2) to what extent do the rules restrict access to information (e.g., exemptions, deadlines for responding to requests etc.) and justify these restrictions, and
- (3) whether mechanisms for appeal and oversight exist to enforce citizens' right to access information (e.g., administrative review, court review, ombudsman, commission etc.) You may consult www.freedominfo.org for information specific to your country.

Legal regulations guarantee free and easy access to official information, contain few, reasonable restrictions, and there are effective mechanisms of appeal and oversight enabling citizens to access information.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is regulated by law. Most restrictions are justified, but access is sometimes complicated by bureaucratic procedures. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms permit citizens to enforce their right of access.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is partially regulated by law, but complicated by bureaucratic procedures and some restrictions. Existing appeal and oversight mechanisms are largely ineffective.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Access to official information is not regulated by law; there are many restrictions of access, bureaucratic procedures and no or ineffective mechanisms of enforcement.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S3.1

Civil rights protection

To what extent does the state respect and protect civil rights, and how effectively are citizens protected by courts against violations of their rights?

The civil rights in question refer to the protection of personal liberty against state and non-state actors, including the right to life and security of person; access to justice, equal treatment before the law and due process under the rule of law; freedom of movement; freedom of religion; freedom to own property.

All state institutions respect and effectively protect civil rights. Citizens are effectively protected by courts against infringements of their rights.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
All state institutions respect and protect civil rights, and there are only few infringements of civil rights. Courts effectively protect citizens against infringements of their rights.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
State institutions respect and protect civil rights, but infringements of civil rights occur in practice. Courts do not effectively protect citizens against infringements of their rights.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
State institutions respect civil rights only formally, and civil rights are frequently violated. Courts do not effectively protect citizens against infringements of their rights.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S3.2

Non-discrimination

How effectively does the state protect against discrimination based on gender, physical ability, ethnic origin, social status, political views or religion?

This question evaluates policies of state institutions aimed at preventing discrimination. Such an evaluation should refer to the measures taken by these institutions and their impact. The extent of observable discrimination may be used as an indicator for the efficacy of anti-discrimination policies.

Please note that this question also includes an assessment of how effectively the state protects the rights of disadvantaged persons or persons belonging to minorities by positive discrimination measures, special representation rights or autonomy rights.

State institutions effectively protect against and actively prevent discrimination. Cases of discrimination are rare.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
State institutions protect against discrimination and have been moderately successful. Few cases of discrimination are observed.	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
State institutions seek to protect against discrimination, but have only limited or partial success. Many cases of discrimination may be observed.	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many state institutions do not effectively protect against discrimination. Discrimination is widespread in the public sector and in society.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.1

Legal certainty

To what extent do government and administration act on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions to provide legal certainty?

This question assesses the extent to which executive actions are predictable (i.e., can be expected to be guided by law).

Government and administration act predictably, on the basis of and in accordance with legal provisions. Legal regulations are consistent and transparent, ensuring legal certainty.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration rarely take unpredictable decisions. Legal regulations are consistent, but leave a large scope of discretion to the government or administration.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration sometimes take unpredictable decisions that go beyond given legal bases or do not conform to existing legal regulations. Some legal regulations are inconsistent and contradictory.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Government and administration often take unpredictable decisions that lack a legal basis or ignore existing legal regulations. Legal regulations are inconsistent, full of loopholes and contradict each other.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.2

Judicial review

To what extent do independent courts control whether government and administration act in conformity with the law?

This question examines how well the courts can review actions taken and norms adopted by the executive. To provide effective control, courts need to pursue their own reasoning free from the influence of incumbent governments, powerful groups or individuals. This requires a differentiated organization of the legal system, including legal education, jurisprudence, regulated appointment of the judiciary, rational proceedings, professionalism, channels of appeal and court administration.

Independent courts effectively review executive action and ensure that the government and administration act in conformity with the law.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Independent courts usually manage to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Courts decide independently, but often fail to control whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Courts do not control effectively whether the government and administration act in conformity with the law. Their jurisdiction is biased in favor of or against the incumbent government.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.3

Corruption prevention

To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?

This question addresses how the state and society prevent public servants and politicians from accepting bribes by applying mechanisms to guarantee the integrity of officeholders: auditing of state spending; regulation of party financing; citizen and media access to information; accountability of officeholders (asset declarations, conflict of interest rules, codes of conduct); transparent public procurement systems; effective prosecution of corruption.

Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their position.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most integrity mechanisms function effectively and provide disincentives for public officeholders willing to abuse their position.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Some integrity mechanisms function, but do not effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their position.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S4.4

Rule of law

S4.5

Control of corruption

Economic and policy-specific performance

S 5 Basic socioeconomic parameters

Economy and Employment

S 6 Labor market policy

S 7 Enterprise policy

S 8 Tax policy

S 9 Budgetary policy

Social affairs

S 10 Health policy

S 11 Social cohesion

S 12 Family policy

S 13 Pension policy

Security

S 14 Security policy

S 15 Integration policy

Sustainability

S 16 Environmental policy

S 17 Research and innovation policy

S 18 Education policy

S5.1	GDP
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S5.2	Potential growth
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S5.3	Unemployment rate
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S5.4	Labor force growth
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S5.5	Gini coefficient
------	------------------

S5.6	Foreign trade
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S5.7	Inflation rate
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S5.8	Real interest rates
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S6.1

Labor market policy

How effectively does labor market policy in your country address unemployment?

This question addresses a government's strategies to reconcile the following objectives: balancing offer and demand on the labor market by providing sufficient mobility of the labor force according to the needs of potential employers, unemployment reduction and job security.

To assess labor market policy comprehensively, special emphasis should be placed on the positive or detrimental effects resulting from labor market regulation (e.g., dismissal protection, minimum wages, collective agreements) and from the modus operandi of unemployment insurance.

Strategies against unemployment have been successfully implemented, thus unemployment is not considered a serious threat.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Labor market policy has been more or less successful.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Strategies against unemployment have shown little or no significant success.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Labor market policy fails to address unemployment effectively, its strategies show instead contrary effects, and unemployment rates are increasing.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S6.2

Employment rate

S6.3

Long-term unemployment

S6.4

Youth unemployment

S6.5

Low-skilled unemployment

S6.6

Older employment

S7.1

Enterprise policy

How successful has enterprise policy been in fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and in stimulating private investment?

Private investment includes not only the acquisition of capital stock, but also entrepreneurial transactions aimed at investment, such as developing human capital, the restructuring of companies, establishing new companies, etc.

Enterprise policy has been successful in achieving the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Enterprise policy has largely achieved the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Enterprise policy has partly achieved the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Enterprise policy has not achieved the objectives of fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and economic competitiveness, and stimulating private investment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S7.2

Competitiveness

S7.3

Unit labor costs

S7.4

Corporate investment

S7.5

Bureaucracy

S7.6

Regulation

S7.7

Net capital flow (FDI)

S8.1

Tax policy

To what extent does taxation policy realize goals of equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues?

The objectives of justice and allocative efficiency suggest that taxation policies do not discriminate between different groups of economic actors with similar tax-paying abilities, such as corporate and personal income taxpayers (horizontal equity).

Tax systems should also impose higher taxes on persons or companies with a greater ability to pay taxes (vertical equity). Tax rates and modalities should improve or at least not weaken a country's competitive position. However, tax revenues should be sufficient to ensure the long-term financing of public services and infrastructure. "Sufficiency" does not assume any specific ideal level of public expenditure, but refers only to the relationship between public revenues and expenditures.

Taxation policies are equitable, competitive and generate sufficient public revenues.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to achieve one of the three principles.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to achieve two of the three principles.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Taxation policies fail to realize the following three principles: equity, competitiveness and the generation of sufficient public revenues.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S8.2

Tax evasion

S8.3

Tax burden for individuals

S8.4

Tax burden for businesses

S8.5

Tax system complexity

S9.1

Budgetary policy

To what extent does budgetary policy realize the goal of fiscal sustainability?

This question focuses on the aggregate of public budgets and does not assess whether budgets reflect government priorities or induce departments to manage efficiently.

Sustainable budgeting should enable a government to pay its financial obligations (solvency), sustain economic growth, meet future obligations with existing tax burdens (stable taxes) and pay current obligations without shifting the cost to future generations (inter-generational fairness).

Budgetary policy is fiscally sustainable.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy achieves most standards of fiscal sustainability.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy achieves some standards of fiscal sustainability.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Budgetary policy is fiscally unsustainable.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S9.2

Debt-to-GDP ratio

S9.3

Net debt ratio

S9.4

Debt interest ratio

S9.5

Public investment spending

S9.6

Budget consolidation

S10.1 Health policy

How effective and efficient are health care policies in your country?

Public health care policies should aim at providing high-quality health care for the largest possible share of the population and at the lowest possible costs.

Of the three criteria – quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency – efficiency should be given less weight if the first two criteria can be considered fulfilled.

Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the population and services are efficiently organized.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide high-quality health care for a majority of the population, but services are inefficiently organized.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the population and services are inefficiently organized.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Health care policies provide poor-quality health care for a majority of the population. Health care services are underfinanced, overloaded, unreliable and inefficiently organized.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S10.2 Private-to-public spending ratio

S10.3 Spending on pharmaceuticals

S10.4 Preventive health care spending

S10.5 Life expectancy-to-spending ratio

S10.6 Infant mortality

S11.1

Social cohesion

To what extent does social policy in your country prevent poverty and limit socioeconomic disparities?

While the prevention of poverty and the mitigation of socioeconomic disparities may coincide, the two objectives differ from each other and may require rather different policies. Poverty prevention is in normative terms more desirable than limiting socioeconomic disparities.

Social policy effectively prevents poverty and significantly limits socioeconomic disparities.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Social policy effectively prevents poverty but does not limit socioeconomic disparities.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Social policy limits some socioeconomic disparities but fails to prevent poverty effectively.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Social policy does not effectively prevent poverty and tends to exacerbate socioeconomic disparities.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S11.2

Poverty rate

S11.3

Associational activity

S11.4

Life satisfaction

S12.1

Family policy

To what extent do family support policies in your country enable women to combine parenting with participation in the labor market?

Traditional family patterns confine mothers to opt out of gainful employment and focus on household and child care work, a division of roles that has lost acceptance among an increasing number of women. This question is based on the assumption that an optimal system of family support should enable women to decide freely whether and when they want to remain full-time mothers or to take up full- or part-time employment.

Family support policies effectively enable women to combine parenting with employment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies provide some support for women who want to combine parenting and employment.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies provide only few opportunities for women who want to combine parenting and employment.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Family support policies force most women to opt for either parenting or employment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S12.2

Family spending

S12.3

Pre-primary education

S12.4

Child poverty

S12.5

Female employment

S12.6

Fertility rate

S13.1

Pension policy

To what extent does pension policy in your country realize goals of poverty prevention, inter-generational equity and fiscal sustainability?

An optimal pension system should prevent poverty among the elderly due to retirement and should be based on distributional principles that do not erode the system's fiscal stability. It should ensure equity among pensioners, the active labor force and the adolescent generation.

These objectives may be achieved by different pension systems: exclusively public pension systems, a mixture of public and private pension schemes, or publicly subsidized private pension plans. Accumulating public and private implicit pension debt is undesirable.

The pension policy is fiscally sustainable, guarantees inter-generational equity and effectively prevents poverty caused by old age.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The pension policy fails to realize one of these three principles.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The pension policy fails to realize two of these three principles.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The pension policy is fiscally unsustainable, does not effectively prevent old-age poverty and fails to achieve inter-generational equity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S13.2

Dependency ratio

S13.3

Senior citizens' poverty

S13.4

Pension spending

S14.1

External security

How effectively does external security policy in your country protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks and safeguarding the national interest can be achieved in several different ways and by combining various external security policies. The effectiveness of these policies depends on the relation between external security policy aims and strategies on the one hand and the way the military forces are financed, equipped and supported by a national consensus on the desired defense policy on the other hand. Whereas military expenditures alone say little about the effectiveness of external security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit ratio of these policies.

Please consider the additional background data provided on military expenditures, which is for your information only and not used to calculate BRI results.

External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguards the national interest very effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy protects citizens against security risks and safeguards the national interest more or less effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks and safeguard the national interest.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
External security policy exacerbates the security risks and does not safeguard the national interest.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S14.2

Internal security

How effectively does internal security policy in your country protect citizens against security risks?

This question rests on the assumption that the aims of protecting citizens against security risks can be achieved in many different ways and by combining various internal security policies. For example, an effective policy includes objectives such as the internal integration of domestic intelligence and police communities and their regional cross-border cooperation with regional/international intelligence and police communities, the domestic strategy of intelligence and police communities and so on. Whereas expenditures on public order and safety alone say little about the effectiveness of internal security policy, they have to be taken into account in order to assess the cost/benefit ratio of this policy.

Please consider the additional background data provided on expenditures on public order and safety, which is for your information only and not used to calculate the BRI results.

Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks very effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy protects citizens against security risks more or less effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy does not effectively protect citizens against security risks.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Internal security policy exacerbates security risks.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S14.3

New security policy

How effectively do security and other policies in your country respond to new security risks by adaptation and self-correction as well as willingness and capacity to cooperate with reliable partners in the international arena?

Contrary to the traditional understanding of security policy, this question rests on the assumption that states have to combine various domestic and external policies to protect effectively against new security risks arising from threats like terrorism, internationally organized crime, human trafficking, etc.

Effective strategies include arming the military forces with high-tech and state-of-the-art equipment, membership in collective security alliances/organizations/treaties, internal integration of domestic intelligence communities and their cooperation with regional/international counterparts, and promoting neighborhood stability, conflict prevention and assistance/risk containment for failed states. The latter objectives should also be pursued by an effective development policy and a fair trade policy.

To substantiate your assessment of these policies please refer to the various background data provided, which are for your information only and not used to calculate the BRI results (data on military forces equipment; data on development aid in relation to GDP and on the ratio of so-called "untied" to total development aid as an indicator of an altruistic development policy; and data on tariffs and duties for textile products as a proxy indicator for protectionism).

The government pursues a highly effective and forward-looking set of policies to protect its citizens.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government pursues a sound set of policies to protect its citizens against new security risks.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government pursues a contradictory set of policies that does not effectively protect citizens against new security risks.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government pursues a contradictory and counterproductive set of policies that exacerbates the new security risks.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S14.4

Homicides

S14.5

Incarceration

S15.1

Integration policy

How effectively do policies in your country support the integration of migrants into society?

This question covers integration-related policies comprising a wide array of cultural, education and social policies insofar as they affect the status of migrants or migrant communities in society. The objective of integration precludes forced assimilation but favors integration by acquisition of nationality.

Please take into account the additional background data on the acquisition of nationality, which are for your information only and are not used to calculate BRI results. While these data alone say little about integration, they are a proxy indicator for a country's willingness to integrate foreign immigrants and preparedness in doing so.

Cultural, education and social policies effectively support the integration of migrants into society.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies seek to integrate migrants into society, but have failed to do so effectively.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies do not focus on integrating migrants into society.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Cultural, education and social policies segregate migrant communities from the majority society.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S15.2

Foreign-born unemployment

S15.3

Foreign-born employment

S15.4

Foreign-born upper secondary education

S15.5

Foreign-born tertiary attainment

S16.1

Environmental policy

How effectively does environmental policy in your country protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment?

This question covers a government's activities aimed at safeguarding the environment and thereby securing the prerequisites for sustainable economic development.

Environmental policy effectively protects, preserves and enhances the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy largely protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy insufficiently protects and preserves the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental policy has largely failed to protect and preserve the sustainability of natural resources and quality of the environment.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S16.2

Energy intensity

S16.3

CO₂ emissions

S16.4

Energy mix

S16.5

Water usage

S16.6

Waste management

S17.1 Research and innovation policy

To what extent does research and innovation policy in your country support technological innovations that foster the creation and introduction of new products?

This question comprises subsidies and incentives for research institutions conducting basic and applied research, as well as subsidies and incentives for establishing start-up companies that transfer scientific output into products and enhanced productivity. Bureaucratic impediments to research and innovation should also be taken into account.

Research and innovation policy effectively supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy largely supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy partly supports innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Research and innovation policy has largely failed to support innovations that foster the creation of new products and enhance productivity.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S.2 R&D spending

S.3 Growth in public R&D spending

S.4 High-tech employment

S.5 Science and technology degrees

S.6 Triad patents

S18.1

Education policy

To what extent does education policy in your country deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training?

This question assesses the extent to which a government's education policy facilitates high-quality learning that contributes to personal development, sustainable economic growth and social cohesion.

Your response should focus on the following, irrespective of the education system's organization: the contribution of education policy towards providing a skilled labor force, the graduate output of upper secondary and tertiary education, and (equitable) access to education. While the latter pertains to issues of fairness and distributive justice, it also has implications for a country's international competitiveness as unequal education implies a waste of human potential.

Education policy effectively delivers efficient and equitable education and training.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy largely delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy partly delivers high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Education policy largely fails to deliver high-quality, efficient and equitable education and training.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

S18.2

Education spending

S18.3

Upper secondary education

S18.4

Tertiary attainment

S18.5

Continuing education

S18.6

PISA results

Executive capacity

M1 Cabinet composition

Steering capability: preparing and formulating policies

M2 Strategic capacity

M3 Inter-ministerial coordination

M4 Regulatory impact assessments

M5 Societal consultation

M6 Policy communication

Resource efficiency: implementing policies

M7 Legislative efficiency

M8 Anticipation of veto players

M9 Effective implementation

International cooperation: incorporating external reform impulses

M10 Domestic adaptability

M11 External adaptability

Institutional learning: structures of self-monitoring and -reform

M12 Organizational reform capacity

Please list the changes of cabinets/of the government between 1 January 2005 and 31 March 2007.

If your system of government is parliamentary or semi-presidential, please go to a) parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. If your system of government is presidential, please go to b) presidential systems.

a) Parliamentary and semi-presidential systems

A cabinet is defined by the same prime minister continuously in office, the same party or parties in government and the same legislative period. The following modes of termination should be distinguished: elections = 1; voluntary resignation of the prime minister = 2; resignation of prime minister due to health reasons = 3; dissension within cabinet (coalition breaks up) = 4; lack of parliamentary support = 5; intervention by head of state = 6; broadening of the coalition = 7.

Parties in government (acronyms)	Type of government single party government; minimal winning coalition; surplus coalition; single party minority government; multiparty minority government; caretaker government	Name of prime minister	Mode of termination	Duration (m/y-m/y)
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

b) Presidential systems

Parties permanently supporting the president (acronyms)	Total % of mandates	Name of president	Date of presidential election and president's term of office (m/y-m/y)	Duration (m/y-m/y)
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

M 2.1

Strategic planning

How much influence does strategic planning have on government decision-making?

Organizational forms of strategic planning include planning units at the center of government and personal advisory cabinets for ministers or the president/prime minister or extra-governmental bodies.

An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between strategic planning staff and the head of government. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

Dominant influence.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Considerable influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Modest influence.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
No influence.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 2.1a

Medium-term fiscal framework

M 2.1b

Annual budget compliance

M 2.2

Scientific advice

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decision-making?

An indicator of influence may be the frequency of meetings between government and external academic experts. Please substantiate your assessment with empirical evidence.

Dominant influence.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Considerable influence.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Modest influence.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
No influence.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.1

GO expertise

Does the government office/prime minister's office (GO/PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

This question examines whether the government office (referred to in some countries as the prime minister's office, chancellery, etc.) has capacities to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals.

The GO/PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet/prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government's strategic and budgetary priorities.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.2

GO gatekeeping

Can the government office/prime minister's office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

Please assess whether the GO/PMO is de facto, not only legally, able to return materials on the basis of policy considerations.

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.3

Line ministries

To what extent do line ministries have to involve the government office/prime minister's office in the preparation of policy proposals?

Please assess whether line ministries involve the GO/PMO de facto, not only legally, in the preparation of policy proposals.

There are interrelated capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.4

Cabinet committees

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees prepare cabinet meetings?

This question studies whether cabinet committees (composed exclusively of cabinet members) or ministerial committees (composed of several ministers and individual non-cabinet members) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether ministerial or cabinet committees are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings.

The large majority of issues are reviewed and scheduled first by/for the committees.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most of the issues are prepared by committees. Or: Issues of political or strategic importance are reviewed and scheduled by/for the committees.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by committees.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no preparation of cabinet meetings by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.5

Senior ministry officials

How effectively do senior ministry officials prepare cabinet meetings?

This question examines whether senior ministry officials (leading civil servants or political appointees including junior ministers below the cabinet level) effectively filter out or settle issues so that the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Please assess whether senior ministry officials are de facto, not only legally, able to prepare cabinet meetings.

Most issues arrive in time to be reviewed and scheduled first by/for the senior ministry officials (i.e., more than 70 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many of the issues are prepared by senior ministry officials (i.e., 50-70 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is some preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials (i.e., less than 50 percent of cabinet agenda items are prepared).	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no or hardly any preparation of cabinet meetings by senior ministry officials.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M3.6

Line ministry civil servants

How effectively do line ministry civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

This question refers to administrative coordination and examines to what extent civil servants of individual ministries effectively coordinate the drafting of policy proposals with other ministries so that political coordination bodies and the cabinet can focus on strategic policy debates.

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by civil servants.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many policy proposals are coordinated by civil servants.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is some coordination of policy proposals by civil servants.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by civil servants.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M4.1

RIA application

Does the government regularly assess the potential socioeconomic impact of the draft laws it prepares (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

If RIA activities are not centrally registered, please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country.

If RIA are not applied or do not exist, M4.2 and M4.3 will automatically be given a score of one.

Not only are RIA applied to all significant new regulations, the impact of existing regulations is regularly assessed, too.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are applied systematically to new or existing regulations, but are limited to those matching defined criteria.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are not applied systematically to study the impact of regulations.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are applied randomly.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA are not applied or do not exist.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M4.2

Needs analysis

To what extent do RIA analyze the purpose of and need for a regulation?

This question seeks to assess the analytical depth of RIA.

Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country.

RIA define the purpose of and need for a regulation in a clear, concise and specific manner.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA mention the purpose of and need for a regulation, but the specification is not sufficiently clear, concise and/or well-defined.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA mention the purpose of and the need for a regulation, but do not specify.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA do not analyze the purpose of and the need for a regulation.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M4.3

Alternative options

To what extent do RIA analyze alternative options?

This question seeks to assess the scope of RIA.

Please try to obtain exemplary information that is representative of the situation in your country.

RIA analyze alternative options (including "do nothing") and quantify the costs and benefits of the different alternatives.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA highlight alternative options and consider the pros and cons of each option.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA consider some alternative options.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
RIA do not analyze alternative options.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M5.1

Mobilizing public support

To what extent does the government consult with trade unions, employers' associations, leading business associations, religious communities, and social and environmental interest groups to support its policy?

This question assesses how successfully the government consults with economic and social actors in preparing its policy. Successful consultation is conceived here as an exchange of views and information that increases the acceptance of government policies in society and induces economic and social actors to support them.

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| The government successfully motivates economic and social actors to support its policy. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among economic and social actors. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The government consults with economic and social actors. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The government hardly consults with any economic and social actors. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

To what extent does the government implement a coherent communication policy?

This question asks whether a government "speaks with one voice."

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government seeks to coordinate the communication of ministries through consultation procedures. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 7.1

Bills adopted in parliament

How many of the bills envisaged in the government's work program are adopted in parliament?

The period under review lasts from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2007. Ideally, you can rely on annual work programs with clearly specified timelines for the submission and adoption of bills. If such documents do not exist, please try to reconstruct a list of government bills from other government documents or interviews.

If the government has changed within the review period, please assess the new government's legislative program only, if you believe the government has been in office for a sufficient period of time. If this is not possible, please provide data for the old government. Changes of government and your chosen assessment approach should be explained in the written assessment.

Total number of bills envisaged in the government's work program:

Total number of government-sponsored bills adopted in parliament:

Share of government-sponsored bills adopted in parliament (in percent; will be calculated by database):

M 8.1

Second chamber veto

How many government-sponsored bills are rejected by the second chamber of parliament?

Please follow the explanation under question M7.1 for the review period and possible changes of government within that period.

Total number of government-initiated and/or government-supported bills submitted to parliament:

Total number of government-sponsored bills rejected by the second chamber of parliament:

Share of government-sponsored bills rejected by the second chamber of parliament (in percent; will be calculated by database):

M 8.2

Head of state veto

How many government-sponsored bills are rejected by the head of state?

Please follow the explanation under question M7.1 for the review period and possible changes of government within that period.

Total number of government-initiated and/or government-supported bills adopted in parliament:

Total number of government-sponsored bills rejected by the head of state:

Share of government-sponsored bills rejected by the head of state (in percent; will be calculated by database):

M 8.3

Court veto

How many bills or laws are declared unconstitutional (completely or partly) by a constitutional court?

Please follow the explanation under question M7.1 for the review period. To simplify the measurement, it is assumed that the constitutional court does not differentiate its watchdog role depending on the respective incumbent government. That is, we count the total number of unconstitutional bills and laws rather than the number of government-initiated or -supported bills.

Total number of bills adopted in parliament:

Total number of bills declared unconstitutional:

Share of bills adopted in parliament declared unconstitutional (in percent):

M 8.4

ECJ infringement proceedings

M9.1

Government efficiency

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

This question seeks to evaluate a government's implementation performance against the performance benchmarks set by the government for its own work. The assessment should therefore focus on the major policy priorities identified by a government and examine whether declared objectives could be realized.

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M9.2a

Ministerial compliance

To what extent does the organization of government ensure that ministers do not seek to realize their self-interest but face incentives to implement the government's program?

Organizational devices providing incentives for ministers include prime ministerial powers over personnel, policies or structures, coalition committees, party summits, comprehensive government programs/coalition agreements and cabinet meetings.

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government's program.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government's program.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The organization of government partly prevents ministers from realizing departmental self-interests.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The organization of government fails to prevent ministers from realizing departmental self-interests.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 9.2b

Monitoring line ministries

How effectively does the government office/prime minister's office monitor line ministry activities?

This question assumes that effective delegation from the core executive to ministries is reflected in the monitoring of line ministry activities by the administration of the core executive. While such monitoring is not sufficient to prevent line ministries from prioritizing sectoral over government interests, the presence or absence of monitoring is taken here as a proxy of effective delegation policies.

The GO/PMO effectively monitors the activities of line ministries.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO monitors the activities of most line ministries.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO shadows the activities of some line ministries.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The GO/PMO does not monitor the activities of line ministries.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 9.2c

Monitoring agencies

How effectively do ministries monitor the activities of executive agencies?

An effective implementation may be constrained by bureaucratic drift. To ensure that agencies act in accordance with government policies, this question assumes that ministries and their leading officials should monitor the activities of semi-autonomous executive agencies in their task area.

In federal states with few executive agencies at the central level of government, the assessment should also consider regional-level decentralized agencies acting on behalf of the federal government.

The ministries effectively monitor the activities of all executive agencies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The ministries monitor the activities of most of the executive agencies only.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The ministries monitor the activities of some executive agencies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The ministries do not monitor the activities of executive agencies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 9.2d

Internal auditing

M 9.3a

Task funding

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

A high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity. Rather, this question focuses on the delegation problem associated with decentralization.

If the central government delegates a public task to lower levels of government (as a rule: regional self-government and in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government), the central government needs to ensure that such tasks are adequately funded. The absence of corresponding funding sources ("unfunded mandates") indicates a lack of responsibility and strategic design. Funding may be provided through grants (shares of centrally collected taxes) from the central budget or by endowing subnational self-governments with their own revenues.

Please note that subnational self-government refers to directly elected subnational administrative authorities with considerable discretion. The broad concept of "delegation" applied here is taken from principal-agent theory and includes independent powers of subnational self-government enshrined in the constitution. Thus, no difference is made between independent powers and those central government powers that have been delegated by laws or executive regulations to subnational self-government.

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 9.3b

Constitutional discretion

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion?

As a high or low degree of decentralization as such does not constitute a meaningful indicator of executive capacity, this question takes the constitutional scope of regional self-government or, in unitary states without regional self-government, local self-government autonomy, as a point of reference.

Central government institutions are assumed to enable subnational self-governments to use this autonomy fully. Subnational autonomy may be curtailed by legal, administrative, fiscal or political measures of the central level. Such de facto centralizing policies may be deliberate or unintentional, unconstitutional or in accordance with the constitution.

The central government enables subnational self-governments to use their constitutional scope of discretion fully.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments' scope of discretion.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided autonomy.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M 9.3c

National standards

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services?

This question seeks to assess how central government ensures that the decentralized provision of public services complies with standards (rules, performance figures, etc.) agreed upon and set on the national level.

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government ensures largely that subnational self-governments meet national standard of public services.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments meet national minimum standards of public services.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments meet national standards of public services.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M10.1

Domestic adaptability

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

Government structures include the organization of ministries, the cooperation among ministries and in cabinet, the center of government and relations with subnational levels of government. This question asks whether these structures have been adapted to address inter/supranational developments and their effects for policy formulation and policy implementation.

Please note that structural reforms are also studied in view of their role in institutional learning (question M11.2).

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has largely adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has partly adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government has not adapted domestic government structures.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.1a

International coordination activities

To what extent does the government participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives?

This question evaluates whether the government actively collaborates in reform initiatives promoted by international fora or organizations. The underlying assumption is that – given the transnational integration of modern states – executive capacity increasingly depends on whether a government is able to actively participate in international institutions and in shaping international policies.

Joint reform initiatives concern challenges or problems that cannot be mastered unilaterally by an individual country and that aim to facilitate international cooperation in fields such as international security, economic development, social progress, human rights issues or environmental protection.

The government actively participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives as often as possible.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government often participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government selectively and sporadically participates in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The government does not participate in the international coordination of joint reform initiatives.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M11.1ba

UN Security Council Missions

M11.2

Exporting reforms

How does the government use opportunities to spread its own reform priorities through supra- and international channels and to build transnational reform coalitions?

This question examines whether the government successfully exports its domestic reform policies/approaches into the international system.

The incumbent government acts mostly as a pioneer.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The incumbent government acts mostly as an early follower.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The incumbent government acts mostly as a late follower.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
<hr/>	
The incumbent government is rather inactive.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M12.1

Self-monitoring

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

Institutional arrangements include the rules of procedure and the work formats defined there, in particular the cabinet, the office of the head of government, the center of government, the portfolios of ministries, the advisory staffs of ministers and the head of government as well as the management of relations with parliament, governing parties, ministerial administration and public communication.

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
There is no monitoring.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M12.2

Institutional reform

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

For a list of institutional arrangements, see question M12.1. Strategic capacity is the capacity to take and implement political decisions which take into account the externalities and interdependencies of policies, are based on scientific knowledge, promote common goods and represent a long-term orientation.

The government improves considerably its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

Executive accountability

Citizens: evaluative and participatory competencies

M13 Knowledge of government policies and political attitudes

Parliament: information and control resources

M14 Structures and resources of parliament, committees, parliamentary parties and deputies

Intermediary organizations: professional and advisory capacities

M15 Media, parties and interest associations

M13.1

Policy knowledge

To what extent are citizens informed of government policy-making?

This question assesses the extent to which citizens have information and knowledge enabling them to evaluate government policy-making adequately.

The question focuses on policies, not the personnel or political composition of government or the power struggles that often dominate government. A high level of information about policies presupposes that citizens understand the motives, objectives, effects and implications of policies.

Please rely on local opinion survey data to substantiate your evaluation.

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of government policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many citizens are well-informed of individual government policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Few citizens are well-informed of government policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most citizens are not aware of government policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M13.2a

Trust in institutions

M13.2b

Perceived influence

M14.1

Number of deputies

How many members of parliament are there?

If your country has a bicameral parliament, please give figures for the first chamber. These figures are used only as reference values for calculation purposes.

NB: This number is not used in the calculation of the BRI.

Total members of parliament:

M14.2

Number of committees

How many parliamentary committees are there?

The underlying assumption is that a parliament with a sufficient number of committees is better able to discuss bills, whereas too many committees may lead to fragmentation. Based on comparative studies, 12-18 committees are considered optimal.

Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Total parliamentary committees:

M14.3

Committee size

How many members does a parliamentary (sub-) committee have on average?

It is assumed that parliamentary committees can best respond to their task of control if they have neither too many nor too few members. Based on comparative studies, 13-25 committee members are considered optimal.

Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Average number of committee members:

Where subcommittees exist, average number of subcommittee members:

M14.4

Pro-government committee chairs

How many committee chairpersons nominated by the governing party (or parties) are appointed?

This question addresses the influence of governing parties in parliament. Please consider only regular parliamentary committees, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Total nominated/appointed committee chairpersons:

M14.5

Deputy expert staff

How large, on average, is the deputy's expert support staff?

This question seeks to measure the capacities of parliamentary deputies.

Expert support staff size:

M14.6

Faction expert staff

How many expert support staff members does a parliamentary group have on average?

This question seeks to measure the capacities of parliamentary groups.

Total parliamentary group expert support staff:

M14.7

Parliament expert staff

How many expert support staff members work for the parliament (including parliamentary library)?

This question seeks to measure the capacities of the parliament.

Total parliamentary expert support staff:

M14.8

Obtaining documents

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to obtain the documents they desire from government. Specify if you consider the rights of committees limited.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parliamentary committees may not ask for government documents.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M14.9

Summoning ministers

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to summon ministers to committee meetings and to confront them with their questions. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M14.10

Summoning experts

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

Please assess whether parliamentary committees are de facto, not only legally, able to invite experts to committee meetings. Please specify if you consider the rights of committees limited.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M14.11

Task area coincidence

To what extent do the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries coincide?

If the task areas of parliamentary committees match the task areas of ministries, each parliamentary committee may focus on monitoring the activities of its corresponding ministry, thereby increasing the control capacity of the legislature.

There are two possible ill-fitting constellations between committee and ministerial portfolios. If there are fewer committees than ministries, the committees may be overburdened with monitoring ministerial activities. If there are more committees than ministries, control responsibilities are split and the parliament may act non-cohesively.

This question considers regular parliamentary committees only, not committees established ad hoc to investigate specific questions.

The task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries fully coincide. Parliamentary committees monitor ministries effectively.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The task areas of parliamentary committees do not fully correspond to the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees are largely capable of monitoring ministries.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The task areas of parliamentary committees do not correspond to the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees fail to monitor ministries effectively.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The task areas of parliamentary committees differ widely from the task areas of ministries. Parliamentary committees frequently fail to monitor ministries effectively.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M14.12

Audit office

To what extent is the audit office accountable to the parliament?

This question assesses the extent to which the parliament can rely on its own auditing capacities.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| The audit office is an integral part of the parliament and is accountable to the parliament exclusively. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is accountable primarily to the parliament. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is not accountable to the parliament, but has to report regularly to the parliament. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The audit office is governed by the executive. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M14.13

Ombuds office

Does the parliament have an ombuds office?

This question asks whether parliaments have institutions that listen to the concerns of citizens, publicly advocate the issues raised by citizens and initiate governmental action to address them.

The term "ombuds office" is used here as a label representing these functions and may be institutionalized in different organizational formats.

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| The parliament has an effective ombuds office. | 10 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 9 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited. | 8 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 7 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 6 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament has an ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited. | 5 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 4 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 3 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <hr/> | |
| The parliament does not have an ombuds office. | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> |

M14.14

Budget debate time

M15.1a

Media reporting

To what extent do the main TV and radio stations in your country provide substantive in-depth information on decisions taken by the government?

This question seeks to assess the extent to which the media provide contextualized information, analysis and background information that enables the broader public to evaluate the government's decisions. For reasons of comparability and simplicity, the question focuses on:

(1) your country's main TV and radio stations (excluding all other electronic and print media as well as pure news channels) and

(2) decisions taken by the government (and not political issues or the political process in general). A lack of in-depth information is not tantamount to a complete lack of information but to the dominance of "infotainment programs" framing government decisions as personalized power politics and diverting attention from the substance of decisions to entertaining events and stories.

The main TV and radio stations every day produce high-quality information programs analyzing government decisions.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
The main TV and radio stations produce a mix of infotainment and quality information programs. Programs with in-depth information on government decisions comprise between five and seven hours a week.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
The main TV and radio stations produce many superficial infotainment programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to programs lasting between three and five hours a week.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
The main TV and radio stations are dominated by superficial infotainment programs. In-depth information on government decisions is limited to programs lasting between one and three hours a week.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M15.1b

Newspaper circulation

M15.1c

Quality newspapers

M15.2b

Polarization

Which of the parliamentary parties may be considered extremist parties?

Extremist parties are understood here as parties that oppose in principal the political freedoms (of opinion, association, contestation and election) and the pluralism of interests constitutive for democracy. Extremists often hold doctrinaire, stereotypical worldviews and sometimes advocate violent means to achieve their political goals.

Please specify why you consider parties to be extremist parties.

Name of party	Ideological affiliation
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

M15.2c

Party competence

To what extent do the electoral programs of major parties in your country propose plausible and coherent policies?

This question seeks to assess the quality of parties' policy proposals by analyzing the electoral programs of parties. It is assumed that programs document a party's capacity to formulate policies and to engage in a programmatic competition with rival parties.

Two criteria of quality are given: a proposal is plausible if its underlying problem diagnosis, the suggested policy instruments/ measures, policy objectives and expected policy impacts are reasonably linked with each other; a proposal is coherent if it does not contradict other proposed policies.

Your evaluation will imply an assessment about whether proposed policies are likely to work, although the question is more focused on the plausibility of policy proposals.

Please avoid an assessment of objectives pursued by individual parties, their appropriateness, desirability etc. "Major" parties are conceived here as parties supported by more than ten percent of the voters in the last national elections.

Most electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Few electoral programs propose plausible and coherent policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most electoral programs do not propose plausible or coherent policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M15.3a

Association competence

To what extent do interest associations propose reasonable policies?

"Reasonable" policy proposals identify the causes of problems, rely on scholarly knowledge, are technically feasible, take into account long-term interests and anticipate policy effects. These criteria are more demanding than the criteria used to evaluate party programs as interest associations can be expected to represent a specialist, substantive policy know-how.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: employers' associations, trade unions, leading business associations, religious communities, environmental and social interest groups.

Most interest associations propose reasonable policies.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many interest associations propose reasonable policies.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Few interest associations propose reasonable policies.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most interest associations do not propose reasonable policies.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

M15.3b

Association relevance

To what extent are the proposals of interest associations considered relevant by the government?

The political impact of interest associations does not only depend on their size or power. It is assumed here that impact is also a function of the quality of public communication organized by an interest association.

The assessment should focus on the following interest associations: employers' associations, trade unions, leading business associations, religious communities, environmental and social interest groups.

Most interest association proposals are considered highly relevant by the government.	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
Many interest association proposals are considered relevant by the government.	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Few interest association proposals are considered relevant by the government.	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Most interest association proposals are not taken seriously by the government.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>