Portugal

   

Executive Capacity

#26
Key Findings
With policy flexibility constrained by financial concerns, Portugal falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 26) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to its 2014 level.

The impact of strategic-planning bodies is small. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy-assessment capabilities, while the Ministry of Finance’s power remains strong given the ongoing budgetary constraints. Informal coordination mechanisms are vital particularly within the current minority government, which relies on other parties for parliamentary support.

RIA instruments are rarely utilized, with assessments remaining unsystematic. A new methodology for evaluating proposals’ economic impact has been implemented. The government consults particularly with economic actors. While communication is general effective, several notable failures were evident in 2017.

The Costa government has successfully balanced austerity reductions with continued budgetary restraint. Ministers have some incentive to follow the government program, though ministers from coalition parties are inevitably less motivated. A significant decentralization program is underway, with considerably greater funding provided to local governments.

Strategic Capacity

#27

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
5
Although the current government had been in office for almost two years as of the end of the review period, there have been virtually no changes with regard to strategic capacity. While there are strategic planning bodies in most ministries, their impact remains limited. The government’s minority status, which makes it dependent on the parliamentary support of three other parties in the parliament, has not contributed to an increase in strategic planning. It remains to be seen whether the stability shown by the government thus far will enable any change in this area in the future.

How influential are non-governmental academic experts for government decisionmaking?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with a panel of non-governmental academic experts at an early stage of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental academic experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Scholarly Advice
5
The government utilizes academic experts for research on a wide variety of topics and to implement strategic development. However, they are mainly used on an ad hoc basis, and without a systematic academic-consultation mechanism in place.

Interministerial Coordination

#16

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills substantively?

10
 9

The GO / PMO has comprehensive sectoral policy expertise and provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO has sectoral policy expertise and evaluates important draft bills.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise, but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has limited policy expertise. While it is able to assess bills, it lacks in-depth policy assessment capabilities within most policy areas. Under the preceding Passos Coelho government, policy assessment largely centered on budgetary implications, notably in terms of reducing costs and/or increasing revenue. This was particularly true during the bailout period, but persisted into the post-bailout. Under the Costa government, budgetary implications have remained important, as the government has sought to maintain its euro zone commitments. However, this government also evaluates how policy proposals might impact its parliamentary entente with its governing partners, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the Left Bloc (BE) and the Greens (PEV).

Can the government office / prime minister’s office return items envisaged for the cabinet meeting on the basis of policy considerations?

10
 9

The GO/PMO can return all/most items on policy grounds.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO can return some items on policy grounds.
 5
 4
 3


The GO/PMO can return items on technical, formal grounds only.
 2
 1

The GO/PMO has no authority to return items.
GO Gatekeeping
8
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is able to return proposed legislation on the basis of policy considerations. In light of the understanding among the four parties that support the minority government, its decisions on returning policy additionally take political considerations into account. The priority given to budgetary consolidation has meant that the Ministry of Finance remains important in this process.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination in the GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
7
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The large majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
7
Most ordinary meetings of the Portuguese cabinet – the Council of Ministers – are used for policy decisions rather than strategic policy debates. Political issues and strategic policy considerations are by-and-large prepared by the Council’s inner core of a few ministers, augmented by other ministers and staff when required.

Citations:
www.sg.pcm.gov.pt/media/8376/pa_2015_site.pdf

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
9
Since the mid-1980s, cabinet meetings have been prepared in advance by senior ministry officials such as junior ministers or directors-general (who are also political appointees), depending on the issue. Although the bailout period itself has come to a close, the continuing conditions of budgetary constraint means that this coordination is still carried out in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance. This latter entity closely monitors all state expenditure.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
7
Informal coordination mechanisms are central to government functioning and coordination. The horizontal informal links between ministries help compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal linkages. Informal coordination became even more important as the Socialist Party (PS) government depends on the PCP, BE and PEV to pass legislation in the parliament.

Evidence-based Instruments

#36

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
4
There has been minimal change in this area with regard to the previous period. RIA instruments are still not utilized. The government’s program includes the goal of “ex ante and ex post evaluation of the impact of structuring legislation, especially that which carries costs for small and medium-sized enterprises.” Documents from the government indicate that it will retain the small and medium-sized enterprise test (“PME test” in Portuguese), as well as the “one-in, one-out” or “Comporta Regulatória” rule designed to compensate citizens or companies for new costs resulting from new legislation, both of which were approved in 2014. While the Costa government is taking steps to implement these measures, notably through its Agency for Administrative Modernization, neither has yet been fully implemented. In March 2017, the government approved a methodology for evaluating the economic impact of government proposals (“custa quanto” measure). This measure was implemented on a trial basis in 2017, with a team of six staff members working on it. The actual effect of this methodology on policy decisions remains unclear.

Citations:
https://www.ama.gov.pt/documents/24077/31275/20160630_AAC_03_SAMA2020Anexo_Global.pdf/55ad0d27-c3fa-441e-ac2b-c824983aead4

https://www.ama.gov.pt/documents/24077/177526/Apresenta%C3%A7%C3%A3o+Ana+Sofia+Figueiredo.pdf/efc0af11-998e-4f69-968e-adfe6bf8199f

João Palma-Ferreira (2017), “Quanto custam as leis às empresas?,” Expresso online – 4/3/2017, available online at: http://expresso.sapo.pt/economia/2017-03-04-Quanto-custam-as-leis-as-empresas-

“SIMPLEX+2016 – Medida «Custa Quanto»” – available online at: http://www.dgae.gov.pt/paginaRegisto.aspx?back=1&id=15058

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
As noted above, systematic RIA does not exist in Portugal. Stakeholder consultation does generally take place, albeit inconsistently and without full participation by all relevant stakeholders. Impact-assessment results are not generally made publicly available or systematically communicated. There are no evaluations of impact-assessment quality rendered by independent bodies.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
Sustainability checks are not integrated systematically into impact assessments. They may take place in some assessment processes but not in others, in a rather ad hoc fashion that depends on who is carrying out the impact assessment. The same is true with regard to the use of sustainability-focused indicators, as well as the temporal dimension of the analyses.

Societal Consultation

#34

To what extent does the government consult with societal actors to support its policy?

10
 9

The government successfully motivates societal actors to support its policy.
 8
 7
 6


The government facilitates the acceptance of its policy among societal actors.
 5
 4
 3


The government consults with societal actors.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Negotiating Public Support
4
The government consults with some societal actors. For example, the Social and Economic Council (Conselho Económico e Social, CES) serves as a constitutional body for consultation and social concertation. Within the CES, there is a Standing Committee on Social Concertation (Comissão Permanente de Concertação Social, CPCS) that brings together the government, employer associations and trade unions. The CES and the CPCS continued to hold regular discussions during the period under review. This was made clear in the CES’ plan of activities and in its press releases.

Citations:
See the CES Plan of Activities for the period under consideration at www.ces.pt/…/PLANO%DE%ACTIVIDADES%20CES%202015_re

Cristina Oliveira da Silva (2015), “Silva Peneda ‘preocupado’ com ‘regular funcionamento’ do CES,” Diário Económico, 18/3/2015, available online at: http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/silva-peneda-preocupado-com-regular-funcionamento-do-ces_214203.html

Policy Communication

#12

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

The government effectively coordinates the communication of ministries; ministries closely align their communication with government strategy. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 8
 7
 6


The government coordinates the communication of ministries. Contradictory statements are rare, but do occur. Messages are factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries are responsible for informing the public within their own particular areas of competence; their statements occasionally contradict each other. Messages are sometimes not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually coherent with the government’s plans.
Coherent Communication
7
Prime Minister António Costa’s government showed itself to be largely effective in terms of communication and coordination during the review period, despite being a minority government with an unprecedented parliamentary-support coalition. Indeed, its first two years in office were marked by a remarkable degree of stability, with the government’s coherent communication contributing to this stability.

However, the government did display some communication failures late in the review period. Some of these occurred in the aftermath of the deadly forest fires of June and October, while others stemmed from separate policy fields. For example, in June 2017, the government initially decided to back Lisbon as a candidate for the process of relocating the European Medicines Agency, but then made a last-minute change and backed Porto as a candidate in July. The government also gave contradictory information in the aftermath of the theft of military equipment from Tancos in June, with the minister of defense adding to the confusing state of affairs in September when he stated that it was possible that “there may not have been any theft.”

Citations:
Lei orgânica do XXI Governo available at www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/0-governo/lei-organica/lei-organica.aspx

Paul Ames (2017), “Portuguese politics cripples Lisbon’s EU agency bid,” Politico, 28/7/17, available online at: https://www.politico.eu/article/to-placate-porto-portugal-pulls-plug-on-lisbons-bid-for-ema

Paulo Tavares e Anselmo Crespo (2017), “‘Não sei se alguém entrou em Tancos. No limite, pode não ter havido furto’,” Diário de Notícias online – 10/9/2017, available online at: https://www.dn.pt/portugal/interior/azeredo-lopes-nao-sei-se-alguem-entrou-em-tancos-no-limite-pode-nao-ter-havido-furto-8759607.html

Implementation

#21

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Efficiency
7
The Costa government is guided by a very impressive agenda, the Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional 2015 – 2019. In its first two years in office, as detailed elsewhere in this survey, it implemented a number of measures seeking to alleviate conditions of austerity. A number of these measures resulted from the government’s negotiations with the PCP, BE and PEV to ensure their parliamentary support. Other more ambitious goals, such as administrative modernization, are also being developed, but will require a broader time-frame for implementation. The government has proved to be considerably more stable than initially predicted, which may allow it to implement its ambitious policy objectives. At the same time, it should be noted that the government continues to face intense scrutiny from the European Union and world markets with regard to budgetary consolidation, along with no-less-intense scrutiny from its parliamentary allies with regard to austerity alleviation. During the period here under analysis, the government was mostly successful in negotiating these pressures and advancing its policy agenda.

Citations:
Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, 2015 – 2019.

To what extent does the organization of government provide incentives to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any incentives for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
7
The organization of relations in the parliamentary and cabinet systems ensure that ministers have incentives to implement the government’s program. While ministers in the PS government are generally aligned with the government program, the fact that the government has to depend on three other parties with very different orientations to pass legislation does create difficulties with regard to ministerial compliance.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
7
The government is relatively small, with 17 ministers and a few more than 40 secretaries of state. A July 2017 reshuffle that created the position of secretary of state for housing increased the number of secretaries of state to 43.

Ministries in Portugal are not independent of the prime minister. The prime minister is also assisted by the Presidência do Conselho dos Ministros and by the office of the adjunct secretary of state of the prime minister. These entities can and do monitor all line ministries’ implementation activities. However, the lack of in-depth policy capacity and the reality of limited resources limit the overall degree of control.

Citations:
http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/ge21/governo.composicao

Diário de Notícias (2017), “Governo: Lista atualizada do XXI Governo Constitucional,” 13/7/2017, available online at: https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/governo-lista-atualizada-do-xxi-governo-constitucional-8635507.html

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies and executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies, Bureaucracies
7
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, Portugal experienced a proliferation of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations and other structures that complicated an already complex direct administrative structure. These structures were often left with little in the way of ex post monitoring. In the context of the bailout and the continuing need to reduce public expenditure, the Passos Coelho government increased its scrutiny of the number and operation of these non-governmental organizations as well as the state administration. However, this interest was fundamentally centered on financial and budgetary aspects rather than the implementation of policy per se. Since the bailout, and even with a very different government under the Socialist Party, there has been little interest in these structures, and indeed the Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional 2015-2019 makes no mention of these.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
6
Unsurprisingly given its extremely small size Portugal, is one of the most centralized countries in Western Europe, with autonomous self-governing areas in the island regions of the Azores and Madeira. A total of 308 municipalities represent the main subnational level of government. OECD figures for 2016 (the most recent data available) show Portugal to have among the group’s lowest relative levels of subnational public expenditure in several areas of education, health and security. However, these figures had improved significantly since the 2012 OECD report.

The subnational sector has long been burdened with increasing debts, and 18 municipalities received support from the Municipal Support Fund (Fundo de Apoio Municipal, FAM) during the period under review.

The current government has expressed a commitment to decentralization. It addresses this topic in its program, even identifying it as the basis of its reform of the state. On 16 February 2017, the Council of Ministers approved a law that transferred a number of very important responsibilities to local governments. Among the most important innovations was to increase the share of the public budget transferred to local governments from 14% to 19%, as stipulated in the National Program of Reforms.

Citations:
www.portalautarquico.pt=PT/financas-locais/transferencias/freguesias

OECD (2013), “OECD Regions at a Glance 2013”
OECD (2016) “OECD Regions at a Glance 2016” available at http://www.oecd.org/regional/oecd-regions-at-a-glance-19990057.htm

http://www.fundodeapoiomunicipal.pt/category/noticias/

Diário de Notícias (2017), “Fundo de Apoio Municipal paga 590 mil euros de juros às câmaras e ao Estado,” 11/7/2017. Available online at: https://www.dn.pt/lusa/interior/fundo-de-apoio-municipal-paga-590-mil-euros-de-juros-as-camaras-e-ao-estado-8628727.html

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
5
Formally, the central government enables subnational governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to policy implementation. However, subnational governments do not have their own sources of revenue, being instead dependent on central-government transfers. This means that the central government generally has considerable control. This control increased with the bailout, and has continued to be substantial afterward. For example, the central government imposed its own conditionalities on the Madeira regional government as part of a bailout package that ended on 31 December 2015, and has acted similarly with other municipalities that have requested central-government help (as noted in the previous question). However, much the same is true of even for municipalities that have not sought a central-government bailout, as increasing reductions in financial expenditures have resulted in budget cuts for programs involving partnerships between the central and local governments.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
6
National standards are largely uniformly applied, albeit as a result of the control and provision of most public services by the central government. However, there are differences between municipalities in some services, as in the case of infrastructure, culture and extracurricular educational offerings. Similarly, differences in service provision can result from the “luck of the draw” in terms of the specific civil servant a citizen encounters. This reflects both the complex and frequently changing policy framework and the relative lack of accountability in public-services provision.

Adaptability

#9

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures no matter how useful adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
7
The European Union is vital to Portugal in all respects. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, Portugal has become an integral part of Europe, with all the implications arising from integration into a huge variety of legal, organizational, security and reporting frameworks. While the government of Portugal has not yet applied all of the EU laws and regulations, it is steadily adopting EU policies. Obviously, since Portugal is part of the European Union, and dependent upon it for funds and trade, the country has had to adapt its structures accordingly.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively in international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
8
Although Portugal is small, relatively poor and not very influential as a nation, it is a member of the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, the World Trade Organization and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP), among other groups. It works actively with other nations through these organizations to develop policies. Given the country’s size and importance, it collaborates quite effectively in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods.

Portugal “punches well above its weight” in military diplomacy through participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief programs under the auspices of the European Union, the UN and NATO. It must also be noted that the previous president of the European Commission and the current secretary-general of the United Nations are Portuguese, both having been prime ministers of the country. Previously, Portuguese politician Diego Pinto de Freitas do Amaral served as president of the General Assembly of the UN in 1995 – 1996.

During the review period, the Costa government sought to increase the country’s influence in terms of shaping the European Union’s future, and hosted the second summit of Southern EU countries in January 2017.

Citations:
DW (2017), “Southern EU states to forge strategies in Lisbon,” 28/1/2017, available online at: http://www.dw.com/en/southern-eu-states-to-forge-strategies-in-lisbon/a-37312241

Organizational Reform

#27

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
6
The current government, which took office on 26 November 2015, has published both a policy agenda, the Programa do XXI Governo Constitucional, and the Lei Orgânica do XXI Governo (legislation stipulating government reorganization). Both of these documents, if implemented, necessitate monitoring the institutional arrangements of governing. The question that remains for this government is much the same as for its predecessors: whether it will be able to deliver on plans to reform institutional arrangements of governing, and effectively institutionalize these changes beyond the mere legal approval of new arrangements. So far, after almost two years of governing, the answer remains no.

Citations:
Programa do XXI Governo Constitutional, 2015 – 2019.

Lei Orgânica do XXI Governo Decreto – Lei # 251 – A/2015 de 17 December 2015.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
5
There is no evidence that the Costa government significantly changed institutional arrangements in such a way as to improve strategic capacity during the period under review.
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