Slovenia

   

Executive Capacity

#33
Key Findings
With a number of a significant gaps, Slovenia scores relatively poorly (rank 33) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has improved by 0.5 points since 2014.

Institutional strategic-planning capacities are generally weak, but a new overall strategic policymaking framework has been adopted. The government office (GO) reviews bills from a legal and technical perspective but lacks sectoral expertise. Legislative projects depend largely on coalition-party negotiations, and are drafted by line ministries or interministerial teams with little GO participation.

RIA quality is uneven but improving, and much legislation is exempt. The Cerar government’s concessions to doctors on wages helped trigger widespread public-sector strikes, contributing to the prime minister’s resignation. Before this point, the government had slowed its reform pace, with many goals and deadlines from the coalition agreement still unmet.

Financing for municipal governments has produced considerable conflict, but the new government has placed a stronger emphasis on providing adequate funds. Successive governments have appointed loyalists within the civil service, increasing politicization. However, regulations are generally enforced effectively and without bias.

Strategic Capacity

#37

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
4
The institutional capacity for strategic planning in Slovenia is rather weak. Capacities for planning in the ministries are limited, and there is no central policy-planning unit in the Government Office. After assuming office, the Cerar government announced that it would expand planning capacities but achieved little progress. In December 2017, however, the government finally adopted the Slovenian Development Strategy 2030, a strategic framework for policymaking in the country. Preparation of the strategy started in June 2016 and involved more than 200 experts and government officials. The strategy sets five strategic goals: an inclusive and safe society; an education system that supports lifelong learning; a productive and equitable economy that creates added value for everyone; the preservation of Slovenia’s natural environment; and a cooperative, competent and efficient system of governance.

Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2017): Slovenian Development Strategy 2030. Ljubljana (http://www.vlada.si/fileadmin/dokumenti/si/projekti/2017/srs2030/en/Slovenia_2030.pdf).

Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Expert Advice
4
In Slovenia, the Government Office and the ministries have various advisory bodies that include academic experts. Prime Minister Cerar, an academic himself, strongly relied on academic and practitioners’ advice when establishing his party platform, coalition and government program. While the Cerar government regularly sought external advice, it often failed to implement it.

Interministerial Coordination

#28

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?

10
 9

The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
4
Slovenia has a strong tradition of departmentalism and collegial cabinets. The Government Office focuses on the legal and technical coherence of draft bills but lacks the capacity and sectoral expertise to evaluate their policy content, especially since the recruitment of expert staff is limited and often subject to political pressures and political compromise. The change in the head of the Government Office in October 2016 – from Darko Krašovec, who had to resign after allegations of corruptions, to Lilijana Kozlovič, a member of parliament belonging to Prime Minister Cerar’s SMC party – did little to change the situation. Marjan Šarec, the new prime minister, has brought in new experts. Among others, he made Damir Črnčec, an influential security expert, his national security advisor.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
3
The Government Office is not directly and systematically involved in line ministries’ preparation of policy proposals. Once the coalition agreement and government program have defined certain projects, full responsibility for drafting bills rests with the line ministries, interministerial commissions or project teams. The Government Office is seldom briefed about the state of affairs. If it is, consultation is rather formal and focuses mostly on legal and technical issues.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
8
Cabinet committees play an important role in the preparation of cabinet proposals in Slovenia and settle issues prior to the cabinet meeting. Under the Cerar government, there were three standing committees: the Committee of State Matters and Public Issues, the Committee of National Economy and the Commission of Administrative and Personnel Matters. In addition, the Cerar government established 11 temporary committees for particular tasks, including cabinet committees for youth issues, disability issues, integration of migrants and protection against natural disasters. The Šarec government has so far kept the three standing cabinet committees.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
6
The government rules of procedure establish clear mechanisms to ensure effective cooperation between the ministries. They require the consultation of all ministries that are concerned before the submission of bills to the cabinet. While senior civil servants are thus heavily involved in the coordination of legislation, the effectiveness of this coordination has suffered from the deteriorating quality and increasing politicization of the upper echelons of civil service. Under the Cerar government, a number of prominent and experienced high-ranking civil servants were replaced by party loyalists with limited administrative experience and even less expert knowledge. The Šarec government’s five-party coalition agreement failed to address the issue.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
7
Slovenia’s tradition of coalition governments has meant that informal coordination procedures have played a significant role in policy coordination. Under the Cerar government, the leaders of the three coalition parties met frequently, making major decisions at coalition meetings that were often also attended by the ministers and from time to time also by the leaders of parliamentary majority groups and coalition members of parliament. In press conferences and public statements after these meetings, very little information about the decisions made was provided to the public. The dominant role of the party leaders within their parties also meant that a considerable amount of policy coordination took place in party bodies. The Šarec government has so far followed this style.

How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?

10
 9

The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Digitalization for Interministerial C.
7
In 2016, the Cerar government transferred competences for information society and electronic communication from the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport to the Ministry of Public Administration, in order to better coordinate the digitalization of public administration with digital transformation in general. The reorganization of responsibilities has led to a more appropriate organization for the implementation of the 2016 “Digital Slovenia 2020” strategy and a more efficient use of the existing ICT infrastructure. One of the goals of the strategy is to further strengthen the use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.

Citations:
Government of Slovenia (2016): Digital Slovenia 2020: Development strategy for the information society until 2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/DID/Informacijska_druzba/pdf/DSI_2020_3-2016_pic1.pdf).

Evidence-based Instruments

#28

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
6
In Slovenia, RIA guidelines have largely been copy and pasted from the European Union. The government’s Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020 acknowledged the need for improving RIA and has brought some progress. However, oversight has continued to suffer from institutional fragmentation, so that the quality of RIA has been uneven among ministries. When an RIA is applied, it is often limited to a qualitative assessment, and there are no official statistics regarding the implementation of RIA. As fast-track legislation is exempt from RIA, RIAs were not performed for at least a third of all new measures passed in the period under review.

Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).

OECD (2018): Regulatory Policy in Slovenia: Oversight Matters. Paris.

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
The RIA process in Slovenia suffers from several weaknesses. First, public participation often fails to meet the legal standards. Second, the conducted RIAs are rarely made public, if ever. Third, quality control is limited. RIA oversight is divided among several agencies; however, supervising agencies largely check for formal and legal correctness, without addressing substantive quality.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
Slovenia’s RIA guidelines provide for relatively far-reaching sustainability checks. However, the specification of assessment criteria and the set of indicators to be used suffer from gaps, and the actual quality of RIA is very uneven. In some cases, there are only vague assessments; in others, comprehensive analytical work is done. During the period under review, the quality of assessments has somewhat improved.

To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?

10
 9

Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 8
 7
 6


Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 5
 4
 3


Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 2
 1

Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Quality of Ex Post Evaluation
6
Ex post evaluations are regularly carried out for the most significant policies, but rarely for all other policies. When carried out, ex post evaluations are primarily used for the improvement of existing policies rather than for the development of new policies.

Societal Consultation

#28

Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?

10
 9

The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 8
 7
 6


The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 5
 4
 3


The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Public Consultation
5
Slovenia has a strong tradition of corporatism and of government consultation with interest groups more generally. The Cerar government stuck to this tradition and discussed part of its legislative initiatives in the Economic and Social Council, the tripartite body for social and economic dialog. The government managed to reach agreement with the social partners over several cornerstones of its legislative program. In other cases, however, consultations failed to produce any results, with trade unions complaining that the government does not take their positions or negotiations seriously. The Cerar government’s indulgence of doctors in late 2017 led to strikes in other parts of the public sector, which contributed to the resignation of Cerar in March 2018. One of the flagship projects of the new Šarec government, an increase in the minimum wage, has been prepared without consulting the social partners, which has led to heavy criticism from employers’ associations.

Policy Communication

#25

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 8
 7
 6


Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 5
 4
 3


Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Coherent Communication
5
Ministerial communication with the public was more coherent under the Cerar government than under its predecessor. However, there were instances of contradictory statements. In particular, the ministers and parliamentarians from the Democratic Party of Pensioners (DeSUS), the second strongest party coalition party, sometimes publicly opposed policies proposed or adopted by the coalition. The new Šarec government started its term with several public clashes over the appointment of ministers, who performed poorly in front of the parliamentary committees, and Damir Črnčec, the prime minister’s new national security advisor.

Implementation

#34

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Effectiveness
5
The Cerar government’s coalition agreement was relatively comprehensive and more detailed than those of previous governments. However, many goals and deadlines stated in the agreement were not met, as the government’s reform propensity abated over the course of its term. The proposed health care and education reforms were postponed several times. The tax reform eventually adopted in summer 2016 was more modest than initially announced. On pensions, the Cerar government agreed with the social partners on a broad reform outline, but largely refrained from committing to more specific measures. With regard to privatization, the coalition agreement took a cautious approach and remained relatively vague. Given the lack of consensus among the coalition partners about the remaining role of the state, it did not come as a surprise that some privatization decisions led to cracks in the coalition. The promised privatization of Telekom Slovenija, the largest communication company in the country, fell victim to political opposition from within and outside the governing coalition. The same occurred with the promised privatization of Slovenia’s largest bank NLB, which was postponed several times. In 2017 and 2018, the government became increasingly preoccupied with its two large-scale investment projects.

To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
6
As head of a coalition government, Prime Minister Cerar primarily relied on frequent coalition meetings of narrow (including only the presidents of coalition parties) or broader composition (including ministers and members of parliament as well) in order to ensure the implementation of the government’s program. In the Cerar government’s first two years in office, seven ministers resigned or were removed from office. In the period under review, no such changes in the leadership of ministries occurred.

Citations:
Haček, M., S. Kukovič, M. Brezovšek (2017): Slovenian Politics and the State. Lanham, New York, London, Boulder: Lexington Books.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
5
The weak capacity of the Government Office (GO) and the predominance of coalition governments have limited the GO’s role in monitoring line ministries’ implementation activities. Under the Cerar government, the GO tended to respect the assignment of ministries in the coalition agreement, so that most monitoring took place in coalition meetings. The new prime minister, Šarec, seems willing to expand the role of the GO in monitoring the activities of line ministries.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies|Bureaucracies
4
Following the passage of the 2002 Civil Service Act, which at least formally has made it easier for the government to get rid of unwanted personnel, politicization has increased in Slovenia’s executive agencies. Despite a rhetorical commitment to depoliticization in public administration in the 2014 coalition agreements, the Cerar government replaced a number of experienced high-ranking and even some mid-level civil servants with less qualified staff loyal to the coalition parties and filled leading positions in executive agencies with politically loyal personnel. Also, ministerial cabinets were largely filled with politically loyal personnel that often lacked the requisite expertise to carry out its functions and aid the minister. Political and personal ties prevented the prosecution of misconduct and incompetency, resulting in a decreasing level of civil service quality at the national level. Under the new Šarec government, the politicization of the civil service has continued.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
3
Municipal governments – the sole tier of subnational self-government in Slovenia – have suffered substantial fiscal difficulties for some time. The Cerar government focused on reducing the bureaucratic burdens without reducing the number of municipalities. However, the measures taken were not effective, and municipalities suffered from the government’s decision to postpone the re-introduction of the property tax to the period after the next parliamentary elections. Government proposals to lower central government transfers met resistance by the Association of Municipalities and Towns of Slovenia (SOS), the Association of Municipalities of Slovenia (ZOS) and the Association of City Municipalities (ZMOS). In 2017 and 2018 alike, the three municipal associations and the Cerar government failed to reach an agreement on the financing of municipalities. The coalition agreement of the Šarec government has placed greater emphasis on the adequate funding of local self-government system, which might lead to some changes.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
5
The Slovenian constitution, the European Charter on Local Government (ratified in 1996) and the Local Government Act give municipalities responsibility for all local public affairs and some autonomy in implementing national legislation. In practice, however, financing constraints and a limited administrative capacity in the larger number of small municipalities limit local autonomy. The Cerar government started to address this issue through the adoption of the Public Administration Development Strategy in April 2015 and a separate strategy for the development of local government in September 2016. Both strategies aim at fostering closer cooperation between municipalities in the fields of public services and tourism, but implementation of those strategies has so far proven inadequate and central government and municipalities are still far apart on the most issues.

Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/Strategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).

Ministry for Public Administration (2016): Strategija razvoja lokalne samouprave do 2020 (Strategy of local government development until 2020). Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/svlsrp.gov.si/pageuploads/lok-sam-2015/aktualno-ls/strateg-ls/12_SRLS_16.9.2016.pdf).

Rožen, Tomaž and Miro Haček (2014): Merjenje upravljavske sposobnosti lokalnih samoupravnih skupnosti: primer slovenskih občin (Measurement of administrative capacity of local governments: case of Slovenian municipalities). Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
3
In Slovenia, public-service standards are poorly defined, especially with regard to the independent functions of municipal governments. As the constitution guarantees the autonomy of every municipality, the extent and quality of public services differ substantially across the country. Financial controls and inspections are often ineffective due to the lack of resources and staff. Moreover, the monitoring of standards is often highly fragmented. In the case of finances, for instance, the Ministry of Finance, the Court of Audit and municipal supervisory committees all play an oversight role.

To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?

10
 9

Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 8
 7
 6


Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 5
 4
 3


Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
 2
 1

Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Regulatory Enforcement
6
Ministries and government agencies largely succeed in enforcing regulations effectively and without bias. However, there have been some cases in which they succumbed to pressure from interest groups. In the period under review, a case in point was the investment of Magna in Maribor in which a number of legal requirements were ignored by state agencies due to the threat that Magna would move its investment to another country and pressure from the Cerar government, which blindly supported the project.

Adaptability

#25

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
6
Upon EU accession, Slovenia developed a complex system for coordinating European affairs, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central coordinator. The Cerar and Šarec governments left this system largely unchanged. In order to increase the absorption of EU funds, the Cerar government created a new ministry without portfolio with responsibility for development, strategic projects and cohesion and changed procedures. As a result, the absorption rate has substantially increased. The Šarec government has kept the ministry.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
Like its predecessors, the Cerar government was preoccupied with domestic political and economic issues and paid little attention to improving institutional capacity for shaping and implementing global initiatives. The country’s main international focus has been on shaping the European Union’s policy toward the western Balkans, where Slovenia sees its strategic interests. In the period under review, the 25-year long territorial dispute between Slovenia and Croatia over the Gulf of Piran and part of the land border continued. While Slovenia accepted the arbitration decision of June 2017 and amended its legislation in December 2017, Croatia has refused to do so, prompting Slovenia to pursue legal action in the European Court of Justice in July 2018.

Organizational Reform

#33

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
4
There is no regular self-monitoring of institutional arrangements In Slovenia. The monitoring that takes place is ad hoc and limited. The annual reports of state organizations are formal and self-congratulatory. Under the Cerar government the number of audits performed by private sector organizations remained low.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
5
At the beginning of its term, the Cerar government increased the number of ministries from 13 to 16 and changed ministerial portfolios. By establishing separate ministries for public administration, infrastructure and environment/spatial planning, as well as by creating a ministry without a portfolio responsible for development, strategic projects and cohesion, the Cerar government improved its strategic capacity. The strengthening of the Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy and the changing procedures associated with the creation of a new ministry for development, strategic projects and cohesion have helped to substantially increase the absorption rate. The government’s Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020 adopted in April 2015 was relatively brief on institutional reform. Same goes for the Strategy for the Development of Local Self-Government until 2020, adopted in October 2016. The main goal of the strategy is to strengthen local self-government and improve the quality of life at the local level. It focuses on strengthening citizen’s influence and their participation in decision-making by local self-government bodies in order to ensure the efficient use of public resources and the provision of efficient local services. However, the strategy is very vague and was not positively accepted by all three associations of municipalities. The new Šarec government has kept the structure of ministries and is yet to pay significant attention to institutional reform.

Citations:
Government of the Republic of Slovenia (2015): Public Administration 2020: Public Administration Development Strategy 2015-2020. Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/Kakovost/St rategija_razvoja_JU_2015-2020/Strategija_razvoja_ANG_final_web.pdf).
Ministry for Public Administration (2016): Strategija razvoja lokalne samouprave do 2020 (Strategy of local government development until 2020). Ljubljana (http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/svlsrp.gov. si/pageuploads/lok-sam-2015/aktualno-ls/strateg-ls/12_SRLS_16.9.2016.pdf).
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