Executive Capacity
#24Key Findings
With a Federal Chancellery that coordinates but is not superior to other ministries, Austria’s executive capacity falls into the lower-middle ranks in international comparison (rank 24). Its score on this measure is unchanged relative to 2014.
The ÖVP-Green government initially retained much of the organizational structure and style of its predecessor, including a strong focus on top-level “message control” and the use of “secretary generals” to better control the civil service. Key policies are negotiated informally between the chancellor and vice-chancellor, who are of different parties.
During the pandemic, scientific experts had unprecedented input into governance. Government communication during the early COVID-19 era was viewed at times as a “disaster.” Other pandemic policy weaknesses derived from the country’s complex federal structures.
The federal states are constitutionally weak but politically influential. Delegated tasks are typically funded adequately. RIA is a vital part of the policymaking process, but ex post evaluation is rare. Organized labor has lost power in the legislative process, but opportunities for public participation have expanded.
The ÖVP-Green government initially retained much of the organizational structure and style of its predecessor, including a strong focus on top-level “message control” and the use of “secretary generals” to better control the civil service. Key policies are negotiated informally between the chancellor and vice-chancellor, who are of different parties.
During the pandemic, scientific experts had unprecedented input into governance. Government communication during the early COVID-19 era was viewed at times as a “disaster.” Other pandemic policy weaknesses derived from the country’s complex federal structures.
The federal states are constitutionally weak but politically influential. Delegated tasks are typically funded adequately. RIA is a vital part of the policymaking process, but ex post evaluation is rare. Organized labor has lost power in the legislative process, but opportunities for public participation have expanded.
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Graph View
How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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9
9
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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7
6
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
5
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3
4
3
Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
2
1
1
In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
As in many other European democracies, Austrian governments tend to be coalitions, as usually no single party manages to secure an absolute majority in parliamentary elections. In terms of strategic capacity, this has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, executive responsibility is blurred, as the presence of too many veto players prevents the development of consistent strategic capacity. On the other, governing coalitions are conducive to more inclusive government. Political decision-making in Austria is still characterized by a tendency to prefer a maximum of consensus, even at the price of postponing necessary decisions and shying away from taboos identified with the interests of special groups (e.g., public service unions or organized agrarian interests). Inter- and intra-party veto players have significant influence and tend to undermine strategic capacity.
Strategic-planning units and bodies consisting of public officials exist within the individual ministries. The Federal Chancellery can be considered the principal strategic-planning unit, as it is responsible for coordinating the government’s various activities. However, it lacks the specialized personnel that would enable it to work as a comprehensive strategy unit and has no power to give instructions to other ministries.
The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government (2017–2019) established secretary-generals above the traditional structures within departments and across all departments in an attempt to improve the government’s strategic capacity. This regime has been continued under the ÖVP-Green government (since 2020), despite some initial concerns voiced by Green ministers. A secretary-general is only answerable to the minister. The intention is to give the respective minister (through the secretary-general) direct control over the department. A recent report by the Austrian Federal Audit Office found that the suggested “streamlining effects” on internal decision-making (as well as the suggested cost reduction for other departmental personnel) remained notably moderate, and in some cases even added to contradictory orders and counter-productive processes within departments.
As in most other countries with complex governmental structures (including coalition governments and federalism), such as Germany and Switzerland, Austria’s overall performance in the coronavirus pandemic was taken by observers as a sign of structural weakness at the level of the government’s strategic steering capacity. It has to be noted, however, that much of this “observed” structural weakness arises out of the federal division of powers within Austria and cannot be considered a direct effect of weak government decision-making at the national level.
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/news/Generalsekretaere_Zusaetzliches_Personal_Risiko_von_Doppe.html#
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/chronik/oesterreich/2083897-Covid-19-und-die-evolutionaere-Sackgasse-des-Oeffentlichen.html
Strategic-planning units and bodies consisting of public officials exist within the individual ministries. The Federal Chancellery can be considered the principal strategic-planning unit, as it is responsible for coordinating the government’s various activities. However, it lacks the specialized personnel that would enable it to work as a comprehensive strategy unit and has no power to give instructions to other ministries.
The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government (2017–2019) established secretary-generals above the traditional structures within departments and across all departments in an attempt to improve the government’s strategic capacity. This regime has been continued under the ÖVP-Green government (since 2020), despite some initial concerns voiced by Green ministers. A secretary-general is only answerable to the minister. The intention is to give the respective minister (through the secretary-general) direct control over the department. A recent report by the Austrian Federal Audit Office found that the suggested “streamlining effects” on internal decision-making (as well as the suggested cost reduction for other departmental personnel) remained notably moderate, and in some cases even added to contradictory orders and counter-productive processes within departments.
As in most other countries with complex governmental structures (including coalition governments and federalism), such as Germany and Switzerland, Austria’s overall performance in the coronavirus pandemic was taken by observers as a sign of structural weakness at the level of the government’s strategic steering capacity. It has to be noted, however, that much of this “observed” structural weakness arises out of the federal division of powers within Austria and cannot be considered a direct effect of weak government decision-making at the national level.
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/news/Generalsekretaere_Zusaetzliches_Personal_Risiko_von_Doppe.html#
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/chronik/oesterreich/2083897-Covid-19-und-die-evolutionaere-Sackgasse-des-Oeffentlichen.html
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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9
9
In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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7
6
For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
5
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3
4
3
In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
2
1
1
The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Due to the fragmented structure of the cabinet, there is no coherent pattern of using scholarly advice. The extent to which each ministry seeks systematic academic advice, and whose advice is being invited, is up to the individual minister.
Economic and financial policy is the only area in which general scholarly advice is easily available and commonly sought. Two institutions established respectively by the social partners (the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) and through a mix of public and independent funding (the Institute for Advanced Studies, Institut für Höhere Studien) regularly articulate specific opinions such as economic forecasts. Governments typically take these two institutions’ work into account when making policy. Both institutes have an excellent reputation for academic quality and independence, but are nevertheless structurally (financially) dependent on government actors. Except with respect to immigration and pension policy, there is no regular academic advisory board, as exists in Germany or the United States.
While the period of the ÖVP-FPÖ government was responsible for a relative decline in public and expert consultation regarding new laws and regulations, and with some expert opinions allegedly suppressed by the government to avoid public dissent, the coronavirus pandemic opened up a new chapter in government-expert relations. Not only have scientists become more prominent contributors to the public debate, there have also been important institutional innovations to foster closer exchange between political decision-makers and scientists, such as the COVID-19 Future Operations Platform (https://futureoperations.at/). Further, the pandemic prompted a new style of dealing with expert advice, with some ministers revealing to the public who exactly their advisers on contested key decisions were. Overall, the coronavirus pandemic became a historic catalyst for a new era of expert-based governance in Austria. The gesamtstaatliche Covid-Krisenkoordination (Gecko), formed in late 2021, included about 25 senior experts from different disciplines and was designed to play a crucial role in all coronavirus-related policies.
Citations:
https://science.apa.at/power-search/7052218416774764840
https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/5746/7/koenig-2020-politikberatung-oesterreich-future-operations-clearing-board.pdf
https://www.diepresse.com/5805409/der-minister-holt-seine-berater-vor-den-vorhang
https://corona-ampel.gv.at/corona-kommission/mitglieder-der-corona-kommission/
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000132010220/das-sind-die-neuen-covid-krisenmanager-und-ihr-expertenteam
Economic and financial policy is the only area in which general scholarly advice is easily available and commonly sought. Two institutions established respectively by the social partners (the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) and through a mix of public and independent funding (the Institute for Advanced Studies, Institut für Höhere Studien) regularly articulate specific opinions such as economic forecasts. Governments typically take these two institutions’ work into account when making policy. Both institutes have an excellent reputation for academic quality and independence, but are nevertheless structurally (financially) dependent on government actors. Except with respect to immigration and pension policy, there is no regular academic advisory board, as exists in Germany or the United States.
While the period of the ÖVP-FPÖ government was responsible for a relative decline in public and expert consultation regarding new laws and regulations, and with some expert opinions allegedly suppressed by the government to avoid public dissent, the coronavirus pandemic opened up a new chapter in government-expert relations. Not only have scientists become more prominent contributors to the public debate, there have also been important institutional innovations to foster closer exchange between political decision-makers and scientists, such as the COVID-19 Future Operations Platform (https://futureoperations.at/). Further, the pandemic prompted a new style of dealing with expert advice, with some ministers revealing to the public who exactly their advisers on contested key decisions were. Overall, the coronavirus pandemic became a historic catalyst for a new era of expert-based governance in Austria. The gesamtstaatliche Covid-Krisenkoordination (Gecko), formed in late 2021, included about 25 senior experts from different disciplines and was designed to play a crucial role in all coronavirus-related policies.
Citations:
https://science.apa.at/power-search/7052218416774764840
https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/5746/7/koenig-2020-politikberatung-oesterreich-future-operations-clearing-board.pdf
https://www.diepresse.com/5805409/der-minister-holt-seine-berater-vor-den-vorhang
https://corona-ampel.gv.at/corona-kommission/mitglieder-der-corona-kommission/
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000132010220/das-sind-die-neuen-covid-krisenmanager-und-ihr-expertenteam
Graph View
Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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9
The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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6
The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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3
4
3
The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The Chancellor’s Office has limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals according to the government’s priorities. These limitations are less of an administrative and more of a political nature. First, the federal chancellor, who chairs the cabinet, is only the first among equals. He or she has no formal authority over the other members of the council. Second, with the exception of the years between 1966 and 1983, Austria has been governed by coalitions since 1945. This further reduces the authority of the head of government, as another key member of the government – the vice-chancellor – is usually the leader of another coalition party. The result is a significant fragmentation of strategic capacities. Responsibility within the government is distributed among highly autonomous ministers and among political parties that are closely linked by a coalition agreement, but compete independently for votes.
The Federal Chancellery does have a department called the Legal and Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), which is responsible for checking the constitutionality of policy proposals coming from the various ministries. Another instrument of oversight is the evaluation of policy effects (Wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung, WFA), which must be integrated into every policy proposal (since 2013). Under this policy, every draft law has to include an evaluation of its effects in financial, social and other terms, thus enabling other members of the government to evaluate its consequences. Importantly, however, this regime does not center on the Chancellor’s Office, but reflects the pluralistic organizational structure of the Austrian executive. Of the 90 measures evaluated in the Bericht über die Wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung 2020, which was published in 2021, only three related to the Chancellor’s Office.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/dokumente/EvalWFA-2020_WEB.pdf?81k8bo
The Federal Chancellery does have a department called the Legal and Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), which is responsible for checking the constitutionality of policy proposals coming from the various ministries. Another instrument of oversight is the evaluation of policy effects (Wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung, WFA), which must be integrated into every policy proposal (since 2013). Under this policy, every draft law has to include an evaluation of its effects in financial, social and other terms, thus enabling other members of the government to evaluate its consequences. Importantly, however, this regime does not center on the Chancellor’s Office, but reflects the pluralistic organizational structure of the Austrian executive. Of the 90 measures evaluated in the Bericht über die Wirkungsorientierte Folgenabschätzung 2020, which was published in 2021, only three related to the Chancellor’s Office.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/dokumente/EvalWFA-2020_WEB.pdf?81k8bo
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
10
9
9
There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
5
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3
4
3
Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
2
1
1
Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
As all ministers are equal, the autonomy of line ministries is substantial. The chancellor cannot determine the outlines of government policy and does not have to be involved in the drafting of legislation. Normally, however, proposals are coordinated by the Chancellor’s Office. Formally, the Federal Ministry of Finance can offer its opinion as to whether a proposal fits into the government’s overall budget policy and thus enjoys a kind of cross-cutting power.
The ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) tried to establish a policy of “message control.” This is a strategic instrument designed to reduce the visibility of individual ministers (although not necessarily their power, as was evidenced by the actions of the FPÖ minister of the interior), and to increase the directing power of the chancellor and deputy chancellor (at least as long as both are in control of their respective parties).
The “Ibiza scandal” – which followed the release of a secretly filmed meeting in which the former FPÖ leader, who was also vice-chancellor, attempted to sell government positions and a media outlet to a (fake) Russian oligarch – demonstrated the limits of message control. Nevertheless, the ÖVP-Green government has retained the message control regime. Over the course of Chancellor Kurz’s second term (2020–2021), it became more and more clear, however, that the whole system was effectively designed to provide the perfect stage for the chancellor, as the ÖVP’s unchallenged “vote puller.” That said, it remains unclear if or to what extent the increasing centralization of government communication can be considered a reliable indicator of a centralization of decision-making power.
Citations:
https://eplus.uni-salzburg.at/JKM/periodical/titleinfo/3860282
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000130384394/nachruf-auf-die-message-control
The ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) tried to establish a policy of “message control.” This is a strategic instrument designed to reduce the visibility of individual ministers (although not necessarily their power, as was evidenced by the actions of the FPÖ minister of the interior), and to increase the directing power of the chancellor and deputy chancellor (at least as long as both are in control of their respective parties).
The “Ibiza scandal” – which followed the release of a secretly filmed meeting in which the former FPÖ leader, who was also vice-chancellor, attempted to sell government positions and a media outlet to a (fake) Russian oligarch – demonstrated the limits of message control. Nevertheless, the ÖVP-Green government has retained the message control regime. Over the course of Chancellor Kurz’s second term (2020–2021), it became more and more clear, however, that the whole system was effectively designed to provide the perfect stage for the chancellor, as the ÖVP’s unchallenged “vote puller.” That said, it remains unclear if or to what extent the increasing centralization of government communication can be considered a reliable indicator of a centralization of decision-making power.
Citations:
https://eplus.uni-salzburg.at/JKM/periodical/titleinfo/3860282
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000130384394/nachruf-auf-die-message-control
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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6
Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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3
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3
There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
2
1
1
There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
There have been no cabinet committees in the period under review. More generally, unlike coalition committees (informal meetings between senior representatives of the coalition parties), cabinet committees have not been a feature of executive organization and governance in the Second Republic.
However, in 2020, an institutionalized mechanism of coordination between various departments concerning youth issues (Koordination Jugendthemen) was created. This structure includes a coordination unit in each department, with the Chancellor’s Office responsible for overall coordination.
Citations:
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/jugend/oesterreichische-jugendstrategie/koordination-der-jugendstrategie/koordination-bundesministerien-zu-jugendthemen.html
However, in 2020, an institutionalized mechanism of coordination between various departments concerning youth issues (Koordination Jugendthemen) was created. This structure includes a coordination unit in each department, with the Chancellor’s Office responsible for overall coordination.
Citations:
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/jugend/oesterreichische-jugendstrategie/koordination-der-jugendstrategie/koordination-bundesministerien-zu-jugendthemen.html
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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9
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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6
Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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3
There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
2
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1
There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Austria’s federal bureaucracy is characterized by structural fragmentation. Each federal ministry has its own bureaucracy, accountable to the minister alone and not to the government as such. Each minister and his or her ministry is regarded as having a party affiliation according to the coalition agreement (though some federal governments have included non-party ministers). Policy coordination is possible only when the ministers of specific ministries agree to establish such a specific coordination. As fitting in the government’s ministerial structure of the government, individual ministers fear loss of control over their respective bureaucracies, and thus lasting and open contacts are possible only between the (politically appointed) personal staff of ministers belonging to the same political party.
Because the Austrian bureaucracy is organized along the lines of a (British-style) civil service system, though with considerably higher levels of informal party politicization, the different ministerial bureaucracies tend to be stable in their political makeup and therefore immune to short-term political influences. However, the creation of secretary-generals at the top of departments in 2017, a system that has been continued by ÖVP-Green government (since 2020), has reduced the autonomy of civil servants.
Because the Austrian bureaucracy is organized along the lines of a (British-style) civil service system, though with considerably higher levels of informal party politicization, the different ministerial bureaucracies tend to be stable in their political makeup and therefore immune to short-term political influences. However, the creation of secretary-generals at the top of departments in 2017, a system that has been continued by ÖVP-Green government (since 2020), has reduced the autonomy of civil servants.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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7
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Various coordination mechanisms – such as weekly informal meetings within each cabinet faction and the cabinet as a whole, regular informal meetings between the chancellor and vice-chancellor, as well as meetings of the coalition committee – have been long-standing elements of informal executive governance in Austria. They did not, however, guarantee smooth decision-making based on consensus, but rather allowed the cabinet to make realistic assessments about which collective decisions were politically feasible. Informal coordination mechanisms were used to negotiate a compromise when a proposal from one party’s minister was unacceptable to the other coalition party.
In the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) regular informal meetings between the chancellor and vice-chancellor became a particularly important element of informal coordination. For all the differences between the FPÖ and the Greens, and their chief protagonists, this practice has been continued by the ÖVP-Green government (since 2020). Several key projects of this government, such as the major eco-social tax reform, were negotiated between Chancellor Kurz and Vice-Chancellor Kogler.
Citations:
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2106372-Krach-im-Koalitionshaus-aber-die-Beziehung-haelt.html
https://www.diepresse.com/6045194/das-plotzliche-ende-von-kurz-und-kogler
In the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) regular informal meetings between the chancellor and vice-chancellor became a particularly important element of informal coordination. For all the differences between the FPÖ and the Greens, and their chief protagonists, this practice has been continued by the ÖVP-Green government (since 2020). Several key projects of this government, such as the major eco-social tax reform, were negotiated between Chancellor Kurz and Vice-Chancellor Kogler.
Citations:
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2106372-Krach-im-Koalitionshaus-aber-die-Beziehung-haelt.html
https://www.diepresse.com/6045194/das-plotzliche-ende-von-kurz-und-kogler
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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9
The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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3
4
3
The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Austria has no particular tradition of digitalized interministerial coordination or, if Austria does, little is known about it. However, as in other countries, the coronavirus pandemic became a powerful “digitalization catalyst.” Ever since early 2020, Austrian ministers and ministries have used Zoom and other digital instruments/formats to host regular interministerial exchanges. According to the OECD Digital Government Index 2019, Austria ranks slightly below average, but better than many of its western European peers (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany).
Citations:
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000116689168/trotz-sicherheitsmaengel-nutzen-oesterreichische-ministerien-zoom
OECD Digital Government Index, available at:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government-index-4de9f5bb-en.htm
Citations:
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000116689168/trotz-sicherheitsmaengel-nutzen-oesterreichische-ministerien-zoom
OECD Digital Government Index, available at:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government-index-4de9f5bb-en.htm
Graph View
To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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9
9
RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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6
7
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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3
4
3
RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
2
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1
RIA are not applied or do not exist.
In Austria, RIAs were established in 2013, and have quickly evolved into an important tool for legislators and parliamentarians. Ever since, RIA has been mandatory for all primary laws and subordinate regulations.
There has been a comprehensive “threshold test” since 2015, through which it is decided whether to conduct a full-scale or simplified RIA for draft regulations. The quality of all full RIAs and ex post evaluations is reviewed by the Federal Performance Management Office (FPMO).
The scope of full RIAs is reasonably wide, extending from environmental and social aspects to issues of gender equality. In addition to reviewing the quality of all full RIAs, ex post evaluations and controls, the FPMO supports the application of threshold tests for those measures not subject to full RIAs. It also issues guidelines, provides training on RIAs and ex post evaluation processes, and coordinates the application of such tools across government.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/berichte_service/Folder_Wo_Steuerung_EN.pdf?7vj62q
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/austria-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
There has been a comprehensive “threshold test” since 2015, through which it is decided whether to conduct a full-scale or simplified RIA for draft regulations. The quality of all full RIAs and ex post evaluations is reviewed by the Federal Performance Management Office (FPMO).
The scope of full RIAs is reasonably wide, extending from environmental and social aspects to issues of gender equality. In addition to reviewing the quality of all full RIAs, ex post evaluations and controls, the FPMO supports the application of threshold tests for those measures not subject to full RIAs. It also issues guidelines, provides training on RIAs and ex post evaluation processes, and coordinates the application of such tools across government.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/berichte_service/Folder_Wo_Steuerung_EN.pdf?7vj62q
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/austria-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdf
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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9
9
RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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7
6
7
6
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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3
4
3
The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
2
1
1
RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
RIAs must be attached to every legislative proposal. The publication of draft laws for public assessment (while previous publication is legally required in many cases, in practice virtually all draft laws are published before they are voted upon) allows public stakeholders to comment on suggested legislation, which is a frequent occurrence. Trade unions and economic chambers in particular, but other institutions as well are regularly invited to provide comment on draft laws.
However, RIAs are not written by sectoral experts, but rather by the ministry or department preparing the draft law. As a result, expertise may in some cases be limited to the sectoral expertise of the body preparing the draft law. Currently, there is no independent body that evaluates RIA quality.
Since September 2017, all draft primary laws are available on the parliamentary website together with a short description of the legislative project in accessible language and the respective RIA. Citizens can submit comments on the draft regulation or support comments made by others online. Since August 2021, citizens can also submit comments on all legislative initiatives introduced in parliament (i.e., government bills, as well as parliamentary and popular initiatives) during their parliamentary deliberation and support comments made by others online. Moreover, in 2018, an interactive crowdsourcing platform was launched to provide the public with an opportunity to express their views ahead of parliamentary initiatives. Nevertheless, no systematic public consultations are held.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/dokumente/EvalWFA-2019_WEB.pdf?7ims0d
However, RIAs are not written by sectoral experts, but rather by the ministry or department preparing the draft law. As a result, expertise may in some cases be limited to the sectoral expertise of the body preparing the draft law. Currently, there is no independent body that evaluates RIA quality.
Since September 2017, all draft primary laws are available on the parliamentary website together with a short description of the legislative project in accessible language and the respective RIA. Citizens can submit comments on the draft regulation or support comments made by others online. Since August 2021, citizens can also submit comments on all legislative initiatives introduced in parliament (i.e., government bills, as well as parliamentary and popular initiatives) during their parliamentary deliberation and support comments made by others online. Moreover, in 2018, an interactive crowdsourcing platform was launched to provide the public with an opportunity to express their views ahead of parliamentary initiatives. Nevertheless, no systematic public consultations are held.
Citations:
https://www.oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wirkungsorientierte_verwaltung/dokumente/EvalWFA-2019_WEB.pdf?7ims0d
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
10
9
9
Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
8
7
6
7
6
Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
5
4
3
4
3
Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
2
1
1
Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
The potential environmental effects of legislative proposals have to be evaluated as a part of regulatory impact assessments, as do effects on employment. Various decrees require that financial and other issues be assessed. Analysis may focus on the short, medium or long term according to specific RIA legal requirements, although the typical analysis focuses on a period of five years. In its annual RIA reports, the government explicitly commits itself to dealing with the SDGs.
While Austria features an overarching sustainability strategy, there remains considerable room for improvement. Still, the formation of a new government in early 2020, which included the Greens as the junior coalition partner, has led to several (if partially symbolic) improvements. In 2020, the government published its first voluntary national report on the implementation of SDGs (Freiwilliger Bericht zur Umsetzung der Nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele/SDGs). In 2021, the government’s budget included for the first time specific information about which SDG is to be accomplished by the respective legislative projects of a department, which means that legislative goals are now systematically linked to sustainability goals. Further, efforts have been made to reach out to and involve Austrian civil society. In September 2021, the first SDG Dialogforum Österreich: Building Forward mit der Agenda 2030 took place. The forum used a hybrid format with participants representing different quarters, and was intended to provide the basis for intensive collaboration between government, public administration, the science community and civil society.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/RIA-in-Austria-web.pdf
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/nachhaltige-entwicklung-agenda-2030.html
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26661VNR_2020_Austria_Report_German.pdf
While Austria features an overarching sustainability strategy, there remains considerable room for improvement. Still, the formation of a new government in early 2020, which included the Greens as the junior coalition partner, has led to several (if partially symbolic) improvements. In 2020, the government published its first voluntary national report on the implementation of SDGs (Freiwilliger Bericht zur Umsetzung der Nachhaltigen Entwicklungsziele/SDGs). In 2021, the government’s budget included for the first time specific information about which SDG is to be accomplished by the respective legislative projects of a department, which means that legislative goals are now systematically linked to sustainability goals. Further, efforts have been made to reach out to and involve Austrian civil society. In September 2021, the first SDG Dialogforum Österreich: Building Forward mit der Agenda 2030 took place. The forum used a hybrid format with participants representing different quarters, and was intended to provide the basis for intensive collaboration between government, public administration, the science community and civil society.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/RIA-in-Austria-web.pdf
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/nachhaltige-entwicklung-agenda-2030.html
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26661VNR_2020_Austria_Report_German.pdf
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
10
9
9
Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
2
1
1
Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Ex post evaluation is a rather unknown field in Austrian politics. The lack of any systematic ex post evaluation tradition and the tendency of political actors to prioritize the next election over all other perspectives makes it highly unlikely that the present government or parliament will establish a structure of ex post evaluations. The absence of long-term strategies, beyond traditional vague ideologies (like social justice or defending Austrian identity), prevent any reasonable systematic ex post evaluation.
The only systematic ex post evaluation is provided by the Austrian Court of Audit., However, the court’s activities tend to focus on the financial aspects of specific government or government-sponsored projects. Nevertheless, ex post evaluation constitutes a major objective for Austrian scientific bodies (outside of ministries) such as the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna (his) and other Austrian university actors.
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home_1/home_2/Taetigkeitsbericht_des_Rechnungshofes_2020_BF.pdf
The only systematic ex post evaluation is provided by the Austrian Court of Audit., However, the court’s activities tend to focus on the financial aspects of specific government or government-sponsored projects. Nevertheless, ex post evaluation constitutes a major objective for Austrian scientific bodies (outside of ministries) such as the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna (his) and other Austrian university actors.
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home_1/home_2/Taetigkeitsbericht_des_Rechnungshofes_2020_BF.pdf
Graph View
Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
10
9
9
The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
8
7
6
7
6
The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
2
1
1
The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The Austrian political system is quite inclusive, but is receptive primarily to particular interests. The corporatist network established after 1945, consisting of government, business and labor representatives, still functions (more or less). This allows the government to obtain information about the formation of societal interests, and to use this information to adapt its decision-making process. However, this explicit social partnership permits the appeasement of certain interests while excluding other groups that are not as efficiently organized as the major economic interest groups. The system of officially recognized religious denominations provides another means of societal consultation. All major Christian churches as well as the Islamic, Jewish and Buddhist communities are included in decision-making processes for issues relevant to their faiths and activities. The role played by these specific economic and noneconomic interest groups has been legally formalized: The government must consult with these groups on all draft bills before sending the proposal to parliament.
A new legal basis for the Islamic community has the potential to improve consultation mechanisms with a fast-growing religious community. The sensitivity for the internal processes within the Islamic Community – especially concerning the responsibility for recruiting preachers and school teachers – has become greater due to the growth of that community.
The trend toward loosening government ties with social partners, as observed under the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019), has continued. The ÖVP-Green government, which assumed office in early 2020, was the first ever government not to include a single minister from one of the government’s social partners. Given this government’s party complexion, however, it is again organized labor that has lost further ground in the pre-parliamentary stages of the legislative process and beyond.
At the same time, opportunities for the public to participate in parliamentary consultations on government and parliamentary bills were considerably expanded in 2021.
Citations:
https://www.addendum.org/politometer/eine-regierung-ohne-sozialpartner/
https://fachinfos.parlament.gv.at/politikfelder/parlament-und-demokratie/wie-funktionieren-begutachtungsverfahren-zu-gesetzesentwuerfen/
A new legal basis for the Islamic community has the potential to improve consultation mechanisms with a fast-growing religious community. The sensitivity for the internal processes within the Islamic Community – especially concerning the responsibility for recruiting preachers and school teachers – has become greater due to the growth of that community.
The trend toward loosening government ties with social partners, as observed under the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019), has continued. The ÖVP-Green government, which assumed office in early 2020, was the first ever government not to include a single minister from one of the government’s social partners. Given this government’s party complexion, however, it is again organized labor that has lost further ground in the pre-parliamentary stages of the legislative process and beyond.
At the same time, opportunities for the public to participate in parliamentary consultations on government and parliamentary bills were considerably expanded in 2021.
Citations:
https://www.addendum.org/politometer/eine-regierung-ohne-sozialpartner/
https://fachinfos.parlament.gv.at/politikfelder/parlament-und-demokratie/wie-funktionieren-begutachtungsverfahren-zu-gesetzesentwuerfen/
Graph View
To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
10
9
9
Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
8
7
6
7
6
Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
5
4
3
4
3
Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
2
1
1
Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
In the past, government communication was largely dominated by individual ministries. This form of communication has usually been seen as a means of promoting coalition party agendas (and the agendas of the respective ministers involved), rather than the agenda of the government.
The past decade has seen a strong trend toward coordinating and centralizing government communication, however. Initially, this included an agreement to use one press officer for both governing parties. In late 2017, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition established a new style of centralizing political communication (“message control”), which marked a significant departure from the style of previous coalitions. This new regime, which effectively centered on the chancellor and the vice-chancellor, has continued under the ÖVP-Green government (in office since early 2020), despite its temporary implosion during and in the immediate aftermath of the “Ibiza scandal” (2019).
The coronavirus pandemic became a major challenge for government communication. Observers (and in particular supporters of one of the opposition parties) criticized a major lack of transparency and many confusing U-turns on government policies. Given the major tragedies involved, respondents also criticized the government, arguing that government communication was strongly focused on depicting the government as “being in control” at the expense of more substantive forms of communication. In particular, the inconclusive communication of the government’s plans for a fourth complete lockdown in late 2021 was widely perceived as a “communication disaster.”
Citations:
https://viecer.univie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog97/
https://orf.at/stories/3236296/
The past decade has seen a strong trend toward coordinating and centralizing government communication, however. Initially, this included an agreement to use one press officer for both governing parties. In late 2017, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition established a new style of centralizing political communication (“message control”), which marked a significant departure from the style of previous coalitions. This new regime, which effectively centered on the chancellor and the vice-chancellor, has continued under the ÖVP-Green government (in office since early 2020), despite its temporary implosion during and in the immediate aftermath of the “Ibiza scandal” (2019).
The coronavirus pandemic became a major challenge for government communication. Observers (and in particular supporters of one of the opposition parties) criticized a major lack of transparency and many confusing U-turns on government policies. Given the major tragedies involved, respondents also criticized the government, arguing that government communication was strongly focused on depicting the government as “being in control” at the expense of more substantive forms of communication. In particular, the inconclusive communication of the government’s plans for a fourth complete lockdown in late 2021 was widely perceived as a “communication disaster.”
Citations:
https://viecer.univie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog97/
https://orf.at/stories/3236296/
Graph View
To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
10
9
9
The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
5
4
3
4
3
The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
2
1
1
The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
The implementation of government policies in Austria strongly reflects the reality of coalition governance. Following the formation of a government, coalition parties agree on policy priorities. Implementation success in different areas is used as a vehicle to promote party agendas, rather than the government’s overall agenda. While under previous governments, each coalition party typically blamed the other for government failures, more recent governments have increasingly sought to abandon that path.
That said, if the coalition partners agree on a policy, it is likely to be adopted, given the high degree of party discipline in parliament and the limited influence of the second chamber. Still, the overall proportion of election pledges that actually become law is lower in Austria than in many other western European countries with more favorable conditions for the fulfillment of election pledges. The realization of several prominent election pledges from the 2019 election campaign, such as a reform of the tenancy law (including the established system of brokerage fees), has been delayed by the pandemic-induced crisis mode that the government has repeatedly found itself in since 2020.
Citations:
Praprotnik, Katrin & Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz, Austria, in: E. Naurin; T.J. Royed, and R. Thomson, Party Mandates and Democracy. Making, Breaking, and Keeping Election Pledges in Twelve Countries, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019, 241-254.
https://www.diepresse.com/6000029/die-vergessene-makler-reform
That said, if the coalition partners agree on a policy, it is likely to be adopted, given the high degree of party discipline in parliament and the limited influence of the second chamber. Still, the overall proportion of election pledges that actually become law is lower in Austria than in many other western European countries with more favorable conditions for the fulfillment of election pledges. The realization of several prominent election pledges from the 2019 election campaign, such as a reform of the tenancy law (including the established system of brokerage fees), has been delayed by the pandemic-induced crisis mode that the government has repeatedly found itself in since 2020.
Citations:
Praprotnik, Katrin & Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz, Austria, in: E. Naurin; T.J. Royed, and R. Thomson, Party Mandates and Democracy. Making, Breaking, and Keeping Election Pledges in Twelve Countries, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019, 241-254.
https://www.diepresse.com/6000029/die-vergessene-makler-reform
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
10
9
9
The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
2
1
1
The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministers are primarily concerned with the agendas of their parties, rather than with that of the government as such. Ministers are selected by the head of each party – typically the chancellor and vice-chancellor. Their first loyalty is thus to party (and their party leader) rather than to the government as such. For this reason, ministers have incentives to implement the government’s program only as long as this is considered to be in the strategic interest of his or her party. Nonetheless, there are a number of informal mechanisms that help commit individual ministers to the government program. For that reason, parties within any coalition cabinet have to agree – informally or formally – not to oppose each other openly, for example, in parliament. Coalitions are usually based on a written agreement, including a political agenda and rules seeking to guarantee loyalty among the coalition partners – loyalty to the common agenda and loyalty defined as not siding with the opposition against the other. The resources available to the chancellor and his office at this level are notably limited.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
8
7
6
7
6
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
5
4
3
4
3
The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
2
1
1
The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
There is no specific institution for monitoring ministries in the Austrian core executive. The Chancellor’s Office is tasked with coordinating line ministries’ activities rather than monitoring them. However, this coordination does allow it to monitor departmental activities to some extent, particularly regarding the implementation of the coalition agreement. Overall, the nature of delegation in the Austrian political executive reflects the established tradition of coalition government. It is the coalition parties’ leaders (i.e., the chancellor and the vice-chancellor) that have significant influence over the individual ministers affiliated with their party, though even they lack the resources to monitor the work of individual departments in detail.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
8
7
6
7
6
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
5
4
3
4
3
The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
2
1
1
The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Ministries are responsible for monitoring the bureaucratic structures individually subject to them. All bureaucracies (except those within the judicial branch) are legally bound by instructions issued by their ministers (according to Article 20 of the constitution), and have to report regularly to the ministries. By establishing secretary generals above the heads of departments (Sektionschefs), the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) strengthened the control of government ministers over their ministerial bureaucracies, a model that has been continued by the ÖVP-Green government (since 2020). These reforms have to be seen against the traditionally advanced levels of informal party politicization of the bureaucracy, which occasionally favor loyalty over competence. Overall, there have been few if any incidents of “bureaucratic drift.”
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
8
7
6
7
6
The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
2
1
1
The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Under Austria’s federal system, individual states (Länder) are constitutionally weak as compared with individual states in other federal systems. Yet politically, the states enjoy significant power due to the principle of federal or indirect administration and the federal structure of all major parties.
The Austrian constitution stipulates that tasks delegated to regional or municipal governments must be adequately funded, although this does not always entail 100% national funding. This principle is in most cases effectively implemented, with some exceptions on the municipal level. Debates are ongoing over allowing the nine states to raise taxes independently. However, some states oppose such a reform and seem satisfied to be financed by federal authorities, with federal funding decided by a negotiated compromise between the federal government (Bund) and the states.
Citations:
https://service.bmf.gv.at/Budget/Budgets/2021/beilagen/Zahlungsstroeme_Gebietskoerperschaften_2021.pdf
The Austrian constitution stipulates that tasks delegated to regional or municipal governments must be adequately funded, although this does not always entail 100% national funding. This principle is in most cases effectively implemented, with some exceptions on the municipal level. Debates are ongoing over allowing the nine states to raise taxes independently. However, some states oppose such a reform and seem satisfied to be financed by federal authorities, with federal funding decided by a negotiated compromise between the federal government (Bund) and the states.
Citations:
https://service.bmf.gv.at/Budget/Budgets/2021/beilagen/Zahlungsstroeme_Gebietskoerperschaften_2021.pdf
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
10
9
9
The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
2
1
1
The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Subnational self-governments in Austria are able to utilize their constitutional scope of discretion quite effectively. While the competences and independent financial resources of the states (Länder) and municipalities are limited by the constitution, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies, which gives the states considerable (de facto) political power. This implies that constitutionally weak states tend to be more powerful at the level of the “living constitution.” Important examples relate to the areas of healthcare and education.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
10
9
9
Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
2
1
1
Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
The national government has relatively few instruments by which to make state governments comply with its formal policies. In some areas, such as education, state governments enjoy much autonomy, which necessarily leads to considerable regional differences. These differences reflect, in particular, the different party complexions of state governments. The coronavirus pandemic showcased the strikingly limited ability of the national government to guarantee identical standards nationwide.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
10
9
9
Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
8
7
6
7
6
Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
5
4
3
4
3
Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
2
1
1
Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
The question of “biased” and “unbiased” cannot be answered impartially by political actors. Political parties and their representatives will always tend to see the enforcement of regulations in different ways, reflecting the different perspectives of the competing parties. But, by and large, the Austrian tradition of enforcing regulations is broadly accepted as being without significant bias.
Generally, it is not so much the “enforcement” of regulation that may be biased, but rather the legislation (or regulations) that are sometimes biased. There is a rather strong tendency in Austrian politics to avoid legislating against the vested interests of powerful (economic or political) actors. Furthermore, depending on the party complexion of the government, different interests are likely to benefit from close ties to governing parties.
Generally, it is not so much the “enforcement” of regulation that may be biased, but rather the legislation (or regulations) that are sometimes biased. There is a rather strong tendency in Austrian politics to avoid legislating against the vested interests of powerful (economic or political) actors. Furthermore, depending on the party complexion of the government, different interests are likely to benefit from close ties to governing parties.
Graph View
To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
10
9
9
The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
8
7
6
7
6
In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
2
1
1
The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The Austrian government has adapted domestic structures to international developments, but with reservations. While the EU political agenda is generally accepted (including EU-related structures and units within the governing machine), the government has proved reluctant to implement specific policies (e.g., by defending the principle of bank secrecy). This hesitancy reflects the fact that the government is often internally divided for constitutional and political reasons. First, the cabinet consists of autonomous ministers who cannot be forced to accept a general agenda. The position of the chancellor as first among equals means there is no clearly defined leadership by a head of government. Second, governments since 1983 have been coalitions. Coalition parties tend to work on a specific party agenda, and have a limited interest in the agenda of the government. In many cases, one governing party tends to favor implementing international and especially supranational (EU) policies more than the other. This issue was particularly pronounced when the FPÖ was part of the governing coalition between 2017 and 2019.
Recently, the government shifted its overall international outlook away from following general EU policies (as established by the principle of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy) to a more diverse attitude – siding in some cases (e.g., concerning the UN migration agreement) with the four Visegrád EU member states rather than with the EU mainstream. In 2020, Austria was part of a small coalition of countries (alongside Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) that prominently blocked suggestions for an EU coronavirus aid program.
A key challenge Austria faces regards the structural reform of its federal division of power between the federal state, and the regions and (to a lesser extent) municipalities. Despite its rather small country size, Austria disposes of a strong federal system with a lot of powers residing with the regions, although some powers are inefficiently divided between the state and the regions (e.g., regarding healthcare). This system leads to a lot of inefficiencies regarding the implementation of effective policies and consumes a lot of resources, which would be invested better elsewhere.
Citations:
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-corona-oesterreich-niederlande-1.4916086
Recently, the government shifted its overall international outlook away from following general EU policies (as established by the principle of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy) to a more diverse attitude – siding in some cases (e.g., concerning the UN migration agreement) with the four Visegrád EU member states rather than with the EU mainstream. In 2020, Austria was part of a small coalition of countries (alongside Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands) that prominently blocked suggestions for an EU coronavirus aid program.
A key challenge Austria faces regards the structural reform of its federal division of power between the federal state, and the regions and (to a lesser extent) municipalities. Despite its rather small country size, Austria disposes of a strong federal system with a lot of powers residing with the regions, although some powers are inefficiently divided between the state and the regions (e.g., regarding healthcare). This system leads to a lot of inefficiencies regarding the implementation of effective policies and consumes a lot of resources, which would be invested better elsewhere.
Citations:
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-corona-oesterreich-niederlande-1.4916086
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
10
9
9
The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
8
7
6
7
6
The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
2
1
1
The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
Within the European Union, the government is obliged to collaborate with EU institutions. This collaboration is rarely controversial. In other matters (e.g., within the framework of the WTO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the United Nations), the Austrian government tends to play a rather low-key role, usually trying to follow a general EU policy if such a policy exists. In some fields (e.g., environmental protection), the government tends to promise more on the international level than it is willing or able to implement at home.
Austria has enjoyed a long-standing reputation as a “bridge-building actor” at the international level, though the main contribution to this has been hosting international meetings in the federal capital, Vienna. At the same time, Austria has tried to avoid any clear-cut positioning, which in many cases could be justified by the country’s constitutional commitment to neutrality. This tradition has continued under the ÖVP-Green government. For example, in late 2021, international talks over the Iran nuclear deal resumed in Vienna, where the first major deal had been struck back in 2015. In December 2021, Chancellor Nehammer also suggested that Austria should act as a “bridgebuilder” in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, though it remained largely unclear what exactly this would involve.
Citations:
https://www.sn.at/politik/weltpolitik/wiener-atomgespraeche-mit-dem-iran-unter-zeitdruck-113732803
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/bundeskanzleramt/nachrichten-der-bundesregierung/2021/12/bundeskanzler-nehammer-oesterreich-als-brueckenbauer-im-konflikt-zwischen-der-ukraine-und-russland.html
Austria has enjoyed a long-standing reputation as a “bridge-building actor” at the international level, though the main contribution to this has been hosting international meetings in the federal capital, Vienna. At the same time, Austria has tried to avoid any clear-cut positioning, which in many cases could be justified by the country’s constitutional commitment to neutrality. This tradition has continued under the ÖVP-Green government. For example, in late 2021, international talks over the Iran nuclear deal resumed in Vienna, where the first major deal had been struck back in 2015. In December 2021, Chancellor Nehammer also suggested that Austria should act as a “bridgebuilder” in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, though it remained largely unclear what exactly this would involve.
Citations:
https://www.sn.at/politik/weltpolitik/wiener-atomgespraeche-mit-dem-iran-unter-zeitdruck-113732803
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/bundeskanzleramt/nachrichten-der-bundesregierung/2021/12/bundeskanzler-nehammer-oesterreich-als-brueckenbauer-im-konflikt-zwischen-der-ukraine-und-russland.html
Graph View
To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
10
9
9
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
8
7
6
7
6
The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
5
4
3
4
3
The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
2
1
1
There is no monitoring.
There is no regular monitoring within the executive branch of the government. Due to the fragmented structure of the government and comparatively weak position of the chancellor, the ability to engage in oversight from within the central government is rather limited.
Core government actors are first and foremost legitimized by the political parties. Though officially appointed by the president, the cabinet consists of individuals chosen by the political parties on the basis of post-electoral coalition agreements. Civil service personnel are in many cases also indirectly linked to one of the political parties. In recent years, short-term appointments within the civil service have bolstered this latter trend, undermining the principle of a professionalized civil service. Individual cabinet members (federal ministers, including the chancellor and vice-chancellor) have increased the size of their personal staffs. This has created a mixed system, partially echoing the model of the British civil service, in which civil servants work under ministers irrespective of their own political links, and partially following the U.S. model of a politicized civil service with party-political links between cabinet members and their staff. This blend of two contradictory principles undermines the reform capacity of the Austrian system. The government and its individual cabinet members can neither depend on the full loyalty of a partisan civil service nor be sure of complete civil service impartiality.
In an attempt to strengthen political control over the civil service, the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) established a system of secretary-generals in all ministries, which has been continued under the ÖVP-Green government, which formed in early 2020. This system has had a centralizing effect by guaranteeing the loyalty of the civil service to the specific minister who appoints the secretary-general. However, it indirectly contradicts the non-partisan status of the Austrian civil service. Rather than following suggestions by the Court of Audit, the primary motivation for these changes has been to achieve more (political) control over the ministry and its staff. This new system was assessed in great detail by the Austrian Court of Audit in 2021, which made quite a few suggestions for improving these arrangements.
The Austrian Court of Audit also played a major role in initiating a major reform of the Austrian administration, which is ongoing. The latest chapter focused on issues of digitalization, for which the government committed €160 million (for more on the Court of Audit, see “Audit Office”).
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home/2021_12_Generalsekretariate.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000124441441/oesterreich-investiert-160-millionen-euro-in-digitale-verwaltung
Core government actors are first and foremost legitimized by the political parties. Though officially appointed by the president, the cabinet consists of individuals chosen by the political parties on the basis of post-electoral coalition agreements. Civil service personnel are in many cases also indirectly linked to one of the political parties. In recent years, short-term appointments within the civil service have bolstered this latter trend, undermining the principle of a professionalized civil service. Individual cabinet members (federal ministers, including the chancellor and vice-chancellor) have increased the size of their personal staffs. This has created a mixed system, partially echoing the model of the British civil service, in which civil servants work under ministers irrespective of their own political links, and partially following the U.S. model of a politicized civil service with party-political links between cabinet members and their staff. This blend of two contradictory principles undermines the reform capacity of the Austrian system. The government and its individual cabinet members can neither depend on the full loyalty of a partisan civil service nor be sure of complete civil service impartiality.
In an attempt to strengthen political control over the civil service, the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) established a system of secretary-generals in all ministries, which has been continued under the ÖVP-Green government, which formed in early 2020. This system has had a centralizing effect by guaranteeing the loyalty of the civil service to the specific minister who appoints the secretary-general. However, it indirectly contradicts the non-partisan status of the Austrian civil service. Rather than following suggestions by the Court of Audit, the primary motivation for these changes has been to achieve more (political) control over the ministry and its staff. This new system was assessed in great detail by the Austrian Court of Audit in 2021, which made quite a few suggestions for improving these arrangements.
The Austrian Court of Audit also played a major role in initiating a major reform of the Austrian administration, which is ongoing. The latest chapter focused on issues of digitalization, for which the government committed €160 million (for more on the Court of Audit, see “Audit Office”).
Citations:
https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/home/2021_12_Generalsekretariate.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000124441441/oesterreich-investiert-160-millionen-euro-in-digitale-verwaltung
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
10
9
9
The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
8
7
6
7
6
The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
5
4
3
4
3
The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
2
1
1
The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
The basic institutional arrangements of governing have remained largely stable for many years. The creation of secretary-generals in the departments and the regime of “message control” at the level of government communication, introduced by the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017–2019) and continued under the successive ÖVP-Green government, were designed to increase the government’s strategic capacity. The overall effects of these reforms have, however, remained uncertain. Apparently, the key ambition was to better sell government policies rather than to fundamentally expand the government’s policymaking capacity.
Regarding public policymaking, governments tend to promise more innovation at the beginning of a legislative period than they can actually deliver. Desired improvements are often prevented by constitutional limitations (e.g., the collective character of the Austrian cabinet) and, no less often, by internal rivalries within coalition governments. The parties may agree in principle on what needs to be done, but veto powers are able to block meaningful reforms during the legislative period. This is particularly true in the legislative arena, as many major bills require a two-thirds majority in parliament.
Some recent efforts to improve the state of play can, however, be identified. The Austrian Youth Strategy, coordinated by the Federal Chancellery, is designed to strengthen and develop youth policy throughout Austria. The goal of this strategy is to bring together policies and measures for young people in order to make them systematic and to optimize their effectiveness.
Citations:
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/jugend/oesterreichische-jugendstrategie/jugendstrategie-grundlagen.html
Regarding public policymaking, governments tend to promise more innovation at the beginning of a legislative period than they can actually deliver. Desired improvements are often prevented by constitutional limitations (e.g., the collective character of the Austrian cabinet) and, no less often, by internal rivalries within coalition governments. The parties may agree in principle on what needs to be done, but veto powers are able to block meaningful reforms during the legislative period. This is particularly true in the legislative arena, as many major bills require a two-thirds majority in parliament.
Some recent efforts to improve the state of play can, however, be identified. The Austrian Youth Strategy, coordinated by the Federal Chancellery, is designed to strengthen and develop youth policy throughout Austria. The goal of this strategy is to bring together policies and measures for young people in order to make them systematic and to optimize their effectiveness.
Citations:
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/jugend/oesterreichische-jugendstrategie/jugendstrategie-grundlagen.html