Poland

   

Executive Capacity

#32
Key Findings
Having shown significant deterioration in recent years, Poland scores relatively poorly (rank 32) in the area of executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 2.3 points since 2014.

Policymaking under the PiS government has been guided by party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. With staffing based on political loyalty, the Chancellery has lost policy expertise and influence. Bills are often submitted by individual legislators rather than ministries, as this allows a swifter process that can be controlled by PIS leaders. Prime Minister Morawiecki has gained informal power over time.

RIAs and consultation mechanisms are often bypassed by relying on fast-track legislation. Consultation tends to be formal, with the government’s clear majority having reduced the need to win over social actors. The swift passage of bills has resulted in very low quality, with many requiring immediate amendment. Information provided by ministries tends to be propagandistic.

With its absolute parliamentary majority, the government generally been quite effective in implementing policy objectives. Local governments are often viewed as oppositional, and the PiS government has sought to reduce their role. This has led to serious task-funding shortages particularly in the larger cities.

Strategic Capacity

#31

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
5
Motivated by EU demands, as well as by the objective of improving the country’s absorption and use of EU funds, the planning capacities of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, KPRM) were expanded following EU accession. The PiS government has relied on this framework and has developed its own long-term Strategy for Responsible Development. This program was presented by the then-serving Minister of Development Mateusz Morawiecki in February 2016 and has since been refined. When Morawiecki became prime minister, a new Center for Strategic Analysis was created in the Chancellery. Ultimately, however, policymaking under the PiS government has been guided by the visions and inspirations of PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński.

Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Expert Advice
4
Under the PiS government, policymaking has become ideologically driven rather than evidence-based. While the government does consult with experts, these consultations are not very transparent. The government’s ideological approach has led many experts who once showed some sympathy for PiS to break with the party.

Interministerial Coordination

#29

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?

10
 9

The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
6
While the Chancellery is well-staffed and evaluates most draft bills, its policy expertise has declined under the PiS government, as the main criterion for staff employment is political obedience, not expertise or professionalism.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
6
Under the PiS government, the Chancellery has kept its enhanced formal involvement in the preparation of policy proposals by the line ministries. However, its actual gatekeeping role has declined. Most bills are submitted by individual members of parliament rather than by ministries, although the bills will have been prepared by the government in advance. This procedure allows for a swifter legislative process with fewer consultation requirements, so that law-making can more effectively be controlled by the PiS leadership.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
4
The number and role of cabinet committees under the PiS government have been limited. After the 2015 elections, it set up an Innovativeness Council, consisting of five ministers, in February 2016 and an Economic Committee at the end of September 2016. The latter was in charge of coordinating the implementation of the Strategy of Responsible Development. There was also a cabinet-level Committee for Social Affairs headed by former Prime Minister Beata Szydło. However, conflicts among ministries were ultimately resolved not by cabinet committees, but by PiS leader Kaczyński and his immediate circle, including Prime Minister Morawiecki. The cabinet was reorganized following the 2019 elections, but the new structures are hidden from public scrutiny.

Citations:
There is a new reconfiguration among ministers after the 2019 election. Generaly however, there is very little reliable knowledge on how these committees de facto work. It is all hidden from public eyes and scrutiny.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
5
Senior ministry officials play a substantial role in interministerial coordination. All meetings of the Council of Ministers, the Polish cabinet, are prepared by the Council of Ministers’ Permanent Committee, which is made up of deputy ministers from the ministries. The Committee for European Affairs, which is in charge of EU coordination, also relies strongly on coordination by top civil servants. In contrast, bureaucratic coordination at lower levels of the hierarchy is still relatively limited, even though the joint administration of EU funds has helped to intensify interministerial exchange. Changes in personnel have secured the dominance of the government over administration.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
8
Informal mechanisms of coordination have played an important role under the PiS government. PiS Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński has served as the gray eminence behind the scene. He makes many important decisions himself, and government ministers’ standing strongly depends upon their relationship with him. Prime Minister Morawiecki’s informal power has grown as both his public reputation and his personal relationship with Kaczyński have improved.

How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?

10
 9

The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Digitalization for Interministerial C.
6
The PiS government has been eager to increase the level of digitalization in the country and to use digital technologies to support interministerial coordination. On entering office, the PiS government established a separate Ministry of Digital Affairs and a Committee of the Council of Ministers for Digitalization. After some haggling, Marek Zagórski, who is also the deputy chairman of the Agreement party (i.e., the party of Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Gowin), was appointed minister of digital affairs in April 2018. He kept this position following the 2019 elections. The Committee of the Council of Ministers for Digitalization has coordinated the government’s use of digital technologies.

Citations:
European Commission (2019): Digital Government Factsheet 2019. https://www.ospi.es/export/sites/ospi/documents/documentos/Administracion-Digital/Digital_Government_Factsheets_Poland_2019.pdf

Evidence-based Instruments

#39

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
3
Poland had a relatively well-established system of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) when the PiS government came to power. The PiS government has left this system largely unchanged in formal terms but has not taken RIA seriously. It has bypassed RIA by relying strongly on fast-track legislation and legislative initiatives initiated by individual members of the Sejm, rather than by ministries or the government. In such cases, no RIA is legally necessary.

Citations:
OECD (2018): OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018. Paris, 222-223 (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-note-regulatory-policy-2018.pdf).

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
2
The quality of the RIA process has strongly declined under the PiS government. Legally, stakeholders are required to be involved, and results must be publicized and communicated; however, such efforts have become rather selective. The quality of individual RIAs is evaluated by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, not by an independent body.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
2
Although Article 5 of Poland’s constitution enshrines the principle of sustainable development and the state’s responsibility to ensure the protection of the environment, sustainability checks are not an integral part of regulatory impact assessments. The PiS government has been less concerned with issues of sustainability than were its predecessors. Moreover, the PiS government has been involved in several infringement-procedure disputes with the European Commission and the European Court of Justice related to its failure to carry out environmental impact assessments for natural-gas drilling projects, and its disregard for sustainability and environmental-protection principles when approving logging activities in the Białowieża old-growth forest in 2016 and 2017.

To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?

10
 9

Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 8
 7
 6


Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 5
 4
 3


Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 2
 1

Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Quality of Ex Post Evaluation
3
According to the RIA rules, ex post evaluations can be requested by the Council of Ministers. In practice, however, primary laws and subordinate regulations are only rarely evaluated. Even when such procedures are carried out, the outcome of the review is not used to improve the quality of laws.

Citations:
OECD (2018): OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2018. Paris, 222-223 (https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/poland-country-note-regulatory-polic y-2018.pdf).

Societal Consultation

#37

Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?

10
 9

The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 8
 7
 6


The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 5
 4
 3


The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Public Consultation
3
The Polish government is obliged by law to consult all parties affected by proposed legislation. In addition, there is a Council of Social Dialogue, composed of trade unions and employers, whose members are appointed by the president. Consultations both inside and outside the Council have been largely formal. Generally speaking, the government’s clear majority in parliament has reduced the need for winning over social actors, and the government perceives many of them as enemies. Public consultation has been bypassed by introducing legislative initiatives through members of parliament, since such initiatives do not require the regular consultation mechanisms, and therefore exclude experts and public. Moreover, the quick passage of major laws has reduced the time available for meaningful consultation. Unlike the employers’ associations and other trade unions, the NSZZ Solidarność trade union has enjoyed a special relationship with the government. Several of its representatives were given positions in the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Affairs, and it has supported controversial reforms such as pension reform. In the case of the 2019 teacher strikes, however, even NSZZ Solidarność has complained about the government’s lack of responsiveness. In stark contrast to the trends at the national level, many municipalities have expanded public consultation, for example by introducing participatory-budgeting processes.

Policy Communication

#25

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 8
 7
 6


Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 5
 4
 3


Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Coherent Communication
5
Ministerial communication is coordinated by the Government Information Center, a department of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. It regularly reports on government activities and connects to other ministries’ press departments. However, information provided by ministries has tended to be selective and highly propagandistic. The government Center for Strategic Analysis, introduced in 2018, has helped to overcome this problem to a certain extent.

Implementation

#24

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Effectiveness
7
Favored by its absolute majority in parliament and the internal discipline of PiS, the PiS government has been quite effective in implementing its policy objectives. It has succeeded in realizing its major campaign pledges, such as the increases in the minimum wage and the family allowance, tax relief for small businesses, the lowering of the retirement age or the reversion to a higher age for entering school, and it has realized them rather quickly. Precisely because so many bills have sailed so quickly through parliament, the quality of legislation has often proven to be very poor, requiring immediate amendments. In general, the government has only been successful when reforms meant more money for certain social groups. In contrast, more complex pieces of legislation, which have involved multiple political or other actors (e.g., school or housing reforms), have been difficult or poorly implemented.

To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
8
Since the cabinet consists of a group of people who were more or less hand-picked by PiS party leader Jarosław Kaczyński, the need for using specific organizational devices for exerting pressure on ministers to stay in line with the government’s program has been limited. Despite some internal debates and power struggles (e.g., between Prime Minister Morawicki and Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro), ministers have largely been committed to implementing the government’s program, one bullet point after another. This situation has not changed since the government reshuffle in January 2018, as some of the new ministers have been even more loyal to Kaczyński than their predecessors.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
8
Ministries are obliged to keep the Chancellery of the Prime Minister informed about legislative progress on a regular basis. If ministries seek to maintain their autonomy, the prime minister, through the Chancellery, or PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński can intervene. The new Center for Strategic Analysis helps Prime Minister Morawiecki and PiS party leader Kaczyński to monitor line ministries’ implementation activities.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies|Bureaucracies
8
There is a large number of executive agencies in Poland. Agencies report to ministries, and ministries have special units responsible for monitoring the activities of agencies and auditing their finances. Under the PiS government, the leadership of state agencies has become highly politicized, with many of these positions being filled by party representatives or allies. As a consequence of the new civil service act that came into effect in January 2016, all employment contracts of previous directors turned invalid, and the positions were no longer filled by open competition, but by personal appointment. A previous provision was canceled requiring directors of state institutions to have not been members of a political party for five years before assuming a leading position in state administration. Thus, compliance between ministries and administration has become easier, but the administration has also become dependent on the political will of the majority. The increase in oversight has led to a decline in democratic checks and balances, professionalism (since there was a massive personnel exchange in the state bureaucracy), and non-politicized relations between ministries and agencies.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
4
Since 1999, Poland has supported three tiers of subnational governments: municipalities, districts and regions. Since the 2015 elections, the relationship between the central government and the majority of local governments still controlled by parties of the previous government has been strained. As heavily criticized by local offices, the reform of the school system has been associated with a strong shift of costs to the local level. PiS distrust of the politicians running the 50 biggest Polish cities has led to selective support for other localities, thus sending a strong clientelistic signal to local authorities that funding and support will be distributed not on merit, but on political grounds. Subnational governments’ fiscal problems have been exacerbated by a decrease in the availability of EU funds at the local level. In the October 2018 local elections, the PiS failed to increase its vote shares in the larger cities; thus, tensions between the central government and local governments are likely to remain strong. This became visible in May 2019 after changes were made to the tax system, such as abolishing income taxes for people under 26 years old. Local governments, which receive a proportion of tax revenues, have calculated that their losses could be PLN 6.6 billion. An additional burden for local governments is the increase in teachers’ salaries, which is not sufficiently covered by the government education subsidy. There were discussions between 12 of Poland’s larger cities about suing the government due to the government’s failure to ensure adequate task funding.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
4
Despite the existing level of decentralization in Poland, the PiS government has perceived local governments as a bastion of the opposition. A view that was reinforced by the 2018 local election results. Thus, the PiS government has tried to restrict local government powers. Since judicial institutions – which could normally be called on in cases of conflict between national and local or regional levels of government – is politically loyal to the government, representatives of the municipalities are unlikely to win judicial support.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
6
Institutionally, the regions have a centrally appointed head of regional administration (voivode) who is responsible for ensuring that national policies are implemented, and that state institutions operating in the region perform their functions properly. The politicization of the civil service under the PiS government has reduced the fulfillment of these standards by reducing professionalism within the regional administrations. Conflicts between the voivode and locally elected representatives, who often have other political priorities, have increased. Moreover, the financial problems of regional and local governments, which have resulted from tax reductions on the national level, make it more difficult to achieve high public service standards. Additional investment in infrastructure might help to mediate these problems, but they are rather directed primarily toward the more undeveloped eastern parts of Poland, which are regions in which people tend to vote for PiS.

To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?

10
 9

Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 8
 7
 6


Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 5
 4
 3


Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
 2
 1

Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Regulatory Enforcement
5
Decision-making and the enforcement of decisions generally follow lines of political affiliation within the current Polish government. As government agencies do not act independently, but rather follow line with the responsible ministry and the party line, it is difficult for outside interests opposing the government to win a hearing. Thus, their attempts to influence government agencies are rarely fruitful, while economic interest groups that are close to the government have more success. For this reason, while government agencies do not act in a strictly unbiased manner, they can be effective in implementing the decisions the government wants enforced.

Adaptability

#30

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
5
Government structures in Poland have been adapted to international and supranational developments, most notably because of NATO and EU membership. Before the PiS government came to power, Poland enjoyed a good reputation within the European Union, and its growing influence showed that adaptation had been successful. The PiS government has been more inward-looking, and has not only been much more reluctant to adapt domestic government structures to international requirements (and EU requirements in particular), but even argues that adaptation is unnecessary.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
With the PiS government, Poland’s international orientation has changed. Steps leading toward deeper integration have been contested and PiS has been more critical than its predecessors of Germany’s role in the European Union. Because of this intransigence, Poland’s reputation and standing within the European Union have suffered. While Prime Minister Morawiecki and Foreign Minister Czaputowicz have been more urbane than their predecessors, the government’s basic approach toward the European Union has not changed much so far. Poland wants to play an active role within NATO and has tried to establish a closer bilateral relationship with the United States, which has also been perceived as a form of side-diplomacy outside the usual channels. Within the Visegrád group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) collaboration is closer and more collective – a tendency that also stretches to other countries in the region – although differing attitudes toward Russia is a source of division between these countries. Unlike the other Visegrád countries, Poland has strongly supported the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union.
Regarding climate change measures and energy policy, the government also stresses national interests, which follow the interests of the coal industry and not the interests of future generations, and is less eager to foster global public goods in Poland and abroad. In this respect, Poland was eager to block any progress at the European Council summit in June 2019. Together with Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic, Poland blocked the EU decision on becoming CO2 neutral by 2050, which led to extensive public discussions, among others, with the French president, Emmanuel Macron.

Citations:
Buras, P. (2019): State of disunion: Europe, NATO, and disintegrating arms control,. London: European Council on Foreign Relations (https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_state_of_disunion_europe_nato_and_disintegrating_arms_control).


Łada, A. (2018): Squaring the circle? EU budget negotiations after Brexit – considering CEE perspective, Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Policy Brief 1, Warsaw (https://www.isp.org.pl/en/publications/squaring-the-circle-eu-budget-negotiations-after-brexit-considering-cee-perspective).

Organizational Reform

#38

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
4
The PiS government has adopted a number of institutional reforms, but has not monitored the institutional arrangements of government in a systematic and regular way. The goal is not to improve or professionalize institutions but to increase political power and employ personnel that follow the party line.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
4
Upon entering office, the PiS government has changed the institutional arrangements of governing. It has changed the portfolios of ministries several times, set up new cabinet committees, overhauled the Civil Service Act and strengthened the position of central government vis-à-vis subnational governments. However, the strategic capacity of the PiS government has primarily rested on its majority in parliament, the strong party discipline and the uncontested role of party leader Jarosław Kaczyński. No reforms have been introduced to improve strategic capacity through an open involvement of, for example, scientific expertise.
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