Romania

   

Executive Capacity

#40
Key Findings
With a number of notable weaknesses, Romania falls into the bottom ranks (rank 40) with regard to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.4 points relative to 2014.

Policymaking has suffered from a lack of strategic planning. Repeated reorganization of the government office has undermined its policy-evaluation capacity. Informal coordination has involved effective control by the PSD party leader, who has toppled prime ministers for acting independently. This has undermined formal government coordination measures.

RIAs are required, though quality and actual use are highly uneven. Ex post evaluations have remained the exception rather than the rule. Public consultation has been largely ad hoc, with external groups complaining that their views are not taken seriously. Ministry communications are occasionally contradictory.

Successive short-lived cabinets have sought to strengthen control over the judiciary and the anti-corruption body, but have failed to fulfil major campaign promises. Subnational governments are underfunded, contributing to the low quality of public services. Regulations are mostly enforced so as to benefit powerful lobbies and politicians’ clients.

Strategic Capacity

#39

How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?

10
 9

Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
 5
 4
 3


Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
 2
 1

In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
Strategic Planning
3
While EU membership has forced the Romanian government to produce regular strategic documents, policymaking in Romania has long suffered from a lack of strategic planning. Subsequent governments have emphasized their commitment to strengthening planning. In addition to a strategic planning calendar, Government Emergency Ordinance 49/2017 proposed a novel link between public institutions’ strategic plans and the country’s annual budgetary process. Romania’s 2018 National Reform Program has declared strategic planning a key priority for the government, highlighting recent improvements in the implementation of the Annual Working Plan of the Government as well as plans for the establishment of a new Strategy Unit through World Bank assistance. Most recently, in June 2018, the Senate adopted a draft bill for “Romania 2040,” which outlines plans for the development of a long-term national strategy through a multi-stakeholder commission that would direct government policy for years to come, a move which has prompted criticism from the National Liberal Party (PNL). As it stands, however, these moves have so far done little to improve strategic planning in practice.

Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Program 2018. Bucharest (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-report-romania-en.pdf).

Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?

10
 9

In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 8
 7
 6


For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
 2
 1

The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
Expert Advice
4
Cooperation between the Romanian government and non-governmental experts has traditionally been only weakly institutionalized. Consultations do take place, but they are irregular and lack transparency as well as mechanisms that would ensure feedback received is actually accounted for in policy itself. The dismantling in January 2018 of the Ministry for Public Consultation and Civic Dialogue, which was established in 2015 with the purpose of systematically ensuring public consultation, marked a step backwards in the formalization of public and expert consultation processes within the country.

Interministerial Coordination

#39

Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?

10
 9

The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
GO Expertise
5
The organization of the Government Office has undergone some changes. Until January 2017, it featured two bodies involved in interministerial coordination, the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG) and the Prime Minister’s Chancellery (PMC). Whereas the GSG focused on the formal coordination, the PMC, consisting of about 15 state counselors with different backgrounds, provided the policy expertise. In January 2017, Prime Minister Grindeanu dismantled the PMC and transferred its responsibilities to the GSG. Once appointed, its successor, Prime Minister Tudose, re-established the PMC and the old dual structure. These changes have infringed upon the government office’s capacity to do comprehensive evaluations of draft bills.

To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?

10
 9

There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
 5
 4
 3


Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
 2
 1

Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
Line Ministries
5
Policy proposals are usually drafted within ministries. The Secretariat General of the Government provides administrative and legal support for policymaking but has a limited role in the quality control of policy design. The Prime Minister’s Chancellery usually becomes involved only after the compulsory public-consultation procedures are finalized, and its mandate is to ensure that policy proposals align with broader government strategy. While the prime minister occasionally publicly involves himself in debating certain legislative proposals and may contradict line ministers, the final decision on the content of the policy proposal tends to be made by the line ministry.

How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?

10
 9

The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
 8
 7
 6


Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
 5
 4
 3


There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
 2
 1

There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
Cabinet Committees
5
In Romania, ministerial committees, composed of one minister, deputy ministers and public servants, feature prominently in interministerial coordination. By contrast, committees consisting only of ministers or with several ministers are rare.

How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?

10
 9

Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 8
 7
 6


Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
 5
 4
 3


There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
 2
 1

There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
Ministerial Bureaucracy
6
Much of the coordination takes place in interministerial committees, usually presided over by a minister and composed primarily of deputy ministers (political positions) and top civil servants. In the absence of these committees, bills are subject to interministerial consultation by being sent for review to the ministries affected by each act. If ministries do not respond to the review request within five days, the non-response is considered tacit approval. Prior to government meetings discussing a particular legislative proposal, the Secretariat General of the Government organizes working groups between the representatives of ministries and agencies involved in initiating or reviewing the proposal in order to harmonize their views. While these procedures promote coordination, the capacity limitations of many ministries and the short turnaround time allowed for review undermine effective review and hence allow for only superficial coordination in many cases.

How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?

10
 9

Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal Coordination
2
In addition to the formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination, there has been an informal coordination of the government’s work by PSD chef Liviu Dragnea, the “éminence grise” of the government. Barred from becoming prime minister himself by a criminal conviction, Dragnea has been keen on preventing prime ministers to act in too independent a manner. In January 2018, he toppled Prime Minister Mihai Tudose, barely seven months after his predecessor Sorin Grindeanu had suffered the same fate. Thus, the informal coordination within the governing party has tended to undermine rather than complement the formal coordination mechanisms within government.

How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?

10
 9

The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 8
 7
 6


The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
 5
 4
 3


The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
 2
 1

The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
Digitalization for Interministerial C.
3
The 2014 National Strategy on Digital Agenda for Romania explicitly called on the public sector to embrace and optimize the use of digital technology for improving effectiveness in governance. This commitment was further buttressed through the establishment of a Government Chief Information Officer within the chancellery. However, the role which digital technologies have actually played in interministerial coordination has been limited so far. In July 2018, the government announced plans to spend €45 million on the development of a government cloud framework to be used by all public institutions in the country. However, similar plans were announced in 2014 and 2017 but have yet to deliver much in the way of results.

Citations:
Ministry for the Information Society (2018): National Strategy on Digital Agenda for Romania. Bucharest (https://www.trusted.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Digital-Agenda-Strategy-for-Romania-8-september-2014.pdf).

Evidence-based Instruments

#28

To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?

10
 9

RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 8
 7
 6


RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
 5
 4
 3


RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
 2
 1

RIA are not applied or do not exist.
RIA Application
6
RIA-related procedures were introduced in Romania in 2005. At least in theory, legislative proposals cannot enter the legislative process without RIA approval from the Public Policy Unit of the Secretariat General of the Government (GSG). In practice, the use and the quality of RIA is highly uneven, and many RIAs are superficial. Capacity remains a critical obstacle to the effective implementation of RIA procedures and requirements. Further problems have stemmed from the complex division of monitoring and evaluation responsibilities between the GSG and the Prime Minister’s Chancellery. While Romania’s 2018 National Reform Programme stresses the government’s commitment to improve RIA, no significant improvements have actually taken place.

Citations:
Romanian Government (2018): National Reform Programme 2018. Bucharest, 21 (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2018-european-semester-country-repor t-romania-en.pdf).

Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?

10
 9

RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
 8
 7
 6


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
 2
 1

RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Quality of RIA Process
5
Romanian law stipulates that RIAs, along with proposed regulations, must be published for at least 30 days on the ministerial websites, and this obligation is usually respected. Only a select few stakeholers are regularly involved in the RIA process. Public consultations are largely online (which is problematic given unequal internet access within the country) with a short time-frame for input, while in-person consultations tend to be informal and, as a result, risk being subject to regulatory capture. Other ministries are not systematically involved in the RIA process. While the RIA process as a whole has been reviewed by the OECD as well as the World Bank, there are no regular independent quality evaluations of individual RIA assessments.

Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?

10
 9

Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
 8
 7
 6


Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
 5
 4
 3


Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
 2
 1

Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
Sustainability Check
3
Romania is formally committed to SDG implementation. It took part in the 2018 voluntary national review of the U.N.’s High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development and has initiated a review of the country’s 2008 National Sustainable Development Strategy with a view to incorporating the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The RIA methodology manual requires that sustainability concerns be incorporated in assessment reports. In practice, however, sustainability checks do not feature very prominently and are not done in a comprehensive manner.

Citations:
Ministry of the Environment (2018): Transformation Towards a Sustainable and Resilient Romania: Romania’s Voluntary National Review 2018. Bucharest (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates/romania).

To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?

10
 9

Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 8
 7
 6


Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 5
 4
 3


Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
 2
 1

Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
Quality of Ex Post Evaluation
3
While the institutionalization of ex post evaluations has been announced several times, they have remained the exception rather than the rule. If such evaluations have been done, their impact on decision-making has been intransparent.

Societal Consultation

#37

Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?

10
 9

The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 8
 7
 6


The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
 5
 4
 3


The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
 2
 1

The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
Public Consultation
3
Romania possesses two tripartite bodies, the Economic and Social Council (Consiliul Economic şi Social) and the National Tripartite Council for Social Dialog (Consiliul National Tripartit pentru Dialog Social, CNTDS). However, neither the Tudose nor the Dăncilă governments have done much in the way of consulting societal actors. In early 2018, the Dăncilă government disbanded the Ministry for Public Consultation and Civic Dialogue established by the Cioloș government in 2015, with its responsibilities to be taken over by other unspecified ministries. In October 2018, the government replaced, with little warning, 13 of the 15 representatives on the Economic and Social Council in order to facilitate the acceptance of its priorities. Where consultation with societal actors has occurred, it has been ad hoc and has been used primarily as a means of government communication and not as an attempt at collaboration. Societal actors as diverse as trade unions and the judges’professional associations have complained that their views have not been taken seriously by the government. In October 2018, the Foreign Investors Council, an organization serving as a liaison between Romanian policymakers and the foreign investor community, criticized the government’s strong reliance on emergency ordinances and for its tendency to reduce formal consultation periods to a mere days.

Policy Communication

#32

To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?

10
 9

Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 8
 7
 6


Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
 5
 4
 3


Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
 2
 1

Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Coherent Communication
4
Both the Tudose and Dăncilă governments have lacked a unified and coordinated communications strategy, defaulting to a decentralized approach with individual ministries communicating new policy initiatives and programs. Under both governments, announcements of different ministers have occasionally contradicted each other. In an address to parliament in June 2018, Prime Minister Dăncilă emphasized the need for improving the government’s strategic communication capacity, but left open the question of how to achieve this goal.

Implementation

#39

To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?

10
 9

The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
 8
 7
 6


The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
 5
 4
 3


The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
 2
 1

The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
Government Effectiveness
4
The Tudose and the Dăncilă governments have not been very effective. While they have relentlessly tried to strengthen the government’s control over the judiciary and to weaken the DNA, they have failed to fulfill major campaign promises. The resignation of Prime Minister Mihai Tudose in January 2018 was prompted by widespread perceptions both within the governing coalition and among the public of unmet promises regarding tax cuts, wage increases and pensions.

To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?

10
 9

The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 8
 7
 6


The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 5
 4
 3


The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
 2
 1

The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
Ministerial Compliance
5
Ministers in Romania have traditionally held significant leeway in terms of deciding policy details within their departments, and the short-lived prime ministers in recent years – all dependent on the backing of PSD chair Dragnea – have been too weak to bring ministers in line.

How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
 2
 1

The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
Monitoring Ministries
6
The government has a special office in charge of monitoring the activities of line ministries and other public bodies, the Control Body of the Prime Minister. In spite of having limited staff and resources, this office monitors the activity of most line ministries fairly effectively.

How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 8
 7
 6


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 5
 4
 3


The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
 2
 1

The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Monitoring Agencies|Bureaucracies
4
The monitoring of agencies in Romania has been plagued by political clientelism and the capacity reduction suffered by many ministries following the often-haphazard personnel reductions associated with the austerity measures adopted in 2010 – 2011. Many agencies even fail to provide legally required information on their websites.

To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 8
 7
 6


The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
 5
 4
 3


The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
 2
 1

The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
Task Funding
3
Subnational governments suffer from a lack of revenues and thus remain dependent on central government funding. As the governing coalition has done little to secure sufficient funding for subnational governments, the quality of public services has remained low. Central government funding has been tainted by party bias, with subnational governments controlled by the PSD recieving more money. Moreover, the funds from Bucharest have come late, so that subnational units have scrambled to keep projects alive during the first months of each calendar year. The financial dependence of subnational governments has contributed to an unwillingness to implement larger-scale projects for fear of losing funding as a result of political changes.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?

10
 9

The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 8
 7
 6


Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 5
 4
 3


The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
 2
 1

The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Constitutional Discretion
3
The autonomy of subnational units is often curtailed by fiscal measures enforced from the central level. The allocation of discretionary financial transfers and investment projects to municipalities and counties along partisan lines has continued during the period under review. Another problem is that allocations are often made with considerable delay, which affects the capacity of subnational units to initiate and complete projects.

To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?

10
 9

Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 8
 7
 6


Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
 5
 4
 3


Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
 2
 1

Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
National Standards
5
The central government seeks to ensure that subnational governments realize national public-service standards. The prefects, which represent the central government in each of the country’s 41 counties as well as in the municipality of Bucharest, have an important role in this respect. In practice, however, enforcement is often undermined by the inadequate and uneven funding of subnational governments.

To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?

10
 9

Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 8
 7
 6


Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
 5
 4
 3


Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
 2
 1

Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
Regulatory Enforcement
3
Generally speaking, government agencies possess the technical capacity to enforce regulations against vested interests. In practice, however, regulations are mostly enforced only to the extent to which they benefit powerful lobbies and politicians’ clients.

Adaptability

#25

To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?

10
 9

The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 8
 7
 6


In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 5
 4
 3


In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
 2
 1

The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
Domestic Adaptability
6
As Romania looks to taking on its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2019, EU affairs have attracted growing attention in the country. However, the political turbulence in recent years has undermined several efforts to adapt domestic government structures to international and supranational developments. For instance, the absorption of EU funds has remained below the EU average, with the country receiving a warning from the European Commissioner for Regional Policy in October of 2018.

To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?

10
 9

The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
 8
 7
 6


The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
 5
 4
 3


The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
 2
 1

The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
International Coordination
5
Romanian governments have supported international efforts to provide global public goods. The country has been actively involved in various U.N. peacekeeping missions, has contributed to global action against climate change and has participated constructively in the allocation of refugees within the EU. In April 2018, it also became a member in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. The country’s international ambitions are evident in its intention to seek a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council from 2020-2021. However, Romania’s international standing has suffered from the democratic backsliding.

Organizational Reform

#40

To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?

10
 9

The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
 5
 4
 3


The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
 2
 1

There is no monitoring.
Self-monitoring
4
There is no systematic and regular monitoring of institutional arrangements. Occasionally, the OECD and World Bank have been involved in governance reviews, but the effects of the latter have been negligible.

To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?

10
 9

The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
 8
 7
 6


The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 5
 4
 3


The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
 2
 1

The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
Institutional Reform
3
Institutional reforms under the Tudose and Dăncilă governments have been largely confined to changes in the portfolios of ministries. Most notably, the Dăncilă government decided to split the Ministry for Regional Development, Public Administration and European Funds into two separate ministries and to abolish the Ministry of Public Consultation and Social Dialogue. However, these changes have failed to improve the government’s strategic capacity. The absorption of EU funds has remained low, and public consultation has further lost importance. There have been no institutional reforms to address long-standing problems such as limited planning capacities or the low quality of RIA. The pledged reforms of subnational administration have not been adopted.
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