Austria

   

Executive Accountability

#16
Key Findings
With ample legislative oversight powers and a well-integrated civil society, Austria falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 16) in terms of executive accountability. Its overall score on this measure has declined by 0.2 points relative to 2014.

Courts have repeatedly strengthened the position of parliamentary investigative committees. Chancellor Kurz’s allegedly false testimony to such a committee produced a judicial inquiry that led to his resignation. Party discipline tends to limit oversight of the government by the allied majority party.

Interest in politics is moderate, but is on the rise among young people. High-quality media products are available, but misinformation is common on social media. The Court of Audit is powerful, with an excellent reputation. The ombuds office is independent, but has some party ties. The data protection authority has acted to block government laws it deems inappropriate.

The major political parties have spent little time developing intra-party democratic procedures. Traditional economic and religious interest groups have been routinely consulted on important measures, although organized labor has lost influence under recent governments.

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

#29

To what extent are citizens informed of public policies?

10
 9

Most citizens are well-informed of a broad range of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many citizens are well-informed of individual public policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few citizens are well-informed of public policies; most citizens have only a rudimental knowledge of public policies.
 2
 1

Most citizens are not aware of public policies.
Political Knowledge
5
A minority of Austrian citizens are well informed; the majority is politically informed only within rather narrow limits. On the one hand, this is because political parties (and the government) do not provide full information on decision-makers’ considerations and goals. On the other, it is due to the characteristics of the Austrian print media, with the yellow press (and its often very strong bias) dominating large parts of the print-media market. In particular, the information offered by tabloids, such as Heute, and distributed for free tends to be questionable and sometimes misleading. In line with international trends, social media propaganda also contributes to a lot of misinformation among certain strata of the population.

A majority of Austrians show moderate interest in politics, a characteristic possibly favored or reinforced by the limited opportunity for participation in the political process by direct democratic devices. As in other countries, social media reinforces the existing tendency toward fragmentation; information and communication “bubbles” exist through which politically aligned citizens strengthen the opinions of like-minded people. A specific problem is that there is no general civic education curriculum in the Austrian school system – and this deficit has an impact on the general level of political knowledge.

The nexus between institutionalized opportunities to participate, and the level of political interest and knowledge is underscored by a recent study that strongly suggests that interest in politics among young Austrians – who have been able to vote at the age of 16 since 2007 – has significantly increased. Other recent research suggests that even in the absence of more sophisticated political knowledge, young people living in Austria have a decent understanding of complex issues relating to immigration and immigration policies.

Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/AKT/SCHLTHEM/SCHLAG/J2017/185JugendstudieWorkshops.shtml

https://science.orf.at/stories/3207052/

On the role of social meadia:
https://www.diepresse.com/5797319/mehr-als-die-haelfte-nutzt-soziale-netzwerke-als-infoquelle

Does the government publish data and information in a way that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable?

10
 9

The government publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 8
 7
 6


The government most of the time publishes data and information in a comprehensive, timely and user-friendly way.
 5
 4
 3


The government publishes data in a limited and not timely or user-friendly way.
 2
 1

The government publishes (almost) no relevant data.
Open Government
6
The Austrian government is not a “closed shop” – access to government data (e.g., provided by the government’s websites) is possible and the opposition’s right to information concerning significant developments is not disputed. However, this does not amount to the high level of open government that may be expected considering the promises given by consecutive governments. The proposed freedom of information act remains stuck in parliament and it appears likely that it will stay there for the foreseeable future.

Recent governments have made an effort to facilitate the provision of scientific micro-data. In 2020, the AUSSDA (Austrian Social Science Data Archive) was awarded the Core Trust Seal and thus certified as a “trustworthy data repository.” AUSSDA is a data infrastructure for the social science community in Austria, originally established in 2016, which offers a variety of research support services, primarily data archiving and help with data reuse.

The passing of a freedom of information act failed in 2021 (as it did in 2017), even though this reform had been a declared top priority by the ÖVP-Green government (or more precisely the junior coalition partner, the Greens). This latter episode showcased the institutional complexity of the Austrian system of government and the state’s veto power more specifically. As the bill would have required a two-thirds majority in both the Nationalrat and the Bundesrat, the states – which opposed the reform mainly because of the expected tremendous administrative costs – were able to prevent the bill from becoming law.

Citations:
https://aussda.at/en

https://aussda.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_aussda/Documents/AUSSDA_project_report.pdf

https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000132182312/koalition-sagt-erstmals-wer-das-informationsfreiheitsgesetz-verhindert

Legislative Actors’ Resources

#13

Do members of parliament have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activity effectively?

10
 9

The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring all government activity effectively.
 8
 7
 6


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for monitoring a government’s major activities.
 5
 4
 3


The members of parliament as a group can draw on a set of resources suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
 2
 1

The resources provided to the members of parliament are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Parliamentary Resources
7
The two-chambered Austrian parliament, in which the National Council (Nationalrat) or lower house holds more power than the Federal Council (Bundesrat), is divided along two main cleavages. First, the strength of political party groups in parliament reflects the results of direct national elections (in the National Council) as well as indirect provincial elections (in the Federal Council). Second, the formation of coalitions creates a government and a parliamentary opposition.

All party groups that have at least five members in the National Council can use the infrastructure (office space, personnel) paid by public funds and provided by parliament. All party groups are represented on all committees, in proportion to their respective strength. In plenary sessions, speaking time is divided by special agreements among the parties, typically according to the strength of the various parliamentary party groups. Since 2014, the creation of a parliamentary investigation committee has been a minority right.

Individual members’ ability to use resources independently of their respective parliamentary party groups has improved in recent years. Members of parliament can now hire a small number of persons for a personal staff that is funded by parliament and not by the party, which has increased members’ independence. More recently, the Austrian Parliamentary Administration developed the EULE Media Monitor / 360°Topic-Monitoring system, which aims to help parliamentarians stay up to date by delivering information in an easy-to-access web-based form. However, this newly won independence is still circumscribed by the strong culture of party discipline, which is not defined by explicit rules but rather by the party leadership’s power to nominate committee members and electoral candidates.

Citations:
https://www.ipu.org/innovation-tracker/story/austria-uses-ai-keep-mps-informed

Are parliamentary committees able to ask for government documents?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may ask for most or all government documents; they are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are slightly limited; some important documents are not delivered or are delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to ask for government documents are considerably limited; most important documents are not delivered or delivered incomplete or arrive too late to enable the committee to react appropriately.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not request government documents.
Obtaining Documents
9
Currently, all parliamentary committees have the power to ask for any kind of document. However, documents deemed “secret” can only be viewed in a special parliamentary room and cannot be copied.

Significant portions in government documents obtained by newly formed investigative committees were redacted, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting privacy. This resulted in an uproar among members of parliament and demonstrated that committees are entitled to obtain documents, yet the government can create significant limitations in accessing parts of these documents.

The Austrian Constitutional Court has repeatedly strengthened the position of investigative committees relative to the government when it comes to obtaining documents and other data. For example, in early 2021, the Constitutional Court ruled that the minister of finance was obliged to provide the investigative committee investigating the “Ibiza affair” (which led to the fall of the ÖVP-FPÖ government in 2019) with access to the emails and other stored data of staff members of the federal Ministry of Finance.

Citations:
https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/VfGH_03.03.2021_UA_1_2021_Erkenntnis.pdf

Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Summoning Ministers
8
Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. When summoned, ministers (or their state secretaries) do attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is in practice limited by the majority that the governing parties have in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is little interest in summoning cabinet members, at least against the minister’s will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, the high level of party discipline in Austria is an additional influence.

In a parliament in which three opposition parties, as in the Nationalrat elected in 2019, governments generally tend to face greater criticism regarding their willingness to answer critical questions in parliament as extensively as possible.

The particular political importance of summoning ministers and the chancellor became clear in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz’s alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee became the source of a major judicial inquiry, which eventually led to Kurz’s resignation.

Are parliamentary committees able to summon experts for committee meetings?

10
 9

Parliamentary committees may summon experts.
 8
 7
 6


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


The rights of parliamentary committees to summon experts are considerably limited.
 2
 1

Parliamentary committees may not summon experts.
Summoning Experts
10
Parliamentary committees have no formal limits in terms of summoning experts. Every party, including the opposition (i.e., the committee’s minority parties), can nominate or invite experts it deems qualified. Expert hearings are held regularly and frequently. However, this opportunity is not always used in the best-possible way. The twin factors of party discipline and cabinet dominance over the parliament’s majority mean that independent expert voices do not ultimately have great influence.

The coronavirus pandemic gave rise to some spectacular incidents concerning experts reporting to the parliament. In 2021, a senior scientific expert was accused of lying about coronavirus-related facts by the FPÖ, which led to the abrupt termination of the hearing.

Citations:
https://www.diepresse.com/6034876/eklat-bei-expertenhearing-fpoe-bezichtigt-aerztekammer-praesident-der-luege

Are the task areas and structures of parliamentary committees suited to monitor ministries effectively?

10
 9

The match between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are well-suited to the effective monitoring of ministries.
 8
 7
 6


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are largely suited to the monitoring ministries.
 5
 4
 3


The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are partially suited to the monitoring of ministries.
 2
 1

The match/mismatch between the task areas of parliamentary committees and ministries as well as other relevant committee structures are not at all suited to the monitoring of ministries.
Task Area Congruence
9
Though parliamentary committees outnumber ministries, the task areas of parliamentary committees are more or less identical to the tasks of the ministries with only minor exceptions. The National Council’s General Committee enjoys a kind of overall competence, including deciding the government’s position within the European Council.

Media

#14

To what extent do media in your country analyze the rationale and impact of public policies?

10
 9

A clear majority of mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies.
 8
 7
 6


About one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. The rest produces a mix of infotainment and quality information content.
 5
 4
 3


A clear minority of mass media brands focuses on high-quality information content analyzing public policies. Several mass media brands produce superficial infotainment content only.
 2
 1

All mass media brands are dominated by superficial infotainment content.
Media Reporting
6
In Austria, about one-half of the mass media brands focus on high-quality information content, analyzing the rationale and impact of public policies. While the marked share of the country’s largest tabloid newspaper, Kronenzeitung, was down to less than 25% in 2021, two (free) tabloids, Heute and Österreich (the third and fourth largest Austrian newspapers), represent more than 15% of the combined market share. The latter two newspapers cannot be described as quality papers, as no serious analysis of policies is carried out and even some form of propaganda, not to say misinformation, is transported over these channels, as became clear during the investigation that ultimately led to the resignation of former chancellor Kurz. With a market share of 7.3%, the left-wing Standard is now the largest national quality paper. Generally, high-quality political information is available from several daily and weekly papers with more limited circulation, but these high-quality media face considerable financial difficulties.

The radio and television broadcast markets continue to be dominated by the publicly owned Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF), although competition by foreign and privately owned media is growing. In response to criticism of this dominance, the ORF offers guarantees of internal independence and internal political pluralism. The ORF is impartial by law and fulfills its mandate reasonably well, making up for deficits existing elsewhere in the media environment. That said, the election of a new director-general of the ORF in 2021 was widely seen as an open political maneuver, in which the ÖVP as the country’s current dominant governing party used its political clout to install its candidate. This episode apart, there was widespread concern that the coronavirus pandemic posed a serious threat to critical journalism.

Citations:
https://www.leadersnet.at/news/53507,media-analyse-2021-42-millionen-leserinnen-bleiben-der.html

https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000128851631/pressestimmen-nach-orf-wahl-ein-sorgsam-durchkalkulierter-deal

https://politische-akademie.at/userfiles/files/downloads/FFI_Report_112020.pdf

Parties and Interest Associations

#26

How inclusive and open are the major parties in their internal decision-making processes?

10
 9

The party allows all party members and supporters to participate in its decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and agendas of issues are open.
 8
 7
 6


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, all party members have the opportunity to participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are rather open.
 5
 4
 3


The party restricts decision-making to party members. In most cases, a number of elected delegates participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are largely controlled by the party leadership.
 2
 1

A number of party leaders participate in decisions on the most important personnel and issues. Lists of candidates and issue agendas are fully controlled and drafted by the party leadership.
Intra-party Decision-Making
4
The Austrian party system is going through a process of deconcentration. The traditionally dominant parties – the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) and the conservative, Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) – have experienced an almost uninterrupted decline since 1980. Winning 37.5% and 21.2% of the total vote in the 2019 national election, they are however still the country’s two largest parties. At the national level, the FPÖ has been the second largest party (rather than the largest) during only one government term, back in 1999.

In general, the major parties have spent little time developing intra-party democracy and have focused instead on appealing to specific groups, whose support is considered necessary to win elections. In preparation for the 2017 general elections, the ÖVP changed its traditional procedure for nominating candidates. The party transferred total authority for the nomination process to one person, the party’s candidate for the Chancellor’s Office, Sebastian Kurz. This did not change for the 2019 elections, with the ÖVP remaining the party of Sebastian Kurz. This development must be seen as a significant decline in intra-party democracy and carries some similarities to what is currently happening to the U.S. Republican Party under the influence of former president Trump.

In contrast to the ÖVP, the other parties have largely followed their traditional procedures, ensuring that the different intra-party interests continue to be represented. However, after losing its primary position in parliament and now in opposition, the SPÖ has started to reform its internal decision-making procedures, which will give party members a stronger role. This was first exemplified in the decision about the new mayor of Vienna, Michael Ludwig. The SPÖ’s new national party leader, Pamela Rendi-Wagner, was initially chosen by the traditional process in 2018. However, in 2020, she was confirmed by a party member vote in which more than 41% of party members participated, with 71.4% backing Rendi-Wagner.

To what extent are economic interest associations (e.g., employers, industry, labor) capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Employers & Unions)
7
The role of economic interest groups is still very strong in Austria: Significant associations include the Austrian Economic Chambers (Wirtschaftskammern) and the Federation of Austrian Industry (Die Industriellenvereinigung) for business and employers; the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) and the Austrian Federal Chamber of Labor (Arbeiterkammern) for employees; and the Chamber of Agriculture (Landwirtschaftskammern) for farmers. In many cases, interest groups continue to formulate (almost) complete laws by themselves, which parliament subsequently only needs to approve. These groups’ ability to shape politics may have been reduced as a result of Austria’s integration into the European Union, but – in domestic politics – their influence remains strong. Though formally independent of political parties, the groups have various individual links to the parties, especially to the Social Democratic Party and the Austrian People’s Party. Moreover, their influence is enhanced by their practice of acting in a coordinated, neo-corporatist way through the social-partnership network.

This has changed to some extent in recent years. The SPÖ’s closest allies have lost ground after the party’s fall from power in 2017. The formation of a new coalition government between the ÖVP and the Greens early in 2020 continued the post-2017 policies. In fact, the ÖVP-Green government was the first national government that did not include any minister representing the government’s social partners (Sozialpartner).

Citations:
https://www.addendum.org/politometer/eine-regierung-ohne-sozialpartner/#:~:text=Eine%20Regierung%20ohne%20Sozialpartner%20%2D%20Addendum&text=Die%20t%C3%BCrkis%2Dgr%C3%BCne%20Koalition%20ist,Minister%20oder%20Staatssekret%C3%A4r%20vertreten%20ist.&text=hatte%20zuvor%20eine%20Funktion%20in%20einer%20der%20sozialpartnerschaftlichen%20Organisationen.

To what extent are non-economic interest associations capable of formulating relevant policies?

10
 9

Most interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 8
 7
 6


Many interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 5
 4
 3


Few interest associations are highly capable of formulating relevant policies.
 2
 1

Most interest associations are not capable of formulating relevant policies.
Association Competence (Others)
6
Alongside economic interest groups, organized religious communities, particularly the officially recognized denominations, have a formalized role within the decision-making process. The peculiar Austrian institution of “officially recognized religious denomination” institutionalizes the participation of major religious groups within policymaking. Like the economic interest groups, they are – often, though not always- consulted before the cabinet approves the draft of a law. This is a critical stage of the process, as most cabinet-approved drafts are also approved by parliament.

A number of other groups occasionally exert notable influence, including the physicians’ chamber, various environmental groups (e.g., Greenpeace) and some human rights organizations (e.g., Amnesty International).

It must be emphasized, however, that not all draft proposals are subject to consultation procedures. A ruling majority can push through a legislative agenda, without formal consultation with interest groups. This happens from time to time, particularly when the government is in a hurry to pass a bill.

The capability of noneconomic groups to formulate policies is, overall, considerably more limited than that of economic interest groups, particularly professional associations.

Independent Supervisory Bodies

#5

Does there exist an independent and effective audit office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent audit office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an independent and effective audit office.
Audit Office
10
The Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof) is an instrument of parliament. Its president is elected by parliament for a period of 12 years, without the possibility of re-election, which gives the president a certain degree of independence.

The Court of Audit reports regularly to parliament and parliament can order it to perform specific tasks. Consequently, the parliamentary majority determines how to handle audit reports and, in cases of doubt, the majority backs the cabinet. Thus, the main vehicle to force the government to react in a positive way to audit reports is public opinion. The Court of Audit enjoys an impeccable public reputation, which affords it a powerful role in constitutional practice.

One problem is the insufficient funding of the Court of Audit, while, at the same time, an increasing number of tasks are delegated to the court by the governing majority. There are also areas in which the court cannot make inquiries. It may be seen as a compliment that, in 2019, the majority in parliament denied the Court of Audit direct access to party finances, to which the court reacted in 2021 by providing its own suggestions for a reform of the party finance law. The court also criticized the government’s “chaotic” handling of its coronavirus policies, which had undermined public trust and limited the effectiveness of some measures.

Citations:
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2121209-Rechnungshof-Corona-Politik-chaotisch-und-unuebersichtlich.html

https://www.rechnungshof.gv.at/rh/home/news/news/news_2/Rechnungshof_legt_Vorschlag_fuer_ein_wirksameres_Parteien.html#

Does there exist an independent and effective ombuds office?

10
 9

There exists an effective and independent ombuds office.
 8
 7
 6


There exists an effective and independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


There exists an independent ombuds office, but its advocacy role is considerably limited.
 2
 1

There does not exist an effective and independent ombuds office.
Ombuds Office
9
The Austrian Ombudsman Board (Volksanwaltschaft) is a parliamentary instrument and reports regularly to the legislature. It consists of three chairpersons that are elected for six years. The three largest party groups in parliament nominate one chairperson each. Parliament is required by law to select the nominees. Ombudspersons are typically very experienced as politicians at the local or regional level and even more so at the national level, and previously active in party-related associations or organizations before joining the Austrian Ombudsman Board (AOB). Qualitative interviews with case-handling staff demonstrated that despite the institution’s public efforts, and many interviewees’ reassurances that the AOB is independent and acts accordingly, there are several areas in which party-related positions become visible in the AOB’s work. While the AOB has wide-ranging competences, it recently called for an extension of its responsibilities to include public sector organizations.

Citations:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Juraj-Nemec/publication/347826593_Public_Policy_during_COVID-19_Challenges_for_Public_Administration_and_Policy_Research_in_Central_and_Eastern_Europe/links/5feb3cc745851553a004c45e/Public-Policy-during-COVID-19-Challenges-for-Public-Administration-and-Policy-Research-in-Central-and-Eastern-Europe.pdf#page=183

https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/JAHR_2020/PK0576/

Is there an independent authority in place that effectively holds government offices accountable for handling issues of data protection and privacy?

10
 9

An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
 8
 7
 6


An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is slightly limited.
 5
 4
 3


A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are strongly limited.
 2
 1

There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data Protection Authority
9
Since 2013, the Austrian Data Protection Authority (ADPA) has existed, which replaced the former Data Protection Committee. In 2018, the ADPA was restructured and, since then, its staff has been continuously increased. The office is headed by a chairperson appointed by the Data Protection Council. The office and its chairperson are not dependent on the government – they are not obliged to follow any specific government directive. The independence of the office has never seriously been questioned. In recent years, there were several occasions on which the ADPA demonstrated its willingness to block planned government laws if deemed inappropriate, such as its veto against the use of algorithms by public authorities when dealing with job-seekers in 2020.

Citations:
https://www.data-protection-authority.gv.at/

https://orf.at/stories/3178244/
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