Legislative Actors’ Resources


Are parliamentary committees able to summon ministers for hearings?

Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. Ministers regularly follow invitations and are obliged to answer questions.
Committees have the legal right to summon ministers to appear before committee inquiries, but in practice compulsion to appear is uncommon. Under the principle of comity, a house of parliament does not seek to compel the attendance of members of that house or another house. It is common, however, for members, including ministers, to appear by invitation or by request before committees, to assist with committee inquiries.
Ministers are regularly summoned to parliamentary committees. The rights of committees do not appear to be restricted. This is reinforced by the fact that most parliamentary members (majority and opposition alike) have little chance of seeing their own proposals pass in parliament. Therefore, they concentrate much of their time on written questions (which must be answered by the minister in charge), which can improve a member’s media visibility. However, when the media attention on a topic is intense, one frequently sees important ministers replaced by (less important) state secretaries during questioning.
Ministers and the top personnel of major state institutions are obliged to attend committee meetings and answer questions when asked. According to the rules, ministers are also required to present draft bills to appropriate committees. If the ministers send officials below the rank of deputy minister, committees may, and often do, refuse to discuss a legislative proposal. If the Chamber of Deputies believes that there has been serious misconduct and a minister’s explanation is regarded as insufficient, it may establish a parliamentary inquiry committee.
Committees regularly summon ministers for meetings, called consultations (samråd). These meetings are key elements of how the Danish parliamentary system works. Consultations play an important role in the legislative process for members of parliament. At the same time, the meetings are where the parliament exercises control over the government.
Henrik Zahle, Dansk forfatningsret 1: Institutioner og Regulering, 2005.

Henrik Zahle, Dansk forfatningsret 2: Regering, forvaltning og dom, 2004.
Permanent committees have the right to request participation of ministers in committee meetings in order to obtain information. However, no information on how regularly committees use this ability is available.

In addition, members of parliament can individually forward written questions and interpellations to the ministers. These must be answered publicly at one of the national parliament’s plenary sessions within 20 days.
Committees are able to summon ministers to hearings and do so regularly. Committee meetings usually begin with a presentation by a ministry representative. Ministers can take part in committee meetings and debates but cannot be regular members of the committee. Furthermore, when deemed necessary, committees invite the Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman or their representatives to a formal hearing as experts on questions of legislative drafting.
Parliamentary committees’ right to summon ministers is established by the Basic Law. Ministers (or their state secretaries) typically attend meetings to which they have been invited. The Basic Law also gives members of the federal government or the Bundesrat the right to be heard in front of the plenum or any committee.
Members of parliament have the right to pose questions to ministers and summon them to answer questions before parliament. At least five signatories are required for such a request. Ministers generally comply with parliamentary requests.

Parliamentary committees have the right to request information from ministries as well as to summon ministers to committee meetings.
Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions (with the exception of court judges). Invited people, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, typically answer questions posed by the members of the parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice-ministers or other authorized civil servants can serve as substitutes for ministers. However, rather than being used as a forward-looking mechanism, this instrument of parliamentary control is often restricted to the explanation of government activities on an ex post basis.
Parliamentary committees may summon ministers for appearances. Ministers regularly respond to invitations and answer questions. In addition, there is a weekly session in parliament where legislators can ask questions directly to the ministers. If a minister is found to have misinformed parliament, he or she cannot expect to continue as a minister for long. Parliament is also increasingly exercising its right to call various hearings.
The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in the Rules of Procedure of the Slovenian parliament. Ministers regularly follow invitations; if they are unable to attend in person, they can also authorize state secretaries to represent them. Ministers are also obliged to answer questions from members of parliament, either in oral or written form, and this obligation is largely respected in practice. Moreover, the prime minister must personally answer four questions from members of parliament in every parliamentary session. In 2018, members of parliament submitted a total of 432 questions to the government generally or to individual ministers specifically (977 less than in 2017), with 88.7% of questions submitted by opposition parties. None of the questions remained unanswered.
National Assembly (2019): Report on the Work of the National Assembly in 2018. Ljubljana (https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_obdobju_2018_%E2%80%93_2022__prvo_leto_mandata_2018__22__6__2018_%E2%80%93_31__12__2018.pdf).
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests, and answer the committees’ questions.
In August 2005, a constitutional reform (Law No. 20,050) established the process of ministerial interpellation. Committees in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have the right to summon ministers for questioning about matters concerning their area. The ministers are obliged to attend. This political instrument has been used on various occasions. The effectiveness of this instrument of congressional oversight depends on the quality and quantity of information accessible to the National Congress through other channels.
Ministers are regularly summoned to committees but they are obliged to appear in front of a committee only if two-fifths of the committee members require them to do so. There are a few restrictions with regard to information given to the committees by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former may restrict his or her comments only to armaments supplies, while the latter is not obliged to give information on any ongoing negotiations or talks in which Greece still participates.

Owing to the ongoing economic stagnation in Greece and tensions with neighboring countries, ministers are frequently summoned to parliament and engage in intense debates with the opposition. As might be expected in a polarized party system, debates sometimes create a spectacle rather than providing a setting for the exchange rational arguments (especially when they are televised).
The summoning of ministers is regulated by article 41A of the Standing Orders of the Greek parliament.
Parliamentary committees can legally summon ministers for hearings, but seldom do so. The foreign minister is summoned and usually attends meetings of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The relative representation of each party across and within parliamentary committees reflects the relative representation of each party in parliament.

The Special Investigation Committee, appointed by the parliament in December 2008 to investigate the processes that led to the collapse of Iceland’s three main banks, summoned several ministers and ex-ministers during 2009 and 2010.

The most notable example of a prominent politician being held accountable was the 2010 indictment of Prime Minister Geir Haarde by parliament, which led to a trial in 2012 before the High Court of Impeachment. Haarde was found guilty on one count of negligence relating to his tenure as prime minister before the 2008 economic collapse. He was found guilty of neglecting to hold cabinet meetings, during the first months of 2008, on important issues relating to the economic collapse. This obligation is stated in paragraph 17 of the constitution. As a first-time offender, Haarde was not given a custodial sentence. He was Iceland’s ambassador to the United States until 2019, when he was appointed executive director representing Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden to the World Bank Group, a role in which he sits on the group’s board of executive directors.
World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/g/geir-hilmar-haarde
Committees may request the attendance of the prime minister, ministers and lower-ranking top ministry personnel such as senior vice-ministers.
Interaction between the executive and the parliament is generally straightforward. Any member of parliament can introduce a parliamentary question (written or oral). Questions are addressed to the parliamentary president. Within one month, the responsible minister(s) must respond and deliver detailed information about relevant policy decisions and departmental activities. Questions and answers are fully published on the Chamber of Deputies’ website. On Tuesdays, when the parliament convenes, there may be a lively question and answer session, covering a broad range of relevant issues posted by opposition parties.
Schroen, Michael (2008): Parlament, Regierung und Gesetzgebung, in: Wolfgang H. Lorig/Mario Hirsch (eds.), Das politische System Luxemburgs. Springer VS, Wiesbaden, pp. 106-129.
Under Article 93 of the constitution, parliamentary committees have the right to summon ministers, which happens quite a lot in practice.

Regarding the resources of legislators to monitor the government, it is worth noting that – through legislative committees – they can (and frequently do) conduct hearings where they summon ministers as well as other public officials, who have an obligation to attend. It is often the case that hearings are held right after Annual Presidential Reports to go over evidence and documents supporting the president’s claims on their respective offices (similar to the State of the Union Address in the United States). While these resources are relevant and useful for monitoring, they very rarely have meaningful consequences for public officials (positive or negative).
Ministers must be heard at least four times per legislative session in their corresponding committee. Additionally, committees can request ministers to be present for additional hearings. A committee request requires interparty consensus. However, each parliamentary group may also unilaterally request ministerial hearings. These vary from one to five per session, depending on the size of the parliamentary group. Ministers accede to requests for their attendance at hearings.
According to Article 54(1) of the Chamber of Deputies Regulations, ministers are permitted to attend committee meetings, and “if their attendance has been requested, their presence in the meeting shall be mandatory.” Furthermore, ministers are requested to present a work report and strategy of their ministry before committees once per session. Sometimes ministers send deputies who are not always able to respond to queries raised by parliamentarians. Notably, the frequency with which ministers attend committee meetings is not documented.
South Korea
The parliament has the constitutional right to summon ministers to appear before parliamentary hearings, and indeed frequently exercises this right. Regular investigation of government affairs by parliament is an effective means of monitoring ministers. Almost every minister has been summoned to answer parliamentarians’ questions in the context of a National Assembly inspection. However, the role of the minister in the South Korean system is relatively weak, with the professional bureaucracy trained to be loyal to the president. In addition, the ruling party and ministers can agree not to invite ministers or to cancel hearings on politically controversial issues. In many cases, opposition parties summon irrelevant ministers simply as a means of furthering political confrontation with the president.
Parliamentary committees summon ministers who appear and respond to questions. This is most frequently the case with the annual review conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Matters, but has been used by other committees, too. Except for very few cases, summoned ministers will appear in parliamentary committees. A few years ago, there was extensive media attention on a couple of instances when former cabinet ministers declined to appear before a parliamentary committee.

The hearings occur regularly and are often broadcasted by public service television. The results of the hearings are published and accessible to everyone.
Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer questions. Outright refusal to answer such a request occurs only rarely. Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer the questions in a forthright manner. Every week, parliamentarians have the opportunity to summon ministers and pose a seemingly unlimited number of questions. Recently, the minister for public health canceled international commitments in favor of dealing with parliamentary issues concerning the bankruptcy of two local hospitals.
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke: 174-182.

NOS, Minister Bruins wil vinger in de pap bij keuze overnamekandidaat ziekenhuis Lelystad, 2 November 2018
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are slightly limited; ministers occasionally refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
Parliamentary committees may summon ministers. When summoned, ministers (or their state secretaries) do attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is in practice limited by the majority that the government parties have in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is little interest in summoning cabinet members, at least against the minister’s will.

While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, the high level of party discipline in Austria creates an additional influence. Under the ÖVP-FPÖ government (2017 – 2019), members of the parliamentary opposition accused cabinet members of failing to answer in detail (written or verbal) questions asked by the opposition. In a parliament in which three opposition parties compete to be the most effective opposition, as will likely be the case following the 2019 elections, future governments will face greater criticism regarding their willingness to answer critical questions in parliament as extensively as possible.
Ministers are normally expected to appear before parliamentary committees, but are not legally required to do so, and sometimes decline for various reasons. In recent years, ministers have begun to send their deputy ministers to appear before parliamentary committees.

Ministers are of course questioned and held accountable in the House of Commons.
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences.
The powers and scope of Oireachtas committees of inquiry are set out in the Houses of the Oireachtas (Inquiries, Privileges and Procedures) Act 2013, which was signed into law in July 2013. The act provides for Oireachtas inquiries, consistent with the Supreme Court’s judgment on the scope of such inquiries. The scope of legitimate parliamentary inquiries that can now be carried out is broad. The legislation expands the scope of evidence that civil servants may give, thus enabling committees to develop a full narrative of events for the purpose of establishing facts.

Cabinet ministers regularly attend committees and assist them with their work. Oireachtas (parliamentary) committees play an increasingly important role in parliamentary business. They can receive submissions and hear evidence from interested groups, discuss and draft legislative proposals, publish minutes of evidence and related documents, and demand the attendance of government ministers.
For a discussion of how a constitutional provision for cabinet confidentiality might impinge on the work of the Banking Inquiry, see the July 2014 post by Dr. Conor O’Mahony on the
Constitution Project @ UCC website:
“Cabinet Confidentiality and the Banking Inquiry”
However, the committee’s work was not unduly hampered by these considerations.
For the Supreme Court judgment on the powers of Oirechtas Inquiries see
Article 143 of the Chamber of Deputies’ rules of procedure enables parliamentary committees to summon ministers for hearings. Similar rules apply for the Senate. Summoning ministers is a regular practice, and ministers normally comply with such requests. During the first Conte government, Interior Minister Salvini was asked by parliament to explain a case in which one of his close collaborators was involved in obscure Russia-related financial dealings for the purpose of obtaining financial help for the Northern League. Salvini refused to clarify this issue in front of parliament.
New Zealand
It is common practice that ministers follow invitations to visit select committee meetings, but occasionally they refuse to do so. This follows a guideline that committees can request, but not require, that a minister appear before them. Only the House of Representatives itself can compel members to attend a committee if they do not do so voluntarily.
Officials and Select Committees – Guidelines (Wellington: States Services Commission 2007).
Ministers and heads of the supreme organs of state administration (or their representatives) are obliged to take part in committee meetings whenever issues are discussed that fall within their domain. Groups comprising at least 15 members of parliament and parliamentary party groups have the right to ask for up-to-date information from members of the government. The Sejm then issues opinions, desiderata and suggestions on these reports. The comments are not legally binding, but in a worst case scenario may lead to a vote of no confidence against a minister, and even to his or her dismissal. In the period under review, the parliamentary opposition undertook several attempts to vote the prime minister and individual ministers out of office. All of them failed because of the government’s absolute majority. The PiS government has taken the summoning of ministers less seriously than previous governments.
According to article 110 of the constitution, the committees of both the Congress of Deputies and the Senate “may summon members of the government” to ask them questions. At least 70 deputies or one-fifth of the members of a committee need to make the request. The request is subject to a vote in the Bureau of Congress and the Board of Spokespersons. The party supporting the government may try to reject some of the requirements made by the opposition, but after 2016, minority governments have been in a weak parliamentary position, rendering this veto much more difficult to sustain. If the initiatives are approved, ministers are obliged to answer questions raised in these sessions. Ministers are regularly summoned by the committees overseeing their policy areas (see “Task Area Congruence”) and it is quite common for ministers themselves to request to be allowed to report on matters relating to their respective departments.

During the 2015 – 2016 caretaker government of Mariano Rajoy, the government repeatedly refused to submit to the control of the Congress of Deputies alleging that there was a lack of trust between both powers under the limitations of a caretaker government and, therefore, that control of legislative power over the executive was weak. In November 2018, the High Court ruled that the control function is implicit in the representative character and in the form of parliamentary government. Consequently, the parliament must also exercise the control function under a caretaker government. Notwithstanding this ruling, the presence of ministers in the parliament was again limited in 2019 under a new caretaker government.
El Constitucional concluye que el Gobierno en funciones de Rajoy tenía que haberse sometido al control parlamentario.” RTVE.es (in Spanish).

Press, Europa (22 November 2018). “El Pleno del TC respalda que el Gobierno en funciones del PP podía ser controlado por el Parlamento.”
Ministers can be summoned to parliamentary committee hearings, but they cannot be forced to attend, because ministers have to be members of parliament or members of the House of Lords, and members of parliament cannot be forced to attend any meeting. However, the Osmotherly Rules recommend that ministers accept invitations to a hearing as an act of respectful courtesy, and thus ministers will usually accept an invitation to a hearing in a select committee. It would be headline news and damaging to the minister in question if they refused to appear before a committee on anything remotely controversial, although the answers given to committees can be bland. Ministerial questions in plenary sessions of parliament complement the work of committees and can be quite sharp in tone. The prime minister and key aides traditionally refuse to appear before select committees, but have appeared before the Liaison Committee, which is composed of the chairs of all the other committees.
Legally, parliamentary committees have the power to summon ministers and the prime minister, and under the Rules of Organization and Procedure of the Bulgarian parliament, these executive-branch figures are obliged to comply. When a minister or the prime minister is asked a parliamentary question, he or she has to respond in person in the National Assembly in due time. There is no penalty for non-compliance except the possible loss of reputation and political image. Members of the executive most often comply with summons from the parliament, but can afford to ignore such summons indefinitely.
Parliamentary committees can and do summon ministers for hearings. However, these hearings are not always taken seriously by ministers.
Parliamentary committees are able to summon ministers. According to the basic law’s provisions on the Knesset, every committee may require a minister to appear before it, and the minister is obliged either to attend the meeting or send a representative to provide the required information. Officials invited by committees generally attend meetings as requested. However, ministers and other public figures do occasionally refuse requests or provide insufficient information, causing conflicts between the Knesset and the government. Committees have no real power to enforce sanctions in these cases. Moreover, they are not authorized to force a minister to provide information at a set date in order to better prepare for a meeting. This is part of the motivation behind the recent reform proposed by several Knesset members. The reform proposal would enhance the Knesset committees’ role in overseeing their corresponding ministries, expand their roles in approving ministry budgets, and give them greater power to summon civil service appointees to public hearings.

One exception to the rule detailed above is the Knesset’s State Audit Committee. Since 1990, the audit committee is able to warrant the attendance of officials, and fine officials who failed to show up to the committee or sufficiently justify their lack of compliance (though the size of the fine is not specified).
Ataeli, Amichai, “The Evasion and its Punishment,” Yedioth Aharonot, 07.07.2016, http://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4825644,00.html (Hebrew)

Lis, Jonathan, “Instead of an investigation committee, a decoration committee: In the Knesset they are jealous of American congress,” Haaretz 7.9.2014: http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/.premium-1.2426295 (Hebrew)

Plesner, Yohanan, “There is Still Hope for Knesset Reform,” IDI Website, 10.8.2017, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/18582

“The Legislature’s Authority to Inquire Information, and the Obligation to Provide True Information,” Knesset Research and Information Center (December 2002). (Hebrew)
A parliamentary committee may call any minister unless precluded from doing so by a vote within the committee. In 2012, the house speaker ruled that committees have the authority to devise their own rules and approved this method. However, since 2013, ministers have freely appeared before various committees to provide explanations or answer questions.
The right of parliamentary committees to summon ministers is enshrined in Article 85 of the Slovak constitution. In practice, committees make relatively little use of this right, as the majority of committee members are members of parliament belonging to a government coalition party and often block such proposals.
The standing orders of the Hungarian parliament stipulate that ministers have to report personally to the parliamentary committee(s) concerned with their issue area at least once a year. However, they do not guarantee parliamentary committees the right to summon ministers for other hearings as well. Moreover, ministerial hearings suffer from heavy time restrictions, with individual members of parliament having only two minutes to speak.
The rights of parliamentary committees to summon ministers are considerably limited; ministers frequently refuse to follow invitations or to answer questions.
The constitution (Art. 79) stipulates that the president “may address” or “transmit his views” to the House of Representatives or a committee “through the ministers.” Moreover, ministers “may follow the proceedings, […] make a statement to, or inform” the House or a committee on issues within their sphere of responsibility. Thus, constitutionally, the parliament has no power to summon executive officials despite a law passed by the parliament to make attendance mandatory. In practice, there have been cases where ministers and other officials that were invited failed or declined to appear themselves or be represented. No attempt has ever been made to activate the law penalizing failures to appear. Thus, since attendance ultimately lies with the discretion of the executive, ministers feel comfortable ignoring invitations when the subject is related to a contentious matter or for other reasons.
1. The Constitution of Cyprus, http://www.parliament.cy/easyconsole.cfm/page/download/filename/SYNTAGMA_EN.pdf/foldername/articleFile/mime/pdf/
Executive officials do not appear on the House or Senate floor. However, department secretaries and other high-level officials of the executive branch appear with great frequency and regularity, essentially on request, before legislative committees and subcommittees. In the context of an investigation, committees sometimes subpoena executive branch members to make an appearance. Most appearances are voluntary, however, motivated by the desire to maintain strong relationships with the congressional committee. The resulting burdens on high-level executives become considerable, with congressional appearances and the required preparation taking up a significant share of executives’ time. Congress uses testimony from executive officials both in evaluating proposals for new legislation and in “oversight,” that is, in reviewing and evaluating the administration’s performance.

As with respect to documents, the Trump administration in 2019 has maintained an unprecedented, blanket refusal to allow executive branch officials to testify before House committees investigating presidential misconduct. As of 2019, there are numerous lawsuits underway, but the House also – recognizing the unprecedented, sweeping character of the administration’s positions, and their incompatibility with the basic design of the constitutional system – has approved an article of impeachment alleging the obstruction of Congress.
Ministers can attend committee meetings as a representative of the government without invitation, and may talk on the subject matter at hand (Rules of Procedure, Article 29, 30 and 31). However, ministers may also delegate a senior civil servant to be his or her representative at a committee meeting. If relevant, the committee may ask a minister to explain a government position, but he or she is not required to comply with this invitation if there is no legal obligation (Article 62). While parliamentary committees are not able to summon ministers for hearings, the responsible minister may voluntarily decide to participate in a meeting. Normally, the committees are briefed by high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats. In the new presidential system, the ministers will always be present at the Planning and Budget Committee when the previous year’s final accounts and following year’s draft budget are discussed. They also attend the budgetary debates in the plenary.

During the review period, the effects of the state of emergency, corruption scandals, mayoral resignations, economic instability and regional affairs (e.g., Turkey’s involvement in the war in Syria, the massive movement of refugees from neighboring countries into Turkey, and Kurdish developments in and outside of Turkey) were highly visible. None of the government’s senior executives took responsibility for or allowed for an independent parliamentary investigation into these issues. Instead, the government – including the president as both head of the executive and chairman of the governing party – demonstrated a lack of accountability vis-à-vis parliament.
Rules of Procedure of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/ictuzuk.pdf (accessed 1 November 2018)
TBMM Faaliyet Raporu, 26. Dönem, 1, 2 ve 3. Yasama Yılı, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/komisyon/insanhaklari/faaliyet_raporlari_26.htm (accessed 1 November 2018)
Parliamentary committees may not summon ministers.
Back to Top